Military Transition Teams
Strengthening Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces
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For the U.S. Army advising indigenous forces is not new. From the Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea and the Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam, to the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador, the U.S. Army has trained indigenous forces to defend their countries against threats for many years. Today, in the global war on terrorism, our Army is once again training host nation forces to meet the challenges facing their emerging governments. Comprising Soldiers of diverse specialties and grades throughout our Army, military transition teams (MiTT) meet the challenges of these sensitive and critical missions. In this Commandant’s Note I want to discuss the importance and challenges of the transition team mission.

We need competent, experienced leaders to fill the ranks of our transition teams. Even though it can be a daunting task to be on a transition team, the final experience is often rewarding because the impact is so great. Transition teams are unique, composed of senior ranking individuals without the traditional structure afforded by junior Soldiers. As the team assembles, members must work hard to build cohesion. Personalities become a key element in team building and many of the team members must retrain on the level-one skills they will now have to perform, instead of simply supervising others performing those skills. While all the team members must be proficient in the warrior skills traditionally associated with the infantry mission, the team must leverage the specialized skills of all the team members if they are to effectively train police and military across the warfighting functions.

The transition team must develop systems to deal with internal sustainment while in theater. Many of the routine activities that occur in large U.S. units are necessary for the effectiveness of the transition team. These include maintenance, physical fitness, administration, maintaining team internal skills while training others, and managing the work load of the team. Establishing the team’s link to intelligence support, fire support, medical support, and supplies is critical. Learning to operate independently of U.S. units can be a psychological challenge as the team relies on each other and the security forces they are training for security. Translators become a vital link to accomplishing everyday activities. The team ultimately needs more translators than an infantry rifle company and the quality of the translators and the teams trust in them will have a direct impact on its ability to effectively accomplish the mission.

Transition teams can find their missions frustrating at times. Teams must not only know their profession well enough to advise appropriately, but convey it through the language and cultural barriers that naturally exist. Significant cultural differences exist that team members must understand, and transition teams must work around these and not force rigid adaptation to the American way. It is not necessary to modify existing procedures if they are established and effective. Understanding when to advise and when to train is the delicate art of the transition team leadership. Recognizing the value of integrating standard U.S. military procedures with native ingenuity and resourcefulness is the formula for success. Remember, the need for simplicity is critical, as orders must be translated from Arabic to English and back, without a misunderstanding of the intent. In addition to these challenges, team members must continually educate U.S. units on how to effectively integrate with security forces despite the cultural differences and potential prejudices.

The transition teams advise, coach, teach and mentor security forces and provide direct access to coalition capabilities such as air and artillery support, medical evacuation, and intelligence gathering. For U.S. units, the transition team is not simply a liaison with an adjacent unit. U.S. forces must establish direct relationships with security forces and their leadership across various echelons to achieve the unity of effort that builds legitimacy and strengthens security forces beyond the capability that a transition team can achieve alone. U.S. forces must clearly define the support available and provide that support quickly when needed. Working together has a tremendous impact on the training of security forces. Not only are transition teams able to focus efforts on weak points within the organization they are advising, but security forces increase their own proficiency and confidence when they work closely with U.S. forces. To achieve a strong police and military capable of independent operations, there must be active participation between U.S. forces, security forces, and transition teams.

Success in Iraq and Afghanistan will ultimately be defined by strong, stable governments that can manage the affairs of their people and defend against foreign intrusion. Border police, national police and the national military are vital to protecting the national interests of these countries and achieving that success. Transition teams are invaluable in building a force that is strong, confident and capable. It is a challenging assignment, but represents one of the most decisive efforts in the global war on terrorism. With the assistance of transition teams, indigenous security forces supported by the coalition will continue to grow in strength and capability to defeat any enemy that threatens the future of their nation.

Follow me!
We have all seen these Soldiers, in Iraq or Afghanistan, operating alone and unafraid closely with the Iraqi or Afghan security forces. They are on the streets of Baghdad, at remote combat outposts and everywhere in between. The NCOs and officers who compose our military transition teams (MiTTs) are accomplishing what is probably our most important mission — to create Iraqi and Afghan security forces who can, in the words of Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno “… fight and win, sustain themselves, who will take ownership of their duties, and understand the concepts of duty to a democratic nation.”

Once an NCO has completed two to three years as a leader in the operational force at his current skill level, it is hard to think of a more challenging or rewarding assignment than to be assigned as a military transition team member. The support of our operational forces to the Iraqi Army (IA) or Afghan National Army (ANA) is extremely important and it helps build the collective confidence of those forces; however, transition teams get “in the weeds” each and every day, to bolster the confidence of the IA/ANA soldiers in their own leaders. This effect is, arguably, one of their most important functions because it will translate into lethality towards our common enemy and it will also increase the Iraqi citizens’ confidence in their own forces’ ability to provide for their security.

All transition team members currently complete a five-phase, approximately 85-day training program, which includes extensive and intensive language, cultural, and tactical training. A portion of the training is conducted in Iraq or Afghanistan so the team can acclimate to the environment and meet their host nation counterparts. Initially, NCOs will be assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division and conduct a permanent change of station to Fort Riley, Kansas. Like most other assignments this is a three-year tour, one year of which Soldiers can expect to be in Iraq or Afghanistan. Another option is to PCS directly to Kuwait, after a two-month temporary duty (TDY) period at Fort Riley. If NCOs are afforded the second option, they may be able to arrange a Home-base Advanced Assignment Preference (HAAP) assignment and move their family to that location. Another consideration is the three-month train-up period at Fort Riley, followed by shorter train-up periods in Kuwait and Iraq, prior to beginning their 12-month period as a transition team member.

Your experience as a transition team member will enhance your professional development in a number of ways, many of which you will transmit to Soldiers under your charge in the future. You will become somewhat of an expert in the respective culture you operate in because you will be immersed in it. Your ability to accomplish your mission will be directly related to your ability to communicate effectively both verbally and nonverbally with your Iraqi or Afghani comrades; therefore, I encourage you to become as proficient as possible in the language. Always remember that one of your goals should be to ensure Iraqi leaders and soldiers are perceived as competent and professional by their own people. There will come a day when our presence is minimal and the only way they will continue to secure their nation is for our counterparts to be confident in their ability to lead their soldiers and for those soldiers to be confident in their own ability to conduct combat operations. Once they achieve this goal, the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan will gain confidence in their own troops’ ability to secure their respective countries.

One common concern for NCOs is whether assignment to a transition team will affect their next opportunity for promotion. I will not speculate on what future promotion panels will or will not hold important; however, the Chief of Infantry has made it clear in his guidance to promotion panels that transition team duty is favorable, and promotion panels should not discriminate against NCOs who have served on them. For example, if a first sergeant has served for one year in a first sergeant position and is placed on a transition team for a year, he should be considered to have met the leadership requirements expected of him for promotion to sergeant major.

Whether you volunteer or are selected for duty on a transition team, it is important to remember it is a priority for our Army. The challenge will be great; however, the rewards will be even greater because you will make a difference at the tactical level — every day. Although your primary influence is at the tactical level, transition team members must always remember their actions can also have strategic implications. You will undoubtedly grow personally and professionally from your experience and become an even better Infantry leader than you already are.

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Current and past issues of Infantry are available online at https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine.
The U.S. Army is considering replacing one of the U.S. Army’s oldest weapons, the M2 .50 caliber machine gun, after more than three-quarters of a century of service. One of the potential replacements for the M2 would be the XM312 .50 caliber Advanced Crew Served Weapon (ACSW). The XM312 is one-third of the weight, has less recoil, and provides Soldiers with the punch of a .50 caliber machine gun in the footprint of a 7.62mm weapon system.

The XM312 is a spinout of technologies developed in the 25mm XM307 ACSW program. The weapon is capable of firing all of the current .50 caliber ammunition in the inventory, including the standard M33 ball round, the M8 armor-piercing incendiary, the M903 saboted light armor penetrator, and the MK211 multipurpose round that penetrates, fragments, and starts fires.

Alan Li, a product director for Product Manager Crew Served Weapons, Project Manager Soldier Weapons, highlights that one major benefit of the XM312 is the weight savings. “The XM312 weighs 53 pounds, including tripod and traversing and elevation mechanism, compared to the M2 system’s weight of 128 pounds, a savings of 75 pounds.” He noted that the system can also be set up faster than an M2 because it does not need ballast to weigh down the tripod.

The XM312 has 70 percent less recoil, which enables Soldiers to use weapon magnification sights they can put their eyes on, which was unthinkable and potentially painful with the M2. Li added, “Lower recoil also means less dispersion of rounds and better accuracy. Better accuracy improves the ease of weapon qualification, provides a more economic use of rounds and reduces the logistical burden.”

Once the XM312 is deployed, all vehicles that mount the M2 will be able to mount the new system. Tests have been successfully conducted mounting the system to the Stryker Combat Vehicle and the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS).

Other benefits of the XM312 include safety and training applications. The XM312 eliminates the need for the operator to adjust the headspace and timing and any special tools for maintenance, reducing the amount of training required. The current XM312 has 131 parts, compared with 244 for the M2. “This translates to lower provisioning, increased main-tainability, and improved reliability with fewer parts that can go wrong,” Li said. It is expected that training Soldiers for the XM312 will require less time because the system is easier to control when firing, making it easier to train for qualifications.

The weight savings, reduced recoil, and increased accuracy of the XM312 allow for employment in places that were unthinkable for an M2, such as in light aircraft, small watercraft and in places previously reserved for only light to medium machine guns.

Colonel Carl Lipsit, the officer who leads Project Manager Soldier Weapons, said that the M2 has served the Army well, but that it is time for a change. “It is a marvelous weapon that contributed to our success on the battlefield since it was fielded. But the times have changed, technology has changed, and the way we fight wars has changed over time,” COL Lipsit said. “To the warfighter, the XM312 is an excellent example of modern technology and design.”

The Army has recently issued a requirement for a lightweight .50 caliber machine gun. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) also has a vehicle requirement for a lightweight/low recoil weapon, but is also looking to expand use of the weapon for dismounted units. The XM312 has the potential to satisfy all three of these needs in one package.

Li noted that, according to the current program cycle, the XM312, if selected, could be fielded at the end of Fiscal Year 2012, or sooner based on Army funding priorities. He added that those who will receive the biggest benefit from the new weapon will be the light units, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and SOCOM forces.

PEO Soldier is the U.S. Army organization that develops, procures, fields and sustains virtually everything the Soldier wears or carries. For more information on Project Manager Soldier Weapons or other PEO Soldier programs, visit www.peosoldier.army.mil.
NEW PT JACKETS MAKE LIGHT SHINE

Often when you hear about Soldiers and visibility, the stories are about trying to camouflage them in the field. However, when it comes to conducting their physical training (PT), our service members need to be seen. Soldiers often perform PT in the early morning or early evening hours when it is dusk or dark.

“The more visible the Soldiers are when doing PT in low light conditions, the safer they will be,” said Beverly Kimball, product engineer.

This is where the U.S. Army Product Manager Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-CIE) comes in. PM-CIE is working with the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Operational Forces Interface Group (OFIG) to conduct a user evaluation of new reflective technologies which enhance the current Improved Physical Fitness Uniform (IPFU) jacket. Two prototype fabrics have been developed with the new technology and sample jackets have been fabricated.

OFIG located and coordinated with 600 participants at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Lewis, Washington, to conduct the user evaluations, beginning in November. The Soldiers participating will be surveyed on their acceptance of the sample jackets.

“The prototype jackets are very similar in appearance to the current jacket during daylight,” said Dave Geringer, assistant product manager, PM-CIE, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, “however, despite their subtle daylight appearance, both patterns are highly reflective and provide a significant improvement in visibility.”

One of the jackets has a subtle digital reflective pattern, while the other has a slight texturized reflective pattern.

“All participants will have an opportunity to wear all the test items. But we want to ensure that all the jackets are tested in the same climate and conditions, so we will be conducting a ‘within groups’ type evaluation so styles are worn simultaneously,” said Kimball.

The jackets will be evaluated for comfort, durability, launderability, wind resistance, water resistance, warmth, and reflective capabilities.

The evaluations are expected to continue through March 2008, and once complete, the data will be compiled into a final report. Geringer said, “If the candidates perform well, they will be presented to the Army Uniform Board (AUB) for approval to replace the current IPFU jacket.”

(This article is courtesy of the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center - Natick Public Affairs Office.)

CORRECTION

In the September-October 2007 issue of Infantry, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was mistakenly referred to as FM 3-14 in the headline to Major Jacob M. Kramer’s article “The Two Sides of COIN: Applying FM 3-24 to the Brigade and Below Counterinsurgency Fight.” We apologize for any inconvenience and/or confusion.

SUBMIT ARTICLES TO INFANTRY

We are always accepting articles for publication in Infantry Magazine. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. We can also use relevant historical articles, with the emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. If you’re unsure a topic is suitable, please feel free to contact our office and run your ideas by us. We’ll let you know whether we would be interested in the article, and we can also give any further guidance you may need.

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A wealth of information that isn’t shared is worthless,” said Sergeant 1st Class Jason St. John, half of the two-man sniper team from the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit.

St. John and his partner, Staff Sergeant Robby Johnson, returned from a second-place finish last year to beat 16 other teams in the seventh annual International Sniper Competition at Fort Benning, Georgia, October 26 through November 2.

Two-man spotter-shooter teams from the Army, sister services, Canada, Ireland and Sweden competed in the weeklong event, which focused more this year than ever before on training and sharing information on the latest advancements in sniping tactics and technology, said Captain Keith Bell, Sniper School commander.

“Finding the best two-man sniper team in the world — that’s secondary to what we do here. We train Soldiers to be snipers, the most deadly weapons on the battlefield,” he said. “That’s what’s important.”

The competition served another purpose as well, Bell said. Each year it draws more and more attention from the media — each year more and more people come to understand the role the sniper plays on today’s battlefield.

“When the enemy blends in so well with the population, you can’t take him out with a hand grenade or a machine gun,” Bell said. “It’s critical to have these snipers in undisclosed locations, basically invisible, who can take out a target in a crowd with one bullet placed precisely.”

Johnson and St. John served as snipers with the 75th Ranger Regiment’s 3rd Battalion. Johnson said the value of a sniper team cannot be underestimated.

“We’re a platoon’s best friend,” Johnson said. “We cover their backs, we cover their fronts, so they can do the mission, whether they’re breaching a building or going over a wall. We’ve got eyes on it before they even get there.”

With five combat tours between them — and now the International Sniper championship — St. John and Johnson said they’ve yet to master the skill of sniping. And that’s a good thing.

“There’s always room to learn and improve,” St. John said. “The moment you think you’re perfect is the moment you’ve discovered your greatest shortcoming.”

Johnson said he came away from every shooting event “kicking himself” for falling short.

“That’s the value in (the competition). Basically, it’s a kick in the face,” he said.

“You realize your shortcomings. It doesn’t matter if you’ve been a sniper for years or you’re competing for the first time, you go out there and you realize there’s so much room for improvement.”
It's your first day with your Iraqi Army (IA) unit as part of a military transition team (MiTT), and you have no idea what to expect. Upon arriving at the combat outpost, the first thing you see is a shell of an unfinished building with a puddle of sewage in front and a pile of garbage 150 meters from the building’s entrance. Flies are an issue — and it does not smell so good either.

At first blush, the IA operations do not impress you either — operations are quickly planned and top-fed. Iraqi soldiers often roll out in a mix of uniforms, some with helmets or body armor but others without.

You spend your first week running around telling Soldiers to put on their helmets and clean up. One day you realize that this strategy is not working. Not only is no one listening to you, but also you have failed to build any rapport with your IA unit. Then it hits you: you are not here to make this into an American unit — you are here to help this unit become the best Iraqi unit it can be.

You have just made your first step toward understanding your MiTT role in mentoring and coaching the IA.

Although this scenario is not unique, for some American Soldiers on Iraqi (or Afghan) MiTTs or police, border patrol or national guard transition teams, the circumstances may not be as grim. Regardless, American Soldiers approach military service from a different perspective than the average Iraqi Soldiers.

To be successful, you must understand the Iraqi perspective, bearing in mind that you want the same thing: a strong IA.

U.S. Army Soldiers and Marines survey a map with Iraqi Army soldiers during an operation in Tharthar, Iraq.

Specialist Kieran Cuddihy
prepared to secure and protect Iraq so U.S. troops can go home.

This article is based on our experiences mentoring and coaching both an IA battalion and the Iraqi police that the IA operates with to improve security in Mosul, Iraq. The article presents a few ideas about fostering teamwork within the human terrain in Mosul. This is by no means an attempt to discuss all the cultural differences between U.S. Soldiers and the Middle Eastern soldiers and policemen. Whether you are reading this article as part of the Coalition force, a MiTT or military police (MP), the goal is the same — to build cooperation between the IA and Iraqi police to provide security to Iraq.

Meeting Expectations. If you are part of a MiTT in Iraq today, the process of transitioning the IA into the lead while working with its Iraqi police counterparts can be confusing and frustrating. The cause of this confusion can be traced to preconceived notions about how army and police units should act and be developed plus how the U.S. Army measures success. These notions come from your experiences as U.S. Soldiers, and you can’t help but apply them when working with the Iraqis.

The trick is to understand what you are expected to accomplish and what you are not expected to change. Armed with this understanding, you can help the Iraqis fashion their army and police into the forces necessary to protect this fledgling democracy.

What are you expected to accomplish? You must help the IA and police become strong enough to beat the insurgency and sustain security in their country. What are you not expected to change? You can’t (and would not want to) change the culture and social mores in Iraq. The bottom line, whether you embrace it or not, is that a uniquely IA and Iraqi police will be the result of your mentoring and coaching.

But before you can build a team, you must understand who the players are and how they interact within this human terrain.

Human Terrain System. According to Dr. Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, the human terrain system is “the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating.” (See the article “An Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs” in Military Review, July-August 2005 edition.)

Here are the players for your team.

Iraqi Army. The IA consists of leaders who may have served in the former regime’s army or in the Peshmurga (in Kurdish units). The background of these leaders will influence how their units operate (doctrine, loyalties, sectarian influences, etc.). Often these units do not trust the Iraqi police and may view the MiTT or other Coalition forces as having ulterior motives.

MiTTs. These are teams of 10 to 12 Soldiers assembled from across the U.S. Army and, after a two-month train-up, assigned to IA units. They must support themselves while advising the IA units often away from Coalition forward operating bases (FOBs). Their primary purpose is to help the IA take the lead and support the IA with Coalition force effects.

Coalition Forces. These may be American units often on their second tour in country. Our MiTT in Mosul was partnered with a Stryker company, consisting of four platoons and a company headquarters. Two of the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F Fire Support Specialist Soldiers from this company were attached to the MiTT to bring it up to 12 men.

The Stryker company’s leadership had served in the same area of Mosul 18 months earlier and had a thorough understanding of the city and its people. Although this repetitive assignment in the same area of operations (AO) in Iraq may not be replicated everywhere in theater, it’s a reasonable assumption that the U.S. Army or Marine Corps brigade you are working with will have been in Iraq before.

Fostering a win-win relationship between the MiTT and the Stryker company commander is key to the success of the mission. The Coalition force can’t accomplish the mission without the MiTT, and the MiTT can’t be successful in its foreign internal defense mission without the Coalition force — this must be a team effort.

Iraqi Police. The long-term goal is to get the IA out of internal matters and focused on external threats to Iraq. Until the police force is strong enough (manned, equipped and trained properly), Iraqi civilian leaders will continue to rely on the IA to provide tactical overwatch in the cities.

Ideally, the IA battalion is partnered with an Iraqi police district that has an officer-in-charge (OIC) comparable to the rank to the IA OIC, but this is not always the case. It is important that these two commanders (IA and Iraqi police) have as open a relationship as possible. If critical information sharing is to take place, these two men must trust one another and work closely with each other’s organizations. A key measure of success for the Coalition force and MiTT within their sector is the level to which they can facilitate cooperation between the IA and Iraqi police.

MP Squads. Along with contracted police trainers, these MP squads visit stations daily. They are tasked to improve and train the Iraqi police. They train the Iraqis on evidence collection and the systems that make a successful police force.

MP units will be critical in helping you to build the relationship between your IA battalion commander and the Iraqi police commander. Including these key MP players is important in facilitating IA and Iraqi police cooperation.

What makes this situation more complex is the requirement for each to trust each other, and trust among these players can be a limited resource. Some players even might exclude others actively when it comes to mission planning and information sharing.

For the IA to transition successfully into the lead and provide for a secure Iraq, all these players must work together. Facilitating this can be a daunting task. All five of these players have separate chains of command and, often, different agendas.
Relationships are central. As they say in real estate, the key is “Location, Location, Location.” In dealing with Iraqis, it is “Relationships, Relationships, Relationships.”

To illustrate this concept, see the figure on page 7. It shows how to build a healthy relationship with an Iraqi unit that leads to the unit’s trusting you and, ultimately, your integration into one team. It first begins with conveying respect.

**Showing Respect.** Iraqis are sensitive to being shown respect and quickly will sense a lack of respect. It is important that you do not make a poor first impression through an unintentional act of disrespect. You will not be able to mentor or coach the Iraqis if their leaders view you as lacking respect for them.

Likewise, you could get a few steps into the team-building process and have to start all over because of a simple act of disrespect. Here are a few pointers about showing respect.

**Salutes.** Salutes are rendered when approaching officers more senior than you. Because there is a strong British influence, the traditional “foot stomp” is rendered. To foot stomp, extend your right leg with your knee bent waist high and then smartly stomp the foot to the ground accompanied by a salute if you have headgear on (without a salute if you are not wearing headgear). If you are the same rank as the commander, it is still customary to render these honors to him — green tab (commander) is “trump.”

You do not have to go with the British approach, but you must render some kind of honors. This is their custom, and you will gain credibility as someone who knows what he is doing.

**Greetings.** Handshakes and smiles are important — the neutral face makes Iraqis think that you are angry or do not like them. As you get to know your counterparts better, hugs are not uncommon. If you are especially close, a kiss on the cheek may become commonplace. You will get used to it — it is a compliment indicating that your status has been raised to “brother.”

**First Impressions.** As indicated in the intro scenario, you may see things in your unit that you want to fix immediately. Do not rush to judgment; you must build credibility before your advice will be considered. If you just arrived and already are telling them what to do, you will be viewed as incredibly disrespectful.

**Building Relationships.** The next step in the process is working out the specific nature of your relationship. This can be started once you have established respect for each other. Only then can you figure out how you are going to work with the members of the unit. This encompasses everything from how you share battlespace to how you will share information.

You are here to put this organization in the lead so make sure they know who is in charge — they are. There is a huge temptation to act as a surrogate chain of command and dictate operations. This will be the approach during the developmental phases of these units, but never forget the goal: Iraqis in the lead.

It is like teaching someone to ride a bike. The goal is to get the training wheels off. You are the “training wheels.” Here are a few pointers.

**Combined Operations.** A good tool for maintaining a good relationship with your IA unit is to conduct combined operations. Our MiTT maintains a 24-hour combined tactical operations center (TOC). In addition, our Coalition force unit conducts regular combined operations with the IA and stages quick reaction forces from our Iraqi combat outpost. This gives the MiTT and Coalition forces 24-hour-a-day exposure to our IA battalion every day.

This team operational concept facilitates sharing vital information and dramatically has improved the speed and efficiency with which IA, MiTT and our Coalition force unit react to changes in our battlespace.

**Mentoring.** Your approach should be mentoring and coaching. Remember, this is their unit, not yours.

If you make a recommendation and the Iraqis don’t accept it — move on. Choose your battles; if every operation becomes a point of contention as you fight to win your point, the Iraqis will view you as a pain to be endured. You also will damage your rapport with the Iraqis and their perception of your respect for them, pushing you back to step one: building respect. You must choose “bones of contention” carefully and approach the Iraqis with respect.

**Attitude.** Another technique for building relationship with the Iraqi unit is to be as positive as possible in public forums and reserve recommendations for improvement for private forums with the commander. The leader can’t afford to be viewed as failing — his popularity counts. If a leader is viewed as bad, his organization might suffer serious retention problems. You can’t afford to be the cause of those retention problems.

**Establishing Trust.** After you establish
how your relationship will work, you will have to gain experience working together to build trust. You will have credibility just by the fact that you are an American Soldier. But that won’t earn you automatic trust. In this culture, trust has to be earned through experiences with each other, and that takes time. Here are a few things to consider:

Reporting. Regardless of what you are doing with the unit, there will be reporting requirements. You can’t afford to be seen as a Coalition spy who reports the IA unit for every minor mistake. The Iraqis understand that you must report without compromise such things as corruption and detainee abuse. But just like in American units, some things you keep in-house and fix yourselves.

If having you around is a sure way to get the unit attention for every minor blemish from its higher headquarters, you never will establish trust with your Iraqi counterpart.

Promises. Be careful what promises you make. If you promise something, you better deliver it. Conversely, promising things you know you can deliver will build trust and provide the very things your counterpart values from Americans — capabilities.

At this point, if you are successful at building trust, do not be surprised if you are invited to your counterpart’s home for a social event; attend if you can. Iraqis are very social and value showing you who they are. Embrace them, and you will build trust.

Shared Danger. Nothing builds trust faster than facing the enemy together. Several times the IA battalion commander, U.S. company commander and MiTT chief have been on the battlefield together in a Stryker and been mortared, struck by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) or had to clear houses together. The Middle Eastern culture values bravery and courage. A little shared danger buys a lot of trust.

The opposite is true as well. If you always monitor the battle from the TOC, the Iraqis will notice.

Building a Team. If you have been successful at these initial steps of showing respect, building relationships and establishing trust, you will start to notice some significant benefits that will yield concrete results. During this phase of the relationship, American and Iraqi units will start to work seamlessly. There will be fewer attempts by Americans to try to motivate Iraqis and more examples of the Iraqis motivating themselves.

The way this synthesis happens has nothing to do with what is said to the Iraqis and everything to do with what is shown to them. Set the example.

Sanitation and Police Calls. If you do not like how dirty the perimeter you share with the Iraqis is, set the example of cleanliness. The Iraqis will begin to emulate your example.

Caution: this takes time. You will feel like you are alone in some of your efforts. Then, one day, you will look up and an Iraqi will be next to you mopping as you clean out the combined TOC.

In our AO, the Stryker company first sergeant led his Soldiers through a police call of the motor pool where the Coalition forces park their vehicles. Most of the trash was not caused by U.S. Soldiers, and there were several why-are-we-picking-up-someone-else’s-mess comments. However, after several iterations of police calls, the IA began to emulate the Coalition force example, and regular police calls began to take place.

Uniform Standards. Maintaining these standards always will be a challenge. But show your Soldiers wearing body armor and helmets, and the Iraqis, ultimately, will follow your example.

Maintaining Patience. A great deal of patience is required throughout this process. This is a level of patience with which we American Soldiers are not familiar. For example, it is not uncommon to sit with your counterpart drinking chai (tea) for hours, just being together. This is time well spent.

Our Armies simply are different in how we approach things. In our Army, we are quick to assess problems and determine solutions. We are dedicated to expediency; we value efficiency in every operation we approach. We would have worked through many issues in the time required to exchange pleasantries with the Iraqis. The Iraqi approach is neither good nor bad but a reality.

You must be aware that our concept of time is not shared by your Iraqi counterpart. To be successful in your mission, you must operate in their environment without becoming frustrated and “losing your cool.”

Work with your U.S. counterparts behind closed doors to resolve those issues you know you can resolve. After deciding on how you need to coach or model the solution, then provide a united front to the IA battalion commander.

On occasion, your advice will be disregarded by the Iraqis who implement a different solution. View that as a good thing. When the IA unit accomplishes the mission, even if it’s a bit rough around the edges, it learns and gains confidence in its abilities. If you come into conflict with the Iraqi perspective, you will show disrespect and damage the relationship, causing you to start all over with building rapport.

This entire process will be frustrating only if you do not endeavor to understand the nature of the human terrain in which you are operating. Transitioning Iraqi units into the lead can be very fulfilling. Your first step is to embrace the human terrain in your Iraqi AO.

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Major Christopher L. Matson, U.S. Army Reserves from Charlotte, North Carolina, served as the maneuver advisor and XO on 3/4/2 IA MiTT. Before deploying, he was a strategic analyst with the 108th Division (Initial Training) in Charlotte where he also served as a budget officer and company commander. Among other assignments, he was a company commander and Communications and Electronics platoon leader in the 337th Military Intelligence Battalion (Airborne), also in Charlotte. He served on active duty as a platoon leader and battalion air operations officer with the 1-27 IN, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

Captain Brent A. Clemmer is the commander of Charger Company, 2-3 Infantry, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, in Mosul. He is on his second tour of duty in Iraq. He was the assistant operations officer with 2-3 Infantry for OIF I and II. Additionally, he served as a platoon leader and company XO in 3-75 Rangers, participating in combat operations in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) I. In Korea, he was a platoon leader and company XO in 2-9 IN, 2nd Infantry Division.
The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person’s need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great chance there; the Sherif trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest and skill we possess.

1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with yourself and them.

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first.

3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency’s sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive of your joint plans.

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm.

6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoid going behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own.

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you must attain it.

8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always with a Sherif’s, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit.
9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townersmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.

10. Call your Sherif ‘Sidi’ in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh ‘Abu Annad,’ ‘Akhu Alia’ or some similar by-name.

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show.

12. Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour. Do not cause a laugh at a Sherif except among Sherifs.

13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.

15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.

17. Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public.

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous and difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character: while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.

19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it.

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action, and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervour, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.
22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too ‘set’ to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don’t attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don’t take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don’t play for safety.

23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.

24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would be more readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers.

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally.

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an Ageyli or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels.

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.

During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Emir Faisal’s party gathers for a photograph at Versailles. T. E. Lawrence is standing behind and to the right of the Emir.
A Soldier may clean his weapon daily or even more, but he rarely changes out its internal components. That may rapidly change.

A recent study funded by Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, the proponent for Army small arm weapons, found methods to estimate when small arm components fail. The findings of the study provide the foundation for truly preventative maintenance doctrine. Rather than waiting for parts to break, these estimates recommend replacing small arm components likely to fail before they actually do so. This will lead to technical manuals that will direct replacing such items as firing pins, bolts, bolt carriers and hammer springs on a routine basis, especially when the Soldier’s unit is preparing for an operational deployment.

It will do so not on the basis of months, but instead based on the weapon’s actual use — the number of shots the weapon fired. The result will be weapons that are more reliable and riflemen that are more effective during operational missions.

What is proposed in this article is adopting a set of parameters for preventative exchange of small arm components similar to that currently used for combat vehicles, aircraft, and other mission critical equipment. Analogous to the “change oil every 3,000 miles” metrics for a vehicle, these measures support the position that is better and less expensive to change a firing pin than replace a weapon. Even more, a Soldier that uses preventative maintenance on his weapon will be more confident in the performance of that weapon and will be more effective in his mission.

Current Policy — Replace When Broken

When a Soldier draws a weapon from the arms room, many times there is little — if any — historical information on that item. In many units, there are so many weapons that it is not feasible to track all the previous information or repair records in either paper or 5988-E forms. In those cases, a Soldier can only take the weapon, perform a functions check, clean it if necessary and then boresight it once on a range. Beyond the standard functions check, there were few pre- or post-operation checks a Soldier or his leaders could perform to determine if components in that weapon were expected to last through the next deployment, next mission, or next magazine.

That scenario may have been acceptable in the past, but the work of Soldier as a System, Land Warrior, Ground System Soldier, and other programs made the rifle and the rifleman a critical component in the global war on terrorism. The small arms rifle is now the core of a very complex weapon system that has day and night vision optics, thermal imagery, and battle command sensors. This modern system can have strategic importance, especially as Future Combat System spin-off systems become employed. What was once a simple weapon worth a few hundred dollars is now a system of systems worth several thousand dollars. This cost does not include the resources to train the Soldier to maximize that system’s potential. Now, the previously low priority small arm is central to what the rifleman can do and his impact within a larger battlespace. This renewed importance requires improved maintenance techniques to keep the rifle in operation. Because of this, it is reasonable to utilize proactive, condition-based maintenance policies that...
are already in place for more costly systems. Imagine you are preparing for a 12-month deployment to Southwest Asia. You are rather new to your unit, and do not have all the information on your platoon or company’s equipment that you wish to have. What if, with little extra effort, you could determine the “health” of your weapons with a rapid diagnosis of simple to measure components? If, with about 30 seconds of work, you could know that of the past 100 weapons going into a deployment with the same number of total shots as yours, 25 percent of them had a broken bolt during that deployment. That would put your weapon with a 25 percent chance of breaking its bolt, possibly during a critical moment. That bolt may look just fine, but a 1 in 4 chance of breaking in a fight might be more than you wish to risk. What if that same information could provide the same information regarding the bolt carrier, hammer spring, barrel, gas rings, and about a dozen other parts that commonly break in the M16 or M4. What if that type of information could also be tailored to your environment? Weapons were developed to function properly in an extreme spectrum of weather and environmental conditions. That does not necessarily mean that they will have common types of part failures or component breakdowns. The parts that wear out and break in an arid high altitude environment such as Afghanistan may not be the same as those that fail in a tropical climate such as the Horn of Africa. With the PEO Soldier study, it is possible to tailor the maintenance policies to accommodate such differences. This would be again analogous to the vehicle owner’s manual that has a Schedule A for routine driving and Schedule B for city or rough-terrain use.

Previously, Risk Components Required Additional Equipment or Capabilities

There are certain to be skeptics and non-believers in adopting this new approach to maintenance. This is expected; most failures experienced with the M16 and M4 weapons are often prevented with proper cleaning. But even a clean weapon at some point will experience failure, and this should be expected since the weapon is in essence a machine. While any one Soldier’s experience with any one weapon may last only a couple years at most, the experience of the durability test by Aberdeen Test Center did test each weapon out to 35,000 shots per rifle or carbine, and 50,000 rounds per automatic weapon. That experience, across all the weapons of different types and origins, demonstrated something that no one Soldier would see: parts break in a pattern that is both predictable and preventable. It is now possible to create a PMCS (preventive maintenance checks and services) policy around those tests that will do just that and lower the risk of small arms failing.

Shot Counters and Odometers

A weapon does not have a device that tracks usage like a vehicle’s odometer. Without one, a Soldier can only make an estimated guess as to how many shots he has fired since the last maintenance was completed. (The Army has requirements for such a shot counter in future small arms, but there is no requirement for a shot counter capability on current weapons. The U.S. Special Operations Command has developed such a device for its rifles and carbines and has started fielding it.) This is again analogous to a person performing maintenance on a vehicle without an odometer. He can guess — but not know — which parts are oldest and in most need of replacement. The Soldier, however, can still perform preventative maintenance. The PEO Soldier study provided a unique method to estimate how many shots a weapon has fired, and then correlates these to the replacement recommendations. When the testers conducted the test out to 35,000 or 50,000 shots, they conducted Bore Erosion gauging every 3,600 rounds. This standard test, currently conducted once a year on Army weapons, is the means to determine when a weapon’s barrel has reached its maximum effective life. The gage used to perform this test typically provides an “Accept” or “Reject” outcome on whether to maintain or replace the barrel. The same gage can also serve as a pseudo-odometer for a weapon. The PEO Soldier test provides a method to translate the gage results into the number of shots the weapon has performed.

For example, a Soldier or his leaders measure his weapon with the Bore Erosion gauge. On a new weapon, there would typically be 14/32” of space between the “Reject” line and the back of the upper receiver. This measurement is possible with the “insert the ruler NSN in the small arm repair kit” or any other tape measure or ruler with 1/32” marks on it. In this case, the Soldier’s weapon shows 7/32” remaining to the “Reject” line. This corresponds to roughly 7,500 rounds through the barrel. (The actual conversions are sensitive and not used in this document. The full report is available to U.S. Government personnel at the Defense Technical Information Center Web site: www.dtic.mil.) Next, the Soldier would refer to the technical manual that lists the preventative replacements that should take place at 7,500 shots. It recommends replacing the bolt and the firing pin. The Soldier requests those items. If those items are available in unit benchstock, the replacement takes place immediately. If not, the parts must be requested as with other equipment. The weapon, in the mean time, is still operational. The Soldier can use it for training or missions, while the logistic system moves the necessary components to him. The Soldier and his weapon are now part of the condition-based maintenance system that pushes required components to the field units, preserving the units combat effectiveness. This supports the sustainability of the equipment without removing it from the operator. At the same time, the Soldier acts with the knowledge that his weapon is within the window of maintenance and that the ‘system’ is working to replace the key components. The result is that the unit can continue its combat training with its full arsenal of equipment and begins it deployment with weapons that are measurably more reliable and fully prepared for the deployment.
The leaders and commanders at every level have more weapons and more reliable weapons at their disposal to complete the mission.

Organizational Impact
There will understandably be a materiel impact on the brigade combat team to support such a policy of preventative maintenance. The size of such an impact is not expected to be as large as the impact already in place to perform the same type of policy for wheeled, track, and flying weapon systems. The impact should ultimately improve and not necessarily increase the effort to maintain weapons. Instead of fixing weapons wherever they are positioned and whenever they break, the unit has the choice of replacing parts on a scheduled, predictable routine. The unit can choose to conduct this type of maintenance prior to deploying, which in turn reduces the likelihood and number of weapon failures once deployed. This leaves the unit less occupied with weapon sustainment and more occupied with weapons training and use during a deployment.

The full impact is still being investigated by the Tank-automotive & Armament Command (TACOM), the organization that creates the technical manuals and maintenance policies for small arms and its supporting components. The final changes will ultimately be nested not only in what the Army feels is best for its weapons and mission requirements, but will also need to complement what the other services and federal agencies desire in their rifle and carbine capabilities. This may be a long time coming and could outlast this author in its gestation. The motivation, however, to implement such a policy is there, and could be improved with a grassroots call from operational units for such a change to be published with haste.

Path Ahead
There is a good deal more to the background and analysis of the study than what is discussed in this article. The full report is available from the Defense Technical Information Center and is available to all U.S. Government agencies. The risk analysis that relates number shots on a weapon to the likelihood of a part breaking is another subject all together. What is important though is the understanding that this type of maintenance policy is more than just possible, it is what is currently in place for most other systems. The PEO Soldier study has only brought it to the small arms arena. It is what already takes place for other systems the nation decided are critical and simply applies them to the Soldier and his personal weapon.

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A Soldier with the 82nd Airborne Division fires his weapon during a live-fire exercise in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq, in December 2006.
Tech Sergeant Dawn M. Price, USAF
**Why the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle?**

This article is dedicated to Sergeant Glen Hicks, Private First Class Jay-D Ornsby-Adkins, and Private Cole Spencer of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Georgia, who were killed in action in Iraq on April 28, 2007, when their HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) was attacked with an improvised explosive device (IED). Their deaths remind us how important our task is to get the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in the hands of our deployed forces in significant numbers as quickly as possible.

Coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been characterized by the enemy’s creative use of IEDs. The majority of Americans are so familiar with the term “IED” that it does not need to be spelled out … it is now a part of our contemporary vocabulary.

In mid-2003, Coalition operations transitioned from traditional force-on-force close combat to conducting counterinsurgency operations and stabilizing a country in chaos from its rapid defeat. As our mission transitioned, our means for waging war shifted from heavily armored tracked combat vehicles to the thin-skinned benign HMMWV. In that regard, the role of the HMMWV shifted from general purpose transportation and maneuver support functions to personnel carriers for infantry squads and “gun trucks.”

As this trend of converting grew in momentum, our Soldiers quickly realized that a M998 HMMWV with canvas doors provided little in terms of protecting its occupants from a simple roadside IED and asked that we provide them with the latest in up-armedored HMMWV (UAH), the M1114 and M1151/52. As the UAH began to arrive in significant numbers, the enemy countered with better IEDs and adjusted their tactics, techniques and procedures. To keep pace we added new armor kits, or FRAG kits to the UAH increasing both the vehicle’s width and weight. In doing this, we traded mobility, payload, visibility and reliability for the necessary protection demanded by the current counterinsurgency fight. It is at this point we realized we had used all the excess capacity of the HMMWV and had reached the point of diminishing returns. Who would have thought that the superb vehicle that began replacing the M151 ¼ ton “Jeep” in the mid-1980’s would become an armored gun truck protecting its occupants against high velocity small arms fire and fragmentation from roadside bombs in 2004.

**Early Introduction of MRAP-Like Vehicles**

While the services continued to make force protection improvements to the HMMWV, both the Army and Marines were also fielding in very small numbers mine protected vehicles for use by explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) and other specialized combat engineer units. These mine protected vehicles go by names such as Cougar, Buffalo, and RG-31 and are characterized by a “V” shaped underbody, monocoque hull, and high ground clearance.

The use of the IED is not new to warfare and neither is the mine protected vehicle. IED is just a new term for an age old weapon. The mine protected vehicles that have now become known as MRAPs trace their origins back to the bush wars in South Africa during the late 1960’s and were slowly adopted by other nations conducting peacekeeping operations. The RG-31 is good example of this.

**The Marines Push the Need for MRAP**

What is new and unique about MRAP is the huge amount of attention it has generated and the unprecedented speed at which the Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing the program and...
buying vehicles. MRAP is a Joint program led by the Marine Corps with membership from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations Command. In the acquisition world, Joint programs are known for their slow pace; however, the MRAP program is an anomaly in this regard. In less than nine months it went from concept development and approval by a senior Joint review panel to having thousands on order from several manufacturers. The DoD has declared MRAP its number one acquisition priority. Today, MRAP is among the largest DoD programs in terms of dollars budgeted and spent (more than $8 billion to date). In keeping with this priority, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has organized a Joint MRAP task force composed of senior pentagon leaders to guide strategic decisions and ensure the unique requirements of each service are met.

**Operational Concept**

MRAP is really a new capability without a predecessor system. MRAP is not a new light tactical wheeled vehicle; not an interim replacement for the HMMWV fleet; or a bridge to the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV), which is intended to eventually replace the HMMWV. Its mission role is similar to the Stryker in many respects. It will provide small units conducting typical counterinsurgency missions with protected mobility and mounted firepower. Squads and platoons will use MRAP to enable both mounted and dismounted missions. Typical mission sets supported by MRAP are cordon and search, raids, mounted combat patrol, traffic control points, convoy security, escort, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and protected transport. MRAPs will replace many UAHs currently used to conduct these missions; however, units will want to retain some UAH for operations in terrain where MRAPs are unsuitable.

MRAP is divided into three categories of vehicles based solely on the number of occupants the vehicle must hold. The Army will only field category I and II vehicles. Category I MRAP is a fire team-size vehicle designed to hold six occupants and category II MRAP is a squad-size vehicle designed to hold 10 occupants. (See photo below of typical category I and II MRAP vehicles). The number of occupants in both categories includes the driver, vehicle commander, and gunner. A category I MRAP provides units with a protected maneuver capability in urban areas and other restricted terrain. They primarily serve as armored personnel carriers for fire teams and weapons carriers for heavy machine guns and the TOW-Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) missile system. Reconnaissance units will use the category I MRAP to conduct mounted reconnaissance while employing the Long Range Scout Surveillance System from the vehicle. The category II MRAP is considered a multi-mission vehicle and provides units with protected transport between secure areas. Sapper squads and rifle squads will use the category II MRAP for protected maneuver and movement when it is necessary to mass Soldiers rapidly for a mission such as a quick reaction force. The category II will also be a special built armored ambulance for use by medical evacuation squads conducting ground MEDEVAC.

**Speed of Delivery Critical to Success**

Currently there are five primary (reduced from seven) manufacturers of MRAP vehicles. These vehicles all look
different, but provide the same capabilities and meet the same required level of protection for mounted occupants. The number of different manufacturers is a result of DoD quickly identifying that no one manufacturer had the production capacity to build and deliver several thousand vehicles in less than a year. This massive number of MRAP vehicles required by our operating forces in a very compressed timeframe is therefore driving the strategy of awarding multiple contacts. Major factors that will continue to influence this strategy are how fast the required number of MRAP vehicles can be produced, integrated, and fielded to the warfighter.

The DoD objective for the MRAP program is to rapidly provide protected, effective, and suitable tactical mobility to the deployed warfighter. Providing a rapid solution in less than 12 months meant that a development phase was out of the question. MRAP had to be a non-developmental item (NDI) which could be quickly produced in large quantities. MRAP’s most important and highest priority capabilities are force protection and survivability. With this heavy emphasis on protective capabilities, trades in other areas were required to ensure MRAP can provide the maximum protection possible. Transportability and off-road mobility are the primary areas affected by these trades.

MRAP Capabilities

MRAP will provide a significant increase in occupant protection from IEDs, mines and small arms fire when compared to a UAH. MRAP is designed with a series of protection mechanisms to enhance the survival and increase the mission effectiveness of its crew and passengers. These mechanisms combine geometric shape, ballistic armor, vehicle height, and injury mitigating systems to provide a superior level of protection and resiliency when compared to other vehicles. Although the MRAP provides a high degree of force protection, the vehicle occupants must still wear their personal protective equipment such as helmet, body armor, eye protection, and hearing protection to prevent the likelihood of injury.

Category I and II MRAP vehicles will have a protected turret able to traverse 360 degrees and mount crew-served weapons such as the M2 50-cal. machine gun, MK-19 grenade machine gun, and M240 medium machine gun. Some versions of category I MRAP vehicles will be equipped to mount the TOW missile system or Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System. MRAP vehicles can reach speeds of up to 65 mph on improved roads, 25 mph on secondary road and trails, and travel 300 miles on single tank of fuel. MRAP vehicles will come equipped with the Objective Gunner Protection Kit (OGPK), Drivers Vision Enhancer (DVE), Jammer, AN/VRC 92 dual long range radio system, Blue Force Tracker (BFT), vehicle intercom system, and Warrior Aid and Litter Kit (WALK).

Future improvements to MRAP are already in the works to provide enhanced survivability over those already being delivered. These improvements focus on providing the warfighter even greater protection against larger IED blasts, and the constantly evolving threats being faced in theater.

Organizational Concept

MRAP will be used by every subordinate unit in the infantry, heavy, and Stryker brigade combat teams. MRAP provides a brigade combat team with several additional capabilities:

- The brigade’s forward support companies will now have protected transport for personnel during tactical movement;
- Key leaders at brigade and battalion will have a protected command and control vehicle;
- Rifle, tank, engineer, and reconnaissance companies or troops have protected tactical mobility for the entire organization;
Field artillery batteries have a protected platform for conducting nonstandard missions; and

Medical units have a protected MEDEVAC platform to replace the unarmored HMMWV frontline ambulance.

The infantry brigade combat team probably has the greatest need for MRAP capabilities because under its modified table of organization it has the smallest number of protected vehicles. The heavy brigade combat team, depending on the tactical situation, will employ MRAP in pure formations as well as mixed formations with tanks and Bradleys. The Stryker brigade combat team has less of a need for MRAP, but will employ them in subordinate units that are not assigned Stryker vehicles. MRAP will also be used by the five types of support brigades (Fires, Aviation, Maneuver Enhancement, Sustainment, and Battlefield Surveillance) and echelons above brigade. The number of MRAP vehicles provided to a company-size element varies widely from as few as eight vehicles to as many as 27 vehicles. Table 1 is an example of recommended company-level basis of issue. Final distribution decisions will be made by HQDA in close coordination with commanders in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

### MRAP Distribution at Company Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>IBCT CAT I</th>
<th>IBCT CAT II</th>
<th>SBCT CAT I</th>
<th>SBCT CAT II</th>
<th>HBCT CAT I</th>
<th>HBCT CAT II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BFV Rifle Co</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Co</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MRAP Fielding and Its Future

The Marines have been providing MRAP vehicles to their forces in Multi-National Force-West since early summer 2007. Army units will begin seeing MRAP vehicles in the fall of 2007, and fielding will quickly intensify in early 2008. The velocity of fielding will only be limited by the theater’s ability to absorb these vehicles. The future of MRAP after the current fight is uncertain. Each service must decide if MRAP is a near term solution or necessary tool for future conflicts. Will MRAP become a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) item or a niche contingency item? Do we divest when we leave Iraq or prepare them for the next conflict? If the latter course is chosen, how does this change the services’ plans to field the joint light tactical vehicle? One thing is certain, the warfighter needs this capability now and many of the above questions can only be answered once we have operational experience with MRAP on a large scale.

Final Thoughts

As stated earlier in this article, MRAP will provide a significant increase in force protection to our deployed warfighters. This improvement should provide both leaders and Soldiers with greater levels of confidence in executing their assigned missions; but MRAP should not be viewed as a “silver bullet.” Units employing MRAPs are not indestructible or immune to casualties. The design of MRAP capitalizes on its protective capabilities, but traded other important attributes to achieve that level of protection. The enemy will observe our operations, make changes to their TTPs, and adapt to our new levels of force protection.

To quote Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview in June 2007 with InsideDefense.com: “No matter how much armor you put out there, all of this stuff at one point or another can be defeated. What we don’t want to do is make the expectation out there that we’re going to save every single individual that we put in one of these vehicles because we’re putting a cocoon around them. You simply can’t do it. There are weapons and techniques that can be used to defeat literally everything, including M1 tanks, Bradleys and the rest of it. So that’s the bottom line.”

Accordingly, leaders and Soldiers alike must make sure that this boost in confidence doesn’t become overconfidence where needless chances are taken. Units who successfully employ MRAP vehicles against the enemy will do so by integrating MRAP protection with training, planning, smart tactics, and well-rehearsed drills.

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One of the first shipments of MRAP vehicles arrive in Iraq.
While the war on terror rages, active component, Reserve and National Guard forces have found that the public is more than ever expecting them to be ready not only to battle enemies abroad but to also respond to disasters at home. From the Los Angeles riots of 15 years ago to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the San Diego wildfires in 2007, these missions are a reality — and with polls showing that the citizens hold the military as the most respected public institution in American life, our citizens’ expectations are only going to increase.

For that reason, all commanders — whether Guard, Reserve or active — must understand just how defense support to civilian authority (DSCA) missions are different from traditional combat operations — and, equally important, how they are the same. These lessons, learned over multiple operations, can help you, as a commander, meet some of the most common DSCA challenges.

Planning Considerations

The common denominator of DSCA missions is that there is no common denominator. DSCA missions can be anything. Some are predictable — hurricanes, tornados, floods and wildfires are generally seasonal. Some might provide notice, like a potential civil disturbance related to the verdict in the latest “trial of the century.” Others are completely unpredictable — an earthquake, a major terrorist attack like 9/11, or even a chemical, biological or nuclear attack. A few National Guard units are tasked with specific DSCA missions, but typically units will be called up out of the blue for short notice missions.

Soldiers with the California Army National Guard and a San Diego County sheriff’s deputy monitor wildfires near Valley Center, California, October 26.

Staff Sergeant Jim Greenhill
Therefore, unlike in most combat operations, you will have very little planning guidance. This means that your planning must focus on a few key tasks that are common to any DSCA mission. For example, during its monthly drill just 48 hours before being called up for the San Diego wildfires on October 22, 2007, the 1st Squadron, 18th Cavalry (Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition [RSTA]), including attached rear elements of the deployed 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry, held a long-scheduled DSCA tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). The 1-18 CA V had been previously assigned as the California Army National Guard’s Ready Reaction Force (RRF) for Southern California, a mission we had to prepare for in addition to all our other combat training and administrative tasks.

This time constraint on our ability to prepare for DSCA operations, as well as the variable nature of the threat — in the last two decades, California’s Guard has mobilized to fight fires and floods, react to earthquakes and to quell riots — made general command guidance with decentralized execution central to our DSCA planning. As the commander, my intent was to give company-level commanders a framework to execute their mission under any scenario, from a permissive environment with largely clear freeways and operating utilities (including cell phones) to a “Wrath of God” event where roads were impassible and communication with higher headquarters was impossible.

Accordingly, our TEWT focused on three key tasks that could be executed by the subordinate cavalry troops and infantry companies without intensive squadron oversight:

- First, mobilize the squadron’s companies, which are located from the Los Angeles area south to San Diego in 11 different armories;
- Second, prepare for and execute a movement to the affected area; and
- Third, conduct security operations in conjunction with civilian authorities upon arrival at the affected area.

Thanks to the TEWT, when the wildfire mobilization order came the following Monday, a civilian workday for most of the 1-18th CAV’s Guardsmen, subordinate leaders understood the basics of mobilizing their units. The 1-18 CAV was even able to have a unit moving to San Diego in just three hours and 51 minutes from H Hour (1300 hours), when I received notification by my brigade commander via my personal cell phone to mobilize the squadron. The RRF standard is that movement commences at H + 12 hours.

**Mobilization Issues**

The mobilization step is critical and requires constant attention from the entire chain of command to perform well. Mobilizing is difficult for the citizen-Soldiers of the National Guard and Reserve because their Soldiers are at work, on vacation, or simply out of the house. Active component commanders must also ensure that they can recall their people on short notice. Commanders must update their recall rosters every month, with reserve component leaders doing so at every drill as part their unit tactical standard operating procedures (TSOP).

While getting physical addresses and e-mail addresses is useful, emergency contact is usually going to be by phone. Most Soldiers have personal cell phones, but young Soldiers tend to change cell numbers frequently. A commander is only going to have a reasonably reliable recall roster if he or she constantly updates it. Besides telephonic recall tests — which units should run at least quarterly — another solid way for reserve leaders to validate unit recall rosters is to require that first-line leaders make direct contact with each of their subordinates during the week prior to drill. Leaving a voicemail does not meet the intent — they need to talk. This SOP also gives junior leaders a chance to make sure their Soldiers are prepared to train and have all the information they need before they show up at drill.

Of course, Soldiers will tend to lean forward — in the hours before the wildfire mobilization, the 1-18 CAV was bombarded with calls from Soldiers wanting to know if the squadron was being called up. But simply watching the news is not enough. Every Soldier should have a ready bag for emergencies containing basic necessities, such as uniforms, undergarments, boots, socks and toiletries, sufficient for a week and ready to go on short notice. Make sure your packing list, which should be part of your TSOP, includes extra Velcro nametapes and insignia as well as a soft cap. Most junior reserve component Soldiers keep their battle gear secured at their armories, but some senior leaders take theirs home. They need to keep that gear packed and ready. Some who commute always keep a ready bag in their cars’ trunks with at least a uniform and some basic gear so they are ready if an event happens nearby.
**Personnel Accountability Considerations**

When a mobilization begins, immediately start a duty log and establish a command and control (C2) cell at the unit’s headquarters with access to phones and computers. It is a good idea to have a television set turned to a news station as well to get the big picture. The C2 cell needs to begin gathering vehicle, weapon, ammunition and perhaps even chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) equipment status. Track significant events and post them on butcher paper.

Most importantly, this C2 cell will serve to track the unit’s strength as it mobilizes and to pass critical information until senior leaders arrive. It is best to develop a report SOP with higher headquarters beforehand, but regardless, your higher headquarters will probably want to know the following:

- Number of personnel assigned,
- Number of personnel present - i.e., “boots on the ground,”
- Number of personnel contacted and inbound,
- Number of personnel not contacted, and
- Number of personnel expected to mobilize.

The number of personnel expected to mobilize is tricky — you will have to count how many personnel are at military schools, serving full time on other missions, or simply out of town. Reserve component units must also exclude those who have not yet completed basic training and therefore will not be mobilized. Keep one other fact in mind — in a big enough disaster, some of your own Soldiers will be personally affected and unable to deploy immediately.

**Time Frames For Mobilization**

Mobilizing takes time. For active units and for geographically tight-knit Guard and Reserve units, it may go very quickly because most everyone lives relatively close by. But in an urban environment, the story is very different — it took the author nearly two hours to cross the Los Angeles basin during daytime traffic to reach his armory when mobilized for the wildfires. For a surprise reserve component mobilization in an urban area on a weekday, expect a bell curve of arrivals: By H+3, you will likely see about 25 percent of expected personnel arrive. From H+3 to H+6, you will rise to about 75 percent of the expected personnel on the ground. The remaining 25 percent will trickle in over the next few hours. Some will even arrive the next day — several 1-18 CAV troopers cut out-of-state trips short and flew back to Southern California to rejoin their units.

**Preparing for Deployment**

If your unit is not on a secure military post, like most reserve component armories, consider what type of security you will need. It may be simple access control, or it may be something more. For example, during the Los Angeles riots, the 3rd Battalion, 160th Infantry headquarters was located within sight of looting and fires, and armed Soldiers patrolled the perimeter.

Once they are mobilized, unit leaders need to begin intensive mission analysis and planning while Soldiers should be focused on the same tasks they would prior to a combat mission — inspections of vehicles, load out, and drawing personal gear and equipment. Your TSOP should contain vehicle load plans. At a minimum, all vehicles should have at least three days’ supply of meals ready-to-eat (MREs) on board as well as either several cases of bottled water or water cans. The implied task here is to make sure these are stockpiled at your unit before the emergency.

As before any operation, first-line leaders need to inspect and identify shortcomings in their Soldiers’ personal equipment — remember, the Soldiers likely grabbed their gear quickly before coming in. Cold weather and sleeping gear are critical — just because it is a DSCA mission does not mean that Soldiers will not be working and sleeping exposed to the elements (The author slept outside 10 out of 14 days during the San Diego wildfires). Check canteens and Camelbacks for water. Ensure Soldiers are issued anything they are missing, and make sure that everything going out of the supply room is properly signed for by the Soldier receiving it. Emergencies end, and property will have to be accounted for.

**Weapon, Ammunition, and Use of Force Issues**

Issue weapons and ammunition as needed. You will be told what weapons are authorized — usually it will be the M16/ M4 and M9 families of weapons. National Guard regulations require “locking plates,” which physically prevent M16/M4s from being set to “burst” or “auto” on each weapon deployed for DSCA. Active component forces may find themselves with the same requirement — fortunately, this is an operator-level process requiring only a screwdriver and about five minutes of...
time. Finally, because troops are carrying both weapons and ammunition, you must institute proper weapon clearing procedures. This is basic sergeants’ business — they know what is required from their combat tours, so empower them to enforce the standard.

Keep in mind that you might not have ammunition stored on site. You may need to go get it, so identify your ammo handlers and the ammo vehicle in advance. Also, make sure your subordinates understand that ammunition will be collected and accounted for to the bullet after the operation ends. Make sure they understand to keep the dunnage for turn-in as well. Finally, conduct a shake-down for privately owned weapons and commercial ammunition. For example, while California’s civilian law (like that of other states) allows an activated Soldier to carry a weapon to the armory, you cannot have your Soldiers bringing their own weapons or rounds on their missions.

Before deploying, it is absolutely vital that all Soldiers review the applicable rules of the use of force (RUF) for the mission. The RUF must be in writing and given to each Soldier. The 1-18 CAV SOP is that every Soldier carries a written copy in the left breast pocket. This is critical — a majority of Soldiers today have operated in combat zones and the rules of engagement (ROE) in battle are often very different from DSCA RUF. There are enormous legal ramifications of the use of force and of detention in DSCA scenarios. Make sure your Soldiers know what is expected of them and what their boundaries are — and if you, as the commander, are at all unclear, your duty is to seek clarification before you deploy your Soldiers. Naturally, the best way to avoid confusion is to obtain the RUF long before an emergency and train on it.

As a commander, you may have some discretion as to the “arming order.” The arming order describes whether the weapon is carried unloaded, loaded, or locked and loaded. In security operations, a loaded weapon is preferable. Experience has shown that an M16/M4 with a magazine in the well is quite intimidating, and therefore, most problems are solved before they arise. When things calm down, unloaded weapons are best; when things really calm down, collect and secure weapons and ammunition unless they are specifically required for a particular mission. Understand that much of DSCA is designed to calm the populace. Heavily armed Soldiers can give the citizenry confidence during an emergency, but after the emergency ends, heavily armed Soldiers send the wrong message. Our primary mission in DSCA is to allow the civilian authorities to reassert control — for that reason, we need to be prepared to step back when we are able to do so.

This also applies to battle gear. Our training SOP has us in our body armor and helmets most of the time, but in the wildfires operation this gave way to load-bearing gear and soft caps with weapons. Again, decentralized leadership is important. There is a time for going in heavy — in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, gang members referred to our heavily armed, flak vest-wearing infantrymen as “Ninja Turtles” but largely behaved in our presence. But in San Diego, civilian law enforcement asked us not to wear the body armor, and our own assessment of the threat supported that request. The best person to determine the uniform is the leader on the ground. Decentralize those decisions to the extent you can.

Movement and Maps
Movement to the affected area is always a challenge. In a permissive environment, use the freeways. If possible, check with the Highway Patrol or State Police to see what roads are closed. Usually, you would expect to use military maps with grid locations. However, you will probably not have military maps of the area. While the Global Positioning System (GPS) will give you grid coordinates, civilian maps are better. During the wildfire mobilization, some troopers brought and used their civilian GPS navigation devices to find their way around San Diego County.

A great option is for American Automobile Association (AAA) members to simply go to a local AAA center and request maps. AAA will give you as many as you want, and the maps are excellent. Also, Google Earth and other mapping and imagery assets on the Internet (assuming it is functioning) can be extremely helpful. Naturally, use your TSOP to prepare for and conduct the movement — give briefings and conduct rehearsals as with any combat zone movement.

Communications
Communications is one area where military procedures are simply unsatisfactory. In most environments, you should simply forgo military radios for long distance communications. They are good for short distance coordination, but cell phones are so superior that attempting to use military radios to control operations over a large area is a waste. Many tactical radios simply will not work in an urban environment even with a signal unit in support. Civilian radios, particularly law enforcement radios, systems using permanent repeater stations are extremely useful, but there will probably not be enough of these radios to go around. But usually just about everyone will have a cell phone, even if it is privately owned.

Using cell phones is not doctrine, and they cost money. You may experience considerable pressure to try and make tactical radios the key communications method. However, there simply is no comparison in terms of efficiency, range, quality, and speed. The wildfire mission was conducted almost entirely by cell phones, with the only problems being most of them were privately-owned until the National Guard issued several hundred a few days into the operation.

Cell phones do have vulnerabilities. The system can become overtaxed by users or even physically destroyed in a major catastrophe. Cell phones are also not secure. Still, bring your radios, but plan on using cell phones if possible. Of course, remember to bring both car and plug-in power rechargers.

Vehicle Support
Repair, maintenance, and refueling operations should be by doctrine with a few twists. Mobilizations tend to start out being mostly “tooth” — you may find it takes some time for someone to remember that the teeth need their tail and mobilize support elements as well. Push contact teams to the subordinate units early and try to set up maintenance operations in a favorable location close to major roads. Ideally, you can locate in a Guard or Reserve maintenance center and use those facilities. Civilian agency facilities may also offer you space — you might find November-December 2007 INFANTRY 23
yourself fixing HMMWVs next to sheriff’s mechanics fixing squad cars. Even civilian companies might offer you the use of their facilities — just make sure you do not end up obligating the government to pay for their services.

Fuel is a key issue. Start by always having your vehicles topped off before they go into your motor pool. If you have a fueler, make sure it is kept full — and make sure you have certified fuel handlers. Bring your environmental equipment as well — emergencies end and you do not want to have to answer for an unattended spill. Fuel is also available from civilian sources if you have fuel credit cards. Be sure to call the finance people to ensure they remove any routine spending ceiling on your cards while operations are underway. Civilian agencies may also let you take fuel from their motor pools. Of course, in a serious emergency, or one when the power is out, expect not to be able to pump fuel from underground tanks.

**Command and Control**

Command and control in a DSCA operation is always a challenge. Remember, your higher headquarters is mobilizing just like you are and they are experiencing the same challenges you are facing, so expect some element of chaos and a certain lack of clear guidance. The best solution is, of course, preparation. At a minimum, the entire chain of command should be using compatible TSOPs, and TEWTs are a proven method of validating DSCA procedures. Establish the proper battle rhythm before H hour and stick to it.

At the company level, focus on mobilizing, moving and preparing for operations. At the battalion level, focus on preparing a very general DSCA operations order (OPORD) and then using fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to provide details and specific guidance. During the wildfires, the 1-18 CAV used a basic DSCA OPORD and then used FRAGOs throughout. Most of them were vocal and were captured in the duty log at the main command post (CP). The command post structure should generally be by doctrine as modified by the situation. During the wildfire mission, 1-18 CAV was assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) in northeastern San Diego County and operated a field trains command post (FTCP) collocated with the joint task force headquarters at the 40th Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s (IBCT) home armory in central San Diego. This allowed for our FTCP to also act as a liaison to our higher headquarters.

Our main CP was collocated with our combat trains command post (CTCP) 35 miles north in Escondido at B Troop’s home armory, which was central to the squadron’s forces for most of the operation. The tactical CP (TAC), consisting of the commander, the command sergeant major and representatives of the squadron S3 cell, was a government van that traveled from unit to unit interfacing with company commanders and civilian authorities while keeping in contact using cell phones.

The CPs all used AAA maps with military operational terms and graphics overlays. The battle boards were almost identical to those the squadron used in a recent warfighter exercise. The mobile TAC further allowed the command team to operate with eyes on the objective and give clear guidance to subordinate commanders while passing information to and receiving information from the main CP — just like in combat.

The lesson here is that military C2 procedures, with a few minor tweaks, work in DSCA operations — do not try to reinvent the wheel in the middle of a crisis.

**Working with Civilian Authorities**

Interface with civilian authorities is generally supposed to come at very senior levels, but it actually occurs at every level. Whether it is a fire team leader being asked for help by a deputy sheriff or a senior Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) official asking a National Guard general for assistance, you need to be ready to work with the civilian authorities. Understanding the challenges of working with civilian authorities is the first step to overcoming them.

Missions coming to you from higher often suffer from the “telephone game” effect — much like in that children’s game,
Critically, as 1-18 CA V’s S3, Major James Westerfield, observed in high intensity combat — is to shoot center mass, often, they will ask for military terms and procedures any better than we understand theirs. Then requested or the support was no longer needed at all. Then what we had been told to provide — either it was much less on the scene wanted from the military was very much different what he or she really wanted. Almost inevitably, what the requestor on the scene wanted from the military was very much different then what we had been told to provide — either it was much less then requested or the support was no longer needed at all.

Keep in mind that civilian authorities often do not understand military terms and procedures any better than we understand theirs. Often, they will ask for numbers of Soldiers — “I need two Soldiers to guard a post office” — but not understand that this is really a task that takes more personnel, as two Soldiers cannot work indefinitely without relief, support, or leadership. They might also use similar terms that mean entirely different things. For example, a police “squad” is not nine Soldiers — it is two police officers in a squad car. The solution is the push for requests by task with specific time periods — “I need the post office guarded for 48 hours.” This makes it much simpler for military leaders to properly analyze the mission and assign resources.

Do not hesitate to advise civilian authorities on military capabilities and limitations, especially in security situations. Keep in mind that while the police are a paramilitary organization, they are very different from Soldiers in terms of training, tactics, equipment and, most critically, outlook. With the exception of military police, who receive special training and gear, Soldiers are trained to destroy the enemy. They carry high-powered rifles, not the pistols, batons, handcuffs, tasers and pepper sprays of a police officer. While the RUF may require shooting to wound, Soldiers’ training — often honed in high intensity combat — is to shoot center mass, i.e. to kill.

During the wildfire mobilization, police officers are trained to de-escalate violence in order to prevail, while Soldiers are trained to escalate violence to defeat the threat. This is not to say Soldiers cannot perform security missions in a DSCA context; it is to say that you must use care in employing them to do so. Also, be prepared to consult with a Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer if requested to do a purely law enforcement mission. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal military forces from performing law enforcement functions except in certain circumstances.

Many of these challenges can be overcome with prior coordination between military and civilian authorities. However, this pre-emergency contact is often limited to either strategic interface involving very senior military personnel or tactical interface with specialized units, like the civil support teams (CSTs). Unfortunately, this means that the first time most Army leaders work with civilian officials — and vice versa — is when the emergency is already underway. The Army should support DSCA collective training involving civilian authorities, including TEWTs, field exercises and command post exercises. At unit level — at least for units most likely to be deployed. While it is difficult for already overburdened active and reserve component units to add DSCA training to their already long list of required training, the alternative is even worse.

Conclusion

DSCA missions are here to stay. American citizens respect and honor their military and those who serve in it, and they are increasingly looking to their service members to protect them at home when disaster strikes. It was not the performance of the military after Hurricane Katrina that caused the political outcry that followed — it was the perception that the military was not sent in early enough. Our Nation is counting on us, whether active, Reserve or National Guard, to be ready to respond when the next disaster strikes. By using the doctrine we have validated at war, as modified by our experiences here at home and by common sense, we can be ready to answer that call the next time it comes. And the one thing that we know for certain is that it will come.

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A s a military transition team (MiTT) chief during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) IV, I was primarily responsible for my 13-man team, my battalion’s Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) partnership, and the Iraqi Army (IA) battalion which I was tasked to train. Demands between the three entities competed daily, with the IA receiving the majority of my personal attention. As an advisor to the IA, I spent most of my time improving one aspect of their operations — the targeting and operations planning process.

Though the process I developed was not doctrinally based, a few indicators suggest that it was effective. First, after four months, the Iraqis demonstrated a higher level of tactical proficiency at the company level. Second, their battalion staff displayed improved staff planning and management. Third, synchronization between IA and Coalition force (CF) operations increased. Finally, the IA executed the process with minimal oversight and showed signs of internalizing it.

I did not expect to serve as a MiTT chief when I signed into the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (TF 1-187 IN) in May 2005. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Randy George, our battalion was a part of Colonel Michael Steele’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). I was initially assigned to the operations section (S3), and, as the S3 Air, I was responsible for the battalion’s maneuver training and air operations. My primary responsibility in the four months between my assignment to the battalion and its deployment was to plan and resource pre-deployment training at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and in Kuwait.

In addition to this responsibility, I was tasked in July to attend the BCT’s seven-day MiTT training program as my battalion’s MiTT operations officer. The purpose of the MiTT train-up was to identify potential trainers; introduce them to their new responsibilities; and familiarize them with Iraq, the Muslim culture, and working with an indigenous population. I attended this week of training because we were short on captains, and the individual who was supposed to be tasked for this job had not yet arrived at the battalion.

When the division tasked each of the battalions to officially stand up organic MiTT teams in August 2005, we still hadn’t received this captain, and LTC George assigned me and seven others (with three more volunteered from the BCT) to man our team. Each team was task organized to have a field grade officer in command, and our battalion executive officer (XO) was designated as our MiTT team chief. When TF 1-187 IN deployed in September to support OIF IV, our MiTT — after spending a week of transition in Kuwait — flew north to attend MiTT training in Taji, Iraq.

While we were sitting through a week of classroom discussion, the rest of the battalion began trickling into our new AO, which straddled Highway 1 in the Sallah Ah Din Province of Iraq. Located north of the provincial capital of Tikrit, our AO encompassed the city of Bayji at its heart. Though our predecessor did well in securing the Bayji area, part of our battalion’s mission was to improve that security by bolstering the ISF in the region. For the next year, our AO did not change, though the number and type of security forces — both CF and Iraqi — would regularly.

The city of Bayji sat in the heart of our sector and east of our forward operating base and was viewed as a major hub in the Sallah Ah Din province because of a major highway intersection that connected Mosul to Baghdad and Kirkuk to Haditha. Further, it was home to a major oil refinery.

Our leadership also viewed the villages of Siniyah and Siliyah as a concern. Located along the FOB’s eastern barrier, these villages still housed a considerable number of prominent military and government officials with ties to the Ba’ath Party. Given these populaces, our
predecessors estimated 10 prominent insurgent cells operating in the area with several others having operational and financial ties with Al Qaeda in Iraq. Improvised explosive device (IED) makers and local thugs represented most cells, and CF regularly sustained casualties. In early October 2005, TF 1-187 IN assumed responsibility for this area and designated it AO LEADER.

In the opening months of our year in AO LEADER, various mechanized infantry, artillery, and Special Forces units supported our battalion during the tail end of their respective tours. Limited ISF forces, consisting of an IA company, a joint coordination cell (JCC), and five strategic infrastructure battalions (SIBs), also supported our battalion at different levels of proficiency. Both the IA company and JCC were stationed on our FOB, while each of the SIBs conducted security operations from outposts located throughout our AO.

In December 2005, we lost our artillery support, switched Special Forces units, and gained two additional units on the FOB: our BCT’s reconnaissance and surveillance target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and our parent BCT headquarters. Both units proved valuable to us; the RSTA squadron almost halved the size of our AO by assuming responsibility of the desolate, unoccupied northern half of AO LEADER, and our BCT was more apt to provide us assets, such as money and personnel because it saw a firsthand account of the conditions in which we were operating. Despite the addition of our BCT headquarters, TF 1-187 IN saw no immediate increase concerning the number of ISF operating
in AO LEADER. This remained the case until February, when the 4th Battalion of the 2nd Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division (4/2/4 IA) moved to our FOB and began conducting operations in AO LEADER.

Known as the “Lion” Battalion, 4/2/4 IA had a typical Iraqi task organization of four rifle infantry companies (with three line platoons each) and a headquarters and service company (HSC), consisting of a command section, battalion staff, communications section, medical platoon, distribution platoon, security platoon, maintenance platoon, and scout platoon. During their time in Kirkuk, the battalion was typically manned at 100 percent of its authorized strength of 765 soldiers and officers.

Since its inception in January 2005, 4/2/4 IA never operated as a typical infantry battalion. Indicative of this fact was the battalion’s use of its companies. An Iraqi HSC is supposed to provide service and support for the battalion’s maneuver companies; instead, 4/2/4 IA HSC conducted most of the battalion’s combat patrols. The four line companies predominantly conducted security operations at tactical checkpoints (TCPs) in and around Kirkuk. If the battalion commander needed a high value target detained or search conducted, he tasked HSC to conduct the mission. This common operating procedure degraded the battalion’s tactical proficiency and hindered its maneuver companies’ effectiveness.

As a result, the companies lacked experience in conducting even the most basic maneuver tasks, to include conducting cordons and searches, cordons and attacks, and raids. Further, 4/2/4 IA did not conduct independent operations, so its staff’s ability to autonomously plan its own missions suffered. As a result, a part of LTC George’s initial guidance to me was to improve the battalion’s tactical proficiency and staff planning.

Contributing to these weaknesses in unit proficiency and staff planning was the fact that in just 13 months of existence, the battalion was already partnered with its third CF battalion and third MiTT. Each team varied operating procedures and provided different guidance and intent, resulting in adjustment periods lasting anywhere from a month to three months. Consequently, the conflicting operating procedures either slowed or disrupted the battalion’s ability to develop a sound battle rhythm supported by clear and unambiguous guidance.

In addition to these factors, another critical event contributed to the battalion’s substandard tactical proficiency. The IA battalion lost almost half of its soldiers due to desertion the month prior to moving to Bayji, reporting over 765 soldiers in January and only 450 in February. This exodus (predominantly caused by soldiers’ desires to stay close to home and protect their families) forced the battalion to reorganize and ultimately cost it a maneuver company and several HSC platoons. This exodus also played a critical part in tearing apart once-cohesive teams. Not only did it degrade the battalion’s proficiency, but it also cut the battalion’s ability to conduct operations by over 25 percent.

Given reports detailing the battalion’s mediocrity in maneuver operations, 4/2/4 IA was tasked organized under LTC George’s command to support his task force’s operations when the TF moved to Bayji in February 2006. When the battalion finally occupied the FOB, it was inexperienced in fundamental maneuver tasks, ineffective in staff planning, and crippled by a major soldier exodus. To improve these weaknesses, LTC George formed a robust partnership that extended past the typical 11-man MiTT team.

Though most battalions stood up MiTTs that exclusively partnered and assumed full responsibility for their assigned IA battalion, LTC George partnered with 4/2/4 IA differently. The true initiative in LTC George’s partnership was the degree in which his staff and companies partnered with their 4/2/4 IA counterparts. Unlike most battalions, TF 1-187 IN’s staff and companies were partnered one-to-one with an IA staff section or company and were responsible for their training, operations and administrative issues. The partnership ultimately yielded exceptional results in terms of increasing 4/2/4 IA’s tactical proficiency at the platoon and company levels and staff planning, particularly in the communications and operations sections.

Given this unique support, I set to accomplish LTC George’s primary training objectives for the 4/2/4 IA: increase tactical proficiency, develop staff planning, and synchronize CF/IA operations. To accomplish these tasks, I divided the MiTT into four cells: command and control (C2), training, partnership, and joint TOC cell.

My team sergeant and I were the C2 cell and developed a typical commander/first sergeant relationship that established a command climate, maintained property books and infrastructure, coached and guided our subordinates, and ensured mission completion. My team sergeant also headed the training cell, which consisted of two other NCOs — our Intelligence NCO and team medic. Between the three of them, they headed two five-day training...
courses aimed at developing junior leadership fundamentals and medical training, respectively. In total, they planned, resourced, and instructed 10 courses that certified more than 100 Iraqi soldiers in six months.

Each of these NCOs was also a member of the partnership cell with the remainder of the team, minus the joint tactical operations center (TOC) cell. Each partnership cell team member paired with an Iraqi counterpart on the 4/2/4 IA staff or in HSC (medical and communication platoons). Partnership cell members conducted their duties daily and focused their efforts on individual training, mentorship, and counseling. The last cell on my team was dedicated to running (in unison with the Iraqis) the joint TOC in the 4/2/4 IA command building. Consisting of two NCOs and four Soldiers, this cell supervised TOC operations, coached their staff duty, and directly liaised between TF 1-187 IN and 4/2/4 IA.

Working with the IA and developing their targeting and operations process was not my only task. I primarily dedicated my time satisfying three entities’ demands: my MiTT team, my battalion (working with my commander, XO and S3) and the 4/2/4 IA battalion (through their commander, XO and S3). Further, I also acted as a point of contact for the BCT ISF cell, TF 1-187 IN company commanders, their fire support officers (who were tasked to liaise between CF and IA commanders), and the IA company commanders and staff.

Given the number of entities and partnerships, lines of communication were at times mixed and complicated affairs when it came time to issue guidance, orders, and intent. For example, LTC George often met with the 4/2/4 IA commander, provided him purpose and intent and then proceeded about his business elsewhere. In some cases, I was not present for his meeting and (at a later time) gave the 4/2/4 IA commander conflicting guidance. Considering the number of partnerships and training and operations between companies, it was simple for guidance to conflict and made daily and weekly synchronization between TF 1-187 IN, the MiTT and 4/2/4 IA imperative.

Each of my lines of communication carried with it a particular set of duties. Though some of the relationships required additional tasks, Figure 1 outlines basic tasks that typically followed each line. My first responsibility was to my MiTT team. As its chief, I assumed the role of leader and commander. Unlike a company command, however, I assumed the additional tasks of directing my subordinates’ training and partnership priorities and guiding their day-to-day activities.

To simplify the demands of synchronizing the plans of nine subordinates across three lines of activity — training, partnership, and Joint TOC — I developed two synchronization meetings. The first meeting was conducted daily with every team member and served as a team update and coordination forum where I readjusted priorities, as necessary. I held the second meeting weekly with each training and partnership cell team member to refine his training plan for the following week. Though only consuming an hour and a half of the day, these two forums served as the cornerstone of my efforts to develop 4/2/4 IA staff planning and further synchronized both battalion staffs’ efforts.

My next major priority was to my parent battalion and the TF 1-187 IN primaries. The primaries included LTC George and my battalion XO and S3. Though I worked directly for LTC George, I received daily guidance and counsel from the other TF 1-187 IN field grade officers. Given their personal natures and duty responsibilities, all three men took interest in every facet of 4/2/4 IA. Consequently, I met with each of them at the beginning of the day. Further, I fed their information needs by developing and publishing a daily situation report that highlighted the previous day’s IA operations, significant intelligence collected, meetings, rumors, and administrative and logistical status changes.

Through these meetings and situation reports, I was able to receive guidance, report significant activities, and advise my superiors on the status of 4/2/4 IA. Given that each of them was also partnered with an IA counterpart but did not meet with them as much as I did, I liaised between the CF-IA partners to ensure that guidance was passed in a timely fashion. In total, I dedicated three or four hours at the beginning of each day satisfying this requirement, but it was imperative in synchronizing CF-IA operations.

My final primary responsibility was to the 4/2/4 IA commander, XO, and S3. As mentioned, I often acted as an extension of my battalion leadership’s partnerships with these three officers. As such, I met with each of them on a daily basis (leave cycles aside) and focused my efforts on teaching them U.S. Army tactics and techniques, coaching them through their duties, and mentoring them as much as a junior captain could be expected to mentor an IA colonel and two lieutenant colonels.

Meetings with the IA commander focused on passing guidance from LTC George, collecting information on the IA battalion’s issues, and advising his actions. An educated man from Kurdistan, the battalion commander was agreeable and knew maneuver tactics. On occasion, I

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planned and taught him classes on staff techniques and planning considerations, but his proficiency as a commander limited the need for too many blocks of instruction. Most time spent with him focused on handling internal soldier issues, enemy actions, and the local government’s demands.

When I was with the IA XO and S3, I focused most of my efforts in practical applications aimed at developing staff techniques. The IA XO was the strongest officer in the battalion and had been in the battalion since its inception. He was experienced, and the soldiers and officers respected him and carried out his orders without question. The most I offered him was counsel and peace of mind from time to time. My relationship with the IA S3 was quite different, however.

The IA S3 was in Iraq’s army for over two decades and relied on extensive combat experience from the Iraq-Iran War to guide his staff planning and mission preparation. With this experience under his belt, he confidently performed his duties but was less open to improving them through western ideology. Given his mentality and his part in the battalion’s primary deficiency — tactical proficiency — I dedicated most of my partnership time developing his targeting and operations systems with the hope that it could increase the battalion’s ability to conduct tactical operations at the platoon and company levels.

It took a month or two of assessment and trial and error, but in April 2006, I determined that the best way to most directly influence the IA S3 and his battalion’s poor tactical proficiency was to develop their targeting and operations systems. My ultimate goal was to develop a system that would accomplish the three tenets of LTC George’s intent. To accomplish these goals, I focused on improving four areas: IA S2 and S3 intelligence sharing, target selection, patrol schedule development, and debriefings. Each of these areas included the IA S3 at its epicenter and, subsequently, ensured our daily interaction.

The first area that I set to develop was IA S2–S3 intelligence sharing. In our doctrine, the intelligence officer is the battalion’s primary information collector and analyzer and, as such, identifies and predicts threat courses of action. After the S2 develops these courses of action, he briefs them to the S3 who, after comparing them, develops friendly courses of action for the commander’s approval. From what I observed of the IA S2 in the opening months of our partnership, he operated along different lines. Contrary to our procedures, he hoarded information, sharing it only with the battalion commander to gain his approval. He then executed the mission himself with only a small band of trusted soldiers from around the battalion. Though his technique occasionally provided results and decreased the likeliness of intelligence breaches, his actions made it impossible for subordinate units to plan and conduct operations and develop their tactics.

To improve upon this procedure, I sought to increase intelligence sharing between the IA S2 and S3 by conducting a weekly targeting meeting between the three of us on Wednesdays. This allowed me to use information from TF 1-187 IN’s Tuesday targeting meeting to guide the Iraqis; further, 4/2/4 IA conducted leave operations on Mondays, so Wednesday meetings allowed the officers a reintegration day as well as almost two full weeks to refine the targeting process. This meeting forced the S2 to share information with the S3 (to some degree) and provided the S3 a set of targets to begin planning against. Prior to the meeting, the S2 brought his list of potential targets, while the S3 brought the battalion’s next patrol schedule. Initially, the IA S2 relied on TF 1-187 IN’s target lists and was reluctant to share the names with the S3. Though it took over two months, the meeting forced the S2 to “open up,” and he consistently reported to the meeting with a target list that correlated with insurgent trends and matched TF 1-187 IN intelligence collection efforts.

The IA S2 opened the meeting by briefing the latest threat estimate and its relevance on our AO and continued to recommend potential targets and the effect he wanted to have on them. Given his input, the S3 then decided what unit could best detect and deliver that effect. Despite differences in leave schedules (both primaries typically attended the meeting twice per month) and an Iraqi tendency to withhold information, the meeting met my intent of information sharing after the first couple of months. By the end of this meeting, the S3 usually held a legitimate list of targets in his hand and briefed his commander immediately afterward.

After the commander approved the target list, the IA S3 and I met daily for the next week to plan each mission. We met in the evenings, and our planning sessions covered the following agenda: assess previous operations (last 24 to 48 hours), confirm previously planned operations (within next 12 hours), and plan future operations (next 24 to 48 hours). Through this process, I sought to maintain visibility on the IA battalion’s independent operations, de-conflict those operations with the joint patrols they were conducting with TF 1-187 IN and coach my IA S3 counterpart in his staff duties. To assist the process, I developed an operations debrief board. During the initial operations meeting (24 hours prior), I used it as a visual aid to facilitate my ability to convey my intent. If a second planning meeting occurred prior to the mission, I used it as a pre-combat planning checklist.

During either meeting, the planning board allowed me to verify that the IA S3 planned and understood all pertinent information — targets, unit task organization, concept of operations, scheme of maneuver, etc. It also facilitated the IA S3’s learning when it came to developing information operations (IO) themes and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Further, it emphasized the need to identify the unit’s reserve, route and quick reaction force (QRF), as well as communications, medical evacuation, and detainee plans.

After the mission was conducted, I made minor alterations to the planning board and used it as a collection tool to consolidate all operational debriefs. To inform TF 1-187 IN of the IA battalion’s operations, I included a copy of the debrief board in the following day’s situation report. The operational debrief, though unfamiliar to the Iraqis, was a critical step in developing their targeting process because it provided them their first opportunity to assess operations in a continual forum. It also facilitated information sharing, reinforced reporting channels and fashioned an after action review (AAR) system. On a weekly basis, I continued to develop and refine the targeting and operation planning cycle.

The weekly targeting and daily operations meetings continued for the next four months and, as the IA S2 and S3 became more comfortable with the process, my input level and supervision tapered off. Though they still needed intermittent prodding, both officers gradually increased information sharing and staff
production. This trend was demonstrated in the staff’s ability to plan more operations and manage more information. Not surprisingly, the IA companies benefited. Because they conducted the majority of combat operations (as opposed to the S2 officer himself), all three companies gained experience and improved their platoon-level tactics. On average, the number of combat operations steadily increased from two-per-day in February to over six-per-day in July. Further, the improved staff planning resulted in a more synchronized Iraqi staff whose increased functionality correlated with a higher number of potential insurgents detained as well as fewer false detentions. Finally, planning and debriefing boards — in conjunction with daily synchronization meetings — facilitated a higher level of continuous cross-talk between the battalions that synchronized both units’ tactical operations.

By focusing on the targeting and operations planning systems, I was able to accomplish a few things. First, I observed the S2 and S3 interaction and was able to more accurately determine whether they were doing their jobs and talking to one another. Second, I could judge whether their information was legitimate and courses of action feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, suitable, and complete. Third, I could AAR their previous actions and ultimately use their information to update TF 1-187 IN. Overall, I felt that I was in the right position to affect IA operations and synchronize them with TF 1-187 IN. As a result, two battalions independently planned and executed operations in the same small area with minimal conflicts of interest and mitigated operational risks.

Though hindered by leave plans, language barriers, and cultural differences, this targeting method improved Iraqi operations. But, it was time and personality intensive. Most of my day was spent preparing, briefing, or reviewing the information required to make this process successful. From discussing options with the IA S3 through an interpreter, to drafting the operational brief on PowerPoint to briefing LTC George on IA operations, I spent the majority of my day making this process functional. Not surprisingly, other aspects of my job suffered. The amount of time required to make this process successful stressed me to the point that my effectiveness as a MiTT chief decreased because I lacked the time and energy to dedicate to other duties — supervising IA combat patrols, facilitating logistics and sustainment procurement, etc.

If all things were equal and I was given the same mission today, I would dedicate the same energy to the same priority with one fundamental exception — I would involve at least one more team member to this process to ensure that it was taught and executed accordingly. Of all things, it would give me more time to focus on other areas of command while providing the same beneficial structure to the Iraqis. Additionally, it would strengthen that subordinate’s professional development and fight against the monotony brought by working with the same person daily.

In retrospect, my time in Iraq and experience with 4/2/4 IA opened my eyes to the amount of work required to stand up a legitimate fighting force at the battalion level, much less any higher. The 4/2/4 IA Battalion was at such a low stage of tactical readiness that it was impractical to expect TF 1-187 IN and a MiTT to leave them fully trained and capable of conducting independent operations after a seven month partnership. As a result, LTC George did what he could and dedicated a few well-placed men and resources to a few key causes — among them, targeting and operations development. Whatever the practicality, however, primarily focusing on a few operational aspects will never be enough. Anyone tasked with a transition team mission will ultimately need to develop their partnered unit’s combat support and combat service support fundamentals in order to stand up any indigenous force capable of taking over a host nation’s security mission. When I left Iraq in September 2006, the IA was not capable of consistently providing these fundamentals down to the battalion level. And, until these fundamentals are provided, CF and MiTT time and energy — at every level — will be needed.

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The 1968 Tet offensive by Vietnamese communist forces began January 30 and 31 in the two northernmost corps tactical zones (CTZ) (Map 1) and quickly spread south, eventually giving rise to combat — much of it in towns and cities — throughout the country. The communists’ Supreme Command had intended the offensive to be a coordinated surprise attack across the length of Vietnam, but failed to realize that North Vietnam had established a date one day earlier for the start of the lunar new year than the date for South Vietnam, and hence their commanders commenced operations a day apart. The attacks began in the northern CTZs on the 30th and a day later in the south. The delay meant that the hoped-for element of complete surprise was lost, and as a result South Vietnamese, American, and allied units in country had at least some advance warning of the offensive. Despite early gains by the enemy, by June 1968 — the month I reported for duty — the Tet offensive had stalled and the stubborn resistance of South Vietnamese Army units and their allies was turning the tide. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA) exceeded 200,000 by the end of the year, with an unknown but presumably far greater number of wounded. U.S. casualties for 1968 amounted to approximately 14,600 KIA and 87,400 WIA, while South Vietnamese losses were around 29,000 KIA and 172,500 WIA.

The Republic of Vietnam units opposing the communists included those of the Vietnamese regular army (ARVN), regional force (RF) civil guard companies, and popular force (PF) self defense platoons. Americans colloquially referred to the latter two paramilitary organizations as RF/PFs, or rough puffs. While regular army units were centrally organized, trained, and controlled, RF rifle companies — numbering around 100 soldiers commanded by a first lieutenant or captain — were recruited and organized within a province, were part of a provincial battalion, and operated within that province at the direction of the province chief, who was usually a Vietnamese colonel. I was assigned as the assistant district advisor to Thuan Hoa district, Ba Xuyen province, IV CTZ (Map 2). The district headquarters village that housed the six members of Advisory Team 73 was the home base to the 566th and 567th RF companies. The popular force platoons were locally recruited volunteers responsible for village and hamlet security, were the least trained and equipped of the three army echelons, and numbered from 25-35 soldiers. By the fall of 1968 most ARVN infantry units were armed with M-16 rifles, while RF companies carried World War II and Korean War vintage weapons. My two RF companies’ heaviest weapons were their .30 caliber Browning Model 1919A4 air-cooled machine guns and M-29 81mm mortars, which were used mainly for defense of the district headquarters and
were seldom carried on operations. Platoons counted on their .30 caliber Model 1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifles and M-19 60mm mortars for firepower. The rank and file of the companies used either .30 caliber M1 Garand rifles or M1 carbines and a mix of .45 caliber M1A1 Thompson, .45 caliber M3, and .45 caliber submachine guns, and M1911A1 pistols. The PF self defense platoons were armed mostly with .30 caliber M1 and M2 carbines. There were, however, some exceptions: the district chief’s bodyguard squad carried AK-47 Kalashnikovs because of their lower recoil and 30-round magazine capacity, something that struck me as odd since the chief rarely went on operations, preferring instead to coordinate operations from his quarters. We had three different district chiefs during my one-year tour. Since we captured large quantities of Chinese-made ammunition from the VC, resupply for the Kalashnikovs was never a problem.

The Vietcong likewise had three echelons, somewhat analogous to the structure of ARVN infantry forces. The best equipped and trained were referred to as main force VC units and operated at up to battalion level under direction of the southern communist leadership. As time passed, VC in our district were augmented by veterans/survivors of the Tet offensive. These had some assault rifles and got more as the war progressed, but also had many of the same weapons as our RF soldiers. Since they had U.S. World War II vintage rifles, their ammunition resupply was a problem which got progressively worse as time went on, until enough Kalashnikovs and ammunition became available to give them first firepower parity, and later superiority, over RF units. By January of 1969 they were better armed, with Kalashnikov assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars.

The next lower echelon consisted of the full-time guerillas in company-sized units who operated at the direction of province communist leaders. The lowest priority among the VC were the squads and platoons operating at village level, whose main weapon in our district was the Model 98 Mauser bolt-action rifle carried by German infantry in World War II. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union had captured vast numbers of Mausers and commensurate amounts of ammunition, which they exported to communist insurgencies around the world during the Cold War. The 7.92 x 57mm Mauser — usually referred to as the 8mm Mauser — fired a heavier bullet at a greater muzzle velocity than the .30/06 M1 Garand, and was a weapon to be reckoned with in the broad, flat expanses of the Mekong Delta where they could deliver reliably accurate fire — albeit at a slow rate — out to 400 yards and beyond. I was surprised to see that the ammunition the VC were using bore pre-World War II German head stamps. That 30-year-old small arms ammo was the standard Berdan-primed stuff with the corrosive primers in use throughout the war, and was utterly reliable. Although these sporadic aimed shots were sometimes attributed to snipers, we never found any indications that true snipers were being employed against us at district level. A single VC sitting alone under a bush, firing an occasional shot at advisors far away across rice paddies, is not necessarily a sniper.

Advisory Team 73 usually participated in two operations per week, most lasting a day, with occasional overnight ambush patrols targeting VC tax collectors and infrastructure, or to cordon off a hamlet for a pre-dawn raid. Because of the knee-deep mud prevalent in the Mekong delta we traveled light (see photo), carrying an M-16 with six magazines or an M-79 grenade launcher with 20 rounds, two canteens, steel pot, wound dressings, and at least one M-72 light antitank weapon (LAW) per man. A Vietnamese radio/telephone operator (RTO) carried our AN/PRC-25 (later the AN/PRC-77) FM tactical radio with four different colored smoke grenades attached to the back with heavy rubber bands. The RF company commander selected the RTOs and made sure they understood that they were to stick with the advisor no matter what. And they did. Tough, courageous and confident, they were always there when I needed that radio. Oddly, the only weapon I ever saw an RTO carry was the .45 pistol.

With this brief outline of the war as of June 1968 and the friendly and enemy force structure and weaponry in Thuan Hoa district, I now want to offer insights into the role, challenges, and limitations faced by an infantry advisor during that time. Some of these are still as relevant to members of today’s military transition teams as they were to me four decades ago, and reflect T.E. Lawrence’s advice based on his experience with Arab warriors during the First World War.
Saving Face — Theirs, Not Yours

This can make or break your relationship with your counterpart or with those you are trying to train. We possess skills that they may not, we have access to things they cannot get, and they know it and do not need to be reminded of these advantages. The trick is to assist the host nation chain of command in such a way that you strengthen their authority without appearing condescending or in charge. Nowhere is saving face more important than in Asia, and instructors stressed this in the Military Assistance Training Advisor Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, prior to deployment. My counterpart, Trung-Uy (1LT) Hiep had been leading troops in combat while I was still in high school and college, and had his tactics down pretty well. He would, however, accept suggestions when we were one-on-one and then gather his platoon leaders and NCOs and present them as his own. One-on-one I also learned a great deal from him, and we built a good working relationship within my first two months in country.

Support Your Counterpart

Command is not an elected office, and your counterpart will not always have the total support of those he commands. If you support him and defer to him when it comes to running the unit, you will earn his respect and that of his subordinates. At first I had junior officers asking me to intercede with the company commander on everything from leave requests, to the order of march for the next day’s operation, to close air support. Stay above unit politics; if you carry every complaint to the commander, you’ll be just another whiner and he’ll tune you out. You only get one silver bullet; use it wisely. You will, however, hear and observe things that worry you and you will have to weigh them carefully, prioritize them, and be very careful about what you carry to him. Remember, approach him only with those matters that you are concerned about. Do not forget that it is better to have him do something 80 percent right than for you to force a zero defects standard on him. Sure, you may be able to achieve the latter by applying pressure through your and his chains of command, but the price of your success will be the loss of his support and your own credibility. His men will know something different has happened; they will soon figure out what you’re up to and rally to him — a fellow countryman — leaving you the odd man out.

They’re Watching You

As one of a half-dozen Americans in our entire district, I soon became acutely aware that we were objects of curiosity. Being more open and less uninhibited, children sought to touch us, our uniforms, our weapons, our vehicles, and our equipment. Even without knowing much — if any — English, they would sit around and listen to us talk simply because we were new in town and represented a diversion. Older youth and adults would tend to hang back and watch us, but for the first six months we were pretty much in the spotlight. They knew our every move. Our interpreter kept us informed as to what was being said about us in the market place, and this gave us a pretty fair idea of the locals’ attitudes toward the advisors. One point: never, ever assume that no one understands what you are saying. Months or years of hard work can be swept away and relationships soured because of a careless remark by an advisor or a member of his team. The locals will know if you’re the team chief and assume that your team members’ words reflect your own feelings. This is one case in which every member of the team must know and support to the ground rules, whether he agrees with them or not. In Thuan Hoa district we had to replace a key member of our team because of a comment made in the team house about the courage of one of our rifle company commanders, and which was overheard by one of the district chief’s bodyguards. The bodyguard was probably the last guy we’d expect to understand English, but the damage was done nevertheless. Remember, a person’s passive language...
They Know the Enemy

When I was advising in a counterinsurgency that had been running for the better part of two decades, I was dealing with counterparts who knew — and were known by — the local Vietcong. They were enemies, but — given the intermarriage and social bonds within the village — most villagers had grown up together and later gone separate ways. A number of the older villagers had fought with the Vietminh against the French, and their sons had followed the same political ideology. We had pretty good intelligence about who had sons with the VC and who was in turn feeding them intelligence on our activities. I learned to be a good listener, and you should do the same. Everyone has a story to tell, and there’s good information in the chaff if you take the time to sift through it. This will mean spending a lot of time with your interpreter, and that raises another point: be patient with him. If he’s in the middle of a translation, let him do his job. Don’t be constantly interrupting with: “What’s he saying? What’s he saying?” because the local he’s talking to may not have gotten to the point yet and the interpreter is waiting for that.

Set Reasonable Goals for Yourself

When I got off the Huey helicopter at district, I knew I was the latest in a line of district advisors and that more would come after me. I soon realized that if I was to make a difference it would be by completing my predecessor’s unfinished projects while planning and executing short-term, attainable goals that I could accomplish without dumping them on the guy who would follow me. I inherited an IR-8 rice project that was intended to introduce what was hailed as the Wonder Rice. Developed in the Philippines, IR-8 yielded twice the harvest of the standard rice grown in Asia, and Vietnamese acceptance of this new rice program was slow. We finally got a farmer to rent us part of a rice field, plow it and work the soil into the right consistency (mud), and plant the thousands of little rice shoots.

My tour ended before the harvest, but my successor was there when a bumper crop came in that astonished the locals. The Vietnamese government won some hearts and minds that year, and U.S. advisors took private satisfaction at having facilitated the project. An advisor should neither seek nor expect recognition for his efforts except from his own chain of command; we were there to support the efforts of the government of the Republic of Vietnam and when we were through we went away, as you and your own military transition team will do. We tackled other projects ranging from well drilling to hamlet medical aid projects and educational expansion when we were not on combat operations, and succeeded in bettering the lives of thousands of Vietnamese.

Listen to Your Predecessor, Train Your Successor

One of the most important contributions we made to the MACV effort was the continuity we ensured by learning from our predecessors and in turn training our successors, and that was built upon honesty. The guy you are replacing needs to tell you about not only his success stories but also his failures. He will wish he had done some things differently, and so will you. The key is to avoid the more egregious mistakes and pitfalls that he has already found. You owe it to yourself and your successor to show him the same openness and straight talk that helped you. Tell him what unfinished work you are leaving and why it is important. Introduce him to your interpreter and later make him aware of the interpreter’s strengths and weaknesses. He will teach them how we fight or how to fight. As our military transition teams continue to develop and reinforce the skills of our allies, we can learn a great deal from what we have done before in another nation faced with an insurgency. If we build upon that base of experience we increase the likelihood that we can more effectively reach those we train, and ultimately prepare them to assume responsibility for establishing and sustaining a stable society free from fear of aggression.

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A Familiar Scenario

An improvised explosive device (IED) has just hit a Bradley fighting vehicle on one of the most-traveled routes in your battalion’s area of operations. No one has been hurt badly, but the BFV has been damaged beyond repair. The battalion tactical operations center (TOC) spins into action. Immediately, close air support (CAS) and attack aviation are requested. The quick reaction force (QRF) platoon is pushed out to the site with a recovery section. A platoon operating nearby is sent to the site of the IED strike to search the palm groves and low-lying areas for triggermen. A quick plan to search the homes in the surrounding area for high value targets (HVT) is thrown together and within minutes locals are being roused by the crash of combat boot against gate and door. Eight hours later the mission comes to a close. The rollup follows: 1 M2A3 destroyed, 2 anti-Iraq force (AIF) members detained for testing positive for nitrates on the ExSpray kit. The “insurgents” are released the next day for lack of evidence and the probability that the nitrate was just soil.

The scenario may be all too familiar for units participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Despite operating in the area for several weeks or months, some Soldiers on the ground know very little about what or who they’re looking for. Why? Fruitless intelligence gathering and failed raids have not led most units to revise their targeting processes, but, rather, to continue applying event-oriented, terrain-based conventional methods of targeting that are insufficient in the contemporary operating environment (COE) in which we find ourselves.

Where Is the Tactical Level COIN Doctrine?

The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence recently produced a COIN “Junior Leader Aide-Memoire,” the most recent work in the litany of COIN doctrine that has been disseminated since OIF began in the spring of 2003. The aid is helpful, but, like its predecessors, is more a grab bag of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and tips than an organized and fully developed field manual. The United States military has been fighting insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere for more than a decade. So where’s the beef?

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Dr. David Kilcullen’s article “28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency” (Military Review, May-June 2006), the USMC’s Small Wars Manual, and others have attempted to address the need for rethinking operations. FM 3-24 specifically discusses the “concentration on elimination of insurgents, not terrain objectives” as an effective tactic against an insurgency. While correctly recognizing the need to focus on people, not terrain, the model is too broad to be effectively used by tactical units and is weighed down with conventional theory that is not effective against an insurgency.

The “Junior Leader Aide-Memoire” calls for COIN warriors to possess law enforcement tools, intelligence skills, humanitarian skills, peacekeeping skills, and warfighting skills. Not every Soldier in one’s formation can be a skilled humanitarian or a brilliant intelligence analyst. Hope lies in the likelihood that a leader will have such individual talents within his platoon and company. The task then becomes building teams within the organization that incorporate each of these skills.

In his article, Dr. Kilcullen advises that company-level leaders “organize for intelligence” and asserts that “rank is nothing; talent is everything.” This is where leaders bridge the gap between “what we need” and “what we have.” Platoons, squads, teams, and Soldiers must be individually charged with task and purpose.
for every mission. The tasks in which the COIN warrior must be proficient span the kinetic/non-kinetic spectrum. Who are your warfighters? Who are your humanitarians? Who are your intelligence collectors and analysts? Rank and position take a backseat to functionality. All counterinsurgency operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic, must be intelligence-driven. Good intelligence must be developed at the lowest levels. Therefore, a premium must be placed on making independent units as effective as possible at intelligence gathering, even if it means keeping a fast-tracking staff sergeant pulling security with the vehicles because his personality is not suited for humanitarian work.

So, the question remains: how are units best task organized in this environment? And, once organized effectively, what must they do to be successful?

**A Tactical Guide for Personality Targeting**

“A Tactical Guide for Personality Targeting” was developed in order to answer these questions. After talking with countless OIF I and OIF II veterans and reading everything on the counterinsurgency market to prepare himself for deployment to OIF 05-07, then-1st Lieutenant John Ryan concluded that he was on his own in the tactical fight. There was no ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) to turn to for guidance in dealing with upset village elders or targeting insurgent leaders in the area of operations. After 32 months of combat operations in Iraq and with several hundred thousand OIF veterans, it seemed that no one had published a “how to” manual on engagement and targeting at the tactical level. CPT Ryan strove to fill that gap while serving his tour in OIF 05-07. What ensued in the summer of 2006 was a 160-page tactical guide to engaging and targeting the terrorists operating in platoon, company, and battalion-sized areas of operation. The manual is currently being reviewed by some of the very men who wrote FM 3-24 and may be available in an unclassified form as early as fall 2008.

**How Personality Targeting Works**

Personality targeting avoids generalities that skew the commander’s perception of the insurgency and instead focuses on specific individuals. The Junior Leaders Aide-Memoire states that, “As a result [of many factors], each insurgency organization is unique.” Personality targeting asserts that this is so largely because each individual insurgent is unique — a free-thinking person who makes decisions and takes action based on relationships, feelings, monetary gain, and personal interest, not just because of his/her membership in a village, religious sect, or insurgent cell. Only after considering the individual insurgent and his relationships, attributes, and environment is he placed into a larger group. By applying objective scrutiny to individual insurgents, the personality targeting process acts as a filter against vague and erroneous umbrella assessments and should limit the number of unproductive tactical operations.

**A Tactical Guide to Personality Targeting** was written with the junior leader in mind, and attempts to fill existing doctrinal gaps. The manual provides new or revised guidance on personality targeting priorities and parameters, the battalion targeting officer’s duties, responsibilities, and task organization, the personality targeting process and ensuing products, and personality and cell analysis. The implementation of a decisive targeting strategy pursuant to an aggressive vision and commander’s intent allow an organization to build a winning mentality through targeting.

**The Personality Targeting Priorities and Parameters**

The seven personality targeting priorities highlight the procedural goals of personality targeting and the specific effects that personality targeting achieves for tactical units. They are:

1. Individual personality target apprehension;
2. Decentralized information gathering and data basing; “bottom-up intelligence;”
3. Detailed processes to filter natural flaws in a human intelligence (HUMINT) based procedure;
4. Fusion and interfacing of assets and sensors;
5. Confirmation and denial of intelligence through tactical operations;
6. Incorporation of doctrinal counterinsurgency fundamentals and contemporary operating environment realities; and
7. Soldiers’ and leaders’ ownership of the personality targeting process.

These topics form the foundation of the personality targeting process. The process considers all of the aspects of combating the insurgency, to include self-inflicted systemic obstacles. Understanding the premise behind instituting a personality targeting process will enable its executors to better integrate its intricacies and assertions. A “battle drill” will never effectively combat the insurgency, but analytical tactical leaders and Soldiers can make sound decisions if they understand COIN fundamentals and targeting priorities.

**Figure 1 — Company Level Intelligence Flow and Organization**

![Diagram of Company Level Intelligence Flow and Organization](image-url)
The Battalion Targeting Officer’s Duties and Responsibilities and Task Organization

The battalion targeting officer (BTO) is responsible for the battalion’s personality targeting process and products, creation and management of the battalion’s database, and dissemination and reception of company-level information. The BTO is also the director of battalion intelligence collection and recommends direction of the battalion’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to “fill in” intelligence gaps. The BTO is the primary officer-in-charge of the battalion intelligence collection team (BICT). Specific duties and responsibilities are deduced from the battalion targeting task organization, BTO battle rhythm, and BICT mission statement. For example, the battle rhythm determines timelines for information dissemination and reception, intelligence report reviews, database building, database management, and personality target recommendations.

Figure 1 illustrates both the intelligence flow and organization for company-level personality targeting and combat missions. Information discovered by the company is “new” or “hot” intelligence. “Hot” intelligence is defined as intelligence developed at the company-level from combat missions or their tactical HUMINT team (THT) representative. “Hot” intelligence requires the company targeting officer (CTO) to complete a target intelligence package (TIP) on the discovered personality targets. Complexity mounts when a company decentralizes operations. Decentralization of company operations will increase the frequency of patrols and the amount of targets that are collected upon. An influx of intelligence will force the CTO to maintain a well-organized database to conduct later analysis. Lastly, the company commander (CO) determines the mission through discussion with the CTO and company executive officer (XO).

The Personality Targeting Process and Products

Database building, database management, database analysis, personality targeting assessments, and all necessary iterations of the personality targeting cycle comprise the personality targeting process. The process begins with intelligence collection and database building and is not completed until the insurgency is neutralized. One insurgent at a time, the personality targeting process defeats the insurgency.

Current U.S. Army doctrine discusses targeting processes in broader terms. FM 30-60.1, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets, uses “find, fix, track, engage, and assess” as its approved process. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, recommends “decide, detect, deliver, assess” as a suitable process. Personality targeting specifies its process in much greater detail. The other techniques can be used for large scale targeting, but are not designed to accurately depict personalities.

An example of the targeting cycle would be to update a personality tracking matrix (PTM) then transfer that information and any supporting data to a TIP in which specific orders and requests (SOR) would be inscribed. The TIP would be given to THT for interrogations and revisions, if more information was revealed, then passed to a tactical operations unit for direct action (raid) against the target that included follow-on investigations at the insurgent site, or avoid direct action altogether, and complete passive data collection (PDC) on the target location — around and around you go.

For the personality targeting process, overarching themes and assets need to be determined through the commander’s intent before the personality targeting initial assessment begins. To ensure that assessments and course of action (COA) development are as accurate as possible, analysts must filter large databases to determine the most reliable information. This information (religious and tribal boundaries, centers of gravity, HVI in the AO) will have been inherited from the previous unit or disseminated from higher. After preliminary and periodic assessments are completed to capture the most current and realistic battlefield depiction for commanders, the assessments steer analysts and tactical units into “pockets” of the insurgency. Lastly, parameters and constraints determined from the assessment provide the battalion an educated direction for tactical operations — focal points for execution.

All of the products rely upon the building and maintenance of a database, and no single product can explain the direction of the battalion’s vision and the complexity of the insurgency. Some of the products are the result of a systematic process and some originate from free thought. The users and analysts have to understand the necessity of both mindsets. The similarity of some products establishes a redundancy in the system. During production, the analyst conducts cross-references to add validity. Intelligence gaps will, at times, have to be filled with “leaps” in analysis, and other times will be answered from detailed research. The redundancy mitigates human error in a HUMINT system. The process requires constant developments and encourages the creation of new products. The importance of free thought and critical analysis cannot be overstated, and no system could replace their worth.

Personality and Cell Analysis

Many units throughout the campaign have lost sight of aging targets and have
not appropriately developed them. Tactical units that fail to develop targets allow the insurgents to continue operations. Units that have stopped targeting because of stagnated reporting are wrong to infer that insurgents have been neutralized and are no longer operating in their AO. Usually, ceased reporting indicates “exhausted” sources or the tactical unit’s lost ambition to continue targeting insurgents. Targets do not arbitrarily stop conducting insurgent activity and CF has no metric to measure insurgents’ “quitting rates.” The only available evidence to determine attrition is HUMINT. Unless reliable HUMINT becomes available to prove otherwise, tactical units must assume that insurgents are continuing operations.

The failure of conventional processes goes beyond operations and includes traditional military intelligence products like pattern analysis. Pattern analysis products are reactive by nature and do not lead to the apprehension of insurgents. Therefore, they have little value except as general FYI. Simplistic traditional products focus on standard military procedure rather than on the many complex factors that govern an insurgent’s actions. These methodologies have plagued attempts to rethink operations within COIN. For example, intelligence personnel assign prefabricated roles to the insurgents in a cell — financier, leader, assassin, etc. Vague, generalized conceptions scarcely represent the reality of the insurgency and distort the commander’s perception of the conflict. Intelligence sections should generate products that focus on the personalities comprising the insurgency and provide tactical leaders with a course of action.

The target intelligence package (TIP) allows tactical units to maintain the initiative by encapsulating everything that is known about a specific target and providing tactical leaders user-friendly resources. Because of the TIP’s impact on personality targeting, analysts must critically evaluate each package and produce sound recommendations. The BTO is ultimately responsible for these products and must review each and every TIP after completion. It is imperative that tactical units develop and maintain this “living” product. Lastly, the TIP is a platform for critical thinking in order to capture personality targets.

A cell intelligence package (CIP) is a consolidation of all the TIPs associated with a specific cell (insurgent organization). After an appropriate cell is chosen, the analyst must avoid listing every insurgent connection, especially for those who don’t live near the rest. This will only serve to increase confusion, while failing to develop a greater understanding of the insurgency. The cell intelligence package provides the same information that a TIP does, for both the individuals of the cell and the cell as a whole.

Cell assessments will be requested, but ensure that the individual personalities are explored before a cell assessment is completed. A cell assessment will be broad and vague, but at times can be beneficial if an operation calls for a large sweeping recommendation. Analysts must remember that CIPs are only accurate after all the individuals have been discovered, investigated, and then analyzed.

Building a Winning Mentality
The personality targeting process begins with a battalion

*U.S. and Iraqi soldiers escort a detainee following a raid in Iraq.*

Staff Sergeant Russell Bassett
commander’s intent, which incorporates counterinsurgency fundamentals and unit decentralization. The commander’s intent must embrace truly unconventional thinking while eschewing standard terrain-based approaches. Commanders at both the battalion and company levels should determine task organization prior to deploying and shape decentralized command and control elements. A decentralized operating structure encourages decision-making by junior leaders, promotes a sense of ownership in Soldiers, and facilitates “bottom-up” intelligence reporting. Leaders and Soldiers must be empowered to make decisions and participate in the process. This allows small units to critically evaluate situations, develop plans, and then execute their “own” operations within the confines of the commander’s intent.

Soldiers must become sensors and contribute to the apprehension of insurgents. Personality targeting offers options and guidelines, and does not arbitrarily direct actions or predetermine operations; it instead prompts action, justified by the commander’s intent. Successful personality targeting processes breed “a winning mentality.” Soldiers will accept discomfort because they are involved in all facets of operations. The process perpetuates itself in order to combat a naturally strong insurgent will.

Personality Targeting in Action
During OIF 05-07 routine combat patrols incorporated passive data collection (PDC) on deliberately selected locations. In February 2006, E Co, 1-67 CAB conducted PDC on a rural portion of the company’s area of responsibility (AOR). Before the combat patrol was initiated, 1LT Ryan reviewed past intelligence reports to gain a better understanding of the insurgent operations in what was, at the time, determined a “pocket of denial” – an area or population center that opposed Coalition forces’ (CF) ideals. His research revealed important intelligence gaps that were critical to converting the area to a “pocket of compliance.”

NOTE: The authors included a narrative discussing CPT Ryan’s implementation of personality targeting during a combat patrol and the subsequent operation spurred by the information collected. Due to the sensitivity of the techniques, however, the narrative is only included in our web-version. Names and locations were changed for security reasons.

On the 15th of February 2006, PDC in Al Lil Beyt, IZ revealed the possibility of a small, family-based cell. During the patrol, we collected a name of great interest: Kareem Yusif Hassan al Janabi. To ensure that we did not create more intelligence gaps for succeeding patrols, a data collection team (DCT) cross-referenced Kareem with documentation in his “supposed” home. The DCT used his birth certificate, ID, and car purchase receipts to determine the validity of his name. At the time, I did not recognize Kareem’s name connection to the prospering sub-cell in Al Lil Beyt. Despite a review of an on-hand link diagram and area specific high value target (HVT) listing, I did not notice the potentiality of his insurgent involvement.

In total, 37 names, pictures, and various forms of documentation were retrieved.

On March 7, while reviewing the previous month’s collections, I noticed the similarity of Kareem’s family and tribal names to a family-based cell that had been targeted by the unit that preceded our own. The Al Lil Beyt family-based cell incorporated the Hassan Yusif al Janab’s. Three brothers – Ali Hassan Yusif, Hussein Hassan Yusif, and Achmed Hassan Yusif – were implicated in various insurgent activities through extensive reporting that met CF judicial requirements. Intrigued by the reports, I reviewed outdated cell link diagrams that showcased their direct contact with the cell leader (operational commander), Khudair Rehan Sabah al Janabi. This connection immediately sparked a reevaluation of the case. E Company’s battalion intelligence liaison, conducted database searches and consolidate the insurgents’ basic information, reports, and analysis in a target intelligence package (TIP).

Completed on March 8, the TIP illuminated a name variation, but confirmed locations, insurgents’ descriptions, native naming conventions of the area, and other subtleties of the case. Notably, the TIP stated that the brothers were frightened into a sanctuary near their old residence. Though the TIP was meticulously produced, name variations often deter CF operations. The natural flaws of human intelligence would not allow me to accept the TIP as truth. Specifically, the naming convention mistakes were unnerving. I also considered the local nationals’ propensity to eliminate parts of their names in order to confuse CF during tactical questioning before I regarded any report as accurate.

I deliberated over the potential facts, mistakes, and assumptions for some time. My initial apprehensions of the intelligence led me to cross-reference the information.
with our partner Iraqi Army intelligence officer, who supported the reports of the insurgent sanctuary. Following my meeting with the IA officer; I conducted hasty mathematical analysis based on timing of the reports and past prosecution attempts. Still uneasy about the probability of capture, I referenced my interpreter who said, “Many of the insurgents do not think the Americans know they are in an area after units switch out.” I assessed an error in the reports and accepted the risk of assuming a last and middle name mix-up; Hassan Yusif al Janabi as opposed to Yusif Hassan al Janabi. The operation was a “go.” To mitigate the errors in reporting, the target area was widened and alternate target locations were selected.

The direct action operations order was issued, but due to administrative constraints, the raid was postponed. Finally, on the evening of March 15, the operation was conducted. Direct action was effectively executed on the target locations and we pursued and captured four local nationals running from the objective area. Follow-on collections also included an attached tactical human intelligence team (THT) that conducted interrogation using information from the TIPs. Augmenting the THT, the DCT utilized our interpreter to tactically question local nationals at the primary site, while I used broken Arabic to collect at the alternate site. In total, we corralled 26 local national males into a consolidated TQA at the primary target location. Since the conglomeration of local nationals was different than the group on February 15, we were forced to deliberately question the unfamiliar faces.

At the TQA, we never asked for the suspected insurgents by name; the local nationals would remain quiet and present false IDs if they knew our intentions. Our staged interpreter monitored local nationals. While we used the applicable steps of EPW treatment, an interpreter gathered the identities of all suspects by first asking names, and then inspecting identification cards. The interpreter annotated the names in the correct sequence so that they corresponded with pictures. The accurate collection of the names and pictures was written in our PDC notebook. Following the collection of local national information, the interpreter and a Soldier reviewed the names on an AO specific HVT list. The Soldier and interpreter determined name and area references, possible false identification, and suspected individuals; however, the local nationals never witnessed the review of the HVT list. Our trusted interpreter had the liberty to make conversation with the local nationals, further develop information about the area, and profile individuals. When false identification was detected, the interpreter yelled ‘Kareem!’ and looked for any nonverbal responses from the local nationals. In the past, reports had discussed that many insurgents did not memorize their false identification information. The technique gave us a direction to further investigate a local national. Because of an odd non-verbal response, we re-inspected the residence of a different man named Kareem.

The name mix-up proved correct after we apprehended a man by the name of Kareem Yusif Hassan al Janabi at the target location and cross-referenced his identity with documentation. The operation did not produce a successful capture; however, situational awareness of the area and information for future operations was gained. From the information collected on the site, we concluded that the Hassan that we apprehended was the second cousin to the persons in question. Through tactical questioning we gathered a corroborating description and the location of Hassan Yusif Hassan al Janabi, who was the father of the three suspected insurgents. The location was one kilometer north and our understanding of the Iraqi tribal structures in rural areas confirmed the possibility of the location. At the forward operating base, I conducted a pictorial debrief and synthesized the follow-on PDC with the prior information from the TIPs. Unfortunately we were unable to conduct another operation before an area of operations transition occurred for our company, but we were on their trail.

Conclusion

Many of the problems with targeting insurgents are systemic and not merely the fault of commanders and intelligence analysts. Conventional targeting methods do not provide the level of detail necessary to confront the complexities of a COIN operation. The current systems do not obstruct commanders from making rational decisions, but neither do they provide a sensible platform from which to do so. Personality targeting aims to fix the problems with conventional targeting and provides the commander with multiple courses of action and a reasonable position from which to make decisions. Discussions about methods and techniques are meaningless if leaders and Soldiers cannot think or use a flexible approach that critically evaluates and filters, and realistically analyzes information.

Captain John Ryan was commissioned in 2003 from the United States Military Academy at West Point with a bachelor’s degree in systems engineering. His assignments include serving as combat engineer platoon leader and engineer reconnaissance team leader in the 588th Engineer Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas; support platoon leader in 2nd Special Troops Battalion at Fort Hood; combat engineer platoon leader in 1-67th Armor Battalion at Fort Hood; and battalion targeting officer in 1-67th Armor Battalion. While assigned to the 588th, he served as a platoon leader during OIF 1 in Khalis, Diyala Province, Iraq, and while assigned to 1-67th, served as a platoon leader during OIF 05-07 in central Iraq. As a platoon leader, he conducted more than 200 raids and passive data collection missions, and developed the company’s small unit targeting doctrine. Utilizing the personality targeting during a five-month period of OIF 05-07, he meticulously developed areas and detained eight personality targets through precise operations. Thirty months as a platoon leader and five months as a battalion targeting officer enabled CPT Ryan to develop and refine the personality targeting process that culminated in this publication while stationed in central Iraq.

Captain Brian Elliott was commissioned in 2002 from the United States Military Academy at West Point with a bachelor’s degree in general management. His assignments include serving as a combat engineer platoon leader and company executive officer with the 588th Engineer Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, and battalion logistics officer in 1-67 Armor, also at Fort Hood. While assigned to the 588th, he served as a platoon leader during OIF I in Ba’Qubah, Diyala Province, Iraq. His platoon in Iraq conducted over 300 raids in less than seven months, resulting in the detention of more than 150 insurgents. CPT Elliott’s interest in the counterinsurgency fight was spawned from his authorship of the TTP portion of the continuity book his company provided to elements of the 1st Infantry Division for their OIF II rotation. His studies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and successful TTPs utilized in OIF and OEF keep him focused on maintaining the initiative through a better understanding of defeating the insurgency at the lowest level – the individual.
This article provides an up-close look at the Combat Training Center (CTC) Mentorship Program and reveals significant insights into the extensive contributions senior NCO mentors are bringing to the CTCs. The article includes the history and philosophy of the program, duties and responsibilities of the senior NCO mentors, and information on how they maintain proficiency.

Today, there are many defense contractors that support the U.S. Army by performing numerous operational and training functions. MPRI, Inc. is an L-3 Communications company that supports military contracts throughout the United States and, on average, in 40 foreign countries. Since 2001, MPRI has supported the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) at Fort Bliss, Texas, with senior NCO mentors at the military’s four CTCs: Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany (formerly known as the Combat Maneuver Training Center). The senior NCO mentors perform as advisers, trainers, and mentors, and discretely assist the senior NCOs at Army, corps, division and joint task force (JTF) staff levels, the brigade and battalion command sergeants major, as well as the operations sergeants major in units rotating through the CTCs. They also provide significant assistance to many officers at these levels by sharing their military experiences from their own combat careers.

The senior NCO mentors are retired Army command sergeants major (CSMs) and sergeants major (SGMs) with numerous years of combat experience. They are assigned to either the CTC or operations group headquarters and are integrated into the operations groups’ training cycles. Additionally, they are certified through a rigorous observer trainer/observer controller (OT/OC) training program through their respective CTC OT/OC certification programs. They perform as military contractors and work with the OT/OC teams. They provide assistance to combat units in many different functional areas as the units rotate through the CTCs.

The senior NCO mentors provide a common sense look...
at things that are sometimes overlooked due to the fast pace of combat operations in today’s Army. Based on their extensive experience, some mentors also teach selected OT/OC certification classes.

**Background**

The conceptual treatment of senior leader development at the CTCs has typically been grounded on progressive, sequential training and education primarily directed to the officer corps focusing on junior and senior-level officers. Unfortunately, there have been limited training opportunities for senior NCOs (master sergeant (MSG), first sergeant (1SG), SGMs and CSM). In November 2001, the U.S. Army initiated the CTC Mentorship Program to help rectify this shortcoming. The program includes four retired CSMs/SGMs that are responsive to USASMA and are assigned to each CTC (BCTP, NTC, JRTC and JMRC). The senior NCO mentors bring dynamic subject matter expertise to the U.S. Army, CTCs and training unit. In fact, their coaching and mentoring are considered well established in the US Army and CTC community as endorsed by the Army senior leadership. Examples of their efforts and success are identified in this article and substantiate that the mentors are well established, respected and capable of making significant contributions to NCO leader development goals and objectives.

The CTC Mentorship Program enhances the training and combat readiness of U.S. Army units from battalion to Army level, to include JTF-level organizations. In addition to USASMA and the CTCs, the program has been endorsed by training units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan and other theaters of operations. It provides dynamic, capabilities-based training for rotational CTC units, with a priority to combat deployable units. The mentors offer NCO staff leaders unparalleled realistic and rigorous tactical training that fosters warfighting competence. The training experience is valuable in providing senior NCOs opportunities to significantly improve and sharpen their skills in accomplishing wartime missions. Additionally, the mentors have the ancillary advantage of improving senior NCO competence in accomplishing tasks associated with maintaining peace and wartime readiness. The CTC Mentorship Program provides the following:

- Trained and qualified senior NCO mentors to assist CTC rotations;
- Pre-rotational visits to units scheduled for a CTC rotation, when requested, and workshops and training assistance to senior NCOs based on training requirements;
- Support to unit training objectives and focus areas during CTC rotations;
- On-site assistance in planning and executing relevant and administrative tasks in realistic combat settings;
- Feedback for both formal and informal hot washes and after action reviews (AARs) with the training unit;
- Liaison between the Army, USASMA and CTCs, reinforcing doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) among senior NCOs of tactical units; and
- Lessons learned that are incorporated into the curriculum of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course at Fort Bliss, Texas.

**Senior NCO Mentors**

As mentioned earlier, the senior NCO mentors are retired U.S. Army CSMs/SGMs who demonstrated professional competence and training expertise while on active duty. The senior NCO mentors are handpicked by the commandant of USASMA and commanders of the respective CTCs, and endorsed by the Sergeant Major of the Army. Most importantly though, they are supported by numerous commanders and CSMs/SGMs throughout the military who have been recipients of their professional support at the four CTCs. They believe in and follow the tradition that embodies U.S. Army values and the warrior ethos. They coach, teach, mentor, control and observe the unit senior NCOs as they go through their CTC rotation, serving as their OTs/OCs.

Each mentor served on active duty in the U.S. Army for generally 25 to 31 years. They possess a variety of military occupational specialties, but they are all retired combat arms Soldiers. Each mentor has combat-related experience in Grenada, Panama, the first Gulf War, or conducted Stabilization Forces (SFOR) or Kosovo Forces (KFOR) peace support operations in the Balkans. They have served in every NCO leadership position from team leader to operations sergeant major, to command sergeant major. They are subject matter experts with the requisite experience and expertise to ensure immediate credibility and rapport with their respective CTC and training units. The mentors use lessons learned from their experiences on a wide range of subjects gained over their many years as senior NCOs and OTs/OCs, and their recent experience as senior NCO mentors. These lessons learned are incorporated into the curriculum of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course at Fort Bliss.

**Philosophy**

The CTC Mentorship Program is an increasingly accelerated program that takes a systematic approach in enhancing the training experience and education of senior NCOs. This program has impact throughout the U.S. Army as units train at the CTCs for deployment to one of the theaters of operations throughout the world where U.S. forces are deployed for combat operations. The program methodology uses a “hands-on” training model and the planning, preparation, and execution training model. It further validates the effectiveness of leadership, integrates TTP and provides valued mentorship during the organization’s execution phase of training, not only in a timely manner, but also in a safe training environment.

The CTC Mentorship Program

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<tr>
<td>SGM (R) Patrick Castin</td>
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<td>CSM (R) Gerald Parks</td>
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maintains a comprehensive communication network providing professional dialog among the Senior NCO Mentors addressing primarily lessons learned and other relevant information. This, in turn, reinforces cohesive team building between organizations within the combat units. The program also identifies and outlines positive corrective action to assist the senior NCO leadership in correcting issues identified during their training experience at the CTCs. This action provides the NCO leadership with more time to plan, schedule resources, and organize training events, which assists in correcting any deficiencies noted during the unit’s rotation at the CTC.

The genuine benefits accrued from effective mentoring include higher motivation, increased personal development and confidence and, most importantly, improved performance. This occurs because, regardless if you are a 1SG, logistics NCOIC or the brigade CSM, effective mentoring makes team members aware of one another’s skills and how these skills can contribute to attaining the unit’s goals and training objectives.

According to the senior NCO mentors, the CTC Mentorship Program offers great opportunities to make the best Army in the world an even better Army! They believe everyone should be a mentor to someone. Mentoring is a way to influence, so if you are a senior NCO from one of the CTCs, and are not mentoring the Army’s future, you are missing an important opportunity to use your experience to influence and set our young leaders up for success. A commitment to mentoring future senior NCO leaders may require the mentor to take risks, like backing off occasionally and letting them make mistakes they can learn from. These mistakes, however, often have a big impact during training that is critical to the senior NCO’s understanding of what the mentor tells him/her. Mentoring requires providing senior NCOs the opportunity to learn and develop while using proven experience to guide them without micromanagement. This will pay immense dividends on the battlefield where they will have to make decisions on their own.

**Duties and Responsibilities**

The role of the senior NCO in today’s fast-paced U.S. Army is a challenge. They must be able to maintain U.S. Army standards and develop their subordinate NCOs to perform tasks that are sometimes above their experience level. Senior NCO mentors assist in being another set of eyes and ears and provide insight to the senior NCO leaders on related issues. They support and assist the commander’s training objectives and focus areas. The mentors are able to provide different techniques for a specific challenge that the NCO leader will need to think through.

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that makes combat ready senior NCOs, and there were many Vietnam era combat experienced senior NCOs that provided very sage counsel. But now we are in a different time and era, and we are losing senior NCOs faster than we are developing their replacements. Now, a large number of senior NCOs have to mature and learn at the same time they prepare for deployment to war.

Throughout the senior NCO mentors’ military careers, the focus on training was to prepare for a war in Europe against a known enemy. That all changed after 9-11. Our young men and women serving in the armed forces today are fighting a completely different kind of war with an unknown enemy. Training today is focused more on urban combat, which is the focus at the CTCs. Combat units training at the CTCs in preparation for their next deployment receive training for the entire unit down to the individual Soldier in subject areas such as negotiations, cultural understanding, language skills, counter-IED measures, escalation of force (EOF) and rules of engagement (ROE), detainee operations, and tactical questioning. In addition, training in how to establish and operate checkpoints and traffic control points, crowd control procedures, dealing with the media, and casualty evacuation is also received.

In their roles as the senior NCO mentor and advisor, they provide on-site assistance to the senior NCO leadership of the rotational unit in the planning and execution of both tactical and administrative operations. In addition, they provide observations and lessons learned in the areas of operations, intelligence, logistics, staff functions, and force protection. The observations and feedback are based on their own personal experiences during their active duty careers, changes and updates received from combat units that are in theater or those that have recently returned, and input received from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). In conjunction with their duties as the senior NCO mentor for the rotational units, they also provide mentoring and coaching to the CTC NCO OTs/OCs based on guidelines and directives received from the CTC command group. The mentors provide continuous feedback to the CTC commanders, operations group commanders and the training unit. They conduct numerous AARs and assist in putting many more together.

In training staff sergeants major, the major task of the senior NCO mentors is to train, mentor and reinforce the roles and responsibilities of senior-level staff NCOs. Additionally, they support combined arms training that replicates Joint-Interagency-Multinational (JIM) operations in a full spectrum contemporary operational environment (COE) at worldwide locations in accordance with the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This support focuses on brigade combat teams (BCTs), divisions, corps, Army Service Component Command (ASCC), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and JTFs in

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order to create training experiences that enable Army senior battle commanders and senior NCOs to develop current, relevant, campaign-quality and expeditionary battle command instincts and skills.

Everything a senior NCO mentor does should be completely focused on making our deploying senior NCOs more productive, adaptive staff managers who can assist in all phases of military operations regardless of their working level. Whether on a battalion-level staff working in a fires cell, or on a JTF as the operations sergeant major, they believe when staff NCOs are well trained by their staff officers and senior NCOs, and they have attended the right schools, these NCOs — through training and practical experience — should be able to assume the duties of an officer in the event of the officer’s temporary or extended absence from the command post. When a staff NCO is set up for success and is properly trained on staff functions, the quality of what you put into the training translates into a competent and responsive senior NCO. They will be major contributing factors in their sections or warfighting functional areas, and the staff NCOs will know exactly what is expected from their leaders.

Senior NCO mentors stress the officer’s role in the command post as primarily one of “seeing the battlefield.” Officers must be capable of assessing the tactical situation, anticipating the enemy’s intent, and determining the long- and short-term impact of enemy/friendly actions. Officers issue instructions in accordance with the commander’s or decision-maker’s guidance. They develop estimates and plans via the military decision-making process. To support the officers, one of the functions of staff NCOs is to be information management managers. These responsibilities include collecting, analyzing, processing, updating, coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating internal command post and separate cell activities, just to name a few. Staff NCOs are the managers of the commander’s required information. To know everything about the commander’s required information needs, and then manage the information at the battalion, brigade and division staff levels, affects everything at the lower echelons (team, platoon and company).

In addition to their work with the CTC rotational units, senior NCO mentors also serve as liaison between USASMA and the CTCs, reinforcing doctrine and TTP among NCOs and officers. They also provide lessons learned and trend briefings at USASMA, the Battle Staff Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Command Sergeants Major Designee Course. They participate in and brief at the JMRC Trends Conference, which keeps the Army OTs/OCs up-to-date on lessons learned from the CTCs. They additionally use instructors from USASMA and the Battle Staff NCO Course as augmented OTs/OCs at the CTCs, which further assists doctrine development efforts at USASMA. They also write articles for CALL and have developed the Battle Staff NCO Review.

**Maintaining Proficiency**

To maintain proficiency and relevancy to current Army combat operations, the senior NCO mentors review and become familiar with current doctrine, TTPs, lessons learned, CTC reports, operational issues, and developments in the proponent service schools. The mentors’ primary focus is on current U.S. Army doctrine. They have a thorough understanding of military operations at platoon through JTF and Army levels. As liaison NCOs between USASMA and the CTCs, they reinforce doctrine and TTPs among senior NCO leaders of units being trained. The mentors collect lessons learned from the CTCs and provide them to USASMA for use in updating doctrine and TTP. They conduct pre-rotation visits to units scheduled for CTC rotations and offer training advice. On a regular basis, they prepare and distribute lessons learned from their observations of units participating in CTC rotations to USASMA’s Lessons Learned Directorate for inclusion into the curriculum of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course at Fort Bliss.

Additionally, each senior NCO mentor conducts several visits/imbeds to OCONUS theaters of operations and other forward sites to observe realistic combat operations and training. This allows them to stay current on Army/Joint doctrine. Locations of recently completed proficiency visits/imbeds include Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Kosovo, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Japan, and Korea.

**Summary**

Senior NCO mentors repeatedly state that it is a privilege and an honor for them to be serving with a team of highly motivated and professional NCOs and OTs/OCs at the CTCs who take the time to provide our young men and women in uniform with the best training the U.S. Army has to offer. Knowing they play a small role in helping to train these outstanding young men and women, and that the training they provide may later save their lives, makes their job both rewarding and fulfilling.

When asked his thoughts on the value of using retired CSMs/SGMs as mentors at the CTCs, Command Sergeant Major David Pierce of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center said the CTC Mentorship Program is important to the U.S. Army today. “I want to share with you some statistics from the global war on terrorism,” he said. “About 97 percent of our coalition partners in Afghanistan are from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), and 77 percent of our coalition partners in Iraq are from the USEUCOM AOR.”

He said what that means is that these forces have rotated through U.S. training commands and, more importantly, the JMRC.
So now you’re deployed from home station and are in the “Sand Box” or the “Rock Pile.” The rest-in-place/transfer of authority is complete, and your unit is developing its battle rhythm. You assess your area of operations and key terrain from your map reconnaissance, patrol experience, and leaders’ recons and study the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action. You want dominating overwatch and supporting fires, precision fires in urban terrain, and squad and platoon counter-marksman capabilities. You want your Soldiers to be able to quickly engage and kill insurgents armed with AKs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) who expose themselves for only a short time to let loose rockets at targets of opportunity.

Your unit may not have organic snipers or designated marksmen. You note your Soldiers’ marksmanship could use a tune-up, but you find the need for longer shots to 300 meters and you don’t want to use the 25-meter zero and function-fire range. You wish you could have sent more troops to the known distance range, to the All-Army Championships or the Designated Marksman’s Course, but in the routine of pre-deployment, re-cock, and re-set there just wasn’t enough time.

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**A Commander’s View**

**SUSTAINING MARKSMANSHIP WHILE DEPLOYED**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID LIWANAG**

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**A Soldier takes part in a reflexive fire exercise.**

*Jorge Gomez*
have been to designated marksman training, or who are former snipers. You give them the guidance that you want the troops to “own” everything from muzzle to 300 meters; you want some decent marksmen who can hit what they’re aiming at to 300; and you want your troops confident in their ability to hit “runners” within 100 meters.

They take stock of their assets. All your troops are armed with decent M16A4 rifles and M4 carbines. You’ve got enough M855 “Green Tip” Ball to support a decent sustainment program. Some of the Soldiers have ACOG telescopes issued by RFI.

They note on their maps that there are a few secure areas on or near your forward operating base with secure routes where you can put in a north-facing range (to keep the sun out of your troops’ eyes in both the mornings and afternoons) with suitable backstopping or downrange area that allows 300-meter shots.

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Soon your junior leaders invite you to inspect training. You find they’ve built two ranges — an improvised known distance or “KD” range and a field firing range. What’s more, they’re not only conducting advanced day and night shooting training but they’re also conducting rifle qualification in the field, and not on the 25-meter paper sheet alternate course of fire.

The KD range was built using “T-Walls” or stacked Hesco barriers. There are firing lines or berms 100, 200, and 300 meters from the T-Walls. They show you the score sheets of the first squads to shoot the alternate known distance qualification course, earning a few Soldiers promotion points for scoring as experts.

The NCOs have stapled cardboard E and F-type silhouettes to 1x4 boards and, from behind the solid reinforced concrete cover of the T-Walls, raise these over the top edge of the T-Wall for 3 to 5 seconds before pulling them down, mirroring the “snap” exposures of the standard “pop-up” range. When a bullet goes through the silhouette, they place a paper or cardboard spotting disk, skewered with a golf tee or wooden spindle, into the last bullet hole in the target. When they raise the target over the berm, the shooter clearly sees where his last round hit without the need for binoculars or a telescope.

They repeat the exercise, only now when Soldiers raise targets over the top edge of the T-Wall they begin walking for 10 feet, paralleling the wall before stopping and pulling down the target. The shooter sees a left-to-right or right-to-left “mover” in the hardest engagement a rifleman has — a body moving perpendicular to his line of sight.

The NCOs repeat the exercises after dark, with the shooters illuminating and aiming their rifles and carbines with AN/PEQ-2 and AN/PAQ-4 aiming lasers and night vision devices at 75, 100, and 200 meters. Some of the squad leaders use tracers, and their fire teams “lock on” to where their leaders are pointing.

On the field fire range the NCOs have found enough empty 55-gallon drums to fill with sand and place at 200, 225, 250, 275, and 300 meters, the more difficult distances to hit when “turtled-up” in helmet, IBA, DAPS, and plates. They’re waiting on E-type silhouettes cut from steel plates to replace the drums. 5.56mm shots against the drums and plates give a solid “Whack!” once they’re hit, giving the Soldiers instant feedback. The E-type plates will be even better, as they won’t have to be replaced as often.

You notice the NCOs put up U-shaped pickets with pieces of engineer tape or bandolier webbing on them at 200 and 300 yards. The tape shifts lightly in the breeze giving those Soldiers without ACOGs or binoculars an idea of how the wind may be affecting their bullets. Some of the Soldiers will put engineer tape out on the concertina or from pickets, phone, and light poles at certain ranges around their FOB firing positions, giving them both range and wind direction once they’re pulling security.

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Now, what was the next thing you had to try to solve…?

Lieutenant Colonel David Liwanag is currently an advisor to the Counter-Terrorism Command, Iraqi National CT Force in Baghdad, Iraq. He previously served with the J3, Special Operations Command - Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Virginia, and commanded the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia, from June 2003 until June 2006. Other previous assignments include commanding the U.S. Army Parachute Team and serving with the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.

Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division fire their weapons at a range on Camp Liberty, Iraq.
“So you see, I can unequivocally endorse the importance and value of the senior NCO mentor in our command. He has become a member of the team,” he said. “He is known as a trusted and dedicated advisor to the commander of the operations group, his CSM, and the commanding general of this command. He is an invaluable key ingredient to the JMRC mission; his effective coaching, teaching and mentoring of our CSMs/SGMs are critical in the role they play on today’s battlefield.”

Command Sergeant Major Frank Graham, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division CSM, said, “The value the senior NCO mentor provided us at brigade and battalion levels during our CTC rotation was immeasurable. He provided exceptional guidance to all my battalion and operations CSMs/SGMs that they needed. A couple main factors were his ability to mentor several CSMs on their relationships with their commanders. It was information that only an experienced CSM can provide. His input during our NCO professional development training to all my NCOs and young leaders was very constructive and vital to our wartime mission; I know the Soldiers are using the experience they gained now in combat.”

Editor’s Note: Since this article was written, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Gerald Utterback has replaced Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Gerald Parks as the CTC mentor at the JMRC. Parks is currently serving in Afghanistan where he is helping mentor Afghan soldiers.

A Soldier takes part in a reflexive fire exercise.

Sargeant Major (Retired) Patrick Castin enlisted in the U.S. Army in September 1976 as an Armored Reconnaissance Specialist (11D). During his career, he held many positions of responsibility to include cavalry scout, squad leader, scout section sergeant, platoon sergeant, senior instructor ROTC, platoon sergeant, assistant operations sergeant, first sergeant, operations sergeant major, and CTC senior observer trainer.

He currently is a CTC mentor for MPRI and assigned to the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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The AN/PSS-14 Mine Detecting Set (NSN:6665-01-504-7769) is more advanced than any metal detector used to accomplish mine detection. The AN/PSS-14 mine detector is only one part of this remarkable mine detection system. The other and more essential part of this system is the operator. The complexity of the system requires operators to be licensed to ensure safe and effective operation. For that reason and the safety of all personnel involved in route and area clearance operations, commanders must emphasize that each operator be properly licensed prior to using the system in a real-world situation. Licensing on the AN/PSS-14 is essential to ensure both the operator and the AN/PSS-14 are adequately sustained and perform as designed when used.

**Basic Operational Theory**

The AN/PSS-14 mine detector applies two technologies: metal detection (MD) and ground-penetrating radar (GPR). The AN/PSS-14 employs aided target recognition algorithms that alert the operator of a presence of a target of interest. A trained operator learns to mute the MD or the GPR to identify objects buried in the ground, pinpoint their location, and determine if they are potential mines. A licensed operator can detect metal objects in the ground and investigate the object using the GPR. The GPR can be used to distinguish potential mines from battlefield clutter and other metal debris.

**AN/PSS-14 Fielding**

The first step in the fielding process is to educate units on the system requirements. The Program Manager (PM) for Countermine and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) sends a team to the unit’s location to conduct a New Material Introductory Briefing (NMIB). During this briefing the PM’s representative will explain the system’s capabilities, sustainment requirements, licensing requirements, and training devices available for the system. The number one goal of the briefing is to ensure commanders lock in time for both the new equipment training (NET) and the unit master training (UMT). U.S. Army Engineer School-trained master trainers conduct UMT. Both of these courses are 40 hours in length and are conducted either at the unit’s home station or at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, whichever is convenient for the unit. Once the training is scheduled, the NET team will arrive at the unit’s location, set up the training site, begin training, and issue the equipment after successful NET completion. Once NET training is completed, the operators who attended the training are considered licensed on the system.

**Training**

The PM has provided the means for every unit authorized the AN/PSS-14 to receive the proper training. The Department of Defense uses the “One Operator Trained – One System Issued” rule for the AN/PSS-14. This means that prior to a unit being fielded their authorized quantity of mine detectors they must have an equal or greater number of “licensed operators.” Operators are licensed in only two ways:

1. Attended the full 40-hour training provided during NET; or
2. Attended a full 40-hour course conducted by a USAES-certified UMT.

Every unit will send operators to NET prior to being fielded the AN/PSS-14. The requirement is to send one operator for each AN/PSS-14 the unit is being issued. It is recommended that unit commanders send sergeants, (E5) or above, from their unit or from higher staff levels to attend the NET training. Those selected sergeants will then be qualified to take the additional training and become unit master trainers.

UMT training is conducted to provide a sustainment capability to each unit issued the AN/PSS-14. Units are encouraged to send as many E5s and above to this training as possible. These individuals will develop unit SOPs and conduct new operator and refresher training after the fielding process is complete. Because of the licensing requirement for this system, all attendees in the UMT course must be E5 or above. Promotable E4s are not authorized to receive the UMT training. Additionally, instructors are required to be operator-certified prior to participating in the UMT training. With this requirement in mind, units must capitalize on sending E5s or above to NET training so they are eligible for UMT later.

**Licensing**

The U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES) feels that any piece
of equipment designed to detect explosives, mines, or other hazards must have a licensing requirement associated with it. The proper use of these types of equipment will prevent the loss of life or limb of another service member. The licensing requirement ensures the proficiency of the personnel trained in utilizing the equipment.

In accordance with Army Regulation 600-55, The Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program (Selection, Training, Testing, and Licensing), Chapter 7–1 states the qualifications to operate are as follows:

a. All military personnel and DA civilians must have an OF 346 and demonstrate their proficiency in order to operate the following mechanical or ground support equipment:

   (13) Mine-detecting equipment, truck-mounted; all makes and models.

   (15) Miscellaneous equipment, any equipment determined by the local commander or higher authority to warrant licensing such as powered lawn mowers; agricultural machinery; food preparation equipment; field ranges; immersion heaters; laundry equipment; snowmobiles; detecting sets, mine portable, AN/PRS-7 and AN/PSS-11.

The USAES has recommended the following changes to AR 600-55 in order to clarify the licensing requirement for the AN/PSS-14. The first draft of this manual was sent out for review and the final version is scheduled for publication in early 2008.

   a. All military personnel and DA civilians must have a DA 5984-E and demonstrate their proficiency in order to operate the following mechanical or ground support equipment:

   (13) Change to Read: “Mine or other explosive detecting equipment, all portable, handheld, or truck-mounted models (including but not limited to AN/PSS-12 and AN/PSS-14).”

   (15) Delete the last line of this paragraph that reads “detecting sets, mine portable, AN/PRS-7 and AN/PSS-11” licensing is at the discretion of the commander. USAES feels that licensing on explosive or mine-detecting equipment should not be at the discretion of the local commander.

Summary

It is imperative that commanders become familiar with the capabilities of the AN/PSS-14. This system is vitally essential in safe route clearance operations in the current theater of operations and in future conflicts. The USAES has provided all the tools required to establish a successful training and licensing program to include providing units with a draft SOP for adoption and immediate implementation. The PM has an aggressive fielding schedule for the AN/PSS-14 for the next few years. If you do not already have both NET and UMT training on your units training calendar, contact Rob Sellmer, AN/PSS-14 fielding manager, at (703) 704-3397, DSN 654-3397, robert.sellmer@us.army.mil for NET and John Sullivan at (573) 563-7646 or cell (573) 528-9081 for UMT immediately to ensure your unit is ready to deploy with the best route clearance capabilities possible.

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Major Dick Winters’ life story begins with a jump out of a C-47 transport plane with 16 other men. Larry Alexander, a reporter for the Intelligence Journal in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, combines interviews with Easy Company, wartime letters, and numerous interviews with Major Winters to develop this biography.

The leadership of Dick Winters was well documented and highlighted in the Band of Brothers book and television miniseries. Band of Brothers addicts will be thrilled at the addition of more details on the outstanding leadership demonstrated by Major Winters throughout World War II and his life and the lives of his men after the war. Winters’ ideas on leadership finish the book in a short appendix. He talks of adjusting to the individual Soldier each day with different styles of leadership. He heartily recommend this biography to anyone wanting to learn about leadership under stress.

Winters’ routine included a five-mile run each morning. The 15, 20 and 25-mile marches also served to harden the 101st Airborne Soldiers. Winters disciplined his men, but preserved their spirit by fitting the punishment to the transgression. He was flexible and ended or changed his punishment of men when the punishment was no longer needed or effective.

The men of the 101st Airborne were learning about the dangers of parachuting the hard way in these early days of airborne training. On March 8, 1944, one man was killed when his chute failed to open. Hard training was the norm at Camp Toombs, Georgia. Winters promoted the men demonstrating strong leadership and field skills at Camp Toombs to leadership positions under his command as combat created openings.

The contact with Captain Sobel was unfortunate for Easy Company, but is a fortunate one for anyone studying leadership. Sobel is an example of what kind of leader not to become. Sobel’s cold and impersonal demeanor and his indifference for his men created a hostile atmosphere. Since Sobel was also harsh and unfair, resentment against him quickly grew. Sobel’s inadequacy in the field also created an increased loss of respect from his company with each mistake. He decreased his chances for success exponentially by skipping training on basic field craft. A great leadership guidebook would include Winters’ example for success and illustrate Sobel’s example for failures.

Winters noted that his battalion and regimental leaders made no attempt to capitalize on training their Soldiers in lessons learned to further sharpen skills. He made a point of intensifying the training of his company, taking advantage of the time between combat missions to improve before the next assignment. Winters carried a rifle, as it made him less conspicuous as an officer and gave him a little more firepower than the .45 officers usually carried. After promotion to battalion XO, Winters conducted court-martials of Soldiers caught stealing. Stopping looting is a command responsibility, but Winters hated conducting the court-martials of men he knew and respected.

If you loved the Band of Brothers book and the HBO miniseries, you will also enjoy this biography, as it gives more details on the man who led Easy Company through training and World War II. Someone could make an outstanding leadership seminar around Easy Company, much like what has been done with the fictional 12 O’Clock High movie.


Two recent memoirs from survivors of the Bataan Death March, and three years of imprisonment, offer insight not only of the march, but the camps where they were imprisoned. Taken together, Tony Bilek’s No Uncle Sam: The Forgotten of Bataan and Gene Hoyt’s Bataan: A Survivor’s Story provide us with two similar yet differing views of their imprisonment. Their stories — unimaginably painful and horrific — are filled with vignettes of terror and inspiration they both experienced and witnessed. The litany of atrocities perpetrated against them and their fellow Soldiers defy imagination, forcing us to reflect inward for understanding while we marvel at the inner strength and resolve these POWs exhibited. These are works of extraordinary graphic brutality that still haunt the authors 60 years following their release from captivity.

Analytical and historical treatments of the Bataan Death March offer us a glimpse of the absolute horror that our POWs suffered during the 55-mile march from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell, but fall short in their treatment of the incredible suffering these men went through. Eyewitness accounts and published works from survivors add to historical writings, which left us with a collective experience of their survival, but little more.

The official history of the U.S. Army in World War II mentions the march happened but stops there, concentrating instead on military operations. Stanley L. Falk’s classic study, Bataan: The March of Death, provides a detailed study of the march routes, surrender negotiations, the failed Japanese plans to
handle the prisoners, and the brutality suffered by those who surrendered. But his work ends there, seven days after the surrender and the prisoner’s arrival at Camp O’Donnell, leaving us to wonder what happened to those who arrived at this temporary barbed-wire compound. This void in the historiography of the Bataan Death March has painfully been filled, in what could be the last memoirs from survivors of the Japanese concentration camps in World War II. (Boyt passed away before his book was published.)

Boyt and Bilek’s presentations could be interpreted as bitter, scathing indictments of the Japanese for what POWs were forced to live through. Boyt’s book is introspective while Bilek’s leans to a more descriptive account of survival interspersed with gallows humor, but they are much more than that. While recounting their stories, they searched inward to understand what it was about them that helped in their survival. No amount of training in the military, or a life of deprivation during the depression, provided Bilek and Boyd with a footprint for survival. To understand how they survived, we must understand their experiences.

Bilek and Boyt were at Clark Field in the Philippines when the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor began. Within hours, Clark was bombed as well, beginning the exodus of forces to Bataan that became a siege. Four months later, the United States military suffered its most humiliating defeat in our nation’s history. Nearly 78,000 American and Filipino troops fought a successful delaying action as long as they could — with World War I-era Springfield and Enfield rifles and little else — against the advancing Japanese military in the remote Philippine jungle province of Bataan. Japanese forces encircled the beleaguered Americans who were running for their lives.

Running low on ammunition, unable to be resupplied, suffering from innumerable jungle-related diseases, and forced to scavenge for food to supplement their daily starvation level half rations, Major General Edward P. King surrendered his forces to the Japanese 14th Army. According to Falk, King — with orders not to surrender — was left with no real decision. Unable to mount further organized resistance to delay the inevitable destruction of his forces, surrender would offer them at least a chance at survival. He could not have known that his decision would start in motion one of the most horrific episodes of degradation, brutality, and survival in the annals of American military history.

Boyt contemplated escape to Corregidor but knew he was not strong enough to survive; Bilek’s commanders surrendered the members of his unit. Both began their captivity after being looted by the Japanese. Although neither had anything of value to be confiscated, that did not erase the fear of the unknown that awaited them. They marched in the blazing sun that sapped their strength and were starved, beaten, and deprived of water. Resting was rare, stopping in small clearances where they could only sit. Thirst became an obsession, as prisoners left the formation to drink out of fetid pools of animal waste along the roadside. Boyt carried a bottle of iodine that the looting guards missed. It purified his water, thus saving his life while many others succumbed to dysentery, adding to the death toll.

Survival on the march was based on luck. Both Boyt and Bilek positioned themselves to avoid beatings from guards and passing Japanese soldiers heading south. Japanese soldiers in the trucks were apt to butt stroke the columns or place their swords out to cut the prisoners. Both witnessed this as the march started and both moved quickly to the inside part of the formation or on the right side closest to the woods. Boyt was very small to begin with and he could “hide” in the middle of the formation and avoid much of the beatings.

For those who survived the march, a lifetime in hell was just beginning. Three years of disease, beatings, death, forced labor, starvation, desperation, and the daily struggle to survive were countered by a will to live, and the strong bonds made between prisoners relying on each other as every day was another monumental struggle to get through one more day. It was 42 months of days; days when a drink of water meant survival or death; days wishing for death to end the beatings or indifference by the guards; days when the stench of death and filth fills the air while fighting through daily monotony, disease and starvation. Escape was impossible; they were in no condition to get very far, and should one escape, nine others would be executed.

POWs were sent to Japan in the cargo holds of freighters, fed very little and were under constant fear of attack from American boats. Boyt’s ship was torpedoed; other “hell ships” were strafed and bombed by fighters. Once in Japan, treatment of the POWs was not as harsh; however, diseases such as beriberi and scurvy were as prevalent as dysentery was in the Philippines.

While Boyt spent two years in Japan working on cremation details and in a garden, Bilek’s year in Japan was at Camp 17 (Camp Ju-Shichi) near Omatsu on Japan’s southernmost island of Kyushu east of Nagasaki. He worked in the coalmines and ended up suffering from injury, pneumonia, and beriberi once again. With no medicine other than food to combat the disease, Bilek spent nearly six months in the hospital receiving blood transfusions from “healthy” prisoners. Once cured, he had to learn to walk all over again. Within weeks, he was back in the coalmines, and marching one day to the site, he witnessed the devastating attack on Nagasaki. Shortly, both would be released amidst a flood of emotions for those who did not survive.

Each new book on World War II forces us to ask, “Is there anything else to learn about this war?” The answer is always yes. Nothing prepared Boyt and Bilek for what they endured. Together, they show us lessons in perseverance, adaptability to their environment, and uncanny luck. They are more than lessons in survival. Although depressed, they did not despair as desperation led to giving up and almost certain death. Making the best of every opportunity presented to them to survive, they depended on their savvy and an intense will to live, never once forgetting their comrades.

Although names and dates have failed them after 60 years, the memory of friends, brutality, camps, and their treatment are as clear to them today as they were so long ago. Both books are easily readable; following a new genre of memoir literature from World War II veterans, one of
openness and candor about the realities of war, and in this case, about survival. Both had reasons for writing their books. For Boyt, it was to leave a record of what happened to him and so many others that will never come home; Bilek’s is one that wanted to set the record straight in a time of revisionism. Neither author apologizes for what they wrote; instead they force the reader to laugh at their humor, cry with them as they are liberated, feel the pain of their beatings, and shudder at the inhumanity they endured. But through it all, they show the strong bonds of camaraderie for their fellow POWs, and the memories of home that helped them survive.


Perhaps, somewhat ignored in the vast writings of the Vietnam War has been a period of fighting coined The Mini-Tet Offensive (officially known as the May Offensive). This offensive began on May 1, when communist conventional forces crossed the DMZ near Dong Ha. On May 5, communist guerrilla forces started conducting operations in and around Saigon. The communist objective was not to deliver a defeat on American ground forces, but to psychologically defeat the American public’s support of the war before the upcoming Paris peace talks.

To oppose the attack of Saigon, four battalions of the 9th Infantry Division were deployed piecemeal to Saigon from their positions in the Mekong Delta. After two weeks of the costliest American fighting (in terms of casualties) in the Vietnam War, the 9th Infantry Division prevailed with a tactical victory. Yet, this tactical victory (as was the case with many victories at the tactical level) did not equate to strategic success for the United States. The above, oft-neglected period of the Vietnam War is the focus of Keith Nolan’s superb book, House to House: Playing the Enemy’s Game in Saigon, May 1968.

For those with an interest in the Vietnam War, the author may be quite familiar. In the past 25 years, he has crafted 11 books focusing on the Vietnam War and infantrymen. Among these books were the classics Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970 and Battle for Hue: Tet 1968. Clearly, Nolan has established himself as one of our leading military historians on the Vietnam War. This reputation is sure to be enhanced with his latest volume.

Although it is not truly articulated by the author, the purpose of House to House is essentially twofold. First, Nolan seeks to provide readers with significant details on the May 1968 battle in Saigon at the tactical level. As discussed earlier, this is a battle that is glossed over in most discussions on the Vietnam War. Second, and probably Nolan’s key objective (as is the case in all of his books) is to enable readers to garner insight into the human dimension of war. The author wants his audience to understand the raw emotions, fears, and intensity that combat generates in the infantryman. Clearly, Nolan accomplishes each of these purposes in this book.

I believe readers will find two significant strengths in House to House. First, is the ability of Nolan to seamlessly shift from different small unit battles within the larger fight in and around Saigon. As readers will quickly discover, the overall fighting in the area was extremely chaotic. Yet, Nolan is able to provide distinct narration on various fights without confusing the reader. It is the rare author, who can juggle various actions and have them complement each other instead of degrade one another. Nolan displays this talent throughout House to House.

The second key strength within the book is Nolan’s ability to start and complete this book. Although this may seem like a given and a trivial point, Nolan understands the importance of starting and finishing a book strong. The author utilizes his opening prologue to provide readers a concise summary of recent strategic and tactical activity leading to the May Offensive. Unquestionably, this sets the conditions for the rest of the volume and puts this combat action in perspective. Nolan concludes House to House with an epilogue neatly detailing the ramifications of the battle for all sides involved. It is expert analysis often missing from books that seem to abruptly end and leave you requiring more.

Besides the above strengths, I found several other characteristics or features that will appeal to readers. First, Nolan has truly mastered the ability to bring words to life. His narration of battle sequences is superb and makes readers feel that they are almost there. Second, as he has clearly demonstrated in prior books, Nolan has conducted exhaustive research in preparing this book. Most impressive is his use of dozens of personal interviews with the infantrymen who fought in this brutal battle. Finally, the author has inserted 32 relevant photographs (most provided to Nolan by Soldiers who fought in the battle) that are a tremendous aid in personalizing the book.

My only criticism with House to House is the quantity and quality of maps utilized in the book. Perhaps, like many of you, I believe a sharp, detailed map is an excellent complement to a writer’s words. This is especially true at the small unit level. Unfortunately, Nolan inserts only four maps in his book, and these lack any graphics or unit locations for both sides. The addition of more detailed maps would have been value added to an already superb book.

Readers will find Nolan is not afraid to praise or criticize decisions or policies made by individual leaders (at all levels) during this operation or during the entire war. He is particularly effective in laying out his argument when he does criticize. He provides sufficient background for his opinion and answers the “so what” in most instances. I found this candor refreshing and thought provoking.

In summary, once again, Keith Nolan has written a book skillfully blending adept writing, impeccable research, and thought-provoking analysis. For those who have read prior Nolan efforts, this is what you have come to expect. You will not be disappointed with his latest volume. For those who have not yet had the opportunity, House to House is an outstanding initiation to his capabilities. It is sure to lead to further acquisitions in his body of work.

From 2003 through early 2006, this collection of newspaper and magazine columns by Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, address mostly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Peters’ insights are quick witted, insightful, and occasionally humorous. No reader will regard time spent with this book as wasted.

The fighting as it progresses in the Middle East as reported by the networks appears to be pretty much a one-sided affair: more U.S. Soldiers and Marines dying month after month while the media giddily tallies our losses, never mentioning the number of terrorists killed and captured. Or the increasing number of towns and cities secured. Or the new schools being built. Or the water treatment facilities and power plants brought on line.

The broadcast and print media in this country are nothing short of shameful in their reporting on the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. But at least a balanced, objective assessment of these conflicts is available from Ralph Peters whose service in various intelligence assignments over 20 years renders him a bonafide, unimpeachable source and observer. He brings common sense and lucid analysis completely lacking in our newspapers and broadcast reporting. “…we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution.” Further, “And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11…we shall hear no disasters” such as the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghrailb? Many media outlets are determined to turn Iraq into a failure, he claims. “The endless orgy of coverage of the Abu Ghrailb incident … is insufferable. The successes and sacrifices of more than a hundred thousand soldiers go ignored, while a sanctimonious media focuses on the viciousness of a few ill-led criminals in uniform.” In his most penetrating insight, Peters writes: “…Susan Sontag, writing in the New York Times Magazine, associated the prisoner abuse affair with the massacres in Rwanda and the Holocaust. Really? Does Ms. Sontag truly believe that Abu Ghrailb equals Auschwitz? Does she know a single American soldier? How simple the world must look from behind her desk…”

Finally, Peters’s most original observation (and there are many) is his comparison of hard core terrorists with the Aztecs. “For all their Muslim trappings … the terrorists … have returned to … behaviors that Moses, Christ, and Mohammed uniformly rejected: they practice human sacrifice. The grisly decapitations … and the explosive-laden cars driven into crowds, the bombing of schools and the execution of kidnapped women are not sanctioned by a single passage in the Koran.”

Space does not permit a total counting of Peters’s spot-on findings. The only way to avail oneself of his insights is to buy the book. Reading even the first few chapters will be rewarding. And, as hackneyed as it is to say so, Never Quit the Fight should be required reading of all senior personnel at the Pentagon, especially those who have never worn the uniform.

CHIEF OF INFANTRY
READING LISTS

The Chief of Infantry Reading List is available online at https://www.benning.army.mil/catd/cald/readinglist.htm (will require AKO login/password). The list is divided into four categories: Junior NCO, Senior NCO, Lieutenants and Captains. In addition to the list, the Web site also contains a short narrative on each selection. The selected books include:

- Malice Aforethought: The History of Booby Traps from World War One to Vietnam by Ian Jones (Junior NCO)
- Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods by John H. Poole (Senior NCO)
- The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Thomas X. Hammes (Lieutenants)
- In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Soldiers by Rick Atkinson (Captains)
A Soldier provides security for a passing convoy during an operation in Afghanistan.

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