Urban Ops

Operation Tapeworm: TF Battle Force Helps Take Down Uday and Qusay Hussein (Page 28)

PEOPLE: A Tool for Civil Consideration (Page 33)
INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail rowanm@benning.army.mil. Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The face of war has evolved since man took up arms to defend his home and family, his possessions, and his way of life. Cities have been the battlegrounds as armies have sought to defend on familiar, complex terrain and adversaries have fought to dislodge them. Until the turn of the last century, large-scale combat in urban areas was the exception rather than the rule because the tactics of the time relied on open terrain in which leaders could observe and maneuver their forces. Today, the face of war is in many ways the city streets. The terrorist is in urban areas, and we are going after him in cities, towns, and villages.

World War I saw heavy fighting in built-up areas across France and Flanders, and World War II included heavy fighting in cities and towns in the Far East; in the Pacific Theater; and in Europe from France and the Low Countries, across Germany, in Italy, and deep within the Soviet Union. It was in the block-by-block, building-by-building fight that the Infantry sustained its heaviest losses. U.S. Soldiers and Marines have fought the urban fight in Korea, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Grenada, in Iraq and in Afghanistan, steadily adding lessons learned to our growing knowledge of the many ways to operate in built-up areas. Today’s urban operations can range from room clearing combat to securing polling places and seating a local government. They are three-dimensional and encompass many nontraditional drills, tasks, and missions.

Today we are a nation at war, and the theme of this issue of Infantry is urban operations. We have selected articles that specifically address both combat and noncombat issues relevant to urban operations and which offer experience from leaders who have operated in the urban environment and who understand its complexity and the training necessary to win. Today’s tactical urban fight is one of squad and platoon actions as we relentlessly search for terrorists, their logistical support, and their weapons, and our Soldiers live, breathe, and work every day in the urban setting.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is absolutely critical in the contemporary operating environment. Our enemy has chosen to intimidate, and citizens are providing even more invaluable HUMINT to our forces. They are warning of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and planned insurgent attacks and, with their help, we are capturing terrorists and their weapons, explosives, and logistical assets. HUMINT was also essential to the operation in which Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed in Mosul in July 2003. Detailed terrain knowledge and reconnaissance played a key role in the mission as well, underscoring the relevance of the METT-TC that we teach daily at the Infantry School.

Urban operations today include all aspects that involve the population: environmental considerations, the historical context in which the population views our presence, public information programs, planning and execution of population movements, and response to natural disasters. Operations such as those we are now conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq demand language skills, detailed knowledge of the terrain, knowledge of the enemy and how he fights, and some understanding of the historical context of the region and its peoples. We are applying a model for cultural analysis that includes population perceptions, ethnic dynamics, organizations of influence, patterns, leaders and influencers, and the economic environment as a means to assess the local civilian considerations (the C in METT-TC) and how they impact military operations. Environmental considerations as part of military decision making are receiving attention, and are relevant to our efforts to assist host nation civilian agencies as we rebuild the infrastructure of recently liberated nations.

Urban operations are the bread and butter of the Infantry today. The challenge is great and demands the best Soldiers, training, and equipment this nation can muster. Our junior infantry leaders and Soldiers — the point of the spear in urban combat — are meeting that challenge daily, and we are responding to a tough enemy by deploying even tougher American Soldiers to defeat him. Fort Benning is meeting the demands of the global war on terrorism with the most valuable commodity we can offer: skilled, aggressive infantrymen trained to standard. We are training for the present fight even as we look ahead to the future.

Follow me!
INFANTRY LETTERS

Communicative Skills Instructors
Deserve Recognition

I would like to thank your magazine for the excellent and timely articles from the War on Terror. Deployed Soldiers are learning and developing doctrine on how to fight our enemies, and Infantry Magazine does a superb job of capturing those lessons learned and communicating them to its many readers.

Most of the authors of those articles are graduates of the Advanced NCO Course, Officer Candidate School, the Infantry Officer Basic Course, or the Infantry Captains Career Course, where they have received instruction in effective reading, writing, listening, and speaking skills from the Communicative Skills instructors, Judy Sasser and Joan Horton. Judy Sasser retired in October after 20 years as a USAIS instructor and was recognized for her contribution to the communicative skills of the more than 100,000 officers and NCOs who have gone forth from Fort Benning to join units around the world during her tenure.

The Communicative Skills Branch team has also edited more than 100 tactical analysis submissions to the Donovan Library that USAIS students and historians will use for decades to come. On behalf of all students whom Mrs. Sasser has taught, the students of ICCC 04-05 presented her with a plaque of appreciation in December for lasting contributions to the professional development of the Infantry Team.

— Lieutenant Colonel Steven D. Russell
Chief of Tactics, USAIS

Editor’s Note

The Communicative Skills program at the Infantry School stands as the best remaining example of a program first begun as an initiative of General W.R. Richardson in 1985, during his tenure as Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command. Recognizing that the reading, writing, speaking, and listening skills of many junior officers and NCOs did not meet the needs of today’s Army, GEN Richardson directed that each of the branch service schools establish a Communicative Skills Division to teach the Army standard. The ladies recognized in LTC Russell’s letter were part of that original instructional group, and hence are part of the history of the United States Army Infantry School.

ALL-ARMY SMALL ARMS
CHAMPIONSHIPS SET

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit will host the 2006 Army Rifle and Pistol Championships in conjunction with the U.S. Army Infantry Center from March 3-11. The U.S. Army Long-Range Championships will be held March 12-14. Training and competitions are open to all Soldiers of all Army components, of any rank, with or without military occupational specialty, including West Point and college ROTC cadets.

“The All-Army is an advanced combat marksmanship training event and competition,” said Lieutenant Colonel David J. Liwanag, USAMU’s commander.

All Soldiers will fire both the M-16 rifle and M-9 pistol in helmet and load-bearing equipment (body armor optional) from 25 to 500 yards with the M-16 and 7 to 25 yards with the M-9. Teams from battalion-level compete for unit recognition and team awards. All Soldiers will receive advanced marksmanship instruction and training materials to conduct train-the-trainer clinics on return to their home station. The U.S. Army Long-Range Championships will provide M-14 and M-24 long-range shooting training from 600 to 1,000 yards.

Soldiers will compete in separate Novice, Open and Pro classes based on their competition experience. The USAMU has a limited number of weapons available for Soldiers and cadets without assigned weapons.

“This is an excellent vehicle for those Soldiers and units reorganized into brigade combat teams and reconnaissance battalions who do not hold MOS 11 (Infantry) or 18 (Special Forces) and cannot attend the U.S. Army Sniper School,” Liwanag said.

At the matches, coaches and NCOICs of the U.S. Army Rifle and Pistol Teams, Army Reserve, and All-Guard Teams will scout, identify, and invite selected Soldiers to compete at the Interservice Championships and the National Matches. Soldiers selected to represent the active Army are funded by the USAMU.

The All-Army matches consist of Small Arms Firing Schools, the Secretary of the Army matches, Chief of Staff of the Army matches, Sergeant Major of the Army Team matches, Excellence-in-Competition matches and special combat matches.

Champions will be awarded All-Army trophies and Excellence-in-Competition marksmanship badges, which are permanent-wear Army awards as described in Army Regulation 600-22 and are above the standard marksman, sharpshooter, and expert qualification badges.

For additional information, registration and match bulletin, visit the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit Web site at www.usamu.com or contact Michael Behnke, the USAMU chief of competitions, at (706) 545-7841 or michael.behnke@usaac.army.mil or clarence.fedrick@usaac.army.mil.
Call it a snipe hunt. Today’s sniper is the hunter and the prey. In Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere coalition forces are fighting the war on terrorism, the enemy is often hiding in plain sight. He looks just like his neighbors.

It takes a skilled sniper to spot - and yes, kill - an insurgent waiting for the opportunity to kill him first.

Snipers from six countries put their skills to the test October 28 through November 4 during Fort Benning’s fifth annual International Sniper Competition. Thirty-one two-man teams took to the sky, the rooftops and the hills to ferret out the enemy before the enemy found them. It’s called counter sniping, and it’s the focus of sniper training around the world today for good reason.

“This is the best, as far as training goes, we’ve ever done,” said Sergeant James Brown, who came from Fort Lewis, Washington, to compete with his teammate, Sergeant Colin Handy. The two spent a year in Iraq, and they said this week’s competition was “combat relevant,” because the scenarios, or tasks, mirrored those they faced during their deployment with 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment.

“As far as being realistic, yeah, this is it,” Brown said.

The competition is relevant by design, said Staff Sergeant Larry Davis, and he should know. Davis participated in the first two competitions here. He’s helped plan and execute the last three.

“We’re not here to test their schoolhouse skills,” he said. “We’re here to see how they perform in a combat situation under a lot of stress. We throw a scenario at them, and let them figure out the best way to handle it by themselves, just like they’d have to do in combat.”

The majority of the school’s 25 cadre — Soldiers in C Company, 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment — are combat veterans, and they had a say in designing the competition since planning started in the spring. The competitors completed one or two events each day, nine in all, based on lessons learned by the cadre in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Sniper teams from Israel, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada and the U.S. (Marines, Airmen, and Soldiers) took turns at the urban stress shoot event on Buchanan Range October 31. With the cacophony of gunfire, air assaults and mournful “mosque music” blaring from loudspeakers — a “stress enhancer,” Davis called it — the snipers were tasked to search a building, top to bottom, and root out hostiles in the area.

Targets dotted the landscape, but it was hard to tell, at first glance, which targets carried guns. That’s where the spotter came in. In each team, the spotter, typically the more experienced of the two, used a scope to identify the target and a scientific calculator to gauge distance and trajectory. A slight miscalculation could result in the death of a bystander — a target minding its own business — and the loss of a few precious points.

“This is the best competition I’ve been to,” said Tech Sergeant Todd Reed, who competed with his twin brother Tim. “They knock it dead here. It’s fun. But it’s not all about the fun. Everybody who competes will leave here a better Soldier, because we share information that will save lives in combat.”

That’s the dichotomy of the event, said Captain Ray Dillman, the commander of C Company. It’s a “gentleman’s game” in that the participants traditionally share the kind of insider information that levels the field.

“And that’s really the goal. At the end of the day, we want an exchange of ideas,” Dillman said. “We’re all friendly forces, and we have the same goal.”

That goal, Davis said, is to win the war on terrorism. The competition has evolved into a world-class event because of the war and not in spite of it. Three years ago, attendance was down as armies around the world focused on the war at hand.

School officials toyed with the idea of canceling the competition. But the war itself made evident the need for sniper training.

“Now, everybody’s trying to improve their snipers,” Davis said.

“Outside of combat, this is really the only way to test your skill level.”

(Bridgett Siter writes for The Bayonet newspaper at Fort Benning.)
More Soldiers Now Eligible for eArmyU — Changes in reenlistment criteria effective October 1 broaden eligibility for Soldiers to participate in the eArmyU laptop enrollment option, officials said, and extend the program’s no-laptop option to all officers.

Under the new requirements, the majority of active-component Soldiers in the rank of private first class and higher may be eligible to sign up for online college courses and receive a laptop computer to use in the program, officials said. Laptop enrollees will be required to successfully complete at least 12 semester hours of coursework in three years.

The eArmyU “no laptop” enrollment, now called “eCourse enrollment,” will also be extended to all officers beginning this month, officials said.

More extensive eligibility information is located on the eArmyU Web site at www.eArmyU.com. (Adapted from an Army News Service release.)

Soldiers Can Get Reimbursed for Purchased Gear — Some service members who bought their own protective gear will get reimbursed for the purchase under a new policy approved October 4.

David S. C. Chu, the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, approved the directive that allows military personnel to be reimbursed “for privately purchased protective, safety or health equipment.”

The order covers the period between September 10, 2001, and August 1, 2004. Pentagon officials said “relatively few” service members are affected by the order.

Reimbursement is limited to the actual purchase price — plus shipping — of the equipment and service members must have the receipts. Under the legislation, those claiming reimbursement must turn in their privately purchased gear. The services will destroy the equipment, as it may not meet government standards. Under the policy, reimbursement cannot exceed $1,100 for any one piece of equipment.

The services can request to add items to the list. The list includes: the complete outer tactical vest or equivalent commercial ballistic vests. The components of the vest — groin protector, throat protector, yoke and collar assembly, collar protector, ballistic inserts and small arms protective inserts — are covered individually. The list also includes the Kevlar helmet, ballistic eye protection and hydration systems. (Adapted from an Army News Service release written by Jim Garamone.)

Be Aware of ACU Knockoffs — Army officials are warning Soldiers against buying imitation Army Combat Uniforms in lieu of waiting for Army-approved ACUs to arrive in stores.

AAFES military clothing sales stores are scheduled to get ACUs in April, but a spokesman said they may appear sooner.

Some Soldiers, anxious to get the new uniforms, have bought imitation ACUs from unauthorized vendors. Authorized uniforms made to Army specifications are produced only by government-contracted companies and will be sold through Army and Air Force Exchange Service stores, officials said.

To tell if an ACU is authorized, Soldiers should look for two tags sewn into the uniform. One tag near the collar is printed with the size and the second tag located elsewhere on the uniform gives the government contract number identifying what company made the uniform, and care instructions, according to Program Executive Office Soldier’s Web site. Some uniforms being made offshore at present do not contain the Identification of Friend or Foe tag, a tag which allows Soldiers to identify friendly forces at night.

For more information, see the PEO Soldier Web site: www.peosoldier.army.mil/pmequipment. (Adapted from an Army News Service release written by Annette M. Fournier.)

Soldiers Get Traumatic Injury Insurance Protection — The Department of Defense has enacted a traumatic injury protection insurance under the Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance, or SGLI program. On December 1, all service members eligible for SGLI became insured for traumatic injury protection of up to $100,000 unless they declined SGLI coverage. The program, which will be known as TSGLI, is designed to provide financial assistance to service members during their recovery period from a serious traumatic injury. A flat monthly premium of $1 will be added to the monthly SGLI deduction, regardless of the amount of SGLI coverage that the member has elected, officials said.

A retroactive provision of the law provides that any service member, who suffered a qualifying loss between October 7, 2001, and December 1, 2005, will receive a benefit under the TSGLI program, if the loss was a direct result of injuries incurred in Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Administered by the Army Wounded Warrior Program, or AW2, on behalf of the Army, the mission of TSGLI is to ensure eligible Soldiers receive the monetary payments they are entitled to while providing them with the necessary information and assistance to complete and submit their TSGLI claims, officials said. If a Soldier is unable to complete a claim due to incapacitation or death, family members with an appropriate Power of Attorney or letter of guardianship may apply for TSGLI benefits on behalf of a Soldier, officials said.

Additional information on the traumatic injury protection benefit, as well as a listing on qualifying injuries, can be obtained by calling 1-800-237-1336 or going to www.aw2.army.mil/TSGLI for application and contact information. (Adapted from an Army News Service release.)

The 2006 Infantry Conference is tentatively scheduled for September 11-14.

Additional information will be posted in upcoming issues of Infantry Magazine.
In November 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Linhart, the Assistant TRADOC System Manager for Bradley at the time (TSM Bradley), and Lieutenant Colonel Andres Contreras, Product Manager – Bradley/113 (PM Bradley), conducted a Bradley survivability assessment for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They visited 10 Bradley-equipped battalions and spoke with a variety of Soldiers: from drivers to company commanders. More than 100 Soldiers were surveyed, and their responses provided useful guidance and direction for future Bradley fighting vehicle improvements (Infantry Magazine, November-December 2004, “The Bradley Fighting Vehicle: The Ultimate Assault Vehicle?”).

Despite being a peerless system, suggestions for improvement to the Bradley family of vehicles have never been in short supply. Bradley users, from the recently polled OIF Soldiers to 20-year Bradley veterans, continue to guide development. PM Bradley, in partnership with TSM-Stryker/Bradley, has taken these suggestions and begun turning them into real materiel solutions.

The following are upcoming improvements addressing a variety of factors.

Adapting to the Urban Fight
A large part of the fight in Iraq is an urban one. Suggestions from the field continue to come in long after LTC Linhart’s survey. Here are some of the things units want their Bradleys
to have in a built-up environment:

**Power Line Protection:** Bradley crews continue to be wary of low hanging power lines. Most Soldiers who had been to Iraq recently reported low, damaged, or makeshift cables between buildings and across alleyways and streets. Often at or below turret level, power lines can be lethal to an unbuttoned Bradley commander (BC) or gunner.

**Bradley Commander’s Light:** Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be a primary killer, and traffic control point (TCP) operations remain essential. Units need to be able to find potential dangers on dark roadside, and maximize stand off in high-traffic areas.

**Responsive Suppression:** Units surveyed wanted to be able to engage close-in targets quickly. They wanted a system that would perform similar to the COAX, but would be able to suppress within meters of the vehicle.

**Rear Ramp Protection:** While the turret, front, and sides of the vehicle can be protected with Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT), there is no analogue for the back ramp. The danger to squad members in the back makes rear ramp protection a top priority.

**Sight and Optics Protection:** A large point of frustration for mechanized Soldiers in Iraq was the vulnerability of their optics. A well-placed stone could disable either the gunner’s or BC’s (Commander’s Independent Viewer, or CIV. This is found on A3 models only) sights completely.

**“BUSK”**

In response to these concerns, TSM and PM Bradley have worked to develop the Bradley Urban Operations and Survivability Kit (BUSK). BUSK is a user-friendly, low cost suite of improvements to the Bradley fighting vehicle. While not yet complete, these improvements will be available to units in the very near future.

**Power Line Protection:** A solution to the power line threat was inspired by jury-rigged solutions from the field. (See Figure 1.) These light, no-conductive rails protect both the crew and the turret optics from low-hanging power lines. They can be installed and de-installed by a crew in minutes.

**Commander’s Light Automatic Weapon (CLAW):** By attaching a low-caliber machine gun to the CIV, we get superior suppression tied to top-notch optics. Targets can be engaged just a few feet away from the vehicle. Research and development has been done using a variety of weapons systems, including the M240B Machine Gun, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and the M231 Firing Port Weapon.

**Rear Ramp Protection:** This solution is still under development. A possible solution under investigation involves using the cage-style armor currently used on Stryker vehicles and M113s. This solution is easily repaired and replaced. Being lightweight, it also offers minimal interference with ramp function.

**Sight Protection:** The Bradley sight protection set protects both the gunner’s sight and the CIV. Composed of a simple metal mesh frame, it attaches to the vehicle with a textile adhesive. It is light, easily stored, and easily installed. Disassembly takes mere seconds. It is designed to maintain a minimum distance between the optics and the screen, to reduce damage from debris.

These were just a few solutions being developed and implemented for the Bradley fighting vehicle. The genesis of every item was input from American Soldiers. The best way to improve this system is to hear from the user. Please send any suggestions or ideas to Jason.Toepfer@us.army.mil. As the TSM Bradley OIC, my job is to ensure needed improvements and upgrades become a reality.

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**Figure 1 - Power Line Protection**

**Figure 2 - Commander’s Light Automatic Weapon (CLAW)**

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Captain Jason Toepfer has served as the battalion maintenance officer for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry; assistant brigade S3 for the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; and commander of both D and C Companies, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. He served seven months as a company commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He currently serves as the Assistant TRADOC Systems Manager for the Bradley.

Lieutenant Colonel Andres Contreras also contributed to this article. LTC Contreras currently serves as the Product Manager for Bradley/113.
Despite most infantry leaders’ fervent wishes, there is simply no way of avoiding lawyers on today’s battlefield. The nature of today’s battle space, where complex questions of American and international law intersect to create traps for the unwary, means that where Soldiers go, the attorneys will go right along with them. Lawyers have always been critical in Bosnia and Kosovo, and those serving in Afghanistan and Iraq today must turn to Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers for advice on everything from the spending of government funds to rules of engagement and the treatment of detainees. Making the legally correct decision on all of these issues is critical to the success of the mission, and all of them are potential “career-ender” or even “go-to-Leavenworth” issues.

An infantry commander is tactically and technically proficient on all his combat and combat support systems — he knows how to employ the tools the Army gives him. But the Army does not effectively teach him how to use his JAG. That can cost him and his Soldiers dearly. However, while a JAG officer is not a combat multiplier in the sense that an attached tank company is, by understanding a few simple concepts, the nonlawyer commander can effectively employ his attorneys and avoid missteps that can paralyze his unit — or worse.

**MIND-SETS: THE LEADER AND THE LAWYER**

The fact that attorneys take a good deal of grief from their combat arms officers counterparts demonstrates that there are huge differences in the way combat leaders and attorneys think and approach problems. That is not to say a lawyer cannot serve as a combat arms officer; in fact, the systematic approach to problem solving taught in law school lends itself well to analyzing military problems. It means that a combat leader should keep in mind that the purpose of law school is not so much concerned with the technical aspects of teaching laws and statutes but rather with developing the ability to “think like a lawyer.” This line of thinking will allow an attorney to approach each legal problem systematically so as to discover the “right answer.”

The concept of the “right answer” demonstrates one of the key disconnects between many combat leaders and attorneys. As combat arms leaders, we respect decisive action and clear guidance in response to tactical problems. But when a combat leader asks a complex legal question, the JAG’s response is almost always something quite different. The lawyer is noncommittal. Instead of saying what will happen, the lawyer might list several possible results ranging from positive to negative. When asked “What is the answer?” the response is often something like “Well, it depends.”

The combat leader needs to understand why he is receiving that type of nonanswer answer. To an attorney, as a practical matter, there rarely is a “right answer.” There are only more likely and less likely results. That’s because an attorney operates in a world where actions and decisions are not necessarily judged by an objective standard but by a subjective standard — by an investigator or even by a judge and a jury in the most serious cases — after the fact. In reality, the answer is usually less what is objectively “correct” than the attorney’s best estimate of what subsequent fact finders would determine to be legally correct.

Further, no one consults an attorney on the easy questions, the ones that are governed by clearly defined rules. (Lawyers call the rare unambiguous rules “black letter law.”) No one ever asks the local JAG if it is acceptable to shoot a detainee; everyone knows that it is illegal. But Soldiers might ask whether they can pressure a detainee to cooperate by denying him sleep for a period. As the recent debates and controversies have demonstrated, the answer to that question was less clear cut early in the Global War on Terrorism.

With this in mind, a commander must realize that the ultimate decision is his responsibility alone. In the final analysis, a JAG is only an advisor — one with specialized knowledge, but an advisor nonetheless. The commander will bear the consequences of a mistake, not the JAG. But by understanding the way his JAG thinks, he can better evaluate the JAG’s advice.

**MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR JAG**

While some commanders treat their JAGs like a sort of pagan
priesthood, where the lawyers are the only ones with access to a secret font of legal wisdom, the effective commander will treat his JAGs as Soldiers first.

Many JAGs were prior service before attending law school so they may understand how a combat unit works in a way a JAG who began his career with the JAG Basic Course cannot. Regardless, JAG Soldiers need to participate in all facets of training and operations; putting them in a corner and telling them to focus on the law would bear little resemblance to the reality in the field.

One deploying brigade commander assigned a JAG to the planning cell. The JAG officer found himself immersed in all aspects of combat operations as well as support tasks. All the while, he was able to add his legal perspective even as he did the same things “regular” Soldiers did — “honchoed” the military decision-making process, wrote orders, and briefed the command. His success won him the trust of his leaders and improved the quality of his advice.

There is nothing that says that a JAG cannot road march, learn to operate an armored vehicle, fire heavy weapons or participate in battle drills. If the Global War on Terrorism has taught us anything, it is that every Soldier can find him or herself under fire. You do that young officer — and yourself — no favors by excusing him from the training that could save his life.

EMPLYING YOUR JAG

A JAG provides the commander with legal advice based upon his or her legal knowledge and research combined with his or her military experience. As discussed above, sometimes that military experience is limited. As for legal knowledge, JAGs will have a basic understanding of the law as it applies to common questions. On some issues, however, the JAG will need to do research – either by using legal references (including regulations, statutes and even court cases) or by contacting subject matter experts (often other JAGs).

The commander needs to know this because he needs to be able to test the validity of the JAG’s legal opinion. The commander should, as standard operating procedure, expect the JAG to explain the basis of his or her opinion when providing it. For example:

   JAG: “Sir, I believe that the rules of engagement should limit our Soldiers to using deadly force only when they are personally under direct fire.”

   Commander: “So you are saying you do not believe that our troops can open fire if they believe they are about to come under fire or if civilians are being fired upon. That seems very restrictive. All right, why do you believe that?”

   At that point, the commander should expect the JAG to walk him step-by-step through the legal analysis process that led to this conclusion. In such a case, the JAG should, at a minimum, show how the higher command’s rules of engagement provide that limitation as well. If the commander is still unsure, he should direct the JAG to contact the higher headquarters for clarification.

   It is important to also understand that lawyers, particularly litigators (“Litigators” are the minority of attorneys who generally argue cases in court; most attorneys are not litigators and rarely argue cases), will tend to advocate for the view they embrace. This can be a problem when giving advice, as the commander needs an objective analysis of all sides of the issue, not just the side the attorney subscribes to. A commander needs to be wary when he senses the JAG has morphed from being an impartial advisor into being an advocate for one point of view.

Of course, there may be a good reason the JAG is so
dead-set on his conclusion; the commander simply needs to keep the lack of objectivity in mind when coming to a decision.

For more complex issues, particularly ones concerning decisions that might come under legal review, the commander should require a written legal opinion. A legal opinion is usually in memorandum form and typically follows the “IRAC” format.

(I) Issue: The “issue” is the precise legal question being discussed. Clearly setting forth the legal issue helps the JAG focus. If the commander sees that the issue is wrong, he can immediately send the memo back to the JAG for another try.

(R) Rule: This is the particular legal rule or rules applicable to the issue. The rule can come from many sources — a policy letter, a regulation, a section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or even the text of a treaty. In Kosovo, for example, United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1244 provides the legal basis for American military operations, and Kosovo Force JAGs frequently refer to it for guidance. Regardless, the “Rule” section should clearly state the rule and how it is to be applied. A good practice is to require that the author attach a copy of the verbatim rule as an exhibit to the memorandum.

(A) Analysis: The analysis is the heart of the memorandum. In this section, the JAG will set out the material facts of the situation then apply the rule to those facts. A good analysis, however, will be objective. The JAG should state the arguments for all possible sides. This is not the place for advocating. If the analysis is weak or incomplete, the commander should send it back.

(C) Conclusion: This is where the lawyer gives his advice. The commander should not attempt to force a rock-solid answer to a tough legal question, but he has a right to the best advice the JAG can give — i.e., the JAG should state clearly what decision he thinks the commander should make.

Of course, there may be several different issues in any particular situation; the JAG should use a separate “IRAC” analysis for each one. Further, the “IRAC” format is not just for written opinions. The JAG should explain his or her reasoning by setting out the “IRAC” points even when verbally discussing his or her advice.

This way of preparing and providing legal advice will be very familiar to anyone with experience in the corporate world. In the business world, nonlawyer businesspeople demand that their attorneys explain their reasoning fully and clearly — an expectation justified by the hundreds of dollars an hour top attorneys charge. An Army commander should expect no less, especially where the stakes are higher than mere money.

**LAWYERS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS, NOT OBSTACLES**

As with any groups of Soldiers, some JAGs will choose the path of least resistance. With regular Soldiers, that means they will eschew initiative and not act until expressly directed. With lawyers, the path of least resistance is often to simply say “No.”

A JAG’s job is to give advice, and sometimes “No” is good advice. But the best combat commanders do not foster an environment where staff members create obstacles — the best commanders demand solutions. For example, one senior combat arms officer made it clear to his subordinates that whenever they brought him a problem, they must also bring a solution. He refused to allow them to shift their challenge to him by leaving it to him to complete their mission. That technique is equally applicable to JAGs. If the JAG determines a certain course of action does not comply with the law, he should be expected to offer some other way to satisfy the commander’s intent that does comply. Incidentally, that senior officer was himself a civilian attorney.

**CONCLUSION**

Today’s commanders face more and more difficult legal challenges than ever before. Whether we like it or not, for the foreseeable future, lawyers will be as much a part of a commander’s “toolkit” as the chaplain and the sergeant major. For that reason, a commander must know how to effectively employ his JAGs so that he receives the very best possible advice. His career, his mission, and sometimes even lives, can depend on it.

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Background

I became the platoon leader for the 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor Task Force’s Scout Platoon on January 3, 2002, and on May 19, 2003 I participated in combat actions in and around Al Huwijah, Iraq, during an insurgent ambush. My platoon sergeant was Sergeant First Class Michael Williamson, and he had more than four months experience with the platoon prior to my arrival. In garrison, the platoon’s task organization consisted of four maneuver sections — Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta — and a Headquarters section. A staff sergeant led each maneuver section with a sergeant as his team leader. Each section had a total of six Soldiers and two M1025/M1026 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), with one turret-mounted M2 .50 caliber machine gun and one turret-mounted MK-19 40mm automatic grenade machine gun. The task force scout platoon totaled 17 enlisted Soldiers, 12 NCOs, one officer, and a platoon medic. Prior to deployment, all of the platoon leaders had more than six months experience in their current positions, and we were at 100-percent modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) strength. (See Figure 1 for the task organization.)

The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) alerted Task Force 1-63 Armor for a probable combat deployment to northern Iraq in mid-January 2003. The conditions were set to open a northern front in Iraq. However, to ensure success the Joint Special Operations Task Force - North (JSOTF-N) needed support from U.S. mechanized and conventional forces to invade, defeat, and stabilize the oil rich region around of Kirkuk. As a result, JSOTF-N requested forces, and USAREUR responded by deploying the immediate ready force (IRF).

The IRF is primarily an air-deployable force designed to facilitate deployment using United States European Command (USEUCOM) operational lift assets. The USAREUR IRF deployed to northern Iraq.
in late March and early April 2003. The 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne operation to secure Bashur Airfield in late March, and the remainder of the IRF deployed by C-17 and C-130 during the following weeks. The entire 1-63 Task Force finished deploying to Iraq on April 17, but due to limited lift capabilities, the scout platoon was only able to transport seven of our 10 HMMWVs. By April 18, U.S. and Kurdish forces had successfully captured the city of Kirkuk, and our role seemingly transformed to one of stability and support operations (SASO) rather than combat operations.

Throughout April and early May, one could classify the situation in Kirkuk as relatively stable. Although the Kurds from northern Iraq, the Iranians, the Turks, and the Sunni and Shiite Muslims were all competing for power in this oil rich area, violence was limited. The majority of unrest at this time occurred between Kurds and all other non-Kurds because the Kurdish people believed this area to be their ancestral homeland, and more importantly, control of this area would afford them tremendous wealth from the export of oil. Consequently, the Kurdish and Peshmerga fighters were extremely reluctant to vacate an area they had just conquered for fear of losing a majority in the newly forming government of Kirkuk. The outlying areas of Kirkuk, however, were not completely controlled by Kurdish fighters, and very few American forces, if any, had ever had contact with Iraqis in the outlying cities and towns.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade effectively stabilized Kirkuk by saturating the city with American forces and rapidly working towards forming an elected government, which represented every ethnicity. The suburbs of Kirkuk, conversely, were not as secure because the brigade did not have sufficient manpower with which to stabilize them. This resulted in a majority of former Baathists moving to safe havens still controlled by Sunni Muslims sympathetic to the former Hussein regime. One of these safe havens was Al Huwijah, a city approximately 50 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk.

Concept of the Operation
On May 19, 2003, the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted a brigade assault on the town of Al Huwijah to capture many senior Baath Party officials and former high-level military commanders. The brigade commander, Colonel William Mayville, task organized his units into the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry; the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade; and elements from TF 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor. Two light infantry battalions traveling abreast were to simultaneously assault Al Huwijah from the northeast and southeast and cordon off the city from all major avenues of approach. Both battalions would then form inner cordons throughout the city and conduct raids on more than 75 locations that housed suspected high value targets (HVTs). The 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor, was the brigade reserve, traveling center sector and was positioned in an assembly area approximately six kilometers east of Al Huwijah ready to reinforce units within the city if needed.

For this mission, my battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Riddle, task organized his units into a headquarters element and one heavy company team. The headquarters element, controlled by LTC Riddle, was responsible for command, control, and reconnaissance for the task force, and he used my platoon as the sole maneuver element within the headquarters section. The heavy company team consisted of one M1A1 tank platoon; one M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) platoon; and one 120mm mortar platoon, led by Captain Joel Fischer. These mechanized forces were capable of reinforcing either light infantry battalion within 15 minutes and could deliver overwhelming firepower should the need arise. Additionally, two embedded reporters — John Sullivan and Kampha Bouaphanh — accompanied the scout platoon for this mission.

My battalion task force’s scheme of maneuver was very concise. The scout platoon’s primary task was to set up a company-sized assembly area six kilometers east of Al Huwijah, 30 minutes ahead of the mechanized force. Our secondary task was to reconnoiter the route to ensure all roads were capable of supporting tank movement. Approximately 30 minutes after the scout platoon established the assembly area, the remainder of the task force would occupy and remain on standby for any on-call missions from the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Because enemy contact on the movement to the assembly area was unlikely, LTC Riddle chose not to establish a communications retransmission (retrans) site along our avenue of approach. Without a retrans site, the scout platoon would be out of communications range with the task force tactical operations center (TOC) for a period of about 15 minutes; however, we would still be in communications range of the two Infantry battalions traveling to our north and south.

The Operation
On May 19, 2003, the battalion commander ordered my platoon to conduct reconnaissance of a route from Kirkuk to the outskirts of Al Huwijah and establish a task force assembly area to conduct future operations as the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s reserve. We crossed the line of departure (LD) at 2000 hours, and I expected the 45-kilometer movement to the assembly area to take...
approximately one hour and 15 minutes. The temperature was around 90 degrees Fahrenheit, the skies were clear with up to 150 meters nighttime visibility, and there was no rain in the forecast. My platoon traveled in a column formation at approximately 45 km/hr led by Alpha Section in HQ20. I was located fourth in the convoy, in HQ26, and my platoon sergeant trailed the convoy in HQ27.

Iraqi civilians and insurgents frequently traveled along our axis of advance — Axis Gold — to conduct business and harassing attacks within the Kirkuk city limits. The battalion intelligence officer (S2) had little or no information regarding Al Huwijah, other than that it was formerly controlled by the Baath party and was suspected of being a hideout of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, vice-chairman of Saddam Hussein’s Revolution Command Council and one of the HVTs of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. To this point in the war, no U.S. forces had been to Al Huwijah, and intelligence predicted a mixed reception with little or no resistance once operations within the city began. We would soon prove this prediction wrong.

During the platoon operations order (OPORD), I instructed the platoon to travel with its headlights on until we reached our release point, which was approximately six kilometers east of the assembly area. From the release point to the assembly area, we would be in complete blackout and radio silence. I did this because civilians frequently traveled along this road, and the danger posed by traveling in complete blackout was far greater than the enemy danger templated by the S2. I also instructed the gunners to mount their M240B machine guns on the turret in addition to their M2s and MK-19s for easier access should the need arise. Other than that, we were conducting two mission essential (METL) tasks that we had rehearsed and conducted countless times before.

At 2010 hours, we crossed LD and proceeded to move along Axis Gold to establish our assembly area. Within the brigade scheme of maneuver, we traveled generally on line with the two infantry battalions to our flanks, and everything up to this point in the mission was going as planned. As we reached the outskirts of Kirkuk and crossed checkpoint 1 (CP1), my platoon noticed a small volley of automatic tracer fire approximately five kilometers due east and oriented straight up into the air. I radioed our progress back to our TOC, gave the battle captain a spot report on the tracer fire, and dismissed this fire as nothing more than coincidence — sporadic weapons fire was a daily occurrence in Kirkuk.

We continued along Axis Gold and, at 2030 hours, approached CP2. Everything thus far in the mission was going as planned, and the only deviation from the intelligence reports was that no traffic whatsoever had passed us up to this point. Upon turning right at the intersection of CP2, my platoon sergeant radioed a spot report of automatic tracer fire two kilometers due north. I radioed our front line trace to the TOC and again sent a spot report detailing the tracer fire. Shortly thereafter, we made a left turn at CP3, and again we noticed automatic tracer fire about four kilometers west-northwest. I radioed the TOC and informed it that Iraqi insurgents, militia, or Fedayeen soldiers in outposts (OPs) were signaling our progress to subsequent OPs. I then instructed the platoon to increase its rate of movement by 10 km/hr to further assess the situation and determine if we were, in fact, the cause of this tracer fire. This stretch of road between Kirkuk and Al Huwijah was illuminated on both sides by overhanging streetlights, so I opted against going blackout for fear of our night vision devices being washed out.

Our movement between CP3 and CP4 was uneventful, and we observed no further tracer fire. Communication with the task force TOC, which was more than 30 kilometers to the east, was beginning to fade when, once again, we observed a very large volume of tracer fire about two kilometers due west. I sent another spot report to the TOC, informed it of our front line trace, and warned the battalion commander to remain vigilant during his movement because there was definitely an enemy element tracking our movement. This was the last clear report I was able to send the TOC.

In the original platoon operations order (OPORD), I instructed the platoon to conduct a 10-minute listening halt at the rally point (RP) and that all further movements would be done in complete blackout. When we reached the RP, however, I noticed a small town to the north, which was the source of the latest tracer barrage. I instructed the platoon to proceed for two additional kilometers before conducting the listening halt. At approximately 2100 hours, we conducted the listening halt with the trail vehicle, HQ27, 100 meters west of a small bridge spanning a dry ravine. The platoon assumed a herringbone formation on both sides of the road with 25 meters between vehicles. We maintained 360-degree security, shut off all lights, and immediately prepared our optics for blackout operations. The section sergeants and platoon sergeant came to my vehicle, and I instructed them to establish hasty traffic control points (TCPs) 50 meters east and 50 meters west of our position and to stop all eastbound and westbound traffic. Additionally, I told the platoon leadership to turn around all westbound traffic moving towards the city of Al Huwijah. Thus far, we had not encountered any traffic, but we decided to establish the TCPs as a precaution. We would depart in 10 minutes to establish the assembly area if we did not make any contact with the enemy.

Immediately after the platoon established both TCPs, all of the streetlights shut off, and we were engulfed in complete darkness. SFC Williamson was located with the eastern TCP, and I was in my vehicle trying to establish communication with our TOC. A van approached our position traveling westbound, and our eastern TCP stopped and searched the van. Two Iraqi men, dressed in civilian clothes, were in the van and had four AK-47s fully loaded with military-taped magazines for quick reloading. Charlie and Delta sections searched the vehicle, flex-cuffed and detained the individuals, and reported that the weapons were well-maintained with
rounds chambered. One minute later, another vehicle approached from the west with four Iraqi men. Alpha and Bravo sections stopped this vehicle at gunpoint and detained the occupants. This vehicle was heavily loaded with weaponry and ammunition, including three AK-47s, one RPK automatic rifle, one SVD sniper rifle, one rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and four hand grenades. In the course of five minutes, we detained six enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and recovered a substantial amount of ordnance. At this moment, I determined that we could not proceed to establish the assembly area and simultaneously guard the EPWs. I then informed the platoon leadership that we would stay here until the remainder of the task force arrived, pass off the EPWs, and guide the task force into a hasty assembly area.

About three minutes after the first two vehicles approached, a third and fourth vehicle approached simultaneously from both the east and the west. Again, these vehicles were loaded with men and weapons; however, these men were equipped with military load bearing vests (LBVs), automatic machine guns, and large amounts ammunition. They seemed unaware of the exact location of our element because they were forced to come to abrupt stops, yet their weapons were at the ready, with grenades easily accessible. We quickly disarmed these men, flex-cuffed their hands, and consolidated them with the other EPWs. My platoon sergeant moved to my position at the far west of the platoon and informed me that he was establishing an EPW holding area 20 meters north of my vehicle. At this point we had captured 12 EPWs, four vehicles, and enough weapons and explosives to fill the back of a HMMWV. I returned to the far west of the convoy with my platoon sergeant to assign four EPW guards and to try to raise communication with the task force TOC.

After we placed the EPW guards and established the holding area, a fifth and final vehicle approached our position from the west, traveling at a high rate of speed. SFC Williamson and I were at the far west of the convoy with Staff Sergeant Scott Isom, the Alpha section sergeant, and the platoon interpreter. The driver of the pickup truck slammed on the brakes and attempted to turn around, and in doing so, was perpendicular on the road with his headlights facing north. SFC Williamson, SSG Isom, the platoon interpreter, and I ran 50 meters west with our weapons at the ready to intercept the truck. The interpreter yelled, “put your hands up” in Arabic, and we yelled the same in English. The two men in the cab of the pickup immediately put their hands up, but the one man standing in the bed refused to raise his hands. He proceeded to remove his white head scarf with his right hand and wave it in the air as a notice of surrender, but he still refused to show his concealed left hand. We warned him repeatedly in Arabic and English to raise his hands, and after a 15 second standoff, I fired one tracer round two inches beside his right ear. He immediately put both hands up, and we proceeded to detain and secure the three men. A preliminary search of the individuals and truck produced more AK-47s, a Simonov SKS rifle, a Belgian-made FN FAL rifle, ammunition, LBVs, and stacks of brand new 10,000 Iraqi Dinar notes. SSG Isom and the interpreter then began escorting the detainees to the EPW holding area while SFC Williamson and I approached the truck to begin a search.

As SFC Williamson and I began moving, we heard a continuous burst of automatic weapons fire to our southwest. We both immediately turned to witness a large and accurate salvo of automatic rifle fire on our position. Tracers flew all around us, and instinctively we both returned fire from our uncovered position in the middle of the road. After about five seconds, we realized we had no cover, and both of us ran back to the lead vehicle on the south side of the road, HQ22, and resumed firing using the hood as cover. SPC Zagyva, the turret gunner on HQ20, immediately reported seeing about six dismounts through his AN/TVS-5 night vision sight at a distance of between 250-300 meters. HQ20, HQ24, and HQ27 mounted the AN/TVS-5 on their weapons, and HQ22 and HQ28 mounted the AN/PEQ-2, so from this herringbone formation, SPC Zagyva was the only gunner with optics capable of identifying the enemy. I gave a fire command to SPC Zagyva: “gunner, machine gun, frontal — fire,” and he delivered an accurate burst of fire on the enemy. I then instructed the other M2 gunners on the south side of the road to follow his tracers and suppress the enemy. Figure 2 illustrates my platoon’s sector of fire at this time, but only HQ20 and the M2 vehicles on the south side of the road were firing.

The Scout Platoon continued suppressing the enemy with seven-to-10-second bursts for approximately 30 seconds. Specialist Billy Barnes, the gunner on HQ22, had fired about 30 rounds when he fell from the turret and yelled “I’m hit.” I was the closest person to him when he fell, and I immediately called for the medic. SPC...
Barnes fell to the front of the HMMWV and was exposed to enemy gun fire. SPC Cammarata, the platoon medic, and I pulled off his body armor and saw a bullet hole in his lower left back and two bullet holes in the front of his body armor covering his chest. We proceeded to remove his shirt and saw a possible gunshot wound to the kidney. SFC Williamson arrived from the rear and took charge of stabilizing the casualty with the medic, but to do so, they were both using their bodies as shields. I stood up and called for a platoon cease-fire to assess the situation.

Both sides stopped firing for a brief moment, and I asked SPC Zagyva for an update on what he could see. He reported seeing five to six dismounts in defilade, and I instructed him to resume firing once he could positively identify their location. The remainder of the gunners to the south would follow his tracers. After two minutes of cease fire, SPC Zagyva resumed firing on the enemy. HQ20 and HQ22 were the only M2 trucks with the correct angle to engage the enemy, and they did so relentlessly for the next 10 minutes. Meanwhile, SFC Williamson and SPC Cammarata successfully stabilized SPC Barnes and moved him to the rear of the truck, but they were reluctant to move him any further, fearing a possible spinal cord injury. I returned to my truck through intense gunfire and radioed to the remainder of the task force, but to no avail. I then called for another cease-fire.

So far, we had exchanged gunfire with the enemy for about 10 minutes, and I told the platoon that reinforcements would arrive in about 20 minutes. SFC Williamson moved up to HQ20 to relay commands while I moved down the line to check on the status of the EPWs and the rest of the platoon. SPC Zagyva then reported seeing two pickup trucks with weapons mounted in the rear moving east, attempting to flank our position. He also reported seeing the trucks stop to drop off dismounts. Now there were 15 enemy dismounts at three locations on the ground. I also received reports from SFC Williamson that the enemy was staging reinforcements from a mosque about 350 meters southwest. I gave the platoon another fire command, and HQ20 resumed their firing. I also gave my gunner, SGT Johnson, a fire command for the MK-19, and he began to suppress enemy dismounts with 40 mm high explosive (HE) rounds. While the turret-mounted machine guns were firing, all the dismounts on HQ22, HQ26, and HQ28 were firing their M4s as well. I used my AN/PEQ-2 in between M2 bursts so that the gunners would not lose the spot at which they were firing.

After 20 minutes and three cease-fires, SFC Williamson ran down the line, calling all the drivers to bring their M240Bs forward. The enemy dismounts continued moving east and were trying to envelop our position, using the ravine as cover. To block the enemy’s movement, SFC Williamson emplaced five guns on line in front of and behind HQ22 and instructed them to engage the enemy dismounts. Doing this allowed the M2s and MK-19 to focus on the vehicles. Thus far, we thwarted three enemy attempts to flank our position, but our readily available ammunition was beginning to diminish, and we had no time to access the additional ammunition located in the rear of the HMMWVs. Suddenly, I made radio contact with the remainder of the unit, so SFC Williamson took control of the direct fire plan. I radioed the battalion commander and gave him the following situation report (SITREP): “Dragon 6 this is Recon 6. We are in direct contact with 15 enemy dismounts and two vehicles 200 meters to our southwest. My current grid is …. We have one casualty with a gunshot wound to the back. What is your ETA (estimated time of arrival)?” Dragon 6, LTC Riddle, responded that they were 10 kilometers from our location and that they had visual on our tracers. He also informed me that the tanks were leading the convoy and were driving in white light.

Next, I called the Delta Section sergeant, SGT Skasik, forward and instructed him to guide the tanks through our position using white light, if needed. The M1A1s and BFVs would be forced to stay on the road and pass through our herringbone due to the ravine and bridge. I also instructed all vehicles to move five meters off the road in either direction to avoid a collision. I maintained radio contact with Dragon 6 on the battalion frequency, and Comanche 6, CPT Fischer, acknowledged all transmissions. SFC Williamson continued to control the direct fires while I updated Dragon 6 on the current situation, and everything appeared to be under control.

Dragon 6 also informed me that an A-10 close support aircraft was on station and ready to assist. I did not have a laser designator capable of digitally lasering a target, but I told the commander to relay to the pilot to destroy whatever he saw south of our position. All friendly dismounts were either in their vehicles or directly beside them. The 173rd Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) relayed this information to the A-10 pilot, and he acknowledged. Moments later, the A-10 pilot, viewing through forward looking infra red (FLIR) at 10,000 feet elevation, spotted enemy dismounts fleeing the impacts of the 40 mm HE rounds. He then positioned the A-10 and delivered a devastating seven-second 30mm chain gun strafing run that immediately silenced the enemy dismounts on the ground.

For the first time in over 30 minutes, there was complete silence as we awaited the arrival of the remainder of the task force. However, when the tanks arrived five minutes later with their headlights turned on, enemy reinforcements forces delivered continuous and accurate fire on our position. They were situated inside the mosque and inside a walled compound 200 meters west of the mosque. Enemy 7.62 mm rounds impacted our HMMWVs and the tanks and also shot through the lens of the AN/TVS-5 mounted on HQ27. The tanks sped through our herringbone and continued straight on the road until I lost visual contact with them. The BFVs were north of our position and had their turrets oriented due west and north. Communication between the mechanized elements was obviously wrong, and I was not confident that they understood the enemy’s location. The tanks were out of visual sight and the BFVs were still north of our location with their turrets scanning opposite to the direction of the enemy. I immediately called Comanche 6 and denied him all clearance of direct fires.

CPT Fischer then stopped his M113 beside my HMMWV, and SFC Williamson approached him, requesting permission to load our casualty for transport to the physician’s assistant (PA). CPT Fischer denied the request and said the first sergeant or another M113 would come shortly to evacuate the casualty. I then contacted...
CPT Fischer on the radio and requested the location of the tanks. He informed me the tanks were one kilometer west of our position and could not positively identify any enemy forces. Frustrated, I then contacted the M2 platoon leader and platoon sergeant and told them directly to reorient their turrets south and to follow my tracers. I gave SPC Zagya one last fire command, and he engaged in the vicinity of the mosque and the compound.

First Lieutenant Ryan Williams, the M2 platoon leader, followed the tracers and identified enemy dismounts carrying rifles and wearing LBVs and helmets. At first, his gunners mistook these individuals for friendly troops, but I reassured him that they were enemy and that his platoon had clearance to fire. He responded with more than 250 25mm rounds that destroyed two vehicles and killed numerous dismounts. Meanwhile, the tank platoon finally corrected itself and fired four high explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds into the mosque and adjacent compound. All enemy fire from that location ceased from that moment on.

We eventually air evacuated SPC Barnes back to the Kirkuk airbase where he underwent surgery to remove fragments from his chest. At the same time as the air evacuation, the infantry dismounts cleared the mosque and walled compound from which the enemy fire had originated. They found numerous caches of weapons and a Belgian-manufactured M240G mounted on a tripod set to our location. Apparently, this weapon was the source of all the extremely accurate fire.

After our task force finished clearing the town, we were more than five hours behind schedule. The 173rd brigade commander ordered the two infantry battalions to continue with their missions, and we continued ahead with establishing our assembly area as planned. The scout platoon did, nonetheless, provide escort vehicles for the 15 EPWs back to the Kirkuk detention facility. Those vehicles returned to our assembly area at 0400 on May 20, and we continued our mission as the brigade reserve. The following day, we conducted five patrols within the city of Al Huwijah and were greeted by fierce stares and open hostility by the predominantly Sunni town. The brigade commander released our unit later that day, and we returned to Kirkuk.

We passed the site of our ambush less than 10 hours after it occurred, and the Iraqis had cleansed the location of all evidence of a firefight. My platoon fired more than 2,500 .50 caliber rounds, 75 40mm rounds, and over 1,500 5.56 mm rounds, yet we did not find a single shell casing on the ground. Additionally, the mosque, the walled compound, and the field in front of them showed no signs of a firefight other than some pre-dug fighting positions all along the road. We now saw the ravine the enemy attempted to use and an additional embankment parallel to the road, which had afforded him excellent cover. Had we not stopped the numerous enemy attempts to flank our position, we could have been split and forced to fight in two or three directions. Nonetheless, the combination of 40mm HE, .50 caliber, 5.56mm, 25mm from the BFVs, and 30mm from the A-10 was overwhelming and unexpected by the enemy.

This ambush marked the beginning of a new wave of Iraqi insurgency attacks and was the prelude to the guerrilla-style actions most commonly associated with postwar Iraq. We succeeded in thwarting this ambush by quick action and successfully disrupting the enemy before he was able to launch his ambush and complete his plan. Furthermore, we did not hesitate to deliver accurate and overwhelming firepower on the enemy. It is difficult and sometimes impossible to prevent an ambush, but if one always remains alert, cognizant of his surroundings, and quick to react, one will always be able to achieve fire supremacy over his enemy before his adversary can do the same.

At the time this article was written, Captain Mario Soto was attending the Infantry Captains Career Course. His past assignments include serving as scout platoon leader, tank company executive officer and tank platoon leader for the 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. He is currently serving as a Special Forces detachment commander for a combat dive team in the 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Members of the 1st Infantry Division’s 1-63rd Armor perform function checks on their vehicles before a mission in Iraq in June 2003.
At 1000 hours on September 3, 2005, Task Force Panther was ordered to deploy to New Orleans. The mission was twofold. First, lead, organize, and conduct search and rescue operations (SAR) throughout Orleans Parish. Second, secure key infrastructure sites within the city of New Orleans. Within six hours of notification, TF Panther was en route to New Orleans. Shortly upon arrival, the regiment secured the New Orleans Convention Center, the Superdome, began rescue operations and evacuating displaced Americans.

TF Panther deployed with the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment; 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (soon to be 5-73rd CAV); 307th Engineers; and 82nd Forward Support Battalion, but in reality, TF Panther led a much larger, joint task force. Upon arrival, the regiment took on a more pronounced signature by incorporating elements from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Emergency Medical Services, and state and local police. TF Panther galvanized these assets, to include more than 90 watercraft ranging from the USS Tortuga to Zodiac inflatable watercraft. TF Panther brought to the area of operations command, control, communications and leadership. There were many organizations willing to assist with a multitude of diverse capabilities, but lacked direction and a way to insert as a solution to the challenges that faced New Orleans.

In the matter of 14 days, TF Panther conducted 219 search and rescue (SAR) patrols and more than 102 infrastructure operations to restore the city’s infrastructure. As a result, TF Panther rescued 853 displaced Americans and evacuated 4,906 — this does not include the more than 350 pets also taken to safety. While saving lives, TF Panther also focused on saving the city by removing debris around fire stations, police stations, hospitals, schools, and other key government buildings and historical landmarks, to include St. Louis Street and Orleans Avenue Housing Projects, the Superdome, the U.S. Mint, Louis Armstrong Auditorium, Aquarium of the Americas, Charity Hospital, Touro Hospital, and St. Louis Cathedral. Concurrently, elements of the 307th Engineer Battalion cleared more than 75 miles of road enabling the city to re-open as the waters receded.

As a part of its search and rescue operations, TF Panther became the first link in connecting displaced Americans with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It commanded the All-American Evacuation site. At the evacuation site, elements from 2-505th PIR and 82nd FSB established a medical triage/treatment facility to provide fast effective medical attention to hurricane victims prior to evacuation. With a combination of busses and helicopters, the TF was able to evacuate Americans 15 minutes after completing their medical exam. In conjunction with this effort to provide medical assistance, the task force provided Medical Civilian Assistance (MEDCAS) to the community. In four days alone, the MEDCAS program treated more than 1,400 Americans. They provided more than 1,500 vaccinations for Tetanus and Hepatitis A. For those who chose not to evacuate, they provided food and water. In every neighborhood TF Panther entered, its units were met with praise. The task force received glowing reports from over 55 embedded national and international media sources. In one NBC broadcast, Tom Brokaw warmly noted, “The French Quarter is the home of the 82nd Airborne Division.”

TF Panther employed the 21st Chemical Company to establish the first decontamination site in support of Operation American Assist — the first real-world decontamination operation in recent Army history. The site serviced both military and civilian assets, decontaminating more than 500 persons and 1,000 pieces of equipment.

Throughout Operation American Assist, TF Panther pulled on its diverse resources to meet the challenges facing New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Most importantly, TF Panther drew deep from its most treasured resource, its paratroopers. From a battalion commander using Vietnamese to comfort a family’s fears about evacuation, to a medic using his native tongue of Tagalog to reunite an elderly Filipino woman with her daughter across the United States, TF Panther continues to personify the “All-American” spirit of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Upon completion of responsibilities in New Orleans, TF Panther was called upon to weather Hurricane Rita and assist as necessary in the Orleans and Terrebonne Parishes in Louisiana, which they did masterfully. In short, TF Panther was key to the success of quickly gaining control of the chaos that reigned after both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The paratroopers of TF Panther showed the same dedication and commitment to America while in Louisiana that they have shown throughout their distinguished history.

Colonel Bryan R. Owens currently serves as the commander of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He previously served as the deputy G3 of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Captain Robert B. Hamilton was commissioned through the ROTC program at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in 1998. He is currently serving as the Regimental Trial Counsel, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, at Fort Bragg.
Major Todd Berry of the 82nd Airborne Division points out key locations on a map of New Orleans.

Soldiers trudge through the flooded streets of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.

Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division patrol the streets of New Orleans in support of the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.

Paratroopers from the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, perform a search and rescue mission on September 13 in New Orleans.

Major Todd Berry of the 82nd Airborne Division points out key locations on a map of New Orleans.
Either directly or indirectly, cultural awareness has long been a part of our military operations. It can include the use of translators to communicate with host nation military and civilians, subject matter experts to advise the commander and his staff on the planning for population movements, or gaining a deeper understanding of the culture, customs, and sensitivities of a nation we are seeking to rebuild in the wake of war. When U.S. planners were drawing up a list of potential nuclear targets at the end of World War II, the proposed targets were considered in terms of tactical, strategic, and economic value; their proximity to other population centers; and their historical and cultural significance to the Japanese people. The ancient city of Kyoto, long a center of cultural and religious tradition, was removed from the list, as was Tokyo, with its enormous civilian population. U.S. sensitivity to the ramifications of an atomic strike balanced the necessity of ending the war quickly against the realization that Japan would one day rely upon her historic and cultural institutions as she once again took her place in the family of nations.

All Soldiers and members of our sister services need to understand that Americans — in or out of uniform, at home or abroad — are representatives of this great nation and her armed forces. At home, our citizens look to us to embody and exemplify those Army values that define our national character. Abroad, the citizens of other countries — friend and adversary alike — will behave according to how we conduct ourselves. Imagine, today we have U.S. men and women in uniform serving in more than 100 countries around the world, and the foreign nationals with whom they must come in contact and interact on a daily basis see the United States of America in their actions. If we show strength, resolution, respect for human dignity, and courage, these traits will reassure our allies and cause our enemies to think long and hard before taking rash action. If potential adversaries realize that we mean what we say and cannot be intimidated, we are dealing from a position of strength, and will have achieved what has been called the position of moral ascendancy over them. But how can we better prepare ourselves and our Soldiers for the challenge of serving on foreign soil?

Most Army posts and their education centers and Army Community Service offices offer area studies, brochures, and other information on wherever service personnel are likely to be stationed, and this is a good way to begin. Pre-deployment training for units and individual replacements includes cultural awareness in its curriculum. Such training must begin early, indeed much of it already exists in the curricula of our educational institutions, and it rests upon both hard knowledge and understanding. The Internet is another excellent source of information that offers virtually unlimited insights into the culture, customs, people, and geography of any country in the world. However you seek knowledge, the key is to READ! Read voraciously. Newspapers, periodicals, newscasts, films, interviews, all offer insights to provide the broadest possible base of information you can find, both on your target country and the region surrounding it.

While textbooks and motivated teachers can impart geographical, cultural, and religious background information to prepare us for overseas assignments, it is the intangible element of understanding that will ultimately define or limit success. We must be able to both understand what drives the foreigner to act as he does, and to impart to him an understanding of what motivates us as Americans. He needs to see our point of view. This does not mean that we need to challenge his own beliefs and values to win him over, but we need not reject any tenets of our own beliefs either, because that would accomplish nothing except to cause him to lose respect for us. In short, you don’t need to “go native” to get your job done; always remember this.

Learning a foreign language can be difficult, but it can pay dividends in your understanding of a nation and its people, and in communicating with them. Aside from the obvious cultural benefits, knowing the host country language can provide access
to intelligence information that would be otherwise beyond our grasp, and speaking the local language can prevent many of the misunderstandings that can damage U.S. relations with the locals and thus hamper mission accomplishment. But I must warn you that once local nationals learn that you can speak their language you will get more attention than you had counted on, and you cannot let this distract you from doing your job.

Another point: you must understand the U.S. position on issues that affect the locals, and support that position without getting drawn into lengthy debate or confrontation on U.S. foreign policy. Refer media questions to your unit public affairs officer, and focus on accomplishing the mission you were sent there to do. Remember that you are part of a team, and that the members of that team support one another. Host nation personnel should understand that as a professional Soldier you owe your allegiance — and time — to the United States of America, and that this is your top priority. If they cannot grasp that concept, or if they try to induce you to change your priorities, ignore them and focus on the mission. The words duty, honor, and country well define the priorities of an ambassador in uniform, and they must be our touchstone as we go about our duties.

Another important quality to cultivate is self-discipline; as an American in uniform, you will be closely observed, both by those who hope to emulate you and by others with more sinister motives. Any moral or personal weakness will soon be revealed, and in the worst possible light; if such should happen you will lose the respect of those who support you and lend credence to the accusations of your enemies. But worst of all, you will have brought discredit upon the uniform and the nation it represents, something that none of us must ever permit.

In closing, let me stress that the role of an ambassador in uniform is an informal one; it carries no credentials, it requires no accreditation by the Department of State, and Soldiers seldom take part in the pomp and ceremonies that are a part of state functions. Their role is a far different one than the often high visibility functions performed by our diplomats, but one that can nevertheless have far-reaching consequences because of its direct interaction with the citizens of another country. We must make sure that we are correctly perceived as honest, disciplined professionals who are proud to wear the uniform of the United States of America, and that those who come in contact with us know we are in their country to do a job that is in the best interests of both nations. To put it simply, when you are overseas carry yourself as you would in America and do your job to the best of your ability. In this way you will show them what it means to be an American. Now go out there and show the colors. God bless America!

Colonel Robert B. Nett, U.S. Army, Retired, entered military service in 1940 as a private in the Connecticut National Guard and later served as a platoon sergeant in the Pacific war zone. He graduated from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning in December 1942 and returned to the Pacific to participate in the liberation of the Philippine Islands. On December 14, 1944, he earned the Medal of Honor for his actions, including hand-to-hand combat, during an operation in which he was wounded three times. Colonel Nett went on to serve in two more wars, in Korea and Vietnam, before retiring in 1973.
At the request of the late President Hafiz Al-Asad in 1986, the first of three volumes on the history of the Syrian Army was published in 2000 titled History of the Syrian Arab Army/Al-Tareekh Al-Jaish Al-Arabi Al-Soori and edited by General Mustafa Tlas. Volume 1: 1901-1948 was produced by the Center for Military Studies in Damascus, Syria. The first volume is 568 pages and covers the Arab Revolt, short-lived monarchy under King Feisal bin Hussein, the French Mandate, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and finally Syrian independence in 1949. Volume 2 will detail the army’s history from 1949 to 1970, and include chapters on the 1958 union with Egypt and the 1970 coup that brought Hafez al-Asad to power. The contents of the second volume are expected to be politically charged as Baathist, Nasserist, and Socialist officers vied for control of Syria in 1960s. The third volume covers the period from 1973 to 2000, and will include the Syrian army’s role in the 1973 Yom-Kippur War and its intervention in Lebanon. No mention is made of Syria’s role in Operation Desert Storm. Thus far only the first volume had been available in the United States, and it is not clear whether the two other volumes have been published.

This essay focuses primarily on the Prussianization and nationalization of Arab officers during the late Ottoman period, the Arab Revolt (1916-1918), the five-month period in which Syria was under Arab rule in 1920, and finally the Battle of Maysalun that enforced the French mandate on Syria in 1920 and is considered by Syrian military decision-makers as their Alamo. This is a major work of modern Arab military history. Little is known about the Syrian armed forces, and this volume demonstrates aspects of its history that are important to the Syrian military leadership. This review translates and analyzes excerpts of the first volume and represents the view of history from the Syrian military perspective. To get a fuller view of the Arab Revolt, readers should explore British, French, and Arabic accounts. Perhaps one of the best articles in English detailing the Arab Revolt was written by Major Maxwell Orme Johnson entitled, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu to Aqaba,” which was published in the December 1982 edition of Military Affairs (Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 194-201).

The Ottoman Period (1901-1918)

Upon the accession of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in 1876, the Sultan at first accepted the constitution promulgated by Midhat Pasha that same year. (Pasha is an honorific title from the Ottoman period; it was a title earned for meritorious service and later became a purchased title.) Although this constitution was later suspended by the Sultan, who then had Midhat Pasha executed, it is significant because it allowed Arab subjects to enter Turkish military academies and schools. This produced an entire generation of Arab officers who would play key roles in the Arab Revolt and the independence movements of Syria and Iraq. These Arab officers were trained by German military instructors and came to realize they could take advantage of a weakened Ottoman Empire to press for Arab nationalist causes. Among the officers named in the book:

- Sami Pasha Al-Farooki: Commanded irregular Arab forces at Jebel Arab in the Levant.
- Jameel Al-Midfaee: Studied military engineering in World War I and fought against Allenby’s forces in Palestine, before switching sides and joining the Arab Revolt and organizing Prince Feisal’s artillery regiments.
- Aziz Al-Masry: Organized the first cells of Arab officers within the Ottoman Army, became commander in chief of Prince Feisal’s army, and was an important Arab nationalist figure.
- Zaki Al-Halaby: Rose from cadet to Bikbaasi (Lieutenant Colonel), became Ottoman military governor in Yemen and in 1914 commander of Arab-Ottoman forces in Syria.
- Yasin Al-Hashimi: Rose to become chief of staff of the 12th Ottoman Division along the Qifqaas Front.
- Ali Rida Pasha Al-Rikabi: Commanded an Ottoman brigade in World War I and received the surrender of the city of Damascus from its last Ottoman governor Mohammed Djemal Pasha Al-Sagheer in 1918.
- Ghalib Al-Shaalan: Attained the rank of general and
commanded the Bir Darweesh Defenses near Medina. Became chief of staff to the 48th Ottoman Brigade in World War I.

The book highlights that Arab officers served not only in the Middle East theater but in the Balkan Wars (1912-1914) and throughout the eastern front against Russia in World War I (1914-1918).

Secret Arab Societies Within the Ottoman Ranks

As U.S. forces are involved in the reconstruction of the Iraqi Army, it is vital that we draw lessons from the past. What made so many Ottoman officers of Arab origin join the Arab Revolt, led by Sherief Hussein, was their aspirations for Arab independence from Turkey and their organization of cells within the Ottoman ranks. The book reveals two major groups under which many Arab officers and noncommissioned officers joined; they were:

- **Jamiat Al-Arabiyah Al-Fatat** (The Arab Youth Group) — Formed by Iraqis and Syrians studying in Paris in 1909, this group aspired to Arab statehood in Mesopotamia and the Levant. When World War I broke out, they moved to Beirut and then Damascus, where they began recruiting like-minded Arab officers within the Ottoman Army. The group’s military leader was Ali Rida Al-Rikaabi.

- **Jamiah Al-Qahtaniyah** (The Qahtaniyah Group) — This was formed in 1910 by Minister of Religious Affairs (Awqaf) Khaleel Pasha Hamadah in Constantinople. The organization included a civil-leader, Abdul-Hamid Zabarawi, and military leader, Aziz Al-Masry. This group organized cells among Arab civil and military leaders in Beirut, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The Qahtaniyah Group swore to destroy those who kill Arabs and organized fedayeen tactical cells. In 1914, the Ottomans rounded up 315 officers belonging to this group and implicated Aziz Al-Masry in an embezzlement scandal that drove him toward the Arab Revolt. In 1915, Djemal Pasha, the Syrian Ottoman governor, publicly executed 32 Arab officers in Beirut and three in Damascus belonging to this group.

The Arab Revolt (1916-1918)

The Arab Revolt began at dawn June 10, 1916, when Sherief Hussein, a descendant of the prophet who was stripped of his title (Sherief [Religious Head] of Mecca) by the Ottomans, led 5,000 tribesmen against the Ottoman garrison in Mecca. All Turkish outposts along the Hejaz (Arabian Red Sea Coast) fell except for Medina, which remained under Ottoman control until after World War I.

The book delves into the role of the Arab-Ottoman officers fighting in the Arab Revolt. They were driven by a dream of having a unified Arab nation encompassing what they called Al-Sham, which was made up of Hejaz, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Officers like Nuri-al-Said brought with them the techniques of modern armies learned in Ottoman academies and German tutors. They were akin to Von Steuben teaching Revolutionary American colonials, but in this case they were trying to instill discipline into the Bedouin tribesmen. Al-Said served as chief of staff to Sherief Hussein Bin Ali, who succeeded in taking Mecca from the Ottomans with 5,000 Bedouin irregulars and now had to contend with Medina (The Prophet Muhammad’s City), 25,000 Ottoman troops, and the Turkish military governor General Fakhri Pasha.

Nuri Al-Said first set about creating military training camps in Mecca under the direction of Aziz Al-Masry. Using a mix of Bedouin volunteers, Arab officers and Arab Ottoman deserters who wanted to join the Arab Revolt, Al-Masry created three infantry brigades, a mounted brigade, engineering unit, and three different artillery groups made up of a patchwork of varying cannon and heavy caliber machine guns. Out of his total force of 6,000, Al-Masry proposed that they be divided into three armies:

- **The Eastern Army** under the command of Prince Abdullah bin Hussein would be in charge of surrounding Medina from the east.

- **The Southern Army**, commanded by Prince Ali bin Hussein, would ensure a cordon was formed around Medina from the south.

- **The Northern Army**, commanded by Prince Feisal bin Hussein, would form a cordon around Medina from the north.

These armies had a mixture of British and French officers attached to them who provided technical military advice. One of these officers was T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). Lawrence remains an enigma, but by his own admission in a never-published version of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he wrote, “it was an Arab war waged and led by Arabs for an Arab aim in Arabia.” This adds credence to the Syrian version of the Arab Revolt that credits Aziz Al-Masry and other Arab officers from the Ottoman army with organizing the troops of Sherief Hussein and his sons.

The Campaigns of the Northern Army

Aziz Al-Masry had a falling out with Prince Feisal and was replaced by Nuri Al-Said, who became the chief of staff. As Nuri served Prince Feisal’s father in Mecca, his placement represents the importance of the Northern Army. In this sector of the Arab Revolt, the Syrian Army historians explain that the bulk of Arab deserters from the Ottoman army joined Prince Feisal and his northern command. After the failure of taking on Medina and its 25,000 Ottoman troops head on, Prince Feisal and Nuri Al-Said decided on a new strategy. They would fight the Ottomans for lines of communication at Wejh, Al-Ulaa, Yanbu, and Tabuk. These were instrumental lines of communication to Turkish forces garrisoned in Medina.

To secure the port city of Wejh, Prince Feisal began cultivating alliances with the northern tribes in the Sham Valley and Jebel (Mount) Arab. This not only provided him with volunteers but also secured his northern flank from attack by marauding tribesmen who were being paid by the Ottomans to stay loyal. Feisal had identified three areas of Ottoman troop concentrations in Northern Arabia and what is now Jordan:

1. Area of Al-Ulaa under the command of General Basry Pasha.
The Northern Arab Army had occupied Yanbu first and from there marshaled forces for an attack on the port city of Wejh, 180 miles north of Yanbu. Finding only 200 Ottoman troops in Wejh, they took the city in mid-January 1917 with little difficulty. This led Ottoman military planners to bolster forces in Tabuk to 500 troops, and Ma’an would be increased to four brigades, due to its importance as a central rail connection along the Medina to Damascus line. Prince Feisal shifted his headquarters from Tabuk to Wejh, leaving his son Zaid to defend Tabuk. At Wejh, Feisal began laying plans to capture the port city of Aqaba and began leveraging his success in Wejh and Tabuk to convince tribal leaders located north of Aqaba in Jebel Al-Arab and Sham Valley to support his campaign on Aqaba.

In April 1917, Anglo-Egyptian forces repulsed a major Turkish offensive against the Sinai and the Suez Canal. The Ottomans attempted to use the spring weather to move forces from Medina to reinforce the Ottoman 4th Army in Palestine. It became tactically clear to the British that under no circumstances could Ottoman garrisons in Arabia be allowed to augment the Ottoman 4th Army, particularly as the British 7th Army planned to campaign and capture Jerusalem proceeding north to Haifa and on to Damascus. It was during this time the British Arab Bureau under Colonel Calyton asked Major T. E. Lawrence to convince Prince Feisal to conduct hit and run sabotage strikes against rail lines to isolate the Ottoman troops in Medina. Lawrence trained members of the Northern Arab Army on demolition and sabotage. Among those trained were two Syrian clans — the Al-Uzm and Al-Asalee, who participated in destroying rail links between Tabuk in the south to Madain Saaleh in the north.

A political benefit to Sherief Hussein’s revolt and siding with the allies is that it neutralized the Ottoman Sultan’s call for a jihad, since Sherief Hussein was a legitimate descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Through Hussein, it was hoped that regional war could be turned into a war against the Turks for Arab nationalism.

Efforts at Wadi Sarhan

Western accounts of the attack on Aqaba leads one to believe that T. E. Lawrence took 50 of Prince Feisal’s men, attracted Bedouin tribes along the way, and then attacked Aqaba. Syrian military accounts reveal a painstaking process of cultivating alliances before attacking Aqaba. This included spending weeks in Wadi Sarhan assuring the support of the Howeitat tribe, led by Auda Abu Tayi. The Howeitat consisted of many subclans and it was up to Sheikh Nasir of Medina, Auda Abu Tayi of the Howeitat, Lawrence, Naseeb Al-Bakry, Zaki Al-Durubi and Subhi Al-Amree (last four representing Prince Feisal) to ensure that all clans of the Howeitat contributed men to the campaign against Aqaba. Aside from the Howeitat they had to secure the support of Nuri Ashaalan of the Anayzah Tribal Confederacy. In about three weeks the group was able to muster a force of 500 Bedouin tribesmen willing to march on Aqaba under the banner of Prince Feisal bin Hussein. This was achieved through a mixture of bribes and promises of a share of the plunder.

The Attack on Aqaba

One cannot understand the context and significance of the capture of Aqaba by forces loyal to Prince Feisal without following the British 7th Army. In July 1917, British forces had crossed the Sinai and were pushing back Ottoman forces from Gaza. Taking Aqaba would secure their right flank since the city contained 1,500 Ottoman troops who were waiting for combined British-Arab assault from the sea. The Turks did not tactically consider the Arab whirlwind from the desert that would envelope Aqaba and force the Turks to redirect their guns landward. The success at Aqaba led to a reorganization of the Arab Northern Army into two sections, with each section having two infantry brigades for a total of four infantry brigades: The Hashemite, 1st Aqaba, 4th Aqaba, Al-Kuweira, as well as an artillery unit and transportation company. Each infantry battalion would have a machine gun company. An operations command headquarters was also established. Both Nuri Al-Said and Jafaar Al-Askary, with help from British and French advisors, would transform the Northern Army into a more organized military unit.

The Battle of Wadi Musa

The Ottoman governor of the Levant General Djemal (Pasha) issued a military edict ordering the Hejaz railway be secured by any and all means. It was left to the Ottoman garrison in Ma’an to send forces to deal with the Arab Northern Army that were encamped at Wadi Musa. The book does not detail the size of the Ottoman force, except to say that it was a massive infantry formation supported by three biplanes. Before the Ottoman unit reached Wadi Musa, they were intercepted by 700 Arab troops under the command of Maulood Mukhlis. Four hundred Ottomans were killed and 300 were captured on 23 October 1917. Mukhlis used the escarpments and hills to wedge the Ottomans in valleys, slowly wearing down the force, and avoiding the Turkish biplanes.

The Battle of Al-Samna

The Northern Army had advanced towards the rocky hills of Al-Samna, overlooking the town and rail center of Ma’an, one of three major Ottoman troop concentrations. A battalion from the Arab North Army attempted to take the train station of the village of Al-Samna but was repulsed by the reinforced Ottoman forces under Colonel Mohammed Djemal Al-Sagheer. The Northern Army battalion lost 250 killed and 200 wounded, leading to the withdrawal of the Arabs from taking the commanding positions of Al-Samna. This battle, which took place on 25-26 April 1918, represents the first major defeat of the Arab North Army in 21 months of campaigning.

The Advance on Al-Azraq

The defeat at Al-Samna and the inability to threaten Ma’an led the Northern Arab Army to reevaluate its tactics. It focused on sabotaging rail lines and harassing distant station stops between Ma’an and Der’aa. As more Syrians defected into the ranks of the Arab Northern Army, they demanded Prince Feisal bypass the

(2) Area of Tabuk under Qaimuqam (Colonel) Atif Bey.
(3) Area around Ma’an under the command of General Mohammed Djemal Pasha Al-Sagheer. He was charged with guarding the rail lines from Ma’an to Der’aa.
garrison at Ma’an, cutting off all communication lines (telegraph and rail) as was done to the Ottoman garrison in Medina, and advance towards Damascus via the town of Der’aa. Feisal knew he needed to consult General Allenby before taking on Damascus, who was advancing towards Damascus through Palestine. Prince Feisal, unable to consult the British commander, resorted to authorizing irregular forces made of the Bani Sakhr and Bani Aqeel tribes and supported by Syrian and Arab officers to take the outposts of Al-Azraq, a key strategic location. Al-Azraq is a mandatory stop for all traffic going from the Red Sea coastal towns and villages through Jordan and onto Damascus. Using irregular forces of tribesmen gave Feisal plausible deniability with General Allenby and satisfied the Syrian officers who wanted to advance north. Allenby was successful against the Ottomans in Nablus and authorized Feisal to advance on Al-Azraq and Der’aa in August 1918.

The Taking of Der’aa
Prince Feisal used 1,400 troops, his 65mm French cannon, a French engineering company made up of 140 Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians, 32 Egyptian motorized drivers, and 30 Indian Auxiliary troops commanded by T. E. Lawrence to capture Al-Azraq and move towards Der’aa. This force was commanded by Nuri Al-Said with the remainder of the Arab North Army remaining in Abi Al-Lissen under the command of Prince Feisal in reserve. Upon reaching Al-Azraq in September 1918, more Syrians joined the Arab North Army, and Allenby’s 7th Army was engaged in the area of Al-Salt. Allenby sent word to Feisal that he needed the Arab North Army to harass the Ottoman 4th Army from the southwest as he pressed the Ottomans from the southeast. The Arab North Army and British 7th Army would then meet at Der’aa. The British troops were bogged down in Haifa, according to Syrian accounts, and the Arab North Army succeeded in capturing both Al-Azraq and Der’aa.

The book’s only tactical discussion involves the preinvasion of Der’aa which included mounted reconnaissance, and the destruction of rail and telegraph lines linking Der’aa to Damascus, Haifa, and Ma’an. The Arab North Army marshalled its forces at Sheikh Miskeen on June 26, 1918, before being given the go-ahead by the British to assault Der’aa on June 29. The army then captured the town and garrison on June 29. Ottoman forces were too drained to face the Arab Northern Army and focused on retreat and the British 7th Army.

Damascus: The Final Prize and Ottoman Surrender
One major criticism of this book is that it does not go deep into the tactics by which the Arab Northern Army captured major towns and their final push towards Damascus. The section on the capture of Damascus begins by stating that on October 1, 1918, elements of the Arab Northern Army entered Damascus on Al-Qadam Road and via Allah’s Gate (Buwaba Allah). They were followed hours later by Australian mounted cavalry that traveled through Beirut Road and entered via Jacob’s Daughter Road (Banat Yacoob). The Arab army stayed only 10 days before resuming their campaign to secure the major Syrian towns of Homs and Hama. The final battle with the Ottoman 4th Army occurred in the outskirts of Aleppo in what the Syrians would call the Battle of Khan Al-Sabeel. The combined British and Arab forces pushed the Ottomans to Al-Musalmiyah Station in Northern Aleppo. Here, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (who later became the infamous Attaturk), along with remnants of the 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Ottoman Armies, made a last defense at Aleppo. This allowed the Arab elements of his Army to be repatriated to their respective homelands and many joined the Arab Northern Army. The majority of Ottoman Turkish units departed for Anatolia on October 26, 1918, according to the book. However, history shows that Mustafa Kemal held out in Aleppo until Armistice Day, November 11, 1918. The British put a stop to Arab plans to pursue the Turks fleeing towards Anatolia. This ended 600 years of Ottoman dominion of the Middle East. The modern Middle East’s problems had only begun.

The Armistice in the Middle East
The world’s attention focused on the Paris Peace Conference and the capitulation of Germany, but no attention was paid to nationalist aspirations of the likes of Ho Chi Minh and Prince Feisal who sought self-determination for their people. It is ironic that President Woodrow Wilson coined the term self-determination, which was so beloved by revolutionaries during the Paris Peace Treaty. The book offers valuable lessons into how the Ottoman territories of the Levant were partitioned by France and Britain as well as how these Great Powers saw the Arab Revolt after their victory against German, Austria-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires.
On November 23, 1918, a military edict was issued dividing Ottoman territories into occupied enemy territories (OET). The Middle East would be divided into three OETs:

* OET-South: This territory extended from the Egyptian border of Sinai into Palestine and Lebanon as far north as Acka and Nablus and as far east as the River Jordan. A temporary British military governor would administer this sector.

* OET-West: This territory included Lebanon north into Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the present-day Syrian coastline including the port cities of Tripoli and Latakia, and as far north as Alexandretta. A temporary French military governor would administer this sector.

* OET-East: This territory included the internal hinterlands of Syria, and encompassed the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. This sector would be administered for Prince Feisal by General Ali Rida Al-Rikabi.

Arabs would control OET-East from November 23, 1918, until July 24, 1920. Prince Feisal would be King Of Syria only five months, March 8 to July 24, 1920, before being forced out by the French after the Battle of Maysalun. Prince Feisal attended the Paris Peace Conference, but it became clear when he was not received as a representative of a head of state or even the son of a head of state that his status was that of military commander and that his pleas for Arab self-rule would fall on deaf ears. Feisal gave a speech asking for Arab self-determination on February 6, 1919, but by April 25, 1920, at a conference of allied powers in San Remo, the French would be awarded OET-East and administer Syria as a mandatory power.

### Military Manpower of the New Syrian Kingdom

Away from the negotiations of Mudros, Paris, and San Remo that formally ended World War I, General Al-Rikabi set about creating a modern army in OET-East. He inherited an initial 9,000 troops and 700 officers. His staff identified officers with formal military training in German and Ottoman academies. They began assigning ranks from second lieutenant to field marshal and designated 600 enlisted personnel as NCOs.

The shortage of troops became apparent in keeping order in Syria’s major cities, for both a volunteer system and mandatory conscription was instituted. The book discusses how 17 recruitment offices throughout Syrian territory were established and helped add 8,000 troops to the ranks by 1920. The early Syrian Army only conducted two live-fire exercises in the 21 months the Arabs administered OET-East. One of those exercises involved a pass and review of troops conducted before King Feisal on April 25, 1920. Feisal gave a speech about the new battle colors of the Royal Syrian Army in which he hoped the colors never become stained by the smoke of battle and blood of men, as long as the honor of this new nation is not threatened. Through the seeds of the new army, Feisal hoped to create a nation, and only two classes of recruits graduated in 1919 and 1920. Military logistics of the new Arab kingdom consisted of 868 employees, of which 338 were women and had only 94 motorized vehicles and 114 beasts of burden.

### Equipping the New Syrian Military

Arming Feisal’s new army would be a constant challenge. After the Arab Revolt, they possessed only 15,600 rifles and pistols of varying calibers and models. During the 21 months of Arab rule, they secured an additional 3,000 rifles and pistols. Feisal petitioned General Allenby in Jerusalem for rifles but was ignored for fear of antagonizing the French. The Arab Army possessed only 200 machine guns with 10,000 rounds, 54 cannons with 50 shells each of varying calibers.

Diwan Al-Shura Al-Harby

War Committee and General Staff
Intelligence — Recruitment — Administration
Operations — Armaments — Logistics

A rudimentary General Staff was created and evolved into a War Ministry in early 1920. This ministry created an engineering section that accomplished much to renovate the Arab sector of the Levant. This included fixing the Der’aa to Ma’an section of the Hejaz railway, establishing workshops to fix military and transportation vehicles, fixing telegraph poles that skirted along the rail lines, and developing defenses around major towns and cities. Major troop concentrations included:

- 1st Army Group in Damascus with 5,000 troops.
- 2nd Army Group in Der’aa with 3,000 troops.
- 3rd Army Group in Aleppo with 3,000 troops.

Each army group has three infantry brigades and three machine gun companies. The Damascus Army Group had an extra artillery company. In addition, the Damascus Army Group was also given its own cavalry regiment of 1,726 horses.

### THE BATTLE OF MAYSALUN

On July 14, 1920, France issued an ultimatum asserting its mandate over OEF-East and demanding the withdrawal of Arab forces from the territory. On July 21, the French sent a force of 9,000 troops from Beirut and OEF-West to occupy Damascus.

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French General Henri Gouraud (on horseback) inspects French troops at Maysalun.
and evict Arab forces and Feisal from Syria.

**French Order of Battle**

A unique feature of this battle is the use of planes and tanks to maneuver through the hilly and mountainous terrain between Beirut and the French objective of Damascus.

- 10th and 11th Senegalese Brigades
- 2nd and 415th Algerian
- Three batteries of artillery from the 5th African Auxiliary
- Three batteries of artillery from the 3rd African Auxiliary
- 6 ½ artillery batteries from the 354th Heavy Artillery Brigade (155mm guns)
- Mounted Moroccan Sipahi Company with mobile machine guns
- Tank Company from the 205th Tank Regiment
- Engineering Company
- Transportation Company
- Four aircraft wings made up of three attack (201st, 202nd and 203rd) and one reconnaissance wing

**The Arab Order of Battle**

The Arabs studied the topography and deduced that a single paved way existed for French tank and motorized forces to navigate the hilly escarpments, semi-desert and desert terrain leading to Damascus. The Arab order of battle is debatable as French and Arab accounts differ. A high estimate is 5,000 men. They are broken down as follows:

- Three infantry groups, each with three infantry battalions and a machine gun company.
- Artillery regiment composed of two artillery companies.
- Hashemite cavalry group.
- 500 volunteer (fedayeen-type) forces.

**Terrain and Deployment of Forces**

The Arabs divided their forces into army groups perching themselves in a defensive fortification approximately 1,200 meters in a semicircular formation. They positioned skirmishes and artillery in a narrow gap leading up to the 1,200-meter heights where the concentration of Arab forces were located. A singular road then forks past the Arab troop concentrations to the village of Khan Maysalun to the right and towards Damascus to the left. The French used aerial reconnaissance to determine the locations of the Arabs and used a combined artillery and aerial barrage to subdue the skirmishers and fedayeen along the passes. The French found gaps around the passes that they exploited, and five French infantry formations came around the passes and worked on the center, left, and right Arab formations. A sixth infantry formation attacked the left Arab flank, exploiting a footpath from Al-Kineesah southeast of the Maysalun Heights. Further southeast the Moroccan cavalry group rode from Deir Al-Ashaeer northwest to envelope Khan Maysalun and harass the Arab force from the rear. The Arab plan would’ve stood a chance except for the introduction of the French tanks that rode through the Arab center and G-6 biplanes that provided valuable intelligence on enemy positions. It is important to realize that the Arabs did provide pockets of stubborn resistance, but the inability to match French firepower and comprehend the mobility of French forces from the air and ground caused a collapse of the center lines and retreat of the flanks. It was estimated that there were 1,200 Arabs dead and 400 wounded. Among the dead was the Syrian War Minister Youssef Al-Uzmah who died from artillery rounds in his command headquarters in Khan Maysalun. The French lost 42 dead and 152 wounded. French forces entered Damascus on July 26, 1920, enforcing a mandate on Syria that lasted until 1946.

**Conclusion**

Although a French victory, the Battle of Maysalun would become a rallying cry for Syrian nationalism and set the stage for resistance movements against the French in Syria. On July 24, 1925 and 1927 (Maysalun Day), there would be violent revolts in major Syrian cities. In order to easily govern Syria, the French pitted minority groups against each other. It was the classic tactic of divide and conquer that made the development of Syria as a nation difficult. There are lessons here in our efforts in Iraq. U.S. forces are on the right track by empowering all minorities and giving them a vested interest in rebuilding a nation torn by years of insane dictatorship.

The Arab officers of the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt played pivotal roles that remain undiscovered in western military journals. If properly motivated by the fervor of self-determination and a better quality of life, Arabs show a propensity to contribute to allied causes against tyranny, even if this tyranny comes from an Islamic source as demonstrated by their fight against the Ottomans. *History of the Syrian Arab Army Volume One* is an important work of military history in Arabic and ought to be studied carefully as a means of understanding the military perceptions of present-day Syrian military leaders.

**Author’s Note:** LCDR Aboul-Enein would like to thank Midshipman 2nd Class Samuel Boyd, a political science student at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Danielle Yaggi, a political science student at the College of William and Mary, for their assistance in researching aspects of the Arab Revolt and editing this work. This essay would not have been possible were it not for the Pentagon and University of Texas at Austin Librarians who made this work available.
A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, scans a balcony during a building sweep in Mosul, Iraq, November 2, 2005.
Staff Sergeant Paul Volino of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, talks to an Iraqi man during a search in Mosul, Iraq, October 19, 2005.
The words, “This is a Fox News Alert,” broke through the excited voices of the Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on the night of July 22, 2003. The Soldiers in the crowded tent fell silent as a Fox News reporter broke the official news to millions of viewers across the world: Saddam’s two sons, Uday and Qusay Hussein, were both dead after a six-hour firefight in Mosul, Iraq. The rapt silence that had commanded everyone’s attention moments before gave way to shouts, high-fives, and backslaps as Soldiers from the 101st’s 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, congratulated each other on their unit’s latest success in the global war on terror.

The 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, “Battle Force,” had seen combat throughout Iraq prior to this particular mission. The battalion deployed to Kuwait on March 1 with the 101st Airborne Division. In late March, Battle Force air assaulted across the international border, landed in Iraq, and first saw combat in An Najaf, a south central Iraqi city on the Euphrates River. After seizing the An Najaf airfield and securing the city, TF Battle Force flew to Al Iskandariyah, just south of Baghdad. The battalion seized several weapons manufacturing plants and massive weapons storage depots. Several days later, the unit continued its 1,200-kilometer push north through Iraq and cleared the southern portion of Baghdad. After 10 days in Baghdad securing key infrastructure and fighting Saddam loyalists, the battalion flew north again to Mosul, the third largest city in Iraq, which is about 100 miles from both the Syrian and Iranian borders. The task force occupied the northeast sector of Mosul beginning in late May and conducted

Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) fire TOW missiles at a building suspected of housing Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul, Iraq, July 22, 2003. Sergeant Curtis G. Hargrave

CAPTAIN C. QUAY BARNETT
civil-military operations and offensive operations throughout their sector of the city leading up to the raid that killed Saddam Hussein’s two sons. I deployed as the platoon leader of the battalion’s scout platoon and served in that position until mid-July, when I became the battalion S-1, a position I held until I left theater in December. Since I had a good working knowledge of the area from my time as scout platoon leader, I accompanied the battalion commander in his vehicle on all missions.

Not since World War II had specific leaders been targeted by U.S. forces in conventional warfare. This approach to combating an armed enemy resulted from the U.S. realization that to win the global war on terror, the leadership of terrorist organizations and terrorist-friendly nations must be removed from power. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden was and still is the target of coalition forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. planners determined that the Iraqi hierarchy comprised 55 key players. These were specifically targeted and placed on a “Black List” with specific rewards for their capture. Their faces were even rank-ordered on a deck of playing cards and given to the coalition soldiers. As a result of the urgency of securing these key Iraqi Ba’ath regime leaders, coalition soldiers began collecting intelligence to win the honor of apprehending the highest members of the 55-person Black List. The top three fugitives were the most known because of the media coverage that the nepotistic Saddam regime had generated from their lavish lifestyle and cruel stranglehold on the Iraqi people. In the past, the role of targeting specific leaders in a surgical strike had been the sole work of certain Special Operations units. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Special Operations units now shared a symbiotic relationship with conventional forces during these high-value target (HVT) missions.

Planning the Operation
On July 21, 2003, an informant had gone to American forces, claiming to know the whereabouts of Saddam’s two sons in Mosul. Several hours later, members of a Special Operations unit arrived at the 3rd Battalion’s tactical operations center (TOC) in northeastern Mosul. The commanders of the two units and the staff of Battle Force began to plan a raid on HVTs 2 and 3 on the V Corps Black List. The commanders’ initial excitement was tempered by their extensive combat experience, and they decided that the informant could well be part of an ambush, since the intelligence seemed almost too good to be true. They agreed to place reconnaissance on the target house during the night and to make their decision to execute the mission or to call it off at 0900 on July 22.

The majority of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) participating in the mission came from outside of Mosul, and hence lacked detailed knowledge of the terrain surrounding the target house. TF Battle Force had been operating in this sector since May and knew how the terrain could be used to the plan of attack. The SOF Soldiers created an initial plan with routes leading into the objective. However, what satellite imagery did not reveal was that the sidewalk that the assault element planned to drive over to reach the objective was several feet high. Since I knew the area well, I suggested an alternate route to the objective that would allow the assault force the surprise and speed that they needed. The SOF commander quickly agreed and, throughout the planning process drew upon the conventional forces’ knowledge of the area in his planning. His willingness to listen to the conventional forces who had been operating in the sector saved his force from confusion and unnecessary delays from obstacles along the raid route. By early morning, the two TF commanders had drafted a plan that would allow the SOF element the speed and surprise that it needed and allowed the TF Battle Force to converge on the objective with six battle positions from all directions that would seal off the objective area to prevent anyone entering or leaving. The planning was complete; now the commanders had to decide if the intelligence was reliable enough to act upon.

Throughout the night, the two units continued to refine their plan for the possible raid, and as dawn approached the tension inside the TOC began to rise with an intensity that matched the coming day’s temperature outside the TOC. Due to the sensitive nature of the mission, only a select few knew that the targets for the planned raid were HVTs two and three. As the night wore on, rumors spread around the TOC about the possible nature of the mission being planned inside. By 0830, the reconnaissance team watching the target house had observed nothing, and the SOF commander considered calling off the mission. However, both commanders agreed that since the combat power was already assembled and a simple, workable plan based on synchronization and surprise had been agreed upon, there was nothing left to do but confirm or deny the presence of the HVTs.

Execution of the Raid
Moments before 0900 on July 22, 2003, with final briefings and rehearsals completed, anticipation pushed the already oppressive heat out of the minds of the Soldiers as they prepared to execute “Operation Tapeworm.” Moments later, as the military vehicles sped through the streets of Mosul, each Soldier mentally rehearsed his portion of the operation and wondered if this would be, as their commander called it, another “dry hole,” or if this would be the final showdown for two of the most feared men in Iraq. These thoughts were soon forgotten, as all six blocking positions, manned by Soldiers from Delta and Charlie Companies of TF Battle Force, called in their operation brevity codes signifying that
they were in position. Simultaneously, the assault force quickly secured the immediate vicinity of the target house. Soon, the questions on the Soldiers’ minds would be answered, and another page of history would be written.

Throughout the night, subordinate leaders had reported to the TF Battle Force TOC to receive course of action briefings for their portion of the raid. Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, was to provide a platoon of Soldiers to man the northern side of the objective and prevent anyone from leaving or entering the objective area. Delta Company, 3-327th Infantry, was tasked to provide gun-trucks at each of the six battle positions that surrounded the objective and form the inner cordon. A squad from Bravo Company, 3-327th Infantry, was tasked to provide drivers for SOF troops as they moved into their initial positions outside of the target house. A Military Police platoon was tasked to provide crowd control and establish the outer cordon.

Intelligence gathered on Uday and Qusay Hussein stated that seven bodyguards were with them at all times, and the U.S. forces suspected that they would also have observation posts established to monitor any traffic approaching the target house. This would require a nearly simultaneous occupation of all six inner cordon battle positions as Soldiers moved into their initial positions outside the objective. Multiple routes were planned for the different elements based on a synchronized occupation of battle positions from all sides. Based on time-distance analysis, each moving element had a different trigger for initiating its movement to its assigned position.

The TF Battle Force commander received the coded confirmation that units had occupied their assigned battle positions and notified the SOF commander. The well-orchestrated movements of many moving pieces then froze in place as an interpreter, using a bull-horn, told the persons inside the house to surrender because they were surrounded. The owner of the house and his family quickly made it outside and into the custody of the U.S. forces. The hopes of a nonviolent surrender were shattered with each round that pierced the cinder blocks providing protection for the U.S. Soldiers around the house.

The Special Operations Soldiers then began to execute the breach and assault on the house itself. From the inner cordon, the Special Operations force requested that the TF Battle Force provide suppressive small arms fire on the second floor of the house. Once inside the house, the assault force realized that the only way to the second floor was a central stairway, which the four men inside could easily dominate with a hail of gunfire. With this the only access to the second floor, it was very easy for the four men upstairs to repel each assault by U.S. forces. After the first assault was repelled and two members were wounded, the SOF commander requested that the inner cordon use small arms and .50 caliber weapons mounted on the gun-trucks from the southern battle position. The TF Battle Force Soldiers at the southern battle position had also received rounds from within the house and were more than happy to be cleared to fire at any moving object on the second floor. Now that the inner cordon was providing suppression, the assault element again attempted to gain access to the second floor and again ran into the same withering hail of lead as before. Several more Soldiers were wounded in the second attempt to take the upstairs floor. The assault team pulled back again, and several teams began to move along the street to a neighboring house. The teams quickly moved onto the roof by climbing up from outside of the house. The Special Operations Soldiers’ level of fitness in accomplishing this feat was nothing short of amazing. Once on the roof of the neighbor’s house, they began climbing and jumping from rooftop to rooftop until they made their way onto the target house’s rooftop. The rooftop teams tried in vain to find a way into the second floor from the roof. With a controlled and escalated response, at the request of the SOF commander, the inner cordon began increasing the caliber and volume of suppressive fire into the second floor. Gun-trucks from TF Battle Force, along with Soldiers at the battle positions, began firing MK-19, .50 caliber, and 7.62mm machine gun rounds into the second floor.

The Special Operations unit had sustained several casualties from the initial two assaults and requested a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of their wounded Soldiers from TF Battle Force. When the call came over the radio, the TF medics were too far away from the fight to provide a rapid response, so the TF Battle Force commander asked for someone to volunteer for the CASEVAC. Three Soldiers from Delta Company and I volunteered for the mission, and we moved from the southern battle position through the open street to the gate of the house and picked up two wounded Soldiers, placed them into a HMMWV, and drove them north to a house that was secured by Soldiers from Charlie Company. The Special Operations Soldiers hydrated the wounded and provided expert self-aid to their injuries, and they were soon trying to rejoin the fight again in spite of their wounds.

Immediately after the CASEVAC team got the Soldiers to a secure location, the Battle Force commander initiated fire onto the second floor with the first of 18 TOW (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided) missiles. Due to the high volume of fire and the large caliber of the weapons, the rounds began to penetrate completely through the target house and into two more houses immediately to the north. In such a dense urban area, the impact of the rounds from the southern battle positions was now affecting several of the battle positions to the north of the objective. I was in the street near the two injured Soldiers when I started to hear rounds crack over my head. At first, I could not figure out where they were coming from to return fire; then I realized that it was .50 caliber rounds from my original battle position coming through the fugitives’ house and then through the house I was near north of the target. To avoid fratricide, the Charlie Company commander
repositioned his platoon inside the courtyard and in the ground floor of a house that was north of the house that was under fire. The impact of the TOW could be felt two houses north of the target house as the rounds penetrated through the house and continued into the homes directly to the north.

After the third assault attempt failed to gain access to the second floor, supporting fires from TF Battle Force shifted from using small arms fire to using all available firepower to level the building. The most obvious reason for this was that seven Soldiers were now wounded as a result of the unsuccessful attempts to assault the building. Meanwhile, the inner cordon battle position to the north where I was began to receive fire from buildings across the street. Many of the Soldiers’ firing positions were limited to shooting from stationary positions exposed in the street because neighboring houses prevented the gun-trucks from getting effective shots with their weapon systems. One of the Soldiers from Bravo Company who was responsible for driving the SOF Soldiers to the objective got behind the engine block on the west side of his vehicle, which was still parked in the open street, just north of the objective. He was shooting back across the street to the east where shots were being fired from inside buildings. He was shot in the arm and the bullet traveled up his arm and exited out the upper portion of his back. The shot came from inside the target house, to which he was exposed while trying to return fire across the street. This operation was quickly becoming a three-dimensional urban fight from multiple directions. I saw the Soldier from Bravo Company collapse in the middle of the open street. I ran out to the position where he was shot, thinking that the shot had come from the direction the Soldier had been firing across the street. I picked up the wounded Soldier’s Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) and began suppressing the area where I had seen shots come from. An NCO from a nearby battle position ran out and joined me and the wounded Soldier in the street, and the two of us took turns treating the wounded Soldier and securing the area. We pulled the Soldier up to a Special Operations vehicle and put him into the back. We managed to stop the bleeding, and a SOF medic ran out to the vehicle and assisted us with much more sophisticated bandages and level of treatment. The NCO and I then got into the front of the vehicle. It had also been exposed to gun fire in the middle of the street, and the glass was shattered from bullet strikes. After difficulty engaging the nonstandard transmission, we then drove the vehicle to a hasty landing zone (LZ). At the LZ, a
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter landed in an empty lot in the middle of the neighborhood to evacuate the wounded Soldier. We carried him to the helicopter and he survived after further medical treatment.

After 18 TOW rounds and thousands of rounds of 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and .50 caliber, the fourth and final assault achieved its goal of entering the second floor. On the final assault, a teenaged son of Uday was still firing a weapon from under a mattress. Members of the assault returned fire, killing him as they stormed the second floor. All four men upstairs died in the firefight; their bodies were carried downstairs to a waiting vehicle and then placed on a helicopter that took them back to Baghdad for autopsy reports and forensic dental and blood work to match their DNA to known samples of that of Uday and Qusay Hussein. Security forces were brought in to secure the site of the raid to ensure that no riots or violence were started by the indigenous population over the death of the two sons of Saddam Hussein. Later that evening, the news was made official by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez that the two bodies were, in fact, the two sons of Saddam Hussein.

The deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein were significant to the coalition forces’ mission to restore security and deny the former regime and its loyalists any hope of returning to power, and represented a major victory for the coalition. The two men were viewed throughout the nation of Iraq as cruel enforcers of their father’s and their own interests. Many Iraqi citizens believed that a corner had been turned in their quest to rid themselves of the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein and his family. There was a subsequent increase in the number of informants following the raid that opened up new intelligence on other members of the 55 “Most Wanted” list. The death of the two sons also eliminated two potential key leaders in the armed insurgency against the coalition forces. On the strategic level, the death of Saddam’s sons allowed the coalition forces a visible way of displaying to the Iraqi people during a critical phase in the transition of governments that the old regime would not return to power. Many Iraqi citizens who had suffered under the volatile despotism of Uday and Qusay Hussein celebrated in the streets of Baghdad when the photos of the two bodies were released. The people of Iraq and those prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism both achieved a great victory on July 22, 2003.

Lessons Learned

- Integration of conventional and Special Operations forces in a mutual area of operation is necessary for fostering a symbiotic relationship that will provide the SOF more firepower and support while providing the conventional forces with intelligence gathering capabilities, ending in a mutually beneficial and more productive execution of missions in the AO.

- Whenever one unit is operating in an environment or area in which they have not previously conducted operations, they should always seek the advice and input of a unit that has operated there. This should be taken to the lowest level possible to get the person or people with the most knowledge of the area to brief the new unit operating in the area.

- Command and control is second only to personal initiative in a firefight and provides the basis for demonstration of personal courage and initiative.

- The command and control element’s plan to incorporate follow-on forces is essential, especially in a non-conducive environment, and this should be a part of the planning process.

- When time allows for detailed planning, use it; if action now is better than a plan later, then establish a simple plan and brief all subordinate leaders your intent; then execute quickly.

- When receiving intelligence of a high value, it is imperative to act upon it immediately; however, that may not mean devoting overwhelming combat power to it immediately. Tactical patience can allow a commander to avoid possible ambushes or traps being set by those parties giving out the intelligence.

At the time this article was written, Captain C. Quay Barnett was a student in the Infantry Captains Career Course. Barnett had previously served as a rifle platoon leader, scout platoon leader and battalion S-1 for the 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He is currently serving as an Operational Detachment Alpha commander in the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
A Need for a Better Tool

Commenting upon guerilla warfare nearly 60 years ago, Mao Tse-Tung declared that “the guerilla swims in the sea of the people.” His metaphor has since characterized revolutionary war fought by insurgents who find sanctuary, support, and protection from the population they seek to violently change. Today, the contemporary operational environment in which the U.S. Army fights is one centered inside of large urban centers, fought against small radical groups, and is surrounded by large populations of varying cultures. To separate and kill the insurgent and terrorist from the surrounding population, and to assist with building the concept of a national will in the legitimate host nation authorities, current Army leaders need a better tool to understand a given civilian population and its culture. Operations in a violent, uncertain, noncontiguous environment require more leadership at the brigade level and below to analyze the culture of their environments and incorporate their conclusions into a synchronized plan. This analytical tool must not be a checklist, must have relevance down to squad level in terms of understanding and applicability, and must enable the individual doing the analysis to directly link their conclusions to the application of combat power. When executing full spectrum operations, leaders who analyze the civilian population using the PEOPLE (population perceptions, ethnic dynamics, organizations of influence, patterns, leaders and influencers, economic environment) technique will more effectively focus their firepower, maneuver, protection, information, and leadership to achieve the desired effects of their mission.

ASCOPE & Its Uses

When analyzing civilians and their culture, many units use the all-encompassing Civil Affairs doctrinal tool known as ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events). The current doctrinal framework of ASCOPE found in FM 3-05.401 is arguably a division and corps level tool meant for usage by Civil Affairs teams. This opinion is reinforced by the Civil Affairs Planning and Execution Guide (GTA 41-01-001). It states that “the best use of CA is against key strategic or operational targets that require unique skills and capabilities of CA forces.”

Areas are “key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s battlespace that are not normally thought of as militarily significant” (GTA 41-01-001;5). These civil areas allow commanders to identify key aspects of their battle space and assist in nonlethal targeting for Civil Affairs teams. Structures refer to “critical civil services and infrastructure that may be identified as high payoff targets (HPTs) by the unit commander.” Understanding capabilities of the area allow commanders to identify public safety and host nation governmental services that require Civil Affairs interface to assist the local population in sustaining themselves. Organizations are groups that may or may not be affiliated with the host nation government and can refer to key international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations working in the area of operation. People in the ASCOPE mnemonic refers to “all the civilians one can expect to encounter in and outside of the AO” (GTA 41-01-001;5). Though very broad in definition, understanding the civilian makeup assists commanders in defining key personnel and their linkages to the resident population. Events are “civilian events that may affect the military mission” (GTA 41-01-001;5). For example, the Civil...
Affairs guide accurately suggests that planting and harvesting season, as well as elections and riots can dramatically affect military operations.

This Civil Affairs method of analysis has been used as a quick reference for commanders when conducting mission analysis to define their battlespace and determine constraints, but does not lend itself easily to the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be used to focus combat power at the lower tactical levels. Moreover, current operations suggest that squad leaders, platoon leaders, and company commanders are the ones analyzing the civilian communities in their areas of operation, making quick decisions, and adapting their maneuver plans to the cultural issues not addressed by their higher headquarters. They are in fact doing these actions oftentimes without the assistance of trained Civil Affairs teams. There is little evidence to suggest that these small unit leaders are even using ASCOPE, or any other discernable tool for that matter to assist in their missions. The ASCOPE model, while a very good tool for broad understanding of an area and its population, really doesn’t lend itself to easy understanding and rapid applicability of combat power for small unit leaders.

These small unit leaders need a tool that is agile enough to be used in any cultural environment and can be integrated into the current model of troop leading procedures for the direct application of combat power.

**PEOPLE**

Studying a foreign culture for military necessity is not meant to better cultural awareness to promote “consideration of others” training in our combat forces; rather, it should expedite the violent destruction of our adversaries and the restoration of peace and stability to the civilian population as a whole. Using the PEOPLE model should allow leaders to accomplish both of these tasks. The PEOPLE model used for cultural analysis is not intended as a radical departure from preexisting doctrinal analysis (ASCOPE), which higher headquarters will undoubtedly pass down to company level commanders through their intelligence staffs. The acronym PEOPLE stands for:

- Population Perceptions
- Ethnic dynamics
- Organizations of influence
- Patterns
- Leaders and Influencers
- Economic Environment

The integration of the PEOPLE tool should be used by leaders at brigade level and below in mission analysis (the “C” – civil considerations portion of METT-TC) and can be directly linked to course of action development. In this manner, leaders can make their conclusions about the civilian population found in their analysis of the mission and link them into their relative combat power analysis when formulating a course of action. This tool will allow leaders to quickly determine the key groups and decision makers in their areas, identify the trends and patterns exhibited, and assess the resources available to leverage this knowledge in terms of protection, leadership, maneuver, firepower, and information. It will also inform small unit leaders as they plan to aggressively destroy enemy cadres and deny enemy influence and gain access to sensitive areas and neutral population groups. Leaders should also use it to focus and collect intelligence and protect their force and the forces of the legitimate host nation authority from harm. Leaders may apply the PEOPLE method of analysis as a means to identify and mitigate risks and accomplish the mission.

Just as using the OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain and avenues of approach) tool for terrain analysis, the sequence leaders use to analyze culture can vary. For example, before analyzing other aspects of culture, leaders may choose to analyze “Patterns” first in order to achieve an historical perspective of the people in their areas of operation.

**Population Perceptions.** The population within a prescribed area of responsibility may have several different groups, both ethnically and politically. It is important for leaders to understand the general perceptions of each group towards the United States, the Army, and the specific unit operating within that area. Understanding the indigenous perceptions will assist leaders in war-gaming courses of action. The population’s cultural makeup and their perceptions can help leaders visualize second and third order effects of their actions. For example, many Arab cultures are male-dominated societies. Traditionally, Arabs from these cultures respect strength and power. If they find themselves not in a position of strength or power, then negotiations or compromise may be used to gain the best of the situation. Therefore, bargaining demonstrates a lack of power and strength that can only be bettered through the art of negotiation. Coupled with the exaggerated threat of difficult circumstances for the one who holds the power in the hopes that he may value cooperation and wealth more than disruption and loss, bargaining is an attempt to survive on one’s own terms when one lacks obvious power and strength to do so.
through overt means. Leaders that choose to initially bargain with men of these cultures may have unwittingly forfeited their position as a powerful decision maker. Most western cultures will bargain from positions of strength to offer a measure of chivalry before they are compelled to force the issue to its certain conclusion. Without this understanding, the two groups of differing cultures are likely to talk past one another as each sits comfortable in his own position.

Knowledge of a culture’s previous interactions with western powers can also help with this analysis. Using books such as T.E. Lawrence’s *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* to analyze the Arab is as applicable today as it was in 1926. Other books and historical records can assist in studying Asian, African, Mongolian, and South American cultures. A culture’s perception of westerners is extremely important with regard to today’s fight as leaders debate when and where to commit forces. It is true that through the use of population status overlays, units can visually depict the attitudes of the communities that populate the immediate area. However, understanding their true demographics that comprise a specific area of operations may require coalition forces to physically interact with them and survey their backgrounds, attitudes, and belief systems. Leaders must also consider which relationships can be reinforced with certain groups, as opposed to what relationships need to be minimized. Information operations focused through a healthy understanding of the perceptions of the civilian population goes a long way to influencing perceptions. After all, perception is often reality.

A thorough analysis of the types of groups within an area can yield the perceptions of the immediate population. Distinctions such as tribal and family differences, ethnicity, and religious beliefs drive perception and consequently, action. For example, the city of Baghdad has a population of roughly five million people — composed of three to four different tribal affiliations, three different ethnic backgrounds (Arab, Persian, and Kurdish), and four distinct religious groups (Sunni, Shia, Christian, Secular) — each with differing perceptions of the U.S. Army and the United States. Each group views the same events in a different manner and acts on those perceptions. Moreover, the cultural attitudes and belief systems traditionally held by these groups significantly influences how they act and interact with foreign military forces. For example, some Sunni Muslims may view Americans as infidels, whereas many Shia Muslims may view the Americans as temporary occupiers in their holy land and refer to them as “followers of the Book,” non-Muslims. These distinctions are important especially when considering force protection issues and intelligence gathering.

Finally, the impacts of the local and international media are critical when analyzing the perceptions of defined groups and their belief systems. The more access to television in urban areas may influence belief systems and actions for or against coalition forces, as opposed to rural areas, when what they view as “reality” is oftentimes according to ‘word of mouth’ information. How they get their news and the type of reported news has a dramatic effect on perception and action. One telling example is the story of “Baghdad Bob” and his false reporting to the Iraqi people in April 2003 as the 3rd Infantry Division was entering the city. The assault into Baghdad exposed information realities to the oppressed Iraqi people, as well as the unreliability of their government’s message. Arguably, the assault into Baghdad demonstrated the transition of the war of maneuver with the beginning of the war of information.

**Ethnic Dynamics.** Ethnic dynamics include cultural mores, gender roles, customs, superstitions and values common to all groups. Leaders that analyze ethnic dynamics can best apply combat power and shape maneuver with information operations. The need for societal security and daily routines may be reinforced with positive information operations. Advertising the death and capture of foreign terrorists or advertising that the local government with U.S. support has just recently repaired a water plant to help a town survive can garner a majority of local support for the coalition effort.

Leaders should mentally synthesize all the ethnic diversity in their areas to determine what the common denominator issues are. These issues are generally things upon which generally all civilians of varying ethnicity can reach consensus. This may foster effective military and civil-military operations that benefit the entire civilian population, as well as persuade the majority of this population that it is in their own best interests to cooperate, rather than disrupt the effort.

One common denominator issue most cultures desire is security. No matter what the cultural background, historical lessons learned from fighting insurgencies around the world have all yielded that success depends largely on the ability of friendly forces to ensure the future livelihood of the local civilian population. By protecting lives, families, essential services and infrastructure of the legitimate indigenous authorities, a quiet tolerance develops in the population suspicious of a foreign occupation. Without this security in place, all other efforts in a counterinsurgency may become secondary. The British success in the African nations of Djibouti and Sudan, and the United States’ examples in the Philippines and Honduras, demonstrate the vital role security can play in a counterinsurgency. The goal then becomes one of isolating the insurgent in the eyes of the people as one that does not represent the group’s future livelihood and present security. In his article “Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective,” Ian F.W. Beckett stated, “some insurgencies may simply lack the ability to progress to a wider base of support where they represent narrow sectional interests as in conflicts based upon separatism or ethnicity.” By appealing to the larger common ethnic dynamics, Army leaders can better fight insurgents that represent the ethnic minority. These
insurgents must also be shown to represent a roadblock to what is commonly held as hope for the future.

By focusing on the common denominator issues, leaders may apply combat power in ways that are both judicious and effective. In this manner, leaders demonstrate dignity and respect of the civilian population while accomplishing their mission. It is possible for leaders engaged in counterinsurgency missions to capitalize on the positive issues people of all ethnic backgrounds value, even in the insurgent's own ethnic group. The insurgents can then be shown to represent violent single-issue and self-serving changes based purely upon ethnic and racial prejudice.

Organizations of Influence. This aspect of culture forces leaders to look beyond preexisting civilian hierarchical arrangements. Many Eastern cultures for example, rely upon religious or tribal organizations as their centers of power and influence, as opposed to Western cultures whose power comes predominantly from political institutions and elected officials. By defining organizations within the community (both internal and external), leaders can understand the groups who exert power and influence over their own smaller communities and which groups can assist in the accomplishment of the mission. Defining other influential organizations or groups of influence allows for effective information collection and broadcasting, as well as a means of intelligence gathering. For example, the educated persons in an Islamic culture include clerics and teachers. Where clerics have power – teachers do not. However, teachers can be very useful in providing intelligence to U.S. forces because they rely heavily upon stability to pursue their profession and better their communities through educating the masses.

It is also important for leaders to understand which significant organizations can exert influence in their areas of operation. These organizations include both state and non-state actors. Some nation-states, for example, can significantly influence U.S. operations in certain areas because of the high trafficking of foreign Jihadists across their borders to support radical Iraqi-Sunni or Wahabbi insurgents. This is also true of other nation-states that border Iraq and exert influence on the Shia majority population. Finally, international governmental organizations like the United Nations and NATO, and non-governmental organizations like the Catholic Church and International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent may be operating near U.S. forces and can lend assistance in terms of general information gathering and humanitarian relief assistance. Some NGOs, such as international terrorist cadres like Al Qaeda and Hizbollah, may support instability by cooperating with insurgents to prosecute violent attacks that cause fear and gain attention. If not properly acknowledged by coalition forces and dealt with expeditiously, their actions can clearly cause negative impacts on media, perception, security and have dire consequences for host nation and U.S. forces cooperation.

Patterns. Every culture and every community exhibit patterns of behavior. Whether it is evening and morning prayer-time, mass movement to local markets at midday, or large movements of people and vehicles that clog roadways and highways at differing times of day, populations display set patterns. Understanding these specific patterns allow leaders to plan and execute combat patrols, recon patrols and outposts, and logistical resupply. Insight to
these patterns may be gained by historical books and references, from State Department country studies, and by other people’s experiences. Prior to Operation Anaconda, planners and members of the special operations community studied the book, *The Other Side of the Mountain* by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, the history of the Soviet-Afghan War, to determine patterns and trends the Mujahideen used when fighting the Soviets in the Soviet-Afghan War. Such patterns proved useful to understand when a similar Mujahideen militia in the form of the Taliban and Al Qaeda faced the United States in the spring of 2002. Knowledge gained included the Mujahideen preference to place mortars and crew-served anti-aircraft guns at mountain bases and wadis, while electing to execute the majority of the fighting physically against the Soviets from the mountain summits. The SOF planners were able to note key habits and deduce the tactics of the Mujahideen to understand how the Jihadist/Taliban forces would fight the Americans. Historic trade and migratory routes of tribesmen between Afghanistan and Pakistan enabled U.S. planners to identify key mobility corridors and lateral routes used by the enemy in the high mountain passes.

At the battalion and brigade level, staffs can best target threat patterns and resources through trend and pattern analysis within the surrounding community. Leaders can focus company and platoon level operations to execute patrols, raids, and convoys based upon identified civilian patterns. Once leaders identify these patterns, it is important they do a continual estimate of them. This is important because as the civilians and enemy change their tactics and patterns, U.S. leaders can discontinue actions or adapt to the new circumstances.

Information operations such as deception may also be integrated into the maneuver plan assisting leaders in identifying the deception objectives based upon the identified civilian patterns.

**Leaders and Influencers.** Knowing who is in charge and who makes decisions enable unit leaders to effectively exercise governance and monitor security within a prescribed area. Many times, the spiritual leader is not necessarily the decision maker for a community, but it is important for the spiritual leader to approve the decision maker’s actions. Further, certain individuals, be they political, criminal, or terrorist in nature, exhibit enormous amounts of influence over certain groups within that population. This influence can be as simple as convincing the group to obey the law, or as complex as motivating the group to exhibit religiously-based fear and hatred for foreigners. Commanders and staff officers that identify indigenous leadership that includes religious personnel, political personnel, and criminal personnel can find courses of action that bolster coalition legitimacy within the population. The linkage of key individuals, sub-organizations and networks can assist Army leaders to unlock a terrorist or insurgent network they face in their areas of operation. Leaders must decide “who” first, then “when” to engage, and with “what.” This allows leaders to actively target these individuals with lethal and nonlethal means to negate their influence and leadership within the civilian population.

**Economic Environment.** Money and resources drive prosperity and stability. Leaders must understand how the elements of national power (DIME - diplomatic, information, military, and economic) affect the surrounding civilian community. More importantly, however, is for leaders to do an assessment of what elements of DIME are in fact lacking in their areas of operation. Usually it is some aspect of the economic prosperity that needs the most help. In 2004, the 1st Cavalry Division used the acronym of SWEAT (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash) to assess levels of economic stability in Iraq. The “SWEAT” assessments enabled the 1st Cavalry to measure the progress of civil-military projects, as well as define the level of prosperity within the local economic environment. Failure to assess economic factors of this type and take action may result in threat organizations filling the void. Beckett noted that “the U.S. 4th Infantry Divisions’ Task Force Ironhorse reported in November 2003 that between 70 and 80 percent of those threat forces apprehended for making attacks in their area were paid to do so, the going rate being anything between $150 and $500.”

By identifying the economic production base for their areas, leaders can effectively prosecute civil-military campaigns that bolster the economic welfare of the civilians in their areas. These campaigns include infrastructure rebuild projects, creating a sense of security, labor opportunities, and education. Having a job allows civilians to maintain dignity and earn respect, as well as feed their families. Commerce and labor generating activities may in fact stem the flow of “neutral” civilians from moving to the side of the enemy insurgent by giving them viable labor opportunities to make their lives better. Additionally, by repairing or creating essential services such as sewers, water, electricity, education and trash removal will inevitably win popular support and increase the level of education and health status of the community. By focusing on the motivations for civilian labor and creating essential services and prosperity where there once was none, unit leaders can effectively win the support of the people who can now feed and clothe their families with less fear of the future. U.S. military leaders can measure their results by contrasting their missions with the desired effects of building job opportunities, generating commerce flow and repairing essential services. Creating economic opportunities can protect the community against poverty and future instability. Knowing the status of the economic environment also assists Army leaders in identifying the threats to local stability. These threats can be anything that contributes to the instability of that particular area. Just as asymmetrical threats like terrorists and insurgents cause instability, the inadequate conditions of broken essential services, poverty and unemployment can be contributing conditional threats to local stability. Leaders can then target both the human and the conditional threats to stabilize their particular areas.

**PEOPLE – The Analysis Tool for Application of Combat Power**

Ideally, leaders can use the PEOPLE matrix to conduct their civil considerations assessment. Brigade and lower unit leaders can express their assessments in bullet-points when coupled with evaluating their higher commander’s assessments. The commander must assess the effects these elements have on the threat forces in their area, as well as the effects on friendly forces within a prescribed area. While seemingly common sense, evaluating these enemy and friendly effects allows for better analysis for the application of combat power.

Applying maneuver options may include
 raids, cordons and searches, ambushes, and criteria for reserve commitment. Firepower applications may include use of close air support (CAS), artillery, mortars, attack aircraft, anti-tank weapons, and the use of snipers. Techniques in the use of counter-battery fire in detecting enemy mortars may also be focused through the element of firepower. Protection application may warrant more patrols and surprise checkpoints in certain areas, the building of forward operating bases (FOBs), changing patrol routes and patterns, training host nation security forces or armed escorts for convoys. Leadership applications should include the commander’s role and defining the roles other key leaders play in upcoming missions. Finally, information applications can vary from use of media sources, engaging the population with tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, civil affairs employment, deception operations, town hall meetings, newspapers/hand bills, or use of radio and television programs to communicate the facts and reinforce the positive results the new government is accepting towards stability.

Ultimately, the bullets listed in the “CONCLUSIONS” block should be applied by leaders when making a tentative plan. After analyzing relative combat power, leaders can incorporate the civilian analysis conclusions to deduce proper application of combat power for the upcoming mission. When leaders determine possible decisive points and specific tactics, techniques and procedures for their upcoming operation, the civilian population will have been thoroughly considered. Assisting leaders with a common-sense method of problem solving for the civilian equation, the PEOPLE tool can be an effective means to plan simple and effective operations.

As combat operations continue to operate within densely populated urban areas, U.S. forces will continue to come into daily contact with civilians. Now, more than ever before, small unit leaders must grasp an understanding of the people that define the areas they occupy. These leaders must discern what drives the local perceptions and motivations, and the expectations of their leaders in terms of security, prosperity, hope and stability. Failure to consider these factors may have disastrous long term consequences for U.S. forces operating there. Most importantly, this cultural understanding can assist U.S. forces with destroying the insurgent that “swims in the sea of the people.” Combined tactical and cultural understanding allows for paring the waters and drying up the sea to isolate, engage and destroy those urban guerillas that threaten local and regional stability. Failure to analyze the civil considerations for a particular tactical mission may well result in an error having strategic consequences. Small unit leaders who use PEOPLE as a tool to assist them in mapping the civilian population within an area can transform their knowledge of cultural applications of combat power for any operation, in any environment.

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**Figure 1 — Civil Considerations Analysis Matrix.** A printable version of this matrix can be downloaded off the *Infantry Magazine* Web site (https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine) under the November-December 2005 issue heading.
I served as the 81mm mortar platoon leader for the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR), during the Battle of As Samawah, Iraq, in March 2003. This position gave me an excellent perspective of the battalion’s fire support operations during that battle.

Training at Home Station

In the months prior to the battalion’s deployment to Kuwait in February 2003, 1-325 AIR conducted training focused on fire support tasks during training cycles at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The battalion and brigade conducted numerous fire planning exercises (FPXs). These exercises consisted of key leader rock drills that rehearsed the fire support aspects of operations. These exercises focused on echelonment of fires based on risk estimate distances (REDS). During a typical FPX, a company or platoon would initiate fires on a fixed objective with the largest fire support asset possible, 155mm howitzers for example, as it began movement to approach the objective. As the unit neared the objective, they would initiate the next fire support system, 105mm howitzers, at a phase line (a fixed distance from the objective) and then shut down the 155s before reaching the risk estimate distance for that system. As the unit drew closer to the objective, it would continue the echelonment of fires in the same manner from 105s to 81mm mortars and then to
60mm mortars until it assaulted the objective. Upon reaching the final RED, the unit would shift fires beyond the objective to cut off enemy counterattack. The exercises focused on the planning of targets and the echelonment of fires to place continuous fires on the objective without assuming risk to the unit by strictly adhering to REDs. The training, however, focused on a fixed static objective with known enemy positions and no real fire restrictions. Captain Shannon Nielsen, the company commander of A Company, 1-325, believed these exercises provided essential fire support training.

“The FPX was one of the most effective training events we conducted. Having leaders (platoon leaders, forward observers, commanding officers, fire support officers) together walking and talking through their fires plan is essential. When I was a PL, I never had training that forced me to be so detailed in my fires planning,” Nielsen said.

The battalion 81mm mortar platoon, under the guidance of Sergeant First Class William Stone and Staff Sergeant Mario Barber, also conducted peacetime training prior to deployment. In addition to training the platoon on mortar crew drills and FDC processing of fire missions, the platoon went to the field and trained on the displacement and hasty occupation of mortar firing positions. These hasty occupations took place on the wooded terrain of Fort Bragg during both the day and the night. The platoon also trained heavily on hip shoot missions: fire missions received during movement that call for the platoon to halt, set up, and fire an immediate mission. The leaders of the platoon discussed the emplacement and employment of mortars in an urban environment, a subject not covered heavily at that time in doctrine or manuals. The platoon studied the material that existed and discussed various ideas and experiences from different platoon members but never had the opportunity to conduct any practical applications or training in an urban environment.

Training in Kuwait
On January 13, 2003, the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, received word that it would deploy to Kuwait in support of the growing standoff with Iraq. The task force deployed to Kuwait between February 12-16. Once in Kuwait, while waiting for the situation to develop, the battalion received two tasks for which to begin planning. The battalion planned an airborne or airland assault onto Baghdad International Airport and to secure the northern airfields at Kirkuk. In preparation for these possibilities, the battalion rigged all of its heavy equipment for airborne operations. The battalion then conducted urban operations training in Kuwait. Very little fire support training took place due to the late arrival of the mortars and howitzers being shipped by sea. The mortar platoon and the artillery battery received the equipment in time to test fire them once in the desert before operations began.

Operation Iraqi Freedom
On March 20, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began with air strikes, followed by a ground invasion. During the first few days of the war, 1-325 remained in Kuwait waiting for the go ahead for an airborne mission. As the 3rd Infantry Division drove north, the supply lines to its rear came under attack from guerrillas coming out of towns it had bypassed. On March 25, 1-325th received orders to prepare to conduct a ground assault convoy into Iraq within 24 hours. The battalion derigged its equipment, convoyed into Iraq, and arrived at Tallil airbase in Iraq on March 28. From there, the battalion received a mission to conduct an attack of the town of As Samawah.

The As Samawah mission called for 1-325th AIR to conduct a ground assault convoy to attack and destroy Republican Guard and paramilitary forces in the vicinity of As Samawah to prevent interdiction of V Corps’ ground lines of communication. The town of As Samawah held an important strategic location at the intersection of two major highways, including crossing points of the Euphrates River. The town straddled the Euphrates and consisted of mostly squat buildings surrounded by low walls.

The people in As Samawah were largely poor, overwhelmingly Shiite Muslim, and many held unfavorable views of the Iraqi regime; however, the enemy regime had begun moving large numbers of military and paramilitary forces toward the southern towns behind 3rd ID’s advance to continue the guerrilla-style attacks against supply lines and maintain control of the local populace. Intelligence reports stated that 1-325 faced a very mixed enemy in As Samawah, a thrown together conglomeration of
Republican Guard, regular army, and Saddam Fedayeen militia. This mixture of regular and irregular forces controlled the local populace through fear and intimidation and used the urban terrain to attempt to control the highways. Intelligence described I-325 AIR’s initial objective at As Samawah as a trench line east of the town. The battalion planned an assault on these trenches, including a plan for fires on the fixed objective prior to its clearance by infantry.

When the battalion arrived at the eastern outskirts of As Samawah at 0300Z on March 30, it discovered that the supposed trenches were, in fact, ditches and berms in an immense landfill east of the town. The enemy did not occupy this area, and the battalion occupied it without incident or contact. A railroad ran through this area, creating a large berm. A large cement factory to the west at the edge of the town, with large smokestacks, warehouses, and multistory buildings, dominated the area. The battalion mortar platoon set up a mortar firing position in the landfill oriented toward the trash dump. The companies began pushing out into battle positions to the north and northwest, overwatching roads and the railroad tracks.

As the sun began to rise over As Samawah, the enemy began to appear. At 0448Z, C Co. engaged a vehicle that tried to run a checkpoint. At 0522Z, a scout team identified seven personnel in green uniforms with AK-47s in the neighborhood north of the cement factory. As B Co. began approaching the cement factory, it began receiving effective small arms, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), and mortar fire from both the cement factory and the neighborhood north of it. At this point, the battle began in earnest.

At initial contact, the companies did not call to battalion for fire missions. The battalion mortar platoon waited at their guns, ready for a mission, hearing the gunfire and seeing the smoke rising from the battle approximately two to three kilometers away. The companies and platoons, in their very first reactions to a direct fire firefight, did not think immediately to call for indirect fire.

As the fight began to develop, calls for fire began to come in. The mortar platoon would receive a mission and be prepared to fire within two minutes. The battalion TOC, however, had to clear all fires 81mm and above. The battalion fire support element used a very slow deliberate method to clear fires. This frustrated the mortarmen who were ready to fire, and especially frustrated the companies, who wanted responsive fires. The companies cancelled their first several fire missions to battalion, not having the time to wait through the clearance process. Company 60mm mortar sections, which did not need clearance of fires from battalion, began to jump in and take the fire missions. The company commanders used their 60mm sections very effectively during the fight. The sections, co-located with their companies, could often see the targets at which they fired. The immediate responsiveness and short range made the fight ideal for company mortars, especially since the company commanders controlled them and could, in some cases, point out the area they wanted targeted to the mortar section. Ammunition quickly became an issue for 60mm mortar sections, as they were limited by the amount of ammunition they could carry.

Frustrated by the lack of calls for fire from the companies and the lengthy clearing process from battalion, the battalion mortar platoon began to assert itself into the fight. Tracking the battle on the radio, the platoon began to pre-shift the guns to enemy positions reported on the radio. The platoon leader then got on the battalion net and called the unit in contact, reporting the mortar platoon ready to fire in its support. This reminded the commanders of the battalion assets they had available and cut the response time of the mortars to a fraction of the doctrinal time standard. The pre-shifting of the guns and advertisement over the radio resulted in fire missions from the companies and got the battalion 81mm mortars into the fight. As enemy fire intensified from the cement factory, both 60mm and 81mm mortars began to pound enemy positions.

At 0650Z, the battle continued to rage between the companies, fighting from behind berms in the landfill, and enemy fighters in the cement factory and adjacent neighborhoods. An enemy sniper located on a catwalk high atop the cement factory smokestack proved especially difficult. Direct fire could not reach him, and mortar fire proved ineffective in neutralizing him. A vehicle from D Co. finally engaged the tower with a TOW missile, neutralizing the sniper.

At approximately 0800Z, the B Co. commander, Captain Gabriel Barton, acknowledged that his unit was low on ammunition and still under heavy enemy fire and began to pull back and consolidate his position. He called for a field artillery smoke mission to suppress his movement. The mission took so long to process, however, that he had to go ahead and move without it. Neither the 81mm nor the 60mm mortars could provide obscuration because they did not have any white phosphorous rounds. The battalion had moved out from Kuwait with the ammunition basic load they had drawn for the Baghdad Airport mission. This package had consisted of less than a basic load of ammunition for mortars because of space and weight constraints and had not included any white phosphorous, presumably because of collateral damage concerns. CPT Barton ended up pushing his 60mm section forward into the fight to a bowl-shaped position alongside the railroad berm to lay down suppression for his units to pull back and consolidate. The mortar section went into action and received a heavy volley of RPG fire in response but sustained no casualties. B Co. successively pulled back its platoons under fire and successfully consolidated and linked up with A Co. by 0900Z. Both companies pulled back to the east and established new battle positions by 1100Z.

At 1200Z, two OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
helicopters came on station in support of the battalion. Battalion pushed the helicopters down to B Co. and CPT Barton, giving him tactical control of them. CPT Barton directed them onto known and suspected enemy positions, targeting enemy mortars and technical vehicles. The OH-58Ds engaged with 2.75 inch rockets and Hellfire missiles, scoring direct hits on buildings with suspected enemy mortar and RPG locations and enemy technical vehicles with devastating effects. CPT Jason Hicks, the 1-325 battalion fire support officer, later stated that the OH-58Ds contribution to the fight, especially their ability to locate enemy positions, engage them with their own weapon systems, and observe indirect fires from battalion on them, proved invaluable to the battalion.

At approximately 1500Z, Navy F-18 Hornets came on station. An Air Force ETAC team attached to the battalion directed them on three runs, dropping three 500-pound bombs onto a warehouse in the cement factory used heavily by the enemy, completely destroying the building.

That evening the fighting in the area of the cement factory died down. The 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment pushed forward to conduct a feint against the bridges over the Euphrates. This feint had two purposes: first to fix enemy forces on the other side of the river to prevent them from repositioning against the 3rd Infantry Division, conducting a crossing further west, and, second, to draw elements of the Republican Guard south to reinforce against the crossing so that U.S. air power could destroy them in the open. At approximately 0200Z on March 31, the attack commenced with massive preparatory fires from A-10 Thunderbolts and 105mm Howitzers from 2-319 Field Artillery Regiment, targeting the north bank of the river. The 1st Battalion’s mortar platoon also fired in support of 2nd Battalion’s attack. Following the heavy preparatory fires, 2nd Battalion, supported by the 1-41 Mechanized Infantry Regiment successfully seized the bridges and established a foothold on the far side of the river. CPT Hicks later stated that the preparatory fires played an important role in the success of the attack, denying the enemy the use of the riverbank and the ability to establish strongpoints or ambush positions against 2nd Battalion, and giving friendly forces a sense of security in conducting the assault. After sunrise the morning of March 31, 2nd Battalion was ordered to withdraw from their positions at the bridges. The 1-325 Task Force History described this decision:

There was some confusion among the troopers as to why the brigade had fought so hard to seize the bridges and then returned back to its original positions. Only later was it explained by Lieutenant General William Wallace, V Corps commanding general, during an after action review, that the attack had accomplished both purposes of fixing the enemy where he was allowing 3rd ID to bypass, and drawing reinforcements from cities in the north to move south, thus exposing them to heavy targeting by airpower.

The following day, the 1-325th AIR saw no major operations. Throughout the day, B Co. still overwatching the cement factory, observed movement of enemy vehicles and personnel. Forward observers called for fire, and the 81mm mortars immediately engaged the target. The battalion attempted to call for 105mm howitzers from the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, but it took five minutes to get a round on target, and the first round was so far off the observers did not even try to adjust it. The battalion attempted to call for close air support, but none arrived. The 81mms continued to engage but achieved limited effects against enemy inside of buildings and moving in vehicles. Finally, OH-58D’s came on station, and though it took B Co. about 10 minutes to talk them onto the target, they engaged and destroyed both enemy vehicles and a building used by the enemy.

That evening, as 1-325 planned its attack to seize the cement factory, B Co. identified a platoon-sized element moving to its front. CPT Barton called for an illumination mission to identify the element. The 60 and 81mm mortars had received a new type of ammunition in Kuwait not used before by any of the NCOs — IR illumination rounds. These rounds gave the advantage of illuminating the battlefield for U.S. Soldiers wearing night vision goggles without illuminating it for the enemy. The IR illumination round allowed B Co. to identify the element to its front as a friendly platoon from 2nd Battalion, preventing a possible fratricide. A similar situation occurred the following night with D Co. Captain Robert Boone, the D Co. commander, received a report from one of his Soldiers that a large group of people were low crawling toward his company’s positions. After illuminating the area with IR illumination from the 81mms, he identified the supposed threat as a herd of sheep.

At 1900Z on 2 April, 1-325 AIR began its attack to seize the cement factory. The battalion fired 105mm preparatory fires on the cement factory and had an AC-130 gunship on station in support. The AC-130 identified no enemy activity in the cement factory, however, and did not fire in support. The battalion seized the cement factory unopposed. This ended 1-325 AIR’s initial battle for As Samawah, the seizure of the landfill and cement factory, securing an initial foothold on the town of As Samawah.

The battalion and brigade continued operations in As Samawah, resulting in the capture and liberation of the town.

**Lessons Learned**

During the battle for As Samawah, 60mm mortars proved an incredibly effective asset for company commanders. Under the direct control of the company commander, they were the most responsive fire support asset, providing immediate fires on targets that could often be directly observed and pointed out to the mortar section.

The active battle tracking, pre-shifting of guns to suspected targets, and advertisement over the radio net of ready to fire status by the 81mm mortar platoon greatly increased the responsiveness
of the fires and effectively got the 81mm mortar platoon into the fight. In the heat of contact, companies did not often think to call for fire. The proactive actions of the mortar platoon brought the battalion level asset to the companies.

The 105mm howitzers proved effective when used as preparatory fires against fixed targets, such as the river bank during the feint on the bridges and the cement factory. The 105s had very limited effectiveness in other situations largely due to poor response time, relative inaccuracy, and collateral damage concerns.

The 1-325 AIR used a very stringent and time consuming clearance of fires process. This resulted in no incidents of indirect fire fratricide for the battalion but greatly reduced the responsiveness of fires and frustrated commanders on the ground. A better system needs to be developed that balanced safety with speed.

In an urban environment, indirect fire had limited effects against hard buildings and moving vehicles. Close air support, especially combat helicopters, were the most effective in eliminating these threats. The ability of company level leaders to direct an aircraft onto a target proved critical, requiring additional leader training in this area. CPT Hicks stated that the use of informal Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs) proved very important in deconflicting between aircraft and artillery. “Often we would get aircraft with little notice, so situational awareness of your location in relation to indirect assets was important,” Hicks said.

The 1-325 AIR peacetime fire support training focused on the model of an attack on a fixed site with known enemy locations, systematic echelonment of fires, and no restrictions. The situation in As Samawah proved very different. CPT Nielsen said that these FPXs are essential because they force commanders and platoon leaders to prepare detailed fire support plans, made them more knowledgeable about surface danger areas and minimum safe distances, and generated excellent discussion among leaders. CPT Hicks observed that leaders focused too much on target planning. He said, “We never know where the enemy is, and rarely fire any pre-planned targets that we plan so hard for. Most fire missions are on-call grid missions, and as long as the FSO is controlling his indirect fire assets azimuth of fire, on-call targets can be just as quickly engaged.” Fire planning exercises are excellent training tools, but should focus more on planning for suspected enemy locations, firing at opportunity targets, using selective systems based on the target, and the restrictions associated with urban areas.

Urban areas change the nature of fire support operations. While 1-325 often trained on infantry tactics in urban areas during peacetime, it placed little thought or emphasis on fire support in urban operations. In urban areas, fires are more restricted due to collateral damage concerns, and thus require more careful planning. Targets in urban areas can be harder to observe and are often located in tight areas requiring precision fires. Enemies on rooftops, in cars, inside of buildings, in towers, and in alleys all prove challenging and require varied responses. In addition, the selection of mortar firing positions and placement of mortars in urban areas proved challenging. Units preparing for the possibility of an urban fight should dedicate thought and training time to these issues, often not covered in doctrine. TTPs employed by 1-325 AIR included the placement of observers on rooftops, the use of sandbags under base plates and placement of aiming poles in cans in order to emplace them on hard surfaces, placement of mortars behind walls and in courtyards for protection, and the use of a diamond formation for the mortar platoon, with each gun facing a cardinal direction, in order to provide 360-degree coverage from within an urban area.

Finally, overwhelming firepower proved decisive in As Samawah. At both the bridges and the cement factory, the overwhelming combination of close air support, indirect fire, and direct fire devastated and neutralized the enemy. The enemy fled the cement factory in the face of overwhelming firepower, resulting in the unopposed seizure of a very complex and decisive piece of terrain. The effective planning and employment of combined fires will prove decisive on future battlefields; firepower is the distinct advantage held by the United States military. The study and understanding of fire support operations is essential for Army leaders in preparation for future battles.

At the time this article was written, Captain Jeffrey Noll was attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at Fort Benning. His past assignments include serving as a mortar platoon leader with the 82nd Airborne Division’s 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment. CPT Noll currently serves with the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT), Fort Lewis, Washington.

Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division prepare to fire an 81mm mortar outside the town of Orgun-E, Afghanistan. In urban areas, fires are more restricted due to collateral damage concerns, and thus require more planning.

Sergeant Kyran V. Adams
As the sun rises over the hills of the Babadag Training Area in Romania, the early morning stillness is shattered by the roar of a M2 Bradley fighting vehicle and a Romanian TAB-77 armored personnel carrier. The vehicles were participating in ROMEX ’05, the first joint U.S. Army and Romanian Ministry of Defense exercise to take place on Romanian soil. From July 19-31, 2005, elements from the 36th Infantry Division (Texas Army National Guard), U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), and the Romanian Army conducted platoon-level training on the hills of the Babadag Training Area. For 12 days, the Red Scorpions motorized Romanian infantry battalion and the 71st Brigade of the 36th Infantry Division fought against the “Altunan Liberation Front.” Before it was all said and done, both units would learn important lessons concerning the execution of coalition operations.

In early July of 2005, elements of the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMTC) deployed to Romania in support of ROMEX ’05. This training event gave the JMRC an opportunity to validate its expeditionary capability by deploying a training support package to a remote location while continuing to provide the same capabilities at its home station in Hohenfels and Grafenwoer, Germany. The training support package consisted of the Warhog Maneuver Task Force Observer/Controller (OC) Team, members of Grafenwoer Range Control, and elements of the Deployable Instrumental Systems in Europe (DISE) team.

The Warhog OC team provided subject matter experts to teach, coach, and mentor the training platoons. They observed the platoons as they planned, prepared, and executed each training event. Upon completion of each iteration of training, the OCs provided feedback in the form of after action reviews (AARs). These AARs were designed to allow the units, through the process of self discovery, to determine their strengths and identify their weaknesses. The OCs also provided doctrinally correct tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to increase the training unit’s ability to execute their missions.

The Range Control team provided subject matter experts in gunnery and marksmanship. This team of trained NCOs was responsible for establishing safe and challenging live fire ranges in accordance with current U.S. Army guidelines. One live-fire event consisted of advanced marksmanship with weapons ranging from the M16 rifle to the Mk19 40mm grenade machine gun. Another portion of the live-fire training consisted of a convoy live-fire range in which platoons were presented with instrumented pop-up targets that simulated an ambush of their convoy. All of these live-fire events were established and executed by the training unit in an expeditionary training environment.

DISE is a multifaceted system designed to provide state-of-the-art training feedback to equipped units. It is composed of a vest with imbedded global positioning system (GPS) and laser sensor, a laser transmitter on each weapon, an antenna that collects the battle field data, and a computer system that collates and presents the data to a viewer. All individuals operating in each training scenario were equipped with DISE. During an engagement, a blue force (BLUFOR) soldier fires his weapon at an opposing force (OPFOR) insurgent. The firing of the weapon triggers the BLUFOR laser, which in turn is registered as a “hit” on the OPFOR soldier’s vest. A signal is sent by the vest to a satellite, which relays the data to the ground based computer system. The system then converts the data to a near real-time display of the events taking place on the ground. Upon completion of the exercise, the entire scenario can be played back during the AAR to emphasize key points on how the unit executed the mission.

The platoons of the 71st Brigade were given three platoon-level missions to execute during the course of their training during ROMEX. These were:

- Conduct Convoy Security,
- Conduct an Urban Combat Patrol, and
- Conduct a Combat Patrol Live Fire.

Each platoon was given sufficient time to conduct their troop
leading procedures prior to the execution of their lanes. Each platoon was also required to execute multiple iterations of each mission at increasing levels of difficulty with respect to OPFOR strength and capabilities in order to increase their level of proficiency at each of the tasks. Every platoon of the 71st BDE was task organized with a squad of Romanian Soldiers. During the Convoy Security and Combat Patrol Live Fire lanes, the platoons were also task organized with a Romanian TAB-77, an eight-wheeled 14.5mm machine gun-equipped armored car similar to a Stryker.

During the Convoy Security lane, the platoons were tasked to escort a mission-essential HEMTT (heavy expanded mobility tactical truck) fueler along a main supply route (MSR). In the course of their mission, the OPFOR would ambush this element and the platoons were forced to react appropriately in order to protect the fueler. During the Urban Combat Patrol mission, the platoons conducted a dismounted patrol of an urban area. The platoons were presented with an enemy that forced them to assault and clear buildings within the village. During the Combat Patrol Live Fire, the platoons conducted a mounted patrol with live ammunition. During this lane, targets were lifted in order to present a threat that caused the platoons to return fire and destroy the enemy.

ROMEX '05 was resounding success. Every platoon within the 71st Brigade increased their proficiency in all trained tasks. Their motivation and demonstrated ability to learn allowed the soldiers and leaders, at all echelons, to better prepare themselves for potential deployments in the future. The JMRC also demonstrated the capability to deploy to a remote site with an effective training package. In the future, as we continue to further develop our expeditionary capability, we will be able to deploy anywhere to support any unit’s training objectives.

ROMEX '05 proved that we could train effectively with our new NATO ally, Romania. JMRC demonstrated its ability to support the European Command’s Security Cooperation strategy with individual through collective training for NATO and emerging partners.

**Major Rafael Cathelineaud** was commissioned in 1994 from New Mexico State University as an armor officer. His first duty assignment was in 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, where he served as a tank and scout platoon leader. MAJ Cathelineaud is currently an observer/controller on the Warhog Team at the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany.
It is NOT just about endangered species, cleaning up spills or being in compliance! Current operations and simulations confirm that environmental considerations include many areas that may be low on the commander’s (and staff’s) priority list, but still need to be considered as part of the military decision-making process (MDMP).

Consider the following scenario: U.S. deployed forces are about to conduct a deliberate river crossing operation against a smart, determined but outnumbered enemy. Multiple crossing sites are planned. One Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will cross at a point in the river parallel to an underground petroleum pipeline. Not far away is an underground natural gas pipeline. Both have exposed standpipes and valves on both sides of the river. The terrain is complex with a mix of small built up urban areas and rolling agricultural fields. Another BCT has a forward base established less than a kilometer away from a commercial phosphorus plant. A municipal power plant in the area of operations (AO) was destroyed by U.S. forces because the enemy was using it for hiding an anti-aircraft battery. It is harvest season and the farmers are trying to get their crops in before the rainy season starts. The U.S. mission is to destroy enemy forces, shore up the fledgling elected government, train their armed forces, and stay on to conduct support operations along with nation building. Winning the hearts and minds of the local population is an important implied task. Another key implied task is to conduct the mission with minimal casualties, both U.S. and civilian.

This was the scenario facing the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN - Engineer-MP-Chemical Schools) Captains Career Course Warfighter III culminating exercise sponsored by the MANSCEN Battle Lab. What are the environmental considerations?

1) Environmental considerations should be clearly identified during the MDMP and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). A thorough terrain analysis to include identification of the existing infrastructure would reveal that choosing a river crossing site adjacent to these pipelines is NOT a good choice. These pipelines could be blown either on purpose or by accidental artillery/mortar fires and create a significant blast, illuminate the crossing sites, spill burning petroleum product in the river and put the crossing at risk. Destruction of these pipelines would also have a significant adverse impact on the civilian population.

2) Selecting a forward operating base so close to a commercial phosphorus plant is NOT a good idea in the interest of force health protection. The fumes from this plant could make Soldiers sick. If the plant were deliberately blown by the enemy, there could be significant loss of life (military and civilian) from toxic fumes carried downwind. The destruction of this plant would also adversely impact the farming community.

3) Loss of the power plant may or may not affect combat operations much, but in the aftermath of its destruction, a lot of time, money and effort will be required to make it operational again. If destruction of the power plant is not absolutely necessary, it should not be targeted. The negative impacts of destroying the power plant should be weighed before the final decision is made to destroy it. There may be alternatives to reducing the enemy fire coming from the facility that do not require the plant’s destruction.

4) Since this is an agricultural area, there will be many feed stores in the area with agrochemicals present. These are easily made into explosive devices that a determined and desperate enemy would employ. It would be an important priority in the offensive operation to secure them, both to deny use by the enemy and to protect them for future use by the agricultural community once combat ends.

5) The farmlands, vineyards, orchards, etc., should be avoided to the extent it is militarily possible. Any follow on stability operations will be made simpler if the civilian population still has a means to make a living and stay employed. It may be necessary as part of combat operations to destroy some of the agriculture in the area, but the consequences will have to be addressed in the aftermath by the government and also by the U.S.

Other environmental considerations associated with military operations that can impact the operation include: dust suppression, insect infestations and vermin, infectious waste disposal, hazardous waste disposal and protection/preservation of historic, religious, and cultural sites.

For more information on environmental considerations during military operations, visit the U.S. Army Engineer School’s Directorate of Environmental Integration Web site at www.wood.army.mil/dei.

Lieutenant Colonel Albert M. Vargesko, U.S. Army, Retired, is a DOTMLPF Integration Specialist with the U.S. Army Engineer School’s Directorate of Environmental Integration at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He received his environmental experience with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources.
Can You ID These Rifles?

#1

Match picture with correct weapon designation

a. AKM with 30mm GP 25
b. AKM
c. AK-47
d. AKMS

See page 48 for answers and discussion.

This issue of Infantry introduces a new feature dedicated to friendly and enemy infantry weapons. In this and succeeding issues, readers will find photos and data on small arms, grenades and mines, improvised explosive devices, antiaircraft weapons and demolitions, and any other weapons that our Soldiers employ or can expect to encounter on the battlefield. As our readers around the world, you will have seen these and other weapons. We welcome your comments, and will include your photos of weapons, descriptions of their effectiveness, and the circumstances under which you have observed them in an issue of our branch magazine.

This first Weapons Corner will be an easy one. Check out the pictures and match the number of the rifle with the weapons’ designation beside the photos.
In this first installment of Weapons Corner, we present the Kalashnikov assault rifle and several of its variants. Mikhail T. Kalashnikov, a Red Army tank commander in World War II, began formulating the idea of a compact, tough submachine gun for tank commanders while he was hospitalized recovering from wounds. Assigned to the small arms research directorate in 1942, he produced the first prototype of his rifle — the AK-47 — in 1945. After testing, the weapon was accepted for service in 1947 and fielded to the Soviet Army starting in 1949. The AK-47 and its variants have been manufactured in at least nine other countries, and U.S. forces have faced it in combat across the globe in large numbers ever since the earliest days of the war in Vietnam. The standard box magazine for the Kalashnikov assault rifle hold 30 rounds, although the rifle may be seen with 20-round box, 60-round double stack, and 100-round banana magazines, and a 75-round drum. The 7.62x39mm cartridge is slightly less powerful than the popular .30-30 Winchester Center Fire hunting round, but the round’s ballistic performance is similar. The 7.62x39mm is so named because of the 7.62mm bullet (.308 caliber) and its 39mm long cartridge case. This is the standard European system of cartridge designation: the 7.62 NATO round is the 7.62x51mm in European parlance, and the German 8mm Mauser service round of World War II — still in use by insurgents around the world — is actually the 7.92x57mm.

A force protection note: huge numbers of Kalashnikovs and their variants have been captured by U.S. and Coalition forces, and some were sabotaged prior to capture, particularly the SVD sniper rifles. In at least two cases, the upper handguards of the SVDs had been removed, a hole bored through the barrel or chamber, and the handguards replaced. All captured weapons must be inspected by an armorer before they are fired or issued for training.

The illustrations and weapons information have been provided courtesy of Geoff Wollin, G-2 Directorate, United States Army Infantry Center.

Differences Between the Kalashnikovs
AK-47
• Milled/machined receiver
• More robust and reliable
• Older than the AKM
• More expensive to produce
• Many different variants

AKM
• “M” stands for modernized
• Stamped receiver
• Easily identified by the numerous rivets
• Shorter life span
• Numerous variants as well

Technical Data

| Overall Length: AK-47 - 900mm |
| AKS-47 - 550 - 800mm |
| Feed Device: |
| 30-rd box magazine |
| 60-nd “Double Stack” |
| 20-nd box magazine |
| 75-nd drum |
| 100-nd “Banana” magazine |
| Weight loaded: |
| AK-47: 9.5 lbs |
| AKM: 7 lbs |

Weapon and Cartridge Characteristics

Type of operation: Gas operated
Magazine capacity: 30 rounds
Overall length of rifle: 31.5 inches
Weight, loaded: 9.5 pounds
Bullet weight: 122 grains, FMJ
Muzzle velocity: 2,329 feet per second
Muzzle energy: 1,469 foot pounds
Rate of fire, full auto: 600 rounds per minute

Answers: 1)B 2)D 3)A 4)C

“Thousands of people of all ages, carrying what they could, lined dirt paths, huddled beside streams, built small shelters among the banana trees or simply sat in total despair. Everywhere one looked, children were crying, their mothers and sisters trying to console them. The putrid smell of decaying bodies in the huts along the route not only entered your nose and mouth but made you feel slimy and greasy. This was more than smell; this was an atmosphere you had to push your way through. Attempting to move bodies out of the way of the vehicle without touching them with our hands was impossible. With no real protection and amongst a population that had epidemic levels of HIV/AIDS, with every body that we moved our hands became more covered in pieces of flesh. It seemed that traces of this blood stayed on my hands for months.”

The above haunting passage taken from Romeo Dallaire’s superb book, Shake Hands With the Devil, is characteristic of the intense emotions captured throughout the book. It is a book that at various times will disturb and horrify the reader. It is a book that will bring many questions to the reader’s mind, yet may not bring any immediate answers. It is a book I highly recommend.

Shake Hands With the Devil is Dallaire’s memoirs of his experience as the United Nations Force Commander in Rwanda during the 1993-1994 period. While in Rwanda, Dallaire witnessed a horrific genocide, which saw more than 800,000 people killed. The effect on him was indescribable. After his command was finished, Dallaire could not move past these tragic events. He struggled with life, and although asked frequently, would not put his experience on paper. Finally, Dallaire was persuaded to begin writing his account. In his preface, the author states, “This book is long overdue, and I sincerely regret that I did not write it earlier.” As you begin to read his account, the reader begins to see why it took Dallaire almost 10 years to tell his story. Within almost every page, the reader will share the painful emotions Dallaire felt in an environment filled with constant horror.

I believe Shake Hands With the Devil will be of great interest and importance to a very diverse audience for many reasons. First, although there are other published books on the subject, Dallaire truly gives a different perspective. The author pulls no punches on his thoughts of key events and decisions (made and not made) that occurred while he was in command and with the leadership he dealt with. As can be expected, Dallaire allows his personal feelings to influence his interpretation of the history. However, his reflection and thought will aid tremendously to one’s understanding of the tragedy in Rwanda.

Most readers should additionally find the command aspects of the book intriguing. I found myself numerous times questioning what I would do in the various situations Dallaire faced. Throughout his command in Rwanda, he dealt daily with problems in logistics and personnel, vague command and control relationships, negotiating with warring factions, and working with United Nations and NGOs (non-government organizations). The list is seemingly endless. Dallaire superbly describes his challenges and the decisions he made. Perhaps, more importantly, he is brutally honest in discussing his mistakes or lack of action. Shake Hands With the Devil is an outstanding study in the art and science of command.

Dallaire’s conclusion will also be extremely beneficial to readers. In it, the author gives his thoughts on how the genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented. Again, as throughout the book, Dallaire does not mince words when laying blame (he includes himself). Perhaps, some readers may disagree with this analysis. Additionally, he discusses how society as a whole can prevent another Rwanda from occurring. Again, I found the conclusion clearly thought provoking and valuable.

The final major area of interest involves Dallaire’s references to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Dallaire openly speaks about the subject and how it inflicted him in his latter days of command and for many years after leaving Rwanda. (This included a suicide attempt and living with chronic depression for an extended period). This discussion is very relevant to the current environment our Soldiers face. The author’s honesty to admitting the disorder is honorable and may break some barriers regarding discussing the subject. Through his words, readers will develop a better understanding of the disorder and how devastating it can be on the battlefield and years after.

In conclusion, after reading Shake Hands With the Devil, I have no doubt that readers will agree it is a book fully deserving of the recent accolades (including many book-of-year awards) received in Dallaire's native Canada. Dallaire’s book will benefit and enlighten not only Soldiers, but people in all areas of society. There is no doubt that this book will leave a dramatic impression on all who read it. It truly is an important work.


Clint Willis, with more than 30 anthologies to his credit, edited this anthology of 22 accounts of men at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ten of the stories are reprinted from nine different national magazines, seven stories are reprinted from four big city newspapers and the last five stories are taken from private sources. All of the stories combined tell the day-to-day struggle of getting a difficult job done at the Soldier level. There is no grand strategy...
BOOK REVIEWS

or theoretical war planning in this collection.

Reading through the hodgepodge of stories of Soldiers, Marines, Special Forces Soldiers, Canadian soldiers and journalists, the common theme is the experience of war at the ground level. Here, simple mistakes cause disaster. The ground-level Soldier keeps doing his job throughout. Looking closely, lessons can be learned from these men. One story tells of an Air Force tactical air control airman calling air strikes on his own position. Defense officials later concluded the airman changed the batteries in his GPS and then failed to reenter the target’s coordinates. The GPS automatically displays its location after a battery change. Simple. The story introduces the Special Forces Soldiers killed by this simple mistake.

One of the uplifting stories tells of Specialist Eddie Rivera of the 10th Mountain Division working his medic magic, running from Soldier to Soldier to patch them up, saving lives. Rivera discovers the bonds of the brotherhood of warriors, as he practically saves his unit, one Soldier at a time. Boots on the Ground is a good place to start for a ground level introduction to modern war.

An example of close combat is seen in a story written by San Francisco Chronicle reporter John Koopman, who was embedded with a unit of U.S. Marines. Six of these Marines were killed during Koopman’s tour. He remembers vividly a Marine named Evnin shooting a 203 at enemy positions and getting shot. His sergeant major helps drag him to safety. As first aid is rendered, the SGM makes a wise crack and Evnin calls the SGM an A_-shortly before being medically evacuated out. Marine Evnin later dies of his wounds and the SGM is a bit haunted by this exchange. The SGM and his Marines keep fighting, fighting through resistance, insurgent attacks and their feelings for their fallen Marines. You can feel the effect on Koopman as well. He has gotten a taste of war.

The primary contribution of this collection is this small taste of war. There is no other common theme than this, combining experiences of Canadian soldiers, Special Forces, Marines, Afghani coalition forces and correspondents. Some of the writers do bring their preconceived idealistic ideas of war. These correspondents walk alongside, but never set foot on the warrior path to realize just how hard just staying alive can be. Paul Roberts, writing for Harpers magazine wrote a story slanted negatively against U.S. forces as he makes American troops appear as buffoons trampling a mistreated, misunderstood culture clumsily underfoot. His story is lost among his cheap shots.

The few stories slanted against Soldiers are smothered in the many other stories reported and told. One key lesson emerges as two different stories told of American Soldiers killed by friendly fire. Two of these Soldiers were shot because they had their helmets off. Both were shot in separate incidents after they were mistaken for Iraqi soldiers.


It’s hard to beat the official U.S. histories of World War II — the Army’s Green Books by various authors; the AAF Grey Books by Craven and Cate; and Samuel Eliot Morison’s multi-volume dark blue work on the U.S. Navy. Gailey makes good use of these and an excellent selection of other secondary sources in a four-page bibliography. He mentions archives but the notes don’t show what he used from them. He is professor emeritus of military history at San Jose State University and has written 20 books. Pertinent to this one is MacArthur Strikes Back, Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943, which lays the groundwork for this story. In addition, the first five chapters are devoted to operations leading up to the campaign in 1943.

The remaining eight chapters cover in adequate detail that campaign. Despite the title (“New Guinea”), there is enough coverage of related operations in adjacent areas to show that the war was not too compartmented. There are several features that make this book more useful and readable than others on this period. Enemy actions and the rationale therefore are given more than usual attention. During the year in question they remained offensively-minded, though willing to conduct strategic withdrawals. There was ample space for this purpose. The contributions of the Aussies (and the lesser ones of the Kiwis) are too often neglected or minimized. The official histories are naturally Yank-centric. Here, Blarney and the forces under his command are treated in an evenhanded fashion — as they deserved while they were doing most of the fighting while MacArthur was building up his forces and a tremendous logistical tail. Attention is also called to the fact that Australia may have been a junior partner but was still the sovereign host nation with her own agenda (not one dictated by London or Washington). This included imperial ambitions not only in Dutch and Portuguese territory but in nearby British colonies. Apparently they were not as covetous of the French domain. Papuan troops are given an appropriate mention. More frequently on stage are the native carriers who performed a variety of roles and who were indispensable for some missions. They brought up a variety of critical supplies, evacuated the wounded, and helped to build roads and airstrips.

Official accounts are too often hesitant to delve into interpersonal relationships. There is no such constraint here. There was a fascinating cast of characters in this theatre. You only wish that Gailey had expanded on this. The seven maps generally serve their purpose but the shaded background (indicating topography) makes it difficult to find some places mentioned in the text. An introductory one, showing the bigger picture, would have been useful. There is a short list of abbreviations at the start of the book whereas the definition would have been handier where first used.

There tends to be a retrospective belief in the inevitability of success in every battle in which we engage. In World War II we took a number of calculated risks. In some, the outcome was for grabs or touch and go. Midway was the best known, but we also have Guadalcanal, Salerno, and Anzio. On New Guinea there was no guarantee of victory with every assault; no triumphal march of conquest. We were often on the defensive.

This is a good, compact story of the bad
with the good — including errors in judgment and intelligence estimates.

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In *Leave No Man Behind*, David Isby critically dissects more than a dozen U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids and rescues conducted in the past 60 years. These operations range from the Los Banos raid in the Philippines in 1945 to recent raids and rescues conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In between, Isby analyzes among others the Son Tay Rescue, Desert One, and Operations in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia. In combination, they make for an outstanding read and a first class book in many aspects. I would like to highlight these aspects below.

First, Isby is not satisfied with simply telling the reader what happened. The author, a well-respected defense analyst and frequent contributor to Jane’s Intelligence Review, utilizes these skills to give credible analysis throughout the book. It is this analysis that truly sets the book apart from others in this genre. Isby gives credit where it is due and places blame where necessary. His candor is refreshing and make for intriguing reading.

Second, the quality of photographs, maps, and sketches within the book are superb. Isby places two sections of photographs inside his book. Included in these are 13 color photographs of events in Panama, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Perhaps these color photographs were not necessary, but they are a nice additional touch for the reader. In regards to the maps and sketches, they are truly special. In fact, the sketches utilized are the best I’ve seen in a book. They are extremely detailed and bring the author’s words to life. The old adage, “a picture is worth a thousand words” is clearly prevalent in *Leave No Man Behind*.

Third, in addition to analyzing each specific operation, Isby utilizes them to give readers a story of U.S. Special Operations since the end of World War II. As the author progresses through the book, he adds discussion on the development and changing role of SOF since the last operation. Although several books have been published regarding this history, Isby’s ability to tie in this history with his aforementioned analysis again sets his effort apart from others.

Finally, Isby concludes his book with an excellent discussion on the future of raids and rescues and the role of Special Operations in conducting them. As Isby suggests, these types of operations will not go away in the 21st century, nor will the significant risk attached to them. Perhaps, most importantly, in the future the incredible political ramifications will also remain constant. The author’s conclusion is an excellent tie-in of his thoughts and analysis.

In conclusion, *Leave No Man Behind* is a superb book that will keep readers focused throughout its pages. For those who enjoyed William McRaven’s *Spec Ops* there is no doubt you will find Isby’s effort at least on par. Perhaps, the key difference being that McRaven focused on operations conducted by various countries, while Isby solely concentrates on U.S. operations. Regardless, Isby has written a volume that superbly analyzes the past with a clear look to the future.

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In his book *What is History?* E.H. Carr warns readers to study the historian before they study the history. This cautionary note is an apt warning for John Mosier and his book, *The Myth of the Great War: How the Germans Won the Battles and the Americans Saved the Allies*. An English professor by trade, Mosier has taken his affection for the French and, combined with interwar period course development, has written a controversial, revisionist history of the western front in World War I. Debasing the official archives of the combatants, railing against the utility of memoir literature and previously written source material, and pointing out that previous translations were incorrect, his reliance on French secondary source material might lead one to be highly skeptical of his work. But Mosier’s book adds to the debate on the history, historiography and the telling of the massacres on the western front.

Like any ambitious work on military warfare, Mosier’s work has both strong and weak points but offers little new in the telling. He simply reiterates the ineptness of both the Allied military and political leadership of the war; the crisis of doctrine as the tactics of Jomini met modern warfare with disastrous results, and the failure to grasp the technology of modern warfare and the concept of operations ingrained in the German army. Instead, the Allies relied on the simplistic strategy of attrition, which in essence is an absence of strategy, and as Mosier points out, inflated enemy casualty statistics to show they were winning. Sadly, those that fell during these suicidal attacks might have a different view.

Where Mosier’s strength lies is in pointing out in battle after battle the “gap” between reported versus actual casualties. To prove the discrepancy in reported casualties, Mosier relied on medical casualty reports as opposed to archival or official military records. The impact of these reports and visits to nearly every cemetery in Europe, presents a highly irrefutable “body count” showing the Allies suffered three times the casualties as the Germans. Another discrepancy that he brings to light is the poor quality and inaccuracy of the maps of the time. Taking battlefield maps and tourist books of the era with him, Mosier visited the battlefields and conducted “terrain walks” showing that towns on the maps were misplaced, elevations were suspect and the trench lines could not have been where previous historians believed they were. And this brings Mosier to believe that if the maps are wrong and the casualty reports are wrong, what else could be wrong about the reporting of the war?

Particularly insightful is Mosier’s interpretation of the Allied prosecution of the war. Mounting massive offensives, they drove into the strongest point in the
German lines following a consistent pattern of war: massive bombardments, advancing “on line” with fixed bayonets, poor planning and security. The Germans either attacked before the planned allied offensives or taking shelter in their bunkers, bore sighting their machine guns when the allies went “over the top,” destroying entire divisions. By 1917, the British had destroyed their army, the French refused to fight and the Germans conducted a “strategic withdrawal.” Enter the American Expeditionary Force; arrogant, fiercely independent and two million strong. They fought relentlessly against and defeated the Germans.

Particularly troubling, Mosier never fully develops the “why” of the American victory. While he points out that the American “doughboys” attacked and did not give up the fight, he dismisses the German reaction to the Americans’ reckless attacks. And this is where his book really lacks the depth of strategic and operational wisdom that comes from a complete study of available resource material. He argues that the American Army, trained by the remnants of the French Alpine Corps, employed identical tactics that von Mudra perfected in the German Army, and that is why they were able to defeat the Germans.

The argument is simplistic. There is no mention of German munitions shortages, an absence of discussing the impact of food shortages both at the front and at home, and finally he never explains why the Germans, winning the war, retreated and later sued for peace. Mosier uses the argument that the Germans were facing shortages both at the front and at home, and that is why they were able to defeat the Germans.

Myth of the Great War should be read carefully and not only with E.H. Carr’s warning in mind, but also with the pronouncement of General Giap when confronted by an American officer after every time the American and North Vietnamese armies fought in open battle, the American won. Giap’s profound response to the American “true, but irrelevant” holds true for Mosier’s book title and presentation.


Dean Joy is not only the author and an ex-infantryman, but he is also a talented illustrator, supplying this World War II account with quality pencil drawings throughout the story. The story starts with his dream of flying fighter aircraft, and follows the reality of three and a half years of wartime service in the U.S. Army from June 1943 to November 1945. The author uses his wartime diary and the book, The History of the U.S. Army 71st Infantry Division to guide his recollections. Sixty days in combat may not sound like much too some, but in the hotly contested areas, all too many friends are killed and wounded.

At a time when many WWII experiences are lost each day, this account is a gift. While Sixty Days in Combat, will not be studied by future tactical leaders, any infantryman can gain insights on the life of an infantryman and the use of mortars in combat. The author vividly describes his transformation in the crucible of training and combat from the life of a civilian youth to veteran platoon sergeant, a leader of men under extreme stress.

The disappointment of failing an eye test thrust the author into the infantry as this disqualified him for pilot training. An IQ test and one year of college got him into a program for specialized training. As so often happens, the needs of the Army interfered with the assignment and Joy ended up on the front lines as an infantryman. Although it took 20 months from induction, the author started his combat period on March 6, 1945, and came out of the combat zone on May 8, 1945, when the war was over. The Army’s replacement policy during WWII is politely assailed as stupid. Replacements could not learn fast enough to stay alive. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army repeats that mistake in Vietnam some 20-plus years later.

The value of an infantryman’s experience is the key to this book. Everyday answers to everyday infantry problems are highlights. Soldiers pissing into their helmets, then dumping it off the back of the truck because a convoy will not stop is an example of the everyday mundane details covered. The details on a near friendly fire incident saved only by a clamping collar not properly fastened is an example of the timeless experience anecdotes which could make a difference by knowing even today.

Preventable deaths are a tragedy in any war and WWII has its share. G Company’s first casualty is shot by mistake by nervous American Soldiers; this and the death of Alfred Feltman are examples of preventable deaths. A lieutenant orders Feltman to walk back to an aid station to get first aid for his wounded arm. Feltman is killed by a sniper’s bullet as soon as he stands up to walk back. That any leader’s order can send Soldiers to their death is a lesson best learned before combat. Other lessons are mixed with the mundane throughout the book, such as Joy using tracer rounds in his M1 to mark where enemy troops were replaced policy during WWII is politely assailed as stupid. Replacements could not learn fast enough to stay alive. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army repeats that mistake in Vietnam some 20-plus years later.

The value of an infantryman’s experience is the key to this book. Everyday answers to everyday infantry problems are highlights. Soldiers pissing into their helmets, then dumping it off the back of the truck because a convoy will not stop is an example of the everyday mundane details covered. The details on a near friendly fire incident saved only by a clamping collar not properly fastened is an example of the timeless experience anecdotes which could make a difference by knowing even today.

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Iraqi troops and a U.S. Soldier from the 327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, conduct a joint patrol in the village of Hechel.

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