Cultural Awareness

Cross-Cultural Interaction Today
The war in Iraq and Afghanistan represents a microcosm of America’s earlier and larger wars, in which we committed ourselves to military victory while planning for a stable and lasting postwar peace. With the defeat of Iraq’s armed forces and the Taliban, the center of gravity shifted to the people as they prepared to assume control of their destiny. Today, the host nation populations are the key terrain that we must secure in the global war on terrorism. We have developed greater cultural awareness of the geographical and civil considerations under which we operate. As we have become more knowledgeable of the local populations and their environment, we have become increasingly adept at getting inside our adversary’s decision cycle, interdicting his actions, and inflicting losses upon him faster than he can replace them with local resources. This is due in large part to information provided by local civilians and military. In this Commandant’s Note I want to talk about cultural awareness, its historical contribution to the Army’s mission, and how we are applying it today as we prosecute the global war on terrorism.

Cultural awareness plays a pivotal role in the gathering and assessment of the human intelligence we need. Credibility of refugees, informants, and centers of influence will always carry its burden of uncertainty, but the information they offer will complement that gained by electronic and other intelligence gathering methods. Today’s deployed formations are fighting amid local populations whose reaction to the U.S., her goals, and the presence of our Soldiers may be supportive, neutral, or hostile, or a combination of these. This is determined by the nature and extent of their contact with our Soldiers, or their civilians’ exposure to the insurgents’ propaganda efforts. Our own understanding of the host nation’s geography, history, tribal and sectarian concerns, economic system, infrastructure, and religion enables us to move freely among the population and destroy the insurgents.

The use of cultural awareness as a combat multiplier is nothing new in counterinsurgency. During campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Apache in the late 19th century, General George Crook — a Civil War veteran of battles at Second Bull Run and Chickamauga and a skilled guerilla fighter — understood the culture and tribal dynamics of the Apache so well that he could exploit conflicts and relationships within the tribes. Today our own knowledge of subtle motivations in Iraq and Afghanistan has likewise created opportunities for success. During World War II, anthropologist Margaret Mead and her behavioral science colleagues investigated the cultures of enemies and allies alike; their and General Douglas MacArthur’s knowledge of Asian culture were factors in the decision to retain Emperor Hirohito as Japan’s titular ruler. This facilitated the stable transition to a postwar form of government free of any insurgency that would have been costly to Americans and Japanese alike. When we consider General Joseph Stilwell’s operations in China, Burma, and India, our special operations forces’ actions during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, or their work with the warlords and tribal leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan, the value of cultural awareness as a combat multiplier is clear.

The war on terrorism is worldwide, but our Soldiers often find themselves dealing with issues that are more regional and local. Coalition commanders and Soldiers need to identify and understand the many complex relationships within their areas of operation. Insurgents attempt to recruit members and support by many means, and we need to understand how they do this so we can defeat them. Our enemy is opportunistic: within eight days of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, regional militant surrogates of al-Qaeda had begun establishing four base camps in Aceh province and gaining press and media attention. The insurgent is persistent, and we can be no less vigilant in anticipating his moves, understanding his goals and motives, and in destroying him before he can act.

Our Soldiers have made great strides in expanding their cultural awareness. Cultural awareness training is now an integral part of our students’ experience at Fort Benning, and we will continue to stress it as we identify additional requirements and resources. We have drawn upon the resources and expertise of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) Foreign Language Center to take advantage of available programs such as DLI’s own area studies; self-assessment tests, pronunciation, and basic language guides; and the Rosetta Stone foreign language program. Our revised reading lists for junior and senior noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains includes books focused on cultural awareness. Infantry Magazine has included cultural awareness as a recurring feature. We complement our training with products of the Combined Arms Center and U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Cultural factors are part of the battlefield, and by including them in our training, planning, and operations we will ensure that in winning the war we will secure a lasting peace. Insurgencies take a long time to develop, and defeating them demands our patience, resolve, and commitment.

Follow me!
Chief of Infantry Releases Recommended Reading List

**Junior NCO**

**Senior NCO**

**Lieutenants**

**Captains**

The list, complete with a narrative on each selection, can also be found on the U.S. Army Infantry Center’s Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/catd/history/index.htm (will need AKO login/password).
Handbook on Iraq
Now Available

PAUL D. PRINCE

A new handbook on how Soldiers can survive their first 100 days in Iraq is now available at https://call2.army.mil/new/toc.asp?document=2393 (will need AKO login/password).

Soldier Handbook: Surviving Iraq was developed due to the increased casualty rate during the first 100 days of a unit’s deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to Colonel Steven Mains, director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The handbook educates Soldiers on how not to become complacent to potential dangers and to be mindful of resourceful enemies who closely observe U.S. tactics to adapt their attack strategies, said Mains.

The handbook is based on responses from more than 1,700 Soldiers — captains, lieutenants and Soldiers from the ranks of staff sergeant and below. About 1,000 of the responses were taken from interviews with redeploying units in Kuwait and Soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Stewart, Georgia.

The Soldiers were asked questions pertaining to individual Soldier behavior, unit leadership, equipment and pre-deployment training.

“Our intention was to learn from the Soldiers what they thought contributed to their survival in Iraq,” said Milton Hileman, senior military analyst for CALL. “We asked them to focus their answers as if they were talking from one Soldier to another.”

The remaining responses came from a 23-question survey that CALL placed on its Web site.

“We were pleased with numerous responses we received from many of the Soldiers,” said Hileman. “The Soldiers in many cases were very insightful.”

“Several Soldiers came up to me after filling out the survey and said ‘Thank you for asking,’” said James Gebhardt, senior military analyst for CALL. “They had a sense of self-worth and self-importance.”

The handbook will be made available in paper format this month.

AIR FORCE TESTS NONLETHAL WEAPON SYSTEM

AIRMAN FIRST CLASS ERIC SCHLOEFFEL, USAF

Airmen of the 820th Security Forces Group at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, are currently evaluating a long-range, non-lethal weapon system that could eventually save lives in the war on terrorism.

The Active Denial System (ADS) is designed to engage and repel human targets by projecting a beam of energy that creates an intolerable heating sensation on the skin, said Tech. Sergeant John DeLaCerda, the NCO in charge of the 820th SFG advanced technologies section.

“Right now, we don’t have a medium between shouting and shooting when determining an adversary’s intent,” he said. “When operating ADS, you can be at a distance even further than small arms range and still repel an individual.”

The ADS beam is invisible and operates on a 95-gigahertz millimeter radio frequency wavelength that moves at the speed of light. The effect penetrates the skin at 1/64 of an inch which causes pain receptors to react. Once removed from the targeted area, the effect of the beam quickly dissipates.

“The pain is comparable to an intensified version of opening an oven and feeling the initial blast of hot air,” said Staff Sergeant Jason Delacruz, an ADS operator who has also been exposed on several occasions for training purposes. “The effects are extremely sudden, and natural instincts automatically force you to quickly exit the target area.”

ADS cannot be impeded by most readily available materials and is designed to be very discriminate.

While the effects can be unpleasant, ADS has undergone extensive testing since its inception more than 12 years ago.

Human effects experts have determined there are no long-term health effects associated with ADS, and research involving more than 600 volunteers and 10,000 exposures has proven there is a less than a one tenth of 1 percent chance of even a very minor injury.

The 820th SFG was the first unit selected to conduct the extended user evaluation portion of the advanced concept technology demonstration process. This process is designed to expedite the transfer of advanced technologies to the warfighters.

Some of the system’s intended benefits include helping troops secure base perimeters, checkpoints and entry control points, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and crowd dispersal, DeLaCerda said.

“ADS has been very effective, and we’re getting a lot of positive feedback,” the sergeant said. “Nonlethal weapons have a real role on today’s complex battlefield because telling the difference between combatants and noncombatants can be very difficult. In the long run, this can help limit collateral damage, protect the innocent, and save the lives of our men and women in combat.”
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission’s decision to move the Armor Center and School from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning, Georgia, not later than 2011 has resulted in a massive planning effort to transform Fort Benning into the future Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE). Guidance from the Army leadership was simple and straightforward: maintain branch integrity within the new MCOE model and ensure that there is no degradation in quality; the MCOE must meet or exceed the current training standards for all Soldier and leader development instruction currently taught at the two schools. Over the past 18 months, the Infantry and Armor Centers have been working very closely on the development of a new organizational design that will combine the Armor and Infantry Schools into a single MCOE located at Fort Benning. A Board of Directors (BOD) guides the planning and execution of the MCOE transformation. BOD members are Major General Walter Wojdakowski, Commandant of the Infantry Center, and Major General Robert Williams, Commandant of the Armor Center, their deputy commanding generals, chiefs of staff, director of the Armor School, director of Infantry Futures, school and center command sergeants major, garrison commanders, and their spouses. BOD members meet quarterly to review transformation progress, provide guidance to planning teams, and to resolve MCOE-related issues.

Planners from Fort Knox and Fort Benning developed a comprehensive campaign plan that outlined the end state and path forward for the development of the Maneuver Center of Excellence. In order to maintain branch integrity, it was decided early on that individual branch schools with proponency offices would be retained under the new model. All program of instruction (POI) training is being reviewed to determine which courses could be consolidated for more effective and efficient training. The Armor and Infantry Schools have already consolidated both the Captains Career Course and Advanced NCO Course. These courses are being taught at both locations with a larger mix of Infantry and Armor branch NCOs and officers in each class until facilities support moving the course load from Knox to Benning. A major change in the MCOE structure was the creation of the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), which will be a purely maneuver and capabilities focused organization. The CDID places all of the “futures” organizations under a single director to ensure integration and synchronization of all of their activities. The subordinate organizations of the CDI will be the Maneuver Battle Lab, Concepts Development Division, Requirements Determination Division, and TRADOC Capabilities Managers (TCM) for Infantry, Stryker, and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams. There will also be a TCM Soldier and a new TCM for Combat Identification. The three brigade combat team TCMS are also a major shift away from the traditional systems-focused management approach to one that will now concentrate on a formation-based organization. The new Battle Lab will combine the current Soldier Battle Lab with Armor Center experimentation assets into a single Maneuver Battle Lab. Concepts development and requirements determination will also include the full range of Armor, Infantry, and Soldier-related issues. The CDI directorate will be led by a Senior Executive Service (SES) civilian who will work directly for the Maneuver Center commander.

A Training Sustainment Brigade (TSB) will also be part of the MCOE organization and will provide oversight of all direct...
support to training events on Fort Benning. It is anticipated that the TSB will be commanded by an ordnance branch colonel and will be subordinate to the MCOE commander. Fort Benning will also transition to a Fleet Maintenance Initiative (FMI) concept for the execution of field maintenance, ammunition handling, and transportation for all training support activities. This initiative will involve the transfer of several hundred military and government civilian personnel spaces to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) for administration of the FMI program on Fort Benning. The FMI program will become an integral part of the Training Sustainment Brigade once it is activated.

In preparation for the stand up of the MCOE, planners from both Fort Knox and Fort Benning are developing a new Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that will quantify the number of personnel and the skill sets required to accomplish the MCOE mission. An MCOE Organization and Functions Manual is also being prepared that will clearly delineate the roles, functions, and responsibilities of all of the MCOE subordinate organizations. In order to ensure that the completed MCOE installation will be able to support all of the current training requirements of both the Infantry and Armor Schools, Fort Benning is in the process of developing a modeling and simulation (M&S) program that will allow them to visualize, through constructive simulations, the most intense training day it could expect to have once the MCOE has been established. This M&S tool will allow planners and trainers to replicate the maximum stress put on ranges, maneuver training areas, road networks, classrooms, and all of the installation’s quality of life facilities. The simulation will allow Fort Benning to identify any potential “break points” well in advance of the actual MCOE stand up and will also provide time to make any necessary adjustments to the campaign plan.

Over the next five years Fort Benning will see approximately $2.4 billion in major construction for additional ranges, barracks, troop medical clinics, vehicle maintenance facilities, a Combined Arms Collective Training Facility, child development center, headquarters buildings, and other infrastructure needed to support the additional students, cadre, and family members on the installation once the Maneuver Center of Excellence is established. Major construction is scheduled to begin after completion of a thorough environmental impact study which should be completed in October of 2007. Construction projects will be completed in phases with 2010 and 2011 being the primary completion years for the bulk of the new barracks, tank and small arms ranges, training facilities, and other quality of life projects.

The Infantry Futures Group (IFG) was formally established at Fort Benning, Georgia, in August 2003 as an integration and synchronization office under the Director, Infantry Futures. The primary function of the IFG is to perform staff coordination activities between the Concepts, Requirements, and Experimentation Divisions, and five different TRADOC Capabilities Managers, that are all subordinate organizations of the Director, Infantry Futures. During the past 18 months, the IFG has been heavily engaged in the design work of the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

**Army Seeks Ideas for MCOE Patch, Crest, Motto**

The Army is accepting design ideas through **March 31** for the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia and motto for the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

The Infantry and Armor schools will collocate and become the MCOE at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the next five years. The center will be responsible for all Army land-based maneuver training development, doctrine, and capabilities development for armor and infantry proponencies.

Personnel assigned to the infantry and armor schools will continue wearing current shoulder sleeve and distinctive unit insignias that reflect the contributions, sacrifices and spirit of each branch. Current and retired military personnel and Department of the Army civilians may provide input for just one or all of the items.

**Submission guidelines are as follows:**

**Requirements:** A clear, hand-drawn or electronic sketch of the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and a short, succinct motto. The motto must be written in English and is limited to 26 characters (letters and spaces). Individuals may provide a suggestion for just one or two of the desired items if they prefer.

**Format:** Designs should be drawn on paper or provided as electronic files. Electronic files should be in JPG or BMP format, and may be sent on diskette or CD-ROM via normal mail or as an e-mail attachment. All submissions must include the name, phone number, e-mail address, and mailing address of the individual submitting the designs and motto.

**Submissions:** Submissions will be accepted through March 31, and may be sent via e-mail (no larger than 3 megabytes) to:

**MCOE_Insignia_Suggestions@knox.army.mil**

Alternatively, input may be sent via normal mail to either:

**ARMOR Magazine**

ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A (MCOE Patch)

201 6th Ave., Ste. 373, Building 1109A

Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721

**OR**

Headquarters, U.S. Army Infantry Center

ATTN: ATSH-ATH

Building 4, Room 451

Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000

**Selection process:** Submissions will be screened by the Maneuver Center of Excellence Board of Directors, which is chaired jointly by the Chief of Armor and the Chief of Infantry. The most suitable and acceptable concepts will be considered for forwarding to the Institute of Heraldry for final production of the patch and crest.
CULTURAL AWARENESS

RESOURCES CAN HELP PREPARE SOLDIERS BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS

EDWIN B. NELSON

The car rapidly approached the checkpoint. The Soldier signaled the driver to slow down by pumping his hands palms down, arms outstretched toward the ground, but the driver failed to respond. The Soldier then signaled the driver to stop by holding his arms out and his palms up towards the driver; again there was no response. The Soldier then fired warning shots in front of the oncoming car, but the driver merely swerved away from where the bullets impacted and sped up. Interpreting this action as hostile, the Soldier then fired at the driver, killing him. Surviving occupants of the car said they were only trying to get away from a hazardous area. When questioned on why they did not slow down or stop, they said that they did not know what the hand signals meant and that they thought the first shots fired were intended to hit them but missed. To an Iraqi, the hand signal for slow down is to clasp all four fingers together with the thumb over them, palm up and extend your arm with the back of the hand toward the driver (See illustration).

The incident cited above is real; it occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1. It is an illustration of a lesson learned about an aspect of war that the U.S. Army has had to relearn in numerous wars — cultural awareness.

The Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu said, “Know thyself but not thy enemy, find level of loss and victory.” Cultural awareness is one aspect of knowing your enemy; it is also a force multiplier in ongoing stability operations in Iraq. Soldiers with knowledge of Arabic and appreciation of Iraqi customs and social mores are more effective in these operations because that knowledge gives them more options in situations requiring rapid decisions.

A large part of the insurgents’ fight against coalition forces consists of information operations (IO). These operations take the form of graffiti, posters plastered on walls, videos posted on internet sites, and word of mouth. Coalition forces must conduct their own information operations to defeat the insurgents. To make these operations successful, Soldiers must have some idea of how a message will be perceived by the Iraqis. Cultural awareness training is designed to provide Soldiers with basic knowledge enabling them to understand why an Iraqi might not receive the message intended.

RESOURCES

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has compiled a list of resources to assist commanders planning cultural awareness training for their Soldiers. These resources are posted on the CALL Web site (http://call.army.mil) under the heading “Training for War” and include the products listed below:

- Graphic Training Aid, GTA 24-01-003, Iraqi Cultural Awareness Smartcard. The smartcard is intended to be carried by Soldiers in a pocket as a reference. The card includes information on useful phrases, religion, etiquette, customs, cultural attitudes, gestures, social structure, ethnic groups and other information designed to keep Soldiers from making social gaffes.

- The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has produced several language guides with words and phrases spelled out in English, Arabic and phonetic spelling. The guides are oriented towards different military organizations (e.g. air crew, military police) or specific military operations (cordon and search, civil affairs).

- The Foreign Language Center of DLI also maintains a Web site called www.Lingnet.org. On this site, Soldiers can access more than 1,000 lessons in 13 languages from the Global Language Online Support System as well as area studies called “Countries in Perspective.”

- Rosetta Stone, a company that manufactures and sells computer-based language programs has developed a series of Arabic lessons for Army use. The program is run by Army e-learning and is accessible through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Portal. Soldiers can learn more about this program online at https://usarmy.skillport.com/rkusarmy/login/usarmylogin.cfm.

- The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, provides MTTs (mobile training teams) and materials, at no cost to the unit, that are focused on cultures in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The MTTs concentrate training on cultural awareness familiarization and predeployment preparations, with the assistance of Soldiers in MOS 09L (translator) and other experienced individuals. TCC provides an in-depth view of various countries, cultures, and their peoples. TCC can provide training in module form.
ranging from four to 40 hours based on unit requirements. The TCC Web site is http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/tcc/cultural/default.asp.

- CALL has published a report on how cultural awareness impacts battle command. The report is a discourse on how cultural awareness should be incorporated into the military decision-making process and training. It is the end product of a CALL collection and analysis team (CAAT) mission to Iraq for the specific purpose of examining how a commander’s knowledge of culture affects his success in battle and in subsequent stability operations. The report delineates how cultural awareness is a part of all lines of operation and examines methods of training Soldiers in cultural awareness at different times in the deployment cycle.

- CALL provides numerous links to papers on the geography, politics, demographics, religion and other area study information developed by the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).

A request for information (RFI) can be submitted directly to CALL if Soldiers do not find the information they need already available on the CALL Web site. CALL has also created a network of more than 40 analysts assigned to operational and institutional units. These analysts can assist a commander’s training preparations by researching lessons learned and compiling information on critical subject areas. (See related article on page 46).

Many wars produce tragedies like the one cited at the beginning of this article, memories of which stay with the Soldier forever. The purpose of these cultural awareness programs is to enable Soldiers to interact with indigenous peoples and eliminate some areas of friction, reducing the chance for future incidents.

All wars fought by the U.S. Army since the Spanish-American war have required Soldiers to have language skills and some level of cultural awareness. Cultural awareness training should be embedded into other training events as future wars promise to continue this trend. Continual exposure to foreign language and culture within the framework of normal training events will habituate Soldiers to the conditions prevailing when deployed. The end result will be that Soldiers are prepared to make rapid decisions based on sound knowledge and experience gained in training, averting tragedy in war.

Edwin B. Nelson entered the Army in December 1977. He served with numerous infantry units including the 1st Ranger Battalion, 101st (Airborne) Division Pathfinder Detachment, and the U.S. Army Sniper School. His last assignment was as command sergeant major of the 5th Ranger Training Battalion in Dahlonega, Georgia. He is currently a contractor working as a lessons learned analyst with the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Editor’s Note: The author recently completed an 18-month tour of duty in Iraq where he served at a logistics site, with a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, with a maneuver battalion, and as a personal translator and cultural advisor to the commander of Task Force Freedom, a two-star command. This variety of jobs was possible because of his fluency in Arabic and familiarity with Arabic culture. He wrote this article to help units deploying or already in Iraq as one Soldier’s perspective on what we are doing right and what we can do better.

Although coalition forces have been in Iraq for three years, there are still some commanders who do not fully understand the significance and the importance of cultural and human factors in the success of our counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. Commanders need to realize that the unconventional fight in Iraq evolves primarily around the Iraqi people, not the insurgency, since the Iraqi people represent the center of gravity in this fight. As long as they continue to base their daily progress solely on the number of terrorists killed and the number of suspects in custody, real progress will be delayed and the U.S. could be in Iraq for decades. As long as the coalition forces are reacting to the insurgency and failing to mobilize the Iraqis in this fight, then the insurgency potentially will be a long one.

So, how can we effectively mobilize Iraqis in support of the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq? The answer is very simple. Coalition forces need to do a better job preparing their troops culturally prior to their deployment to theater and then continue to do so while on the ground.

We cannot expect the troops to understand Iraqi culture in a one or two-hour PowerPoint presentation. The cultural training should represent a good portion of the troops’ predeployment training especially for maneuver and civil affairs units. During this phase, the troops should not only try to learn some basic Arabic words and some understanding of the religion, but they should also focus on becoming familiar with their new area of operation (terrain, history, tribes, ethnicity, level of cooperation, and prior coalition’s accomplishments in the area). In a perfect world, all this information would be readily available to the troops and their leadership prior to leaving the states by picking the brains of their counterparts in theater. Another option is to create an Iraq-Afghan center that effectively debriefs and collects lessons learned from troops and commanders returning from either OIF or OEF tours and then feeds this data to the deploying troops.

Cultural knowledge accrued during predeployment training will serve the troops well while they are conducting dismounted patrols, checkpoints, raids or when they are among the locals. Troops, commanders, and civil affairs staff will all benefit from the training since it will allow them to draw a fair picture of what to expect once they are on the ground and to better plan for their mission.

Once in theater, commanders should spend ample time interfacing with the locals and engaging their leadership in order to better understand what drives these people on daily basis. Is it the need for better security, employment, fuel, electricity, health care or eliminating corrupt government officials in the area?

During these engagements, the commanders and their staffs need to carefully assess the influence, capabilities, and qualifications of government officials and military leaders in the area. During my deployment, I witnessed several appointments of Iraqi officials such as mayors, vice-governors, chiefs of police and others that were based on family and political affiliations instead of qualifications. On the Iraqi Security Forces side, I met numerous commanders from both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police who were promoted from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel or from major to brigadier general, and then they were assigned to command specific battalions or brigades. Both scenarios never sat well with local Iraqi people. Commanders need to be on the lookout for these types of situations and try to avoid them before
they happen because it can easily damage the stability of the area of operations (AO).

While engaging mokhtars, sheiks, mayors and informal authorities and leaders, commanders should pay close attention to the number of visits and time spent with different local leaders in order to avoid any speculation regarding the commander’s favoritism toward certain tribes or villages. These social engagements are time consuming, require a lot of patience, and may even interfere with daily operations but are a key factor in the stability of the AO.

Once the commanders start interfacing with the local Iraqis and their leadership, it is mission essential to keep these channels of communication open at all times with the local leaders either through physical contact or cell phones/satellite phones (most Iraqi citizens have one nowadays). Commanders should meet with local officials on a weekly basis in order to share information and discuss the area’s critical issues from both the locals’ and the coalition’s perspectives and to determine how they can fix them. Throughout Iraq, the most critical issues are fuel, electricity, employment, and health care.

**Fuel**

As the Iraqi government continues to struggle with the fuel shortage and the increasing demand from Iraqi citizens for fuel, each AO requires a fuel control plan. A good method is to use the Iraqi security forces and local Iraqi officials in your AO in order to create a distribution plan of the fuel flowing into the gas stations. One plan that is very effective in the Tigris River valley area, which is located about 40 miles south of Mosul, is to use squads from either the local police or the army at all the gas stations to create order. This ensures a fair distribution of gas and, most importantly, eliminates price gouging and black market fuel in the area. This approach allows the Iraqi citizens to pump their share of fuel for the same price at all the gas stations without worrying about waiting all day in line to end up not getting any fuel because the gas station owner sold all his fuel to the black market merchant instead of to the regular citizens.

**Electricity**

Distribution of electricity in Iraq is uneven, unbalanced, and sporadic. For example, in Mosul some neighborhoods have electricity flowing through their lines for more than 20 hours a day while on the other side of the city, other neighborhoods only receive four to six hours of electricity a day even if the electricity in both areas comes from the same power plant. What is the reason behind this unbalanced distribution? The answer is either the insurgency or abuse of power by the local Iraqi government officials that control the distribution of electricity.

The insurgency is often responsible for the corruption of electrical wires or lines that feed electricity to certain neighborhoods because they are being used as safe havens by the terrorists. They do not want coalition forces to be able to use lighted streets and houses during night raids. Also, the insurgents shut down electricity in villages and certain neighborhoods at night as a signal that...
coalition forces are present in the area.

The second reason for irregular distribution of electricity is that certain Iraqi government officials live in certain neighborhoods and they pressure the engineer in charge to make sure that their town or their neighborhood gets continuous service throughout the day regardless of the shortages in other areas. In either case, troop commanders should get involved in fixing the problem, especially those involving the insurgency’s destruction of electrical wires, by recommending to their Iraqi security force counterparts that they increase patrols around power plants or even put a platoon/squad in each power plant. If the unbalanced distribution is caused by the selfishness of a local Iraqi official, the commander should try to resolve this issue with the local official and simultaneously push the issue through the chain of command, although it may take months and sometimes years for the Iraqi government to take corrective actions.

### Employment

The local Iraqis always get their hopes up for better employment opportunities when new units arrive in the area. Therefore, commanders should plan the mission of their civil affairs section prior to their arrival in theater. In a perfect world, a large part of the planning should be based on the feedback of their counterparts already on ground, since they are in direct contact with the Iraqi locals and have a good idea about project priorities in different sectors of the AO. This will also allow the civil affairs members to avoid the assumption that every village in the AO needs new schools, new roads, water projects, and the like. The reality is that the Iraqi infrastructure needs will vary from one village or city to another. So, an effective civil affairs plan should be based on the needs of different sectors in your AO including what your predecessors have accomplished. It should also cover any long-term projects that have been already discussed with the locals so that both the departing and incoming civil affairs teams will be on the same page.

Once the commander and his civil affairs staff have spent the first month interfacing with the locals, it is time to start discussing the project list for the area with the sheiks, mokhtars, and mayors. During these meetings, it is very important that the civil affairs officer explains that this project list is the result of coordination with the departing unit and is based on the feedback they have received from locals as well as the departing commander. In this way, the civil affairs officer shows that the local Iraqis’ feedback is very important to the coalition. This approach also minimizes the distrust that exists between the locals and the civil affairs staff when it gets closer to the transition period. Unfortunately, there were numerous incidents where units promised a village a certain project, but it never got off the ground because the incoming unit decided that it was not a priority for them or just didn’t want to be involved in any sort of civil affairs activities.

The civil affairs staff should put in place a fair and equal bidding process by which the local contractors may bid on a project. This process should give priority to local contractors over outsiders, but when an outsider gets the projects then he should be required to hire some locals to work on the project. This approach will ensure jobs in the area and allows the civil affairs to keep a close eye on the contractor through the local workers. The civil affairs staff should also pay close attention to the contractor that ends up winning project bids all the time because this will automatically send a wrong message to the Iraqis, who will ultimately interpret it as form of favoritism by the coalition toward certain contractors.

Units need to create a tracking system with the history of old and current contractors that civil affairs have dealt with or continue to deal with and the quality of their final product. It is important to pass these records on to incoming units. There have been incidents where a contractor starts a project but never finishes it and in some cases, just takes the project funds and disappears until new units arrive to the area. Then he goes back and bids on new projects and unfortunately ends winning some of them because the departing civil affairs failed to pass the contractors’ history to their counterpart. Lastly, the civil affairs unit should do a better job assessing the final cost of any project before it gets put on the list for bidding. According to Iraqi civilians, the coalition has overpaid on numerous projects.

### Health Care

Public health in Iraq is in free fall, and care is often triage at best. While Iraqi health care services continue to suffer from the lack of medical infrastructure, equipment and staff, the coalition commander should seize the opportunity to strengthen bonds with the locals by creating a medical assistance program that will provide the local Iraqis with basic medical needs. The program should consist of frequent visits of coalition medics to clinics, hospitals, and villages in order to conduct medical screening and provide basic medicine to the Iraqis. This visitation not only benefits the locals, but it also serves as a training session for the Iraqi doctors and nurses. The coalition medical programs should not become the primary care in the region, but they can strengthen ties with the local community.

During my time in Iraq I was able to observe various American, coalition, and Iraqi units. The most effective were always the ones with closest ties to the local community. The average Iraqi does not want chaos; he wants a chance to raise his family and insure a better life for his children. If we show him the way to do so, he will support us and not the terrorist.

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Sergeant Mounir Elkhamri is a U.S. Army Reservist who just completed an 18-month tour in Iraq. He is also a Middle East military analyst for the Foreign Military Studies office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has native fluency in Arabic and working fluency in French and German. He is a graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City and is currently working on his master’s degree in Middle East Studies.
INTO THE THOUGHTS OF JIHADIST LEADERS

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

The current global conflict against terrorism has compelled a new way of thinking about the curriculum and study of the military sciences. Books unknown among American military planners must be brought to light for they address the innermost thoughts of the adversary and his tactics, aspirations, and measures of success. Books, pamphlets and articles found from the alleyways of Arab cities to booksellers in major Arab cities become precious finds for those wanting to become a connoisseur of jihadist movements and countering violent Islamist extremists.

One book that was printed in 2002 and 2003 and is read by many Egyptian counterterrorism and law enforcement experts is Makram Muhammad Ahmed’s Muamara Ann Murajaatha: Hiwaar maa Qaada Al-Tataruf fee Sijn Al-Akrab (Conspirators or Reformers: A Dialogue with the Leaders of Extremism in the Maximum Security Prison known as the Scorpion). This work was published by Dar-Al-Shrook Printers in Cairo, Egypt. Ahmed is a well-known journalist who has taken on controversial topics for decades and was among those targeted for assassination by Islamists in the '90s. The failed attempt on his life led to his exploration and interviews of Egypt’s most notorious jihadists to find out, in their own words, what aspects of the Egyptian and Islamist experience led them to choose violence as a means of imposing their vision of an Islamist state. He argues that the jihadist movement of the 1980s-1990s caused fractious civil divisions among Egyptians and retarded economic growth, which in turn increased hardship among Egyptians; it has also stifled Egypt’s writers and intellectual life. Ahmed observes that: “jihadists are half ignorant and half educated, lost between affairs of religion and the real world.”

This essay will review Ahmed’s book and highlight those passages that are of use to American military leaders to help better understand the inner thoughts of a generation of jihadist leaders. Ahmed’s questions are probing, such as how can Islamist groups establish an Islamist government when they excommunicate whole swaths of (Egyptian) society? After all, it was the label of secularist that led to Ahmed’s attempted assassination at the hands of a youth, who had not read a word of Ahmed’s writings. The youth attempted to shoot Ahmed because a cleric labeled him as wanting to separate religion from the state, and every secularist is thereby an infidel deserving of death.

Ahmed’s Critical Observations on the Jihadist Movement in Egypt

Ahmed sees many opportunities within Egypt’s modern history for Egyptians to exercise the right to ask where the wrong lies between the government and the Islamists. What is the correct way ahead in addressing Egypt’s social and political problems? Finally, the key question is: why does a religious organization (The Muslim Brotherhood) that was established initially as a social organization resort to violence and murder? To understand these questions one must examine Egypt’s modern history and the opening salvos between Islamists and the government beginning in 1948. Discontent over the conduct of the first Arab-Israeli War led members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their military wing Al-Jihaz Al-Sirri (The Secret Apparatus) to conduct bombings in Cairo and attempts to murder government figures. Prime Minister Mahmoud Nokrashi ordered the disbanding of the Muslim Brotherhood and 20 days after the order, on Dec. 28, 1948, he was gunned down. This led to a round of arrests and retaliation ending in February 1949 when Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna was killed by Egyptian secret police. Ahmed opines that the really potent and violent elements and splinter groups of the Muslim Brotherhood did not emerge during the monarchy that ended in 1952, but when the group attempted to kill Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954. The severe crackdown of Nasser led to the radicalization of Egypt’s Islamist movement that burst forth in the assassination of Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat in 1981 and the violence that ensued through the '80s and '90s.

Ahmed is critical of President Sadat. He argues that the late Egyptian leader handed increasing power to Islamists by:

- Releasing imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members from prison to counter Nasserists, leftists, and Arab socialists determined to topple Sadat.
- Allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to openly conduct their activities, publish pamphlets, and radicalize the population to counter secular Arabs that were seen as a threat to Sadat.
- Amending the Egyptian constitution twice. Once in 1971 that made Islamic Law a primary source of legislation in the country. The second amendment occurred in 1981 and made Islamic Law the primary source of legislation in the country. Substituting “a” with “the,” in Ahmed’s view, was the most destructive aspect of Sadat’s presidency. Sadat compromised on this amendment to gain support for legislation reforming family law in Egypt, a program forwarded by Sadat’s wife, Hijan.
- Turning a blind eye to Islamist groups, which were dominating college campuses and enforcing Islamist dress codes on students, as well as imposing religious morality in towns in southern Egypt.

Sadat attempted in 1981 to regain control of Islamist groups, starting with the closure of the Islamist paper Al-Dawa (The Calling). He also reimposed the standing rule banning religious parties from Egypt’s political system. In an attempt to appear balanced, Sadat exiled the Coptic Patriarch Pope Shenoda III in Wadi Natrun in the Sinai. There is argument whether Sadat’s decision was to protect the Coptic Pope or whether it was designed to affirm the separation of religion from Egypt’s political life. What is clear is that Sadat attempted to crack-down on Islamist groups that had been unleashed for a decade in Egypt. Sadat’s
peace initiative towards Israel, violence against Copts and government officials led to the perfect storm that broke out on the military reviewing stand in Oct. 6, 1981—the date of Sadat’s assassination. It is in this climate the book introduces the biographies of the violent Islamist leaders incarcerated in Cairo’s maximum security prison, the Scorpion, known officially as cell block 992 of Tura Prison. There were members of the Gamaa Islamiyah (Islamic Group) Shura (Consultative) Council. Several prisoners interviewed were on death row, and most of those represented the military wing of the Islamic Group. It is important to note that the Gamaa Islamiyah was severely undermined in the mid-90s both by an outraged Egyptian public and virile security and intelligence services.

Incarcerated members of the Shura Council consisted of: Karam Zohdy, leader; Najih Ibrahim, strategist and ideologue; Safwat Abdel-Ghani, chief planner of the assassination of Prime Minister Rifaa Mahjoub; Ali Sherief, operational planner; Usama Hafiz; Badri Makhlouf; Mamdouh Yusuf; and Hesham Abdel-Zaher.

Incarcerated members of the military wing who were condemned: Hassan Al-Khalifa, Ahmed Bakri, Ghraib Hashaash, and Shaaban Huraidy.

An assessment of the 12 shows that five have bachelor’s degrees, one in engineering and another in medicine. The rest have the equivalent of a technical college education in business or trade school. All were born between 1953 and 1969, with the younger members being involved in perpetrating physical violence.

Ahmed’s Questions

Jihad as a means or an end?: The discussion begins with questions on the concept of qital (murder) and jihad (holy war). Zohdy, the lead jihadist, argues that many within the jihadist movement understand jihad and specifically martyrdom to be the only objective in Islam. Therefore, they sacrifice themselves without consideration to the benefits and/or damage this is doing to Islam. It is important to impart a public campaign that emphasizes jihad as a means and not an end. Safwat Abdel-Ghani, then takes up the question, saying that jihadist thinking has harmed the Egyptian society and economy and only caused rifts among Egyptians. In the end, it did not call people to Islam but damaged the faith even further. Other Islamic terms abused by the jihadist include hisbah (holding an individual accountable for acts of immorality and infidelity) and nahy ann Al-munkar (prohibiting vice); both are means of exerting societal control at the community level. Jihadists use these Islamic concepts not for the purpose of awakening a moral conscious but for exerting control over neighborhoods and towns. Prisoner Usama Hafiz led a discussion on hisbah (enforcing moral accountability), the concept of intruding upon one’s privacy with the objective of catching a fellow Muslim in an act that is considered to be morally objectionable to the individual doing the surveillance. Jihadists seek out immoral behavior and thus violate the Quranic words wa-la tajassasu (do not spy upon one another). Ali Sherief indicated that since jihadist groups establish secret cells then their message is illegitimate. He also criticized Islamist militant groups for making jihad the all-consuming singular issue in the practice of Islam, and expressed his guilt by saying that Islam is not propagated through evil. During the period of conquest, the incarcerated jihadist leaders discussed how the conflict was between armies in the field of battle and not communities and that Islamists have suppressed the Quranic injunction of not transgressing the bounds of warfare.

On Shariah Law: Shariah (Islamic) Law cannot be divorced from the realities of daily life; as apart of his revisionist thinking, Karam Zohdy advocated a reading of the Quran and Prophetic sayings both literally and then examining the realities in which these verses and revelations were imparted to Prophet Muhammad. It is vital to then look upon the issue of Islamic literalism, interpretations and then the realism of applying these laws in society whether in Prophet Muhammad’s time or now.

On Takfir (excommunication): Zohdy discusses how jihadists blur the lines of actual clear hostilities between nation-states like Israel and Egypt during the Arab-Israeli Wars, in which Jews were demonized with the encouragement of the government; the jihadist took this a step further applying this labeling of infidelity on Egypt’s Coptic Christians. Zohdy remarks that this was combined with taking the Quran selectively and applying the literal verses in an unrealistic way. One quarter of Egypt’s population is Coptic Christian, which makes their discrimination a social-ill for Egypt and a cause of sectarian strife. Usama Hafiz argues that the Fatwas (religious rulings) of Sheikh Bin Taymiyyah (1258-1327 AD) that demonize Christians, Jews, and Mongols were issued in dealing with certain historical pressures of the period and that Bin Taymiyyah cannot be applied in today’s situation. Bin Taymiyyah lived at the times of the Crusades and the wars between Mameluke Egypt and the Mongols over control of the Levant.

The author continued his discussions in a maximum security retreat in the Sinai known as Liman Prison in Wadi Natrun. There Najih Ibrahim summarized his views that ghilu (expressions of superiority) in Islam goes against the Quranic principle of fair dealings. Expressed in the 7th century in the metaphor of the merchant’s scale, one cannot uphold fair dealings when jihadists are quick to declare a fellow Muslim an infidel. Islam is a moderate faith. Islamist militants have taken the faith into a perverted extreme, and arguments by these ideologically rehabilitated Muslim jihadists from the older generation (that of Zawahiri and Bin Laden) offer a unique opportunity to develop counter-ideological campaigns against jihadist works, speech, and pamphlets.

Najih Ibrahim calls the doctrine of takfir a catastrophe in Islamic tolerance. One could also add that takfir is a cancer on Islamic thought and evolution. Takfir is also what caused the loss of public support for Islamists and radicals in Algeria, initially elected to government in 1992; they lost a sense of moral high ground when the Islamic Salvation Front and the current Salafist Group for Propagation and Combat excommunicated swathes of Algerian society and murdered women and children. When looking at Muhammad’s society in Medina, the rightly-guided caliphs, the apex of Islamic civilization in the 9th century, one sees that the Islamic
state is constructive and not destructive.

**On Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman:** In discussions over the blind cleric, his imprisonment deprived the Gamaa (The Islamic Group) of its spiritual leader, a man who could issue religious edicts and sanctions assassinations, mass murders and terrorist acts. Should he ever be released from federal custody, Najih Ibrahim, one of those Islamist leaders interviewed, said he was sure Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman would resume his leadership and activities in the jihadist movement.

**On September 11th:** Karam Zohdy reiterated to the author that the imprisoned jihadist issued a formal communiqué denouncing the attack, and further declared that the killing of merchants, children, women and, according to Zohdy, 600 Muslims in the World Trade Center is an Islamically illegal act. The leaders of Gamaa level the following charges on Usama Bin Laden for conducting the 9-11 attacks:

- The common good of the Islamic community as a whole supersedes that of a single group. The 9-11 attacks have damaged the Islamic *Ummah* (community) as a whole.
- It destroyed the Taliban regime and through this act undermined both the Al-Qaeda group and the state that hosted it.
- Bin Laden has undertaken an impossible goal by grasping at too many global Islamist causes in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Algeria, Kashmir, Tunisia, Libya and in France. The jihadist prisoners reminded the author that Prophet Muhammad did not undertake war on two fronts.
- Bin Laden undertakes jihad for its own sake and not to accomplish any realistic objective.

**Operations of the Gamaa:** Aside from the Luxor attack of 1997, there were plans to conduct an assault on the Opera Aida performance in the pyramids, but it was considered a hard target. *Gamaa* was behind the assassination of not only Sadat, but Speaker of the Parliament Rifaaat Mahjoub, the unsuccessful attempt on Information Minister Safwat Sherief, and the failed yet sophisticated attack on the current leader, Hosni Mubarak, in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. *Gamaa* in the ’80s and ’90s also undertook a deliberate targeting for specific and diverse objectives that included:

- Egyptian tourist sites to destabilize the economy and bring media attention to the group.
- Coptic Christian businesses and churches to create a split among segments of the Egyptian population and domestic instability; in addition, stolen funds from Coptic businesses are used to finance *Gamaa*’s operations.
- Deliberate attacks on police, security, and intelligence officers as a means of causing the state to increase its oppression and harshness against the people.
- Attacks on Egyptian intellectuals like the murder of Faraj Foda, and attempted murder of Nobel Literature Laureate Najib Mahfouz to suppress criticism of the need to establish an Islamic State in Egypt.

*Gamaa* was also among the principle groups that facilitated the transfer of young Egyptians to Afghanistan both during the end of the Soviet invasion and during the fight between the Afghan warlords.

**Discussions Continue at Liman Prison in the Sinai**

On a broader historical level groups like *Gamaa*, *Takfir wal Hijrah* (Condemn and Immigrate) and Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad were a product of Nasser’s crackdown and violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1954 to 1970. When President Sadat released many prisoners to counter leftists and Nasserists threatening his rule, many found the Muslim Brotherhood’s methods too liberal and founded their own smaller yet violent and radical groups.

Najih Ibrahim turned to discussing the problem of Muslim society and the obsession over small issues of Islamic practice that go beyond the basic pillars and the earning of extra blessings from God. This obsession has diverted attention to the larger issues of establishing a just and prosperous society, and solving the massive socio-economic problems that Egypt faces.

**A new concept from the Islamist prisoners:** Hamdy Abdel-Rahman, a *Tanzem Al-Jihad* member and member of the Consultative Council for the *Gamaa*, discussed the term *fiqh waqaeex* (realistic Islamic jurisprudence). This means interpreting Islamic laws in ways that take into consideration the realistic challenges of 21st century society, and not the other way around. He uses examples such as performing the *Hajj* (Pilgrimage to Mecca). Although it is a once-in-a-lifetime obligation, it is not to be conducted at the expense of financially burdening a family.

Getting into the ideological minds of the adversary is crucial in fighting the phenomenon of Islamist Radicalism. Author Makram Muhammad Ahmed, a Muslim intellectual, understood that this is a battle for who will and in what way Islam will be interpreted in the 21st century. It is vital that American policymakers and military planners review Arabic works such as Makram Ahmed’s and begin to seriously engage, find ways and enable Muslim moderates to defeat *takfiri* (declaring one outside the faith) ideology. Perhaps it is time to label this fight a war against takfiris, a concept used to sanction the murder of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims alike and which is prevalent in most jihadist groups. These series of interviews also bring forth in the words of major Islamist militant leaders the damage caused to Egypt’s society, economy, and people as a result of their actions. This message must be incorporated in any counter-ideological campaign against such organizations as Al-Qaeda and militant Islamist terrorists from Algeria to Indonesia. The future of American war studies lies in part in the many Arabic books written by or on Islamist militants; it is time to begin highlighting these works, discussing them, and entering into the vocabulary of the adversary.

**Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein** is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer who has been on special detail in the Washington, D.C., area. From 2002 to 2006 he was Middle East Policy Advisor at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He currently serves as a Counterterrorism Analyst. He wishes to thank PS1(SW/AW) David Tranberg, USN, who is an undergraduate at the University of Maryland University College for his valuable comments and edits to this review essay. The author wishes to thank the John T. Hughes Library for providing study space and reference books to work on this review essay.

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SLAYING THE PAPERWORK MONSTER

CAPTAIN THOMAS ANDERSON

Paperwork will always be with us. A deployed unit company commander will face many challenges, and his administrative responsibilities remain critical to the welfare of his Soldiers and their families. Poor management of personnel products, particularly in a combat zone, can be an incredible mission distracter, resulting in misallocated time resources and inaccurate Soldier administrative actions. There are several areas that require a commander’s attention to successfully meet the demands of paperwork in a combat zone.

Awards

The administrative task that most affects morale downrange is the Army awards system. The commander is the first-line approval authority for awards leaving his company, and his signature is the first on the back of the DA Form 638. Commanders must do their best to anticipate requirements for award submissions in three areas.

- **Achievement.** Before deploying, the commander should consider the requirements for awarding the various individual Army awards (including the criteria for awards for valor) to consider scenarios that he believes should result in a Soldier receiving a particular award. This will encourage the commander (and NCOs) to be on the lookout for actions that may merit special recognition. The Army’s awards system is highlighted in Army Regulation 600-8-22.

- **Service.** Every Soldier who successfully completes a tour in a combat zone is eligible to receive an award for his actions during that time period, as long as it does not cover any actions for which the Soldier has already received an award (AR 600-8-22). Typically, brigade and battalion commanders will establish general criteria for which they will approve service awards, including level of responsibility (not rank), service time period, and duty performance. To meet the desire for all service awards to be issued before redeployment and because of the high volume of awards in theater, initial submission of service awards can often be required by higher level commanders with only half of the deployment completed. Commanders should alert their platoons of this requirement and the necessity to record Soldier actions early on to prepare service award documents.

- **Post-Deployment Stop-Loss Departures.** To maximize time with family during the post-deployment recovery period, some commanders may require in-theater completion of PCS/ETS awards for those Soldiers departing the unit shortly after redeployment. Due to the new unit lifecycle requirements, some units could see as much as a 75-percent personnel turnover after redeployment. Finishing the requirements for their departure awards downrange, though an additional strain for the combat commander, ensures that both the Soldiers and the commander can focus on recovery (and not paperwork) upon redeployment. It also attempts to avoid the common mishap resulting in Soldiers departing a unit without receiving their PCS/ETS award.

OERs/NCOERs

Although the S-1 often will issue reminders and facilitate meeting deadlines, the commander is the primary person responsible for ensuring that his unit meets suspenses with regards to evaluation reports. There are many spreadsheet tools available that can aid the commander in determining his time hacks for OERs/NCOERs. Keeping an updated and detailed record of the performance of officers and NCOs he rates and senior rates will make for an easier transition when reports are required for unanticipated reasons (personnel moves, etc.). Of course, periodic written counseling performed by the commander will basically enable the OERs/NCOERs to “write themselves.” Important tools for counseling are DA Form 2166-8-1 (March 2006 - NCOER Counseling and Support Form) and DA 67-9-1a (Junior Officer Developmental Support Form). Honest feedback and evaluation, particularly in combat, will contribute to creating a more efficient unit by developing good leaders into great ones and counseling poor performers. Proper written counseling can often mean the difference between whether an unprofessional and incompetent Soldier is rightly chaptered out of the Army or merely disciplined and shuffled to another unit.

Casualties

The unfortunate reality of combat demands that the commander...
prepare for the issues that will arise when one of his Soldiers becomes a casualty. Standard Army procedure requires every Soldier to have two forms completed for use should he become a casualty: the DD93 (Record of Emergency Data) and VA Form SGLV-8286 (Service Member’s Group Life Insurance Election and Certificate). The company commander should keep a copy of each of these forms on file in his company headquarters as well as with the battalion S-1 office for use during casualty incidents. More information, though, is required during casualty situations than these forms provide. For instance, after the family has been notified of a Soldier’s non-life threatening battlefield injury, the commander may be required to call the family to personally inform them of the Soldier’s status. Neither the DD93 nor SGLV-8286 contains requirements for the Soldier to identify the phone number for his next of kin. Additionally, important information, like location and disposition request of significant property such as automobiles in the event of a major injury, do not appear on these forms. Several units have created unit specific forms called “Blue Books,” which are typically drafted by the unit S-1 and include requests for information such as the name of the Soldier’s bank and any specific desires for burial. This is especially important since many Soldiers do not create wills before deploying to combat. Soldiers should be encouraged to update the “Blue Book” at least once during a 12-month combat tour.

Leave/Pass
The Rest and Recuperation Leave Program is now a standard operation throughout the Army, and all Soldiers deploying on a 12-month tour will receive a standard 15-day leave to any destination in the world. Typically Soldiers are only authorized leave after 60 days in-theater and until 60 days prior to scheduled redeployment. Using that model, and the requirement that a commander must have no more than 10 percent of his force on leave or pass, the commander can draft a “tentative” leave plan for his company even before the deployment begins, thereby giving the families a general idea of when they can expect their Soldiers to return for leave activities. Those Soldiers with a specific family-oriented event, like the birth of a child, a wedding, or a child’s graduation, should be given priority in selecting a tentative leave date over other Soldiers. It should be stressed to the families, though, that mission requirements can always cause changes in leave/redeployment calendars, and those Soldiers receiving disciplinary action while deployed will not be granted leave privileges. More information on the pass/leave programs can be found at www.armyg1.army.mil/WellBeing/RRLeave.

FRG Letter
One of the most important things a commander can do “administratively” during combat is to maintain good written communication with the families of the Soldiers. This can easily be achieved by creating a mailing list for all the Soldiers’ families in the company. Some Soldiers may be initially hesitant to allow their commander to send letters to their families, but the pay-off can be immense in terms of morale for the Soldiers. Although they will not talk about their own heroic actions, Soldiers want their families to know about the good things they are doing on a day-to-day basis down range; a good monthly update letter can help their families understand the achievements of your company’s Soldiers. The battalion commander should typically give his approval before disseminating any letters to family members, and caution should be used against dispensing the letter over e-mail as it could be altered by someone else before resending.

Unit History
An administrative task often overlooked is the compilation of data to develop the unit’s narrative of its efforts in combat. The unit history and timeline that a commander creates about his company will be critical to his Soldiers’ recovery and rehabilitation after combat. During combat operations, the commander has the best perspective of the company’s combat operations — it is his company. Keeping a running journal of events from the command point of view, combined with Soldier input, media pieces about the unit, and after action reports, will result in a detailed reconstruction of the unit’s activities and accomplishments after the deployment is complete.

Ops NCO
Though not officially task-organized to an infantry company, designating an operations NCO will greatly increase a company’s ability to accomplish administrative tasks with ease. The commander should choose an intelligent Soldier with computer and organizational skills. That specialist or sergeant becomes the company’s liaison with the battalion S-1, as the commander and first sergeant will often be too busy with missions to focus significant attention on paperwork minutia. The operations NCO should be personally tied-in with the commander’s administrative systems to avoid duplicating work.

Given the option, few commanders would choose to execute administrative and paperwork tasks rather than combat and mission-focused operations. Spending a short time prior to deployment preparing the systems to effectively manage administrative tasks in theater will allow the commander to focus on winning the fight against the enemy, instead of becoming decisively engaged with spreadsheets and FormFlow.
All planning processes are based on a set of stated and unstated assumptions about the nature of the problem the process is trying to solve. The seven-step military decision-making process (MDMP) is no different. In an article written at the School of Advanced Military Studies titled “COIN Modeling: An MDMP Technique for Planning Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” author Samuel Hales said that the MDMP was originally designed for force-on-force battles between conventional combined armies. For the sake of this article I will make one critical assumption that will guide the rest of my work, which is that the asymmetric environment and the insurgent threat we face today is the face of warfare for the 21st century. The fluid, asymmetric threat environment we face today in Iraq will be quickly adopted by our enemies of the future. Simply put, asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not fighting fair. This can include the use of surprise in all its operational and strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways unplanned by the United States. Not fighting fair also includes the prospect of an opponent designing a strategy that fundamentally alters the terrain on which a conflict is fought. Insurgency warfare is a social movement that is willing to use force to achieve a socio-political end state within their perceived community. The aspects effective insurgencies touch incorporate diplomatic, information, military and economic means, and they do not present themselves in a linear fashion. The traditional courses of action (COAs) defined and developed in steps 3 thru 6 of the MDMP are devised to focus on specific pieces of military equipment or organizations as opposed to social and political aspects associated with a population.

Does the MDMP, as described in FM 5-0, adequately address challenges our battle staffs at the battalion and above will continue to face in the future? Our military clearly needs a tool that can...
effectively analyze the dynamics associated with the threat I have described. This process must facilitate planning as part of a cycle of continuously improving and adjusting COAs. The MDMP, as it exists today, is clearly not up to the task of supporting complex problem solving in such a dynamic and asymmetric threat environment. A staff process that is efficient, agile and incorporates a technological solution to visualizing the battle space is clearly an area we need to explore as we prepare for warfare in the 21st century.

The MDMP uses an analytical rationale to problem solving. It does not build on or incorporate experience and expertise, but rather builds on these analytical processes and is not a fluid or adaptive process. The seven steps of the MDMP each begin with inputs that build on previous steps. Each step, in turn, has outputs that drive subsequent steps. The process is detailed, deliberate, sequential and very time consuming. In the environment I have just described, time is a luxury our military can ill afford. As Napoleon was once quoted as saying: “You can ask me for anything you like, except time.”

Time being the most critical of all things, we need to do better. Time pressures which exist in all manners of warfare, but are especially prevalent in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight, degrade the MDMP significantly. Although there are provisions for a time constrained environment, this process is clearly supported by omission of steps from the original process. The commander performs many of them mentally or with less staff involvement. Thus, the abbreviated process is much more directive and limits staff flexibility and initiative. It is also less likely to explore all available options to the commander and increases the risk to an operation by overlooking key factors or options the staff may have otherwise addressed in each COA. Given the challenges we are destined to face in the COIN environment, a process that can only be made better by becoming worse is indeed no option at all.

We clearly need to take a critical look at the MDMP process and develop a means that is as applicable to the asymmetric environment as the MDMP was to the conventional fight. Leaders today need to uncover expertise among their staffs, know their people and have dedicated staff members assigned against asymmetric problem sets. Everything from the geography, buildings, media, religious influences, people and equipment must be focused on. Staff members must consider these dimensions collectively in developing and assessing friendly and enemy COAs and then present a recommendation to the commander. The key to a good solution lies in the ability to correctly assess a specific situation considering all the circumstances, especially since this assessment will guide the commander’s judgment about what is a good COA.

My final point, and the one that influenced the title, is that while the process itself clearly needs to be brought into the 21st century, so too do the tools we incorporate into it. Often, the most requested tool in any version of the MDMP process is that which helps participants visualize the battle space, such as an automated version of the terrain, detailed electronic map or enemy situational template (SITEMP).

Some means to rapidly sketch and disseminate the base COA is imperative. In order to enhance and streamline the process, it is clear that technology must play a key role as well. We currently have virtual simulations for small arms threat scenarios, tank battles and systems such as the engagement skills trainer (EST) and tank and aviation simulations that we incorporate into our training programs every day. We need to explore this dimension one level deeper and provide for tools that make visualization of the battle space easier. A technological advancement in the form of three dimensional modeling could easily streamline the MDMP. In fact, without much stretch of the imagination, it could perhaps even eliminate COA development, analysis and comparison (steps 3-5) altogether.

The threat environment in the 21st century will clearly continue to be associated with the asymmetric environment and the insurgent based threat. We must place a greater emphasis on the execution phase of future operations and the resources allocated against each of these priorities. The planning phase must be streamlined and compressed as well in order to help facilitate this. A staff process that is efficient, agile and incorporates a technological solution to visualizing the battle space is clearly a path we need to explore. The irony here is that these are not new concepts at all, and in fact General George S. Patton, Jr. once stated that, “Execution, rather than planning, amounts to 95 percent of mission accomplishment.” He also directed that army-level orders “should not exceed a page and a half of typewritten text with the back of the page reserved for a sketch map.” With a stronger process specifically designed to meet the complexities anticipated in future warfare and incorporation of technological tools to facilitate the process, our military can easily overcome some very basic challenges to the MDMP that seem almost insurmountable today.

Major Edward C. Wilson is assigned to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) G2. He is currently assigned as the battalion executive officer with the Special Troops Battalion in Kuwait. His previous assignments include serving with the 1st Armored Division, where he served as DS MI company commander and the G2 collection manager for Task Force Falcon in Kosovo. Other USARCENT assignments include serving with the G2, C2 and C3 training sections and assignment to Camp Buehring, Kuwait. He worked to develop the POI for the battalion and brigade battle staff seminars offered during the RSOI process in support of OIF, emphasizing counterinsurgency operations and counterIED training. Additional training includes work with the Joint IED Task Force and Task Force Troy at Camp Victory, Iraq, graduation from the COIN Academy in Taji, Iraq, and service as an instructor at Camp Buehring, Kuwait.

A list of references for this article are on file and available through Infantry Magazine.
The September 11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism have been teaching us a lesson which the military has long acknowledged. That lesson is that peace must be proactive. During peace, society needs to do those cultural things which would prevent war.

Cultural or social efforts preventing war include two points. One is to have a strong defense structure. Such military strength has global and local limits, but even Osama bin Laden knows and Saddam Hussein and al-Zawaqiri knew what our military could do. This is the reason bin Laden is still in hiding. The second is to be culturally involved, helping encourage people here and abroad to do good, and nonviolently correcting their misdeeds, where possible.

I shall examine four views of peace and war. These include naïve peace and hot war, peace as cold war, transitional peace and transitional war, and proactive peace. Taking the holistic historical perspective, I see an evolution. The world seems to be evolving from the first theme and toward the fourth one. Our current war on terrorism, including the conflict in Iraq, appear to be the third situation of peace and war, changing toward the fourth view.

Naïve Peace and Hot War
Naïve peace and hot war appear to comprise human history. One nation deploys uniformed soldiers to attack another country. The attacked country may be able to militarily respond. This ongoing process or peace-war cycle has included nonmilitary activities.

Spies, recruitment of civilian sympathizers from the “enemy” side, cutting off supply lines to the “enemy” military, and using various forms of psychological warfare comprise nonviolent or nonmilitary endeavors. No war throughout history has been completely a sudden, violent, military affair.

Naïve peace means that nations have taken pre-war situations for granted. The attacked nations have generally ignored situations in the countries which have attacked them. Enemy leaders, rulers to call for war against another nation, do not suddenly drop from the sky. They grow up learning and deciding that one day they must hit another nation. Their intentions and actions would not have been possible had the attacked countries been proactive instead of naïve. Had spies and overt social relations been in place in foreign countries, an enemy might not have evolved.

A peace which ignores potential enemies leads to hot war. One nation attacks another. The defending country seeks to militarily respond. Such response involves soldiers from the attacked nation to kill the uniformed military of the attackers. Once the killing and destroying are over, the defending nation feels the enemy is eliminated, and it returns to another naïve peace. This means the peace-war cycle is simply awaiting the next war.

What we see in naïve peace and hot war is akin to ignoring daily maintenance, and then responding or reacting to a crisis. But society tells us to do the opposite in many instances. We hear of preventive medicine, crime prevention, fire prevention, preventive maintenance. One day, hopefully the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq can help us see the need for terrorism prevention.

Peace as Cold War
The peace-war cycle (naïve peace and hot war) has been with us through World Wars I and II, and Korea. With conventional weapons, societies have had little difficulty imagining attacking, responding, and hopefully defeating the enemy. Killing the enemy has been seen as possible and necessary as a means of preserving the defending nation’s existence and future. Every invention including guns, dynamite, machine guns, aviation, radar, ships, and so on, changed the face of war.

Taking life and destroying property had historically been relatively easier. Technology helped the attacker become more powerful, and the defender more hopeful in surviving. Ironically, Just War Theory showed us that even conventional war would be unethical and required justification. Technology, it turned out, was socially and morally limited even before sophisticated weapons emerged. Nuclear weapons reinforced and extended that view.

The cold war redefined war and peace. Peace may or may not have been naïve (we
were seeking out Communists as we were not seeking out al Qaeda), but did become a tense situation, a cold war. Technology meant no longer simply another new weapon, but a quantum leap toward the unthinkable. Any attack would mean Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) instead of the destruction only of the enemy. The atomic and then hydrogen bombs meant something ominous. The attacking nation would fly bombers with nuclear weapons against another country which possessed the same planes and bombs. A response entailed a nuclear one where both nations could destroy each other, and bring about global disaster.

Technology taught us a lesson. War with conventional weapons required justification; a conflict involving nuclear, and then biological and chemical weapons could end civilization. No longer could a war be justified.

We have evolved from conventional war requiring justification, to the possibility of nuclear warfare where humanity could become extinct. Terrorism is now teaching us the ultimate lesson. Terrorists are forcing us to rethink peace, and thereby war. We have left the cold war, and entered a transitional peace involving transitional war.

**Transitional Peace and Transitional War**

September 11 was unique in history. A supposedly invulnerable nation was attacked. The target included not only the military (Pentagon), but also civilians (World Trade Center), but no visible military forces were attacked. The attackers were civilians, using box cutters to hijack civilian aircraft. What we experienced was an attack on our soil by civilian sympathizers and fighters.

The military, however powerful, could do only so much in Southeast Asia, before political and social forces restrained us. Vietnam was a transitional war, forcing us to see the cultural foundations of proactive peace. But Vietnam occurred “over there.” The war on terrorism started “here.” Actually, it evolved “over there,” in the Middle East as we slept for nearly six decades “over here” and “over there” since after World War II.

A transitional war is complex. The military takes on a social role with civilians and uniformed personnel. Civilians not associated with the military need to relate to foreign cultures. This type of war is showing us that conflict does not just occur. A dysfunctional culture enables people to learn to hate, and attack.

The attacked nation needs to respond with both military and civilian forces. Military forces attempt to take down enemy leaders (who train but will never themselves fight), and suicide bombers and other terrorists. In doing so, the uniformed soldiers learn they are dealing with social causes of conflict. Some in the military will need to enter combat, but doing so from a justified context. Others will need to socially and culturally help in reorienting potential and actual terrorists. Still others, outside the military, perhaps outside the government, have to engage in helping foreign people develop their country so that future terrorists do not emerge.

Transitional war does not aim to merely kill. Even hot war and conventional conflict could not do that: it was unethical and unjustified. The aim of transitional war is not merely to kill the enemy in a just war, but to help a transition from war to peace. This means a transition in foreign countries from dysfunctional (terrorist breeding) to functional (not terrorist breeding) environments. This type of war means transitional peace.

Currently, the Army is pointing the way toward change. West Point is preparing its cadets for a changing world where they will be linguistically aware and be leaders in political situations. Special Forces Soldiers take positions in town leadership roles. The Army continues to train its uniformed members to be world ambassadors, through cultural awareness. The Army’s Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) are doing an important job of rebuilding Iraq and other countries.

A transitional peace means that at home we can no longer take things for granted. Reject naïve peace. This leads to conventional hot war, can bring about a cold war, and will result also in terrorism. A transitional peace is coupled with a war that is putting us in transition toward proactive peace. Transitional war forces us at home to rethink our vulnerability, global social duties, and humanity. It is a transition toward proactive peace.

**Proactive Peace**

Peace is naïve, transitional, or proactive. Naïve peace leads to conventional war, peace as cold war, and terrorism. Transitional peace and war are efforts away from naïve peace and cold war, and toward a proactive peace. Proactive peace means that we are monitoring potential and active terrorists here and elsewhere. This cannot involve a dismantling of our military. Potential terrorist leaders need to know that should our social and cultural programs fail, their lives and futures are not rosy. They will always be on the run, in hiding, or be killed.

In monitoring potential and active terrorists, proactive peace encourages the innocent to continue doing good, and corrects misdeeds of the potentially violent. To many, proactive peace may be an ideal which we cannot attain in the real world. Civilians do most of the work; no violence exists requiring military activity. This does not mean we no longer need a military. A strong military is our safety net.

Additionally, a military means increasing emphasis on an integration of special operations and conventional strength. At the risk of offending many in the military, I argue for a change in terminology. What we term “special operations” ought be called “general operations” because Green Berets and others in special ops fight and train in diverse environments, relate to foreign citizens, and are generalists instead of specializing in land (traditional Army), sea (Navy), air (Air Force), or have an otherwise branch identity (Marines). Special operations can mean the five branches just named.

**Terrorism Prevention**

I argue for an interdisciplinary science or discipline of terrorism prevention. This compares well with preventive medicine. In medicine, we can first ignore our health and diet (naïve peace) and then require surgery (hot war). Second, we can ignore our health, knowing that our system cannot endure surgery. Going under the knife for a problem we create would kill us (MAD).

Third, a transitional health means that we ignore good diet, and an illness arises requiring serious, long term treatment (transitional peace and war). Hopefully, after years of neglect, we can one day
have good health after ongoing treatment and diet.

When does “treatment” stop? In real world terms, when we do withdraw troops from other countries? Technically, this cannot even happen in proactive peace. In transitional peace, the later, if at all, the better; the sooner, the worst. Indeed, why withdraw troops when we can build bases and house our military in case we need them for countering violence? Beyond violence, and in order to prevent future war, a base would be ideal for housing a permanent military doing civil affairs work.

During both transitional peace and war, and proactive peace, the military is a must. During a transitional period, the military is visibly taking lives. In proactive peace, the military exists in strength in the event that we fail in various instances to stop a terrorist emerging and attacking. Sam C. Sarkesian (U.S. Army, retired) and Robert E. Connor, Jr. (U.S. Army retired), point out in their outstanding book, The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century, that tomorrow’s military needs to be a priority, and integrate conventional and nonconventional forces. They said both combat and noncombat missions or goals are emerging realities in the “conflict spectrum.”

In an article in the November-December 2005 issue of Infantry Magazine, Colonel (Retired) Robert B. Nett speaks about our military as “Ambassadors to the World.” A transitional war requires that troops do more than participate in violence. They are in foreign lands to help other cultures survive, and turn potential terrorists and insurgents toward our side. These troops are giving metaphorical medicine to help heal foreign cultural wounds.

Michael M. Kazanjian is an adjunct instructor in Philosophy at Triton College in Illinois. He has written numerous articles on terrorism for a variety of professional publications. He has a master’s degree in Philosophy from Duke University. A list of references for this article is on file with Infantry Magazine.
THE NEW ARMY: REDEFINING ROLES
CAPTAIN JOSHUA GASPARD

As a young officer of the new Army with two yearlong deployments in the war on terror — Iraq and Afghanistan — I am amazed at the changes I see. From my first experience of the military during the summer of 1998 at the United States Military Academy to the present, I have noticed a growing difference in the operations and leadership of company-level organizations. Ten years ago, commanders would not have imagined that the training, mentorship, and development of young officers would primarily take place in a combat environment. The same commanders would find it unbelievable that these same young officers would conduct nearly all training in a combat environment — with the focus on near-term, combat-related missions. All units in today’s new Army encounter these small, yet powerful changes. The adaptiveness and agility of the new Army makes us all reevaluate our priorities to ensure we optimize all efforts to accomplish our missions in the contemporary operating environment.

The reach of the new Army is limitless. Techniques, tactics, basic operations, and even duty positions and responsibilities are in the ripples of the transformation. My personal experience as an airborne infantry headquarters company executive officer (HHC XO) during a recent 13-month deployment to Afghanistan is yet another example of the new Army and the vastness of its changes.

The purpose of this article is to show how the influences of the new Army shaped and ultimately redefined the HHC XO duties and responsibilities during my recent efforts in the global war on terrorism.

The transformation I experienced as HHC XO — in addition to my regular duties — was that I assumed the role of the special interest missions of the battalion. One such mission that was repeatedly executed was Village Medical Outreach (VMO). The VMOs allowed our battalion to reach the Afghan population through medical treatment and education, with an Information Operations (IO) influence.

The VMO missions proved to be the largest, most influential non-kinetic operations in our battalion. As the HHC XO, I assumed the role as the VMO commander. This was the most unique position because it involved the integration of more than 15 different skill sets to properly influence the population. With the brigade and battalion commander’s intent, I created the vision of...
the VMO to provide medical, veterinary, dental, mechanic, and humanitarian assistance to the local populace through all of the varying skills sets in our team. After overcoming the initial challenges of building the strategy and composition of the VMO team, we soon had a well-trained, efficient force that could conduct assistance missions in any sector and on any terrain by all forms of transportation to positively influence the population.

The vision of the VMO was to positively influence the populace to create the conditions for combat forces operating in the local area and facilitate intelligence collection. With our vision known, we developed a strategy to achieve results in our area of operations. Each village selected for VMO operations tied into current kinetic operations to assist in the intelligence collection and to foster the positive perception of coalition forces operating in the area. We wanted to maximize the effectiveness of the VMO missions in certain areas by executing them at the end of all large scale kinetic operations. The strategy was for infantry platoons and companies to conduct their operations to kill or capture anti-coalition militants and terrorists over a seven to 10-day period. Once the kinetic mission was complete, the VMO team would enter the area to show the populace that we truly cared about their well-being, while also trying to rid their country of terrorists and militants. The long-term strategy was that once we conducted these “linked-missions” several times in certain areas, the populace would develop trust and faith in the coalition forces. With the short and long-term strategies developed and understood, we had to build the VMO team to execute our strategy and influence combat operations.

To build a successful, well-balanced VMO team, our initial challenge was to find all of the personnel needed — the hardest part of this was getting the actual permission to resource the individuals who the VMO team required. Our brigade’s support battalion provided the majority of the personnel needed — medical specialists, optometry specialists, dental technicians, mechanic support, and veterinary technicians. Through our brigade and battalion headquarters, we requested civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPs) teams, public affairs office (PAO) representatives, tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams, and local national medical support (doctors and medics). The final members of the VMO team consisted of elements from our battalion: the security element and the VMO command and control (C2) element. The security element was always an infantry platoon either already on the ground at the future VMO site or at a predetermined link-up site. Its purpose was to escort us to the selected VMO site and provide site security throughout the duration of the VMO.

Always embedded with the infantry platoon were security forces from the Afghanistan government — Afghan National Police (ANP) or Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANP and ANA were combat multipliers for three reasons. First, they showed the populace that they were there to help and to ensure a safe and secure environment for the local population to get treated. Second, they knew the area. They were subject matter experts on the terrain and the personalities of the local leaders. They introduced the VMO to the correct local leadership to foster a great working relationship that facilitated any assistance we needed from the local leadership. Finally, the ANP and ANA spoke the native language. The VMO was only effective if we could spread the message of our purpose. The ANP and ANA conducted local patrols to inform the population of our arrival and to explain our capabilities during our visit. With the infantry platoon and the Afghan security elements, we had the combat power and security to operate in all conditions.

The final members of the VMO were the C2 element. I selected a highly capable communications staff sergeant to serve as the NCOIC. His primary mission was to supervise the execution of the VMO tasks, but his unique skills also allowed him to provide the VMO with constant communications to the battalion headquarters. With the VMO team assembled, we now had to communicate our vision and strategy to ensure successful execution.

The first task was to have an initial meeting with all members of the VMO — now called Team Village. At this meeting, we discussed the vision and strategy and what resources it would require to execute the upcoming mission. Besides the usual Soldiers’ load — food, water, ammunition, personal supplies, etc. — we determined what supplies each skill set would need to execute its mission with an expected customer base of 1,000 Afghans over the period of seven to 10 days. The medical teams submitted varying lists of medicines and supplies required. The mechanic team requested basic parts needed to fix local civilian vehicles, generators, and tractors. The Civil Affairs and PSYOPs teams created packages of humanitarian supplies and information products (posters, handbills, newspapers, etc.) to be distributed to the local populace. With the lists of required resources, we submitted the requests for approval by the brigade commander as part of his Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for funds to procure the necessary supplies.

With approval from the brigade commander, we had the personnel, resources, and the initial plan to begin the execution of Team Village.

With the personnel and resources in place, our first task was to bring Team Village together for our location-specific operations order. This one-page document provided all members of Team Village with the task organization, pertinent details, timelines, tasks, packing lists, and other miscellaneous information for the upcoming mission. The one-page format we used proved to be a great way to communicate the details of the mission to all members of the VMO. Additionally, the format clearly articulated the requirements needed from outside members of our battalion — Army aviation lift assets, Air Force fixed-wing support, and other agencies that might support throughout the course of the mission.

With the OPORD complete and understood by all personnel, we focused on final preparations. The first task was to pack all of the supplies and equipment. We learned that Pelican cases and two John Deere Gators proved to be the most effective transport technique during CH-47 air movements. The NCOIC tasked all VMO teams to pack their cases in an efficient manner so that upon arrival at the VMO
site, all teams could open their cases and immediately begin operations as needed. Once all cases were packed, the cases and other special equipment were loaded onto the Gators and strapped down for secure movement.

With the Gators loaded, our focus turned to individual Soldiers’ equipment and packing lists. Since many of the Soldiers were support personnel and had not experienced the rigorous Afghan terrain except on major forward operating bases (FOBs), we had to be very strict in determining Soldiers’ packing lists. Since we were transported to most of our VMOs by CH-47 helicopters, we did not have the time or space to have each Soldier bring excess personal equipment. We needed to quickly load and off-load the helicopters since we would be landing on semi-permissive landing zones (LZs). The NCOIC personally inspected all of the Soldiers’ equipment to ensure the Soldiers had the adequate personal equipment for the duration of the mission. As we executed more and more of the VMOs, the Soldiers learned what necessary gear and equipment they needed and quickly discarded any excess equipment.

Again, we knew many of the Soldiers had never left a FOB or flown on a helicopter so we had to include a few additional training opportunities to ensure all of the Team Village Soldiers knew how to quickly load and off-load the helicopters. The end state for Team Village was to be able to rapidly load and off-load all personnel, their individual equipment, and the two Gators with all of the medical supplies and equipment. Since every LZ we arrived at was different than the last, we needed to be well versed because it would be the infantry platoons on the ground providing LZ security, and time was our biggest enemy once on the LZ. We coordinated with the Army aviation units for static load training and to conduct rehearsals. The final training objectives for the VMO personnel were actions on direct and indirect contact, moving in a tactical formation from the LZ to the local coalition base camp, and any other Soldier tasks we deemed necessary such as communications gear usage, night vision device refresher, etc. With the necessary training complete, we were ready to execute the mission and begin to influence the Afghan population.

Upon arrival at the VMO sites, several tasks would occur simultaneously. The NCOIC would link up with the infantry platoon leadership to determine all aspects of our “visit” — where to sleep, latrine areas, trash areas, security concerns, etc. He would brief all Soldiers on the layout of where we were staying and any pertinent information. The most important initial task the NCOIC accomplished was the actions on contact drills. He articulated to all of the Soldiers what they needed to know if direct fire or indirect fire was received during our stay. He would assign the Soldiers tasks and fighting positions during any enemy contact. While the NCOIC briefed our FOB plan, I conducted leader link-ups with the platoon leader and the local leaders (district chief, police chief, Afghan National Army commander, etc.) to discuss our purpose and timelines of the actual VMO. The important point of the discussion was the resources we needed from the local leaders to make this VMO successful — a location, security forces, and efforts to spread the message within the community. Once the leaders recommended a potential VMO site, we conducted a small reconnaissance of the site to ensure feasibility before we decided to bring all Team Village leaders. While at the potential VMO site, I discussed with the platoon leader and local Afghan security forces about the basics on my expectations for security integration and support of the VMO. I explained my concept on internal and external security requirements, local patrols, and some stand-off security to help screen any potential threats along certain access points. With site selection complete and the initial security assessments understood, we needed to conduct the leaders’ recon of the site.

The leaders’ recon element consisted of the VMO command team, a security element, key members of each section (medical, dental, veterinary, mechanic, and Civil Affairs representative), and local leaders. The primary purpose of the leaders’ recon was to determine the specific layout of the VMO with all stations. We walked the proposed site and assigned each section the room or location they would use based on any special requirements they might need — paying particular attention to the female medical team. With the layout of the VMO determined, we finalized the integration of close and far security into the plan. The most important piece for efficient execution of the VMO was the “flow plan” of the site locations. This involved using the local national security forces to manage the flow of the patients to ensure no lengthy lines or “lost” patients. We discussed with the platoon leader and local national security element leaders how the flow inside the VMO site would work. We assigned escorts throughout the VMO site to maintain positive control of all patients. We determined the locations for the patient lines outside of the VMO site and how the local security forces would maintain control over the crowds and keep them in organized, orderly lines. The final step of the leaders’ recon was to reassess our security plan to ensure we had several layers of protection throughout the area to create a
safe and secure site for patients and the Team Village members during the VMO.

With the leaders’ recon complete and all respective elements knowing how their areas would look during execution, we needed to prepare all other remaining Soldiers for the execution of the VMO for the following day. The fundamentals were basic Soldier tasks. The NCOIC had all Soldiers prepare their individual equipment, clean their weapons, and pack the supplies. The element leaders briefed their teams on what the layout would look like in order to best pack the medicines for the following day to ensure rapid establishment. Once all VMO elements accomplished their internal tasks, we briefed the timelines for the following day and what the big picture setup of the VMO would look like. We always closed out the evening with a quick rehearsal with just the Soldiers to allow them a chance to visualize what the VMO execution would look like.

With the preparation complete, we eagerly awaited the execution. The first step of execution was the early establishment of the security element. The local national security forces cleared the area around the VMO site and created a wide perimeter. The infantry platoon followed up and ensured the area was safe for the VMO elements to move into position. Finally, Team Village initiated movement for the setup of the VMO site. Due to the leaders’ recon and rehearsals the previous evening, all VMO elements knew where they had to go. This led to an efficient and rapid setup. At this point, the NCOIC and I focused on fine-tuning the flow plan. We spoke to the local national security leaders for our final adjustments. We established the entry and exit points of the site and began to have any arriving customers file into lines. Our final step before we began the execution was the final rehearsal on site. We did this because many patients would need to see more than one specialist and that would require multiple lines and cause additional confusion inside the perimeter. We needed to identify those issues before the patients were inside the VMO site. With the setup complete, security in place and the final rehearsals conducted, we began to admit the first patients for the day.

Execution during the day often flowed smoothly and required minor adjustments throughout the day. During the execution at the VMO site, several other tasks occurred simultaneously. The PAO representative recorded our progress through pictures, interviews, and various discussions with Soldiers, Afghan security forces, and the local populace. The Civil Affairs team engaged the local community to assess any potential projects for the area, conducted village assessments, and distributed humanitarian supplies. The PSYOPs team conducted an aggressive information operations campaign through local patrols and interaction with the local populace. The tactical HUMINT team wandered from station to station within the VMO site to identify any Afghans who could provide any information that might result in future kinetic operations. These are only a few tasks these VMO elements conducted simultaneously to the medical and mechanic support at the VMO site.

With any operation come friction points that slow and disrupt the execution. A few friction points we learned consisted of extreme patient cases, additional medicine buys or shipments, and aerial cargo delivery drops. From time to time, we encountered some extreme cases of patients. We enlisted the support of any local national doctors to assist us and be able to direct the patient to the nearest major hospital for care. But in most cases, the hospitals were out of range of the patients and so we coordinated aerial evacuation for the patients to one of our major FOBs to then transport them to a major hospital. We learned to have a plan for extreme cases before we arrived at each VMO site. The Civil Affairs teams had the ability to make immediate purchases of medical supplies if we were short. The medical teams created a list and the Civil Affairs team ventured into the local bazaar for the nearest pharmacy to purchase the items we needed. This had two effects. First, it supported the VMO with the supplies we needed. Second, it supported the local economy and showed our interest in continuing to help the population. Finally, we often received humanitarian assistance through aerial cargo delivery systems (air drops). This was very resource intensive in personnel and equipment. We had to establish a security element on the drop zone and determine how to consolidate all of the supplies and equipment upon impact with the ground. The majority of this operation was handled by the Civil Affairs team. They were responsible for transporting the supplies off the drop zone and distributing the supplies to the local populace. Even though only three friction points were discussed, it gives insight into potential problems and the importance of forecasting and predicting any possible issues.

The final phase for the VMO was the shutdown. The first step was to cut off the line. If we were going to repeat the VMO the following day, we informed the population and dismissed them and told them when to return the following day. If that was our last day, then we triaged the patients in line and brought forward the
most urgent and assisted the others as we could support them. Once all of the patients were complete, we began the breakdown piece. Again, we focused the VMO elements into breaking down their equipment to allow for easy set up the following day. Finally, we had the VMO elements submit their statistics for the day and submit any lists of medicines they were short on in order to allow us to procure those for the following VMO missions.

The experience of my battalion in Afghanistan is unique in all aspects. I understand we are not the “norm” for battalion-level operations, but this article focuses on using a key junior battalion leader (HHC XO) to perform tasks often felt to be above his abilities. With the aggressive and eagerness needed to fight and win in the war on terrorism, we have to adapt our mentalities and focus on the new Army — the Army that will win the war on terror at the company level and below through young, combat-tested leaders. My battalion leadership realized this, and subsequently, the role of the HHC XO did change for our battalion.

We provided great support to the Soldiers, influenced the Afghan population, and killed the enemy as well.

Use this article as a building block to strengthen infantry battalions from a leadership perspective and as a combat multiplier against the terrorists and militants we face across the globe. Our battalion did not figure out how to win the war on terror in one year, but we did take the necessary steps to pave a little of the way for the Afghan people to take ownership of their country and get on the road towards complete freedom, and more importantly, show them that we care about their success and that we will be there for their continued progress.

Captain Joshua Gaspard is currently assigned to 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He has previously served as a platoon leader with 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (173rd Airborne Brigade) during OIF I and as HHC executive officer with the unit during OEF 6.

**TEAM VILLAGE - 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE Village Medical Outreach 03-05 (Zabol Province)**

**Executive Summary**

**Task Organization:** 1 x female medical team (3 x medics), 1 x male medical team (2 x providers, and 1 x ANA doctor), 1 x optometrist technician, 1 x dental technician, 1 x veterinary team, 2 x mechanics, 1 x tactical PSYOP team, 1 x civil affairs detachment, 2 x 5-ton drivers, 1 x female searcher, 1 x infantry rifle platoon for security, 1 x squad of ANA for security, elements of ANP at each location, 1 x interpreter support team (8 x interpreters), and company level C2

**Mission:** Team Village conducts a VMO in AO ROCK (vic Mizan, Qalat, and Sahjoy) 15 – 22 September 05 to engage local nationals through special skill sets in order to increase popular support for coalition forces and GOA operations and positively impact intelligence collection.

**Key Tasks Accomplished:**

**Medical:** The medical team provided treatment for 1,910 local nationals, to include 704 men, 703 children, 447 women, 7 ANA, and 49 ANP — with the ANA doctor accounting for 291 of the total number of local nationals seen. The medical team treated a variety of ailments to include malnutrition, parasites, malaria, dysentery, skin infections, body aches, anemia, dehydration, and several pregnant women needing an exam and prenatal vitamins to include providing baby formula.

**Dental:** The dental team conducted 95 exams (63 men, 10 children, and 22 females), extracted 108 teeth and distributed 560 dental hygiene kits to local nationals.

**Optometry:** The optometry team conducted 419 exams (273 men, 86 children, 59 women, and one dog) and distributed 186 pairs of sunglasses and 19 pairs of prescription reading glasses.

**Veterinary:** The veterinary team treated and distributed deworming formula for 965 sheep, 25 goats, six donkeys, and 14 cows.

**Maintenance:** The maintenance team repaired three ANP trucks, three civilian pick-up trucks, two civilian mini-vans, 10 taxis, three tractors, one dead-lined U.S. HMMWV, and one dead-lined U.S. 5-ton.

**Civil Affairs detachment:** The CA team conducted eight village assessments, two well repair project nominations, one water-well project nomination, the Mizan district HQ project nomination, and identified other future CERP projects in sector. Additionally, the CA team spearheaded the CDS humanitarian assistance recovery and distribution plan for Mizan and Manda (Sahjoy). They distributed 80 stoves, 160 bags of charcoal, 80 Halal MRE cases, eight cases of tea, 120 cases of water, 10 bags of flour, five bags of sugar, five bags of salt, 95 bags of beans, 90 bags of rice, 120 tarps, 36 bottles of oil, 160 pairs of shoes, 160 hygiene kits, four first aid kits, 10 teacher and school supply kits, and 240 blankets to local and village leaders and elders within the Mizan and Manda area.

**Assessment:** While in Qalat, we encountered a very aggressive and eager crowd. With the help of ASF, we slowly built the flow structure for our operation; however, what allowed us to expedite execution of our plan was a single Afghan man. He was guiding the Afghans to help the situation. When we asked him if he was a village elder, a police chief, or a government official, he simply replied that he was a normal Afghan. When we asked him why he helped us so much, he said, “My people, my country, my duty.” As I reflected on his statement, I began to notice things that were not as evident in the previous VMOs. Looking at the ANA, ANP, and district leaders, I could feel a larger sense of pride towards the mission. They did everything within their power to ensure our success — from managing massive crowds to assisting with the CDS drop and distribution of humanitarian products to conducting locals patrols — they would not let anything stop them. Slowly but surely, Afghans are on the path to success.

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OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE WAY WE’RE FIGHTING THE WAR IN IRAQ

CAPTAIN ROBERT MURDOUGH
Throughout my tour in Iraq, I suspect like many officers and NCOs, I questioned some practices, policies, and ways of thinking, looking for better ways to accomplish our mission. The single greatest trend I noticed was a widespread acceptance of the status quo without much in the way of new thinking in how we can do better. Realizing that muttering and complaining are essentially useless, this is my attempt to contribute to the military profession. Writing this article allows me to put into words the vague sentiments and opinions I’ve cultivated through the last 16 months based on conversations with fellow leaders, news reports, and personal observations. These are my observations and recommendations for changing the way the U.S. Army is fighting the war at the tactical and operational levels; I hope to contribute to a professional discussion that will result in new approaches to fighting the current and future counterinsurgencies.

The strategic level and political dimension of the Iraq conflict are outside my lane and well outside the span of control of a brigade, battalion, or company commander. The “why” of winning the war is none of our business; our job is to become very good at the “how.” For purposes here, the “operational level” should be considered the brigade and battalion levels, and the “tactical level” company and below. This article focuses on these levels. Also, I use the term “combat Soldiers” and “combat arms” broadly — including any infantry, armor, or artillery unit functioning as a maneuver element. In Iraq, infantry and armor units are performing identical tasks with near-identical equipment.

I believe that the war in Iraq can and will be won by battalions, companies, and platoons across the country taking on the hard tasks and figuring out how to overcome them, not simply being satisfied with the status quo or “steady state.”

Mission

The Army’s mission in Iraq is complex and daunting, and defining it clearly at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels has become increasingly taxing on military planners since May 2003. The greatest difficulty at the operational level has been translating strategic goals and directives into tactical tasks with definable objectives. The greatest difficulty at the tactical level is overcoming the preconceived notions of “what we should be doing,” educating the company-level combat Soldier on his mission, and how it is both similar and different from that of “conventional” warfighting.

The ambiguous, even euphemistic strategic goals in Iraq do not translate well into tactical objectives. However, as the purpose of this is to focus on operations and tactics, I’ll forego any discussion of national policy on the war on terror, the nation’s mission in Iraq, and strategic decision-making, and summarize the general “lines of operation” that have formed the nucleus of the neo-doctrine throughout Iraq:

- Neutralize anti-Iraqi forces (the current all-encompassing term for anybody anti-government, anti-coalition, or otherwise an impediment to the mission)
- Train and develop Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Patrol)
- Conduct civil-military operations by using military resources, including troops to physically and economically improve the civil infrastructure.
- Conduct information operations
INFANTRY are often priorities themselves, such as the training of ISF, civil-military operations, and governance. The Army as an institution has embraced the war we are fighting valiantly to keep equipment, training, and doctrine current and relevant. The unequivocal fact is that we are currently in a counterinsurgency, which is the requirement to conduct combined patrols with ISF. The logic is that the Iraqi soldiers and policemen will see “what right looks like” when they watch their American counterparts. These patrols accomplish that, and have the additional effect of bolstering the local citizens’ faith in their own security forces. It is a challenge for American platoons, who must deal with the friction caused by the Iraqis’ unsecured communications systems, lack of night vision equipment, and sometimes weak endurance, to say nothing of their often dangerously negligent weapons handling, but all of these are simply excuses not to do what is hard (also what is right). Combined patrolling — with Americans in charge until the Iraqis are truly ready to take the lead — is an excellent way to train and increase public confidence in the ISF.

The notion of a “platoon leader’s fight” in Iraq is applicable. Platoon leaders and company commanders are the ones doing the work, and success or failure rests on their shoulders. At the operational level, commanders need to articulate clear, definitive tactical tasks whose accomplishment supports the overall mission - not an easy task, but vital to avoiding the “steady state” status quo. At the same time, they need to provide raw, accurate, assessments of the ground situation to higher commanders (readiness of ISF, security of the local populace, etc.). For their part, tactical leaders need to embrace every aspect of their mission,
including the mundane civil affairs, the taxing training and mentorship of Iraqi soldiers and police, and the repetitive interactions with the local population — because there is nobody else to do it. No matter what is reported in the media, what is briefed by general staffs, and what is written about on storyboards, this war will be won or lost by battalions and companies facing the reality of the conflict we’re in, and relentlessly doing what is hard, doing what is right, and making their subordinates do the same.

Troops
We hear often in the media about how there’s “no front line” in Iraq. This is usually to explain why Soldiers in noncombat arms units sometimes come under enemy attack. However, this couldn’t be farther from the truth. Although there is no definitive “line” where friendly forces meet enemy forces, there is a definite, physical line that separates the combat Soldiers from the support Soldiers. It is known as “the wire.”

Service support Soldiers in this conflict are in fact safer than they have ever been in previous wars. Throughout Iraq are heavily fortified, usually comfortable, isolated compounds known as FOBs (forward operating bases). The perimeter is known to combat Soldiers as “the wire,” and it is a definitive line of demarcation — and there is a sharp division, at every rank from colonel to private, between the Soldiers who go “outside the wire” and the ones who stay on the base. This sharp division, arguably greater than it has ever been in previous wars, is the cause of some friction at the operational, tactical, and even individual Soldier level. When my unit first arrived in Baghdad, all the leaders received a briefing on the improvised explosive device (IED) threat particular to that city. A military intelligence NCO gave the briefing, and when one of the platoon sergeants asked a question about civilian reaction to IED detonations, the NCO responded with “I don’t know that, they don’t let me leave the wire.” Instantly his credibility with his audience was shot. Combat Soldiers are continually exasperated when service-providing units, such as finance, are only open for business for six hours a day. They can’t understand how, after they’ve been on an eight or 10-hour patrol with people trying to kill them, with another patrol 12 hours away, there are Soldiers collecting the same combat pay as them who only have to perform their one task for six hours a day.

It is possible to go an entire year in Iraq and never once see an Iraqi person, to chamber a round in a weapon, or even witness the unique combination of sights, smells, and sounds that is an Iraqi community. Even within a combat battalion, let alone brigade, there may be Soldiers who never leave the wire. Even at this level, there is a division between the fighters and the supporters. In one task force, the intelligence officer had never been outside the wire. When he briefed the enemy situation, he got the names of routes wrong. When he attempted to do analysis of the last day’s activity, it was either so obvious (“the last two IEDs indicate there is an IED emplacer”) or so wildly inaccurate (“believe that this area will continue to be outwardly hostile,” when for days troops in the area received nothing but smiles and waves), with no justifying intelligence, that he was essentially written off. Conversely, another task force S2 made a point of going on patrol with the task force commander as frequently as possible. When he spoke, people listened because he was able to speak intelligently about the area.

The best thing an operational or tactical commander can do to better the effectiveness of his Soldiers is to require that every member of his command depart the FOB as frequently as possible (there are very few people whose job requires them to sit at a desk 12 hours every day). Logisticians will better be able to plan supply convoys and recovery missions if they have seen the routes involved firsthand. Interrogators and intelligence analysis will have a far better understanding of the local culture and atmospherics by sitting in a room with their commander while he speaks to locals, drinking Chai tea and observing how they interact with guests and each other, than they will ever get from a DA pamphlet on Iraq. The JAG attorneys who review the detainee packets and are expected to know the vagaries of the Iraqi judicial system will be much more knowledgeable if they meet
regularly with Iraqi police investigators and Iraqi judges. Battle captains will know what information matters to commanders on the ground, and will avoid the temptation to bombard them with requests for updates if they see how complex the ground commander’s job is. And it will diminish, even erase the lines between the combat Soldiers and those whose principal job is to support the line units.

As for the support units, the Army has been trying doggedly to reduce the “tail to teeth” ratio (as is evidenced by the now ubiquitous civilian contractors performing all manner of support functions), but still only infantry, armor, aviation, and select artillery, military police, and engineer units are anywhere near the “teeth.” Those units with a viable combat function should be expected (and, logically, trained and equipped) to do it well — on a FOB and outside of it. Our brigade support battalion was phenomenal at this. Their mechanics, fuelers, equipment operators, and truck drivers — all service support Soldiers — would eagerly go wherever the mission required without a second thought. For seven months, they ran a 300-mile LOGPAC (logistics package) convoy weekly, with nary an infantryman among them. The Army needs to take an honest look at every job, every position, and determine whether that Soldier is really required to win the nation’s wars — and if not convert it into a civilian position and allow another of the total active duty slots to be a fighter, changing “tail” into “teeth.”

Administrative support units, such as personnel and finance, should be consolidated as much as possible, and tasked to support the combat Soldiers at any extent. In Tal Afar the personnel services detachment was far and away the best one I’d ever seen; they worked 24 hours a day and were atypically friendly and helpful. Six-hour workdays and weekends off are nonexistent for the fighters; it should be that way for all Soldiers in a combat zone.

**Enemy**

The enemy in Iraq is a diverse, adaptable, and patient foe. Though the enemy is a wide array of diverse factions with different ideological and political motivations operating independently of — and sometimes in opposition to — each other, their approaches to fighting the coalition are universally the same. In that regard, they can be monolithically categorized as one entity, currently dubbed anti-Iraqi forces or AIF. The Army has produced a great deal of information and widely disseminated it to the force to ensure that every unit enroute to or in theater is fully aware of the enemy’s latest techniques, strategies, and organization. However, though most leaders know how the enemy fights, many don’t fully understand how he thinks beyond the basic, “they want the coalition out of Iraq.”

The enemy has studied us, and he knows a great deal.

- He knows our rules of engagement.
- He knows where our unit boundaries are.
- He knows a unit’s average tour length and can tell when units are in transition.
- He knows it takes time to react to contact, especially from inside a vehicle, and he knows we’re reluctant to shoot into a populated area.
- He knows that he doesn’t need to win a single firefight to win the war — it’s not that kind of war.

- He knows that with each casualty (the more spectacular the better), public support for our mission back home erodes. He knows we won’t be here forever.

At the tactical level, the enemy’s preferred methods of attacking are, not surprisingly, those which put him in the least danger. Thus, IEDs, sniper fire, and sporadic small arms fire are his battle drills. In every case, the trigger man and his fellows have a certain way of escape, either by departing the area or blending in with the population. He’ll use these attacks to keep coalition Soldiers on edge. He’s fighting a war of attrition against us — slowly, patiently, one strike at a time he will try to attrit our national motivation, and cause a psychological effect against our Soldiers, making them reluctant to dismount from their armored vehicles, subtly shortening patrol durations, and causing them to avoid certain areas or zones.

The counter to this is simple — a defiant, aggressive demeanor and mind-set. Once, when walking down a major street, one of my Soldiers came up to me and said that the local nationals were telling us we shouldn’t be there, that it was a dangerous neighborhood. My response to that was, “that’s exactly why we’re here.” The mere presence of confident, armed Americans walking the streets serves as a deterrent. The enemy would rather take on a convoy of armored vehicles than a rifle squad any day. The convoy has limited visibility, restricted maneuverability, and slow reaction time. The rifle squad reacts instantaneously to enemy
contact, can go virtually anywhere, and most significantly, has a potential rapport with the local citizenry. Afraid of the fast moving, noisy armored vehicles, the average Iraqi citizen is overwhelmingly sympathetic to the kind-faced, friendly, congenial American Soldier.

We will never totally destroy the enemy. It’s not that kind of war. However, the way to defeat him is to neutralize him in the strictest sense of the word — to render him useless, meaningless, and impotent. The enemy understands that at the ground level we are fighting a war for the population — their trust, their confidence, and their support. A strategy of attrition may work against us, but it will not get us anywhere against the enemy. We can kill insurgent fighters daily by the hundreds and still lose the war if we don’t win the fight for the local population, which is the focus of the next section.

**Terrain and Civilian Considerations**

I combined these two aspects of analysis because of the nature of the war in Iraq (indeed, the nature of most counterinsurgencies). At the strategic and operational levels, the civilian population is the key terrain. Despite its overuse as a media sound bite, we truly are fighting for the hearts and minds of the local citizenry, and so is the enemy. Granted, in a raid, ambush or firefight, all the tactical principles of terrain analysis apply — observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, etc. But securing and holding terrain for the sake of holding terrain is meaningless. If a unit secures a route or an area, the enemy will flow around it (and, potentially, through it). The best effect a unit can hope to achieve is disrupting the enemy freedom of maneuver — by obstacles, checkpoints, and patrols. However, the enemy is not tied to terrain at all — he will go elsewhere and try again.

To the enemy, the civilian populace is everything. It is his base of operations, his cover and concealment, his source of supply, his moral and psychological support, and most significantly, his pool of future recruits. Denying the enemy control over the local populace denies him all of these things, and leaves him truly helpless, vulnerable, and combat ineffective.

Winning the fight for the local population is done with more than just bullets. The Iraqi people are, if nothing else, survivors. They will side with whoever offers them the best hope for the future. How do we convince them it’s us? That’s the challenging mission faced at the ground level, and one that must be embraced by leaders and Soldiers at the ground level. The lines of operation discussed previously must be advanced simultaneously in order to swing public support toward the coalition. In some cities and villages, this is being done tremendously well. In some, it is a resounding failure. In every case, failure or success results from platoons and companies on the streets, in how they interact with the local population.

The enemy has a number of advantages — his propaganda system is far more effective than ours. He is quick to capitalize on any successful attacks against coalition Soldiers and quick to decry any moral or ethical travesties (real or perceived) by the coalition. He speaks the language and knows the culture. He can use intimidation and coercion to his benefit, which the coalition obviously cannot do.

However, most of the Iraqi people know that the Americans are honest brokers, and know that they will at least receive fair treatment from us. That gets the proverbial foot in the door. From then on, success rides on the captains and lieutenants building relationships at the ground level, learning who the local leaders are in business, religion, and politics, and establishing a rapport with them. Once they have befriended the local leadership, they begin to work with them — as sources of intelligence, as conduits for the pro-coalition themes and talking points, and as a liaison between themselves and the local people.

Additionally, the coalition must show that they will help the nation get back on its feet, that the fledgling government offers them the best hope for the future. The enemy’s greatest resource right now is a virtually unlimited supply of unemployed, disillusioned young men. The men planting bombs on the sides of the road by and large are not the fanatic Islamic jihadists; they are simply young men who wanted a few thousand dinar to take care of their families, and saw an easy way to make it.

Battalions and brigades can deny the enemy this resource by a number of ways. First, simple security — the mere presence of an aggressive, vigilant coalition unit serves as a deterrent, causing many of those gunmen and bombmakers to think twice. Our policy in Mosul was to have at least one platoon out on patrol at all times. Coalition units can translate tactical successes into psychological ones, with the message that standing against the coalition isn’t worth it. This security has the second-order effect of making the streets safer, encouraging shop owners and businessmen to return to work. The third-order effect comes because safer streets for businesses means safer streets for customers, so the market demand increases, and businessmen hire more workers — meaning more people get jobs and the economy starts to grow. People with a steady job and money in their pocket are far less likely to take up arms and join the insurgency; they’re too busy providing for their families.

Another technique, applied with mixed success, are the civil-military projects done at the battalion and brigade level, which vary from infrastructure improvement to food distribution to cleaning and renovation of a public facility. Funding from these projects come from a variety of sources, both military and civilian, and serves the dual effect of improving the local infrastructure and infusing the local economy by hiring and paying local laborers. Two impediments to success of these operations are the failure to consider how useful these projects really are and institutional resistance to this type of mission. The projects need to be things that truly benefit the local population for the long term, not just something done “to feel good about ourselves.” For example, medical capabilities operations, where locals are treated by American military physicians, are extremely heartwarming and excellent public relations events but do little to improve the infrastructure or quality of life in the long term. Better would be renovating the local hospital and training Iraqi physicians — harder, and less eye-catching, but producing greater lasting effects. Also, there can be a lot of resistance at the lower levels due to the belief that humanitarian or other civil affairs missions “aren’t really our job.” While the funding, materials, and in some cases professional experts may come from another agency, the unavoidable fact that going anywhere and doing anything in Iraq requires an armed escort ensures that combat troops will have at least a supporting role in almost every endeavor. In short, it is our job, because we’re the only ones who can do it.
Yet, as discussed in the “Mission” section above, simple deterrence isn’t enough (a day where nobody shoots at you isn’t victory, it’s a patient enemy), and civil projects only temporarily jump-start the economy. In order to achieve a lasting effect, the coalition needs to accomplish the extraordinarily difficult task of imparting in the Iraqis a sense of civic duty and the rule of law, two concepts that have been foreign to them for decades. By the military, this is done at the grassroots level — spending hours upon hours talking to the local citizenry, educating them, engaging them in discussion about their society and their future, and slowly beginning to cultivate in them the feeling, taken for granted in America, that they have a responsibility to their community. This is extremely difficult, even exasperating at times, and requires almost infinite patience. The Iraqi culture of Insh’allah (“if God wills it”), apathy, ingrained aversion to difficulty, and resistance to altruism seems at times insurmountable. However, with a lot of persistence and a little luck, they will begin to assume that civic responsibility — I’ve seen company commanders succeed remarkably at this. The local citizens will start calling the police when a crime occurs. They will help the coalition and security forces root out the criminals and evildoers in their neighborhoods (denying the enemy his sanctuary). And they will reduce their need for the coalition to act as a deterrent force.

The fight for the local citizenry is more complex and requires a set of skills far more diverse than those required to seize and hold a piece of terrain. But the fight is just as real, and victory just as critical in this war as holding ground was in previous wars. And, ultimately, the victory will still be won or lost by the actions of Soldiers and leaders on the ground. It is also worth mentioning that Soldiers need to actually be on the ground to accomplish their mission. Some units, infantry and armor alike, show an aversion to dismounting. The Army is fond of saying that wars are not won from the air or sea; by the same token wars, at least counterinsurgencies, are not won from inside an armored vehicle. Sergeants, lieutenants, and captains have to get on the ground, talk to the locals in their homes and neighborhoods, and become ambassadors, diplomats, and detectives as well as warriors. Only then will the fight for the civilian populace — and the war — become winnable.

Time
Every unit’s tour in Iraq is finite. With few exceptions, most Army units are in Iraq for a year. Institutionally, this system works great; it ensures a continual cycle of fresh troops, infuses veterans back into stateside units to help their training and preparation, and helps with Soldier and family morale. But, with a unit’s redeployment tied to a calendar and not to any objective victory criteria, it lends itself to counting days or “marking time.” I am not recommending any change to the policy of yearlong deployments — it works very well for the Army as an institution. What is important is for a brigade to make the most of the year it has, and not be satisfied with just counting backwards from 365.

A year in Iraq goes by remarkably quickly. The beginning is filled with simply learning the nuances of a particular area of operations and getting into a battle rhythm. The end is filled with plans for redeployment, plans for replacement by another unit, and attempting to tie up as many loose ends as possible. However, there is a window of roughly nine months in which a brigade or a battalion can truly affect monumental change. Brigade and battalion commanders have enormous latitude to conduct operations as befits their particular areas of responsibility. Because fighting a counterinsurgency is a slow and time-consuming process, brigades and subordinate units need to quickly develop a campaign plan and then vigorously adhere to it, making the necessary checks and adjustments along the way. The intent for every combat brigade in Iraq at the end of its tour should be for the situation in its particular area of responsibility to be recognizable from what it was like when they arrived with respect to the enemy, the local population, the ISF, and the Iraqi government.

This requires leaders — every leader at every level — to work relentlessly toward victory, setting goals, achieving them, and then setting new ones, never satisfied with the current state of affairs. It is not easy, but war is not easy. When units find themselves in the grip of “groundhog day” syndrome, where every day is identical to the last, never making any forward progress, they are headed down a dangerous path of complacency and acceptance of the status quo. It’s an almost imperceptible process that can happen to the best, most well-intentioned leaders.

Despite yeoman efforts to ensure continuity between units as they replace one another year after year, there is always a temporary regression as new units replace veteran ones. The enemy recognizes the change and steps up his efforts. Unfinished business, if not of great significance, will often remain unfinished. The new unit has a period of getting acclimated, learning the particulars of its area of responsibility, and has to begin anew the process of developing relationships and earning the support and trust of the local population, and by then the unit has its own, freshly developed, issues with which to deal.

The imperative for every commander, then, is to do as much as he can in the time he is given, working toward the eventuality that someday the mission will be complete and another unit will not be needed. The litmus test is, “if my unit were to leave today, what would happen?” If the answer is “nothing,” then the unit has succeeded. My brigade commander’s philosophy was, “we are here to work ourselves out of a job.” That’s what eventual victory in Iraq will look like — when the government institutions, including military and police, function for themselves, when the local population doesn’t tolerate renegade insurgent groups, leaving them no sanctuary, and thus the coalition is no longer needed.

Captain Robert Murdough is an infantry officer and 2003 graduate of the United States Military Academy who served for 15 consecutive months in Iraq with the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in 2005 and 2006. During that period of time, he served eight months as a rifle company executive officer and seven as an infantry battalion mortar platoon leader. He served as part of an infantry task force and a cavalry task force in Mosul, Rawah, Sinjar, Tal Afar, and Baghdad. He was awarded both the Combat Infantryman’s Badge and Order of the Golden Spur.
One of the benefits of being an embedded advisor to an Iraqi Army battalion is it offers you the chance to form some independent observations about the environment and challenge what you read, hear, or see from people wearing the same uniform as you, but are outside of your own team. If you are willing to listen to the people who have lived here all of their lives, who have an understanding of why people here do what they do, why they live where they live (who understand how corruption and the black market work, how criminals here operate, how the enemy fights, what the people are talking about on the streets, etc.), you will learn things about the operational environment that you would not in a conventional assignment as a member of a task force. One of the things I’ve learned about the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight here in Mosul is that perception often creates reality.

We call it Information Operations (IO) or non-kinetic effects, but essentially it is about winning the battle over perception or winning minds. Some of this can be accomplished by showing reality for what it is; this might be through community engagements, IO flyers and other media, or just by being visible. However, other parts are more difficult and require a significant demonstration with material results in order to make them believable. For example, if you wish to change people’s perceptions about improvised explosive devices (IEDs), you might show them how IEDs impact their personal lives — unsafe neighborhoods, loss of profits, loss of wives, sons, daughters, etc. However, if you are going to tell people their government is working on their behalf, you better be able to back it up with examples of improvements in basic services, lower prices for propane, or decent opportunities of employment to counter the incentive for participating in criminal or terrorist activities. If there is a strong perception that these services are absent, you would be wasting your time and credibility trying to convince people who obviously know otherwise.

Creating the Perception of Being More Then You Are

Sun Tzu prized deception as means of unsettling the enemy and creating doubt in his mind. This is something the insurgent/terrorist elements also wish to do. It is a tenet of insurgent operations to create fear in the opposition, create doubt in the populace, and cause paralysis in government forces in order to create opportunities for exploitation. We can also do this to the insurgent, through what is referred to as “mirroring” the enemy. However, “mirroring” can be interpreted to mean “matching;” another interpretation might be “neutralizing” since the primary means of defeating an insurgency is to deny it public support.

If the enemy has freedom of movement, he can strike simultaneously in several locations as long as his goals are not tied to specific terrain, at a specific time. This makes it difficult to allocate resources to meet every potential threat. If we put an overt overwatch here, or employ some other static asset to target activity at that location,
The enemy picks a new spot, uncovered by the movement of coalition and host nation security force assets from one location to another. The enemy knows our resources are finite, and has employed information collection assets (people with cell phones) which blend in perfectly with their environment against the places where we base combat power, or along those entry and exit points we must travel as we come and go. He uses civilian patterns such as work times, population movement times, vehicles that appear indistinguishable while observed from helicopter or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) altitudes because they understand we use aerial platforms to direct maneuver units. Their intent is to create confusion and provide further opportunities for their operations.

The enemy here concentrates on coalition MSRs (main supply routes) and to a lesser degree ASR (alternate supply routes) with SAF (small arms fire) and IED ambushes. He understands our requirement to maintain the primary lines of communication (LOC). The enemy also understands that by attacking those LOCs he will draw coalition forces’ (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) combat power to them and away from the neighborhoods where the populace lives, giving him more freedom to influence the critical human element.

This is no secret to the enemy’s ability to predict our intentions; he has watched us rotation after rotation. He knows how we move, when we move, etc. He now has an institutional record of how a company, task force, or brigade combat team (BCT) will progress through their year in Mosul. The enemy understands the evolution of our reactions over a year rotation, and as such they often seem to be two steps ahead of us. Because of the changes in Baghdad which required the second BCT here during our rotation to go south, we got to watch another BCT arrive on station. The action, reaction, counteraction, counter-counteraction cycle were almost the same. Differences in TO&E (table of organization and equipment) and some changes in the proficiency of the ISF kept it from being exactly the same, but the enemy did try and feel out the new unit much as we saw them do with the last one. We often establish patterns unconsciously even when we try not to. Sometimes we even do it on an organizational basis.

If we continue to confirm their expectations, we will telegraph our intentions and expend resources while he moves his operations from one location to another; this allows him an advantage to stage a second or third attack. If he doesn’t seize the initiative, we cede it to him by playing to his strengths. However, if we change the rules, by taking advantage of their expectations, some of their strengths become a weakness. Imagine the leader for an IED emplacement cell who does not get one or two phone calls about the location of a coalition or Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police patrol, but gets 50 saying the patrol is in 12 neighborhoods instead of two by redirecting patrols to generate more spot reports; or through gaining access to their network. What type of operational picture does that confront the enemy with? What conclusions does he make about where to go, his chances of success (meaning he collects his money, and lives to do it again), or his chances of getting to a site among all the patrols he believes are operating out there?

A capability sorely lacking is ISF human intelligence (HUMINT) and covert operations. What if ISF could infiltrate AIF networks with ISF moles? This opens up options not available to western coalition forces. Consider the damage that could be done to an insurgent or terrorist network from inside. Such capabilities reside in other states, and even in the U.S. we take this approach with fighting crime, but we have not developed it in the ISF to the degree where it is a practice at the local
level. Consider the IO effects of information obtained through undercover operations where an AIF cell leader made it clear that he was unconcerned about civilian casualties, regardless of age, gender, profession, religion, etc.; the counterinsurgent forces could use this to wage an effective IO campaign that called into question fundamental Arabic values such as honor as the apply to the enemy. Consider the evidence for trial!

Even though the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) are getting better and stronger through better resourcing and training, they would still be pressed to be exactly at the right spot at the right time on a consistent basis without compromising some other location. If you focus solely on “Tier 1” sites (known for specific activity), the activity at those sites will migrate. This is where a combination of pattern analysis, which indicates likely migration sites to be used against the intended targets, and an increase in the frequency of patrols to cover those and other areas will help to create the perception of failure or compromise in the minds of the insurgent/terrorist. At this point you are targeting his will to conduct the attack. It does not mean you will stop all attacks or that he will not adapt and change his tactics, but you have changed the dynamics of the situation and reclaimed some of the initiative. This is just one example of creating a perception in the enemy’s mind that causes him to doubt what he believes to be true about his assumptions on how we operate.

Another possible method is to get ahead of the enemy’s decision cycle by showing him what he thinks he should see, or is used to seeing, then taking another action which results in his neutralization, defeat or destruction. You might do this through a combined ISR and maneuver plan that overtly covers tier one sites (the goal here is to fit the mold of the guy who did the same thing before you), while covertly covering Tier 2 sites far enough away to not be compromised by local information collectors with cell phones, but close enough to direct some type of effects once the enemy commits. If you can tie it to a time window and a known favorite target, so much the better. The object is not to target the location of the activity; it is to target the activity.

Keeping the enemy off balance requires constant adjustments like innovative variations of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) such as flash TCPs (traffic control points), TCZs (traffic control zones), overwatches, etc. It requires guarding against setting patterns in routes, patrol times, duration of TCPs, force protection practices, and even in such areas as detainee handling and transfer. Every aspect of operations must leave some seed of doubt in the insurgents mind in order to keep him from being mentally prepared for what he will face. It must change constantly because each variation of a TTP has a shelf life in a given area before the enemy adapts and innovates. To gain and retain the initiative, the opponent must be kept off balance for gravity to have any effect. It requires a constant assessment and reevaluation of what friendly, enemy and neutral forces are doing in order to stay ahead of the enemy’s decision cycle.

The Venus Fly Trap & the Lantern Fish: Predator Mimicking

There are a number of ways to make the insurgents wonder if we have helped the ISF develop as fully as we should, either because they are uncomfortable to our conventional sense of things, or we are institutionally ignorant of them (it could be forgotten knowledge as well). If the insurgent seeks to make our life difficult by blending in with the population, then we should do the same to him. If the impression is that there are insurgents who are really covert/undercover counterinsurgent forces out operating amongst the population, then what impact does that have on his operation? Who does he trust? Is the guy on the cell phone calling in a patrol or just talking to his cousin? Is the guy running a kiosk or is he part of a neighborhood watch? This is another aspect of attacking his will, and one in which we are culturally ignorant as a military. While big city police forces use such tactics against organized crime all the time, our military does not think along those terms (probably because unless we use surrogates, we would not blend in). The ISF, and for that matter other indigenous security services in current and future COIN environments, do have that capability and we should encourage them and resource their exploitation of it. Anything that causes the insurgent to doubt what he sees gives us an advantage.

Where the Mind Goes, the Heart Will Often Follow

We know that stability and security are joined at the hip. We also know that we will have no long term solution for either without public confidence in the government as an adequate provider of basic services and freedoms where people can at least tolerate life. One of the tools that the insurgent uses against security forces, and one that unfortunately puts the burden of proof on government and its organs, is to discredit the government by pointing out their inability to improve the situation fast enough. The insurgent only needs to create the impression that the government could do more, but chooses not to because it does not care about the people it is supposed to serve in order to draw away public support from the government.

An example would be the propane shortage. The terrorists took advantage of a 500 percent increase in the cost of propane by
declaring it the fault of Apostates of Islam (you see this type of language a good deal in AIF propaganda) and killed a few black market propane salesmen to make their point. They then got bonus points out of it by accusing the government and its security forces of being corrupt and weak because either they were clearly profiting at the population’s expense, or they were too weak to do anything about it. In truth the problem is very big, ranging from production to delivery in an unstable security environment to a black market that expanded to meet the demand. However, the perception that the insurgent was trying to cultivate was a much easier sell, because it provided an explanation the majority of the public was more likely to accept.

The combination of propaganda with murdering a few propane salesmen further exacerbated the problem by spreading terror amongst the black marketers, so then there was almost no propane inside of Mosul for about a month, black market or otherwise. The government and its security forces at that point were forced into a complicated position and deprived of the initiative. The AIF takes one or two aspects of a problem, then they look for enough evidence that could support the perception they seek to use to influence enough people to gain traction. That is how influencing perception works: it doesn’t matter what the truth is, only that it is believable enough or convenient enough for the target audience to ingest. In this way it’s not too different from a savvy ad campaign, political pundits, or the 6 o’clock news.

Once public support is withdrawn from the government, it is often by extension withdrawn from government institutions (such as the army or police) or the known allies of the government (such as the United States). Once this occurs the insurgent then has ideological freedom of movement which paves the way for physical freedom of movement, or to paraphrase Mao’s metaphor “fish amongst schools of fish.” This is where stability and security are linked, and any solution that relies on security alone either develops into a tyranny or falls victim to the insurgent because it becomes a war of attrition of wills (will to see it through, will to persist, and demonstrated public resolve).

The obverse of this is to tie the activities of the insurgent/terrorist to the decline in the government’s ability to provide for the populace. It requires both a dynamic IO campaign that captures every act of terror and weaves it into a campaign fabric where the actions of the insurgent are seen as preventing the government from fulfilling basic obligations to the people. The goal of both sides is to gain and maintain public support for its operations while denying it (along with its benefits) to the other side. It is the perception of how hard government is working, the perception of how corrupt it is, or the perception of who can provide security and who cannot that determines who the people will support; and who they will not.

The effects of perception are not limited to the battle for public opinion. A great example of CF perception that might generate adverse action is lack of situational awareness of local or national events that fail to show up on our radar. While everyone waited for some type of event to mark the verdict in the Saddam Hussein trial, there are other events that slipped by. For instance, on a day where AIF had conducted a linear ambush initiated with an IED and declared it the fault of Apostates of Islam (you see this type of perception) and killed a few black market propane salesmen to make their point. They then got bonus points out of it by accusing the government and its security forces of being corrupt and weak because either they were clearly profiting at the population’s expense, or they were too weak to do anything about it. In truth the problem is very big, ranging from production to delivery in an unstable security environment to a black market that expanded to meet the demand. However, the perception that the insurgent was trying to cultivate was a much easier sell, because it provided an explanation the majority of the public was more likely to accept.

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Another example in today’s stage of Iraqi Freedom might be the planning of a unilateral CF operation in battlespace that is supposedly transitioned to the Iraqi Army. The CF partner unit puts out TCPs with a task to block all non-CF traffic. Meanwhile, the IA ADC (assistant division commander) and his staff, who were enroute to attend a meeting with the CF ADC, were turned around at a checkpoint that they had no idea was there because the coalition partner unit failed to inform the IA of the locations, or allow them to pass through even though they were in clearly marked Iraqi Army HMMWVs and Toyota Land Cruisers. What is the perception of the Iraqi Army, or the civilians who witnessed it and why is it important?

**Application for Now and Future COIN Environments**

When developing an indigenous force, the organizational structure and capabilities should not be built on what is convenient, or familiar, or comfortable unless they match the
problem at hand. This is both a cultural and an institutional problem exacerbated by resource constraints (time, training, equipment, etc.). We should not be constrained by institutional bias, but instead should try to look beyond the immediate problem; even if we can’t implement the right solution at the time, we should at least acknowledge the need for growth in new directions to provide that indigenous force with the tools that make the most use of its organic potential and highlight its natural strengths. In this way we provide the basis for a security force that can function without the capabilities we augment them with, and at the same time neutralize insurgent strengths.

The lack of tools within an organization that is structured to conduct COIN should be built around the objective of securing the public will and denying it to the insurgent/terrorist. This means equipping that organization with the tools to influence minds such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, covert information collection, and a good analytical capability to turn information into timely and targetable intelligence for a well-trained strike force. These capabilities, when joined in one organization, produce a synergistic COIN force that can gain and maintain the initiative, and hand the enemy a moral defeat. For U.S. forces the challenge is to adapt our own organizations structure and integrate those capabilities faster then the enemy can.

I believe one of the central objectives of Mosul AIF is to create conditions through perceptions that either improve their overall regional and national position, or allow them to maintain a long term base of support for later development. Their strategy seems to be to continue to diminish the effectiveness of ISF and CF as representatives of alternative government to what they — the AIF — purport to offer. The AIF seek to accomplish this through economy of force attacks (ambushes) to focus our attention and resources on MSRs/ASRs which prevent us from interacting with the public, working to provide the services which would positively influence public perception of government, and winning public support. They will then use the opportunities to gain freedom of movement and influence within the population areas.

Consider the face we show when we do go into populated areas to conduct cordon and searches of entire neighborhoods; what was our motive for doing so? Are we only reacting in the way that we’ve been taught in the CTCs (combat training centers) or from lessons learned by 2003/2004 because we’ve failed to understand the enemy’s evolving use of the population? Has the public that we aspire to influence seen these types of reactions before in a coalition force unit and do our actions mark us the “occupiers” the AIF paint us as?

If we cordon and search/knock an area because its adjacent to a Tier 1 site, does the public there see it solely as a retribution type response to our losses to IEDs or as genuine concern for the improvement of life there? Are we symbolically being seen by the public as only looking to confirm our suspicions of guilt by association? If all we are doing is confirming the suspicions seeded by AIF, what is the incentive to risk the wrath of the AIF? What are we demonstrating to the public to expect from representatives of the government? Have we missed the intent of the AIF tactics by thinking their primary goal is to inflict casualties on CF forces, not influence the people? Are we creating opportunities for the AIF will to issue propaganda to reinforce or twist public perceptions to their own needs?

I think the only way to really discern and counter the AIF here in Mosul is to get out in front and truncate it. It is going to take a lot of resources, and it can’t be a trickle; it has to demonstrate it on a large scale that AIF cannot react to fast enough. It means a campaign plan for Mosul that links security with stability. The problem is that while TFs and BCTs are resourced for security, the large resources required rest with the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) and OGAs (other government agencies). Without stability and security being linked the best we can hope for is a delaying effort in a war of attrition of public support.

To do this we’d need some tools like a census of:

* Who lives where;
* How many hours of electricity they receive a day;
* How much they pay for propane, benzene (Mogas) and kerosene;
* How long they wait for gas;
* Do they have clean water;
* Do they have enough food;
* Do their kids go to school;
* Do the military age males (16-40) have jobs; etc.

If you get a feel for the human factor, we may be able to operationalize a campaign that actually exploits resources where they are needed by neighborhood, etc. We’d need to coordinate with local leaders such as muktars and sheiks so that it is not perceived as an attempt to collect information for military purposes of isolating a group or tribe.

While every city in Iraq has some like and unlike conditions in it, Mosul has provided some great lessons about the need to consider perception in a COIN environment where the key battleground is the human heart. Counterinsurgency solutions are ultimately the victors of a contest of ideologies that are perceived by the population as being the best alternative for them to follow and support. It is a battle for the will of the people.

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Terrorism, IO, kinetic actions, etc., are all the tools and tactics used by one or both sides to influence that perception. If you deny the insurgent the population, he must retire, negotiate, or become limited to more clandestine activities until he can exploit another weak government and offer an alternative and begin the cycle again. Understanding the people’s perception of actions and events can make all the difference in applying the right resources at the right place at the right time to achieve the objective.

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**Major Rob Thornton** is the executive officer/S3 advisor for the 1/2/2 Military Transition Team (MiTT) in Mosul, Iraq. His previous assignments include serving as operations officer in the FBCT Experimental Element at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and as a staff officer and company commander in the 1st Brigade, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, Washington. He also served as an XO and platoon leader with the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

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FOCUSED OPERATIONS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME IN A MATURE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

MAJOR OLIVER MINTZ
SECOND LIEUTENANT TORY HOUSE

“The Insidiousness of Organized Crime

Conditions in a peace operations environment allow for the robust application of conventional forces toward information collection. This collection could be focused against organized crime (OC) in a manner that allows the continual exploitation and reduction of OC as an obstacle to societal progress. While the daily activities against OC are typically police actions, the long term effect of OC poses a substantial threat to a safe and secure environment, and the growth of a stable government and economy. It is imperative that leaders in peacekeeping missions understand the nature, environment, and targeting of organized crime.

In peacekeeping operations, intelligence is the most vital of all commodities. It drives all operations, and all operations should be conducted, at least in part, to gain more of it. As conditions in both Iraq and Afghanistan evolve and move toward a future of peace operations the Army would do well to look forward and reexamine the conduct of such missions. Currently, the best example of how Iraq and Afghanistan may look in a few years is Kosovo. Admittedly, the cultural differences are many, but the multinational environment focused on maintaining the peace and assisting civil rebirth is likely to be very similar to an Iraq of the future. It is important for leaders at both the tactical and operational levels to understand some of the particular dynamics of that situation, which of these pose the greatest threats to civil instability, and how to combat them.

In peace operations the situation is often ripe for the success of OC. A number of particular conditions exist, beyond the obvious lack of police support and other corrupt individuals who would support OC. A fundamental understanding of these environmental conditions will prove helpful to commanders as they array their formations to enforce the peace.

OC is not a problem that affects only the economics or politics, or legal systems, or reconstruction efforts of a region; it affects all of them. In the former Soviet states OC has become an integral part of the economy and is a tremendous hindrance to their emergence into the modern political and economic world. Pervasive OC has a number of effects. Fundamentally it prevents the growth of legitimate economy where legitimate businesses compete for business and the laws of capitalism and economics govern the market. This symbiotic relationship is the building block for many other functions.

Legitimate businesses establish a link of accountability with the government, according to Fareed Zakaria in his book The Future of Freedom. That linkage functions as such: businesses grow and generate revenues, these revenues have a multiplier effect, and all of that income generated is taxed by the government. By levying taxes the government then becomes accountable to the business class who can rightfully demand improved transportation networks, security, beneficial trade policy, and many other ways in which a government enables economic growth.

OC networks do not operate within this framework. OC proceeds are largely cash and are not taxed. They do not compete fairly, but rather contribute to the growth of markets that operate outside of honest capitalism. They contribute to instability and insecurity which discourages foreign investment (a staple of ignition for emerging nations). In order to protect their interests they can very easily corrupt the law enforcement and legal systems due to the meager wages often paid to public servants, and particularly so in emerging nations.

Without question an ineffective or corrupt judiciary prevents the function of legitimate rule of law. In addition to not meting out just punishment it brings discredit upon the local police. The average
citizen, who sees a wrongdoer arrested and then back on the street days or hours later, makes the connection that the government did not do its job. Oftentimes, the populace lacks a fundamental understanding of the particulars that govern the functioning of the system, and the laws by which the police must abide. A judicial system that cannot or will not prosecute offenders not only keeps dangerous individuals on the street, but lessens the power of the police in the public’s eyes, according to Cesar Beccaria’s 1764 work On Crimes and Punishments. This perception has a cumulative and negative effect on the perceived ability of the policing arm, and begins to make their job that much more difficult.

Oftentimes a judiciary fails due to internal corruption, or on a more practical level, because of the sheer caseload. Lack of experience in managing dockets, controlling evidence legitimacy, and enforcing distinctions between hearsay and testimony all contribute to the practical failings of emerging judicial systems. Societies emerging from upheaval and under control of international organizations or multinational coalitions are often at the behest of many masters, and are subject to complex processes and regulations. Additionally, political infighting, which often goes unchecked as outsiders try to either allow the process owners to solve their own problems or smooth political feathers, slows the appointment of judges or resolution of cases. The actions of the judiciary are often guided by other forces related to OC. It is possible for the OC groups to intimidate judges, or simply buy a favorable decision. Whatever the reason, the real result is a negative perception of the local police as the judicial system often struggles to keep up with the caseload and overcome the corrupting influences of OC.

When a government does not or cannot provide for its citizens, people will work outside the system. This is a fundamental breach of social contract theory. Social contract theory posits that individuals in a society subjugate their individual rights in return for security and a better society. This idea is an underlying premise in the governmental system of most developed nations. States in transition often function in a breach of this contract. For states that have been struggling to emerge out of the third world, even the average person is forced to commit minor crimes simply to get by; buying black or grey market goods, paying a police officer or official to process paperwork, or paying an inspector to overlook a minor deficiency are but a few examples. Thus, people become complicit in the corruption, and corrupt themselves. This activity becomes so ingrained in the daily fabric of life that “organized criminals” are often thought of as simply efficient and organized businessmen. Moreover, the populace becomes dependent on the black or grey market goods and services, and actions taken against organized crime negatively impact the populace’s standard of living. While most of these same people would otherwise favor the rule of law, their need to maintain what is often a minimal standard of living trumps that preference. This type of corruption can be characterized as “functional corruption” wherein people pay for an illegal product or service. In emerging nations this is often viewed as capitalism. This is in contrast to “dysfunctional corruption” where officials are bribed or coerced into looking the other way while an OC violates a fellow citizen’s personal or property rights. The key difference between functional and dysfunctional corruption is the introduction of a victim.

One of the hallmarks of a legitimate government and system of justice is the monopoly of the use of force to enforce law or government policy, according to the article “Mature Peacekeeping Operations as Facilitators of Organized Crime” by Irv Marucelj. A notable example of a government failing to maintain this power is in the case of the Colombian government and the narcotics kingpin Pablo Escobar. If a government does not have the mandate and ability to utilize overwhelming force then OC can violently exert themselves to fill this vacuum. This becomes particularly dangerous when the government that is usurped by OC is going through a period of transition of limited sovereignty (“Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Security” by William L. Smith).

In emerging societies OC often maintains the ability to use force to settle disputes with the local populace, other criminals, businessmen, and law enforcement and government authorities. This ability to use force, without fear of judicial retribution, can range from direct action attacks to the threat of force against business rivals and judicial figures.

This situation is brought about by the weaknesses of governmental authorities as described above, and is exacerbated by the ubiquity of weapons. The ownership and use of weapons is in all likelihood not a new phenomenon. Likely, previous governments or regimes were unable to protect the populace who were thus forced to arm themselves for various reasons. This goes hand in hand with the pervasive public attitude that selective lawbreaking is an accepted part of life. This fact, coupled with the reality that a fallen totalitarian regime can lead to a loss of control of weapons accountability, lead to a situation where weapon possession is a part of daily life.

In many respects OC operates just as a legitimate business, and the public often sees it as such. This creates a number of additional hurdles. In terms of economic and business theory, OC moves into markets where there is both a customer and a need. OC fulfills that need; after all, nature abhors a vacuum. OC experiences a growth cycle like a normal business, and becomes integrated into the economy. As they grow they seek to set favorable conditions for their success by currying the favor of politicians and decision makers. Unlike legitimate business, OC violates the “felicitation principle” wherein the aim of laws and governance is to give the greatest happiness to the largest number of people in a society. Instead, OC is self-serving, closed to outsiders, and focuses on the baser desires of its markets. Just as legitimate businesses carry goods in inventory, so do OC groups. Typically this inventory expands beyond legitimate products and into narcotics, prostitution, protection rackets, counterfeiting, and theft of intellectual property.

One of the largest obstacles to overcome in terms of a successful information operations campaign, against both the criminals and the populace, is the notion that criminality is acceptable as a way of life, and is in fact a necessity to a life of any worthwhile quality. In the example of Kosovo, and the former Yugoslavia in general, it is the widely held belief that the government should provide the
necessities such as electricity and water. When the government fails to provide these things, the average person can more easily rationalize turning to the black or grey market or other nefarious methods; he might think, “The government isn’t helping me so I have to help myself.” This mindset becomes so pervasive that criminal networks have literally “incorporated” it.

Just like any entrepreneur, organized crime networks are drawn to good markets. However, a good market to a criminal entrepreneur includes both a good market (i.e. a place where a seller meets the needs of a buyer) and certain favorable market conditions such as a weak judiciary and a populace willing to conduct business. Such market conditions often exist where there is an ambiguity of law enforcement responsibilities, or during a period of transition to increased sovereignty. Once in these markets the growth of organized crime networks will go through a growth cycle much the same as a legitimate business.

Such businesses may arise from local criminal entrepreneurs who see an opportunity in their local area, from established criminal networks within the region, or worldwide (i.e. Chinese gangs in New York). This influx of criminal outsiders is not unlike the globalization of legitimate businesses. This criminal globalization takes place using the same tools and systems, namely ease of worldwide travel and the advantages of information technology that connect the globe. Once established in an area, criminals will set up supply chain and distribution systems, carve out, and expand their markets. They will continue to expand and solidify their market share against criminal competitors, law enforcement, and military forces conducting peacemaking or peacekeeping operations.

They will do this through both legal and illegal methods. They will compete traditionally in terms of price and meeting legitimate and illegitimate needs of buyers. They will also hedge their investment using strong arm techniques from general thuggery, including menacing, coercion, assaults, outright attacks, and intimidation against all parts of a competitor’s supply and distribution chain. An atmosphere of fear is established so that these tactics, along with solidifying their sway with leaders, ensures that they will retain the freedom to grow and run their business.

The lobby business in Washington is a multibillion-dollar industry. Any major corporation hoping to successfully compete will seek to influence the conditions that affect its business environment. Pfizer spends huge sums attempting to gain favorable rulings from lawmakers, and Wal-Mart has spent many a day in city board meetings trying to alter local zoning laws. In fact, third world criminal networks are rank amateurs when it comes to gaining political or legal ruling favorable to business. However, the big difference is revealed when it comes to methods. It is safe to say that Ford Motor Company has not fired an RPG through a judge’s window to gain a favorable ruling in a lawsuit. Admittedly, in developed nations there are those who engage in extreme and illegal acts to gain favorable political actions. However, they are on the extreme fringe of the normal pattern of business. In an environment characterized by ongoing peace operations, criminals maintain the threat or actual application of force as a tool to achieve their political and legal ends. Although their means may differ from the accepted standards in the U.S. or Europe, the goal of an OC group is the same as a legitimate businessman; the acquisition of wealth.

Despite looking and acting like a legitimate business, OC is, in fact, a cancer that prevents the growth of that very thing they pretend to be. Understanding this fact and the impact of OC is the first step toward building a plan to combat it.

**Conditions for kinetic intelligence collection**

In contrast to the operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, troops in Kosovo and other peace operations enjoy relative freedom of maneuver; currently referred to

_A car belonging to individuals associated with criminal activity is searched by Kosovo Police Service officers under the watch of Kosovo Force (KFOR) Soldiers in Letnica, Kosovo._
as a permissive environment. There is little risk or cost associated with a mission anywhere in the region, as the likelihood of direct attack is next to nil. This freedom of action creates the conditions that are ripe for collection against OC.

The chance of any criminal launching any type of attack against peacekeeping forces is extremely unlikely for a number of reasons. OC thrives on blending into the population and being invisible to military forces, who are often concerned with other threats as well. Criminals maintain this anonymity by fully cooperating, almost to the level of patronizing, with the military forces. To launch an attack would be bring a storm of attention that would negatively impact their business in the worst possible way. Moreover, OC factions lack the manpower and firepower to overcome military forces in a protracted fight. Worse for them, to do so could likely taint their reputation within the local populace, on whom they rely to sustain their business. This is particularly true in Kosovo where KFOR is held in high regard by many of the Albanian majority. It is often in the OC group’s best interest to simply wait for the peacekeeping forces to forget about the group and move on to other missions.

Forces available to the commander in modern peace operations are often limited. Peace operations, by their nature, are manpower intensive. Coupled with increasing political pressure to get troops home as soon as the combat phase of operations has ended, in peace operations commanders must fight with an economy of force. Despite a high troop-to-task ratio, conventional forces can be dedicated to intelligence collection.

The term “presence patrol” has made its way into the military vernacular. While some would argue that “reconnaissance and surveillance” patrol is a more accurate term, the fact is many patrols are merely presence. Presence patrols reassure both potential wrongdoers and the law-abiding populace that their remote location has not been forgotten. While these patrol leaders have been briefed on their collection requirements, those requirements usually take a backseat to presence.

By sending patrols to actively collect, the focus of the patrol leader and its members is on intelligence. One successful method to ensure the destruction of the “presence-patrolling” mind-set is by conducting longer patrols that give the leader more latitude. For example, a patrol is given 72 hours to collect five basic pieces of information on a specified OC-related high-value target (HVT). This technique gives the leader the freedom to move when and where he sees fit, and is loosened from the constraints of a six-hour patrol. By focusing on the intelligence target rather than time spent in a certain place, patrols will be present over a wide area, while still gaining valuable intelligence.

One concern is that the patrols will begin to try to take on the characteristics of a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT). To mitigate this risk the patrol leader is thoroughly briefed on the specific requirements that the patrol can collect on without crossing over. Soldiers must be trained on the techniques of tactical questioning, use of interpreters, and overt and covert LP/Ops. As always, the targets selected must be nested within the collection emphasis and meet the commander’s intent.

The ability to orient patrols on a long term intelligence objective is a luxury enjoyed less in combat environments than in peace operations. Conventional troops patrolling in Baghdad have far less ability to focus on an intelligence target because they are not afforded the ability to move with relative impunity. The very ubiquity of soldiers and military vehicles that move freely around a mature peacekeeping environment allows soldiers focused on an intelligence objective to hide in plain sight. This ability in conjunction with the greatly reduced risk of attack grants the freedom of movement that is necessary for an intelligence oriented patrol.

**Targeting Organized Crime**

The identification of an organized crime element by uniformed peacekeepers begins by earning the trust of the local populace. Upon arriving in theater the primary task of any unit should be to get their soldiers talking to the local populace. Doing this achieves many goals. It initiates, through effective dialogue, relationships between the peacekeeper and populace. This personal involvement demonstrates the peacekeepers’ resolve, and by talking face to face with the peacekeeper, preconceived notions can be dispelled through respectful yet candid dialogue. Over time if these conversations are managed effectively and occur on a consistent basis, they will result in a willingness of the populace to begin to inform the peacekeepers about security threats in their area. This is especially true if they see that the peacekeepers are taking an active role in undermining the authority of OC elements.

Consistently developing useful and constructive relationships with the populace requires discipline from the Soldiers and requires leaders to explain the mission completely. Patrols remain focused events and do not evolve into routine events where individual Soldiers are simply going through the motions. Additionally, all information that Soldiers collect must be passed higher for fusion with previously collected information. That information can be analyzed and used to drive follow-on missions. Soldiers given actionable intelligence and a meaningful mission will perform splendidly. Conversely, it should surprise no one that when soldiers are given “cookie cutter” lists of things to look for and vague missions, these soldiers will begin to go through the motions, especially as long deployments wear on.

Over time the peacekeeper can develop a good rapport with the local populace. Both soldiers speaking to average people, or leaders engaging Spheres of Influence (SOI), need to be cognizant of the subtle signs that locals want to talk discretely about topics. When dealing with organized crime elements retaliation can be severe against individuals who assist peacekeepers or law enforcement. As such, care needs to be taken when discussing such matters with the locals. Collecting information from the local national about the OC group in as detailed a manner as possible uses the 5W’s and H principle (who, what, when, where, why, and how). Upon receiving this information it is incumbent to corroborate the information provided. Some items to consider are whether the information was provided by a disgruntled neighbor, a competitor, or if it is a genuine concern. Additionally, how should this person be handled during follow on visits? Is it safe for the local to continue to talk with uniformed peacekeepers about this topic, or does this person need to be handed off to THTs which have a lower profile than the uniformed soldier? Two key questions that will drive the decision regarding how to handle this local will be what the likely threat to this local is if the OC element discovers the transfer of information, and will it look unusual for soldiers to be speaking with this individual? Again, if it is decided
to continue collection on the local populace using conventional assets, leaders need to insure that their soldiers clearly understand the legal limitations placed on non-HUMINT collectors. The bottom line is all soldiers can talk to the populace and ask direct questions. However, non-HUMINT collectors cannot task, recruit, or coerce, according to Special Text 2-91.6, Small Unit Support to Intelligence.

In developing a better picture of the organized crime group, key questions need to be answered. From the perspective of operations and intelligence officers in a permissive theater one of the most important questions to answer is whether the local government/ law enforcement is willing and/or able to effectively combat/confront the OC element. A collection plan is required to answer this question.

The first question when considering a strategy to target OC must be “Can the local government confront this problem on their own?” If they have the capability, then continue to guide them in that direction. If this is not possible then leaders must determine what needs to be done so the local government can eventually confront this problem. In determining a course of action key questions about the local government, judiciary, military, and police force need to be answered to determine how to proceed. Is the local government, or elements of it, willing to confront the OC element but paralyzed by the fear of retaliation? Are parts of the government and/or police force assisting the OC element? If law enforcement is in collaboration with OC, which other parts of the government can be reasonably expected to assist? A detailed collection plan needs to be developed to learn who one can and can not work within the government to remove or reduce the threat posed by the OC element. Techniques that can be used to collect information on the local government are:

1. Periodic meetings with local government and police to gauge their ability to confront the OC threat
2. Observation by patrols on how the police conduct themselves in regards to the OC threat
3. Conversations with the local populace to determine their opinions about the local government and police force’s ability to confront the OC threat.

The end state of this collection is a better understanding of whom one can and can not work with inside the local police force. Additionally, it will likely be determined that some individuals within the police force are colluding with the OC element and therefore need to be targeted. There are multiple ways to target these individuals and each approach depends on the specifics of the situation and the ROE.

As previously mentioned, the monopoly of the threat of force is a fundamental pillar of a legitimate law enforcement structure. When the threat of force by OC groups becomes so extreme as to be a fundamental impediment to a safe and secure environment, it then becomes a military problem to be confronted by peacekeepers. When developing an OC targeting and collection plan part of the critical path must include a system to give to the local government a monopoly on the threat of force. The following plan is proposed.

**Disrupt/Deceive/Inform/Influence**

One cautionary note before beginning any disruption operation: insure that prior to targeting individuals or businesses that your information has been corroborated by at least two sources of intelligence and ideally by different types of intelligence disciplines (i.e. imagery intelligence, HUMINT, etc.).

The first step in restoring the local authorities’ monopoly on the threat of force may be for a peacekeeping force to degrade the OC element. This will not often be as simple as acting on intelligence and capturing an individual. The ROE will likely forbid such straightforward solutions because in mature peacekeeping environments a large degree of sovereignty has been handed back to the local authorities. This alone restricts the peacekeepers ROE. An OC member can be captured and handed over to the local police only to be released because of corrupt and/or frightened prosecutors and/or judges. The answer to this peacekeeping challenge may be to conduct overt disruption operations on the OC element in conjunction with an aggressive information operations campaign targeting the local populace, police, and judiciary.

The purpose for the overt disruption operations directed against the OC element is multifaceted. The first is the reduction of the invincible image that the local populace and police force may have of the OC element. Each disruption is also an intelligence collecting opportunity. The third purpose is to co-opt OC to do what you want them to do. By making your disruption seem like a cause and effect scenario (i.e. if the criminal stops threatening other people, the peacekeepers will stop disruption of his business) you can effectively shape some of his actions. The final purpose is to enter his decision cycle, forcing him to take actions in reaction to the actions of the peacekeeping forces.
not the other way around. Furthermore, effectively focused operations should hurt the OC element financially, thus driving up the cost of doing business. Finally, the purpose for the Information Operations (IO) campaign is an explanation to the local populace why they had to be inconvenienced during an operation. These encounters demonstrate resolve to confront this criminal problem and encourage the local populace and police to stand up against the OC element.

Effectively targeting OC elements requires an understanding of their center of gravity (COG). The COG for OC is most often profit. Rarely are OC groups ideals-based. Even in Iraq criminal gangs are beginning to emerge. Their actions are driven by profit, not religious zeal. Money is the driver which makes all other things possible for OC; it allows them to sustain themselves, and to keep their enterprises functioning. Money also allows them to buy political favor outright, or buy the tools and weapons that allow them to coerce favorable actions. Material possessions beget power and prestige with communities that often have very little. Negatively impacting OC groups’ cash flow can have a very profound effect on the organization as a whole, and should be a major action undertaken by peacekeepers within the ROE.

To effectively target this type of organization the peacekeeper needs to understand how the OC element functions. Identify how the OC operation works and look for opportunities to disrupt those operations. OC elements typically operate in a reverse cycle. This presents peacekeepers with a window of time during normal day operations to target OC groups in their rest cycle and deny them the opportunity to rest and tend to family issues; tired criminals are careless criminals. This opportunity as well as night operations aimed at impacting the places of business of OC groups present the peacekeepers and law enforcement authorities multiple options. To determine the best option, or operational mix of the two, leaders must consider the situation as a whole.

Do the OC elements have legitimate businesses that act as a front for their illicit operations? If business fronts are identified they can be targeted to both disrupt operations and collect intelligence on those establishments. Restaurants, bars, and factories are a few examples of legitimate business fronts that OC elements can use to conceal their illicit activities. These business fronts can act as meeting locations as well. During disruption operations these businesses can be effectively shut down for hours during a search, or days with the use of posted peacekeepers preventing access, depending on the desired effect on the OC element. Upon entering one of these establishments as part of a disruption team, all individuals need to be tactically questioned and photographed to develop a baseline of information regarding who possibly associates with the OC element. The photography is particularly important as it serves to both document and intimidate the OC figures. Next, the establishment needs to be searched to exploit any incriminating documents or reveal concealed grey or black market goods. Additionally, messages need to be delivered to the suspected OC members and a separate message to individuals that may have just been caught up the disruption operations. The message to the OC members can be used to inform, influence, or deceive. In addition to the verbal or written messages delivered, the mere presence of peacekeepers during the disruption operation will send a nonverbal message to the OC members and the local populace alike. The message to individuals who may have just been incidentally caught up in the operations is needed to explain why the peacekeepers conducted this operation. This message is needed to mitigate some of the 2nd and 3rd order effects associated with conducting such aggressive operations.

The timing and frequency of these disruption operations can be used as a leverage to influence behavior of the OC members or group. Disruption operations will drive away customers and employees and this fact needs to be used against the OC element. The desired result of disruption operations directed against these establishments demonstrates peacekeeper resolve to the local populace and police force, and publicly degrades the OC element’s standing in the community.

It is also useful to examine the transportation networks that the OC element uses to move their grey and black market goods. A holistic, production to customer, approach needs to be taken to determine how OC elements transport their grey and black market goods. Pieces of the OC logistics network to be evaluated are: production facilities, post production cache sites, intermodal transportation methods, cross border transportation methods, long range transportation methods, consolidation/deconsolidation cache sites, and customer pick up points. Each one of these logistic nodes needs to
be evaluated to identify vulnerabilities for exploitation. The goal is to drive up the cost of doing business for the OC element through intelligence driven disruption operations of their logistics network. When crime no longer pays, it will stop.

It is vital to identify the individuals that work for or help prop up the OC group. Conversations with the local populace and the police force, and observation of suspected OC frequented establishments enhances the knowledge base of which individuals are involved with the OC element. Once OC members are identified, attempt to limit their freedom of movement and collect additional information such as: vehicle description, work location, home location, times at work and at home, and a photo of the individual. This information can be used in follow on missions directed against this individual.

Reassessment

Periodic reassessment of both OC capabilities and local authorities’ reaction to disruption operations is necessary. If local authorities’ actions directed against the OC element have increased, the peacekeeping task force needs to decrease disruption operations accordingly. In conjunction with the reduction in disruption operations the peacekeeper should continue to periodically assess local authorities’ ability to confront this threat. However, if local authorities’ actions directed against OC threat do NOT increase, then develop a collection plan to determine why not. Has the OC element been sufficiently degraded that the local police can confidently confront them? Upon reassessment, increase disruption operations in conjunction with I/O messages. Is the leadership within the police force colluding with the OC element and therefore no amount of degradation of the OC element will spur action from the police force? While working within the ROE of that specific theatre, determine a plan targeting the police officers who are colluding with the OC element. There may be an international organization (i.e. UN, EU, etc) which provides oversight for local police and other government officials. If this is the case, attempt to coordinate with oversight officers to apply additional pressure on the local police. Each theatre will be different in regards to the degree sovereignty has been handed over to the local police force and what powers the international community retains. Apply that power to bring additional pressure on the local police force to reprimand, fire, or arrest suspected corrupt police officers or leadership. Finally, messages directed at the local populace regarding the societal threat that organized crime also applies pressure on the local police force to act. Be careful not to undermine the police force. The 2nd and 3rd order effects of publicly identifying corrupt police officers will likely outweigh the benefits gained by outing this corrupt officer.

The reassessment and adjustment cycle will continue based on local authorities’ abilities and OC threat. If progress slows or stops a return to implementing phase one (disrupt/deceive/inform/influence) may be required.

The long term endstate is local government regaining a monopoly on the threat of force. This is a strategic level achievement. On a battalion or brigade level, positive movement toward that endstate during the course of a deployment is a reasonable goal. Setbacks should be expected during this long and incremental process. Persistence is the keystone to success. Although the peacekeeping force is capable of dealing with the OC threat in the short term, it is imperative that the local authorities become more involved in combating the OC threat. Successful progression towards an exit strategy requires the peacekeeper to constantly seek opportunities to get the local authorities involved.

Conclusion

Organized crime’s pervasiveness reaches all aspects of an emerging state. Leaders in a peacekeeping mission must understand the effect of this enemy on a free and healthy society — both political and economic. Despite the challenges of a peacekeeping mandate, certain conditions do exist to effectively target OC. By understanding OC as a business, it is possible to craft a targeting and collection cycle that not only strikes the heart of that business but also targets its enablers. As the hotspots of today’s conflict slowly cool and turn toward a more permissive state, Army leaders would do well to keep abreast of the lessons from today’s situation in Kosovo as a handrail for tomorrow’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Major Oliver Mintz is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and has held positions from infantry platoon leader to infantry battalion S3. At the time of writing, he was completing a tour in Kosovo where he held positions as a brigade battle captain and the battalion S3 for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry (TF ALAMO) Texas Army National Guard.

Second Lieutenant Tory House served as the tactical intelligence officer for 1-141 IN (TF ALAMO), TXARNG, deployed to Kosovo as part of KFOR7 from December 2005 to December 2006. House is a graduate of St. Edwards University with a degree in Computer Systems Management.

A list of references for this article is on file with Infantry Magazine.
We are living in historic times! Historical changes are occurring daily during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is providing timely and pertinent information to deployed units around the world. If you are still unfamiliar with CALL, it is an agent for change focused on the collection, analysis, dissemination, integration, and archiving of new concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and solutions throughout the Army from the tactical through theater/strategic levels of war. CALL is forward deployed around the globe and provides joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) forces with historic and emerging observations, insights, and lessons (OIL). The support provides valuable TTPs to deployed and follow-on forces and helps improve the warfighting capabilities of the Army. CALL is a multimedia-based operation that disseminates information through a variety of print and electronic formats, with the CALL Web site serving as the central repository.

Based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Center for Army Lessons Learned is experiencing tremendous growth. CALL is rapidly expanding with L2I (lessons learned integration) analysts working at numerous military installations assisting in GWOT. These L2I analysts gather lessons learned, research requests for information (RFI), and support their proponent agency (i.e. Infantry Center).

History of the Army Lessons Learned System

Technology has emerged as a means of gathering and distributing information/lessons learned in a timely manner. “By

The mid-1980’s, the Army leadership realized that despite the huge investments in the National Training Center (NTC), there was no method in place to capture the warfighting lessons coming from the training center, nor was there a system in place to capture combat lessons learned from Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.

To fill this void, the Army created CALL in 1985. CALL’s initial publications focused on successful TTPs used at NTC by continental United States (CONUS) units training for desert combat.

The success in forging the Army’s heavy forces into an effective combat machine led to the creation of additional combat training centers (CTCs): the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (now located at Fort Polk, Louisiana); Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) (re-designated JMRC in 2005) at Hohenfels, Germany; and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As the CTC concept grew and evolved, so did the focus of CALL.

Recognizing the need to quickly react in the event of combat, CALL developed a collection process. The process affords the U.S. Army the opportunity to collect lessons from anywhere it executes a combat mission. When Operation Just Cause began in Panama in December 1989, CALL conducted its first combat collection effort. Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program, establishes a system for collecting and analyzing field data and disseminating, integrating, and archiving lessons from
Army operations and training events.

The system employed by CALL consists of several basic components: plan, collect, analyze, integrate, disseminate, and archive. Exercising each of these components in a systematic process results in lessons and information that provide an intelligent approach to operations. The test for CALL and the entire lessons learned system is whether it can help Soldiers and units perform their mission right the first time, regardless of the mission.

Lessons Learned

The CALL Web site (http://www.call.army.mil) describes how lessons learned came about. “Because of the uncertainties and diversity of the modern battlefield, the Army is constantly learning and adapting its doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. The various mechanisms that drive this change in a coordinated and coherent process fall within an umbrella concept known as “lessons learned.”

This process is represented at all levels of the Army — from individual units conducting after action reviews immediately after a training or operational mission to the formal programs conducted by CALL and several branch schoolhouses. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) is the Army’s coordinator for the collection and integration of lessons into Army procedures and doctrine. CAC facilitates real-time collection, analysis, and archiving of lessons learned information across the Army through a variety of techniques. These include:

- Formal efforts, such as embedded liaison officer cells within forward-deployed units, liaison cells at the Army’s various training centers, integration analysts stationed at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) centers and schools and embedded within operational unit headquarters at home station, and specialized collection and analysis teams that focus on specific hot topics and mobile training teams.

- Informal efforts such as collecting, analyzing, and archiving published after action reviews and conducting individual interviews with selected Soldiers returning from the operational theater.

CAC organizations perform a detailed doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis on available data and work with individual leaders, Soldiers, units, and the Department of Army and Joint staffs to identify key Army issues, and assist in developing both near-term and long-term solutions. By rapid sharing of techniques that work in the field, CAC insures that Soldiers and leaders in harm’s way do not have to ‘reinvent the wheel’ each time they do a mission. The CAC lead for coordinating this major and important effort is the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Request For Information (RFI)

A truly revolutionary aspect of lessons learned is the RFI, which any Soldier can initiate. This is a valuable tool that can be utilized to capture information/lessons learned in a timely manner. CALL has assembled a broad range of information resources, documents, and search tools that are available online at http://call.army.mil. When a user is unable to find what is needed, an RFI can be submitted on the CALL Web site by clicking the “Request Information or a CALL Product” link in the upper left-hand corner of the CALL home page.

Provide the unit/organization and an address with building number and street. If you are a contractor, please include contracting officer representative (COR) information, as CALL must confirm “the need to know” prior to providing information.

The RFI form can also be used to request CALL publications or other products listed on the CALL Web site. These products include handbooks, videos, smart cards, graphic training aids, and training programs. For Official Use Only (FOUO) information can only be sent to a unit/organization street address. CALL also needs the unit/organization information for tracking information flow. When asking for publications, include the quantity needed.

Also indicate if the RFI is urgent in the request section of the form and contact CALL at (913) 684-9569. If you are submitting an urgent RFI during times when the CALL RFI system is not monitored (non-duty hours), contact the Fort Leavenworth staff duty officer, who will notify CALL for immediate action (DSN: 552-4448/4154/COM: 913-684-4448/4154). Advise the duty officer that you have submitted an urgent request on the CALL RFI system and that you need to be contacted by a CALL representative as soon as possible. CALL will attempt to provide the required information in less than eight hours for urgent requests.

The RFI form is also found on the Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET) and is used in the same manner as the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET) RFI system. The CALL RFI system requests personal information to verify the requestor’s need to know and right to access restricted information. Personal information is also used to contact the requestor, if necessary, and to send the requested information. Failure to furnish the required information may result in the RFI being delayed and possibly denied.

Conclusion

The computer age has arrived and information technology (IT) is assisting Soldiers daily. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is an active participant in the war on terrorism. CALL is a valuable asset to all branches of the military. The effectiveness of the program greatly depends upon how many military units and individual Soldiers utilize the resources that CALL has readily available. The end state is both the quantity and quality of information/lessons learned that CALL can research and distribute to Soldiers worldwide. Knowledge is power; Soldiers can log on to the CALL Web site at http://www.call.army.mil.

Robert A. Charles is a retired light infantry first sergeant with more than 22 years of service. His assignments included serving with the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 3rd Ranger Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the Infantry Training Brigade with the 2nd Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment. He is now employed as a contractor for Eagle Systems & Services, Inc., where he serves as a military analyst at the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Gregory Valrie is a retired armor first sergeant with more than 24 years of service. He is a veteran of OIF 1 where he served with 2-69 as a tank platoon sergeant (C Company), and OIF 3 where he served as first sergeant of a tank company (C Company) with 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. He is now employed as a contractor for Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), where he serves as a military analyst at the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Mission of the Squad Designated Marksman (SDM)

“The primary mission of the SDM is to deploy as a member of the rifle squad. The SDM is a vital member of his individual squad and not a squad sniper. He fires and maneuvers with his squad and performs all duties of the standard rifleman. The SDM has neither the equipment nor training to operate individually or in a small team to engage targets at extended ranges with precision fires.

“The secondary mission of the SDM is to engage key targets from 300 to 500 meters with effective, well-aimed fires using the standard weapon system and standard ammunition. He may or may not be equipped with an optic. The SDM must, therefore, possess a thorough understanding and mastery of the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship as well as ballistics, elevation and windage hold-off, sight manipulation, and range estimation.”

— FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 carbine

By definition the squad designated marksman (DM) is a sharpshooter at the maneuver foot-Soldier level. It is NOT another dismounted soldier role, but rather a well-developed organic, assigned rifleman skill.

The DM provides discriminating, on-command organic precision direct fire support to fire team, squad, section, and platoon leaders. DMs extend the “Reach” of small unit leaders to cover and dominate key terrain and avenues of approach from 200-300 yards to 300-500 yards. DMs provide short-range counter-sniper fire capability in cities and built-up urban areas.

In the movie Saving Private Ryan, actor Barry Pepper portrays Private Daniel Jackson, a marksman who provides long-range observation and precision rifle fire (historically, the 1942 US Army infantry squad was organized around Soldiers armed with M1 rifles, Browning automatic rifles, and a single M1903 Springfield rifle with telescopic sight).

DMs in mounted convoy security and escort vehicles give precision fire coverage with lower risk of collateral damage than from machine guns and Mk-19s.

Precision fires are highly coveted in urban and built-up areas in “The 3-Block War.” The small-unit leader always uses METT-TC to best place his direct-fire assets. The DM’s ability to shoot well gives the leader flexibility when planning movement to contact or retrograde. Overwatch elements can immediately destroy or suppress enemy troops in suspected or known enemy positions during bounds and provide support fire when machineguns displace. DMs in raids and deliberate ambush support elements naturally weigh in with precision direct and suppressive fire in base-of-fire teams. In the security element they seal off the objective area by fire.

While a 25-meter offset zero is good to generally align a sight to a rifle, there is no replacement for a true point-of-aim/point-of-impact zero confirmed on a 300-meter KD or steel target range. DMs with night vision devices, scopes, and properly-zeroed AN/PEQ-2 or PAQ-4 infrared target illuminators and aimers provide round-the-clock precision fire support.

Noise or sound suppressors will confuse the enemy about the DM’s firing location. A suppressor will not make you silent —
but at night or in town it can make you virtually undetectable. M995 5.56mm armor piercing ammunition is extremely accurate from the M16 and M4, usually shooting 300-meter ten shot groups half the size of M855 “Green Tip” ball. The M995 bullet weighs the same as an M16A1 bullet (55 grains vice 62 grains for M16A2 Ball) and it flies faster and flatter so zeros are different.

Media coverage (and the ability to post digital video almost immediately to the Internet) sensitizes leaders to Law of Land Warfare restraints. The principle of proportionality prohibits “indiscriminate attacks” which cause incidental damage to civilians, or damage to civilian objects and property “Excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage.” When DMs are properly equipped with optics, they can distinguish armed combatants from noncombatants and minimize collateral damage with precision snapshots in areas where targets are fleeting and only briefly exposed.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has conducted both urban combat and designated marksman field experiments. Eight Marines from the Marine Corps Security Force Designated Marksman School attempted to positively identify 132 role-playing targets in various uniforms and with various weapons systems (totaling 1,056 target identification attempts) at ranges from 100 to 700 yards. The DMs attempted to acquire and identify targets with no optic; with the 4-power Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG); and a variable-power telescope at 3, 6, and 8 power. These are some of their consolidated findings:

1) Marines without optics had more difficulty correctly identifying targets than those DMs with optics;
2) Marines without optics could not identify targets more than 50 percent of the time after 100 yards;
3) At longer ranges shooters identified more targets correctly at 8 power magnification than with lower magnification;
4) At shorter ranges it took less time to correctly identify targets as optic magnification increased;
5) DMs will experience eyestrain if they are constantly in “scan” or “observe” mode in their optics;
6) If the DM is the only man with optics, some leaders will run him ragged scoping out all suspicious or suspected enemy positions.

Precision M16 fire at longer ranges (300-500 meters) is not magic, but it is a high demand/low density skill. Leaders should screen their riflemen to find who may be a naturally gifted or trained shot. Precision M16 marksmen come from a variety of backgrounds:

1) There are rare, naturally gifted shooters;
2) Some Soldiers will come from rural backgrounds or with hunting experience, again leaders may have a few within their ranks;
3) Some Soldiers will have a competition shooting background with air rifles or .22s.

How can small unit leaders develop DMs?
1) Establish local training courses.
2) Send Soldiers to compete with their rifles. Military and civilian shooting championships are held around the country, many locally or on Army and National Guard posts and camps. NRA and Civilian Marksmanship Program clubs host regular M16 highpower service rifle competitions (usually from March through November), matches, clinics, and practices.
3) Request train-the-trainer missions from the Army Marksmanship Unit, Infantry School, National Guard Marksmanship Unit, respective National Guard State Marksmanship Coordinators, or the Army Reserve Small Arms Group.
4) Request courses from the Director of Civilian Marksmanship.

How can small unit leaders train and sustain their DMs once deployed? While field-fire ranges with steel silhouette “Iron maiden” targets are the most time and manpower efficient, leaders can make ad hoc Known Distance ranges by surveying a range and laying out firing berms; digging trenches (“Pits”) or building protected/raised earth target berms or earth-filled HESCO barriers; and stapling cardboard E-type silhouettes to 2 x 4s to raise and lower targets from behind protection. Shot holes are marked in the silhouettes using standard target markers and spindles.

The designated marksman is NOT a sniper in the classic sense, but a line rifleman with highly developed and practiced shooting and observation skills. He is immediately responsive to the small unit’s leader for precision direct fire. ALL Soldiers can develop into trained shooters.

### CONTACTS FOR TRAINING & MATERIALS:

**Commander**

U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit
7031 Bill Street
Fort Benning, GA 31905

**Commander**

C Company, 2nd Bn., 29th Inf.
US Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, GA 31905

**Commander**

NG Marksmanship Training Center
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
North Little Rock, AR 72199

**Commander**

U.S. Army Reserve Small Arms Readiness Group
4950 South 2nd Street
Bldg. 307A Fort Gillem
Forest Park, GA 30297

**Commander**

Weapons Training Battalion
Marine Corps Combat Dev. Command
27211 Garand Road
Quantico, VA 22134

**Director of Civilian Marksmanship**

Civilian Marksmanship Program
P.O. Box 576
Port Clinton, OH 43452

**Center for Army Lessons Learned**

LTC (Ret) Scott Blaney
10 Meade Ave (Bldg 50)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

[https://call2.army.mil/focus/sniper/SDMMaterials.asp (CAC required)]

**NRA Competition Shooting Division**

11250 Waples Mill Rd.
Fairfax, VA 22030

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**Lieutenant Colonel David Liwanag** commanded the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia, from June 2003 until June 2006. He is currently assigned to the J3, Special Operations Command - Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Virginia. Other previous assignments include commanding the U.S. Army Parachute Team and serving with the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group.
Shotguns in Combat: Lethality in the Close Fight

The shotgun has been a part of the American experience since the earliest colonists brought their muzzleloading smoothbore muskets and blunderbusses ashore in the New World. These crude weapons enabled colonists to feed and defend their families and to later wrest our independence from Great Britain. Even when the development of rifled weapons extended the range and accuracy of individual weapons, the weapon capable of firing several shot pellets at a time remained the most common frontier weapon. The shotgun offered a far greater chance of a successful hunt, and in the close combat against other colonists or hostile Indians — themselves armed with either edged weapons or trade muskets — a shot charge or a combination of shot and ball (commonly referred to as buck and ball) could be relied upon to quickly disable or kill an adversary. The primary musket caliber in America from the Revolutionary War until the middle of the 19th century was .69 caliber, and for this reason Civil War soldiers armed with shotguns were told to arm themselves with a 16-gauge weapon, because the standard .69 caliber ball best matched that bore size. The double-barreled percussion shotgun shown in Figure 1 dates to ca. 1845 and was of the type typically carried by Confederate cavalry.

Cavalry favored the shotgun for horseback engagements because of the difficulty of accurate aiming and the greater hit probability offered by either a charge of buckshot or the buck and ball load of one ball and three to six buckshot. General George Crook and a number of his officers and men carried shotguns during their campaigns against the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Apaches up until 1886. Likewise, officers fighting in the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902 also favored the shotgun because of the close-range advantage it offered. Long the weapon of choice for home defense, the shotgun has also earned a reputation as a fearsome killer on the battlefield. The most familiar of these is the trench gun of World War I, originally a Winchester Model 1897 12-gauge pump action shotgun (Figure 2) used in the close-range business of clearing enemy trenches. This weapon and similar models made by Stevens served throughout World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam, the Stevens Model 77E being commonly seen in Southeast Asia. U.S. forces have preferred the pump action shotgun for its reliability and ease of reloading. The Remington Model 870 and the Winchester Model 1200 (the latter with a bayonet attachment resembling that of the Model 97 trench gun) were standard military shotguns from 1966 through Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and continued to see service up into Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Model 1200 replaced the Model 870, and has itself been replaced by the Mossberg M500. All of these have been issued in 12 gauge, due to the size of the shot charge, availability of ammunition, and their robust reliability.

Infantry Magazine has featured articles in the September-October 2005 and September-October 2006 issues, and copies of these issues can be provided upon request. These earlier articles feature descriptions of the weapons, specifications, qualification standards, and the types of ammunition currently available.
Great, and the 300 were the Spartan King Leonidas, invasion for as long as possible. Among Spartans were selected to delay the Persian army to organize a defense, 300 the invasion and allow the main force of conquering all of Asia and approaching the Persian King Xerxes and his army were endured, the Greeks were keenly aware that soldiers is revealed through Xeones’ intense training and discipline instilled in his war-hardened master Deinekes. The become a soldier and avenge their murders. The death of Xeones’ parents, he wanted to a soldier and fight for your country. After there was no greater honor than to become prepare them for war. In the Greek society, of the training Spartan soldiers endured to become a soldier and get them. The remaining Spartans words “Molon labe” which means: Come and get them. The remaining Spartans fought them off for as long as they possibly could, but were eventually overrun. Estimates range that the Spartans killed between 20 and 100 Persians for every Spartan killed. Although the Spartans were defeated at Thermopylae, their courage and sacrifice motivated the Greeks to unite, and they eventually defeated the Persians.

This is an extraordinary book on so many different levels. Pressfield does a tremendous job of recreating the Greek society from 2,500 years ago. In addition, despite our tremendous advances in weaponry, the tactics of land warfare used by the Spartans against a far superior force are still relevant on the battlefield today. The courage, honor, discipline, and sacrifice these Spartans showed in the face of certain death should serve as an example to all soldiers defending their country. Gates of Fire is a tremendously entertaining and magnificent work for Soldiers and civilians alike.


Thomas Ayres, who passed away in March 2006, wrote for the Dallas Times Herald, Civil War Times and Columbiad, (USA national history magazine). A seasoned investigative reporter and an award-winning columnist, he was the author of Dark and Bloody Ground, The Battle of Mansfield and the Forgotten Civil War in Louisiana and That’s Not in My American History Book.

Military Miscellany is listed as a reference/trivia book. It is a compact book packed with interesting tidbits about military personnel and forgotten events. Ayres shares untold stories of Americans such as Walt Disney, and how he was an ambulance driver in World War I. He also briefly notes that Cadet Edgar Allan Poe was dismissed from West Point, but provides little detail as to why.

The book is a sure page-turner, unfolding unknown facets of American military history. Ayres included many notable quotes from people such as General Philip Sheridan, who said “A crow could not fly over it without carrying his rations with him,” describing the devastated Shenandoah Valley. The book also includes many military facts such as the breakdown of the construction of the Pentagon and how many of the pieces of heavy equipment are buried within the building site. “A Chronology of America’s Foreign Military Involvement,” also lists important United States encounters from 1775-2005.

Although Ayres does not include a bibliography, he includes an index as a quick reference guide. He also includes timelines, lists, and other facts. The book is packed with interesting military lore. The stories within the book reflect the military in an honest witty tone.

Anyone, from the general to the private or the historian to the military enthusiast, will find A Military Miscellany informative and inspirational. This book is certain to
be a favorite, with Ayres’ descriptions of some amazing and amusing blunders and surprising trivia.


One of the root causes of Islamist militancy and methods to enable recruitment and sanction violence are the so-called unchallenged fatwas (religious edicts) issued by clerics. It is vital that well-known fatwas were utilized by jihadists like those of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman and Abdullah Azzam not only be exposed for the damage they do to Muslim society as a whole, but be Islamically challenged by other clerics. This requires a sensitization for the fatwas of jihad, and Shmuel Bar, director of Studies at the Institute of Strategy and Policy at Herzliya University in Israel, provides an insightful starting point to begin understanding how war of fatwas represents the tip of the spear in the debate over whether Islamic history, law and precedent will be interpreted in a constructive or destructive manner in the 21st century. In many ways classical Islamic scholars were much wiser than their counterparts today. The book highlights a quote by 13th century scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who serves as a major source of fundamentalist Muslims. He said, “As for the fanatics, they can place any problem upside down. When they turn to the sunnah (Islamic precedence) they borrow only what corresponds to their pronouncements and contrive tricks to push away evidence that does not suit them.” This sentence rings as true today as it did more than 700 years ago, as jihadist ideology selectively applies only those aspects of Islamic law that advances its agenda of dominance and control.

Among the problems identified is how the relationship between the ulama (religious establishment) and the government differs from one Middle Eastern country to another. The Saudi royal family is highlighted as having lost control of the rank and file ulama, and that the number of fatwas issued by unsanctioned Saudi clerics is on the rise since 9-11. This has led to a decree that only authorized ulama can issues fatwas and only the government can issue calls for jihad. Egypt attempts to balance its Fatwa Committee rooted in Al-Azhar independence with a wide range of rulings from the Sheikh Ali Gomaa’s condemnation that western tourists in Egypt are unarmed guests who contributed to Egypt’s economy and should be protected to the radical rulings sanctioning suicide bombings. Syria does not care about nor desire an independent clerical establishment.

Pages dissect how a sound fatwa is made that includes maslahah (pragmatic determination of public interest), daru’iyarat (necessity) and tahsiniyarat (improving the human condition). These were ways in which the four schools of Sunni Islamic law were derived and represent a complex and highly educated means of making sound rulings, an education not rooted in Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other movements who issue militant edicts condemning whole swaths of society, both Muslim and non-Muslim. One chapter focuses on the complex debate on jihad and issues of what tradition would call just war, it reveals an obsession by classical Islamic jurists not on the reward of 72 virgins in paradise but the morality of killing noncombatants to include women, children, monks, nuns and the spoiling of the environment by destroying trees and damaging wells. Page 17 does have a typographical error, citing the massacre of tourists in Luxor, Egypt, as occurring in 1977, it happened in 1997. The book ends with a chapter entitled, “The War of the Fatwa,” and takes reader into the ideological struggle between clerics for the soul of Islam. Bar ends with an appeal for western policymakers to come to terms to the reality of the religious nature of this conflict and to pay close attention to those who have a healthy, reasoned, and constructive view of Islam versus those who manipulate the faith to serve destructive ends.

Sister in the Band of Brothers, Embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq.


Photographer and journalist Katherine M. Skiba shares her experiences as an embedded journalist in her book Sisters in the Band of Brothers, Embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq. The book is an insightful account of the embedding process of U.S. journalists on the front lines of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Skiba, a seasoned award-winning reporter, is a Washington, D.C., correspondent for the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. She has covered stories such as the Oklahoma City bombing, the 9-11 terror attack on the Pentagon and various U.S. peacekeeping missions.

Official plans began on October 30, 2002 to hold training sessions for potential embedded reporters. The plan consisted of embedding 600 journalists into units conducting specific operations of major interest. Skiba describes her determination to hold a media position with the DOD and how she shuffled to find every military piece that she had written, in order to qualify to receive a place in the journalistic “lottery”.

Her embedding process began at Fort Benning, Georgia. She recounts her “media boot camp” training in an honest, humorous tone. “Orders is orders” she said as she describes her military greeter, Major Alex Covert, who was prepared to deploy on short notice. She describes his dedication and willingness to sacrifice his presence, as he may deploy and leave his wife to deliver their firstborn child alone.

Skiba recalls her own farewell to her husband; in the event that anything should happen to her, she said, “Marry someone nice. Fish a lot. Forgive me for doing this.”

Although she trained alongside the troops, the truth is, that up until this war the military and the media have been adversaries. Skiba and other journalists have been depicted as members of “humanity’s dumpster,” she claims.

Her account of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a collection of real-life situations during her journalistic involvement with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The unit, also known as the Screaming Eagles, was famous for the heroism of its Soldiers.
during World War II. The unit was recently immortalized in the “Band of Brothers” television series. She describes the “golden deserts” of Iraq and the inconveniences of war through the eyes of an “outsider at best, and a problem to solve at worst,” although she admits that the Army does not have “problems, only issues.”

In her book, she presents an image of our U.S. Soldiers as the caring humans they are, describing their comrades, men and women, their families, their hopes, and their dreams. Her vivid descriptions of human experiences of Camp Thunder, whether viewed by military or media, combatant or noncombatant, man or woman, range from a “sand-drenched, snake-infested outpost” and a “five thousand star hotel.”

Her 50-day tour with the 101st Airborne to “Bad Guy Land” ended with the collapse of Baghdad and the comconitant fall of Saddam Hussein.

After her return to the United States, nightmares, flashbacks and post-traumatic stress became a part of her being. She felt distanced from the peace that she once had and admits that she will never be the same.

_Sister in the Band of Brothers, Embedded with the 101st Airborne in Iraq_, is a must read for infantrymen, academia, civilians, and journalists. The powerful story of this reporter provides an account of the individual stories from family members, who were searching the media for answers about their loved ones — their soldiers. Professionally, her accounts of the conflict provided hope, strength and courage for the waiting families at home and became a vital lifeline to encourage patience during troubled times. The book is a testament to the bravery and courage of 101st Soldiers in the face of danger during war.


Staying alive is the best reason for a Soldier to read and study this history of booby traps. From rats in WWII stuffed with plastic explosives to explosives disguised as stone, mud, rock or horse droppings, many devices from past wars can be compared to devices used Iraq or Afghanistan. Knowing what to look for and developing an idea of tactical possibilities aids Soldiers in coming home unscathed.

Ian Jones worked in bomb disposal for 35 years, first as a British Army officer, then as an explosives officer for the London Metropolitan Police. He was the commanding officer for all bomb disposal in Northern Ireland as an Army major and also worked in Germany, Bosnia, Belize, South Africa and Kosovo. Jones uses his extensive knowledge to organize a detailed introduction to explosive devices. A thorough reading of his work helps raise bombing awareness dramatically. Jones uses detailed anecdotes to survey the period from World War I to Vietnam.

Jones starts his survey with WWI experiences ranging from the standard booby-trapped grenades, flags, an eight-day delayed bomb in a German building, to explosives on an observation balloon that downed an attacking German plane and pilot 150 yards away. The mine clearers of the time developed the method of using a magnetic compass to locate mines or shells hidden in the wall. The compass needle deviated up to 30-40 degrees when passing a hidden large metal object like a mine. The WWII section introduced a greater variety of devices, increasing the need for advanced training for engineers. The booby-trapped canteens and radio handsets set the standard for going after the Soldier/strider. The report of a British patrol encountering a booby-trapped door during WWII in 1943 is especially memorable. The patrol notices the device and carefully attaches a line to the doorknob. A slit trench located straight across the road provides convenient cover for the entire patrol as they pile into it to protect themselves from the door device. As the door knob is pulled, explosives go off in the trench, killing the entire patrol.

The wide variety of devices and tactics used in both World Wars and Vietnam was fascinating. Despite the awkward British title, _Malice Aforethought_ is an excellent primer on improvised explosive devices.
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