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This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

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In January, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff approved a new small arms strategy which lays out our goals for the near, mid, and far term concerning weapon systems 40mm and below. The strategy emphasizes training, sustainment, and modernization.

The most important aspect of our new strategy is training. The Army recognizes that every Soldier is a rifleman, and it has increased the frequency of weapons qualification to twice per year and provided the ammunition necessary to support this change. To increase realism, TRADOC now requires all Soldiers to qualify wearing body armor, and it has switched from a foxhole-supported firing position to a kneeling firing position when qualifying. We at the Infantry Center will continue to update rifle marksmanship training doctrine, reflected in Field Manual (FM) 3-22.9. This FM was updated in 2003, and now includes detailed advanced rifle marksmanship information. Change 4 to the FM will be published this year with the new qualification standards as well as other advanced topics. We are also updating training aids to more accurately reflect the way Soldiers fight and we will specifically focus on updating the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000).

You have told us that most of the weapons you are using perform well and do not need replacing. Therefore, the second part of the small arms strategy will focus on sustaining our current fleet to ensure its continued performance; the M249 SAW will be the top priority. Contributing to the sustainment effort, the Army Materiel Command has developed an aggressive refurbishment plan to enable units to rapidly refit their weapons on return from deployment. AMC will pick up M249s from units, overhaul and return them, or replacement weapons, within two weeks. This is in addition to small arms inspection and repair teams that are available to assist commanders in assessing and improving small arms readiness.

Soldiers continue to hold the M4 in high regard. Army units want more M4s and we are increasing our efforts to meet this desire. In fact, the Army recently made a decision to pure fleet deploying Brigade Combat Teams with M4s in “next to deploy” order. Additional M4s will be provided to theater as “theater provided equipment” for non-BCT units. Our current M4s will also receive some product improvements. These improvements include sights and accessories such as the 4x rifle combat optic (ACOG) and improved PEQ-2. Other systems will continue to be product improved as part of the sustainment strategy. This includes the development of a lightweight M240 and product improvement of the M2 .50 caliber machine gun to a fixed headspace and timing variant. These sustainment efforts will be the focus of effort over the next two years, with product improved systems such as the improved .50 caliber beginning fielding during that time.

The Army will use emerging technology to modernize the force. Some of these efforts are currently underway. A new modular grenade launcher with an improved sight, a modular shotgun, and a semi-automatic 7.62mm sniper rifle are all in testing. These weapons could begin fielding in the next 12 to 18 months if testing is successful.

Our modernization efforts will emphasize key capabilities. We will focus on the light machine gun capability with product improvement of the M249 SAW and an improved personal defense weapon (PDW) capability.

This improved PDW capability includes focus in two areas – compact carbines and pistols. The compact carbine will be a weapon with longer range and greater lethality than a pistol. It will also be shorter and more maneuverable than either a rifle or a carbine. This weapon is intended specifically for vehicle drivers, aircrews, armored vehicle crews, engineers, construction teams, and other Soldiers whose primary duties require them to fight within smaller spaces, replacing the pistols or M16s these soldiers carry. The M4 serves in this capacity now for some Soldiers, though the ultimate goal is for a more portable weapon than even the M4. Pistols will remain in the force, and part of modernization will include improvement in capability for those Soldiers still carrying pistols. The Future Handgun System (FHS) is an ongoing Soldier Enhancement Program initiative that is intended to improve lethality, ergonomics, and reliability over the current M9 pistol.

For the future, we will develop lighter, more lethal and more supportable systems. These systems will employ emerging developments in airburst and counter-defilade munitions, non-lethal technology, and caseless ammunition. I am truly excited about the potential this emerging technology has to dramatically reduce the Soldier’s load while making Soldiers more lethal. We will continue to keep the force informed of developments in this area.

The new small arms strategy will ensure that our Soldiers will remain the best trained, best supported, and most lethal force on the battlefield.

Follow me!
Army changes Tattoo policy — The Army has revised its policy on tattoos in an effort to bolster recruitment of highly-qualified individuals who might otherwise have been excluded from joining.

Tattoos are now permitted on the hands and back of the neck if they are not “extremist, indecent, sexist or racist.” Army Regulation 670-1, which was modified via a message released January 25, also now specifies: “Any tattoo or brand anywhere on the head or face is prohibited except for permanent makeup.”

The new policy allows recruits and all Soldiers to sport tattoos on the neck behind an imaginary line straight down and back of the jawbone, provided the tattoos don’t violate good taste.

“The only tattoos acceptable on the neck are those on the back of the neck,” said Hank Minitrez, Army G-1 Human Resources Policy spokesman. “The ‘back’ of the neck is defined as being just under the ear lobe and across the back of the head. Throat tattoos on that portion of the neck considered the front, the ear lobe forward) are prohibited.”

Soldiers who are considering putting tattoos on their hands and necks should consider asking their chain of command prior to being inked.

Should a Soldier not seek advice and have tattoos applied that aren’t in keeping with AR 670-1, the command will counsel the Soldier on medical options, but may not order the Soldier to have the tattoos removed. However, if a Soldier opts not to take the medical option at Army expense, the Soldier may be discharged from service.

If a Soldier’s current command has no issue with his/her tattoos, the Soldier should have personnel files so notated that the Soldier is in line with AR 670-1, officials said. Though not mandatory, having the notation entered serves as backup documentation at a follow-on command which might feel the Soldier’s tattoos don’t meet Army regulation.

Army Deployment Excellence Award — The Army’s 2007 Deployment Excellence Award competition is now open for active, Reserve or National Guard units and installations. To participate in the DEA program, a unit is required to have executed or supported a training or contingency deployment during the competition year. The competition year begins on December 1, 2005, and will run through November 30, 2006. All units and installations are encouraged to plan now to complete in this elite competition. What’s the prize? Two representatives in each winning and runner up units in each category will receive an all expense paid four-day trip to the Washington, D.C. area to accept the unit’s award (trip includes travel, per diem, lodging, ground transportation, time for shopping, tours of Washington area and a photo with the Army’s Chief of Staff).


Upcoming Smoke & Obscurants Conference — The Joint Project Manager NBC Contamination Avoidance, Product Manager for Reconnaissance and Obscuration is organizing the Obscurants 2006 Conference. This year’s conference will consist of four days of presentations, discussions, and exhibits with an afternoon of field demonstrations. It is scheduled for October 2-5 in Destin, Fla.

Conference organizers are seeking presentations and posters on topics including but not limited to: applications of smoke in the field; current and future capabilities/systems; modeling and simulation; environmental issues; toxicology; and dissemination methods.

Visit the conference Web site at www.obscurants2006.com for more information and online registration.

2006 Warfighting Conference

The 2006 Warfighting Conference is tentatively scheduled for September 11-14.

Once available, additional conference information will be posted to the Fort Benning Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil.

Information about the conference will also appear in upcoming issues of Infantry Magazine.

Doctrine Corner

FM 3-21.10 (7-10), The Infantry Rifle Company, is approved and can now be found on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Web site (www.us.army.mil.)


For more information, contact the U.S. Army Infantry School’s Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate at: DSN: 835-7114, COMM: (706) 545-7114, or e-mail: doctrine@benning.army.mil.
Iraqi Earns Ranger Tab

BRIDGETT SITER

He calls himself “Capt. Arkan.” Arkan is his first name, and he prefers not to have his picture taken.

More than a year ago, Arkan arrived at Fort Benning, Ga., to attend the Infantry Captains Career Course and Airborne School — the first Iraqi soldier to do so. The first week of May, Arkan also became the first Iraqi to attend Ranger School and earn the coveted Ranger tab.

As the aide to a three-star Iraqi general, Arkan is aware that divulging too much of himself puts others at risk. But he’s effusive with praise for the Ranger Training Brigade and the training he’ll take back to Iraq’s new army.

“I’ve learned a lot — tactics, teamwork — all that good stuff,” said Arkan, who “saw a lot of war action” as a member of an Iraqi quick-reaction force before becoming the general’s aide. Soon, he said, he’ll be assigned to a tactical or training unit.

“This was a big hit for me. It changed my leadership 100 percent,” he said. “I will apply what I learned on the ground for my new army.”

“My new army” is the army Arkan’s served in since 2003. The 25-year-old graduate of the Baghdad Military Academy was a former member of the “old Iraqi army” under the Hussein regime. That army was one million strong, he said, but he never considered it a career option.

“You had to be close, you know, to Saddam and his people. Now it is very different,” he said. “There are a lot of opportunities. They value the soldier now.

Before, the connection between officers and NCOs was not good,” he noted. “Now they let the NCOs do their jobs and support them 100 percent. Now they value their lives, their worth — it is a different Army.”

And the NCOs value their jobs as well, Arkan said.

“They believe in what they’re doing. It’s a volunteer army, and even though the recruiting stations are being bombed all the time, they still keep coming,” he said. “They still want to serve.”

In spite of what the media would have the public believe, Arkan says morale in the Iraqi army is quite high, and that bodes well for the future of a free Iraq.

“I have a big, huge faith in the future,” he said. “It’s going to be good. It’s just a matter of time.”

Arkan hopes he has paved the way for other Iraqi soldiers to train in the U.S. He’s the first to graduate the ICCC, Ranger School and Airborne School. Another Iraqi started Ranger School this week, he said.

“When I was here before, I saw my classmates had the Ranger tab, and they were different. I knew I wanted it then,” he said. “It is good training to pass on to our units. There will be a big use for what we learn here.”

(Bridgett Siter writes for Fort Benning’s Bayonet newspaper.)

Army Stands by Official CLP Products

J.D. LEIPOILD

The Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) wants to make it clear to all Soldiers that the only two approved CLPs (cleaners, lubricants, protectants) that should be used on a variety of weapons systems are Breakfree and Royal.

In a Pentagon press briefing, Maj. Gen. Roger A. Nadeau, RDECOM commander, reiterated that the Army has conducted a battery of tests that concluded the products under recommendation since 2003 were still vastly superior to others.

“When desert ops came up in 2003, the then-director was asked to take a look at the Army’s CLP to see if there was a lubricant with relaxed cleaning and preservation qualities that, in a desert-like environment, would be exceptional in performance to what the Army had at the present time,” Nadeau said.

So the Army took a closer look at its field requirements, and solicited samples from manufacturers for products aimed primarily at lubrication. The Army Test and Evaluation Command tested 21 samples received by manufacturers, as well as the two CLPs already approved at the time, under multiple categories of application and a wide variety of operating environments.

“The tests were on four weapons systems covering handguns, rifles and machine guns …bottom line, end-state to the tests was that the superior performers in all categories turned out to be those products which were already approved by the Army,” Nadeau said.

Nadeau cautions Soldiers using unauthorized CLPs that the product may work fine on Monday and Tuesday but by the time Friday rolls around the Soldier might have created a scenario he or she didn’t see coming – “weapon failure, not on the range, but in a firefight.”

“We authorize products to Soldiers which have undergone rigorous testing, products we know that will work every time,” Nadeau stressed. “Soldiers don’t have to think about quality performance, the testing has been done ad nauseam and works across a spectrum of operating environments.”

While there are technical manuals and bulletins that tell Soldiers exactly how to use the authorized CLPs, the key to any weapon’s success is up to the individual Soldier’s training and dedication to weapon and cartridge cleaning.

“Even if the manual says you should clean your weapon twice a day, if you’ve got time, clean it four times a day; if you’ve got more time, clean it eight times a day because the one time you didn’t clean it may be the time it jams,” Nadeau said.
The Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence in Iraq was established last year to help units adapt to and train for the war against terror in Iraq as it is fought today, which is much different than it was 2003, 2004, or even 2005.

“There is a different nature of operations now,” said Army Lt. Col. Pete Cafaro, the center’s deputy commandant. “Some of the units were here at the beginning when they were fighting their way to Baghdad. Now that’s not the fight. Now what we’re trying to do is train the Iraqis so they can assume their own battlespace.”

Leaders of American and coalition units attend the weeklong course at the center, which is the brainchild of Army Gen. George Casey, commander of Multinational Force Iraq. Brigade commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders and senior staff — including NCOs — come to the center for counterinsurgency instruction. Each class has about 40 students.

Students attend the course when they come to Iraq for their pre-deployment site survey, Cafaro said. “Then they have more chance to get back to their units and change their training regimen to stress things they will need to do once they move to their area.”

Because the unit leaders know the areas they are going to, the center tailors training to unique requirements they will face. Leaders from units already in place come and discuss challenges they face and tactics, techniques and procedures they have found work. The units can also discuss the personalities of the people involved and cultural aspects of the situation that are important to the new unit.

The course starts with the fundamentals about counterinsurgency, Cafaro, a Special Forces officer, said. “Then we move to discussing foreign internal defense, which is the task of basically helping a country establish security within its own borders. That, of course, is the challenge the Iraqi government has.”

The 31-member instructor/facilitator team then brings on topics unit leaders need to be thinking about to transition from theory to actual exercises, training and operations. Part of this is the relationship among units on the ground, military transition teams, and Iraqi units. Cafaro stressed that training Iraqi army and police units is the top priority for coalition units.

Unit leaders also learn about detainee operations. It is not enough to just say a suspect is a terrorist, Cafaro said. Detainees will end up in court, so the course discusses having the right evidence in the right formats to prosecute suspects.

On the intelligence side, the center stresses getting intelligence analysts into lower levels in a unit. “Most of our information is coming from the bottom up, not the top down,” he said. “The intel analysts need to be closer to that source, so units are learning that they need to beef up their S-2 (intelligence and security) sections and push them down to company or even platoon level.

The course also encourages units to “get out of the vehicles and walk,” Cafaro said. “That is the best tactic in counterinsurgency warfare.”

The instruction also stresses Iraqi culture and history. “This helps the students understand why things are the way they are,” the colonel said. “It helps them understand some of the different segments of the population and their religion. Finally, it helps them understand that things that are important to us may not be important to the Iraqi culture and vice versa.

“For example, we put a large stock in out identity as Americans,” Cafaro continued. “The Iraqi starts with himself, goes to his immediate family and works out from there. Given what they’ve been through, it’s understandable that they don’t have a lot of love for a national government. When you are dealing with the Iraqis, you have to take that into consideration.”

For each class, senior coalition leaders speak of the campaign plan. “You are hearing it directly from the leaders,” Cafaro said. “It helps the units understand their places in the plan and why what they will do will be important to the overall strategy.”

With the growth of the Iraqi army, the center is sponsoring mobile training teams that provide the instruction to Iraqi army units at their stations.

Cafaro said the biggest challenge facing the center is to change the mind-set of the people attending the course. He called the course’s students “hard-charging officers and NCOs” who are the best in the world at applying a traditional military solution to a situation.

“But counterinsurgency is about changing peoples’ perceptions and getting them to buy into a situation,” Cafaro said. A traditional military answer is often the wrong answer in such a situation. “For counterinsurgency to work you have to get the people involved,” he said.

The center strives to get leaders to think “outside the box.” Escalation of force is one example. “We try to get people not to take counterproductive actions,” Cafaro said. “Force protection is very important, don’t get me wrong, but there are certain things you can do that are not helpful, like the escalation of force. Let’s really think about, ‘Do we have to shoot our weapons to warn people?’

“If we have to, then fine. But the nature of what you are doing is not winning you any friends,” he said. “The idea is to try not to create more enemies. If we do escalation of force and it results in some needless casualties, then you haven’t created a lot of support for what we’re trying to do.”

(Jim Garamone writes for the American Forces Press Service.)
Infantry missions conducted as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom are vast and diverse, and many involve the use of the M1114 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Our unit has been assigned such missions, to include providing convoy security for transportation assets from Kuwait into Iraq. We crew M1114 HMMWVs exclusively. When we arrived in theater and signed for the vehicles, many of our Soldiers were asking for an auxiliary mount for the turret, but their requests were driven by competing interests. Some Soldiers wanted to be able to cover a secondary sector without the need to traverse the main weapon system 180 degrees. Other Soldiers were interested in a secondary weapon system that would allow them to cover their primary sector and continue to use the front gunner’s shield for protection. Still others wanted the ability to elevate the secondary system rapidly to cover the back side of bridges as they passed underneath them.

Some gunners preferred the mount on the left side and others wanted it on the right, while some wanted it mounted on the front angle of the armor on either side of the gunner’s shield. This placement would allow them to mount a MK-19 in the main mount and have the direct fire capability of the M249 or M240B covering the same sector of fire. Some Soldiers preferred to mount the M249, while others wanted to be able to mount the M240B. Maintenance also mandated that the mount attach to the turret through the existing holes.

We took all of these competing interests and developed a versatile mount that met many of our Soldiers’ needs. Since the idea was developed by brothers named Brown (the authors - 1LT Lars and SFC Nels Brown) with the help and feedback of many of the men in C Company, the Charlie Brown Mount was born.

The idea started when Sergeant Robert Schultz found a swivel-arm machine gun mount (NSN 1005-00-406-1493) taken off an M113A3 armored personnel carrier at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office at Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda. The machine gun mount has a pivot point that allows a six-inch arm with a pintle lock at the end to rotate the gun 360 degrees. The triangular base attaches with three bolts. We then designed a platform that would mount in eight different positions on the turret armor using only the existing holes. We did not have access to raw materials that would normally be required to manufacture the platforms, so we used the M1114 fuel door that had been removed during an armor upgrade. It turned out that we were able to get all three pieces cut from the same fuel door, making it a very efficient process. We cut the bolt holes that we needed using a plasma cutter and welded a gusset and a triangular platform onto the plate, and we had the Charlie Brown Mount.

The Charlie Brown Mount secures to the outside of the turret, using the existing holes. The swivel arm rotates just above the top of the armor, allowing the gunner to stay low and utilize the cover of the armor, but also allows the gun to rotate over the top of the armor so it can be secured inside the protection of the turret. The swivel-arm also allows the gunner to comfortably fire the M249 or the M240B, because it moves the longer M240B out so the gunner can get behind it while maintaining a steady, solid position in the hatch. The M249 will rotate 360 degrees in most positions with the plastic 200-round drum, but our gunners generally prefer the cloth SAW pouch (NSN 1005-01-334-1507) and the nylon M240B nylon ammunition bag (NSN 8465-99-151-3394). Mounted guns can also be elevated with ease to cover bridges and overpasses when the Charlie Brown Mount is secured in the most rearward position on the turret without traversing the main gun mount.

The Charlie Brown mount has satisfied several different competing interests for an auxiliary weapons mount for the M1114 turret. The swivel-arm machine gun mount already existed in the parts inventory, so we didn’t have to redesign the wheel. The swivel arm allows for excellent fields of fire including traversing and elevation, weapons retention with a pintle lock that does not require a pin, and weapons security because it can be secured inside of the turret. The welding and cutting for the platform were fairly easy, as long as some type of welder and torch or plasma cutter are available. It is the simplest design that we could develop for maximum versatility. Both M249s and M240Bs have been fired from the Charlie Brown Mount at the range, and the M249 has been fired in a combat action and has functioned very effectively. Anyone interested in additional information or would like to see additional pictures, contact 1LT Brown via e-mail lars.brown@us.army.mil or contact C Co. operations at DSN 318-844-1025.
The Stryker Mobile Gun System

MAJOR JONATHAN B. SLATER

The Stryker Mobile Gun System’s (MGS) mission is to provide direct supporting fires to infantry squads during the assault. Its primary function is to destroy or suppress hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun and sniper positions, and to create infantry breach points in urban, restricted, and open rolling terrain. Additionally, in the self defense mode, the MGS provides limited anti-armor capabilities.

The purpose of this article is to provide the infantry leader an overview of MGS capabilities and the employment of the weapon system and training of its crews.

Overview
The MGS is a direct fire supporting weapon system mounted on a Stryker chassis. It has a crew of three: driver, gunner, and vehicle commander. This weapon system gives the infantry commander a rapid fire precision capability of a high caliber round, which is his personal sledgehammer.

The MGS can be fought as an organic platoon, with one MGS in support of an infantry platoon, or some other variation.

The MGS meets all the requirements of the Stryker fleet for mobility, survivability, and commonality of chassis repair parts.

Planning considerations
The Mobile Gun System has several unique characteristics that must be considered when employing it tactically. These include safety, security, and command and control considerations while integrated with mounted and dismounted elements.

Safety
Safety considerations with the Mobile Gun System are significantly above the general considerations of vehicle movement with troops. Dismounted Soldiers working in proximity to the MGS must be aware of its gun barrel blast area, critical hearing damage area, and back blast area from target impact. The firing of the MGS within an urban environment has the implications of overpressure from both the firing blast as well as the back blast, which can affect windows, exposed personnel, and loose debris. The immediate area behind the gun muzzle for a distance of 25 meters requires hearing protection to avoid rupturing of the ear drum. This safety consideration necessitates the communication of warnings to all friendly Soldiers in the area prior to firing the weapon system. The risk factors associated with each of these areas can be reduced through training and education. The most beneficial training method is to mark off the safety distances from the MGS and point of impact, then have the Soldiers see what the distances look like on the ground. Leaders should specify an identifiable location on the ground for limits of advance prior to use of the main gun.

To further complicate the safety considerations, the structure of buildings must be considered as you do not want to overmatch your target which could lead to complete demolition of the building structure, penetration of multiple buildings behind the target area,
operating in close proximity to the MGS. Although the effect of each type of round has not been characterized on every type of building, an effort is being planned to provide that data to field units in the future.

The MGS also has a significant range safety danger zone associated with its arsenal of rounds. Leaders must take those ranges into account prior to employment. For example, a gunner may choose to engage a sniper location in a building with a Sabot round. After that round impacts the sniper location, it has the potential to continue down range for up to an additional 9 kilometers. This impact will require the leader to assess the down range impact such as a town or friendly forces in that general direction.

SBCT leaders need to ensure that whenever possible, they integrate full graphic control measures into their operational plans. These include no-fire areas (NFAs), fire coordination lines (FCLs), and no maneuver areas between the MGS’ planned firing positions and targets — keeping all friendly forces well clear of the MGS’ muzzle-to-target line.

**Security**

The SBCT infantry company commander must plan for providing security for these valuable assets. When operating in an urban environment, the dead space must be observed by dismounted Soldiers. Security issues also point out the personal safety issues for infantrymen operating in close proximity to the MGS.

**Command and Control**

The MGS’s primary role is to provide support to assaulting infantry. As such, the MGS will frequently be attached in support of an infantry platoon. The maneuver leader will ensure his forces are prepared prior to ordering the MGS to fire. The maneuver force will also coordinate movement in formations and coordination of fires.

**Observations from a development exercise that was conducted at Fort Benning in August 2005 resulted in the development of the following:**

* Assault element observes impact and determines if additional rounds are required to form breach. The amount of debris and dust caused by the round exploding will take approximately 10 seconds to dissipate. *Assault leader tells MGS to shift fires prior to conducting the assault. If mounted, the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) quickly reaches the breach site, Soldiers dismount and enter breach. Then the ICVs move beyond the objective to provide far side security. If it is a dismounted assault, the ICV provides suppressing fires as needed then moves to the far side for security on the assault leader’s command.

*The MGS should have an additional sector of fire for the coaxial machine gun because main gun rounds should not be fired when Soldiers are in the gun line. *A planning consideration prior to the assault is if a secondary breach site is required for another building to conduct the breaches sequentially or simultaneously with more than one MGS in support.

*Leaders should develop blast area overlays for operations planning to ensure unit safety. Bunker engagements can be deliberately planned or occur hastily. In a deliberate attack, the MGS should maximize the use of its sights. Following the engagement it will provide overwatch for maneuver elements based on mission requirements. If the engagement is hasty, the leader of the maneuver element will order the MGS forward to destroy the bunker based upon initial contact and spot reports. The MGS will destroy the bunker per procedure and provide overwatch while an infantry squad clears what remains of the bunker.

The MGS can operate in a MOUT environment as a complement to dismounted infantry by providing precision fires with its coax machine gun while the infantry provides local security and clears road intersections to protect the MGS flank. A single HEP-T round will subdue any enemy personnel in a building should the infantry come across a strongly held position.

The MGS also brings the capability to address snipers in multistory buildings. The coax machine gun can place precision fire. The main gun can fire a HEP-T round into the window or through an opening below the floor to destroy the enemy position from below. This same procedure can be employed to clear a roof top.

There are multiple ways to communicate with an MGS crew in MOUT operations. Although FM communication is primary, the driver can monitor the movement and hand and arm signals of the dismounted element ahead of him.

Since coordination between mounted and dismounted forces is difficult, dismounted infantry without any means of communicating with the MGS crew should stay clear of the MGS due to its limited field of view close to the vehicle. Planning for MOUT movement requires the evaluation of routes due to the vehicle turning radius and main gun rotation.

**General observations and planning factors**

*FM communications should always be the primary form of communication with the MGS. *Street width can greatly affect the operation of the MGS main gun.

**MGS Ammunition**

The commander designates the ammunition mixture for the MGS based on METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops,
against tanks and tank-like targets. Creating infantry breach points. Armor defeating capabilities. It will be the primary round for blast, concussion and fragmentation are desired with secondary buildings, crew-served weapon emplacements and troops, where fortifications, and personnel.

HEAT-T round — used primarily against lightly armored vehicles (secondary armor), field fortifications, and personnel.

HEP-T round — is used against field fortifications, bunkers, buildings, crew-served weapon emplacements and troops, where blast, concussion and fragmentation are desired with secondary armor defeating capabilities. It will be the primary round for creating infantry breach points.

Sabot round — used as the primary armor defeating round against tanks and tank-like targets.

Canister round — primarily used in an antipersonnel role against troops in the open.

Training Suggestions

Breach Point Aiming — The current way to create a breach point in a building requires the MGS to fire rounds in pattern based on distances and offsets between rounds. For developing that skill, the crew should practice moving the aim point. To do this, the crew will need three or more circles cut out of cardboard or other durable material that are 30 inches in diameter and have a crosshair drawn center of the circle. This exercise requires the gunner and an assistant at the building location. The gunner will take aim on the building and direct the assistant to place one of the circles on the wall centered on the gun sight reticle. The gunner will next move the aim point based on the offset and again the assistant will position a circle centered on the reticle. After three aim points have been attached to the reticle. The gunner will next move the aim point based on the offset and again the assistant will position a circle centered on the reticle.

MGS Breach Aiming Point

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>1st Hole</th>
<th>2nd Hole</th>
<th>3rd Hole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200 meters</td>
<td>2 mils from outer edge</td>
<td>.5 mil from top of first hole</td>
<td>2 mils left or right from center line of first hole</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training Aids

MGS Training Aids

Coordination Between Gunner, Driver, and Vehicle Commander — Gunners and drivers need to work efficiently together while maneuvering in a MOUT environment. A critical skill is the rapid engagement of a target after moving from a covered and concealed position. The gunner must position the gun tube in the direction of the enemy while the driver pulls the vehicle forward. Additionally, the driver should try to slightly turn in the direction of the enemy for increased survivability. Following the gun firing, retrograde to the covered position must also be practiced as the two events will need to happen very quickly, without damaging the vehicle’s gun tube by ramming it against any covering structures.

Movement With Infantry — Familiarity of MGS crews and dismounted infantry is critical. It is recommended that habitual support relationships between specific MGS gun crews and specific SBCT rifle Platoons be formed to develop coordination and teamwork. In collective training, it is important that at the infantry Platoon level the MGS be incorporated into the training plan, specifically for breach operations, MOUT training, and movement techniques.

MGS Way Ahead

The full rate production decision is scheduled to be made in late July of 2007 following the IOTE. Additional information on the Mobile Gun System can be attained through the SBCT Transformation Portal at www.sbct.army.mil.

The following are the current manuals available regarding the MGS:

- The Mobile Gun Platoon, FM 3-20.151;
- Mission Training Plan for the MGS Platoon, ARTEP 1797F-11-MTP;
- Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Company, FM 3-21.11;

In addition to these manuals, the TRADOC System Manager will continue to provide lessons learned and additional information of the system’s evolution to the user community.

Major Jonathan B. Slater is the Assistant TRADOC System Manager—Stryker at Fort Benning, Ga. He is responsible for the Mobile Gun System. He has served as the operations officer for the SBCT Transformation Team, commander of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry (Mountain), a rifle and anti-armor platoon leader, and HHC executive officer with the 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division.
As anyone who has ever deployed knows, there are numerous missions that your unit may be tasked to perform during combat or stability operations. This particularly holds true for the infantry. Iraq has proven no different in this respect than any other conflict. In this theater, some of the most common missions that can occur for infantry units are convoy security missions. Ironically, this can be one of the least understood and trained missions for contemporary units, especially for line platoons in both mechanized and light infantry.

While serving as the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander for a mechanized infantry task force deployed to Iraq, I saw techniques that worked and some that did not during convoy security missions. Soldiers from our task force at one point or another during the yearlong deployment traveled the length of the country. I have gathered some of the lessons learned during these operations (some of them learned the hard way).

There are several different threats that the enemy poses in Iraq. These include small-scale ambushes against patrols, direct and indirect fire against fixed sites, and terrorist-type attacks with either suicide bombers or other asymmetric avenues designed to not only inflict casualties but to draw media attention. Regardless of his methods, one thing to keep in mind about the enemy we face in Iraq is that he is a guerrilla fighter. As such he tends to attack perceived weakness. If Soldiers present a disciplined and unified front, they are far less likely to be attacked than if they are perceived as lackadaisical or ill-disciplined. Especially in convoy security operations, following certain principles in planning and enforcing discipline will lead to mission success. Given the environment in Iraq, convoys should simply be considered combat patrols with the same pre-combat inspections and rehearsals.

For simplicity, I have organized the lessons learned into three different phases: preparation, execution, and recovery.

**PREPARATION:**

**Order of March.** There are several basic principles to determine vehicle order of march. If required, your convoy should be divided into three different sections: a security element, cargo vehicles, and recovery assets. You must have security elements evenly distributed throughout the convoy because on today’s asymmetric battlefield a convoy is as likely to be attacked from the flank or the rear as the front. To combat this you must intersperse dedicated security vehicles that carry crew-served weapons (CSWs). When deploying your security elements, it is important to remember that these guntrucks should always work in pairs or sections; this enables one vehicle to cover another and makes them less susceptible to the effect of an improvised explosive device (IED) or rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack. Security elements are necessary to prevent civilian vehicles from entering...
your convoy. In the event of a halt or an attack, these vehicles stop traffic and seal off the front and rear of the convoy. A large cargo vehicle is a poor choice for this job as it is not very maneuverable. However, if it is necessary to use one because of limited vehicles, use it at the front. A cargo vehicle carrying a CSW in the rear requires the truck commander (TC) to face towards the rear, limiting his ability to control the vehicle (very early in the deployment this contributed to a vehicular accident in my company). The recovery assets should always be towards the rear of the convoy, as it is much simpler to pull these vehicles forward to a disabled vehicle than to turn them around (twice) to retrieve one.

Command and Control. Having divided the convoy into three separate parts — security, cargo vehicles, and recovery assets — the convoy commander must designate responsible leaders for each section. This will enable the commander to maintain a proper span of control. If there are a large number of cargo vehicles, the convoy commander should divide the cargo vehicles into chalks and designate chalk leaders. However, it is usually simpler to have the separate chalk leaders report directly to the convoy commander rather than a designated leader for the chalk leaders. As for placement of the command and control (C2) vehicle, this is up to the convoy commander and largely dictated by METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians). It is a poor choice for a convoy commander to be the lead vehicle, however, because that TC must be focused forward for navigation and to observe threats, which would not allow the TC to focus on the rest of the convoy.

Vehicle Load Plans. These should be standardized across the convoy, as much as is practical, in order to enable Soldiers from any vehicle to very quickly know where something is stored on another vehicle. Also, once it becomes routine, Soldiers on the vehicle can quickly locate critical equipment such as a combat lifesaver (CLS) bag, without wasting time searching for it. At a minimum, each vehicle should carry several different classes of supply: CL I (food and water), CL III (usually in fuel cans), CL V (ensuring there is ammo for each of the weapons on the vehicle), and CL VIII (our unit took an ammo can and filled it with CLS kit supplies, then painted it white with a red cross). Some other useful CL V items to carry are thermite grenades, smoke, and pyro. On each of our HMMWVs my company also had a tow rope already attached and tied to the front, which could quickly be cut loose if required. However, this method should only be used for quick recovery to a more secure location, towbars being the best method of recovery. In the convoy there should be at least one towbar for each type of vehicle (it is good to keep in mind which towbars will work with each vehicle, e.g. a HMWWV towbar will not work on a HEMMT). Also, you must have two of each type of vehicle or an additional recovery vehicle. For example, if you bring only one 5-ton, Murphy’s Law guarantees that will be the vehicle that becomes non-mission capable. Lastly, any important items that are required for the mission should be cross-loaded on as many vehicles as possible to allow for flexibility. If you put all of the items on one vehicle, see above reference to Murphy’s Law.

Mission Brief. This is simply an operations order (OPORD). Anything less than this will endanger your Soldiers. We developed a template for all convoy commanders in the company to use to ensure all necessary portions were discussed. Whatever format your unit develops, it should cover all aspects of an OPORD as well as a few peculiar to convoy security missions. Every convoy must have a brief prior to leaving the base. Every person who will participate in the convoy must attend the brief. At every brief the convoy commander should discuss the battle drills for react to contact. Even though your Soldiers may have heard these battle drills hundreds of times, it is necessary to repeat them since there is always the possibility of another unit in your convoy or new Soldiers, and everyone must understand the actions he must take. The convoy commander must also discuss common convoy information, such as route, speed, distance between vehicles, communication plan, designated aid vehicle, recovery vehicle, location of towbars, identify CSW vehicles, order of march, and correct passenger and vehicle count. This last part is critically important, especially if the convoy makes any type of contact with the enemy. In addition to templated areas of heavy enemy activity, the convoy commander should also review recent enemy TTPs and enemy contacts within the last 72 hours. During our deployment, the enemy would adopt certain techniques until they were no longer effective and would then switch to something new. Lastly, the convoy commander must identify all nonmilitary who might be with the convoy such as civilian contractors, other government agencies (OGA) personnel, or VIPs and be cognizant of their location.

Rehearsals. This is a step that is very important for complicated or dangerous routes, and it is the last chance for leaders to emphasize their plan. Rehearsals can be as detailed as the time allows or the mission dictates. Our rehearsals for the road march to Kuwait took two days. For a well-trained unit, full-scale rehearsals for a simple convoy may not be necessary, but at a minimum all vehicles must make a radio check and verify the route.
Inspections. This is an absolutely crucial step for any unit regardless of its level of experience. Without proper inspections Soldiers may be heading out of the forward operating base (FOB) with broken equipment or without the equipment they need to execute the mission. It is the leader’s responsibility to ensure the unit is capable of conducting its mission, and a pre-combat inspection (PCI) is the best way. My old brigade command sergeant major had a favorite saying: “Don’t expect what you don’t inspect.” It is absolutely true.

EXECUTION:

Own the Road. While deployed in a combat zone, the convoy commander is responsible for the conduct of his convoy. It is important not to frustrate the civilian population by driving aggressively without cause. This only upsets the delicate balance of maintaining influence over the civilian population and may facilitate the enemy. There is, however, a priority to protect American troops, even at the cost of traffic delays and civilian inconvenience. Guntruck HMMWVs can quickly shut down all traffic on the road if necessary. Even if there is no enemy contact and the convoy stops because a vehicle has broken down, there is still a danger posed by passing traffic. By blocking off the road (or at least your side of it), you reduce these risks greatly. In Iraq, if you stop on a four-lane divided highway (which is the most common road for convoys), traffic will often jump to the other side of the road and effectively create a new lane on the opposite side of the highway. The trucks serve as shields in this formation, providing protection for others nearby. It is essentially the same as when pioneers circled their wagons. We left a passage down the middle of the formation to allow security and command vehicles to move back and forth.

Know the Route. This is another example of what sounds like common sense, but if it is not emphasized Soldiers will sometimes neglect it. There is a significant amount of intelligence built up on each of the major convoy routes in Iraq, and it is more often than not easy to predict where the enemy will strike. Certain stretches of the main supply routes (MSRs) look like moonscapes from all of the IEDs that have exploded on them. With this in mind, it is a good idea for leaders in the convoy to know the likely areas for enemy activity, and to have a plan on how to react if the convoy is attacked in that vicinity. In this case, communication is often the key. Particularly if you are traveling out of your area of operation, it is extremely important to know all frequencies and call signs of the units who are along the route. Some portions of the route are served by aerial relays and a nonsecure net where a convoy can call for assistance. The best method is to contact the unit who owns the territory directly if assistance is required. The SOP in my company was to have the units, call signs, and frequencies along common routes laminated and posted in front of the vehicle commander’s seat.

Use Caution and Common Sense. There are a few techniques that Soldiers must use to better protect themselves while providing security for convoys. One way is by staying down in HMWWV gun turrets. The bottom line is that on a convoy, the enemy is most likely to strike first. Given this, Soldiers must protect themselves against first contact. The common catch-phrase was that Soldiers should be in name-tag defilade, meaning only the top part of the torso and head are exposed. Being low in the turret helps Soldiers to avoid some of the blast and shrapnel from an explosion, and presents less of a target to a sniper. Leaders must continually emphasize this. Another technique that all vehicles in a convoy use is dispersion. This is the main defense against a suicide bomber or car bomb. Having proper intervals between vehicles not only ensures that only one vehicle will be impacted by an explosion, but it also presents a much less inviting target, and one that the enemy will be less prone to attack.

After enough time in a combat zone, Soldiers often develop somewhat of a sixth sense. The rule of thumb is that if something looks wrong, it probably is wrong. If you know that normally at 2000 hours a certain street is packed with civilians walking up and down, and tonight you only see a few dogs running around, exercise caution. It may end up being nothing, but experience in a combat zone will tend to give you a “little voice” that may end up saving you or some of your men. Don’t be afraid to slow down the convoy or take an alternate route if something seems amiss. An excellent example of what can go wrong when you do not notice details was a mine strike in our sector from a transportation unit. The enemy had buried an anti-tank mine in the middle of the freeway under a pile of sand. The first five vehicles drove around the suspicious pile, but the sixth vehicle ran over the top of it.

React to Contact. It is important for everyone you are traveling with to know and understand the battle drills that your unit will conduct upon contact. Every situation is different, but invariably certain principles can be applied that guide quick action. Some of the primary contingencies that a convoy will encounter in Iraq are react to an IED, react to small arms fire/RPG, suicide bombers (on foot or in a vehicle), vehicle breakdown procedures, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Once security is established, CASEVAC and recovery operations are conducted. It is important that Soldiers know and understand the battle drills so everyone can react in the same way if the situation arises. In the event of a convoy with mixed units, it is even more important for the convoy commander to cover and rehearse SOPs and battle drills prior to the convoy mission.

RECOVERY:

Equipment. Following a successful mission, the tendency in undisciplined units is to head to the nearest PX, dining facility, or Internet café. However, a proper recovery of equipment is what will enable a unit to accomplish its mission the next time. Any mechanical malfunctions on a vehicle should be annotated and fixed as soon as possible. Weapons of all types, but especially mounted machine guns, will accumulate a lot of dust and should be cleaned after every mission. Magazine maintenance becomes important too, because after a week or two of patrolling most magazines on M-4s or M-9s will start to foul and cause jams. The only way to prevent this is to take them apart and blow the dust out every week.

After Action Reviews (AARs). The threat in Iraq is a thinking, learning, and adapting enemy. We must therefore constantly learn and adapt as well. The best way to do so is to conduct frequent
and thorough AARs. I understand that most Soldiers picture an AAR as sitting in an air-conditioned trailer listening to the observer/controller explain through PowerPoint slides why everybody got killed again, but it can be something as simple as the squad leader talking to his Soldiers and then backbriefing his lieutenant or platoon sergeant. There are a number of trends that come and go, and convoys that head out briefed up on the latest events are much more prepared than others who remain ignorant. Also, Soldiers discover TTPs that are effective in countering enemy techniques, and without the process of an AAR spreading these TTPs throughout the company and task force could prove difficult.

Rest Plan. Too often in combat it can seem as though there is a nonstop cycle of critical missions. Soldiers must not undertake long convoys with little or no sleep. This can sometimes be as dangerous as driving into an ambush. Even the most motivated, best led, and highly disciplined Soldiers will make mistakes and have trouble completing simple tasks after long hours with no sleep. On a convoy, the danger is elevated since not only the enemy but vehicle accidents can cause casualties. Leaders need to compare the need for the operation to the risk, and make an informed decision from that assessment. Junior leaders must be involved in this process as well, since they are the ones who know whether the driver came in off from a patrol at 0200, or is fresh and ready for action. On long cross-country convoys, leaders must use the same principles and determine whether it is worthwhile for the convoy to press on to the next FOB or halt at the current one and allow Soldiers to sleep. The key is to avoid unnecessary risk.

CONCLUSION
Traveling along routes that the enemy knows you will take is always hazardous. American Soldiers face that danger every day as they convoy along supply routes in Iraq. Infantrymen assigned to provide security for these convoys have a difficult mission, but one that can be less so given a few precautions and training. Although the circumstances change from convoy to convoy, the basic principles do not. By following these principles, infantrymen can ensure the success of these missions. Some field manuals that cover convoy security are FM 3-21.91 (Tactical Employment of Anti-Armor Platoons and Companies) and FM 3-20.90 (Tank and Cavalry HHC and HHT).

Understand that it is a learning enemy we face in Iraq; as he changes techniques so must we. Changing our patterns and methods of operation routinely allows us to maintain the tactical initiative, which contributes directly to achieving our operational objectives. For the basic parts of a convoy security mission, preparation and planning, accountability, battle drills, and recovery, it is not so much the particular system that matters, just the fact that a system exists and is followed by all the Soldiers and leaders.

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So, this is it — you are a company executive officer (XO). What are you responsible for? How do you execute those responsibilities? What are the responsibilities of your new teammates? How does it all fit together? What does your commander expect of you? The battalion XO? The company?

The purpose of this article is to give a primer of what XOs can expect during a deployment to Iraq or in other combat environments throughout the Army.

The role of the XO in the company is analogous to what we expect of an XO at any echelon. He organizes the company assets in support of company operations. Although the company XO doesn’t have a staff to manage, he actively brings together his knowledge of Army support systems to support the company team. His duties carry him through mission planning, sustainment operations, and maintaining accountability. Like the company commander, the executive officer is responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen in the planning, execution, and support of company operations. To be effective, he must be knowledgeable and proactive.

**Operations**

During mission planning, it is essential that the XO integrates his knowledge of company combat service support (CSS) capabilities into the commander’s plan. The serviceability of critical equipment, consumption rates of different classes of supply, and a detailed knowledge about resupply capabilities of higher headquarters are areas that the XO must have command of to be able to effectively help the commander. In many units, the XO uses this knowledge directly in writing the CSS paragraph of the operations order (OPORD).

The XO is also responsible for ensuring that attachment and adjacent unit coordination is made. Miscommunication with attachments and adjacent units can potentially cause a number of miscues, jeopardizing the mission. Often, assumptions are made about what an attachment knows or is capable of. Clear instructions using unmistakable language is the best way to communicate with unfamiliar units.

Once the company operations order is given, the XO continues to supervise mission preparation. He enforces the company timeline and addresses any issues that may arise leading up to the start of the mission. He must be proactive during this period by spot-checking company elements to ensure that the commander’s intent is being met. These tasks are often shared with the first sergeant.

During company missions, the XO most effectively serves as the primary command and control (C2) element for the task force. The timely sending and receiving of accurate reports throughout the unit is important for mission success. These channels are critical during operations in order to help the commander maintain situational awareness. Often, the commander’s attention will be primarily devoted to maneuvering and monitoring the tactical situation. In contact, the commander can quickly become overwhelmed with information. By monitoring the task force net, the XO can relieve the commander of deciphering unnecessary radio traffic. The XO can respond to requests for information and filter information. The commander then can concentrate on making tactical decisions with the support of his XO who helps him maintain situational awareness.

**Sustainment and Accountability**

The XO’s focus on efficient communication between his unit and others is also important in executing his steady-state responsibilities. During steady-state operations, the XO ensures that his company command post (CP) communicates effectively internally as well as externally. Demands on the company headquarters include transmitting information to and from higher headquarters, battle tracking of platoon patrols, and maintaining the company timeline. The company CP’s vital role in directing information ensures the company can respond quickly to the changing combat situation.

Keeping the company supplied with all of their necessary resources is difficult when deployed. Units are consuming more and using equipment at rates estimated at six times their peacetime rates. Therefore, the XO must master the Army supply and maintenance system and get it to work effectively in support of his company. And to be quite honest, nothing is more frustrating for a combat arms officer than trying to understand the Army’s labyrinth of
Most combat units base their operations out of forward operating bases (FOBs). Many are so large that they house about three task forces including a forward support battalion. Having a forward support battalion on the FOB makes supporting companies less of a hassle. They have Class I yards where water can be picked up and a dining facility that serves four meals a day. Direct support maintenance is closer to units now than it was on their garrison bases. There so many support facilities so close saves time and resources, enabling company XOs to focus on other areas to improve the unit.

Yet, sometimes logistical convoys must still be conducted to resolve property book issues and pick up and turn in Class VII. Although companies have access to e-mail and secure telephones, issues that arise are sometimes a bit complex and require face-to-face communication in order to reach an effective resolution. Working with brigade property book offices sometimes requires a convoy to their FOB. Throughout a deployment, you can expect to be fielded new equipment that requires convoys to different FOBs in order to receive and service the new equipment.

The headache for the XO in Iraq now is keeping track of property. Companies can have upwards of five different property books that they must balance. Much of the equipment is the same but just comes from different sources. There is no difference in how you use the equipment, but reporting its status to the different agencies can be a handful at times. At the same time, you will constantly be receiving, servicing, and turning in equipment from the various agencies. Making coordination with them by e-mail or phone can sometimes be difficult. It is usually best to convoy to where the brigade property book is located to handle the issue in person.

**Leading**

Leading headquarters platoon in their various missions can also be a challenge. Here again, the XO needs to be a leader. Usually the XO has Soldiers of various MOSs consisting of commo reps, NBC, mechanics, a supply sergeant, and a supply clerk. Your headquarters element’s logistical operations need to be synchronized with the combat operations of your line platoons. This can be a difficult task since many times you will be dealing with young Soldiers. Whenever possible you want to ensure you bring resourceful Soldiers with initiative into your headquarters element. They will have to be able to operate with little guidance and often under tight timelines.

The XO must be prepared to assume duties that fall outside of those normally or doctrinally prescribed. During my tour I was tasked to plan and execute a full-scale platoon gunnery, including Table XII. In the middle of a week’s patrol cycle, we deployed with a small element to a range where my training team taught and mentored light infantrymen on the basic operation of the M2A2 Bradley and mechanized infantry tactics. Months later, I was tasked to plan and execute a small arms training program for a company of Iraqi army soldiers also at the range. Their training included RPG firing and a MOUT live fire. These experiences were quite rewarding and a welcomed change of routine.

Serving as a company executive officer is a great opportunity for growth. You have much more exposure to many leaders in your organization than when you were a platoon leader. Observing the leadership of more experienced officers in your organization, not to mention your own company commander, provides great insight into how to lead in today’s Army. The challenges that they face are many of the same ones you could expect to see in the not-so-distant future.

Your increased exposure also allows you to build more relationships within the unit, which also contributes to your growth. Your relationship with other XOs in the battalion allows you to share information that can support your learning. You are all dealing with many of the same problems, and of course, four heads are better than one. Throughout our deployment we held weekly maintenance meetings with the task force XO, battalion maintenance officer (BMO), and team chiefs. During the meetings, we addressed logistical issues and solved problems together. These meetings also served as a way to share information about future operations that enabled the company XOs to assist our commanders in planning. What you learn about the missions of higher headquarters and adjacent units puts your work in a greater context. This helps to clarify what you must accomplish in order for the task force to operate as a synchronized whole.

It also is rewarding helping the platoon leaders as they grow and learn. Many times you will serve as a sounding board for their ideas as they face many challenges that you have seen before.

The company team XO has to be a leader in his own right. This is not simply because he may be faced with commanding the company in the commander’s absence, but because he has a huge role in influencing the company team. After assisting the commander in planning, it is the XO who will supervise mission preparation. It will be the XO who enforces the company time line and will become aware of obstacles to the plan before the commander. He will be the first person sought to clarify guidance and address problems. As a result, the XO is in the best position to resolve these conflicts if the resources are within his disposal. This could include resolving conflicting guidance, setting priorities, or making coordinations. In the execution of these duties the XO speaks with the authority of the company commander. To succeed, the XO has to possess the respect and competence expected of the commander himself.

In addition, the XO takes a great deal of pressure off the company commander and gives him greater flexibility to conduct operations that best fit the combat situation. Without you, the company would not be able to operate. There is enough doctrinal guidance for the first sergeant and the rest of the Soldiers to pick up the slack. Yet, the contribution of an XO is the only way that the company can realize its potential. With the great demands made on combat units in theater today, having an aggressive XO has proven indispensable to enable the company to accomplish its demanding missions.

Captain Brent Dial served as company executive officer for B Company, 1-64 Armor, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), which recently returned from a year-long deployment to Iraq. CPT Dial is a 2002 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.
A light infantry battalion’s modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) must include organic support units to establish self-sustaining forward operating bases (FOBs) to combat insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) transformation is underway. The MTOE projections for the IBCT are still in the draft format, as the official publication of FM 3-90.6 has not been released. The IBCT MTOE used in this article represents the “working” reality as of December 2005. I have served on both Special Forces and conventional forward operating bases as an executive officer (XO) of a light infantry company and as the battalion S-4 (logistics officer) for a light infantry battalion. As an XO, my company was responsible for the perimeter security for Special Forces FOBs in Baghdad. I was the firsthand coordinator to “tie” in Special Forces sustainment systems to the requirements of the conventional light infantry. As a battalion S-4, I oversaw the logistic requisitions, maintenance, and daily logistical operations of a conventional infantry battalion FOB in Baghdad.

The purpose of this article is to define, discuss, and elaborate on the future of the Army infantry battalion MTOE as related to the establishment and management of FOB operations. The transformation to the IBCT MTOE successfully incorporates all of the necessary battle operating systems under the appropriate leadership that is required to establish and maintain FOB operations as well as conduct ongoing offensive stability and support operations.

There are three types of infantry brigade combat teams that will be formed during the transformation: the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) — light infantry, airborne, and air assault; the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) — mechanized infantry; and the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). This article will look at the impact of the IBCT transformation as it relates to the light infantry battalion task force in sustaining FOB operations. The Stryker and heavy battalion and brigade concepts have already executed transformations of support and tactical battle operating systems. In addition, this article assumes that light infantry battalions, upon deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, will be equipped with M1114-type armored vehicles to cover their expanding tactical areas of operations.

The ongoing Global War on Terrorism has triggered the conventional U.S. Army to reexamine the sustainment and operational platforms required to support ongoing stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The forward operating base is a non-doctrinal conventional answer for staging these to defeat insurgents; however, the FOB concept has been in use for years by the Special Operations Command. Special Forces establish FOBs to maintain battalion-level command, control, and sustainment operations. Historically, the conventional Army executed “firebases” and “base camps” to sustain the force. What is the difference? Firebases and base camps were central locations where separate units — combat, combat support, and combat service support — worked together for a common mission. A forward operating base is a self-managed secure location in which battalion-sized elements can stage, sustain, and conduct operations. The key is “self-managed.” One commander is overall responsible for sustainment, garrison, and tactical operations. During the GWOT, conventional forces have created FOBs to accomplish relevant offensive and support operations. Battalion commanders have typically been responsible for establishing and maintaining their respective FOBs. To sustain the force, non-MTOE detachments have been task organized subordinate to the tactical battalion commander.

FOB REQUIREMENTS

There are many requirements to establish and maintain a battalion FOB. Using the conventional, pre-transformation MTOE with task-organized augmentees is inefficient, and thereby ineffective. Here is a summary of the basic tactical requirements for most battalion-sized FOBs operating in Iraq.

To maintain FOB security and force protection, an appropriate number of personnel required to maintain security and alertness must operate or secure all gates. This includes the sergeant of the guard, gate guard, and recon and surveillance patrols in and out of the perimeter.

Daily offensive patrols are required for conducting stability and support operations to positively affect the local population...
and defeat insurgents. Patrols require multiple tasks and purposes to focus towards stability and support (as well as defeating insurgents). For example, one platoon, given a 12-hour patrol tasking, will meet with the local Imam, monitor Friday prayer, record gasoline prices, verify consumer sales prices, and overwatch key routes in the area of operations. Company commanders are responsible for assigning and ensuring that platoons are focused on their tactical tasks and information is collected and sent to the battalion intelligence section for processing.

Typically, platoons will establish patrol bases in their respective sectors to conduct temporary recovery and sustainment operations. During surge operations, the FOB sustainment teams will work in a classical-doctrinal sense and establish resupply and maintenance push-packages that platoons and companies can receive easily. The focus of providers during surge operations is to make logistics as seamless and user-friendly as possible.

**CLASS I, III, IX**

The focus of a FOB is to conduct combat operations. Robust logistical systems and facilities must be in place to maximize the maintenance, equipment, and morale factors that arise in the complex environment of stability and support operations.

To feed the required 600-800 personnel (depending on attachments) of an MTOE infantry battalion, there must be a unit-specific dining facility. “Hot chow” provides needed nutrition for combat Soldiers; in addition, a place to eat and converse with peers can provide a sanctuary that enables proper Army team building and improves morale exponentially.

Four meals a day must be served (breakfast, lunch, dinner, and midnight) to provide hot meals to all maneuvering forces incorporating 24-hour operational cycles. To support the menus required, unit S-4s and the dining facility NCOIC must ensure rations are ordered two weeks in advance. When ordering rations, keep in mind that up to 50 percent of produce will arrive rotten and unusable because of intangible issues (environment, external contracted transportation, and international port rules, etc). Proper reporting and requesting standards must be followed (in accordance with the division food service procedures). Army food service doctrine dictates that one meat and two starches can be served per meal. Practice has shown that two meats per meal are a minimum essential serving requirement to provide Soldiers with the adequate variety and prevent the appearance of eating the “same” thing every day. In addition, serving nonstandard meal rations for each meal is a great technique to vary the meal selection for Soldiers (i.e. serve eggs for lunch and midnight meal).

Units fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan rely heavily on vehicles to cover their expanded area of operations. Doctrinal fuel operations are based on offensive refueling techniques such as tailgate refuel or services station refuel operations as part of combat/field train operations. These are not feasible methods for long-term sustainable operations on an FOB. The fuel resupply method must be user-friendly and accessible 24 hours a day with a seamless user-oriented distribution plan. Unleaded fuel (MOGAS) and diesel (JP8) are both required to sustain the battlefield operating system requirements in a battalion. One 5K JP8 tanker (M939) and one MOGAS TPU (M1095) are a minimum requirement for sustaining operations. A trained petroleum technician operating the fuel point is essential to prevent equipment failure, environmental spillage problems, and ensure proper operation.

Currently, to sustain unit level maintenance, unit organic mechanics are authorized to conduct 20-level maintenance. Unit maintenance fixes routine problems. Generally, major work resulting from enemy engagements is evacuated to the brigade and division-level maintenance units to conduct major direct and general service repairs.

Due to the high operational tempo of vehicles in a battalion, vehicles are commonly “hot bedded;” once vehicles conclude a mission, crews are switched, and the vehicles return immediately into the area of operations without in-depth maintenance and no vehicle-specific driver assigned to promote responsibility. To mitigate this, a “Jiffy-lube” type of maintenance program must be established. Upon completion of each 24-hour block of vehicle usage, organizational mechanics are rotated to do a 20-level preventative

Refueling operations are an important part of FOB operations. The fuel resupply method must be user-friendly and accessible 24 hours a day with a seamless user-oriented distribution plan.
FOB. Many “big-ticket” items and services necessary equipment prior to arrival at the Army to outfit battalions with all of the is required. It is extremely difficult for the tactical situation, contracting for support enable a robust on-hand supply system, the brigade field trains (located at the FSB) S-4s and support platoons must travel to battalions to stockpile supplies. Battalion does not include an organic means for and other expendable items that individual maps, zip-ties (used as flex cuffs), 550 cord, lights, VS-17 panels, markers, acetate, spectrum of operations. This includes key resources stockpiled to conduct a full-planners and sustainers must have enough for any sustaining operation. Many requirements. S-4s must project, request, that will enhance their staffing requirements. S-4s must project, request, and stockpile resources to provide senior staffs the essential materials for success.

Company requirements are the priority for any sustaining operation. Many operations are no-notice; therefore, logistic planners and sustainers must have enough resources stockpiled to conduct a full-spectrum of operations. This includes stockpiling of basic military items: chemlights, VS-17 panels, markers, acetate, maps, zip-ties (used as flex cuffs), 550 cord, and other expendable items that individual Soldiers use daily. The traditional MTOE does not include an organic means for battalions to stockpile supplies. Battalion S-4s and support platoons must travel to the brigade field trains (located at the FSB) and pick up requested supplies from their centralized service supply area (SSA). To enable a robust on-hand supply system, infantry battalion FOBs must have their own organic SSA.

Because of the constantly evolving tactical situation, contracting for support is required. It is extremely difficult for the Army to outfit battalions with all of the necessary equipment prior to arrival at the FOB. Many “big-ticket” items and services are required for the FOB to sustain long-term combat operations. This includes key Soldier services such as laundry, area beautification, force protection construction, heavy equipment, and morale and recreation items (gym equipment, television, and non-MTOE equipment acquisitions). Because all of these items are nonstandard military items, a heavily scrutinized contract must be bid, negotiated, written, and approved. This will be completed by the logistical officer on the FOB and sent to the brigade and division contracting officers for review. It is imperative to be knowledgeable of the format, process, and system to acquire the items. The contracting process must be followed to ensure money is not abused and wasted on items that higher echelons have already procured and to ensure that local civilian contractors are not causing dangerous competition within the civilian population.

CLASS II

FOB operations are varied: information operations, contracting, civil affairs, offensive operations, and stability and support operations. To adequately plan and execute all those operations, it is essential for a full battle staff to have the capabilities to conduct extensive planning. This requires a robust system to provide the necessary office equipment: proximas, computers, printers, ink, paper, plotters (especially for terrain team purposes), pens, paper, pencils, etc. To focus on what “matters,” staffs cannot be limited in assets that will enhance their staffing requirements. S-4s must project, request, and stockpile resources to provide senior staffs the essential materials for success.

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LOGPAC

All of the aforementioned logistical operations rely on external support to replenish existing stocks. This is accomplished through logistics package (LOGPAC) operations. The LOGPAC is planned by the brigade-level logistical team and requested through standard reports from the battalion S-4. Typically, LOGPAC will be conducted to successfully maintain the appropriate fuel and food stocks; times and methods of LOGPAC are situationally dependent. LOGPAC is planned and executed by the forward support battalion (FSB) leadership and executed using its assets. Security is generally provided by the receiving unit.

LOGPAC is a deliberate operation both in the delivery (by FSB) and in the receiving (by tenant FOB unit). Upon arrival of the LOGPAC, each commodity area must have assigned personnel to rapidly download required items (food, fuel, CL IX and CL II items).

IBCT TRANSFORMATION

The new MTOE for a light infantry battalion will centralize support units under one commander. Upon completion of transformation, a forward deployed infantry battalion commander will have his own full dining facility, supply support area, direct support-level maintenance team (with chief warrant officer as shop officer in charge), transportation platoon (with enough trucks to move an entire company), and an ammunition section. All of these service support assets will be located in the new forward support company, which would be subordinate to the infantry battalion commander (when deployed) and organic to the brigade support battalion (BSB) when in garrison.

The transformation will ensure that the user is the priority for all aspects of support. Infantry commanders will establish priorities of support. Special support-trained Soldiers will provide support. Historically, the support platoon was the only internal support unit organically subordinate to the infantry battalion commander. This platoon comprised infantry Soldiers who were given the tasks and responsibilities to operate outside of their trained military occupational specialties (MOS). The forward support company will be manned with MOS-trained Soldiers to accomplish their trained tasks. The forward support companies for the light infantry battalions will comprise truck drivers (88M), mechanics (62 series) logistic warehousing personnel (92A), logistic organizers (92Y), and cooks (92G). In addition to the Soldiers, the commander of the forward support company will be a Quartermaster/Ordnance/Transportation officer. This will greatly aid in the planning, development, and execution of support-specific tasks due to the professional skill-support related background of the unit commander. Historically, the infantry HHC commander was responsible for the training of the support units for an infantry battalion; however, he was not trained in the specific aspects of combat service support.

One challenge that faces the IBCT MTOE is the garrison versus deployed rating schemes. The garrison BSB (formally the FSB) commander is to be the trainer, mentor, and evaluator of the forward support company. When deployed, the maneuver commander will then become the tactical control (TACON) commander of the FSC with the evaluation rating still falling back on the BSB commander. This will cause confusion in perceptions of who has the priority of support, and how to
MILITARY TASK ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The IBCT MTOE infantry battalion (deployed) will comprise three rifle infantry companies (A, B, C), one weapons company (D), a headquarters company (HHC), and a forward support company (FSC). The headquarters company will include the mortar platoon, scout platoon, medical platoon, and command/staff group. There will no longer be a maintenance section or dining facility (they are moved to the FSC), and the snipers will be moved from the scout platoon to the command/staff group. In the rifle companies, there are weapons squads in each combat infantry platoon. The tactical impact on the IBCT battalion MTOE will not significantly affect the operations of maintaining and establishing an FOB. The additions of a new weapons company, adding weapons squads to each platoon, and separating a sniper detachment from the recon platoon will offer commanders more tactical freedom as they continue to fight the terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Because the FSC is responsible for the logistical, maintenance, and transportation requirements of an infantry battalion, it comprises only combat support MOS Soldiers. Therefore, whenever the FSC conducts convoy operations to support the FOB, line company Soldiers must provide security. Leaders of the two elements must coordinate with each other and communicate their plans to their commanders, and the security leader provides the leadership required to execute the mission. Although the purpose of any FSC mission will be logistic in nature, security can never be compromised; therefore, the maneuver security leaders should always be in charge of the mission.

CL I, II

Logistical requirements are the sole basis of emplacing the FSC in each deployed light infantry battalion. In the past, there was a distinct line drawn between supporters and operators. The infusing of both types of Soldiers under one unified command will help to mitigate the apparent separation. This type of Army team building is essential in creating an effective mutually supporting fighting force.

The DFAC will be the responsibility of the FSC; formerly, it was the responsibility of the headquarters company. This realignment will aid in training, executing, and centralizing the request process. Because the unit commander will be a logistical expert, the filing of reports and requests for resources will be more efficient. The FSC commander will serve as the SPO (logistical coordinator) for the infantry battalion.

Each FSC will have a service and supply section that will establish a battalion-level service supply area (SSA). This is an area comprising individual company bins that will be filled with items that company executive officers and supply personnel have requested through the normal supply channels. The SSA will be required to receive company requests and then process, receive, and distribute supplies. In addition, a battalion-level SSA will be able to manage and create a PLL of CL IX and II parts that will comprise high-use items. This will greatly enable staffs and tactical units to replenish needed expended items without routinely leaving their own FOB’s. The FSC commander will be overall responsible for the creation, training, and execution of the FOB SSA. They will serve as the primary point of contact between the infantry battalion service support area and the brigade support battalion supply service area.

There will be no change to the FOB contracting process; this will still be done by the battalion S-4. However, under the new MTOE, the battalion S-4 will be a logistical officer (Quartermaster, Ordnance, or Transportation) and will have the training and experience required to expedite and administer these requirements better than an officer not trained in this area.

CONCLUSION

The realignment of support units under the tactical battalion commander is an excellent and effective way of ensuring much needed essential support is administered to fighting Soldiers. However, leaders must not rely solely on the institutional model for mission accomplishment. All leaders must possess a “can do” attitude for any mission: tactical or logistic. At the end of the day, the only thing that matters is mission accomplishment. The IBCT MTOE gives each unit commander (infantry company, forward support company, and battalion) the assets that are required to fight and win against insurgents by providing the necessary logistical structure of FOB operations to maximize combat battle operating systems.

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After finishing the basic infantry officer course at Fort Benning, I looked forward to a career of what I thought would be distinctly infantry experiences such as maneuvering M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and conducting dismounted patrols. The Global War on Terrorism was already underway so I was prepared to contribute in whatever way I could.

What I never expected when I left Fort Benning for U.S. Army Europe was that in a couple of short years I would be leading a platoon of truck operators and fuel specialists in a combat zone. The purpose of this article is to share my experiences with other infantry officers preparing to deploy as support platoon leaders. I wanted to provide a vehicle commander’s view of events leading up to and through the majority of this platoon’s deployment.

My personal preparations began shortly before being assigned to support platoon six months prior to the battalion’s deployment. My company commander directed me to an old acquaintance of his, who was then assigned to the U.S. Army Transportation School. He was responsible for both assembling and developing many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) coming out of Afghanistan for truck units operating in tactical convoy operations, and he had also begun turning his attention to the latest lessons learned from OIF.

I learned early on that established doctrine would be of very little use to me in Iraq, and that the best platoons would learn through aggressive use of after action reviews (AARs), experimentation, and as a result of bold leadership at the lowest levels. My plan for success involved a commitment to tireless innovation, experimentation, and inculcating an aggressive, success-orientated climate within the platoon. An exchange of e-mails with a mentor made me feel comfortable that I was on the right track in attempting to develop a “fully tactical” support platoon. This initial contact began a long and detailed process of learning and preparation, both at the individual and platoon levels.

My self-study began with consulting doctrinal materials on truck platoon and convoy operations. I quickly found established transportation doctrine inappropriate to the OIF operating environment because of its obvious emphasis on safety geared more for a training area and movement along built-up, Western-style freeways such as the autobahn in Germany. As a Bradley platoon leader, I had already discovered how I could use Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) resources to improve tactical operations in a training environment. I consulted CALL on tactical convoy operations and stability and support operations which proved a good general train-up and yielded some useful TTPs.

After some initial, fast-paced study I determined that the next logical step would be to develop an initial SOP specifically designed for the support platoon in a combat zone. I went to my infantry roots with FM 7-8 Rifle Platoon and Squad and FM 7-7j Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley) as well as the Ranger Handbook, but it was clear that light and mechanized infantry doctrine would not serve my purposes. Although infantry doctrine remains the premier foundation for small unit tactical operations, it is not flexible enough to encompass SOSO and support platoon operations. Also, infantry doctrine is based on levels of communications capability, firepower, and maneuverability that a support platoon will not normally have or easily be able to achieve. After examining SOPs that had been designed for other kinds of units such as scouts, engineers and heavy mortar platoons, I concluded that the best foundation for my platoon SOP would be the Convoy Leader Training Handbook. In my experience, completing an SOP prior to deploying paid great dividends, focused my preparations, and gave the Soldiers an added confidence that their leader was actively preparing for future operations. The importance of a platoon leader writing an SOP is that he has thought through the mission, the operating environment, and possible problems — a requirement of...
successful combat leadership.

In the months leading up to our departure for Kuwait and after consulting with the platoon sergeant, I held several platoon-level sensing sessions in order to gauge the Soldiers’ concerns and field questions quickly before they festered into debilitating rumors. I made a point of incorporating the battalion chaplain into some of these. The focus of my remarks during these sessions was to explain to the Soldiers as clearly as possible (based on the information I was getting from various sources including from our S2 shop and counterparts in theater who we would be replacing) what was happening in our future sector as well as trends across Iraq. My experience was that the platoon was solid, confident, and felt immensely empowered by having the “truth” and knowing their leader was leveling with them. Had I really believed we were unprepared — which I never did — I could not have stood in front of them and ensured them that every reasonable measure was being taken to ensure success in the mission. It was always stressed that success was in our hands more than a function of “higher’s” actions or lack thereof. I always remained confident that there is strength and confidence in knowledge and attempted to impart that attitude to the Soldiers of the platoon.

Taking a cue from the 1st Infantry Division, I stressed from the outset that there are no “convoys,” only combat operations. From the line of departure (LD), the platoon would be organized tactically to maximize combat power and not organized simply to facilitate movement from point to point. The Soldiers would receive every possible advantage especially with respect to the benefits of the latest TTPs and other lessons learned (i.e., training would never cease but only become better refined in theater). I made an extra effort to learn as much as possible from the departing unit, although I declined to incorporate all of their lessons learned. I had already learned that high performance units have know-how, will, and teamwork — and that is what I was determined to achieve within the support platoon. I was determined to develop a “winning culture” that would sustain the Soldiers through high optempo, enemy contact, friendly casualties, and collateral damage. As things turned out, the Soldiers and subordinate leaders excelled in this regard better than I ever could have expected or hoped for. Through the efforts and professionalism of the Soldiers, my aim of being prepared was realized.

From day one of joining the platoon, I insisted on implementing a leadership professional development (LPD) focusing on the upcoming deployment. I was emboldened by the observation, made in a major unit AAR, that Soldiers felt unprepared for OIF. Even though they knew what to expect in a superficial way, they still believed they were unprepared for the strains of full-up combat operations. I would counter this trend by specifically developing combat leaders first and foremost, regardless of MOS or duty position. The LPDs began during a month-long deployment train-up at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, which also included a convoy live-fire training exercise. I took full advantage of the captive audience and used most evenings in the training area barracks to present briefs on tactics and discuss related issues with the squad and section leaders. We discussed the nature of continuous operations, the importance of casualty and mass casualty evacuations, the Troop Leading Procedures, and weapons maintenance in a desert environment, among numerous other topics. Without an exception, and somewhat to my surprise, the sergeants turned into eager students. They approached the topics with a seriousness completely appropriate to the situation. The coming months would prove that they had taken those initial lessons to heart. The LPDs allowed me to establish a mind-set — offensive, confident, flexible — in the platoon’s leaders before we ever left home station. It was as important for them to have confidence in me as it was for me to have confidence in their combat leadership capability.

The platoon’s leaders were junior in almost every way. Only one was serving correctly in rank and MOS according to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). All the others were serving one or two grades above their rank. Despite this, my statements early on and my actions later in theater made it clear that individuals would be kept in all-important leadership positions only by merit of demonstrated competence, which in my mind meant also a willingness and capability to constantly learn and improve. Within the platoon we could draw on only a small amount of relevant experience. The platoon sergeant was a Desert Storm veteran and a section sergeant had served with the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) during OIF.
Considering this gulf between experience and expectation, it became essential to the success of the platoon that every available NCO be trained as a competent and flexible assistant patrol leader (APL). Not only did the APLs serve a key role in mission preparation and execution, but they also assimilated and passed on the “winning culture” to every Soldier in the platoon.

The most important of the tactician’s tools, the Troop Leading Procedure is time-tested and is based fundamentally on the practices of winning units. The TLP proved its worth to the platoon tenfold and was the single most influential action we took in theater, by admission of the headquarters and headquarters company commander and many within the platoon. The TLP — done to standard — simply served as a concrete tool for assuring every mission was well planned, rehearsed, prepared for and executed properly. It gave subordinate leaders a detailed direction, and useable standards, in how to successfully prepare for and execute missions. The TLP began with the initial warning order and did not end until the lessons learned in the AAR had been incorporated back into the platoon’s SOP and training plan.

In the fast changing and asymmetric operating environment of Iraq, the successful platoon must have a system for capturing and implementing lessons learned as quickly as possible. The mission of the support platoon in Iraq can be so diverse and rapidly changing that to be successful, second only to forward looking leadership, the organization must be mentally flexible and adaptive. We conducted an AAR immediately after each mission when we returned to the forward operating base. Lessons learned from AARs in theater resulted in five distinct editions of the SOP over the course of a year. The SOP spread over time through the task force in bits and pieces, proving that every kind of unit can learn from the experiences of others without respect to MOS or combat function. The AARs allowed me and the other leaders to learn from the Soldiers, from their unique perspective, and with time the Soldiers saw that their leaders listened and sometimes incorporated their ideas into the SOP, and this led them to observe even more closely overall mission execution and their own individual actions within that execution. The cycle between observation, discussion, recommendations, and implementation was kept as tight as possible — lessons learned from the AAR were sometimes incorporated into the very next mission. I prepared the leaders early on to expect to have to learn fast and “adjust fire” often, to expect change as a constant — the AAR process that I insisted on merely reinforced that expectation. I believe the net result was that every leader in the platoon understood intuitively that we were a “learning organization,” learning as proactive students as we went along. We learned that AARs, done correctly, not only progressively improved unit operations but served to empower Soldiers and leaders in just the right way; they became critical of their own performance and comfortable with making on-the-spot corrections of others no matter the situation or the ranks of those involved.

The platoon’s mission remained relatively stable. The platoon conducted more than 120 missions over a year, encompassing every major form of support platoon operation, from class of supply pulls and push, refuel-on-the-move (ROM) missions, emergency class of supply and backhaul missions, to logistics resupply point (LRP) missions. We drew all classes of supply from the brigade support area that was to the north of our FOB along a relatively well maintained main supply route (MSR). For several periods, each lasting several weeks to months, we pushed logistics packages (LOGPACs) to patrol bases on a 24 or 48-hour basis. The support we received from the line companies in securing the trucks during movements proved essential; however the AIF still attacked with IEDs and mines despite the presence of escorting M1s and M2s. We also conducted LRPs during large task force and higher operations but these actually proved to be the easiest to plan and the most straightforward to execute. The platoon was able to execute an essentially doctrinal mission even if the operating environment dictated that most of our methods were anything but standard.

The platoon’s command M1114s came equipped with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) which turned out to be essential for enhancing situational understanding during all phases of mission execution. Leaders were able to focus on key tasks such as making necessary radio linkup with adjacent units and units in support, as opposed to being tied up just trying to figure out exactly where they were and where they were in relation to everyone else in the battlespace. FBCB2 also enhanced mission planning and preparation because it enabled mission leaders to rehearse from “screenshots” — the soldiers could visualize the terrain, they could “see” danger areas and potential ambush sites. The benefits of FBCB2 as both a mission planning and execution tool came down to leaders exploiting the technology to enhance traditional tools such as the TLP, actions on contact, and battle drills. FBCB2 was a combat multiplier by enabling our leaders to actually focus on soldiers and lead during mission execution.

The goal of the platoon was for every vehicle crew to be equipped with a handheld radio for inter-unit communication. This goal was only met after a civilian electronics business was convinced to donate over twenty units to the platoon. The importance of the radios proved to be more psychological than anything; the power of the crews to communicate during mission (something truck operators are not used to having) should not be overlooked.

The platoon gained extensive experience operating both along MSRs and in an urban environment. These two operating environments were very different and required very different approaches. Naturally the MOS-trained truck operators were most at home on the MSRs in situations that resembled their training experiences.

The initial response from subordinate leaders was that the urban environment was
“no-go” terrain for the support platoon. The assumption was the platoon would automatically be far more vulnerable as the HEMTTs traveled at slower speeds winding their way through the city. It was assumed that the HEMTT’s turning radius and supposedly limited maneuverability would preclude effective operation amidst the chaotic urban sprawl, and that local national traffic and pedestrians would nullify the benefits of the platoon’s heavy firepower. Experience turned this assumption on its ear. The second half of the deployment — once the task force had reentered the city — saw the platoon executing most of its operations in and around urban environments. As the mission changed and the platoon’s leadership continued the process of aggressive AARs, the so-called dangers of the urban environment were de-mystified in the minds of the soldiers. They learned that urban environments are not necessarily more dangerous though they do require specific preparations and TTP. The three hundred and sixty degree, three dimensional fight in urban operations requires vigilant security, overlapping fields of fire, concise and rapid communications, and a level of situational understanding far above what is usually required on an open MSR.

The qualities of the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) in our sector changed noticeably over the course of the deployment. During the early months of our operations the AIF launched mass, but horribly uncoordinated attacks. Around the time of the Transfer of Sovereignty (28 June 2004), the composition and operations of the AIF changed. More foreign fighters appeared and attacks began to show some resemblance to fire-and-maneuver tactics. It was apparent that they were attempting to learn from their experiences and it also appeared that they were spreading their own lessons learned throughout parts of Iraq. AIF tactics which were seen as successful in Baghdad, for example, soon appeared in our sector.

The aggressive and imaginative leadership of this platoon internalized a long list of lessons learned. We learned to AAR everything — there was something to learn in most of what we did no matter how routine it appeared at first. We learned what all successful small unit combat leaders know: trust in and execute realistically the Troop Leading Procedure during every mission. Train all leaders to a level where they can either lead or assist in the leading of all kinds of combat patrols. The success of our mission came down to flexible thinkers and versatile actors. In general, all the lessons learned that we identified over the course of our deployment pointed to emphasizing an offensive mind-set and stressing the basics. The basics are many but they include proper radio operation, battle drills, land navigation, casualty treatment and evacuation, and weapons maintenance. I was guided by the idea that under the particular circumstances in which I found myself, I would try anything that offered a reasonable degree of success — I would push to implement a dozen changes in the platoon in the belief that three or four ideas would turn out to work especially well and measurably contribute to our success.

Just as important to this topic as all the successful actions we took are the things that we were, for whatever reason, not able to achieve. I believed in the utility of a very large, walk-able terrain model, detailed, durable, and all weather, but lack of physical space on a small, crowded FOB precluded this. A large terrain model was also not realistic since the ability for us to operate freely outside in the open was severely curbed by the fact that we were constantly under threat of indirect fire attacks. I also wished for but never succeeded in acquiring a dedicated mission preparation/debrief room, with air conditioner (necessary in the hot summer months), completely sealable for OPSEC reasons, and not used for any other purpose. Both the mission leaders and the soldiers deserved a physical space where they could focus their attention on the mission free of distractions, and where all needed supplies and resources were on-hand, such as satellite images, vehicle models for rehearsing actions on contact, and a table for thoroughly inspecting mission essential items. The need for this was felt throughout the deployment.

General George S. Patton was lucky enough to be in position to oversee the early formation of the 2nd Armored Division and its transformation into a highly disciplined unit of high esprit de corps. What he was able to accomplish with the division helped greatly to solidify his reputation as a superb trainer, strict disciplinarian, and aggressive combat leader. A man of no small ego, Patton had to be reminded by General Eisenhower that he had not made the 2nd Armored Division, but that the 2nd Armored had made him. Likewise, whatever I was able to accomplish was due to the capabilities, professionalism, and all-American drive of the Soldiers in this platoon. They exemplified the confident warrior and displayed excellent, mature judgment each and every day. They served their country proudly and expertly. They maintained a very high level of morale and always remained mission focused. This article is dedicated to the fighting Soldiers, America’s youth, who accepted and trusted in their leadership to a degree that I never could have imagined possible.

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The purpose of this article is to give readers some insight into current sniper operations in two different types of terrain in Iraq. My intent is not to write a manual on sniper operations; this work is meant to give snipers a base from which they can develop their own tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

One thing needs to be said from the start — check your ego at the door. Remember, just because you are a sniper school graduate and have been doing this kind of thing for a while does not mean that you are the best or that you can’t learn new things. We are 75-percent student and 25-percent teacher. If you are not constantly learning new things, you will be left with outdated tactics.

In order to ensure mission success you must first establish mutual trust between the chain of command and yourself. This allows the command to understand the team’s capabilities and limitations. The single most important thing that allows me the freedom to operate is the trust of my battalion commander and the officers below him. This trust is gained by actions, not word of mouth. We started by gaining his confidence during planning and then validated his confidence by actions in the field. Additionally, it is imperative that you gain the confidence of your fellow Soldiers. If you don’t have respect from them, you’ll never be anything but an amateur punk regardless of what you have seen and done! You are a professional — act like one.

See the Terrain

Our sniper team spent a total of 12 months in Iraq. Our first six months were spent in the farmlands, where the six-to-eight IEDs a month didn’t leave much to hunt; if your element is in a vast open area such as rural terrain, good luck finding the IED emplacers. The caches, however, were enormous.
The enemy used this area to supply the large cities nearby with the shells and mortars to make their IEDs. Most of the caches we found were underground and had been there for at least a rain, but you will disrupt the smugglers and possibly even discover the insurgent safe-houses and training/staging areas. Let the side of the road hides go to the tankers and Bradley guys that have the capability to look and shoot a lot farther.

The majority of our operations occurred in the final six months spent operating in eastern areas. Several factors worked in our favor here. First, the area was fresh. Potential hides were not spoiled by prior coalition presence. Second, we discussed our potential actions in dense urban terrain before we ever left the States, and we continued to learn every day based on analysis of our experiences in combat.

See Yourself: Selecting the Team

Your personnel selection should be very strict. There should be no favoritism. Leaders need at least two full weeks to train and oversee candidates to properly evaluate their abilities prior to selecting anyone. Leaders also need to watch the individuals’ conduct within the group. You want a tight-knit team of Soldiers who think on the same wavelength and see different views at the same time. Keep in mind that you can teach anyone to shoot, and the job is only 10-percent shooting. What you are looking for is a clear thinker who can take a situation apart one problem at a time and make rapid decisions. Once you have chosen your crew, rank distinctions need to be relaxed so you can put everyone on the same playing field, using your group members’ individual characteristics to their full advantage. When you can do this and retain proper leadership respect, you have an advantage that no enemy can counter.

See Yourself: Selecting Equipment

Most of our engagements are conducted with an M4/ACOG combo. I also suggest a drop in match trigger. We acquired a few Bushmaster triggers and they work wonderfully. Try to talk your unit into purchasing a few flash suppressors; not because they can’t be heard (because they can), but because they hide your position by throwing the sound off and because a well made one hides your muzzle flash completely (which is great for night engagements).

Principles of Operation

Our experience is that most people in our area are inside during the night. Once we find our hide location, we enter the building and clear. There are details you need to consider when doing this. The majority of people are streetwise and will immediately spot anything that looks out of place.

Make sure that everyone has an M16/M4-type weapon; we don’t use crew-served weapons. In the hide, we usually keep one Soldier looking at the entrance and on the radio, and two in different loop holes. The others are resting. If you do more than this, you are not going to make it long enough to keep good observation. When it is your time to rest, REST!

Leave nothing in the middle of the room; everything needs to be up against a wall including weapons and water bottles. You don’t need to be moving to try and get a shot on some guy or a better angle of observation and boot a half-empty bottle of urine across the room letting every one in the country know where you are! (Besides, you could fall).

Our unit maintained a static outpost (OP) charged with overwatching a vital main supply route (MSR) in the middle of the city. Additionally, this OP served as a staging area for operations deeper in the city. This position was decisive to our effective sniper operations. The fixed site mission is often despised by many snipers because they feel that they are being used as mere guards. However, 80 percent of our targets come from observers, RPG teams, and riflemen operating around this OP. We disrupted weapons deals, IED hand offs, and insurgent meetings by simply observing and engaging from this site. This building became the highest priority target of the insurgents in our area, and after a series of failed attacks the insurgency gave up and began targeting other places in town simply because of their fear that “the American Qunas will shoot you in the head.” We used a room that was originally used as a junk room, but we established it as the best room in the building simply because we made the effort to clean it up. There were existing windows to the north and south. From this location we could see into the traffic circle from the highest place in the area.

Like every good infantry Soldier, as soon as the shooting stops we reestablish security, check weapons, change magazines, and clear our sectors of fire. The more the enemy adapted, the more aggressive we became.

If you are going to operate from another echelon’s fixed site, you need to once again establish a rapport with the chain of command there; they are in charge of the building, so if they don’t think you are a positive influence on their area you are going to have a hard time. When you establish your area, you should have a place there that is all your own. Snipers have cool guns and gear that everyone wants to play with; reduce the visual on your equipment and it won’t get broken needlessly. When working with other companies, you need to talk directly with that commander. If there is a flaw in the overall plan, you need to address it. As I said before, if you don’t earn the commander’s respect he will give you a look of disgust and dismiss your knowledge as hot air. We have enjoyed good success engaging insurgents that come from other areas and assume that because U.S. forces are not at that intersection right now it will be safe to move there. We have seen groups of fighting-aged males gather, converse, and move out just on the other side of buildings, and shooters positioned to move, shoot, and peek at unsuspecting Soldiers trying to figure out how to better breach a wall or door.

I know this article covers a lot of disparate topics; however, I wanted to get as much out as soon as I could. Take what you can out of this article. Mind your manners with the populace, stay focused, keep a cool head, and always remember that no matter what, at any given time before or after an engagement there are still insurgents out there that only want to kill you. I am sure there are things I have forgotten and as I think of them I will write them down and update this article.

At the time this article was written, Staff Sergeant Jim Gilliland was serving as sniper section leader for Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. SSG Gilliland’s previous assignments include serving with the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and NCO Academy. His next assignment will be with the 5th Ranger Training Battalion in Dahlonega, Georgia.
The purpose of this article is to highlight four areas where I wish I could have done better as a commander in combat. These four areas are where my lack of focus hindered my company’s ability to accomplish its mission in the most efficient and lethal manner. This article is in no way a reflection on the men of my company or my battalion. I had the distinct privilege of commanding and working with an incredible team of Soldiers, NCOs, and officers who proved their mettle time and time again in combat.

After leaving command, I had a unique opportunity to reexamine some of the problems that I faced in combat from a different point of view:

1) I stayed in touch with the unit that replaced us; and
2) I returned to Afghanistan twice where I was able to observe a different unit deal with the problems that I had faced.

Here is what I learned:

Commanders need to empower and train junior leaders to make quick, life-or-death decisions on their own.

How we trained at home station

My company had a great opportunity to train prior to our deployment to Afghanistan. We truly implemented the crawl-walk-run method in our training from simple marksmanship through platoon situational training exercises (STXs) and live-fire exercises (LFXs). However, all these events focused on reacting to the enemy’s actions. All the live fires began with the pneumatic machine gun firing and the little green “Ivan” popping up. The squads were experts at reacting to contact. But, what about initiating contact? What about the myriad of different decisions that a junior leader has to make under stress in combat? I realized later that I had not developed scenarios that forced my junior leaders to make tough decisions on the spot, without calling higher for guidance.

Results in Combat

One of the squads, along with the platoon sergeant (PSG), was conducting a night ambush. On this particular night, four Afghans were walking in a single file on a trail, and two of them had AK-47s. The team leader (TL) spotted them and called the squad leader (SL) who called the PSG. Now, the PSG was forced to make a quick decision, and he wasn’t the one with eyes on the target. The end result was that the four Afghans walked away without any action from the squad. Whether they were combatants or not is not the issue. The issue is that the SL had not been trained and empowered to make this type of quick decision.

Doing something would have been better than nothing. After the incident, the first sergeant and I preached this again and again in the fire base, but it was too late. Some of our junior leaders were trained to react instead of initiate contact, and it was a hard habit to break.

To correct this, we set up a team LFX lane. The teams began the lane in a wadi where they could not see up the hill. The platoon leaders (PLs) briefed each team that two anti-coalition militants (ACMs) had been spotted up the hill wearing chest racks, carrying AK-47s and were planting a mine in the road. The PLs then set up two E-type silhouettes with chest racks and AK-47s. The teams then loaded into a cargo HMMWV and started up the hill. The difference in the teams was remarkable. One team crested the hill and immediately took action. The SAW gunner, with no prodding from his team leader, opened fire and cut down both targets. The team then cleared the enemy and secured the area.
Other teams crested the hill, looked at the obvious enemy, dismounted, formed a wedge, and moved toward the enemy waiting for the proverbial “pneumatic gun” to go off so they could launch into their battle drill. It was almost unbearable to watch.

**How to fix the problem**

**Mind-set**

Often, leaders try to mitigate this problem by adding layers of command and control. This is the wrong answer. No matter how many leaders were on a patrol, it was always the newest private or the youngest team leader that saw the enemy first. We must trust our team leaders and squad leaders and empower them to make decisions.

**Training**

Training should include the repetition and constant drilling that builds confidence and forms a team. However, training scenarios must put junior leaders in stressful situations where they must make split-second, life-or-death decisions without calling higher. The key to making the right decision quickly is to know the **commander’s intent**. If junior leaders internalize the commander’s intent, they will make the right decision. Additionally, they must know that they have the trust and confidence of their commander to make these important decisions on their own. A big part of this is
Knowing that the junior leaders will take their mistakes. Once our junior leaders have internalized the commander's intent and know they have the commander's confidence, they will make the right decision and respond expeditiously. Foster an environment in your company where junior leaders are empowered to make decisions and even to make mistakes. Don't build a zero-defect mentality.

**Commanders personally need to be involved in the gathering and processing of intelligence to focus the company's efforts.**

**How we trained at home station**

Every training mission prior to our deployment, we were given a specific target by battalion and told to conduct a raid, deliberate attack, ambush, etc. Battalion gathered and processed the intelligence and passed us a target packet to facilitate our planning.

**Results in Combat**

My company arrived at our firebase, and we looked at each other and said “Well, what do we do? Where is the enemy?” We rarely had a specific target to strike, and battalion was too far away to help gather intelligence. My response to this was to conduct extremely aggressive patrolling in hopes of finding the enemy. Day and night we launched squad-sized patrols to conduct ambushes and movements to contact. However, of the numerous firefights we were in, we never initiated contact. We were always reacting to the enemy. I believe our heavy patrolling did not help us find the enemy; instead, it just attracted the enemy to us. They set the operational conditions and chose when and where to engage us.

**How to fix the problem**

**Deliberate Targeting Process**

I had the opportunity to read AARs from other units who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, and many leaders shared my frustration over the inability to find the enemy. Additionally, I have spoken with many current company commanders and asked them about the targeting process in their companies. Unfortunately, many replied, “We just patrolled the streets and did vehicle checkpoints” or “Battalion didn’t give us any targets, so we just drove around looking for action.” So, how does a commander target an enemy that he cannot see? The answer is to identify an insurgent leader in the area, and target this enemy leader and his network.

This simple targeting method gives a specific purpose to your company’s efforts. Now, instead of conducting a “presence patrol,” you are looking for elements of the targeted network. All a company needs to begin targeting this network is one lead on a low-level facilitator in the network.

As the company conducts more raids, the company commander and intelligence representative can build a line-and-block chart and association matrix outlining the ACM network. They can compile intelligence on how Achmed’s network conducts operations. With every raid and capture, they continue to build and fill in details on Achmed’s network.

**Coordinate with Local Government**

As a commander, I wanted little to do with meetings. My men would escort the S2, Civil Affairs, and Special Forces Soldiers to the meetings, but I would wait outside. I missed a valuable opportunity to gain potential targets and better accomplish my mission.

Finding the right local leader to sponsor is a difficult task. It is hard to judge who is an honest supporter of the government of Afghanistan. Much time and analysis must go into this choice. A commander does not want to end up supporting one tribal leader against another. After six months, my battalion found the right local leader. We developed a great relationship with him and his men. This resulted in added security for our Soldiers and better targeting of the enemy. These local leaders know who the ACMs are, and once you gain their trust, they will tell you. This process builds stability and sets the groundwork for good local leaders to govern the area and secure themselves.

**Study Military Sources**

Throughout history, commanders have dealt with the same issues that we are facing today. There are no original ideas on how to best find, fix, and finish the enemy in an insurgency. Books can give you good ideas or at least get you thinking in new ways. I read The Bear Trap with my lieutenants prior to the deployment. We discussed this chapter by chapter every morning before PT. However, we stopped doing this overseas. We got so busy that we did not make time to keep reading books that would help us generate fresh thinking. We had the time to do this while deployed, and I am confident that a rigorous reading program would help generate new ideas on how to target the enemy.

**CrossTalk With Other Leaders**

- All the leaders in-country (sister company commanders/SGA employees) are facing the same problems you are facing. Cross talking with these leaders will generate new and different ideas on how to find/fix/finish the enemy in your area. Many leaders (including me) do not want to drop our guard and ask others to share their ideas because it might sound like we need help. However, we owe it to our Soldiers to find the best way to defeat the enemy, even if it means swallowing our pride.

**Commanders need to take time to think.**

**How we trained at home station**

Throughout my career, I have endured images in books and movies of the officer hiding in the firebase while his men are fighting and dying outside the wire. Even prior to becoming a cadet, when I read the book Platoon Leader, I swore that I would not lead like this. “Lead by Example!” and “Lead from the Front!” are phrases that I absorbed throughout my time in the Army.

With these thoughts in my head, I made sure I was at every range and every training event. Although the CDR/1SG’s presence at a range may raise the level of training that is occurring, it can also stifle the initiative and decision-making of junior leaders (refer to point #1).

**Results in Combat**

Throughout my time in Afghanistan, I was constantly on patrol with my squads and platoons. Often, I provided an unneeded level of C2. The times when I was not on patrol, my junior leaders did an incredible job. They were very aggressive and used all assets including indirect fire and close air support to destroy the enemy. I believe I had the respect of the men because I did not hide in the firebase, but I never built in time for me to reflect on how to better accomplish the mission or on how to win in our area. If I had not gone out so much, I might have solved some of these problems overseas instead of writing about them now.

**How to fix the problem**

I am not advocating commanding from behind a desk or hiding in the firebase. However, this is a thinking-man’s war. The enemy...
is constantly improving and changing. Commanders must build in time and institute mechanisms to allow themselves to think about what they can do to better find/fix/finish the enemy.

Some of these mechanisms are as follows:

☐ Read!

☐ Block time on your calendar to meet with a PSG/PL/SL to just talk and brainstorm about better ways to accomplish the mission.

☐ Conduct PT with the 1SG where you focus on bettering your company.

☐ Conduct a regular Ops/Intel Assessment. During this meeting, focus on what you are currently doing, what the enemy is doing, what should you be doing to win in 30 days, six months, five years. It is amazing when you lay this out how ideas on how to focus your company will jump out at you.

Leaders and units need to pursue the enemy relentlessly.

Every time the ACMs in Afghanistan tried to stand and fight against U.S. forces they suffered withering defeats. Because of this, ACMs usually use hit-and-run tactics. Throughout my time in Afghanistan, the enemy never engaged my company unless they fired from dominant terrain and had a planned exfil route. After a “mad minute,” the enemy broke contact with amazing speed and blended into the population or the countryside.

How we trained at home station

In most of our home station LFXs and simunitions training, we fought an enemy that stayed on a fixed target. This allowed us to quickly complete our battle drill. Although you need to be prepared for a hardened enemy, rarely does the enemy stay and fight to the death.

Results in Combat

During our firefights early in the deployment, we would quickly gain fire superiority over the enemy, but then lose contact as the enemy ran away. During one engagement, the squad in contact returned fire, the mortars fired in handheld mode, and I sent two mounted elements in opposite directions. One of the mounted elements captured the ACMs six kilometers from the engagement site. It was amazing how much ground the ACMs had covered in such a short time.

How to fix the problem

The obvious fix is to not get ambushed in the first place. A good terrain analysis will quickly uncover the best ambush spots. Stop and clear these potential ambush spots with as many assets as you can before you move through them. However, when you are ambushed, stay in pursuit of the enemy. Don’t lose patience. One of the frustrating facts of fighting in Afghanistan is that the enemy rarely shows himself. Although it is not ideal, after an ambush you have a good lead on the enemy. Do not turn back to the firebase until you have exhausted every resource to regain contact. Leaders must know what indirect fire targets they can call at all times, and they must know what routes they can send different elements on to prevent enemy exfil. Throughout the chase, leaders must maintain command and control of these elements who are often moving in many directions. Also, leaders must be patient. Give your units time to regain contact.

One of the great hindrances to staying after the fight occurs after sustaining friendly casualties. As leaders, we pay lip service to eliminating the threat prior to attending to our casualties. When we see the men we love injured, it is very hard to focus our attention on killing the enemy. Stay focused on the enemy, and don’t let your mission turn into a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) drill.

When I returned to Afghanistan as a staff officer, I got to listen to a battle on the radio that demonstrated how to stay after the fight. An ACM squad (+) ambushed a small patrol near the Pakistan border. The Soldiers fought back and killed four ACMs, but they sustained multiple casualties. I’ll never forget the words of the patrol leader over the radio, “OK men, don’t let this turn into a CASEVAC drill, continue to focus on killing the enemy.” The patrol then moved all the way to the Pakistan border and met with the Pakistan Army border guards. The patrol stayed all day and reengaged the enemy that night.

Conclusion

As I reflected on my time in command, I knew that I could have done better in the four areas/principles that I have outlined in this article. However, there were many times that the great leaders in my company accomplished one or more of these principles and destroyed the enemy.

For commanders heading to combat, you have great challenges ahead of you. You are facing a life-and-death chess match, and your company will be looking to you for the answers. I hope that these four principles will help you better find/fix/finish the enemy while continuing to build Iraq and/or Afghanistan into solid nations.

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As U.S. forces take stock of the fact that 70 percent of Iraqis voted in the December 15 elections, it is vital to examine the history of how and when the Iraqi army played so prominent a role in the political life of the country. By exploring the history of Iraq’s civil-military affairs, we can begin to diagnose telltale signs of what worked and what did not work in Iraq’s difficult birth as a nation-state and maintaining Iraq’s borders despite fierce sectarianism along religious and ethnic lines. In his essay “The Second Learning Revolution,” which appeared in the book Rethinking the Principles of War, Major General Robert Scales advocated that military decision-making has been pushed to lower and lower ranks. He pointed out that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, junior officers and NCOs are making decisions that were the purview of colonels during the Cold War.

It is therefore of utmost importance to equip them and American military planners with an understanding of the evolution of Iraq, its military and their relationship with civil authority. America’s war colleges must not shy away from the treasures to be found in Arabic books that discuss military affairs. This essay will explore Iraq’s military relationship to the Hashemite dynasty that lasted from 1921 to 1958. It will rely primarily on the work of Dr. Akeel Al-Nasseri who in 2000 wrote a seminal study entitled Al-Jaysh wal Sultah Fee Iraq Al-Malaki, which is translated as The Military and (Political) Authority under the Iraqi Monarchy 1921-1958 (Dar Al-Hassad Publishing, Damascus, Syria: 2000). Note that under Saddam Hussein this Iraqi historian published this work in Syria and in his adopted homeland of Sweden. One of the benefits of the liberation of Iraq is the hope that Iraqi intellectual life suppressed under Saddam will blossom once again. Readers will learn the methodical history of Sunni domination of the armed forces, a remnant of Ottoman times and carried over by the British when it ran Iraq as mandate from 1922 to 1932. In addition, the different currents that undermined the Iraqi monarchy of Feisal I and his dynasty to Feisal II would lead to the Arab world’s first military coup d’état and bring such external players as Nazi Germany, the Vichy French, and the British in World War II.

The Iraqi army under the monarchy went through four phases of political development leading to the July 1958 revolution that finally brought Iraqi officers into complete control of the country:

- Foundation phase (1921-1932),
- Destabilization phase (1932-1941),
- Radicalization phase (1941-1949), and

Seeds of the Foundation Phase: Ottoman Military Administration of Iraq

Before the creation of modern Iraq in the aftermath of World War I, the Ottoman Turks administered the region as three distinct quasi-autonomous entities. The three regions centered on Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Each of these separate provinces had a duly appointed Ottoman Pasha from 1534 to around 1870 that governed on behalf of the Ottoman sultan and collected taxes for Constantinople. Ottoman governor of Baghdad Midhat Pasha restructured the three provinces of Mesopotamia with Baghdad retaining central control over Mosul and Basra. Although not in existence at the time, Iraq was slowly taking shape with Baghdad becoming the central capitol of the Mesopotamian province. The Ottomans realized that with the sheer size and central location of Baghdad, this province and whoever the Sultan selected to govern it dictated the course of the smaller urban areas of Mosul in the north and Basra in the south. This dispels the theories that the British created modern Iraq; it instead inherited three Ottoman provinces centrally run from Baghdad.

The Ottomans used a divide and rule system of keeping dominance over Mesopotamia. It capitalized on divisions between:

- Urban mercantile aristocratic families versus agrarian tribes that farmed along the Euphrates River;
- One tribe against another in Iraq’s desert and semi-nomadic regions;
- Shiites versus Sunnis; and
- Various Shiite hawzas (circles of influence that competed within Shiite Islam for a following).

The latter half of the 19th century saw significant reform of the Ottoman army. Chiefly these reforms included opening European-style (Prussian) military academies and the creation of a modern general staff. For Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the pivotal reform was the opening of officer ranks, military schools, and officer academies. Arabs began to experience military service as a full-time profession in the late 19th century. Arab officers trained in the 1870s onward would rise to command in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Mesopotamia was the hub of military activity, and the 16th Ottoman army was charged with providing security...
Foundation Phase: Arabs Who Passed Through the Ottoman Military Education System

One the eve of World War I, about 1,000 Iraqi officers were in the service of the Ottoman sultan. Arabic sources divided those officers into two major camps during the outbreak of the war and its four-year duration.

(I) The first group of about 250 joined the Arab Revolt and fought under the banner of the Sherief (Sherief is an honorific title denoting descent from Prophet Muhammad’s family) Hussein of Mecca and his three sons Abdullah, Feisal, and Ali. They were stimulated by British promises of creating an Arab homeland that stretched from Arabia to the Levant and Iraq. After World War I and the leaking of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided Ottoman lands into British and French spheres of influence, they felt their cause had been betrayed and evolved into infamous Arab nationalists, playing an important role in the development of modern Iraq and the evolution of what today is the fighting force known as the Arab Legion. This group included Jafar Al-Askary and Mouloud Mukhils. Others included Nuri Said and Jawdat Farouki. Their efforts along with British intelligence officers like T. E. Lawrence were able to keep the Ottomans diverted in suppressing an Arab Revolt in Arabia, tying down divisions that would have been used in a drive towards occupying the vital Suez Canal in Egypt. It is this group of officers that fought with the Arab Revolt, encircling the Ottoman garrison in Medina, occupying the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and finally marching with General Edmund Allenby’s British forces to Palestine and Damascus. They would form the core of loyal military officers for both King Abdullah bin Hussein of Jordan and King Feisal bin Hussein of Iraq.

(II) In the second group of Ottoman graduates who were Iraqi, about 300 remained in Ottoman service and considered defiance of the sultan a sacrilege. They fought and commanded Ottoman troops in the Balkans, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Russia, and Greece as well as in the Sinai. This group would return to become repatriated into the new Iraqi army under King Feisal and would play a role on the fringes of the new Iraqi mandate. To what degree they felt bitter regarding the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire is not clearly known, but one can assume that their loyalty to King Feisal was always suspect.

Jafar Al-Askary would be the first of King Feisal’s military leaders to arrive in what would become Iraq and would serve as war minister in Iraq’s provisional governments, of which several existed until 1932. In 1920, Jafar Al-Askary began the process of repatriating and absorbing Iraqi military personnel dispersed in the Middle East and in Ottoman theaters of battle to form the new Iraqi army. Among the challenges he faced during the First Provisional Government (January 1920-September 1921) were balancing those Arab officers who wanted to remain in Syria to fight the French while fomenting a revolution against the French mandate on the Levant, but on the other hand retaining those same leaders into the nucleus of a new Iraqi army. During the Second Provisional Government (September 1921-August 1922), War Minister Askary focused on Iraqi troops under Ottoman service held as prisoners in such places as ship hulks in Greek harbors and those stranded in Arabia. Aside from bringing in former trained Arab combatants who had served in the Arab Revolt or under Ottoman colors, Askary and a dozen Hashemite officers from the Arab Revolt debated other aspects of creating a modern Iraqi army. That discussion included:

☐ Deciding to field an all-volunteer force;
☐ Determining who would be eligible to serve in the army;
☐ Creating zones of training whereby those joining in the north of Iraq would train at Hilla and those joining in the southern or central regions would train in Baghdad.
Arab Views on the British Mandate of Iraq

Two political attitudes existed among this cadre of Arab officers and troops brought together from Ottoman service. One argued for an alliance with Britain and allowing the mandate to take its course to create a modern and regionally powerful Iraq. Others were on the fence and supported whichever side was winning street skirmishes. Another significant portion was known as the radicalists, who wanted immediate independence and union with Syria. They rejected King Feisal and the British mandate. This group included seniors officers like Sabbagh, Sidqi, Shabeeb, and Jawad; all of whom would provide a host of officers that served in Iraq’s military. It was in this climate that King Feisal and his advisors began promoting and assigning Sunni, Sherifan (Arab Revolt) officers to senior ranks in Iraq’s new army. Out of 304 officers who returned to Iraq after World War I, 191 were Sherifan (Sunni and primarily non-Iraqi) and eight were above the rank of colonel. Of those eight senior officers, only three were non-Sherifan (Iraqi). What evolved under the monarchy was an officer corps dominated by 30 primarily Sunni families with the lion’s share of Iraq’s military leadership coming from these families: Askary, Said, Saddoun, Suweidi, Sahruudi, Shabandar, Bajaie, Gaylani, Daftari, Jaderjee, Hashimi and Ayubi. These 20-30 military families intermarried and promoted one another’s interests within the Iraqi armed forces of the monarchic period. Their families dominated the Iraqi officer corps. Their descendants exist in today’s Iraq and no doubt continued attempting to protect their interests even during the Baathist period. Some of these officers were eliminated by Saddam Hussein who saw them as elitists; others perished in the wars against Iran, Kuwait, and the United States. The question today remains if these families will attempt to re-establish the old order and what their views are on Iraq’s new military. Perhaps a key question is: how many of the descendants of these families with a militant tradition in Iraq are part of the Sunni Arab insurgency?

King Feisal I

When King Feisal was evicted from Syria in 1920 by French forces, the British in the 1921 Cairo Conference installed him as King of Iraq and decided to transition the country to independence in 10 years (1922-1932) under his rule. King Feisal of the Hashemite clan of Mecca knew that he was a Sunni outsider from Arabia asked to rule over Iraqis, and this placed him in a difficult situation. However, he was attuned to the ways in which the Ottomans governed Iraq and quickly assessed that:

* The Shiite hawzas stood against the British mandate;
* The mercantile urban families stood against Hashemite (sometimes called Sherifan rule) in Iraq;
* The Sherifan officers of the Arab Revolt who fought for Arab self-determination on the British side now stood against the British experiment in Iraq, but were divided on which course the new country should take. Should Iraq follow Iraqi nationalist or Arab nationalist agendas? Should Iraq attempt to regain the unity of Arabs as it was under the Ottomans? Or should Islam be the unifying force of the country?

Initially, the urban elite of Iraq’s major cities refused to build a middle and upper middle class cadre around King Feisal or serve in the newly created Iraqi army. A few Iraqis did join the army as officers but were against a monarchy they deemed as alien so they sought to undermine it from within. Clerics, both Sunni and Shiite, directed their anger at the British primarily and excluded demonstrating against King Feisal. They had stimulated the 1920 uprising that opposed the enforcement of the Sykes-Picot Treaty and the mandate systems. The rebellion would last well into 1921 and lead to a commitment of thousands of British troops. A key leader of the 1920 Revolt was Shiekh Al-Dhari, a Sunni clerical leader who incited an urban riot against British forces in Iraq. His descendents today head the Muslim Ulema Council in Iraq, a Sunni Islamist and Salafi inspired organization that some argue is the peaceful face of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Iraqi officers of the 1920s could be classified as:

* Collaborators of the British and the Hashemite monarch in the name of stability and order;
* Urbanites who strive towards a gradual shift in political power to the urban mercantile class;
* Tribal chiefs who sent their sons to look after regional interests and policies from Baghdad unfavorable to their tribe or region;
* Ottoman officers who joined the Iraqi army as mercenaries;
* Pan-Arabit intelligentsia who strove towards a unified national agenda with Syria, Jordan and the Lebanon;
* Iraqi intelligentsia who strove to create an Iraqi national identity and regional hegemony; and finally
* Those who safeguarded Shiite or Sunni interests through the use of their military commissions.

British Views on the Creation of Modern Iraq

The future of Iraq would be the subject of much debate among British colonial officials. The Cairo clique represented by Sir Percy Cox felt that immediate independence for Iraq coupled with indirect British rule would be the best course for the newly emerging nation. In that manner, King Feisal could establish himself without overt British support that would undermine his tenuous legitimacy as King of Iraq. The Delhi clique, represented by A. T. Wilson, wanted direct British rule over Iraq as the only means of guaranteeing short term stability until such time that Iraq’s mandatory status ended, and they could have institutions of governance and national unity. The British discussed Iraq’s
divisions and among the proposals was the creation of an Iraqi army as a means to foster national identity. More importantly, the key determining issue in London was how to manage the Iraqi mandate with as little investment in security and actual commitment of British forces. This debate was clearly demonstrated in the memoirs of Winston Churchill, but perhaps a more concise case for getting Iraqis to assume more responsibility for securing British interests in Mesopotamia was found in three letters written by T. E. Lawrence to three different British newspapers between July and August 1920. Central concepts of these three letters are:

* A criticism of British policy makers essentially “setting up in Mesopotamia a government which is English in fashion and is conducted in the English language.” He advocated raising two divisions of local volunteer troops and making Arabic the official language of government, and also looked to the dominions of Canada and South Africa as a model on how Iraqi governance should evolve under the British mandatory system.

* Advocating the tapping of British officials with significant experience in India, Sudan, Egypt and other colonies to act as advisors to King Feisal behind the scenes.

* Warning against being compared to the Ottomans; citing they killed 200 Arabs yearly to maintain the peace. He argued that the 1920 Revolt cost more than 10,000 Arab lives, and that the British were losing their legitimacy as a benign hegemon. (*T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace* by Malcom Brown. Stackpole Books, 2005)

Arabic books focus on King Feisal’s insecurities in governing Iraq including his eviction from Syria in the Battle of Maysalun in 1920, being non-Iraqi, being a Sunni ruler imposed on a Shiite majority, and perhaps the most pressing tactical problem for the new king was that some Iraqi tribes had more weapons caches than he.

The British crafted the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that defined the terms of the 10-year mandate and imposed the following security terms that would be a source of constant tension between Askary, Nuri Said and King Feisal on the one hand and British authorities on the other. Issues of contention that relate to security included:

* Cooperating with British forces to quell internal riots and civil disobedience;
* Defining a percentage of Iraq’s total revenue that would go to the military;
* Assigning a British flag officer as inspector general of the Iraqi army;
* Providing the British high commissioner in unimpeded access to Iraq’s military installations and oversight of all Iraqi military operations carried out by the army;
* Permission to recruit 7,500 Iraqis as levy forces;
* Basing six Royal Air Force squadrons in Iraq; and
* Agreeing to undertake the training of the Iraqi officer corps and furnish advisors and trainers in Iraq.

The problems with this treaty included the Levy Force evolving into a better equipped and elite Iraqi force that was resented by the regular Iraqi army. Arab historians single this out as an example of how the Baathists would model their Republican Guard forces on the British Levy Force. The Iraqi Provisional Government ruling on behalf of King Feisal sought to reduce the initial four battalions used to secure British installations and officials from four in 1922 to two after 1927. The terms of the treaty further undermined King Feisal’s legitimacy and bolstered the radicals within the Iraqi military establishment. Oversight over the Iraqi army and its internal security operations would be the main contention point between four provisional governments, being an all-consuming issue of the Third Provisional Government of Prime Minister Saddoun (January 1928-April 1929). Initial Iraqi plans for an all-volunteer force was re-debated with Iraqi generals seeing a general draft as a means of wresting control from the British. However, there were those generals vested in the preservation of the Hashemite monarchy who viewed a general draft as bringing sectarianism and training Shiites, Kurds, and undesirable Sunni tribes who would then form a ready force under a tribal sheik at the expense of the central government. Objections to the idea of a draft were voiced by Kurds and a minority sect known as Yazidis. Prime Minister Nuri Said was among those who stood against conscription and expansion of the army initially. His opposition would change, however, when he realized the need for a wider security force after the British mandate ended in 1932 and as the expansion of the army became a defining issue in ending British oversight of Iraq. In the end, the Iraqis would adopt a three-layered defense force of regular volunteers, four-year conscripts and three-year conscripts. The government forced Yazidis and other minorities to submit to conscription, and this further undermined the armed forces.

### Solutions to King Feisal’s Problems

To address the challenges of ruling Iraq, Feisal brought in loyal officers and troops who fought with him during the Arab Revolt, an event made famous by the notoriety of T. E. Lawrence. His first order of business was to create a security force that maintained internal order and suppressed any vocal objections to his rule. Feisal I and one of his trusted military advisors Tewfik Suweidi...
worked to create a cadre of loyal Sunni officers from remnants of the Arab Revolt. This system evolved in time to 61 army officers who maintained oversight and security for King Feisal. Fifty-one were former Sherifan officers who fought in the Arab Revolt. This situation would remain until 1941. Although the British attempted to create a parliamentary monarchy in Iraq, what developed was a parliament rife with dissent and revolutionary ideas aimed at undermining King Feisal. In the early formation of the Iraqi monarchy, the Shiite clerical leaders saw the new Iraqi army as the only defense against Wahhabi encroachment from Saudi Arabia, a matter that preoccupied Iraqi Shiites in the 1922 Karbala Conference. The Iraqi army supported by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) was used to subdue Saudi incited tribes and keep Iraqi Sunni tribes from coming into the Al-Saud confederacy. The urban intelligentsia saw in the Iraqi army a chance for Arab self-determination denied them by the European victors of World War I, a chance for unity, and a return to past glories of the Arab empire. Military training slots were allocated for sons of tribal chiefstains as a means of guaranteeing loyalty. This was not a new development but a carry over from Ottoman times. It made much political sense as it allowed King Feisal to undermine the hold the 20 to 30 martial families had in the Iraqi military.

**Uprisings and Revolts: Towards the Destabilization Phase**

Modern Iraqi history is replete with serious riots, insurrections, and violent incitements so it is a testament to coalition forces and Iraqi security forces that rioting and violent protests have not been as prevalent. Iraqi forces supported by the British RAF put down 130 uprisings and revolts between 1921 to 1932. After the British Mandate ended in 1932, there were 10 major uprisings in five years centering in the Kurdish regions, Nasiriyah, Diwaniyah and Basra.

Worse was to come after Iraq became an independent nation in 1932 leading to the pro-fascist government of Prime Minister Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani in 1941. Starting with the Colonel Bakr Sidqi Revolt in 1936, six major military coups took place in five years. These officers would be motivated by the examples of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran who were seen ridding themselves of foreign influences and dictating modernity, order, and independence. Both were former military officers. Some Iraqi officers were a product of the same Ottoman schools that produced Kemal Ataturk, and matters in Iraq were made worse during Prime Minister Nuri Said’s use of the army to eliminate political enemies. The Iraqi army was not immune to the political turmoil in the country and the various nationalist, monarchist, Marxist, reformist, and fascist currents. The first communist cells within the army were uncovered in 1935. In 1937, more than 65 soldiers were imprisoned for supporting the Iraqi Communist Party. In 1938, Military Regulation 51 was imposed for any person or persons importing subversive doctrines into the armed forces.

**1941: Radical Expressions, Rashid Ali Gaylani and the Nazi connection in Iraq**

The discovery of huge oil fields near Kirkuk and the installation of King Feisal I placed Iraq firmly under British control. Yet the rise of anti-British sentiments gave birth to several anti-colonialists and Arab nationalist movements, the British resorted to military force when British interests were threatened, as in the Rashid Ali Gaylani coup of 1941.

Rashid Ali Gaylani was born in 1892 to a prominent aristocratic Sunni family in Baghdad. He studied law in Baghdad and began his career in Iraqi politics in 1924 in the government led by Yasin al-Hashimi, who appointed Gaylani Minister of Justice and then Minister of the Interior. Both men opposed any British involvement in the Iraq’s internal politics. They rejected the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed by the Pro-British government of Nuri Said in 1930 and formed their own Party of National Brotherhood to promote a nationalist agenda. Gaylani would ascend to the prime ministership in 1933.

During the 1930s, Gaylani was highly influenced by Haj Amin al-Husseini, an ex-Ottoman artillery officer turned school teacher. He is better known as the grand mufti of Jerusalem, who had been exiled from the British Palestine for his anti-British activities. Husseini was active in organizing anti-Jewish riots in the late 1920s and found support in Hitler’s Germany. By 1940, Gaylani thus dubbed his own association of fierce Arab nationalists comprising four colonels — the Golden Square. It was at that time that the ideological foundations of what in later years became the Baath Party were laid. Baathism is a fusion of Arab nationalism with fascist ideas created by two Syrian students studying in the Sorbonne: Salah-al-Din Bittar and Michel Aflaq. The party wasn’t organized until 1947. Due to requirements of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Iraq broke relations with Nazi Germany in September 1939. As a prelude to independence, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 preserved for Britain important stakes in Iraq, specifically:

* Commercial interests in Mosul and Kirkuk oil fields and air bases next to Baghdad and Basra;
* Vital strategic land and air link with India; and
* The right to transport troops through Iraq.

In March 1940, Gaylani replaced Nuri Said as prime minister. Consequently, when Italy entered the war in June 1940 Iraq did not sever relations with Rome. When Gaylani was appointed prime minister in 1940, Iraq had experienced the
untimely death of King Ghazi in a car accident and the ascendancy of a weak regency of the new four-year-old King Feisal II. The power would be in the hands of his uncle, Prince Abdal-Illah. (Prince Abdal-Illah stepped down in 1953 when Feisal II came of age, but he continued to be a close chief adviser and companion of the young king. He was also a strong advocate of pro-Western foreign policy.)

Though Abdal-Illah supported Britain in the war, he was unable to assert control over Gaylani, who used the start of World War II to further Iraqi nationalist objectives. He refused to allow troops from India and Australia to cross through Iraq to the North African front. He also rejected calls that Iraq break ties with Italy and sent his justice minister, Naji Shawkat, on a secret mission to Ankara. This mission’s intent was to make contact with the German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, and win German support for his government. The allies and Britain in particular grew concerned with Iraqi negotiations to renew ties between the Nazi regime and Iraq. The discussion between Nazi and Iraqi officials included promises to provide military support to Germany when its armies reached Iraq. At a later meeting, Haj Amin Al-Hussieni’s private secretary acted as the representative for the Iraqi government. Gaylani guaranteed Germany that Iraq’s natural resources would be made available to the Axis war effort in return for German recognition of the Arab state’s right to independence and political unity.

By December 1940, the British demanded the removal of Gaylani, and in January he was replaced with General Taha Pasha el Hashimi, another pan-Arabist who was more palatable to Britain. This only aggravated Iraqi mistrust of Britain and their supporters in the government, and together with some of his pro-Axis colleagues, Gaylani made plans to assassinate Abdal-Illah and depose Taha el Hashimi. This was an elaborate plot to seize power. However, as elements of the Iraqi military began siding with Gaylani, Abdal-Illah fled the country March 31, and on April 3, Gaylani regained power.

**Fascist and Iraqi Nationalist Showdown with British Forces in Iraq**

One of Gaylani’s first acts was to send an Iraqi artillery force to confront the British airbase at Habbaniya, while other British forces landed at Basra. Constructed in 1934, the airbase was situated on low ground by the Euphrates River and was overlooked by a plateau 1,000 yards to the south, which rose to around 150 feet at its highest point. The base had a force of 96 mostly obsolete aircraft. The British had 2,200 troops to defend the base and 12 armored cars. It housed a Flying Training School of 1,000 airmen supported by 9,000 civilians, many of them British dependents. Its defenses consisted of a seven-mile long iron fence and a constabulary of 1,200 Iraqi and Assyrian levies. By the second day of fighting, a few more Blenheim fighter bombers arrived. Encouraged by hints of German assistance and German triumphs in Greece and Crete, Gaylani began to move against the British by breaching the 1930 British treaty rights and besieging the air base of Habbaniya on April 30, 1941. British infantry began shuttering by air from Shaibah to reinforce Habbaniya. The Vichy French government in Syria aided the new Pro-Axis Iraqi government and provided a conduit for German assistance to keep the Iraqi National Defense Government alive. Gaylani collaborated with Nazi German intelligence units and eventually accepted military assistance from Nazi Germany.

Tactically, there were two major British military installations in Iraq; one was at Basra and the second was the airbase at Lake Habbaniya, west of Baghdad. To secure Iraq, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered General Archibald Wavell to protect the Habbaniya airbase. General Wavell felt overcommitted and short of resources needed to reinforce Iraq. With the presence of Italian divisions in North Africa, he thought that Iraq was a minor aggravation. Wavell left Iraq’s RAF base lightly guarded by a locally recruited constabulary (levy force) backed by armored cars. Despite overstretched British forces in Egypt and North Africa, Churchill insisted on overthrowing the Gaylani regime in order to preserve British strategic interests in the Gulf. The prime minister understood this was a war of engines and turbines in the air, sea and land, and this required petroleum. An Indian division sailed for Basra, and a hybrid force of a British brigade composed of Arab Legions assembled in Jordan under the command of General Sir Edward Quinan.

Hitler ordered planes and arms to be sent to Baghdad in support of Gaylani. German Luftwaffe units arrived in Mosul on May 12, 1941. Hitler’s 30th Directive on the Middle East was reported to have said “The Arab Freedom Movement is (in the Middle East) our natural ally against England. In this connection, the raising of rebellion in Iraq is of special importance. Such rebellion will extend across the Iraq frontiers to strengthen the forces which are hostile to England in the Middle East, interrupt the British lines of communication, and tie down both English troops and English shipping space at the expense of other theatres of war. For these reasons I have decided to push the development of operations in the Middle East through the medium of going to the support of Iraq. Whether and in what way it may later be possible to wreck finally the English position between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, in conjunction with an offensive against the Suez canal, is still in the lap of the gods...”

According to the book *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance, Volume III* by Winston Churchill, captured Nazi leader Rudolf Hess, who served as Hitler’s secretary, pointed out in an interview with the British Foreign Office that “in any peace settlement Germany would have to support Rashid Ali and secure eviction of British presence from Iraq.”

Resenting the Royal Navy’s July 1940 attack on the French fleet lying at anchor at Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria, French Admiral Jean Darlan negotiated a preliminary agreement with the Germans and offered to release Vichy war stocks in Syria, including aircraft, and permit passage of German war material across Syria, providing a Syrian air link for the Germans to support Gaylani from the Axis-occupied Dodecanese Islands. German agents, with ample
Major General John Glubb was then a major in command of the small task force of Arab Legion that reached Habbaniya on May 18 after crossing 500 miles of desert. As the British forces advanced towards Iraq from Jordan, RAF bombers virtually annihilated the Iraqi air force, and extended their attacks to Syrian air bases that serviced German He-111 bombers and Me-110 fighters. The Iraqi army established itself on the high ground to the south of the Habbaniya airbase. An Iraqi envoy was sent to demand that no movements of either ground or air were to take place from the base. The British refused this demand and opened fire on the Iraqis, knowing the relief force was only hours away.

The British forces surrounded at Habbaniya consisted of 2,000 troops, 20 armored cars and a few Bristol Blenheim fighter bombers. With help from the ground forces at the base and the Iraqi levies comprised mostly of Assyrians and Kurds, the Iraqi troops were pushed back to Fallujah through a combined air, ground, and artillery assault. The air battle was taken to the remaining Iraqi airbases. Habbaniya had essentially lifted the siege with its own resources. A secondary mission of Habforce was to establish a line of communication across the desert and in addition to provide a flying column for operations. This roving column came to be known as the Kingcol after its commander, Brig. Gen. J. J. Kingstone. The Kingcol (derived from Kingstone’s first four letters of his name and col for roving column) would be composed by the headquarters of the 4th Cavalry Brigade and Signals, Household Cavalry Regiment, one battery of 60th Field Regiment, 1st Anti-Tank Troop Regiment, a detachment of the 2nd Field Squadron, two companies of the 1st Essex Regiment, a detachment of 166th Light Field Ambulance, a desert mechanized regiment, Arab Legion detachment (minus)

Unfortunately for Berlin, by the time Hitler was moved to declare that “the Arab liberation movement is our natural ally,” Churchill had preempted Axis intervention in Iraq. The Iraqis made things worse for themselves when they mistakenly shot down the plane of Major Axel von Bloomberg, Germany’s negotiator sent to coordinate military support for the Gaylani coup. Despite energetic efforts by Dr. Rudolf Rahn, the German representative on the Italian Armistice Commission in Syria, to run trains of arms, munitions and spare parts to the insurgents through Turkey and Syria, and the intervention of approximately 30 German planes bolstered by a dozen Italian planes, Iraq’s five divisions proved no match against the British forces backed by about 200 aircraft.

Iraqi forces comprised one infantry brigade plus two mechanized battalions, one mechanized artillery brigade (equipped with twelve 3.7cm howitzers), one field artillery brigade (equipped with twelve 18 pounders and four 4.5cm howitzers), 12 armored cars, one mechanized machine gun company, one mechanized signal company, one anti-air/anti-tank battery. In view of the situation, London decided to organize a relief force to go to the aid of Habbaniya. This force was named Habforce and consisted of the 1st Cavalry Regiment supported by one royal field artillery regiment. One mobile infantry battalion and three mechanized squadrons from the Transjordan Frontier Force were assembled. This force was short of equipment and would have to travel a total of 535 miles to reach Habbaniya.

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Once the allied reinforcements arrived in two columns (Kingcol, headed by Brig. J.J. Kingstone and Habforce, headed by Major General John George Walters Clark) across the desert from Palestine and Transjordan, the Iraqi army was cleared from Fallujah and pursued along the river valley to Baghdad, which fell within a week with the nominal restoration of the regent and the pro-British government. Using Iraq as a staging area, British forces invaded Iran with a Soviet intervention from the north on August 25, 1941, installing pro-British Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Unsettled by Vichy France’s invitation to the Germans to use Syrian air bases, Churchill ordered the invasion of Syria and Lebanon, which fell on July 14 after a six-week campaign. Nuri Said was reinstalled as prime minister of a pro-British government on October 10, 1941, and Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Vichy France a month later. Allied (British) occupation of Iraq continued until October 26, 1947. The last British soldier left Iraq on May 30, 1959, with the closure of the strategic Habbaniya airbase in Iraq.

Gaylani fled to Iran, then Istanbul, and finally ending up in Berlin where Hitler provided him protection. After World War II, he lived in exile in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, returning to Iraq only in 1958 following the revolution that overthrew Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. Once again, he attempted to seize power, and plotted a revolt against Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim Kassim’s government. The revolt was foiled, and Gaylani was sentenced to death but later pardoned. In 1961, Gaylani was
Prince Abdul-Ilah and Prime Minister Nuri Said take part in a ceremony in Baghdad in November 1942. Nuri Said served as prime minister for 14 terms over the course of 28 years.

released from prison by a special amnesty, settling in Beirut. He died in Lebanon four years later. Gaylani’s reputation was revived by Saddam Hussein, and he was portrayed as a national hero. In the Memoirs of the Qadriah Order (Tazkara-Qadriah) written by Sayyad Tahir Allaaddin Al-Gaylani, grandson of Abd ar-Rahman al-Haydari al-Gaylani, wrote:

“Sayed Rashid Ali al-Gaylani: Son of Sayed Abdul Wahhab Al-Gaylani, as trustee of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) and seasoned statesman with political vision, he was held in high esteem. He was opposed to the enslavement of Iraq and in (the) national interest served as Prime Minister. Subsequently the Government consulted him on important national issues. The people were by and large fond of him because of his growing sympathy for their cause. Notwithstanding his political consciousness he was exceedingly pious, virtuous, close to almighty God, fearing God with abstemious life-style.”

Conclusion

There are many things that American forces and military planners can learn from the British experience in Iraq, as well as the construct of the Iraqi military during the Ottoman and monarchic periods. But first, the writings on Iraq’s development as a nation-state need to be rediscovered and reinterpreted with an eye to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which has taken Iraq into a new and more promising phase as a nation-state. Primary sources can be found in British memoirs and writings, as well as several key Arabic books that allow a fuller view of the evolution of the Iraqi military and how it has interjected itself in the country’s political life. British influence in Iraq was limited to only a small segment of the population, the Sunni Arabs and in the end the focus of the British presence in Iraq was to maintain access to strategic bases and air-routes to India as well as energy resources. Therefore Iraq’s constitution and electoral politics during the monarchy were geared towards maintaining Britain’s position in Iraq. The U.S. and coalition partners over eight decades later have striven to include and empower the various segments of Iraqi society and even when the Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 elections, other population groups within the Iraqi Provisional Government showed great statesmanship and included Sunnis in the drafting of the constitution and in the government in general.

The U.S. has finally fulfilled the dream of Iraqis since the creation of the nation-state to shape and mold a truly national security force that shall further cement the national identity. Integrating Iraqis in quelling violence was also a key improvement in the management of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The British handling of the 1920 Revolt lasted four months and led to more than 450 British and 8,450 Iraqi casualties. On the positive side, the British did lay out the seeds of modern industrial capabilities for Iraq in the political, military, and economic as well as petroleum sectors. The British focus was not to get Iraq on its feet and give the Iraqi people the liberty to choose their form of government. Therefore, they could never fully develop Iraq’s industrial capability. In many ways, the insurgency of today retards that development; but not to the extent seen with the anger of Iraqis against the British mandate. It is vital to distance Operation Iraqi Freedom from any references to the old British mandate system. This includes rebutting such news channels as Al-Jazeera in which imperialism, colonialism, occupier and the United States are used interchangeably in programming. This conjures up memories of the past for many Iraqis, which is an unfair and out of context characterization of U.S. intentions in Iraq. Other lessons learned from the Iraqi monarchy include the need to be constantly vigilant for anti-government cells within the Iraqi military and the need to enshrine in culture and in the constitution an apolitical officer corps, emphasizing the peaceful and constructive methods officers can use to bring forth grievances to seniors. Finally, there need to be more studies at the war college level on Iraqi civil-military affairs from the Ottoman period, the Hashemite period, the rule of the generals and Baathist period. Arabic books on the subject need to be translated, analyzed and debated. Perhaps the most incisive study done during Operation Iraqi Freedom on past lessons to be learned in governing Iraq was sadly not a book, but a booklet published in 2003 entitled U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience edited by Michael Eisenstadt and Eric Mathewson. It was this Washington Institute for Near East Policy booklet that stimulated this work. The U.S. military needs more such papers and studies.

Lessons from the British Experience

Basil Aboul-Enein has recently completed his graduate studies and works as a part-time Arabic language instructor. He is currently seeking a commission in the United States Navy. Both brothers share a passion for Middle East history and politics, and much of this material is part of their debates on Iraqi history as it relates to current events.

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Basil Aboul-Enein
As the United States Army and our sister services prosecute the global war on terrorism, the experience we gain and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that emerge are reflected in the way we do business. A fundamental part of that business is training, and I’d like to take a few minutes to update you on changes to the Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC) that we present here at Fort Benning. Some of the changes are already accomplished and the remainder are ongoing.

A number of factors have led us to change ICCC. The main reasons include:

• The need to move from our traditional “input-based” program of instruction (POI) to an outcome-based program — more on this later;

• Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to remain relevant. In particular, the need to better incorporate the ambiguities and difficulties we face in the contemporary operating environment (COE) into the course;

• Increasing perceptions that ICCC had become somewhat rigid and that we were not putting enough emphasis on flexible problem solving and effective communications;

• External requirements to change, including TRADOC’s increasing emphasis on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, COE, cultural awareness, and, most immediately, the impending merger of the Infantry and Armor Schools into the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

As we prepare to merge ICCC with its Armor counterpart into the “Maneuver Captains Career Course” (ICCC + ACCC = MCCC), Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell, our chief of Tactics, and his small group instructors (SGIs) are working closely with their counterparts at Fort Knox. The initial step, nearly completed, is agreeing with the Armor School on what the course will look like. This is more than just the POI; it’s also the way we will teach it — the culture of the course. Both commandants have enthusiastically endorsed our proposal, and we are ironing out the final details. The next step, underway now, is to begin teaching the new course at both ICCC and ACCC so that the two begin to converge. The third step, planned for later this year, is to run the initial pilot course at Fort Benning, with instructors and students from both schools learning together. We will adjust POI and methods based on the lessons we learn in the pilot and move quickly to the final step, a fully merged MCCC. Although the Maneuver Center of Excellence will continue to have both an Infantry School and an Armor and Cavalry School, MCCC (and “Maneuver ANCOC”) will remain under the Maneuver Center commander — responsive to both commandants, but subordinate to neither.

The most fundamental change (but one which has resulted in little real change in the classroom) is moving from a traditional TRADOC input-based curriculum to one based on outcomes. In other words, we are no longer beginning with “Provide 4.5 instructor contact hours on developing a unit physical fitness program (using the attached Training Support Package),” but rather defining what a successful graduate should know and be able to do, and then figuring out what needs to be taught and how we need to teach it. In this example, it would be that the graduate “Can develop and lead a successful company PT program, including combatives.”

In the field Army, this is nothing new. We would not dream of assigning a battalion to seize an objective, and then direct exactly how the commander was to advance, where to establish a support by fire position, which company to use in the breach, etc. Instead, we tell the commander his mission, our intent, and the constraints under which he has to operate. We then require him to backbrief how he plans to accomplish it, to make adjustments as required to ensure it fits into the overall plan, and then we hold him responsible for achieving results. We believe this approach is best for our schools too, and that’s how we’ve redesigned ICCC.

At the end of this article, I’ve included our initial cut at the course purpose, the “desired outcomes”, and the “measures of effectiveness” (MOE) for each. These MOE both define the otherwise somewhat fuzzy desired outcomes and allow us to assess whether we are succeeding. Together, the desired outcomes and their MOE will also serve as the basis for all evaluations and assessments: student grades, peer evaluations, formal course feedback, surveys to you in the field, after action reviews (AARs), etc.

Other important changes:

• Almost every scenario has a “mixed”, task-organized TOE, more reflective of the real-world operations we’re conducting. A light company will have a heavy platoon attached, for instance.

• We have tried to incorporate contemporary operating environment into every scenario and every day students encounter a few of the most difficult realities we face daily in operations. Among them:

  □ Every scenario includes civilians that have to be dealt...
with in a specific cultural context;
☐ Every leader down to at least company commander is required to understand the political context of the operation;
☐ Students are steered to think about long-term consequences of short-term actions. Our intent is to make sure each captain understands this not just intellectually, but at gut level. Our initial (primitive at this point) approach is to link tactical problems within a given “module”, allowing consequences to carry forward. For instance, if CPT Haskins takes an unwarranted brute-force approach to preventing local villagers from interfering with airfield operations on Tuesday, then on Friday, the situation he faces will be a much more difficult one than his buddy who used a bit more subtlety and finesse and therefore avoided provoking unnecessary hostility.

☐ Grouping students by type of gaining unit. In the first half of the course (Company Phase), all the students will be jumbled together within their 16-man small groups. In the second half (Battalion/Brigade Phase), we will resection the students by type of gaining unit: Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), or Special Operations. All students will still train on how to become a maneuver battalion S3. All will wrestle with the same tactical scenarios and problems. However, this allows an opportunity for a slightly different focus within each group. HBCT students might spend extra time emphasizing development of engagement areas, for instance, while those going to Special Ops (Special Forces, Civil Affairs [CA], and Psychological Operations [PSYOP]) might focus a bit more on how best to employ PSYOP and CA assets in a particular type of operation and examine what problems typically arise. Again, though, I want to stress that we are creating maneuver battalion S3s, not specialists. We expect that we will sometimes get it wrong, and someone who went through the HBCT group will be assigned to an IBCT; we will still expect him to do just fine.

☐ We have increased the emphasis on:
☐ Quick decision making;
☐ Analyzing, understanding, and being able to explain the important points of a given situation;
☐ Communicating effectively.

While Fort Benning has always done these things, and I think most of us regard them as strengths of infantry officers generally, we are pushing even harder on developing them.

☐ Adaptiveness and flexibility. The Army and TRADOC are devoting a great deal of effort to figuring out how to develop these traits in Army leaders. Again, we think this is nothing new to the Infantry. In fact, our students arrive with a great deal of flexibility and adaptiveness. Over 90 percent are combat veterans who have learned to improvise and prevail under pressure. So, our concern is not to instill something that’s not there. Rather, it’s to teach them tactical planning in a way that magnifies these natural abilities instead of suppressing them or supplanting them with a preference for rigid doctrine. (For what it’s worth, we don’t believe our doctrine is rigid, but that it is often applied rigidly — we’ve all known doctrine zealots.)

☐ Again, we’ve taken a simple, crude approach, which, so far at least, seems to be working. As they become more comfortable with the material, we begin throwing in “twists:” changed missions, FRAGOs changing the task organization, short-notice accelerated briefing requirements, incomplete or incorrect Soldier watch for suspicious activity in Iraq. Cadre of the Infantry Captains Career Course are trying to incorporate ambiguities and difficulties that Soldiers face in Iraq and Afghanistan into the course.

Photo by Technical Sergeant John M. Foster, USAF
information, insufficient resources, etc… just like we’ve all experienced in the real world. We are hoping to achieve two things. The obvious one is to develop captains who keep their cool and react well to change. Less obvious, but perhaps more important, we’re trying to develop captains with an instinctive preference for creating courses of action that are flexible and can be adapted to changing circumstances, rather than perfectly optimized and synchronized plans tailored to a specific situation but which have to be thrown out if the circumstances change.

Encouraging experimentation. We have given the SGIs a great deal of latitude in how to achieve the course aims. Every group will begin and end each module on the same day, and they will all use the same scenario. All will have the same terminal learning objectives for the module. But standardization ends there. One SGI might require three full-up orders briefs. Another might mix quick-decision drills with one deliberate planning drill. Still another might choose to use historical vignettes and student-taught classes or a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). Obviously, this type of decentralization requires increased awareness by the SGIs’ chain of command, as well as some additional azimuth checks during the course. It also depends on our ability to continue selecting absolutely top-notch captains as SGIs. But we believe that it will enhance our ability to train adaptive and flexible leaders, and by sharing what works and what doesn’t across the teams, we believe we will continuously improve the POI and our methods of instruction. Only the outcomes are fixed (and even they will be regularly reviewed and updated). Everything else remains subject to change. Results are what count. So far, we’re pleased with the results.

Although ICCC is not a counterinsurgency course, we are all, obviously, very interested in COIN, and we have to address it in order to be relevant. We are taking two approaches. First, as described above, we’ve incorporated the most important elements of the COE into all aspects of the course. Dealing with civilians and their culture, the importance of an operation’s political context, and careful consideration of long-term consequences of short-term actions all come to the fore in COIN operations. Indeed, at a company or even battalion level, many COIN operations are indistinguishable from operations in a more conventional framework. What differ are the principles guiding our thoughts and actions. Therefore, our second approach is to spend some time in the course examining the principles of COIN in depth, including how they differ from the conventional principles of war and how that difference will affect our overall operational pattern within a scenario.

None of the changes I have outlined is final. We have every expectation that we will continue to change ICCC, and then MCCC, in order to adapt to the implementation of Army force generation (ARFORGEN), to incorporate new TRADOC initiatives on cultural awareness and adaptive leader training — mostly, though, to adapt to the wars we’re fighting and the perceived needs of commanders in the field. What we expect to keep is an outcome-based approach to designing and assessing the course. To that end, we will shortly be sending a quick e-mail survey to all Infantry, Armor, and Special Forces battalion and BCT/Group commanders who supervise our recent graduates. We want their feedback on how well we’re doing at meeting our desired outcomes, and whether we’ve gotten those outcomes right.

We also invite feedback on anything else, especially in the areas of tactical instruction, doctrine, and collective training products.

Listed next are the ICCC purpose, our desired outcomes, and the measures of effectiveness for each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of the Course</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To prepare students for the leadership, training, and administrative requirements of a successful company commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prepare students to execute the tactical planning responsibilities of Battalion S3s. This includes mastery of company tactics.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Outcomes with their Associated Measures of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desired Outcome: Demonstrated ability to think critically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness: A graduate:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Can summarize a situation briefly and simply, but thoroughly, in his own words;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uses logic, observed facts, and past experience to isolate critical factors and focus on them;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Articulates how the factors in a situation have interacted in the past, and are likely to affect each other in a given course of action;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Makes sound decisions using logical reasoning and evidence, and not just emotion or others’ reasoning;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Makes reasonable decisions in the absence of complete information and under time pressure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Is able to describe the strengths and limitations of doctrinal concepts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Does nothing without being able to articulate why he is doing it.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Desired Outcome:** Demonstrated adaptability and flexibility in solving problems, including tactical problems

**Measures of Effectiveness:** A graduate:
- Consistently succeeds despite conditions and requirements that change in the middle of solving a problem;
- Keeps a clear head, rapidly assesses the changed situation, and identifies impacts on the plan;
- Identifies critical shortages in resources and information and either resolves the problem or works around it;
- Develops doctrinally correct solutions that are not limited to "approved solutions;"
- Uses all available tools, not just the standard tactical ones;
- Develops plans that include built-in provisions for changed circumstances;
- Not so detailed and synchronized that commander is forced to "fight the plan;"
- Unexpected enemy action or unforeseen circumstances do not result in having to completely jettison the plan and "ad lib;"
- Accounts for the longer-term consequences of short-term tactical actions;
- Improvises while accounting for consequences of deviating from the plan;
- Takes "good enough" action now, rather than much better action later.

**Desired Outcome:** Demonstrated ability to communicate in a way that is thoroughly understood and inspires confidence in subordinates

**Measures of Effectiveness:** A graduate:
- Briefs concepts and orders that are understood and able to be implemented by:
  - Staff Sergeants unfamiliar with the plan (company phase);
  - Lieutenants unfamiliar with the plan (Bn/BCT phase);
- Conveys confidence in himself and his plan;
- Uses graphic aids to add to the audience’s understanding and does not allow them to distract from the points being conveyed;
- Answers questions concisely and uses them to his advantage;
- Writes in accordance with the Army Writing Style, so that his writing:
  - Can be understood in a single, rapid reading;
  - Conveys all the essential information pertinent to the topic;
  - Presents the bottom line up front; and
  - Uses graphic control measures correctly and neatly

**Desired Outcome:** Demonstrated mastery of the science of tactical planning at company through battalion/task force level, and thorough understanding at BCT level

**Measures of Effectiveness:** A graduate:
- Knows and follows the troop leading procedures, develops and sticks to timeline;
- Correctly articulates essential doctrinal concepts;
- Produces orders that are doctrinally correct;
- Correctly describes the significant capabilities and limitations of all units and major systems in a BCT;
- Is able to use the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process to produce necessary products;
- Employs all available units within their capabilities and limitations;
- Builds maneuver plans that are feasible, account for all available units’ capabilities, and are executable by real soldiers;
- Employs fire support correctly and doctrinally;
- Plans engineering support correctly and doctrinally;
- Integrates logistical support into maneuver plans correctly;
- Integrates prudent force protection measures into plan;
- Correctly plans the movement and employment of command elements;
- Synchronizes essential elements of combat power at key points of the battle.

**Desired Outcome:** Practiced in the “art” of tactical planning

**Measures of Effectiveness:** A graduate:
- Writes mission statements, commander’s intent, and concept statements that, taken together:
  - Correctly identify and focus on the key elements in the situation;
  - Are consistent and easily understood;
  - Could stand alone and result in probable success;
  - Create plans that are simple, flexible, and executable;
  - Identify and focus on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities and maximizing friendly strengths;
  - Incorporate key civil considerations into maneuver plans.
- Creates plans designed to set conditions for subsequent operations;
- Accounts for longer-term consequences of short-term tactical actions;
● Uses all units correctly and advantageously;
● Prefers sub-optimal but flexible courses of action to optimal ones that will likely fail in changed circumstances;
● Coordinates subordinates’ activities without over-reliance on commander’s decision points or central control;
● Ties control measures to tangible, visible terrain features.

**Desired Outcome:** Demonstrated understanding of critical training and leader functions of company commander

**Measures of Effectiveness:** A graduate:
● Understands the critical aspects of running a successful Family Readiness Group;
● Can explain correctly the key points of the training management system at company and battalion level;
● Can produce satisfactory and executable company training schedules;
● Can write and brief a satisfactory battalion quarterly training plan;
● Understands 350-1 training requirements;
● Can develop and lead a successful company training program, including combatives;
● Understands the legal considerations of combat operations;
● Understands key legal requirements and constraints of a company commander in garrison and in the field, and knows where to go for help;
● Has thought about and can articulate the importance of establishing a positive command climate, and techniques for doing so;
● Understands key administrative functions of a company commander, including supply accountability, maintenance, and personnel evaluations;
● Understands maintenance management and property accountability systems.

**THE OIL-SPOT TECHNIQUE**

**Tactical Approach Needed to Counter Insurgency**

**CAPTAIN JAMES SPIES**

So what? Is this a justified response for a tactical commander after having a strategic counterinsurgency model explained to him? Although there appears to be a renaissance of counterinsurgency thought in the military today, there still exists a disconnect between conceptual answers at the strategic level and the practical tactics to achieve those goals. This article proposes a tactical approach based on the oil-spot technique.

The oil-spot is the best tactical solution to an insurgency because of its economical use of force. In this case, the oil-spot refers to the operational technique in which the counterinsurgent forces secure sectors in a methodical sequence. Through the expansion from a secure sector or base area, resources are efficiently marshaled to achieve social control of a fixed political space. Critiques of the oil-spot technique are found in Robert Taber’s *War of the Flea: The Classical Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Brassey’s Inc.: Dulles, Virginia 2002). His critique revolves around the “oil slick” operations of the French in Vietnam, but this failure was due to French misapplication. Correctly contrasting this view is Andrew Krepinevich’s proposal to use this technique in Iraq, which he discussed in his article “How to Win in Iraq” in the September-October 2005 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. This article proposes an operational cycle to maximize this oil-spot technique.

No single solution to insurgencies exists. Keeping this in mind, a

**Figure 1 — Counterinsurgency Operational Cycle**

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**Colonel Casey Haskins** is the director of Combined Arms and Tactics at the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982 and was commissioned as an Infantry lieutenant. He has served in a variety of light, heavy, and special operations command and staff assignments in the United States, Germany, Bosnia, and Iraq, most recently as chief of plans for Multinational Force-Iraq and chief of staff of the Iraqi Assistance Group. He is scheduled to take command of the Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning in July 2006.
tactical solution must be left sufficiently broad to accommodate varying cultural, ethnic, and socio-political differences while rigid enough for standardized implementation. The endstate for the counterinsurgency operation at the tactical level should always be to move from a posture of controlling the population to involvement by the population. The desire is to foster formal and informal social controls by the local populace so they can take over control of the oil-spot. This concept of social controls accentuates the critical fact that insurgencies are defeated by working through, with, and by the local population.

The tactical counterinsurgency cycle as described in Figure 1, relies on four phases with multiple operations and decisions within each phase. Disrupting the insurgency’s OODA Loop remains at the core of every phase. The OODA Loop is the observe, orient, decide, and act cycle developed by John Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel. This cycle describes how individuals or organizations determine their actions. Interrupting the enemy’s OODA Loop allows counterinsurgent forces time and space to maneuver within the local populace.

The first phase is to conduct the military decision-making process (MDMP). The MDMP for a counterinsurgency operation is decidedly different from that of a conventional military operation. Ideally, ethnographic intelligence would drive the decision process determining where operational boundaries are drawn. Currently, the military creates zones and sectors based on geographic markers. In a counterinsurgency operation, physical geography falls second in priority to the topography of the local populace. The people become the terrain; more specifically the social network makeup of the populace is the terrain.

Mapping, analyzing, and then describing the ethnographic topography to the commander is not an easy task for any staff. This is distinctly different than the cultural awareness currently observed. Operational boundaries based on this information are then developed by weighting decisions on the future needs of co-opting social network for security and intelligence purposes. The goal at the end of the first phase is a decision as to where boundaries will be drawn for the cordoning of specific social networks and which networks are to be co-opted for use.

The intent of the second phase is to establish a cordon followed immediately by the conduct of saturation patrols. British forces successfully cordoned off portions of Yemen in 1965, creating both physical and psychological impact. The physical isolation of a community through checkpoints and patrols served to interrupt the logistical and intelligence operations of the insurgents, therefore hindering the insurgents’ OODA loop. The cordon served as a means to provide security to the local populace, not intimidate it. Collective action on the part of the local populace in assisting the counterinsurgent fight is only possible if the local populace feels it is secure from insurgent retribution. U.S. military may conduct patrols regularly through an area, but when night falls, and the patrols go back to their forward operating bases, the local population is left to the coercion of the insurgency. Continuous saturation patrolling allows a level of security that inhibits the insurgents’ ability to intimidate. Imagine a crime-ridden neighborhood that suddenly has a pair of police officers on every street corner. That is the intended psychological effect of cordoned zones with saturation patrols. This desired effect is also the reason an oil-spot is the only feasible technique. The resource intensive nature of the oil-spot precludes large-scale simultaneous operations of this sort. Isolation operations that prove to be both psychological and physically effective provide the sense of security for the population requisite to their involvement with counterinsurgent forces.

Successful isolation operations observed in the British counterinsurgency in Malaya and on a limited scale in the Strategic Hamlet programs during U.S. involvement in Vietnam moved populations into isolation. Large urban areas require bringing the isolation to the population versus the population into isolation. These unique population control measures serve to reinforce the psychological sense of isolation for the enemy.

The intent of saturation patrolling is the very real effect of establishing control over the population. Studies of collective efficacy within inner city communities show that control is critical to providing a sense of security. For human nature, security is a necessity that precludes many other needs. Progress can only be effective once control is established. The saturation patrolling also allows for a means of initial census taking of the population. If the insurgents operate amongst the local populace, it becomes essential to track and identify the local population. Roger Trinquier in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency addressed the critical nature of a census with identification cards. The counterinsurgent forces must develop a system to track resources and population movement. If an area is cordoned and proper vehicle registration techniques are applied, it is possible for counterinsurgent forces to determine if a vehicle belongs in a cordoned neighborhood. Impounding vehicles in inappropriate neighborhoods diminishes the insurgents’ resource pool of vehicles while impeding their freedom of movement. A decision point to move to the next phase is based on the level of
control of the area. If counterinsurgent forces have positive control of the area through patrols and checkpoints, the third phase initiates. This is also the time confidential informants are developed along with recruitment of local constabulary. Previous steps of census taking and intelligence development provide positive linkages with social networks previously identified during the MDMP. (The conduct of a census also serves as an opportunity to reinforce conditional civil affairs. This is the time to explain to locals that telling the truth about residency and local activities ensures they receive the services they want.) This facilitates the active recruitment of local constabulary.

The third phase is the development of social networks. Initial steps look to develop Human Intelligence or HUMINT. This serves as an extension of the constabulary for intelligence collection. HUMINT networks should consist of confidential informants, pseudo-insurgents and community contacts. The endstate is to create a series of collection networks that can act as vetting sources for each other. Clandestine collection sources can confirm information provided through community contacts or walk-in informants. The most controversial of the collection sources, pseudo-insurgents, would rely upon the turning of captured insurgents, who are then reinserted into the operational area to make contact with, and collect on the insurgents in the sector.

Counterinsurgency is 90 percent intelligence. Gaining the trust of the local population is necessary to gain timely intelligence, and this is brokered on the ability to provide security. This security is only possible with a full understanding of what is happening within a sector and affecting it.

Co-opting the social networks is the next step within this third phase. Rather than attempting to create groups within the community to assist in policing, social networks should be co-opted to create self-policing networks, a community or neighborhood watch. According to the article “Neighborhood and Community: Collective Efficacy and Community Safety,” which was written by Robert Sampson and appeared in the June 2004 issue of New Economy, studies of community groups in inner cities have shown that the individuals who make up community groups are motivated by selective, tangible incentives, while the leaders of the groups will most often be motivated by the respect and status gained by leading a successful group. The co-opting of these social networks requires realistic, attainable goals that are linked to desired civil affairs programs. The intent is to entice the most number of individuals in the community to participate in reporting incidents and not allow the insurgency to grow through their passivity.

Combining intelligence from co-opted social networks and Human Intelligence networks to drive the targeting process is the fourth phase. This targeting process should not look at individuals, but entire networks of enemy cells. The best strategy for this targeting process today can be found in the Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI) used by law enforcement against organized crime. Just as proposed earlier, police agencies using ETI use overt and covert infiltration of criminal organizations to target and dismantle the majority of a network at one time. This requires a balance of tempo and patience to identify the most vulnerable areas of the enemy’s activity before attack. Further determining the scope of the investigation, intelligence officers look to identify new linkages from historical data and identify where further investigation is required. The intent is to predict trends and anticipate steps needed to counter these insurgent trends.

At the end of this targeting process, nominated targets and Civil Affairs projects are executed based on the desires of the social networks co-opted. Operations in this last phase should look to dismantle the majority of the insurgent enterprise at one time. Simultaneously the communities that assisted in the intelligence gathering and self-policing that made the direct action operations possible are rewarded with Civil Affair projects they asked for in the previous phase. Rewards for assistance are based on the level of support from the local populace and the correlation between the level of CA and local support should be stressed to the local populace. These last steps of intelligence analysis, raids and contingent CA are repeated to eliminate the insurgent threat in the area. Once a constabulary is in place, and the local community shows support for the counterinsurgent forces while feeling safe, a move to next oil-spot is made.

The targeting process of this last phase is enemy oriented. Intelligence should drive the operational parameters, not the physical boundaries. The unique challenges of counterinsurgent operations require that operations follow the intelligence regardless of where it leads. Patience will be required to fully develop a target packet on an insurgent network. Similar to criminal investigations, counterinsurgent operations take a great amount of time to develop intelligence prior to acting. This may prove the hardest tenet to maintain.

The goal is to create formal and informal social controls in place of the use of suppressive force by counterinsurgent troops. Creation of a constabulary force from the local population provides security so the population feels free to speak while addressing their grievances. Civil Affairs projects will assist in the development of trust, but not in the normally misinterpreted manner of “hearts and minds.” Civil Affairs should always be contingent of the assistance of the population.

A final note, that although the term phase is used throughout this article, the choice of the term phase is not intended to denote a lockstep methodology. The application of this tactical model will see the simultaneous conduct of every phase described above at one point or another. The driving concept behind the tactical cycle described above is the empowerment of the local population to act as a force multiplier. Heavy initial presence in a counterinsurgent operation may be required, but the intent is rapid growth of the social and intelligence networks so that operational effectiveness increases, while the counterinsurgent forces footprint decreases. The faster a counterinsurgent force can employ the local forces and co-opt social networks the faster a tipping point is achieved. With the success in one oil-spot, it becomes possible to move to the next, where word of initial success will already be spreading facilitating future successes.

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**Captain James Spies** is currently a student in the Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict master’s degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School. He received his commission through ROTC in 1995 after graduating from Emory University in Atlanta. Spies commanded an Operational Detachment Alpha with the 5th Special Forces Group which completed two tours in Iraq.
The first reported ground fratricide incident during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) occurred shortly after midnight on 25 March 2003, when one British tank fired on another near Basra. The tanks were engaging pockets of Iraqi soldiers near a bridge over the Qanat Shat Al Basra canal, which runs along the western edge of the city. In a nearby sector, a troop of tanks was tracking, through their thermal sights, a group of enemy personnel that had been reported by the battle group headquarters. The “target” was reported as an enemy bunker position. The targeted tank was unfortunately in turret-down position, its crew working on the turret top and was misidentified by the second tank crew as the reported “enemy” troops. The tank commander requested clearance to shoot, which was granted. Two shots of high explosive shell (HESH) fired at 4,000 yards blew the turret off the tank, killing two of the crew and seriously wounding two others. Both tanks were fitted with visual and thermal Combat Identification Panels (CIPs) in working order, but the second tank crew could not obtain a clear visual view due to the hull-down position of the tank, according to the article “Blue-on-blue Ground Incidents during OIF,” which appeared in Issue 2-2004 of Defense Update.

CID is made up of a multitude of facets: Situational awareness and target identification within specified rules of engagement are the cornerstones. Individual and collective training is the glue that binds these aspects together. To help prepare our forces to prevent or reduce the potential for fratricide and simultaneously increase combat effectiveness, U.S. Army TRADOC is currently implementing a five-tiered training approach for CID. This training will provide “trigger pullers,” a graduated and increasingly robust training program to meet current and projected CID challenges. Regardless of the technology, or the ability of the command and control architecture to provide near perfect situational awareness, once the vehicle commander or individual shooter reconfirms the target is hostile before firing, the final decision to engage a target by direct fire is and will always be relegated to the shooter — the gunner with his finger on the trigger.

The basis and foundation of the TRADOC 5-tiered CID training plan is CVI training within a graduated training model (see Table 1). The primary CVI training aid of choice is the Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V) and Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) with embedded imagery from the ROC-V program. ROC-V is a thermal sight recognition tool that provides a visual and thermal Combat Identification (CID) training aid. ROC-V is a thermal sight recognition tool that provides a visual and thermal Combat Identification (CID) training aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIER LEVEL</th>
<th>TYPE TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual</td>
<td>CVI with ROC-V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual and Team</td>
<td>Advanced Gunner Training Simulator (AGTS), Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS), Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers (UCOFT), Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Team and Unit</td>
<td>Gunnery, ranges, New Generation Army Targetry System (NGATS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unit and Collective</td>
<td>Force-on-force training exercises with JCIMS at home station and CTCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Collective and Joint</td>
<td>Virtual mission rehearsals, combined arms rehearsals, rock drills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Fratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment, or facilities, which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.”
— U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Fratricide Action Plan

Figure 1 — TRADOC Combat Identification Tiered Training Model
training program that runs on any computer with the Windows operating system. ROC-V helps Soldiers learn to identify the thermal signatures of combat vehicles through the use of an interactive curriculum that teaches the unique patterns and shapes of vehicle “hotspots” and overall vehicle shapes. ROC-V also provides Soldiers with practical experience in the use of their individual weapon thermal-sensor image controls. Through the use of virtual sight controls, soldiers learn to effectively adjust their thermal optics to find targets and reveal their thermal identification cues. ROC-V includes training and testing to support the U.S. Army Soldiers Manual Common Task (SMCT) Skill Level 1 for visual vehicle identification.

ROC-V is currently the standard ground CVI training tool within the U.S Army and Marine Corps. HQ TRADOC has directed implementation of ROC-V across multiple mission area specialties for both soldier common skills and specialty CVI training. The training program includes paper trainer versions for reference without a computer. The instructor control module permits individual and collective training, testing, and tracking of scores. ROC-V is the only training aid available for currently fielded JCIMS devices. ROC-V is available via Web site download at https://rocv.army.mil. (This Web site is provided only for authorized U.S. Government use and requires an authenticated login.)

A recent survey of sample ROC-V users that accessed the ROC-V Web site in 2005 indicated 79 percent stated ROC-V program improved their individual CVI skills, and 87 percent rated the ROC-V program as an effective CVI training aid. The survey also provided specific recommendations to improve the program to better meet the needs of the warfighter. Feedback from instructors and graduating students at master gunner schools also indicates user satisfaction with the training program. Many recommendations from these users have been incorporated into the current version of ROC-V.

Representatives from the four armed services are involved in direct consultation with the ROC-V development team to produce the next generation of ROC-V to meet other specific mission area applications. The ROC-V team has already produced a look-down aspect angle version for the air-to-ground mission areas such as fixed-wing close air support, attack and reconnaissance rotary-wing platforms, and AC-130 gunships. It is currently in use by USMC light attack helicopter squadrons. This same product improvement has potential utility for tactical Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) sensor analysts. Army Training Support Center (ATSC) has assumed responsibility for distribution of compact disc versions of ROC-V through the Joint Visual Information Activity, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania at http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil. ATSC designed these compact discs as a supplemental distribution method to the Web-based, online download method for those soldiers that cannot access the Web site. TRADOC, in partnership with Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI), is working towards embedding ROC-V imagery within combat vehicle tactical trainers and adoption into TADSS and future combat system trainers. Future efforts also include the development of a web-based SCORM conformation course that can be hosted by the individual services.

Leaders must ensure they have a plan to reduce the risk of fratricide. Along with improving situational awareness during operations, the key is tough, realistic CVI training before operations. ROC-V meets that training requirement. The ROC-V Computer-Based Training (CBT) is exponentially ahead of traditional training methods. Bottom line — ROC-V training saves lives.

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**Figure 2 — ROC-V Main Menu Screen**

Dr. William M. Rierson is a retired Field Artillery officer with 23 years active duty service. He provided significant contributions to eight major CID assessments over the past 10 years as a systems analyst with the Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team (JCINET). Dr. Rierson presently serves as the lead analyst for the Ground Combat Division of the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) located at Eglin AFB, Fla. JFIIT is a subordinate command of United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

David A. Ahrens is a retired Field Artillery officer with 28 years active duty experience. He continues to serve the U.S. Army as a military analyst working CID issues for TRADOC’s Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Training located at Fort Monroe, Va.
In preparation for a joint British and American Civil Affairs operation in Iraq, a diverse team under the aegis of the 9th/12th Lancers researched past assessments of the town done by Danish forces at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During this research, the team learned a great deal about Danish techniques for conducting Civil-Military Operations (CMO), techniques which will help battalion-level forces plan and conduct their own operations supporting the transition of governance and security to local Iraqis. The most relevant Danish innovations involve the task organization of their CMO assets and knowledge management in regard to CMO projects.

The Danish Battle Group has approximately 550 soldiers, augmented in Civil Affairs activities by civilians working for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The unit’s mission is to provide operational security for coalition forces, educate Iraqi forces to facilitate a transition to self-sufficient security operations, and to support the reconstruction of Iraqi society. Their concept is to have an overall national strategy to fill the reconstruction gap from the time a regime has collapsed until a new system of governance has been established.

Captain Ferdinand Kjaerulf, one of the Danish officers the British and American team met, said, “the Danish military is not directly interested in state-building but has realized the need to support the transition phase from the conflict to the state-building phase. In the war on terrorism, the military is needed to support the initial phase of the state-building process in order to prevent terrorism and ‘failed states’ to develop.”

To do this, the Danish Battle Group employs three separate but interrelated agencies to conduct CMO — a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Team responsible for any Civil Affairs actions that impact force protection, a Reconstruction Team (RUD) responsible for coordinating projects designed to improve the standard of living for Iraqis, and the nonmilitary “Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities Initiative” (CPA) run by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The American and British CMO team met with the CIMIC Team liaison officer Captain A.I. Gjevne, CPT Ferdinand Kjaerulf from the Reconstruction Team, and Nicholas Keller from the CPA.

Nicholas Keller had previously served in a military capacity as a CIMIC platoon leader in southern Iraq. He provided the American and British CMO Team with an assessment completed in 2004. In his current capacity Keller works directly for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and though he has no direct military mandate, he coordinates the disbursement of Danish funds to civil affairs projects throughout the province. In his role, Keller can quickly approve projects up to $100,000 in cost. His intimate knowledge of military and political objectives allows him to advise on the appropriate disbursement of funds for larger, or longer lasting, projects. He updated the 2004 Danish report on Safwan with his personal knowledge of pending and current projects and will continue to liaise with future British and American efforts in the town to ensure they fit within overall plans for the province.

Keller works closely with CPT Kjaerulf’s Reconstruction Team, helping to fund their projects. Kjaerulf’s Reconstruction Team is one of four such teams composed of Danish military personnel who coordinate directly with local governing bodies to suggest, plan, evaluate, find funding for, execute and maintain civil projects. Currently, for three Iraqi towns in the rural area north and west of Basra, these Reconstruction Teams have more than 500 projects in the execution phase, many more in various stages of planning, or awaiting funding. This is a success story, the exact sort of success story not receiving enough press in America, the small but important milestones in rebuilding and establishing a better Iraq.

Sometimes a project has less impact on the local standard of living, but — instead — a definite military importance. Such projects require close coordination with local governmental agencies, and if handled correctly, can serve in a dual capacity,
providing benefits to Iraqis as well as to coalition forces. Take, for example, a project involving the clearing, grading, and leveling of the shoulders of a busy section of highway. For coalition forces this is extremely important in order to eliminate locations for IED emplacement, to improve driving conditions, and to clear lines of sight. Yet, if undertaken with Iraqi cooperation and input, and with the full consent of local governing councils, it has added value — in this instance allowing better pedestrian and bicycle transportation along the route. This type of CMO project is, in the Danish scheme, coordinated not by a Reconstruction Team, but by a CIMIC Team such as the one for which CPT Gjevnøe works.

The three separate Danish CMO efforts are divided logically to provide clear guidance for distinct CMO objectives: military reconstruction, force protection, and funding of civilian projects. However, without close coordination none of these efforts would succeed, or — worse yet — they would either be duplicated or in direct conflict with other military or political objectives. For this reason the Danish have created an excellent system for managing the knowledge and activities of each function.

Knowledge management, especially with regard to Civil Affairs projects, has caused a problem for coalition forces. Specifically, with American troops rotating out of country yearly and British forces rotating every six months, Civil Affairs teams as well as combat patrols and leaders develop but often fail to pass on to their replacement units a wealth of information regarding infrastructure, local politics, local personalities, pending projects, needs and wants of the population, and other pertinent information.

The Danes recognized this at the same time as they recognized the potential for duplication of effort by their three-pronged CMO attack. Therefore, they have created a massive database chronicling all past, present and future civil projects, along with corollary information on the relationships between key local personnel involved in the planning, execution, and future maintenance of such projects. This information proves invaluable at the onset of new projects, allowing the Danes to cross-pollinate successes, benchmark progress, eliminate duplication, communicate instantly between their agencies, choose the most efficient and trustworthy contractors for new work, and maintain and transfer that storehouse of information to their successors each rotation.

The method for this knowledge accumulation and sharing is a simple Access database. It is searchable across multiple fields. CPT Kjaerulf demonstrated how, if necessary, he could call up all projects related to, say, education, and then further sort the results to give him a list of the headmasters for the schools throughout the entire sector, or limit that list to only a single township, maybe eight or nine people. Having selected such a project, or contact, the display page of the database instantly provided him with a project status (planning, waiting funding, execution, maintenance), contact information for all the relevant persons, links to related projects undertaken by the CIMIC team or the CPA, a short synopsis and recommendation entered by the CPA on potential political ramifications of the project (viewable by the Danish government back in Europe), grid locations for the project site, and next steps for the project. The database also allows CPT Kjaerulf’s commanding officer Major Christian Ishøj, chief of the RUD, to create and print customized reports in Excel and to monitor the progress of his four Reconstruction Teams. The different teams from CIMIC, RUD, and CPA all work on the same database on a common server. The database can be used by different actors not sharing same server, simply by sending e-mails with small updating Excel files.

American Civil Affairs operations should adopt a similar three-tiered CMO process and augment it with a system of knowledge management to enable close, continual coordination and to facilitate lasting situational awareness as units rotate in and out of theater. This approach allows targeted responses to force protection issues that involve close coordination with local governmental agencies, an interim system for providing civilian relief that does not necessarily meet a military objective, and a means by which to deconflict military and political objectives, thereby easing and speeding the process of reconstruction and eventual self-governance.

Captain Buchholz is currently serving as the S5 and Route Security Element commander for the 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment, which is currently deployed to Iraq. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Mobilization and Information Operations Officer for the 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade and a Unit Assistor for the 1-338th Training Support Battalion out of Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

The Danish anti-IED project not only provided clearer lines of sight and a substantially decreased number of locations for IED emplacement, but also made it easier for local Iraqis to use the road for pedestrian and bicycle transport.
The Kalashnikov rifle and the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher have come to symbolize the insurgent and his tactics ever since the Vietnam War. Both are as common in the global war on terror as they were in that earlier conflict, and are encountered daily by U.S. and Coalition forces. The penetrative effect of the hollow (shaped) charge had been known since the 1860’s where it was used to effect in demolition and mining work, but the earliest mass-produced of these weapons was the German Panzerfaust antitank grenade launcher (Figure 1) which was first fielded in 1943 and saw service with Wehrmacht and Volkssturm organizations during the later years of World War II. Its relatively short effective range of 30 meters was somewhat offset by the ability of its 150mm shaped charge to penetrate 140-200mm of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA), the standard medium for evaluating and comparing the effects of antiarmor munitions.

The Soviets were quick to grasp the potential of a simple, light, easily fired grenade launcher, and by 1944 were working on what was to become the RPG-1, whose 70mm rocket could defeat 150mm of RHA at an effective range of 75 meters, two and a half times that of the Panzerfaust. Due to difficulties with the fuse mechanism and the propellant charge in extreme seasonal climates, however, the RPG-1 was never produced in quantity, and once these issues were resolved the product improvements were applied to the RPG-2 (Figure 2), which entered Soviet service in 1949. The operation of the RPG-2 was easy for soldiers to learn, and its penetration of 200mm RHA and its effective range of 150 meters — twice that of the RPG-1 — were
significant improvements over its predecessor’s performance. With its HEAT warhead and solid-propellant fuel, this was the first antitank weapon to be encountered in large numbers by U.S. forces during the Vietnam War.

The RPG-2 was to be the mainstay of Soviet individual antitank weapons until the early 1960’s, when the RPG-4 underwent testing. It achieved a 10 percent greater RHA penetration (220mm), an effective range of 300 meters — twice that of the RPG-2 — and a flatter trajectory due to its higher velocity. While the RPG-1 and RPG-2 had two simple wooden heat protectors clamped to the barrel to protect the firer’s hands from burns, the RPG-4 had a shorter but more robust and centrally thickened plywood heat shield over the wider charge chamber and a flared blast shield at the breech. Like the RPG-1, the RPG-4 was never manufactured or issued for other than testing, because in 1961 it was superseded by the product-improved RPG-7 (Figure 3).

The RPG-7 can be found in most of the former Soviet states and surrogates, in those countries long accustomed to acquiring Soviet-built arms, and throughout the Third World. Readers with experience in the later years of Vietnam, or in Somalia, Desert Storm, Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots need no introduction to the RPG-7. Those unfamiliar with the weapon will recognize it by its optical and iron sights, an improvement over the solely iron sights of its predecessors; by its thick 3-clamped plywood heat shield that tapers to the rear; and by its flared venturi nozzle at the rear. The effective range is from 300-500 meters, depending on the type of round fired, and the PG-7VL grenade is capable of penetrating up to 500mm of RHA.

While the family of RPGs was characterized by its reusable launcher, the development and fielding of the U.S. Army’s M-72 LAW (Lightweight Anti-Armor Weapon), shown at Figure 5, in the 1960’s introduced the concept of a disposable launcher, an innovation that was not lost on the Soviets. Their own version, the RPG-18 (Figure 4), was first fielded in 1972. Since these have been found in the hands of insurgents fighting in Iraq today — although in much smaller numbers than the RPG-7 — it is logical to infer that they were part of Saddam Hussein’s arms acquisitions from the Soviet Union and the states that it comprised, although they may well have also been imported into Iraq by terrorists operating out of Syria, Iran, and other regional states. With its effective range of 200 meters, RHA penetration rated at 300mm, and a muzzle velocity of well over 110 meters per second, it is a formidable weapon.

The final weapon to be described in this month’s Weapons Corner is the U.S. Army’s M136 AT4 light anti-armor weapon. Originally developed and manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics of Sweden, and later manufactured for the United States Army and Marine Corps by Alliant Techsystems, it is a powerful weapon suitable for either anti-armor or bunker reduction applications, with considerable secondary antipersonnel effects, given a sufficiently frangible target such as masonry. With its 84mm warhead, the AT4 has an effective range of 300 meters and can defeat approximately 355mm of RHA. The AT4 is discussed here solely for the purpose of comparison with our own anti-tank weapons and those of our adversaries. We welcome reader comments and personal observations on the employment, characteristics, and effectiveness of the family of rocket propelled grenades.

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Have an article or idea to submit to Infantry Magazine?

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Martin Dockery, son of Irish immigrants, recounts his tale of his life as a combat advisor to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units in a remote part of the country during the early part of the Vietnam War. The account of his experience is “not about closure; [his] hope is that by putting all of this in writing, [he] can make some sense of it.” It is that sentence that sums up the entirety of his story.

The narrative is written with an unpretentious earnestness that cannot be dismissed as trite or contrived. The beginning chapters include a warmly nostalgic recount of his childhood and some revealing anecdotes about his large Irish-Catholic family. Dockery is successful in being concise, diplomatic, and yet still endearing; a style he successfully maintains throughout the entire book even as he attempts to handle some very controversial ideas.

The book is not an editorial or a commentary about the controversy surrounding Vietnam, although Dockery is not without opinion. Instead, the book attempts to convey Dockery’s personal story. He very evenhandedly deals with his conflicting feelings concerning his charge as an officer and his personal regard for the mission. He is gracious in his assessment of what was, in reality, inadequate training, and he never once passes judgment on his superiors for their choices. Although he clearly disagrees with some of the ideology of the conflict, he is very adept at being fair and accommodating.

Despite this book’s obvious military content, it has a very wide civilian appeal. Dockery easily punctuates the narration with history and handles military jargon with both levity and agility. As a civilian reader, I enjoyed the way in which he explained the intricacies of the Vietnam situation but never condescended to my lack of knowledge about history. His disclaimer in the acknowledgment states that, although he did some research for background, all the events recounted in the book are solely from his memory. His candor when speaking of his own work is charming, and it is this charm that is one of this book’s greatest assets.

The book is not without its imperfections, however. In his effort to keep his writing conversational, Dockery tends to wander off on tangents. There are several occasions when he digresses from the subject at hand to spend two or three paragraphs on topics unrelated, or at best marginally related, to the current discussion. The results of his wandering pen are not all that distracting, as his book has such a poignant memoir quality to it, but it is nonetheless apparent.

The book is quick paced and will keep even the most military ignorant person entertained for most of a reading. Dockery is so equitable in his retelling of events that readers of any opinion about the conflict will benefit from his memoir.


This candid and powerfully written book is Floyd W. Radike’s story of his combat service in the Pacific during World War II. It is a saga of mud and mayhem, of chaos and cruelty, and the reality of small unit combat leadership.

Radike was initially a lieutenant and rifle platoon leader in the 161st Infantry Regiment, a National Guard unit in the Regular Army 25th Infantry Division (ID). The ill-prepared and inadequately trained 25th ID was diverted with two days’ notice to combat in the dank and disease-ridden jungles of Guadalcanal. During this campaign, the strength of Radike’s company was reduced from five officers and 195 men to two officers and 11 men.

After operations on Guadalcanal, Radike lauded the effectiveness of the M1 rifle as “the best thing that had ever happened to an infantryman.” Tactical and logistical shortcomings, however, included the continual lack of information, the failure of logistics to provide adequate water to the Soldiers, a shortage of maps or aerial photographs, no jungle boots or uniforms, and the lack of hot meals and fruit juices – the latter being commonly available to rear echelon Soldiers.

The 161st Infantry Regiment also fought fierce battles on New Georgia and later on Luzon in the Philippines in 1944-1945, during which time the unit suffered 135 percent casualties. The infantry fought against fanatic Japanese soldiers who had built strong defensive positions, supported by tanks and artillery, in the ridgelines and mountains of Luzon. The 25th Division was designated to participate in the invasion of Japan, but the dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki canceled those plans.

This excellent book contains a fast-paced, highly readable, and earthy narrative. In many respects, it can serve as a primer of World War II-era infantry leadership. The fighting at Guadalcanal, and later at New Georgia and the Philippines, according to Radike, was “deadly, debilitating, and offering constant tension and fear, as well as mixing in mud, blood, and despair.” While Radike bemoans the incompetence of senior leaders and the relative comfort of rear echelon units, he knew from experience that “the U.S. Soldier had courage as well as sense.”


This remarkable text is the account of a United States Marine Corps veteran of World War II, a member of that heroic band of Americans whom Tom Brokaw aptly
named “The Great Generation.” At a time when America faced a greater peril than she had at any point in her history, these men and women set aside their security, hopes, and dreams and stepped forward to answer the call. Bob Nolan is one of their number, and A Marine’s Tale is his story.

This short book is a heartwarming account of the events and motivation that impelled a young man to enlist in the Marine Corps on June 2, 1942. It traces his adventures — and his misadventures — as he travels across the United States, undergoes the life-changing experience that is boot camp, joins his unit, and is transferred to the Pacific theater of operations where he was to serve in the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, as an artilleryman in combat against a bitter and determined Japanese enemy. For the first time, he bore the pain of losing friends with whom he had trained, celebrated, and fought in defense of our nation.

Nolan offers insights into the communications equipment, the officers and NCOs they had, and the weapons they used that could only have come from the pen of one who has been there and done it. He learned the Marine’s trade in places most of us have only read about: Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Iwo Jima, to name only three. Reading A Marine’s Tale, even today’s warriors can learn much, because Nolan’s rite of passage six decades ago is much the same that which today’s men and women in uniform must undergo as they too prepare to serve.

The author cites the support of big-name entertainers such as bandleader Kay Kayser, Eddie Cantor, Dinah Shore, Marlene Dietrich, and many others from movies and sports to illustrate America’s total commitment to her armed forces. One cannot help noting the few American entertainers today who have stepped forward themselves to support today’s men and women who are fighting in the global war on terror.

The book is set in large, clear type which makes it an easy read, and the format of chapter headings could be set in smaller type without detracting from its legibility. The book has a number of photos and maps which are useful but suffer because of the manner in which they were reproduced. Should the author decide to issue a second printing, I would recommend that the new printing be done working with a printer who can offer digital typesetting and photographic reproduction. The few typographical errors do not distract the reader from the author’s message, and would no doubt be corrected in a second printing.

A Marine’s Tale is well worth reading. It is not only Bob Nolan’s account of a young man growing into adulthood during an intensely stressful time, but is also a compelling narrative of his survival — and the survival of those around him — by means of his own relationships with family, friends, peers, and superiors who are all trying to deal with the effects of a world at war themselves. Nolan allows the reader a glimpse into the mind of a youth who weighs the obligation of military service and his intense sense of loyalty to his family, something familiar to many of us who have served in uniform, or who are serving today.


Warrant Officer Class Two Ian Kuring has written a first class account of one of the world’s finest infantry organizations. The Australian infantryman has proven himself in battle generation after generation. Kuring explains just how the military history of Australia began and traces this epic story from its first Infantry units to today’s SAS squadron deploying to Afghanistan in December of 2001 as a result the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. He is able to explain through charts and maps where the Australian infantry units originated in Australia and where they where sent to fight in various campaigns from the first time an Australian colony provided assistance for the defense of the British Empire in the fighting in the Sudan in 1885 to the steaming jungles of the Pacific. If you would like to have a better understanding of one of the U.S. staunchest allies and how this country that is large in territory but has a small population has been able to protect its sovereignty, then this book is the one volume that will provide you with the most insight. I found the information provided about the Australian infantry in World War I to be the most significant in establishing a record of combat that was so inspiring that the infantryman that have followed these brave men have always wanted to make sure that they would never put a blemish on the fighting record that had been earned with so many shattered lives. Kuring’s book is not just about battles. He goes to great lengths to explain training and the equipment used as well as the types of weapons that were issued for each time period. He also discusses the tactics and organizations and why and how they came to be used. As with all infantry organizations it seems that their sacrifices, especially in the 20th and 21st centuries, are sometimes overshadowed by other branches. As in most wars, it is the hard-living and hard-fighting infantryman that has, and continues to sustain, the most casualties in battle for his country and so it is with Kuring’s story of the Australian infantry soldier. If the book has any flaw at all, it would be that Kuring was unable to go and use the primary sources for this book because of limited funding. He has done a superb job, and with all the additional organizational charts for Infantry and his list of the various infantry units, it is the most complete history I’m aware of on this subject. It is a book that all infantrymen should take the time to read!

If you would like to obtain a copy of Red Coats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001. By Ian Kuring, please contact the publisher. The book was first published in Australia in 2004 by Australian Military History Publications, 13 Veronica Place, Loftus 2232 Australia, Phone: 02-9542-6771 Fax: 02-9542-6787.


Bud Hannings has hit another home run. His earlier works, A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes (1988) and A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes Volume II—1919-1945 (1991) established his skill at crafting exhaustively researched and meticulously documented chronologies of the warriors who have fought to first establish and then preserve this nation from 1770 through the
end of the Second World War. Even while working on his defining work, a history of the Korean War, he has found time to compile yet another superb text, *Forts of the United States*, which he describes as “an historical dictionary, 16th through 19th Centuries.”

In 738 pages, Hanning describes virtually all of the fortifications by state and name, including the establishment dates and reasons, uses and modifications, and the disposition of each of them. Because of his precise descriptions of the forts’ location, future researchers, historians and archeologists should have little trouble locating the sites. He also backs up his text with an exhaustive, detailed bibliography that affords access to yet more sources.

Of particular significance are those forts that no longer exist and hence are not widely known as tourist attractions. These forgotten sites — in virtually every state of the Union — reveal each state’s contribution to the early settlement of America, her fight for independence, and her extensive preparations for the common defense. We are a nation at war, and Americans can look with pride to vestiges of America’s commitment to defense of life and liberty from the earliest days of the Republic.

As in his earlier books, Hanning retains an evenhanded approach to history, neither slighting nor favoring States or the factions that are now interwoven as the fabric of our military history. He ignores the often divisive parochialism born of interservice rivalry, choosing instead to present the facts as we need them: unvarnished and undistorted. Lest he omit anything that could be useful to those interested in our history, Hanning even includes military hospitals of Washington, D.C.; forts activated during the Florida Seminole Indian War; Pony Express Depots; and Spanish missions and Presidios.

This is a remarkable book, and one that deserves to find a far broader audience than in the libraries and history departments of universities. Middle and high school students will gain an appreciation of their own local history by completing assignments and reports that draw upon Bud Hanning’s sources, and in so doing will reinforce their own pride and sense of identity as citizens of this great nation. Buy it, read it, treasure it, and pass it down to your children and grandchildren.


Desert Shield/Storm was a limited war in terms of both duration and geographical coverage. There are those who consider it as Act I of a conflict which was renewed in 2003 and continues today. *Jayhawk* covers one segment — and does so extremely well! VII Corps was one of five somewhat similar organizations in the chain of command on the front lines.

Though I plunged into and enjoyed the Army Green Books as they rolled out after World War II, I find the current generation of official histories far more attractive. It’s hard to tell whether the selection and presentation of material has improved. Advances in information technology may have helped. This was the first conflict of the computer age and a flood of documents was created - maybe too many to deal with easily. The declassification process seems to have been a problem for the author. The appearance has been vastly improved. There are 144 well-chosen color pictures; 27 maps of excellent quality and appropriate scale; 10 charts which help clarify the text; and three appendices which serve much of the same purpose. The only minor quibble is that the map symbols at the back of the book might have attracted more attention in the front.

Bourque is a “whiz kid” who was one of the elite few to be selected for the second year at Leavenworth, the School of Advanced Military Studies. The foundation of this book was his PhD dissertation from Georgia State University. He served as a night operations officer and duty officer at the 1st Infantry Division’s command post during the operation so he was personally acquainted with many of the messages which formed the framework of the battle.

The battle is considered the payoff, other phases may be equally vital — even if less exciting. The book is well balanced in covering the status of VII Corps before the war, the movement into the theater of operations, the preparatory phases, the actual fighting, continued missions at the front, the unit’s return home, and then finally its deactivation.

This is a great work for serious scholars but not for devotees of “whodunits” or revisionist history. It warrants retention in the permanent collection of anyone with a real interest in warfare as waged at the corps level.


There really is no single description that would do justice to this book. It is part narrative history, part personal memoir, part photographic history, part documentary history. It contains a good amount of each, and one who served in or is now serving with the division could not ask for more.

The author (who recently passed away) had written previously on the division’s other World War II exploits, i.e. North Africa and Sicily. For this work, he gathered up a large amount of material concerning the division’s 6 June 1944 landings in Normandy and the days immediately following. Then, with the assistance of his wife, he arranged that material into a readable and useful military history.

General Smith joined the Army right out of college in July 1940. He was promptly assigned to the 1st Division’s 16th Infantry Regiment. He was a brand new Infantry second lieutenant. He served with the regiment for the duration of the war; by 1945, he had reached the rank of major. (In later years, he had several tours as the honorary colonel of the regiment.) In brief, the 1st Division was “his unit.” The table of contents that list the titles of nine chapters, ten appendices, General Smith’s notes and writings, and an addendum identify the book’s contents.

I know he had other writings in mind. But it was not to be. He has received his last set of PCS orders; the division will not soon, if ever, see his like.
We are an Army at war, and our enemy will make full use of any lessons learned articles and other open-source materials available on the Internet and in any DoD publications that discuss our own tactics, techniques, and procedures; vulnerabilities; and U.S or allied casualties.

As the Infantry’s branch magazine, we must avoid revealing anything that will endanger U.S. and coalition forces’ personnel or missions. Operations security (OPSEC) is as important today as it has been at any time in our nation’s history, and we will do our part to deny the enemy anything that could help him.

Because of this, the back issues of Infantry that have been posted to our Web site were removed from the site effective May 22, 2006, are now being screened for any potentially sensitive material, and OPSEC sanitized information will be made available at a later date. Future printed issues of the magazine will have been scrubbed to avoid unauthorized disclosure.

A version of the magazine with the author’s full article content will also be available at a later date, through a password-protected site which affords a greater degree of security than that formerly possible on the Web site.

Any questions or concerns can be e-mailed to Inf.MagazineDep@benning.army.mil.

Iraqi Army troops and U.S. Soldiers air assault from a CH-47D Chinook helicopter in Iraq.