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Then and Now
A Century of Excellence
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Commandant’s Note
MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

A CENTURY OF TRAINING
APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED

In April 2007, 100 years ago, the Army established the School of Musketry at the Presidio of Monterey, California. This was beginning of the Infantry School. In this Commandant’s Note I want to discuss how the Infantry applied lessons learned in combat to improve the training of our Soldiers even as the Infantry School itself evolved over the course of a century.

Friedrich von Steuben began the U.S. Infantry’s first systematic training when he drilled George Washington’s Continental Army at Valley Forge in 1778. Following the Mexican War the Army’s peacetime training continued intermittently until the Civil War, which represented the first confrontation between eighteenth century tactics and nineteenth century technology. Union and Confederate forces sustained casualties far greater than those of any earlier conflict. The massed frontal infantry attacks favored by Union and Confederate forces early in the war fell apart in the face of field artillery firing canister and grape shot and the massed fires of rifles accurate to ranges two or three times those of the smoothbore muskets still in use. These Civil War lessons spawned Major General Emory Upton’s U.S. Army Infantry Tactics, published in 1874, which remained in use until after the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Following the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, Commander of the Pacific Division, established the School of Musketry at Monterey in 1907 to address shortcomings identified in the war with Spain. The post at Monterey was too small for training large numbers of troops, however, and the school moved to Fort Sill, Oklahoma as the Infantry School of Arms in 1913 where field artillery, infantry, and cavalry officers and noncommissioned officers learned the fundamentals of their profession.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and initial reports from the field showed that our own Army needed to train for modern war, and on a far larger scale than ever before. Fort Sill was not big enough to accommodate the levels of training needed and the Army selected a site near Columbus, Georgia as the Infantry School of Arms in 1913 where field artillery, infantry, and cavalry officers and noncommissioned officers learned the fundamentals of their profession.

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Soldiers trained there on contemporary machine guns used by the warring powers. At the same time, the Small Arms Firing School opened at Camp Perry, Ohio. The Army officially established Camp Benning on October 19, 1918, less than a month before the end of World War I. By now, after-action reports flooded the War Department from Europe and after close scrutiny our training further evolved.

Camp Benning escaped the closure of military posts during the post-war demobilization when Colonel Paul B. Malone — himself a decorated WWI brigade commander and staff officer — presented the case for preserving the camp before Congress. He stressed the urgent need for a single infantry school where the Army’s Soldiers and leaders could learn their profession, and on February 20, 1920, Congress voted to resume the construction and growth at Camp Benning.

As war clouds again spread over Europe in World War II, Fort Benning trained over 600,000 Soldiers and commissioned 52,000 lieutenants by the end of 1945. The Infantry Board received and applied the lessons learned during WWII for the next generation of Soldiers. Ranger units in Burma, the Pacific, North Africa, and Europe necessitated Ranger training at Fort Benning. The first Ranger class for individual candidates graduated on March 1, 1952. Barely five years after World War II, the Korean War presented new challenges as the Army faced an enemy whose massed infantry assaults and tenacity again gave rise to changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures to deal with this new threat.

In Vietnam the limited road network and elusive nature of the enemy demanded better mobility. Under Major General Harry W.O. Kinnard’s leadership the 11th Air Assault Division tested and refined the air mobility concept at Fort Benning in 1963, and in 1965 deployed to Vietnam as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Throughout the Cold War, during the Vietnam War, in Operation DESERT STORM and smaller conflicts, and now during the global war on terrorism we still gather and apply the lessons learned in combat. Our ability to capture and rapidly disseminate information on the enemy’s intent, his weapons, and his tactics, techniques, and procedures enables us to share intelligence with our allies, and to train our own Soldiers to destroy him.

The Infantry saves lives and wins battles because we collect and share relevant information on the enemy. As we welcome the Armor School to Fort Benning and become the Maneuver Center of Excellence, we look back with pride on those early days after 1913 when infantrymen, field artillerymen, and cavalrmen trained together at Fort Sill and we look forward to this superb training opportunity in the future.

Follow me!
The Captains’ Career Common Core Course (C5) will become required for graduation from all branch captains’ career courses (CCCs) beginning June 1. The C5 provides a series of critical skills grounded in leadership, communication, composite risk management, critical reasoning/thinking and developing a positive command climate. The skills are intended to better prepare officers for their next 10 years of service, and the change is in keeping with the Army Chief of Staff’s vision to continue transformation of the Army Officer Education System.

The instruction is in a Web-based interactive multimedia format that facilitates self-paced study. Although completion of the C5 is not a requirement to attend a captains’ career course, Soldiers may complete the training before beginning the career course. “This gives students a good basis for the beginning of the CCC and relieves them of the requirement while they are at the resident phase,” said Lieutenant Colonel Shawn M. Maxwell, C5 coordinator at the Center for Army Leadership, Professional Military Education Division.

The curriculum supports preparation of company-grade officers for company command, as well as battalion- and brigade-level staff positions in combined, joint and multinational environments. It provides first lieutenants and captains with a common foundation of operational and leadership instruction tied to the officer’s specific career field, branch, and functional area needs, Maxwell said.

First lieutenants and captains may enroll in the C5 via ATRRS. Eligible officers should contact their career manager to determine specific branch requirements. More information is available at the Center for Army Leadership’s Army Knowledge Online Web site at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/376783.

At the direction of the Acting Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, the Army has opened a Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline (1-800-984-8523). The purpose of the hotline’s call center is twofold: to offer wounded and injured Soldiers and family members a way to seek help to resolve medical issues and to provide an information channel of Soldier medically related issues directly to senior Army leadership so they can improve how the Army serves the medical needs of our Soldiers and their families.

Many wounded and injured Soldiers who have supported the global war on terrorism, as well as their families, are enduring hardships in navigating the medical care system. The Army is committed to providing outstanding medical care for the men and women who have volunteered to serve this great nation. Recent events made it clear the Army needs to revise how it meets the needs of our wounded and injured Soldiers and their families. In certain cases, the Soldiers’ chain of command could have done a better job in helping to resolve medically related issues.

Leaders in Soldiers’ chains of command also need to be aware that this call center exists and that it has not been created to circumvent the chain of command. The hotline is open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., Monday through Friday, but it will eventually expand to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week as additional personnel are trained and added to its staff.
Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier is testing a new parachute system that the Army plans to use to replace the system in use since the 1950s. The new parachutes address increased weight requirements and provide additional safety benefits.

Beginning in 2008, all T-10 parachutes, which have been in the Army inventory for more than 50 years, will be replaced with the Advanced Tactical Parachute System (ATPS) T-11. Although the T-10 is a proven system, today’s paratroopers face increased requirements beyond the T-10’s design.

Paratroopers are required to jump in more equipment than in the 1950s, when the total weight of Soldier, parachute system and combat load averaged 300 pounds. The T-11 is designed to carry a paratrooper with a total jump weight of as much as 400 pounds safely to the ground.

A key safety benefit of the T-11 is a significantly slower rate of descent averaging 18 feet per second, resulting in a 25-percent reduction in impact force over the T-10. The T-11 achieves the slower descent by having a canopy with a 28 percent larger surface area than the T-10, while weighing only seven pounds more. Additionally, the main canopy design results in minimal oscillation after inflation and after lowering the combat load.

Operational testing of the T-11 began in January under the supervision of the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate and PEO Soldier. It is being tested by XVIII Airborne Corps paratroopers, riggers, and jumpmasters who will make more than 3,200 test jumps from January to October to ensure its suitability for use in mass-tactical, static-line operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John Lemondes, PEO Soldier’s Product Manager for Clothing and Individual Equipment, explained that the T-11’s reserve parachute is more reliable and much safer than the T-10’s. “The T-11 harness improves paratrooper comfort and integration with the parachute and mission equipment. The T-11 main canopy design results in a much smoother deployment sequence, minimizes oscillation and significantly reduces the rate of descent, which will result in many fewer jumper-related injuries. It will ultimately result in more Soldiers available for duty because of fewer injuries.”

Under the current fielding plan, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Rigger School and the Airborne School will receive the T-11 in 2008-2009. The 82nd Airborne Division will receive the new parachute in 2009-2011, and T-10s will be replaced Army-wide by 2014.

Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, PEO Soldier designs, develops, procures, fields, and sustains virtually everything the Soldier wears or carries. By employing innovative concepts and technologies, PEO Soldier has made great strides in quickly getting improved equipment into the hands of Soldiers, especially those in Iraq and Afghanistan. PEO Soldier headquarters is supported by three Project Managers (PMs). PM Soldier Warrior is responsible for Land Warrior, Air Warrior, and Mounted Warrior. PM Soldier Weapons manages both individual and crew-served weapons. PM Soldier Equipment has purview over Sensors and Lasers, Soldier Survivability and Clothing and Individual Equipment. PM Soldier Equipment is the material developer and program manager for all of the U.S. Army’s parachutes and auxiliary parachute equipment.

For more information on PEO Soldier, visit the organization’s Web site at http://www.peosoldier.army.mil.

(Debi Dawson is a public affairs officer with PEO Soldier’s Strategic Communications Office.)
ARMY TO FIELD IMPROVED ARMOR

DEBI DAWSON

The Army continues to upgrade body armor to increase protection from bullets and fragments, and soon will field the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) to Soldiers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The IOTV meets Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier’s goals of providing Soldiers with the most advanced protective gear available while also improving comfort and mission effectiveness.

“The IOTV is more than three pounds lighter than the current OTV, but provides an equal level of protection over an increased area,” said Brigadier General R. Mark Brown, Program Executive Officer Soldier. “This vest epitomizes our continuous efforts to seek the next improvement and to provide our Soldiers the best body armor available, bar none. It is live-fire tested — we know it will prove itself in combat.”

“The weight of the IOTV was reduced by eliminating overlap,” said Major Carl Fulmore, assistant product manager for Soldier Survivability. “With the IOTV, we were able to streamline previous improvements.”

For example, the vest now has a higher cut in the underarm area, which will eliminate the need to attach the axillary or underarm protector to the current deftloid axillary protector set. The deltoid protector can still be attached at the commander’s discretion. The vest’s integrated throat protector provides the same protection as the current attachable version, but it’s designed to be more comfortable. The now integrated side plate carriers decrease the vest’s profile, and a lower back protector extends the vest’s coverage by 52 square inches.

The IOTV’s numerous improvements go beyond increased protection. A single-stage quick release added to the front of the vest allows a Soldier to doff the IOTV and its attachments with one pull. The vest then falls to the ground in two pieces and can be put back together in minutes.

“This feature would only be used by Soldiers in emergency situations, such as being trapped in an overturned or submerged vehicle. It’s not meant to simply be a quick way to get out of the IOTV at the end of the day or mission,” Fulmore said.

Medics could use the quick release to treat wounded Soldiers, or they could use an opening on the left shoulder, which allows easy access while still providing protection to the patient.

Comfort and utility features are also part of the improved design. The most notable may be the IOTV’s overhead opening. An internal waistband provides a snug fit and moves much of the weight from the shoulders to the waist.

“This design significantly decreased the vest’s profile and should increase mobility. We believe mobility equals survivability,” Fulmore said.

Other features include:
- The addition of a long variant to sizes medium through extra large. This extends the size range from eight to 11 and should result in a near-custom fit for Soldiers.
- Additional modular lightweight load-carrying equipment attachments as a result of moving the opening from the front of the vest. These attachments are now in the universal camouflage pattern.
- Enhanced small arms ballistic insert pockets with four inches of vertical adjustability, which will allow for better placement of the plates based on individual body proportions.
- Additional storage pockets.
- A mesh lining to aid ventilation.

Soldiers will continue to use the enhanced small arms protective inserts and the enhanced side ballistic inserts.

(Debi Dawson is a public affairs officer with PEO Soldier’s Strategic Communications Office.)
In November 2006, the U.S. Army Infantry Center began a transition of its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Managers (TSMs) to TRADOC Capability Managers (TCMs) in coordination with the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). The TSMs were systems-focused and by TRADOC regulation had built-in disestablishment criteria after fielding of a specific system. However, we have learned that the TSMs provided intensive oversight of key Army systems across the Army imperatives of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) at very low cost in terms of personnel resources. The TSM system provided a direct user representative link to the materiel developer community, specifically, product managers (PMs) and program executive officers (PEOs). In short, the TSM concept has worked well for key Infantry assigned systems, i.e. Soldier, Bradley, Stryker, Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided (TOW)/Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), and Javelin.

As the Army nears the completion of modularity and implements base realignment and closure (BRAC) federal law, it became apparent to both the Infantry and Armor Centers and ARCIC that a different paradigm needed to be established to manage our BCTs across the domains of DOTMLPF and still maintain a direct user link to PMs and PEOs. Conceptually, it was determined that TCMs would not be disestablished and continue to provide intensive DOTMLPF oversight of assigned systems as well modular BCTs. Therefore, in coordination with efforts to establish the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) at Fort Benning, TCM-Heavy Brigade Combat Team, TCM-Stryker, TCM-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)/Close Combat Missile Systems (CCMS), TCM-Soldier, and TCM-Combat Identification were established from the existing TSM structures at the Infantry and Armor Centers.

The new paradigm is to intensely manage our BCT formations as well as assigned systems. A major change will especially occur for the IBCT. Whereas TSM-CCMS only provided DOTMLPF oversight of the TOW/ITAS and Javelin systems, TCM-IBCT/CCMS will now provide that oversight as well as DOTMLPF integration for the IBCT. While it is not envisioned that TCM-IBCT/CCMS will be the proponent for all IBCT issues, TCM-IBCT will provide a single point of contact to help resolve key IBCT issues as they arise.

TCM-IBCT/CCMS Mission

The TCM-IBCT/CCMS serves as the MCOE single point of contact to oversee the IBCT as it is properly organized, trained and equipped for success on the battlefield. Performs duties as the Army’s centralized manager for all combat developments user activities associated with the Javelin, ITAS, TOW missile system, and kinetic energy (KE) close combat missile systems.

TCM-IBCT/CCMS is in the process of conducting an initial DOTMLPF assessment of the IBCT and will brief the Chief of Infantry in third quarter FY 07. We will incorporate input from our active and reserve component IBCTs in this assessment. By the end of March 2007, TCM-IBCT/CCMS will have accomplished the following tasks:

• Write TCM-IBCT campaign plan.
• Finalize charter with ARCIC.
• Educate USAIC, TRADOC and DA agencies and the filed Army concerning TCM-IBCT role.

Throughout the remainder of the year TCM-IBCT/CCMS will:

April-June 2007 —
• Review Directorate of Combat Developments post combat survey and CALL data … Determine initial IBCT DOTMLPF assessment.

July-December 2007 —
• Establish Integrated Concept Team.
• Coordinate within USAIC and TRADOC to address issues.

IBCTs will comprise 54 percent of the Army (active and reserve components). That equates to 38 of 70 BCTs. It is time that this versatile formation gets the staff oversight that it deserves and requires.

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Author’s Note: The intent of this article is not to prescribe the approved method for managing combat stress, but rather offer some thoughts and generate discussion on how a battalion commander can manage this very important issue.

As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, more than 3,000 service members have been killed and over 21,000 wounded. Given the conditions of combat, multiple deployments and other related issues, units are showing more and more signs of combat stress, a stress that can slowly erode the war-fighting abilities of any unit. A few of the rather obvious causes are back-to-back deployments, separation from home and loved ones, and the loss of fellow Soldiers. A few of the not so obvious causes are marital problems, financial problems, anxiety, and fear. Identifying the not so obvious causes and taking actions to mitigate them is a tough task. All of these causes, and more, can quickly lead to declining unit readiness, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and health problems, as well as a variety of other related problems.

What Help Is Out There?

Few if any clinical experts exist in the maneuver battalion to help in dealing with casualties and combat stress. Nor does the commander receive a lot of institutional training in dealing with this subject. Closing this gap is a challenge.

In addition to personal leadership (of the commander), the battalion chaplain can assist in identifying indicators of combat stress. Keep in mind that Soldiers often see the chaplain in confidence. It is important to empower the chaplain to fix problems without the direct involvement of the battalion commander. However, the commander/chaplain relationship should allow for the two to share information without violating the trust of the Soldier. Of course, another very valuable asset is the battalion command sergeant major as he often maintains a thumb on the pulse of the battalion.

The brigade psychiatrist or combat stress doctor is a trained professional who can help to identify combat stress and, in many ways, prevent it. He can help identify the Soldiers most at risk of developing PTSD or other behavioral disorders. Some of these disorders include flashbacks, nightmares, irritability, trouble concentrating, sleeplessness and decreased alertness, all of which will eventually affect unit and individual Soldier readiness.

The assistance of the combat stress doctor doesn’t always have to be reactive. Scheduling counseling sessions with a platoon throughout a deployment is a great way to be proactive and get ahead of the problem. One technique is to conduct initial sensing sessions between the doctor and the Soldiers, followed by more in-depth sessions with Soldiers identified as “high risk” for stress-related disorders. Additionally, there are other medical teams outside of the brigade that specialize in preventing and treating combat stress. The expertise that these teams bring to the battlefield is tremendous. It is highly recommended to deploy the same combat stress team to the battalion on each occasion. A feeling of trust will develop over time, creating an environment where Soldiers feel comfortable discussing issues with familiar personnel. The combat stress team should visit the battalion for a few days early in the deployment, prior to any
incidents, to begin building a rapport that will pay dividends later. The battalion commander (and his subordinates) should foster an environment that allows for Soldiers to feel that they can seek help without being labeled as weak.

More than 15 percent of service members returning from Iraq and 11 percent of service members returning from Afghanistan have met the screening criteria for major depression, generalized anxiety, or PTSD, according to a study published in the July 1, 2004, issue of the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care.”

“The most important thing we can do for service members who have been in combat is to help them understand that the earlier that they get help when they need it, the better off they’ll be,” said Colonel (Dr.) Charles W. Hoge in the June 30, 2004, Associated Press article “One in Eight Returning Soldiers Suffers from PTSD.” Hoge, a medical doctor with the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, was one of the authors of the study.

These same assets can be of great value during a unit’s regeneration program upon redeployment for both the Soldier and his/her family.

Seeing the Signs
This is tough for several reasons: age, maturity, experience in the Army, and training levels all can affect how troops (and leaders) deal with combat stress. However, the commander must be able to see the signs, and in some cases, take deliberate actions. It is important to train subordinate leaders to address combat stress with their Soldiers and deal with it themselves. The hardened platoon sergeant may enforce the “suck it up” approach. This approach is more common than not and is also understandable given the conditions of combat. However, it may eventually lead to poor leader decisions, impact on Soldier performance, and possibly contribute to unwarranted escalation of force incidents. None are good for a unit. Granted, in combat, times can be tough for everyone; however, a few techniques can help lower and manage the stress level.

Some of the approaches that the commander can influence include:

- Adjust the combat patrol schedule,
- Morale phone calls,
- Physical Training,
- Mandatory “stand-down” day,
- Shuffle duty positions — give a guy a break,
- Bible studies,
- Sensing sessions,
- In-theater passes,
- Visit the troops, go on a mission with Soldiers,
- Special meals (Big motivator!),
- Train junior leaders to identify symptoms early,
- Group counseling,
- Ask your NCOs,
- Effective FRG and newsletters, and
- Leader-to-leader discussions with battalion commander and the leaders at all levels.

Another outlet available to all Soldiers is environmental leave, commonly referred to as R&R leave. Ironically, this may cause stress and coping issues for many of our Soldiers. A few techniques to mitigate are:

1. Leverage the rear detachment (phone trees, rear detachment chaplain, etc).
2. Transition “from and to” the patrol schedule both before and after a Soldier departs for leave and lastly,
3. Closely manage the leave windows for the leadership of the unit. Of course, a mandatory deployment briefing that addresses leave/travel process, finances and expectation management when joining the family, in addition to other areas can be of great value to our Soldiers. Upon redeployment, recommend no more than a 48-hour pass for all Soldiers, regardless of rank. This is a great opportunity to slowly but efficiently integrate back into the CONUS environment, meet newly assigned battle buddies and get reacquainted in the barracks or back at home. Additionally, recommend a reverse SRP (Soldier readiness process) focused on finance settlements, medical screening, family reunion briefings, and to offer the opportunity for Soldiers to seek assistance from a chaplain or a medical professional if needed.

What to Look For
Some Soldiers experiencing combat stress may show no symptoms while others show many. Physical signs may include excessive talking or joking, out of character quietness, vomiting, tight stomach (contractions), sweating, constant headaches, hyperventilation and exhaustion, just to name a few.

Emotional signs of stress may include anxious or agitated behavior, anger towards all Arabs (or local nationals, depending on where the unit is operating), anger towards peers and the Army, depression, calloused or numb behavior, resentment, loss of confidence, and a general disbelief in or support of the mission.

Seeing the signs while engaged in steady-state operations is hard. Who best does this? The squad leader, a battle buddy or the first sergeant? Everyone shares the responsibility, but the final responsibility lies with the commander. Seeing the signs is complicated by the fact that leaders can also experience combat stress but are still expected to perform leadership duties inherent to their rank and position. Who watches the commander? Great question, as he is often without peers on the FOB (forward operating base) or within the unit. Great obvious sources, of course, are the battalion command sergeant major, chaplain, or in some cases, even the company commanders.

Conclusion
Managing stress before, during, and after a deployment is critical to maintaining the war-fighting readiness of our force. With prolonged operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and potential conflicts in other areas of the world, we must continue to care for our most valuable asset — the Soldier.

The long-term effects on the Army are obvious. Our junior leaders and young Soldiers will be the senior NCOs and leaders of tomorrow. While there may be no textbook solution to manage combat stress, working hard to reintegrate our Soldiers back to their homes, families and society, as well as utilizing the assets available in the field, coupled with good old-fashioned leadership, may help us sustain the long fight.

Lieutenant Colonel Gary Brito is currently serving as a senior trainer (Scorpions) at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. He previously served as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Georgia.
Victory proverbially has a thousand fathers, and the success of our brigade in Operation Enduring Freedom VII has well over 3,000. But a share of the credit also belongs to the system that brought the team together.

The 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division developed from an ideal into a battlefield reality within a year and a half. The “Spartan” experience demonstrates the utility of the three-year lifecycle manning system and validates, in large measure, the concept of the modular brigade combat team.

The brigade began with little more than a commander and a dream. Fortunately, that commander was the ideal man for the job. Colonel John Nicholson’s office at the Pentagon was incinerated during the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. The colonel escaped with his life only because the arrival of household goods that morning kept him away from his office. His commitment to the mission and the team could not have been more powerful.

I had served with Colonel Nicholson during a previous assignment and knew I was getting not only a motivated commander but one of the finest leaders and tacticians available. Conscious of the possibilities and potential of the new organization as well as the challenges we faced, the commander and I sought to seize the unique opportunity to build a very special team from the ground up.

The colonel had already struck upon the “Spartans” theme by the time we discussed our unit identity in late July of 2004. As we talked, I grew more and more enthusiastic about the concept. The Spartan ideal embodied everything we hoped to achieve. The ancient Spartan warriors formed an elite class set apart by their training, professionalism, and service. They idealized discipline, loyalty, self-sacrifice, valor, strength, and skill.

When the colonel asked my advice for a motto, I conducted a little research before responding. As I learned about the ancient city-state and its unique warrior class, I came across a Spartan expression that perfectly distilled our ideal: “With Your Shield or On It.” The phrase meant for Spartans that a warrior should return from battle with shield in hand or perish in the fight. Since a warrior’s shield protected the comrades who stood beside him in fighting formation, the motto suggested ideals of sacrifice, solidarity, courage, and teamwork. Once the theme coalesced, the Spartan ethic informed every aspect of our brigade.

We had a commander and a command sergeant major so we had a brigade — at least on paper, and we had one hell of a motto. But that was about it.

The commander and I assembled the Spartan team from a variety of 10th Mountain “legacy” units, preexisting elements pressed into service in new capacities and entirely new organizations. We brought the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment over from 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain and 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment from the division’s 2nd Brigade. We significantly enhanced the capabilities of a resident main support battalion to form the 710th Brigade Support Battalion. The 4th
Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment formed from the remnants of division artillery (DIVARTY). As the DIVARTY command sergeant major, I watched my organization steadily disintegrate until it vanished entirely into the fledgling BCTs, and then I took my place in the Spartan Brigade.

A new battalion-sized element featured unique reconnaissance, mechanized movement, and targeting capabilities. The 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment relied largely on new troopers to fill its ranks, leaning heavily on brother Spartan battalions for leaders. We established the 3rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion from six separate battalions within the division.

Bringing these capabilities together within the same brigade paid rich command and control dividends. Since the commander and I controlled all assets within the 3rd BCT, we could move personnel among battalions as necessary. They could coordinate activities among all the brigade’s organizations, de-conflicting schedules and resolving issues when necessary. Brigade leaders could pass guidance and directions through organization channels rather than coordinate with separate headquarters for support. Instead of negotiating with distinct organizations, they simply passed orders to subordinate units. The modular organization also encouraged cross-talk among leaders and Soldiers from different specialties, enhancing cohesion and understanding across the brigade.

We confronted a number of significant challenges as the brigade stood up. Equipping the new force on a condensed timeline posed enormous logistical difficulties for our supply chain. The most daunting challenges revolved around manning. The establishment of the new brigade brought enormous numbers of new Soldiers to Fort Drum. Our brigade alone received around 2,000 new Soldiers during the run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) VII. This posed significant reception and housing as well as integration, training and equipping problems.

The new arrivals stretched the infrastructure around Fort Drum to the breaking point. Base housing facilities for married and single Soldiers alike were soon exhausted. Virtually every property in nearby towns was rented, sold or leased in short order. While post leaders initiated construction projects designed to increase the housing capacity at Drum, leaders and Soldiers resorted to increasingly remote locations in the near term. Significant numbers of brigade Soldiers commuted 45 minutes to an hour each way every day from regional towns. Some lived as far out as Syracuse, a commute that typically began at 3 a.m., including privately owned vehicle (POV) and shuttle bus legs.

Fortunately, the brigade’s senior NCOs acted energetically and decisively to mitigate the problems. Spartan sergeants major and first sergeants met personally with incoming Soldiers as they completed in-processing Friday afternoons. They discussed the post, the area, the division, expectations and standards. They also discussed Soldiers’ experiences and backgrounds, and any personal or family issues that could impact the team. The personal interaction allowed our leaders to make informed decisions about who to place where rather than randomly assign incoming Soldiers to units and housing areas. If two out of six guys had to live in Syracuse, who among them were best prepared to handle the situation responsibly? Who needed a strong, directive leader to impose discipline? Who was prepared to accept greater responsibilities, perhaps move into a leadership position?

The relative youth and inexperience of our incoming Soldiers pushed enlisted brigade leaders to their limits. Many new Soldiers required close supervision, vigorous mentorship and remedial training. Platoon sergeants and squad leaders devoted enormous energy to developing junior leaders, identifying young Soldiers with leadership potential and providing the mentorship necessary to create tactically and technically proficient team and section leaders.

We sought from the earliest stages of the brigade’s existence to inculcate a common Warrior Ethos. One aspect of the Warrior Ethos was conceptual. It revolved around esprit de corps, discipline, and mental toughness. Another aspect of the Warrior Ethos revolved around combat training, instilling skills that complemented the Warrior spirit and produced Soldiers capable of taking the fight to the enemy.

The combat training also ensured our Soldiers saw themselves as — and they were in fact — Warriors first and technicians second. The training instilled tactical, weapons, and self-defense skills.

A brigade-wide combatives program instilled self-defense skills while encouraging physical fitness and discipline. The program contributed enormously to the effectiveness of our Soldiers in close-quarters combat with the enemy. It helped us inculcate not only the proficiency but the aggressiveness, confidence and fighting spirit necessary to confront and defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

We strongly emphasized marksmanship throughout the train-up for our rotation. The emphasis on marksmanship reflected our commitment to fundamental Soldier skills, our philosophy of conducting training “across the board” and our determination to inculcate the Warrior Ethos throughout the brigade. On a practical level, it also reflected situational awareness. Our analysis proved correct. Many of our Soldiers — and not just infantrymen — fought during small arms engagements against the enemy in Afghanistan during OEF VII.

We adopted a small arms master gunner model. Much of the marksmanship training
broke down conveniently into modules. This allowed us to conduct training in self-contained blocks, maximizing flexibility and ensuring everyone reached an acceptable level of warfighting proficiency. Short-range marksmanship training prepared Soldiers to confront the enemy with confidence, skill and deadly accuracy on the battlefield. We maximized participation in squad designated marksmanship and advanced rifle marksmanship training programs. The training typically culminated in react-to-contact live-fire drills, convoy live fires and combined arms live fires.

The universal marksmanship effort complemented, but did not replace, service-wide schools and programs. It provided a baseline of competence on widely employed weapons systems, ensuring a large proportion of our Soldiers could apply lethal force on the battlefield. Whereas previous efforts focused on honing the skills of select “trigger-pullers,” usually infantrymen, artillerymen and cavalrymen, we made mechanics, cooks and medics “trigger-pullers” in their own right.

We also took advantage of formal marksmanship courses designed to refine the skills of our finest shooters. We sent select Spartans to Sniper School and brought in mobile training teams (MTTs) to reach others.

We implemented perhaps the most comprehensive and dynamic universal observer program conducted within a maneuver organization. Our philosophy was simple: we provided basic training on fire procedures to anyone who might go “outside the wire” on patrol or mission. We weren’t the first organization to implement universal observer training, but we conducted the training on an unprecedented scale. Soldiers from other artillery job specialties, infantrymen or armored cavalrymen might practice calling for fire, but how many logistics, staffs or personnel from outside the organization typically receive universal observer training? We trained mechanics, cooks, members of other governmental agencies and even Afghan National Army allies in basic fire procedures.

We established the Spartan Responder program to ensure maximum proficiency in buddy aid. This went far beyond the conventional combat lifesaver model. Rather than train a couple guys at a time as slots opened up, we turned our subject matter experts into trainers. Medics trained each other and then turned to the rest of the force. By the time we deployed, 100 percent of our companies had received basic emergency medical training.

Meanwhile, a quiet revolution in battalion support unfolded in the frozen woods of northern New York. The modular configuration of the brigade afforded a unique opportunity to disperse support assets. We attached a forward support company (FSC) to each maneuver organization. Support Soldiers integrated almost immediately into their battalions and squadron. This not only established unprecedented cohesion and camaraderie but ensured we would truly train as we fought. Training alongside infantrymen, artillerymen, and cavalry troopers also afforded 710th personnel unique opportunities to learn from the men they supported. Soldiers serving in FSCs trained to the same standards as the combat arms troops they supported, developing in the process into some of the Army’s most lethal mechanics, logistics and medics. Combat arms Soldiers, in turn, benefited enormously from their exposure to subject matter experts in a wide array of support specialties.

Training progressed through individual and small group phases to squad, platoon and company exercises. Company training gave way to battalion-level exercises conducted at home station. Elements from all of our battalions participated in capstone live fire and fire support training events, setting the stage for our mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), which was conducted in June at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Our mission identified early on, capstone training events and the MRE focused specifically on escalation of force (EOF) scenarios.

As the deployment approached, we conducted final training missions and participated in team-building activities. Senior NCOs conducted a staff ride to Fort Ticonderoga, New York. The staff ride allowed me and battalion command sergeants major a final opportunity to interact with and mentor senior brigade NCOs. An already tight senior NCO corps emerged from the staff ride even stronger and more cohesive.

Practicalities dominated our final weeks at home station. We packed outbound equipment and received theater-specific gear. We sent Soldiers to the numerous mandatory theater briefings and conducted cultural familiarization training. Soldiers completed final administrative and medical screenings and spent valuable time with their families.

As the torch party departed in January and advanced parties and main bodies prepared to deploy, the commander and I could reflect on enormous achievements. Had we merely constructed and deployed a brigade within 18 months, the achievement would have been remarkable. Yet we had accomplished much more. We had assembled one of the most highly trained and cohesive maneuver brigades to serve...

A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment peers across the Pakistani border with the aid of an Improved Targeting Acquisition System from an observation point in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.
in the war on terror. Few brigade-sized elements featured such versatility or such comprehensive capabilities. Seldom if ever had a higher proportion of Soldiers within a brigade possessed such a wide range of capabilities. Prior to transformation, how many brigades contained mechanics and clerks trained to infantry standards of marksmanship? How many truck drivers and radio technicians in other organizations could call in fire missions with deadly accuracy?

The lifecycle system aided our efforts in a number of critical ways. First, it brought the team together relatively early on. Key leaders came to know their Soldiers early in the cycle, allowing them to identify and mentor potential leaders in the earliest stages and train to the strengths and weaknesses of every troop. This helped leaders turn Soldiers into combat multipliers. A strong shooter might develop into a mentor for weaker ones; a skilled fire supporter might teach less proficient Soldiers to call for fire. Playing to Soldiers’ strengths created valuable subject matter experts, enhanced confidence and developed leaders.

Colleagues, in turn, helped Soldiers remedy deficiencies and turn weaknesses into strengths. A skilled fire support team member, for instance, might learn buddy aid from a medic he taught to call for fire. A gifted marksman might be a mentor on the range and a student in the motorpool.

Second, the lifecycle ensured maximum predictability throughout the planning, training and execution phases of our mission. This allowed for highly effective medium and long range as well as near-term planning. Key leaders arranged cumulative training events that built on previous instruction. One level of training built on another, beginning with individual, team and squad events and culminating in integrated large scale exercises. The predictability of the lifecycle also allowed us to integrate individual schools, temporary duty missions and advanced training opportunities into our battle rhythm. Rather than send Soldiers to schools haphazardly as opportunities arose, we consciously selected dates that dovetailed with unit calendars and the broader brigade training plan.

Predictability worked to the benefit of the individual Soldier as well as the team. A Soldier who knows with a reasonable degree of certainty when he can attend BNCOC, pursue educational opportunities or take leave stands a much better chance of accomplishing personal and family as well as unit goals. Leaders and Soldiers planned for major training events and missions and scheduled personal activities accordingly. Family members knew when brigade and unit activities permitted free weekends and leave opportunities with their Soldiers and when they did not.

The continuity provided by the lifecycle also yielded important advantages to our brigade. Under the individual manning system, Soldiers and even key leaders arrived and departed sporadically — often at the worst possible times. Transitions frequently occurred during the run-up to important activities or missions, leaving Soldiers without proven leaders and trusted colleagues when they needed them most. The lifecycle helped in two significant ways. First, it kept most of the team intact throughout the cycle. Second, it allowed us to prepare for the transitions that did occur and mitigate their impact.

By encouraging cohesion, stability and continuity, the lifecycle contributed to morale and esprit de corps. Soldiers developed tight bonds with their leaders and with each other. Despite an intense mission and a high operational tempo, our brigade has enjoyed robust retention rates, particularly among those opting to remain with their organizations. While a number of factors influence retention, the cohesion encouraged by lifecycle manning clearly played a role. Indeed, the cohesion of one infantry squad was so strong that its members reenlisted on the same day for similar terms in order to keep the squad together.

Critics of the lifecycle often fault the system’s inflexibility. Since the lifecycle deliberately aims to lock a team into place throughout a major mission, it is certainly less flexible than the individual manning system. But it bears reiterating that the advantages of continuity generally outweigh the disadvantages incurred by limiting flexibility. The inflexibility of the lifecycle, moreover, is often exaggerated. When leaders find it absolutely necessary to “bust the cycle,” they can. I’ve done it myself in order to place the right man in the right position to accomplish the mission. With sufficient coordination and support from brigade and higher echelon leaders, a lifecycle unit can indeed move Soldiers into and out of its organization. The threshold of justification for such move and the effort required to complete it are simply greater.

The lifecycle, some critics warn, has the potential to lock NCOs into positions that hinder career development. This critique is not entirely without merit. Battalion command sergeants major not assigned a brigade could find themselves trapped at the same level for consecutive lifecycles. Other senior NCOs, particularly those promoted during the lifecycle, might well serve part or all of a cycle in positions below their grade. These problems are, in some cases, mitigated by career developing opportunities within the brigade or, more rarely, by busting the cycle, but they cannot be denied.

The replacement system for lifecycle units requires further development. Originally, the system’s architects expected a package of personnel configured according to brigade needs and likely attrition patterns to fill vacancies over the course of the lifecycle. This package never materialized for us. Instead, we ultimately obtained backfills from other 10th Mountain organizations on an individual basis, an imperfect solution at odds with the entire concept of the lifecycle.

On balance, however, the lifecycle system represents a vast improvement over the individual manning method. The continuity, predictability and stability inherent in the lifecycle definitely helped us create a winning team. The lifecycle system significantly and directly improved our cohesion, our technical and tactical proficiency, and our warfighting capabilities. Our pride, esprit de corps and cohesion — our drive for excellence in everything we do — was significantly enhanced by the unity built during our lifecycle. The lifecycle contributed heavily to Spartan success during OEF VII. I’m convinced it will play a similarly constructive role in the development of other brigades.

Command Sergeant Major James Redmore is currently serving as the command sergeant major of the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. He previously served as the command sergeant major for the Division Artillery, 10th Mountain Division.
The soldier engaged in combat is pervaded by a tumult of feelings, often in contrast with each other, conflicting feelings where passion tends to overcome reason, motivation and sense of ethics. An alternation of rational and irrational predominance, which involves also the commanders compelled to live through even more explosive and stressing situations.

THE SOLDIER
The figure of the soldier has been socially recognized since the dawn of civilization. He distinguished himself by his strength and aggressiveness. He stood out from the rest of the group because he was able to defend territory and food supplies and take food away from other groups. He was the “prince of survival” and, for this reason, the community praised him but at the same time stood in awe of him. As Plutarch wrote in Life of Lycurgus, in the 8th century BC Lycurgus aimed to create a new Spartan society whose members were invincible warriors. They had to be untouched by “the superfluity and vanity; this basic general rule operated in Egypt where soldiers were kept quite separate from civil society. For many centuries, Spartan society held great fascination for all Greece and inspired Plato when he idealized “his State” in the republic. According to him, society was divided into three groups depending on the nature of each individual: philosophers, warriors, and citizens (farmers and craftsmen).

Philosophers and warriors have to lead the utopian State of Plato. Philosophers are seen as the source of all wisdom; they know what is good for the city (they know the truths of life more than anyone else in the world). Warriors have the virtue of bravery. (The military must ensure that people obey the philosophers’ will, and they have to defend their territory against enemies.) These two classes rule the lower ones which consist of craftsmen and farmers who produce goods for the community. The ruling classes have to worry not only about their own well-being but also about that of the entire community. All these groups have to have two important virtues: justice, which means performing one’s particular functions, and moderation.

Contemporary society, technology and new ways of looking at the military world enable us to draw an analogy between these two Platonic virtues and those virtues that lead the soldiers during peace and through war. The military draws on its strength in fighting and aims to win. However, strength can act as a powerful and effective deterrent when it proves to be potentially destructive and winning.

Fighting means being able to use violence in a sensible and effective way, killing only if necessary and allowing for the fact that one can be killed. Winning means being the ideal instrument for neutralizing attacks against the community/state.

Neutralizing attacks implies aggressiveness of military spirit and moderation in order to achieve one’s goals without going beyond humanitarian limits. Soldiers are experts in the use of force and have to use it avoiding any excesses.

It is widely believed that in wartime everything is allowed (inter arma silent leges). Actually, there is nothing more dangerous than holding an opinion like that, not only from a civil point of view but also in military terms. As General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) said, war is famously “the continuation of policy by other means.” By nature all human beings surrender themselves to pathos (passion) rather than to logos.
(rationality) and ethos (ethics and morals). In particular, during war human beings reveal their real nature and can cause irreparable damage. For this reason, the civilized society calls for ethical behavior and principles which are transformed into regulations that guarantee humanity and justice. This process provides an effective safeguard against unjust wars. In fact, we can question the legitimacy of a war if the way it is fought violates basic human rights (the rules of ius in bello), the principle of proportionality (it concerns the damage inflicted), and the principle of discrimination (between fighters and non-fighters). “However just a war is, it will turn out to be unjustified if to win it the two important principles of ius in bello are violated (it does not matter how much and how often).”

THE SOLDIER, FROM INSTRUMENT TO ACTOR

We have to confront the dilemma about whether soldiers are just pawns in the government’s plans or rational agents within that military continuation of policy.

If we regarded soldiers as mere instruments for attaining political objectives, lifting the burden of making important decisions from their shoulders, this would make their tasks much easier. Choosing this option means transforming a fighter into a mere war machine, which is built to win and is based on training, discipline, and leadership.

If we saw them as real protagonists of the war and able to solve knotty problems and make key decisions affecting national objectives and policies, they would be in a very delicate situation. In this case, in fact, they are no longer free to operate in accordance with international rules governing military operations (ius in bello), which are fundamental parts of their doctrine. In addition, they are at the mercy of public opinion and, consequently, they are burdened with responsibilities they would prefer not to have.

Considering the soldier as a “thinking” being means recognizing a change of his role: from pawn to actor, “from simple cause to intelligent cause;” he can be seen as “a cause able to produce good and bad things” and not “something produced by another cause without order and objectives.”

This changes the meaning of the term “soldier.”

In peacetime, the soldier is only potentially engaged in military operations and fighting. Consequently, he is able to plan his work according to his primary objectives and take into account the effects that have been produced by his own actions (effect-based operations).

However, we have to consider carefully different theaters of operations in which a soldier can operate. In fact, he could show a very rational or aggressive disposition according to the context. It is clear that our analysis is much simpler if we take into consideration the theater of operations in which the thinking and instinctive parts of the soldier come out.

WHO THE FIGHTERS ARE

Training and discipline pull soldiers in a particular direction on the battlefield (combat motivation). In the sudden quiet that follows the fighting, they stop to think about the results that have been achieved and the major objectives that must be pursued as they assess the whole situation. In this phase reason prevails (military ethics), and soldiers are able to make important decisions taking into consideration their humanity and, at the same time, the need to win.

All soldiers go through alternate periods of rationality and irrationality. The figure above shows the extreme levels of these two mental conditions: military ethics and combat motivation.

It should also be realized that the commander of large units is able to operate without getting physically involved in the fighting. The responsibility of the mission and his own troops and the respect of law require a great deal of energy. In addition, he feels a surge of pure adrenaline during the battle because he would like to be on the front line with his soldiers; to fulfill this onerous task he has to get the maximum benefit out of “his inner resources” — combat motivation and military ethics. The commander, whose soul often surrenders to the combat motivation, becomes very close to his soldiers through this emotional involvement (pathos), and extremes meet. This makes the structure of the Army solid, and all these elements make it an organic whole.

The third and last figure we can see in the virtual battlefield shows the staff. They work for the commander in order to transform every single decision into action in accordance with the tasks and law (ius in bello, military ethics). They work in a context where there is little physical and emotional involvement and where they are able to act reasonably and responsibly following “the rational path” of his heart.
WHAT LEADS THE SOLDIER

Soldiers are driven by an instinct which pushes them to act to pursue specific aims. This is referred to as military ethics and combat motivation. Military ethics is a set of rules governing the public and private conduct of the military. It consists of fundamental values such as country, discipline and honor.

In short, military ethics remind soldiers of “what they have to do and for whom.” Circumstances affect our choices, but a soldier cannot let this happen during his work. He gets around this by following the rules governing the army, trying to predict the consequences of his actions during the mission, treating his comrades with great respect, and taking into consideration the current situation. This means adopting a morally correct attitude.

Combat motivation can be explained by offering a precise definition of both terms. Motivation is derived from the Latin word *motivus* which means “able to make something move,” that is to say a conscious or unconscious stimulus to the action. If this stimulus refers to the individual, it can be described as “a dynamic factor of human behavior which leads an organism towards a goal.” As far as the adjective “combat” is concerned, it refers to the individual aggressive behavior. It is a phenomenon emerging from the state of war and is not a feature of people who justify it. Soldiers, who have received adequate training and are under good leadership in an ideal environment, are driven by this instinctual impulse which enables them to overwhelm the enemy with determination. Combat motivation regards the individual and the group at the same time. As far as the soldier is concerned, it appears to be a willingness to win and survive. Instead, in a group it shows itself as cohesion, which is something that relates members of an organization to each other so that all members display willingness and honor, their own commitment to themselves, unity and objective.

CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS

What I have described by referring to the roles as soldier-fighter, soldier of staff and commander is just abstract theory, whereas the reality is much more complex than it seems. A soldier does not have to see himself as a war machine; a commander should not expect him to take decisions or make choices about simple and ideal situations.

During the battle he fights bitterly and hard against the enemy and he moderates his aggressiveness adhering to simple and essential ethical principles. These principles must be easy to remember and comprehensible. For example, in the U.S. Army’s Soldier’s Creed, the so-called “Warrior Ethos” is outlined: “I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade.”

Soldiers driven by their instinct and principles of honor and comradeship are able to persist in their actions even in bad conditions, trying to win the battle no matter how difficult it is. In this case, persisting in doing something is not a mere courageous action. It is moral courage; it is not only an energy that pushes them to take risky and definitive decisions, but it is an inner energy which enables them to summon the willpower to fight.

The U.S Army’s Soldier’s Creed stresses that modern armies tend to make the motivational aspect prevail over the ethical part of the soldier although they recognize the need to morally respect the enemy and the rules of war. Referring to the graph on page 13, in fact, we could move the parabola of combat motivation to the top of the graph (or to the bottom) depending on whether the army aims to have (especially in the front line) soldiers driven by *pathos* rather than by *ethos*.

A useful comparison will show an important point: the U.S. Army demands a lot of its troops in terms of results. The policy adopted by the Italian armed forces is quite different. As a consequence, American Soldiers put a greater emphasis on the objective that must be obtained whereas Italian soldiers lay particular emphasis on how to achieve it. This allows us to notice the different degree of trust placed in the single individual. Outlining just a few principles in the detailed checklists is symptomatic of an organization that does not exert a strict control over its members and allows them to operate free within limits. This makes them feel much more involved in the pursuit of their goals and urges them to devote themselves to the operation, even taking the initiative if necessary. On the contrary, enunciating lots of principles without classifying standard operating procedures according to their features could make the single individual feel confused and bound to comply with instructions that are given by people who have the power to decide.

Until today, this attitude towards operational problems has turned out to be able to achieve good results and it has been considered to be a good quality of Italian armed forces in the peacekeeping missions because it has allowed them to fulfil essential and strategic aims, earning universal praise. In the future, this quality could transform into a serious handicap. The Italian Minister of Defence said, “A peacekeeping operation does not have to impose limits to the military functions since the combat features of an army must be distinctive.” These words warn the military against any misinterpretation of what the battlefield is — a place of violent clashes with the enemy.

Once again, our attention is drawn to the concept of the warrior defined by Plato in the “Republic.” This concept is valid even in the contemporary society because it clears up any doubts about what view the armed forces have to hold on the figure of the soldier in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding about some fundamental concepts that have meanings which are often twisted.

Peace considered as absence of military conflict cannot be guaranteed forever. This resource must be safeguarded constantly by adopting an adequate policy of security, which says an appropriate use of force should be used only if necessary.

The equation security-inability to communicate violence represents the cornerstone of being a warrior. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, when the military operates in peacekeeping missions it should face the situation with its usual military mind supported by adequate professional training and moral creed.

Former American Secretary of Defense Les Aspen said, “We have to carry out a mission, we have to fight and win the wars of
our Nation. For whom do we do it? For the American population. This “twofold ethics” justifies the American armed forces ... Since we are able to fight and win all the wars of our Nation, we are much more capable than others of facing different kinds of mission such as peacekeeping and relief operations ...

Soldiers must be regarded as “combat ready” instruments; they are trained and equipped to further strategic aims. However “we cannot give a weapon to anyone. Consequently, a well-chosen selection and a rigorous moral and disciplinary training of people who pursue a military career are needed.” Adequate moral “training” must be considered an unequivocal point of reference in all situations, when they are on garrison duty or during a military operation, when they undertake a combat or a peacekeeping mission.

To meet this objective it is necessary to explain simple and basic principles to the soldier concerning the figure of the fighter. They must be regarded as consistent and clear principles, to give examples:

* “I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills” (U.S. Army, Warrior Ethos);
* “I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat” (U.S. Army, Warrior Ethos);
* “...the ethos of the Army is sustained by all soldiers doing their duty with an implacable will to succeed; accepting their grave responsibility and legal right to fight and kill according to their orders and their unlimited liability to give their lives for others; confident that in return the nation will look after them and their families” (British Army);
* In combat: you will act without relish of your tasks, or hatred; you will respect the vanquished enemy and will never abandon either your wounded or your dead, nor will you under any circumstances surrender your arms (The French Legionnaire’s Code of Honour);

*A mission once given to you becomes sacred to you; you will accomplish it to the end and at all costs (The French Legionnaire’s Code of Honour).

This is important to face the difficult situations of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. At strategic level, the commander has to face delicate and controversial questions. This requires a higher standard of competence. The shift of organizational leadership towards real strategic leadership involves the development of new abilities and habits. At an organizational level, tasks and objectives are really clear and this requires specific competence. Consequently, tasks and standard of performance must be clear and easy to understand.

The commander finds himself in a difficult situation because he has to manage the most delicate resource, which is the matter of ethics. He cannot adopt an immoral attitude towards the enemy, because he is a human being and has power to think logically. In other words, he has the ability to think in an intelligent way because reason is peculiar to man. He realizes that everyone is born equal.

His behavior will be ethically correct if he considers the enemy exactly like him. His behavior will be immoral if he views him as an instrument to serve military interests. The principle must be independent of specific goals everyone strives for. In this way, it is universal and ethically valid.

The commander always finds himself in a delicate situations which could affect his soldiers and civilians’ life as well as success and failure of strategic and political objectives of the nation. In addition, these situations are surrounded by an aura of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Commanders do not play a key role only in saving others’ lives but also in guaranteeing deterrence. They have to be ready to conduct military operations involving the killing of people and destruction of property. Since soldiers have to face difficult situations in many cases, the commander is not allowed to be in a state of inertia and paralyzed with fear. A commander could make mistakes when he makes decisions, which are often subjected to revision. However, this possibility does not have to inhibit him. On the contrary, he has to give much more vigor to his conduct and adopt an attitude that seems to be wise and correct in that particular situation.

In any case, taking an ethically wrong decision means increasing the number of choices that they will have to face, as well as the future impact of those choices. A bad ethical decision could catch the commander in a trap showing him the wrong way.

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The Army is making great progress in its transformation as it moves to a brigade-centric organization. Part of this transformation is the creation of forward support companies that provide logistics support to battalions and operate as a subordinate of the battalion. The integration of these companies has created some challenges for their supported units. Many of these challenges stem from the creation of new doctrine and deviate from the accepted norms of Army of Excellence (AOE) doctrine. Battalion commanders and executive officers struggle with the differences between the AOE doctrine they learned early in their careers and the emerging doctrine of the transformational Army. Many commanders across the Army do not use the forward support company (FSC) and the expertise within it to its full potential. This appears to be due to a lack of understanding of forward support companies’ capabilities and subject matter expertise and because these leaders have not yet been trained on the new logistics doctrine by the institutional Army.

For many years, brigade-level logisticians created forward logistics elements (FLE) “out of hide” to augment existing capabilities like the support platoon or battalion maintenance section to weight the battlefield logistically as needed with assets and C2 (command and control). This ensured that critical supply and maintenance capabilities were forward with supported battalions. The FSC was created to provide all of the assets a battalion needed to be self-sufficient and the necessary C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) to plan, synchronize, and control logistics operations. The forward support company is a multifunctional unit that includes a distribution platoon and a maintenance platoon organized to provide support to a maneuver battalion (FM 4-90.1).

The purpose of this article is to provide information on the doctrinal composition, capabilities, and operations of the forward support company and will provide both doctrinal and non-doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to both current and future combined arms battalion (CAB) commanders and staff officers. This article will also address methods of applying the capabilities of the forward support company to sustain current counterinsurgency operations.

This article focuses on the CAB FSC and will not address the unique requirements of FSCs supporting RSTA (reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition) squadrons and fires battalions; however, the fundamental principles are the same for all FSCs. Also, for the sake of discussion, the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), combined arms battalion, forward support company’s modified table of equipment will be used throughout the article.

The forward support company is a 233-Soldier, multifunctional unit that includes a distribution platoon and a maintenance platoon organized to provide support to a maneuver battalion (FM 4-90.1). This is
intentionally a very broad mission statement. The FSC provides each battalion a robust and flexible logistics capability that can perform both doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions for the battalion in support of full spectrum operations. Although the FSC is organic to the brigade support battalion due to Title IX considerations, it operates under the command and control of the CAB commander through attachment or operational control. The sections highlighted below provide the doctrinal missions and capabilities of the subordinate elements of the FSC. These elements are the company HQ section, the food service section, the distribution platoon, and the maintenance platoon. Each section’s critical equipment, military occupational specialties, and potential shortfalls are highlighted.

**The Company Headquarters**

The FSC headquarters is similar to every other company headquarters in the Army. The headquarters section is responsible for the command, control, supply, and administration of the company. It also performs the following logistics tasks:

1. Coordinates and provides technical support to the combined arms battalion.
2. Advises the combined arms battalion commander on sustainment requirements versus available assets.
3. Determines the unit’s sustainment requirements in coordination with the BSB (brigade support battalion) operations section, combined arms battalion S4, and logistics representatives from attached units.
4. Provides input to the combined arms battalion logistics estimate and service support paragraph of the operations order (OPORD).
5. Plans and monitors support operations and makes necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met.
6. Plans and coordinates allocation of available CSS resources.
7. Tracks available assets through subordinate company teams, BSB support operations section, combined arms battalion S4, and other units.
8. Requests backup support when needed.
9. Recommends support priorities and enforces priorities received from higher headquarters.
10. Coordinates with the S3, S4 and HHC commander on CAB support area (CABSA) locations.
11. Plans and executes contingency operations as required.
12. Coordinates with the S3 and S4 on primary and alternate routes into the combined arms battalion support area.
13. Establishes and monitors brigade and battalion logistics situation report (LOGSITREP), logistics status (LOGSTAT), and logistics spot reports in accordance with an SOP.
15. Develops and maintains tactical and CSS overlays.
16. Develops the CSS synchronization matrix.
17. Keeps the BSB abreast of the logistics situation and future support requirements. (Field Manual-Interim 3-90.5, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion)

(Many of these tasks were previously performed by the battalion S4, but now the battalion has trained and dedicated logisticians to coordinate and provide continuous support.)

The headquarters section also has a couple unique items of communication equipment which allow for theater-wide communications:

**Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3)** — BCS3 is the Army’s maneuver sustainment command and control system. It aligns sustainment, in-transit, and force data to aid commanders in making critical decisions. This system capability provides operators the complete logistics picture in the form of the “running estimate.” BCS3 provides:

- A map-centric display on a commercial laptop — a thorough technical and visual picture of the battlefield,
- The ability to plan, rehearse, train and execute on one system, and
- System software that can operate on unclassified or classified networks.

**Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT)** — The VSAT is the satellite communications system that allows the BCS3 and the Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced in the maintenance platoon to transmit and receive data.

**CSS Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI)** — CAISI is a secure, wireless local area network (LAN) which provides the “last mile” connectivity between logistics automation systems and VSAT type networks.

**Movement Tracking System (MTS) Controller Station** — This is a satellite-based, messaging and mapping system that provides asset visibility of and communication with transportation assets. This system is designed to be integrated with command post operations.
Movement Tracking System Vehicle Mounted — The vehicle mounted system provides the FSC commander the same capability as the controller station while on the move.

All of these systems combine to provide the FSC and the combined arms battalion with a logistics common operating picture. They also provide the FSC a “reach back” logistics capability. When combined with the combined arms battalion’s ABCS (Army Battlefield Command System) suite, these systems create a complete picture of the battlefield for the battalion commander.

Field Feeding Section
The FSC food service section provides Class I food service and food preparation. The food service section can prepare and deliver hot meals to the maneuver company teams. It distributes prepackaged food, prepared food, or both. It can provide one heat-and-serve meal and one cook-prepared (A or B ration) meal per day. Central to the food service section’s mission is its ability to task organize and deploy with company teams and operate remote feeding sites. The field feeding section has two critical pieces of food service equipment. They are:

* Containerized Kitchen (CK) — The CK is a mobile field kitchen that can support 800 Soldiers with up to three hot, cook-prepared or heat-and-serve meals per day. One CK replaces two mobile kitchen trailers and provides more food preparation capability. The CK is mounted on a tactical trailer and towed. Major features of the CK include electrical power from an onboard tactical quiet generator (TQG), an environmental control for heating and cooling, and refrigerated storage of 60 cubic feet. Cooks in the CK can roast, grill, boil, fry and bake. The CK has running water, a protected serving line, and ventilation of exhaust and cooking by-products.

* Kitchen, Company Level, Field Feeding-Enhanced (KCLFF-E) — The KCLFF-E is used for field feeding of company-sized units. It is designed to heat, deliver and serve one heat-and-serve ration per day for up to 200 Soldiers. It also has a limited capability to provide perishable and shelf-stable meals prepared by cooks. In order to operate, the KCLFF-E requires two food service specialists along with assistance from the unit being supported. The KCLFF-E is moved using a HMMWV or larger vehicle.

A cook with a forward support company takes water into a containerized kitchen before dinner at Forward Operating Base Hope in Iraq.

Distribution Platoon
The mission of the distribution platoon is to provide supply and transportation support to the combined arms battalion. It consists of a platoon headquarters section, Class III transportation section, general supply section, and Class V transportation section. The distribution platoon receives, transloads, and distributes all classes of supply minus Class VIII; although the platoon may distribute Class VIII based on battalion SOPs. The platoon may distribute supplies via unit distribution (combat logistics patrols [CLPs]), supply point distribution (FOB-centric), or both. It also has the ability to conduct simultaneous Class III and V support to line companies, HHC, and the FSC itself. The platoon can provide its own security while conducting CLPs or it can be augmented by maneuver forces based on METT-TC.

Key Equipment:
- 1 x FBCB2
- 1 x Forward Area Water Point Supply System
- 12 x M978 HEMTT Fueler
- 1 x M977 HEMTT Cargo
- 5 x M1120 HEMTT Load Handling System
- 5 x M1075 Palletized Loading System
- 5 x M1083 MTV w/Ring Mount
- 5 x M2 .50 CAL MG
- 1 x Container Handling Unit (CHU)

Personnel:
- Platoon leader: Quartermaster Corps
- Platoon sergeant: 92A40 automated logistics specialist
- 13 x petroleum specialists
- 1 x water treatment specialist
- 28 x motor transport operators
- 1 x automated logistics specialist

The real shortfall of the distribution platoon is the lack of ammunition specialists (89B) within the platoon. The Class V section is composed of only motor transport specialists. The battalion relies on these specialists to get on the job training in the management of ammunition.

Maintenance Platoon
The maintenance platoon provides field maintenance to the CAB. With more than 140 Soldiers, the maintenance platoon is larger than most companies. The platoon consists of nine sections: platoon headquarters, maintenance control, maintenance, service and recovery, and five company-level field maintenance teams (FMTs). The platoon has a wide variety of military occupational specialties giving it a robust maintenance capability. The maintenance platoon provides maintenance support for the following types of systems:
- M1 series tanks,
- M2/M3 series fighting vehicles,
- Construction equipment,
- Tracked vehicles,
- Wheeled vehicles,
- Weapons systems,
- Fire control systems,
- Power generation equipment,
- Communications equipment,
The platoon maintains a limited quantity of combat spares (prescribed load list [PLL] and shop/bench stock) in the maintenance control section. The maintenance platoon operates the unit maintenance collection point. When a company is detached from the battalion, the FSC commander detaches a supporting maintenance package that includes the personnel, tools, test equipment, and PLL stocks necessary to support the company, usually the habitual FMT plus any additional capabilities required by the mission.

The maintenance control section provides command, control, and supervision for all administrative functions of the platoon. With guidance from the FSC commander, the Headquarters section monitors established maintenance priorities, provides recommendations for reinforcing support, as well as plans and conducts all necessary platoon training activities.

The maintenance control section is the primary manager for all maintenance in the HBCT combined arms battalion and serves as the “nerve center” for the battalion’s maintenance activities. The maintenance control section performs all of the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) and dispatching operations and tracks scheduled services for the combined arms battalion using the Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced (SAMS-E). All company team SAMS-E boxes and PLL clerks are collocated with the maintenance control section. The maintenance control officer (MCO) manages all the SAMS-E operators. The SAMS-E clerks operating each company box process each DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet) completed by the operator or crew and verified by the FMT. Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 4–90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics, defines the responsibilities of the maintenance control officer, as follows: “The maintenance control officer (MCO) is the principal assistant to the commander, both battalion and FSC, on all matters pertaining to the field maintenance mission. The MCO serves as maintenance officer for the maneuver battalion and FSC ... He is responsible to the commander for the management of the combined efforts of the maintenance control section, maintenance section and service and recovery section, and the maintenance system teams...”

This eliminates the need for maneuver commanders to pull a battalion motor officer (BMO) “out of hide.” Battalion commanders now have a school-trained maintenance officer with supervision (the FSC commander) to manage their fleets! The MCO is also aided by a maintenance officer, usually a chief warrant officer 1 or 2, plus a sergeant first class who serves as the maintenance sergeant. According to the article “Maintenance Management in the Heavy BCT” which appeared in the September-October 2006 issue of Army Logistician, author Captain Eric A. McCoy pointed out that the maintenance control section must accomplish the following tasks:

1) Coordinate recovery of the battalion’s equipment,
2) Evaluate and ensure the quality of all maintenance completed by the maintenance platoon,
3) Monitor the status of equipment undergoing repairs, and determine the status of the repair parts required to complete those repairs, and
4) Perform maintenance according to the priorities established by the maneuver battalion commander.

The service/recovery section provides recovery support to elements of the combined arms battalion. This section also provides limited reinforcing recovery support to field maintenance teams. When reinforcing recovery support is required, FMTs request support from the maintenance control section.

The maintenance section provides field maintenance for the HBCT combined arms battalion. This section primarily focuses on the HHC and the FSC. It also provides maintenance support to elements attached to the combined arms battalion and provides reinforcing maintenance to the FMTs.

Each field maintenance team is tailored to support infantry, armor, and engineer companies. As the FSC commander task organizes his company, all or part of an FMT goes with the company teams to maintain habitual support doctrinally. The company commander sets the FMT’s priorities for his company, and the FMT operates under the control of the company first sergeant while supervised by the FMT maintenance NCOIC. FMTs carry limited onboard combat spares to help facilitate repairs forward. If inoperable equipment is not repairable by the FMT due to METT-TC or a lack of repair parts, the FMT uses recovery assets to recover the equipment to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) or designated link-up point. FMTs are fully integrated into the combined arms units’ operational plans.

Key equipment includes the FBCB2, M88A1, M88A2, M984 HEMTT wrecker, M1089 MTV wrecker, M1075 PLS, Forward Repair System, FMTV Series, and M2 .50 cal. machine gun.

**The Role of the FSC in COIN**

The forward support company fulfills its primary mission of supporting its battalion almost without fail at combat training centers.
and in theater. This is done through traditional methods of command and control, distribution operations, and maintenance activities. However, the FSC has many other capabilities and possesses areas of expertise not currently being used. The following sections may assist battalion commanders in exercising the capabilities of the FSC as it conducts both doctrinal and non-doctrinal missions. The FSC can perform valuable shaping operations such as combat logistics patrols, assessment of essential services, and limited support and training for host-nation security forces logistics.

**Combat Logistics Patrols**

The enemy wants the most visible and “easiest” targets to exploit in the media. The enemy thinks the most vulnerable targets are lightly armored, logistics convoys. So if the enemy wants to attack logistics targets why not operate them at night when we are at our best? Combat logistics patrols should not be used as “bait” as some may suggest, but supplies must be moved across the battlefield, so why not force the bugs to come out of hiding when we are at our best? Why not position our assets at those critical points on the battlefield so that the bugs can be crushed?

The most common mission for the FSC is combat logistics patrols (CLPs). Much has been written on the subject of convoy security in the last few years. It is not the intent of this article to discuss convoy battle drills and things of that nature. The things that will be covered are decisions that must be made by battalion commanders such as security, air/ground integration, and setting the conditions for success.

**Security.** The question of security for combat logistics patrols and who provides it is a question that every unit that rotates through the National Training Center asks itself. Each unit struggles with convoy SOPs and the allocation of combat forces to the FSC. Additionally, the question of, “Who’s the convoy commander?” becomes a heated topic of discussion; the answer to which is not clear and must be settled by the unit through standard operating procedures. There are basically three methods of security for a CLP:

1) **Self:** The FSC uses organic assets to provide its own security.
2) **Allocation of external assets:** Roughly a platoon-sized element is temporarily attached to the FSC for the conduct of the mission.
3) **Combination of both:** Platoon-sized elements secure the patrol through more dangerous terrain, and the FSC secures itself through less dangerous terrain. This usually involves link up operations with multiple companies within the battalion AO.

All three of these methods can be successful. The decision comes down to METT-TC, and the level of training of the Soldiers involved.

**Air/Ground Integration.** The use of Army aviation is almost automatic when plans for ground combat operations begin. Immediately, battalion S3s contact higher to find out what air assets are available for the next cordon and search, but what about combat logistics patrols, especially if the CLP is “self securing”? Is the use of an air weapons team for convoy security a good economy of force mission? Aviation support provides valuable firepower and “eyes forward” for combat logistics patrols. They can detect IEDs and other potential threats, and they can provide accurate fires for the convoy commander as he actions through the kill zone.

Critical to the integration of aviation is training for the leaders of the forward support company. Planning and using close air support is not taught at the logistics schoolhouse yet. These tasks need to be incorporated into training at home station for at least squad leaders and above. Then the use of air support can be refined at a combat training center by all elements within the battalion.

Finally, upon deployment, battalion S3s should include CLPs into habitual aviation requests to brigade.

**Setting the Conditions.** Much is written on setting conditions for offensive operations. Terms like tactical patience and momentum are often used, but do we apply the same level of thought and analysis for tactical logistics operations? No. More often than not, the battle captain does not even know when the FSC is on the road because some other operation has his attention. Below is an example of a conditions checklist that could be helpful for battalion S3s and battle captains in planning, coordinating, and tracking combat logistics patrols.

1) **What is the mission, route, and frequency/call sign of the CLP?**
2) **Is aviation support on-station? Frequency/call sign?**
3) **Has the security force linked up with the FSC and completed rehearsals?**
4) **When was the last route clearance conducted?**
5) **What friendly operations are in progress or planned during the CLP? Is there a conflict?**
6) **Is the QRF postured to support the CLP?**
7) **Do the units know that a CLP is moving through their AO?**
8) **What is the latest intelligence for the route?**
9) **Is the CLP traveling through Tier I IED sites at prime hours?**
10) **Convoy commander turns in final manifest and receives latest intelligence update.**

**Assessment of Essential Service Requirements**

The FSC has a wide variety of military occupational specialties that can be readily applied in the civilian world on commercial equipment. The reason many Soldiers enlist in the Army is to obtain job skills for use upon completion of their enlistment. Why not use these same skills to assist in helping local populations during counterinsurgency operations? Chapter 8 of the new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, states:

“In general, according to existing U.S. military logistic doctrine, there is no provision for U.S. forces to become decisively or exclusively engaged in providing essential services to the HN (host nation) population during COIN operations. However, this doctrinal position does not prohibit units from using applicable skills and expertise resident in their military organizations to help assess essential HN service needs. In conjunction with these assessments, logistics and other units can also be used to meet immediate needs where possible and in the commander’s interest, and to assist in the handoff of essential service functions to appropriate U.S. government agencies, HN agencies, and other civil support organizations.”

In other words, if you have the ability, do what you can with what you have until it can be turned over to the appropriate parties. By having an FSC within the battalion, commanders now have
the ability to do more. The ability to assist the local populace can lend credibility to commanders. The FSC commander along with the Civil Affairs team leader/S-5 can work together to build area assessments for the battalion commander. Below is a list of capabilities available to commanders within the FSC using the SWEAT framework:

**Sanitation:** Water treatment specialist and field sanitation expertise in food service section (along with HHC medical platoon)

**Water:** Water treatment specialist

**Electricity:** Power generation specialists

**Academic:** All can aid in training and education for critical job skills

**Transportation:** Assessment of rail/bus/ferry/port capacities and facilities and assessment of mechanical maintenance of rail/bus/truck/ferry operating equipment

**Food Supply:** Food service section can inspect packaging and facilities, with veterinary assistance food quality and vector control

**Fuel:** Petroleum specialists can inspect and test fuel facilities and storage

A potential SWEAT team could be:

Security Team

Civil Affairs Team

Sanitation/Water/Fuel/Food:

1 x 92W, water treatment specialist
2 x 92F, petroleum supply specialist
1 x 63J, quartermaster/NBC equipment repairer
1 x 92G, food service specialist
1 x 68W (HHC), combat medic

Electricity: 1 x 52D, power generation equipment repairer and 1 x 52C, utilities equipment repairer

Academic: CA team

Transportation: Distribution platoon leader

**Host-Nation Security Forces Logistics**

Since the advent of military transition teams, deployed units are not as involved in the logistics of the Iraq/Afghanistan Security Forces; however, units may still be called upon to assist these forces with training and/or logistics support. The most significant logistics challenge in training HN security forces is enforcing accountability and curtailing corruption.

FM 3-24 states: “Logisticians conducting such training should expect to find themselves repeatedly emphasizing the long term benefits of supply discipline and materiel accountability and the importance of those practices to the security and development of the host nation. For this reason, emphasis should be placed on inventory procedures. Simultaneously the black market should be monitored for the presence of pilfered military equipment as a means of determining the effectiveness of logistic procedures and accountability training.”

Other areas of logistics training may include warehousing and transporting supplies, combat logistics patrols, maintenance, and recovery operations.

Units may also be called upon to provide emergency resupply to HN security forces. If so, then contingency stocks of Halal MREs, bottled water, and ammunition should be kept on hand. Ammunition can be obtained through captured stocks. Overall, support to HN security forces should have a minimal impact; however, units will increasingly find themselves conducting joint patrols with HN forces and be better postured to react quickly to urgent needs.

**Maintenance Support to the Combined Arms Battalion**

Current doctrine relating to maintenance support to the combined arms battalion is written in the context of supporting high-intensity conflict (HIC). FMI 3-90.5 discusses the allocation of field maintenance teams to the companies of the combined arms battalions. In a HIC fight, this makes perfect sense, but what about in the current FOB-centric counterinsurgency?

When a preponderance of the maintenance personnel is sliced out to the companies, decentralized maintenance activities occur and in a HIC fight they should; but in units operating on battalion or larger FOBs, maintenance should be centralized at the battalion level. This ensures a number of things. First, the maintenance control section has better visibility of the battalion’s non-mission capable vehicles’ and parts’ statuses. The maintenance control officer can better enforce maintenance priorities and surge mechanics for high priority efforts. Second, maintenance personnel can better sustain 24-hour operations. It is important to remember that mechanics will not only be performing their primary duties but will also have force protection requirements and other details. Historically, 30 percent of personnel from support units provide force protection at FOBs; having all of the mechanics underneath the umbrella of the maintenance platoon ensures both the force protection and maintenance missions. Thirdly, the consolidation of maintenance personnel in a FOB environment provides for both the specialization and cross-training of mechanics leading to better efficiencies in the production capabilities of the platoon.

A final recommendation for the employment of the FSC maintenance platoon is to establish a “service station” for patrols when they return to the FOB. This ensures combat vehicles are being taken care of and returned to the fight in peak condition. The service station is a one-stop shop for the line companies returning from missions. See Figure 2.

**The changing role of the Army Cook**

Current field feeding is primarily performed by logistics contractors. These contractors provide quality meals for over 90 percent of coalition facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. These services have limited the role of the Army cook in providing prepared meals to Soldiers to only working in remote locations. So what are all the

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**Figure 2**

**Battalion Service Station**

Tasks:
1. Conduct After PMCS
2. Report deficiencies to mechanic
3. Mechanic verifies fault and orders/installs parts
4. Refuel
5. Draw Class I, IV, V, and VIII
6. Repack vehicle for combat

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The field feeding section in the FSC has 23 Soldiers. This number of Soldiers provides the commander a pool of personnel to accomplish many tasks. Here are a few recommendations for the employment of the field feeding section:

- Convoy/area security — Alleviates the security burden from the line companies and ensures every combat logistics patrol has a maneuverable security element. This element can also perform security for area assessment teams or MEDCAPs.
- Personal Security Detachment — Train approximately 16 Soldiers in personal security for the battalion commander and other battalion leaders.
- Force Protection — Entry control points and other guard duties.
- Dislocated field feeding — The FSC should maintain a reserve of four cooks to operate two KCLFF-Es in case of unforeseen, out of sector missions.

The field feeding section should be resourced with four M1114s with M2 .50 caliber machine guns and MBITR radios for dismounted operations. The key to success for these security operations is home station training, followed by utilization at a CTC prior to deployment.

**Other Nontraditional Logistics Missions**

Below is a list of four other nontraditional missions the FSC can perform:

- Nonstandard casualty evacuation: The FSC has 28 FMTV vehicles that can mobilize to support casualty evacuation.
- Split-based operations: The FSC has enough communications equipment to support logistics command and control in two nodes.
- Female search teams: Since the FSC is the only unit that has females at the battalion task force-level, having all of them trained in personnel search techniques allows units to search indigenous female personnel without violating cultural differences.
- Captured ammunition/arms holding area (CAHA): The FSC should operate the initial storage point for captured ammunition, arms, and equipment. This will also provide for contingency stocks of ammunition, weapons, and armament repair parts for HN security forces.

**What battalion commanders must ensure...**

Some battalion commanders place more emphasis on logistics than others. What follows is a discussion of the things battalion commanders can do to ensure their FSC provides all it is capable of and is a full member of the battalion.

**Integration of the FSC as a unit** — This starts with the relationship the maneuver battalion commander has with the FSC commander. If the battalion commander treats him or her like a lesser Soldier/ officer because of their branch of service, then that is how the rest of the battalion will treat the FSC. The FSC commander is the senior logistician in the battalion and should be held fully responsible for the material readiness and supply status of the battalion. Additionally, FSC officers and Soldiers should be held to the same standards as the rest of the battalion.

**Integration of the Combat Trains Command Post and FSC Command Post** — Units are finding much success consolidating CSS command and control in one centralized command post. Many times the S1 and S4 operate independently of the FSC commander and this creates a disjointed concept of support. Creation of a “fusion cell” combines the S1, S4, and FSC and provides a “one-stop” point for all administration and logistics. An example of this integration is shown in Figure 3.

**Battle Tracking in the TOC** — FSC operations, including recovery missions and combat logistics patrols, should be planned, coordinated, and tracked just as other battalion operations.

**Medical Support** — Commanders should task the medical platoon to provide at least one medic to support FSC missions. The FSC has no organic medical capability and although the FSC will have first responders and combat lifesavers, having a true medic will save lives.

**Training the FSC** — FSC operations should be fully integrated in all battalion training. The FSC should not be allowed to just simply feed, fix, and supply the battalion while the line companies train. The FSC should conduct convoy operations, tactical refuel and recovery missions, establish tactical feeding sites, and conduct crew-served and individual weapons training.

**Summary**

The FSC provides each supported battalion a robust logistics capability. The FSC can provide critical shaping and sustaining operations to be integrated with the other lines of operations. The FSC commander gives battalion commanders an executive agent for all logistics matters and ensures integration with higher levels of support. After fully integrating the FSC into the maneuver battalion, commanders will see just how effective their logistics systems are and how well they are integrated with other combat operations.

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A decisive point is the tipping point in a military operation when one side begins to win. It lends focus and clarity to an operation. Commanders focus their efforts on achieving the decisive point and continue through to the desired endstate. In a boxing match, a decisive point could be when one fighter lands a devastating blow, allowing him to follow up and knock his opponent out. In a football game, it could be when a team recovers a fumble and runs it back for a touchdown. Decisive points are measures of effectiveness and initiative.

FM 3-0, Operations, defines a decisive point as “a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.”

Current doctrine for company level leaders and below focuses decisive points on either controlling terrain or destroying the enemy. According to Sir Robert Thompson, the architect for British counterinsurgency success in the Malayan Emergency, neither tactic alone is sufficient. In his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, Thompson said, “The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas.” Thompson focused his efforts foremost on attacking the cause of the insurgency, not just its symptoms. Unfortunately, focusing solely or primarily on killing the enemy or controlling terrain often creates a search and destroy mentality which addresses the symptoms and not the cause. According to Thompson, “most search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist (or now insurgent) recruiting drives.” A search and destroy focus reduces an Army to cutting grass without pulling out the roots. In Iraq and Afghanistan, successful leaders across the Army are focusing their Soldiers on defeating the cause of an insurgency instead of just killing or capturing the insurgents.

Because winning looks different in defeating an insurgency, the model for decisive points should be changed. Commanders know they have more in their toolbox than “kill or capture,” and that success cannot be measured solely in body counts or hilltops. Decisive points can and should reflect that. Decisive points in counterinsurgency at the company level should include quantifiable measures of influence and success in building the government’s legitimacy with its people and successfully transitioning authority to its own security forces, as well as traditional measures of success.

Conventional War

Conventional doctrine for high intensity conflict was created and refined through Western warfare. By the 18th century, Western and Central European countries accepted unwritten rules of war in order to keep it from being more terrible and maintain some level of social order. The disagreements of nations were ultimately decided by massing military forces against their counterparts and fighting pitched battles to gain a decisive victory, according to Warfare in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871 by Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber. Underlying these ideas are the assumptions that the enemy army would agree to pitched battles and that these engagements would be decisive; meaning that the people would accept defeat and its implications to their way of life. A major difference between conventional conflict and insurgency lies with this crucial aspect, the people and their consent.

The underlying principles in American doctrine, tactics, and strategy are found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini as they were interpreted through the 19th and 20th centuries, according to the book Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl. The book also discusses how both authors were writing in response to the unprecedented success of Napoleon fighting conventionally against conventional forces in Europe. According to Nagl, Clausewitz defined war as a function of the people, the government and the army, while Jomini focused his writings on the army, specifically on massing friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses at a decisive point in order to destroy the enemy’s army, and with it his ability to “properly” resist. Because of the culture and assumptions of Europe, Clausewitz’s broad interpretation of conflict was focused narrowly into the most dynamic and decisive factor in Western
and Central Europe — the army. Through the Prussian and later German interpretations of Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s ideas, the modern focus of “find, fix, and finish” was born.

The context that caused the decisive factor of war to be the army must be considered to fully appreciate what other dynamics exist. Within similar societies of continental Europe, the assumptions of purely military wars were relatively safe. Therefore, Napoleon was able to take Austria and Prussia after defeating their armies in pitched, decisive battles with minimal resistance, according to Doughty and Gruber. However, where there was a fundamental cultural or religious disagreement with Napoleon and what his rule represented, as with Spain or Russia, something different happened. The war of “the fist and the axe” was born.

Insurgency

In On Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse-Tung uses the example of Napoleon in Russia in 1812 to show the contrast between conventional and unconventional warfare. Mao read Clausewitz and Western military history, and this greatly influenced his thinking. From Napoleon’s 1812 example, Mao learned how a great army can win battles but lose the war. Napoleon invaded Russia, seized Moscow, and waited for the surrender of the Czar. He had seized decisive terrain and any army that would dare to meet him would be defeated; by conventional standards he had won. However, something different was at work. As Napoleon waited in Russia, the winter rolled in. His supplies ran short. The Cossack cavalry conducted limited attacks against his logistics and army. Napoleon could not sustain his soldiers nor impose his will on the people of Russia. The result was that Napoleon, who had left France with 600,000 soldiers, returned to France with only 100,000, although he never lost a battle. The Russians’ victory was won through exhaustion, not decisive combat.

Mao saw this kind of conflict as the Achilles’ heel to the powerful conventional force he faced in China in 1930s. He considered the three variables of war from Clausewitz for his situation: the people, the government, and the army. He knew he could not field a superior army to the Japanese. However, he found that by exploiting the crucial variable of the people he could change the conditions on which war was fought. He could shape the battlefield to the point that he gained the initiative. The focus and importance of winning the support of the people in guerilla warfare cannot be overstated because this is where the initiative is won or lost. It can clearly be seen in Mao’s “Three Rules and the Eight Remarks,” all of which focus on influencing the population:

Rules:
1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish, nor unjust.
4. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.
5. Return what you borrow.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Make the population feel secure.

Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house. (In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds.)
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be courteous in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

“Because he is a foreigner and a barbarian, guerrillas can gain the confidence of millions of their countrymen.”

— Mao Tse-Tsung

On Guerilla Warfare

Mao Tse-Tung also said that the nature of the guerilla is to conduct limited attacks at a time and place of his choosing and escape to a safe area or anonymity amongst the people. Guerillas know where the forces they attack are, but the same is not true of their opponents. Guerillas need intelligence superiority for this and it gives them the initiative. A guerilla’s intelligence superiority comes from the active or passive support of the people. Therefore, with the support or submission of the people, a guerilla force can continue to attack if and when it chooses. With the support of the people, the guerilla force is unable to be found, much less fixed or finished, unless it wants to be.

FM 3-0 says that a decisive point, “allows commanders to gain marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.” Few things are more powerful and decisive in an insurgency than the intelligence superiority that a successful guerilla force enjoys. In the words of Sir Robert Thompson, “The population is not only providing the guerilla with his food and intelligence, but providing him perfect cover and concealment.”

Decisive Points in Defeating Insurgency — When Do I Start to Win?

“The key strategic thrust is to provide meaningful security for the Vietnamese people in expanding areas of increasingly
effective civil authority ... In order to provide security for the population our operations must succeed in neutralizing the VCI and separating the enemy from the population. The enemy Main Forces and NVA are blind without the VCI. They cannot obtain intelligence, cannot obtain food, cannot prepare the battlefield, and cannot move “unseen.”

— General Creighton Abrams

As quoted in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl

In conventional conflict the outcome is decided purely by military action, and decisive points are limited to the destruction of enemy forces or the control of terrain. However, counterinsurgency has the aspect of simultaneous military and political action with the focus on the support of the people in order to isolate the guerilla. Because of this feature, decisive points within the population become crucial. The population provides intelligence, logistics, recruits, and legitimacy to either the guerillas or the government. Therefore, the battle is won or lost at the popular level.

“Necessary measures were taken to achieve their three objects: of protection, of uniting and involving the people, and of development, with the ultimate aim of isolating the guerilla units from the population.”

— Sir Robert Thompson

Defeating Communist Insurgency

The focus here is on protecting and influencing community leaders, building indigenous military or police forces through joint actions, and transitioning to host nation control in order to establish the government and the rule of law. Success and the tipping point in this kind of conflict is not measured in body counts or control of a hill, but in the level of support from the people. Local people provide intelligence, logistical support, recruits, and legitimacy to one side or the other. For intelligence, support can be quantified by the amount and quality of intelligence on guerilla activities that coalition forces receive. Logistical support can be measured by the number of workers willing to work with and for the government and amount of food or material sold to coalition forces. Success in recruiting can be measured in the number and quality of local people willing to serve in indigenous security forces. Legitimacy can be measured by overall support of the government and its programs.

Conclusion

The influence and support of the people is crucial to success in counterinsurgency. What this means for tactical leaders at the company level and below is that decisive points are not only based on the terrain or enemy, but may also be based on the people and local forces. With the active or passive support of the people, the guerilla can fight at a time and place of his choosing. However, with the support of the people coalition forces can isolate the guerilla from his intelligence and logistical support and reduce him to criminal status. Decisive points in counterinsurgency at the company level should include quantifiable measures of influence and success in building the government’s legitimacy with its people and successfully transitioning authority to its own security forces.

Captain Brandon Anderson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2003. He is currently serving on a military transition team in Afghanistan. His previous assignments include serving as weapons platoon leader for D Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, and as a rifle platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division.

The author would like to thank Major Joshua Wright, Major Desmond Bailey and Australian Army Major Gregory Rowlands for their help with this article.
Throughout 2007, Fort Benning will celebrate its 26th year as the world’s premier military musket school. Throughout numerous accomplishments over the past two decades, the Maneuver Center of Excellence’ Musketry School has moved to Fort Benning and settled into its permanent home on post.

Through numerous accomplishments, the Maneuver Center of Excellence’ Musketry School collocates from the School at Fort Benning.

To mark this proud moment, Walter Wojdakowski has written “The Musketry School Centennial.” The book, which will be distributed across Fort Benning, is available in bookstores and online. The book will be available in bookstores and online.

A drill sergeant and other recruits offer words of encouragement to a trainee negotiating an obstacle course on Fort Benning in October 2006.

U.S. Army photo

Officer candidates practice throwing grenades from the standing position on a range on Fort Benning in October 1965.

An instructor offers guidance to an officer candidate during training on Fort Benning.
2007, Fort Benning and the Infantry community celebrate the centennial of the Infantry School. First established in 1907 at Monterey, California, the School of Field Artillery moved to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from 1913 to 1918, before settling permanently at Camp Benning in 1918.

Under General George S. Patton’s leadership, Fort Benning is poised to become the Army’s Center of Excellence by 2011 when the Armor School moves from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to join the Infantry School in Fort Benning.

An important milestone in Infantry history, Major General Montgomery Meigs has declared 2007 the “Year of the Infantry School.” In addition to media articles and display panels, a suitable outdoor celebration is planned for the site of the new National Infantry Museum.
The 100th anniversary of the Infantry School is April 1, 2007. On that date in 1907, the School of Musketry opened for courses in rifle and machine gun marksmanship at Monterey, California.

In 1913, the School of Musketry moved to Fort Sill and then on to Camp Benning as the U.S. Army Infantry School in 1918. Within three years, Camp Benning was rechristened Fort Benning, and the Model 1905 Bayonet on the school’s shoulder patch rotated from point downward to point upward.

A search of The Bayonet, Fort Benning’s post newspaper, shows that celebrations in the past commemorated the anniversaries of the founding of the Infantry School using 1907 as the founding date. In addition, the Infantry Library, now known as the Donovan Research Library, began in 1907 when General Arthur MacArthur donated around 50 books to start the collection.

The United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning traces its creation to the beginnings of the Continental Army during the War for Independence. George Washington appointed Captain “Baron” von Steuben as Drillmaster of the Continental Army in 1778. The Prussian veteran instituted a single manner of infantry drill for the Continental Army by consolidating all junior officers into platoons and companies, and drilling them together to create a body of instructors for the entire Army. Later, von Steuben convinced Washington to create a model company of infantry to demonstrate drill and maneuvers to the rest of the army. These were the origins of an American School of Infantry. After the War for Independence, Congress undid most of the fine instrument created by Washington and von Steuben by reducing the Army to an 85-man company for a year and allowing commanders of the Regular Army and the militia to use whatever drill suited them.

In 1813, the Army adopted a form of Duane’s Tactics during the War of 1812 to reduce the infantry drill to one standard drill. On March 4, 1826, Major General Edmund P. Gaines established the first infantry training post at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis, Missouri. The Infantry School of Instruction began training enlisted men and small units and quickly expanded to training infantry officers in their duties. By November 24, 1828, the post closed as all the troops and infantry units were needed across the nation. Though what became known as the Infantry School of Practice lasted only two years, the overall efficiency of the United States Infantry improved immensely, and the idea of recreating a similar school was not lost on those in attendance.

In 1881, the Army created a military postgraduate program for officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, known as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry. This same program is now the Command and Staff School. In 1892, the School of Application divided into a School for Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas, and a School for Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, leaving the infantry without a formal school.

After the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur ordered the establishment of new target ranges and a course of fire for every unit and post in the Department of California and the Columbia. To provide formal instruction for the marksmanship instructors, General MacArthur ordered a school be established in the department. The first commandant, Captain Frank L. Winn, later commented, “From this idea the plan developed into a school of experiment and theory in the use of the rifle in battle and of improvement, by testing, in the rifle itself.” As a result, the War Department approved the establishment of the School of Musketry, Pacific Division, at the Presidio of Monterey, California. Though the original intent was the development of small arms use in the infantry, the scope of development and instruction soon grew to include, “all subjects connected with small arms, ammunition and tactics.” The latter directive allowed the instructors to pursue research and training methods to prepare infantrymen for modern warfare.

Initially, the school staff consisted of Captain Winn as the officer-in-charge, an assistant instructor, one company from each of the two divisions in the department and a machine-gun platoon. Each quarter, the rotating student body consisted of two officers from each of the infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments in the division, one enlisted man from each company, troop, and battery, and additional officers and enlisted men as selected by the division commander. The school cadre arrived on March 25, 1907, and replaced the 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry in garrison. The new school opened for business on April 1, 1907.

Outgrowing the limited ranges at the Presidio in Monterey, California, the School of Musketry relocated with the School of Fire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1913. Both schools languished within a few years as both instructors and students were needed to secure the border with Mexico and for the Punitive Expedition of 1916. Upon the Declaration of War with the Central Powers on April 6, 1917, it became apparent that the Infantry, Field Artillery, and the 35th Division could not continue to train on the same ranges at Fort Sill. The War Department needed dozens of new facilities to muster and train the millions of Doughboys required in Europe as soon as possible. By the summer of 1918, the Infantry cast about for a new home.

In an attempt to lure an Army training camp to the Columbus
area, the Encampment Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Columbus, Georgia, presented a “Proposal for the Lease of Land to the United States Government for Establishment of School of Musketry,” on January 17, 1918, to representatives of the United States Army. Included in the original proposal are endorsements from the Muscogee County Commissioners to build access roads and the Columbus Power Company to build electrical transmission lines if the government accepted the property for a training camp. With options secured on 7,400 of the 9,000 acres proposed at $2 per acre, total estimated construction costs for the cantonment came to $706,000. A formal plan dated January 23 lists a total of 2,008 students, instructors, and permanent party planned housed and headquartered in 67 buildings. While the original proposal for the camp envisioned a lease on the land, the Army decided later to convert the cantonment to a permanent facility and continue training there after World War I.

On August 17, 1918, a telegram arrived in Columbus, confirming the selection of the area for the new site of the Army’s Infantry School of Arts. By October 6, troops transferring from Fort Sill stepped off the train and stood in formation on October 19 christening the new post “Camp Benning” in honor of a local Confederate General, Henry Lewis Benning. Unlike most temporary training facilities created in haste during the Great War, Camp Benning survived postwar budget cuts to become a permanent infantry school in 1920. In 1921, the Army formally designated the post as the Infantry School and changed the name to Fort Benning in 1923.

During the 1920-1921 school year, the new school graduated hundreds of lieutenants and captains from the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components. In addition to instructors, Camp Benning included demonstration units to support training, an Army Air Corps detachment and the 32nd Balloon Observation Company at Lawson Field, and the Infantry Tank School. While the Tank School moved to Camp Meade, Maryland, within a year, the infantry tanks moved back to Fort Benning in 1932. In addition to training leaders, Fort Benning became an important center for testing weapons and tactics, publishing professional journals and manuals, and developing maneuver doctrine - roles it continues into the 21st century. As the home of the largest branch of the Army, Fort Benning continued to grow in facilities and troops assigned through the lean years of the Great Depression.

From 1927 to 1932, Lieutenant Colonel George Marshall served as the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School. In this role, Marshall instituted a rigorous training program known as the “Benning Revolution” preparing thousands of officers for higher command in World War II. The infantry tank units grew through the 1930s until Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., and others formed and trained the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Benning, before deploying overseas for combat in World War II. Numerous divisions and smaller units were either federalized or created at Fort Benning during peacetime draft buildup in 1940 and throughout World War II.

In 1940, the Airborne “Test Platoon” initiated the Airborne School that still graduates thousands of parachutists for the United States military each year. The Officer Candidate School began graduating infantry lieutenants in 1941 and still operates as the only federal OCS program in the Army. Over 100,000 Soldiers entered the Army as privates or lieutenants at Fort Benning during World War II, and the post earned the nickname: “The Benning School for Boys.” At the end of the Second World War, Fort Benning remained a vibrant facility as Ranger training began, the infantry developed a mechanized component and prepared troops and leaders for the Korean War, Vietnam, and other Cold War commitments. At this writing, the U.S. Army Infantry School and Fort Benning have more troops assigned as cadre or in training than any other facility in the United States military.

From 1945 to 1965, Fort Benning transformed to its standard role as an education, testing, and doctrine development center. While recruit and officer training increased during the Korean War, 1950-1953, the next major expansion took place during the Vietnam War. The concept of helicopter-borne air assault was tested at Fort Benning for two years before the 11th Airborne (Test) Division became the 1st (Air Assault) Cavalry Division prior to deployment to Vietnam in 1965. In addition to greatly-expanded OCS, the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course trained thousands
of infantry sergeants from 1967 to 1972, forming the basis for the current Noncommissioned Officer Education System. On several occasions since 1965, brigades and smaller units were formed and trained at Fort Benning to deploy around the world to serve as part of NATO, Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other missions.

In 2005, the U.S. Congress approved a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to move the Armor School from Fort Knox to join the Infantry School at Fort Benning. The resulting Maneuver Center of Excellence will combine both mounted and dismounted combat training and doctrine development at one location for the entire U.S. Army by 2011. Together with the Airborne School, Ranger School, OCS, Sniper School, the Army Marksmanship Unit, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and many deployable units, the Armor and Infantry colocation will create one of the most important, and certainly the busiest, U.S. Army posts.

During 2007, the School of Infantry celebrates its centennial — 100 years of continuous service to the United States. While Fort Benning transforms into the Maneuver Center of Excellence over the next few years, it will still serve as the “Home of the Infantry” while also functioning as the “Home of the Armor.” While operating at three locations with three different names, the Infantry School has increased dramatically in size and in scope, but has not materially changed its mission. While infantry training and doctrine development took place at a number of locations at different times throughout our nation’s history, the current United States Army Infantry Center began as the School of Musketry at Monterey on April 1, 1907.

Dave Stieghan is the Infantry Branch Historian and Command Historian of U.S. Army Infantry Center. He is currently researching the Infantry School Centennial, the Echo Teams/Companies that served in Vietnam, and the U.S. Army NCOCC “Shake and Bake” course conducted from 1967 through 1972 at Harmony Church and four other posts.

A list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry Magazine.

## PAST USAIS COMMANDANTS

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A History of the Infantry School

How Fort Benning Became ‘Home of Infantry’

Editor’s Note: The following was adapted from an excerpt of an article that was first published in Volume XXIII of The Mailing List, which was printed in February 1942. The Mailing List was a predecessor of Magazine.

This chapter is an extracted portion (Chapter III: Sections 1 and 2) of a manuscript entitled “A History of The Infantry School.” The history was written in 1931 by First Lieutenant Leroy W. Yarborough in collaboration with Major Truman Smith and with the assistance of Major Charles A. Willoughby and Major Leven C. Allen. The history covers a full and complete account of the development of the Infantry School idea for the training of officers. It includes the details of the establishment of the Infantry School of Practice at Jefferson Barracks, 1826-1828; The School of Musketry, Presidio of Monterey, 1907-1912; The School of Musketry and The Infantry School of Arms at Fort Sill, 1912-1918; and The Infantry School at Fort Benning, 1919-present.

Chapter I of this history appeared in Volume XX of The Mailing List in July 1940 and Chapter II in Volume XXXII, August 1941. (The volumes containing this complete history are available through the Donovan Research Library on Fort Benning.)

Military Events Concerned with the Infantry School of Arms at Fort Sill and Camp Benning, 1918-1921

The period of three and a half years following the removal of the Infantry School of Arms to its new site near Columbus, Georgia, has no parallel in the school’s history.

In the kaleidoscopic whirl of events which revolved about the school during that time there was a dramatic intensity which assumed an increasingly high pitch until its abrupt termination in an anticlimax of neglect. It began, figuratively, as the banishment of an overgrown stepchild from its home, when its too rapid wartime expansion led to its eviction from Fort Sill and its partial dismemberment and distribution, between three widely separated camps. There followed the brief epoch of urgent haste to reunite its fragments and to resume its mass production of trained manpower; then the intervention of the armistice marked a new crisis in the school’s career and opened a third epoch through which the school ran a long gauntlet of hazards of uncommon variety.

Efforts to establish the school near Columbus had carried on for more than a year before it was finally moved to Camp Benning. Two classes of people were engaged in this endeavor, local citizens and Army officers. Although the motives of each group differed slightly, their main efforts coincided sufficiently to accomplish the common end. After the armistice, the status of Camp Benning, and likewise of the school, became uncertain. To some it appeared to be a wartime installation that would disappear with the passing of the conditions which created it. Soon after the termination of the war, there developed a strong opposition to the maintenance of the school at Camp Benning. Forthwith began a lengthy and heated contest which divided the community and drew into the struggle groups of Army officers and members of Congress. The camp’s citizen proponents lauded it as an economic asset to the community. Its local opponents denounced it as a menace to religion, home, and womanhood. To the Army officers, the infantrymen particularly, it appeared to be an almost ideal location for an infantry school and, as it was already established, they desired to retain it. If the camp was abandoned, the school might not be reopened for years, if at all. It was a bird in the hand, so to speak. The interest of members of Congress, reflecting, no doubt, the views of their constituents, varied from downright indifference or hostility to intense favoritism. The fate of the camp and the school, as well, several times lay on the lap of the gods, and the gods were not inclined to be friendly. Its survival through this long period of attack, revilement, and neglect is a miracle of accomplishment, a monument to the indomitable spirit of those who fought in its cause. In none of the major groups, which participated in the contest over Camp Benning was there complete harmony. The aggregations of citizens and congressmen were divided into opposing factions, between which there was rank dissension, even hostility. Even in the Army group there was not complete accord, and the loose statements of some officers were quoted by foes of the camp in the congressional hearings which later enhanced the importance, if not the dignity, of the contest. But of all who engaged in the struggle to continue the infantry’s school at Camp Benning, none was more diligent nor zealous than the Army group, yet the range of activities of none was more circumscribed than that of this group. Their share in the fray had to be conducted with circumspection, and their initiative of action could rarely extend beyond the limits or service routine.

As the characters of the respective groups differed, there was likewise a diversity of interests and a medley of motives inspiring their works. Most of their efforts progressed concurrently and in some cases, especially those of individuals were overlapping. An attempt to recount their activities and the ensuing results in the exact order in which they took place would produce only a maze...
The Decision to Move the Infantry School From Fort Sill

The War Department’s order directing the removal of the Infantry School of Arms from Fort Sill to the new Columbus site was the climax of a long series of circumstances and events which ultimately led to the selection of this locality as the one available site which was nearest to the ideal for infantry training purposes. Official cognizance of the probable necessity of relocating the infantry’s school was first indicated in July 1917, and arose from conditions created by the rapid expansion of both it and the Artillery School of Fire, which taxed the limited facilities of Fort Sill beyond their capacity and led to petty friction between the two schools. In this same year, too, at least four favorable reports had been made on the Columbus region by Army inspectors or boards in the search for desirable training sites. Although none of these had to do with the Infantry School of Arms, it is not improbable that the succession of favorable reports directed official attention toward Columbus. In January 1918, General R. M. Blatchford examined the Columbus locality among others in a search for a site for a small-arms firing school, an associate activity of the Infantry School. In July the board, of which Colonel Henry E. Eames was president, designated it as second choice in case the site near Fayetteville, North Carolina, could not be secured for the infantry’s school. An inspection of land adjacent to that selected by Colonel Eames’ board near Fayetteville had been made in the preceding month by Colonel E. P. King, Jr., of the field artillery in a search for a training ground for that arm. Colonel King’s selection of that locality was subsequently confirmed by the Secretary of War. This left the Columbus region as the best one available for the infantry, and as a result of a study made by the general staff during July and August, it was designated as the locality in which would be situated the Infantry School of Arms upon its removal from Fort Sill. The plan at that time contemplated the acquisition of 250,000 acres of land for a school with a capacity of 30,000 officers and men.

In the meantime, the construction division of the general staff had commissioned Majors Solomon and Gibb to select a site for cantonment in the vicinity of Columbus. On July 12 they announced their selection of a site on Macon Road about three miles east of Columbus, which lay between two main railroad lines. Later in the same month Colonel Clopton, of the tanks corps, recommended the area near Columbus as especially suited for a tank school. In September, following the Chief of Staff’s approval of the recommendation that the Infantry School of Arms be removed from Fort Sill, orders were issued by the War Department on September 12 which directed the transfer of the school to Columbus. Similar orders were issued at the same time to the school’s offshoots, the Small Arms Firing School at Camp Perry, Ohio, and the Machine Gun School at Camp Hancock, Georgia.

Colonel Eames arrived in Columbus on September 21 and he lost no time in preparing for the arrival of the remainder of the personnel and the reopening of the Infantry School of Arms in its new location. He at once established his headquarters in Columbus in a building at the southwest corner of First Avenue and Thirteenth Street where the offices of the construction firm which was to build the cantonment to house the school were located. One of the first matters to engage Colonel Eames’ attention was that of providing shelter for the troops who were due to arrive in little more than a week. Plans for a temporary camp and the problems in connection with its construction were discussed during a conference which Colonel Eames held on September 23 with Major John P. Jones, Quartermaster Corps and representatives of the contractors who were to build the temporary camp. On the following day, Colonel Eames visited the area east of Columbus, which was then the proposed site of the cantonment, and designated the location of the temporary camp for the school. On Major Jones he imposed the responsibility of having the camp ready for the expected arrival of the troops soon after October 1.

In the meantime, representatives of the two other schools, which were to be absorbed by the Infantry School of Arms, had arrived in Columbus, and with them, Colonel Eames discussed the requirements of the consolidated school preparatory to the designation of the actual site it was to occupy. While the area east of Columbus, which had already been selected as the site of a cantonment, appeared to be satisfactory for general war-training purposes, it did not entirely fulfill the technical requirements of the Infantry School of Arms. On September 25, Colonel Eames and Majors Critchfield and Maloney of the Small Arms Firing School located an area on the southside of Columbus which appeared to possess topographical features that were more suited to the needs of the school. One of these was a site for a class “A” rifle range, an important feature of the installation of the consolidated school. Although Colonel Eames’ board had originally endorsed the area near Fayetteville as its first choice, he evidently found the Columbus site, on closer acquaintance, to be the better of the two, for just a few months later he gave his unqualified approval to its superior qualifications. He said in the course of his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee at that time: “The commanding generals of the Western Department, the Southern Department, and Southeastern Department were each directed by the War Department to send a board of officers into all the states comprised in their departments in order to locate a suitable place for this
school. These boards went out and spent a month or two in a careful examination of hundreds of sites, extending from California to Virginia, and in every state between. As a result of that, the three boards reported certain sites as suitable, and certain others as quite unsuitable. After a period of time, the proceedings of these boards were sent to me as president of the fourth board, and I examined them; and my board went over the territory, as I say, from the Pacific to the Atlantic looking for a site that would meet the military requirements of the school with which I was familiar; and this place at Columbus was decided upon in preference to anything we saw.”

**Acquisition of the Land for the Infantry School**

October was a month of rapid physical development for the reunited school. On October 4 a number of instructors arrived from Fort Sill. On the fifth, Colonel Eames was appointed commandant of the Infantry School of Arms to succeed Colonel Miller, who had not come to Columbus. On the sixth, the first troops arrived from Fort Sill. These were the two officers and 503 men comprised in the Infantry School of Arms Detachment, and a medical officer, who arrived at their destination at 2 a.m. Colonel Morton C. Mumma, commandant of the Small Arms Firing School, at Camp Perry, Ohio, preceded his command by a few weeks, and arrived in Columbus on the eighth. Favorable changes in the war situation in Europe resulted in the approval by the Secretary of War on October 9, of modified plans for the Infantry School of Arms which reduced its capacity to 24,000 officers and men, and its area to 115,000 acres. This action was followed on October 19 by the Secretary’s approval of an expenditure of $3.6 million to purchase a tract of land comprising 115,000 acres, the boundaries of which were left to the discretion of Colonel Eames. On the 19th also, local attention was concentrated momentarily on the temporary camp when, in compliance with a request made in September by the Rotary Club, it was ceremoniously christened “Camp Benning.” Legal machinery for the acquirement of the lands for the school was set in motion on October 23 by the request of the Secretary of War to the Attorney General of the United States to institute condemnation proceedings on behalf of the Government. The arrival on October 26 and their assignment to the Infantry School of Arms of 40 officers and 700 men of the Small Arms Firing School, completed the transfer of personnel and ended the brief career of that institution. On October 28 the contract for construction of the camp was awarded.

Construction work for the new camp, and local condemnation proceedings to acquire the 115,000 acres of land comprised in this area, were both started on the second of November and began what promised to be a month of rapid progress in the reestablishment of the school. But in little more than a week came the armistice. The effect of this momentous event, which ended the greatest conflict the world has ever suffered, was not immediately apparent at Camp Benning. The construction work at the new site proceeded as rapidly as the contractors’ facilities permitted, and the school, on December 2, enrolled a class of about 100 recent West Point graduates and resumed its courses of instruction as if nothing had happened. It was, of course, a matter of general knowledge that the war’s end would ultimately affect conditions at Camp Benning but to what extent was not known. However, the construction division of the general staff was even then working on a revision of the plans of the school on a peacetime basis, and on December 26, the modified plans which reduced the school’s capacity to 10,000, were completed. At the end of the year the school had two sites, but it had yet no home and its personnel of approximately 125 officers and 1,200 men were still occupying the temporary camp east of Columbus.

**The Struggle Begins to Keep Benning/Infantry School Open**

For Camp Benning and the Infantry School of Arms the arrival of 1919 marked the advent of a long period of uncertainty and hazard. Vague apprehensions disturbed those to whom the future of the infantry’s school was a matter of concern. Rumors that the camp and the school were to be abolished reached Columbus. Already opposing interests were marshalling their forces for the contest which was to decide the fate of the camp.

On January 9 the Assistant Secretary of War issued orders which directed the suspension of construction and land acquirement and the salvaging of all materials and construction work, either wholly or partially completed.

Since its relocation to the Columbus site, the school had undergone a series of reductions in area and training capacity. Originally intended as a school for 30,000 officers and men, its personnel capacity was successively reduced to 24,000 and then to 10,000, which the latter figure represented its proposed peacetime capacity. Its area, too, which had begun at a quarter of a million acres had dwindled to 115,000. It soon became evident to the military authorities that even more extensive reductions would have to be made in the project if the camp was to be retained for a peacetime school. Soon after the cessation order had halted the construction at the camp, Colonel Eames and Major Jones were called upon by the warplans and construction divisions of the general staff to assist in preparing plans and estimates for a peacetime infantry school with a personnel capacity of 5,040 and an area of 98,000 acres. This work was completed and

*After the end of World War I, the status of the Infantry School and Fort Benning became uncertain.*
the new plans were transmitted to the operations division on January 27.

Paradoxically, it would seem that while a steady process of physical contraction was being applied to the school, the month of February presaged the adoption of a policy of immense expansion of the scope of the school’s work. The trial of combat had revealed many latent defects in our infantry training methods and had emphasized others which had been self-evident but unavoidable in the hasty mass production of new infantry officers. Contemplation of these flaws in the infantry’s war-effort developed quickly a realization of the necessity for finding means of obtaining uniformity and greater efficiency in infantry training methods. The infantry’s school was regarded as the proper instrument with which to accomplish this end, and forthwith a study was conducted to broaden to the character of the school from one dealing primarily with the technique of armament to an institution whose teachings would embrace the entire field of infantry tactics and would impart a knowledge of the cooperation of infantry with other arms. From these deliberations, which were to exert a strong influence on the future character of the school, no conclusions were manifested until fall. On February 22 the West Point class which had begun a short course of instruction in December graduated.

March began as a harbinger of material progress, for on the eighth the Assistant Secretary of War issued orders which directed the continuation of the execution of the peacetime plan of the school. An expenditure of $9.2 million was allowed, of which $6.6 million was for construction, and the remainder for purchase of land. Officially, the work of building the camp was resumed. Actually, it had never entirely stopped, despite the mandate of January. Major Jones, the constructing quartermaster, who seems to have been an officer whose talents included rare qualities of initiative, ingeniously interpreted his instructions to salvage the work as meaning to carry on to completion all partially finished buildings, and then to preserve them from deterioration by the application of paint. However, superior authority of that time may have regarded his adroit translation of his orders, his operations were of immense practical permanent value in the development of the embryonic camp.

After a respite of three weeks, instructional work was resumed when a new class of student officers enrolled on March 15 for a three-month course. On March 23 the garrison of Camp Benning was augmented by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry from the demobilization center at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

Early in April the reunion of the school’s dismembered parts was completed by the arrival on the third of some 200 men of the Camp Hancock machine-gun center and their consolidation with the personnel of the school on the fifth. This detachment, which included two demonstration machine-gun companies — one animal-drawn and the other motorized, was accompanied by a number of officers, both instructors and students. Colonel Eames concluded his important labors as commandant on April 22 upon the arrival of his successor, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth. Colonel Eames thereupon became executive officer of the school.

On June 17 the Infantry School of Arms began its move from the temporary camp on Macon Road to its new but uncompleted home at what is now Fort Benning. Uncertainty still obscured the future of the new camp. The local authorities, actuated by an ardent desire to save the camp for the school, did everything they could toward affecting this end. One of their plans, by which they hoped to avert abandonment of the camp, was the production of an appearance of intensive training activity to impress congressional or other influential observers. The idea seemed to be that the presence of a large class of student officers engaged in important studies would make less feasible an interruption of the school’s career, and might also aid to divert any sentiment which favored such a move. At any rate, this is the only explanation which has been advanced to account for the decision to retain the class of officers which should have been graduated on June 15, for an additional three-month course. While the school was in process of removal and settling, the students enjoyed a two-week holiday period, during which they recuperated to some extent from the enervating effects of a long spell of hard work in the high temperatures of summer. They returned to their classes on June 30 and carried on their strenuous work of bayonet combat, drills and firing of weapons in the intense midsummer heat. It was a trying ordeal and a severe test of morale. The months of June and July saw a succession of curiously contradictory orders which alternately granted carts blanche authority to proceed with the development of Camp Benning and summarily checked such activities. The authorization which the Secretary of War had given in March for the completion of the project had allotted approximately $2.6 million for the purchase of the land required. On June 5 the officer in charge of the acquisition of land was told “to spend as much as may be needed” for the procurement of the 98,000 acres which the camp was to have, although it was apparent even then that the transaction would require more than the allotted sum. On July 1, the Secretary of War again placed an

Soldiers used to sleep in tents in the early days of Fort Benning. The silo in the background of this 1925 photograph was part of Arthur Bussey’s plantation, which he sold to the government so that the School of Infantry could be built.
official ban on all construction work and purchase of land for Camp Benning. All unexpended funds hitherto allotted for these purposes were to revert to the United States Treasury. Apparently the injunction did not affect operations at Camp Benning until July 5, for the local quartermaster records show that land purchases and construction work ceased officially on that date. Local enterprise again met the situation. With such materials as were at hand, the inhabitants of the camp set about improving their living conditions and, despite the sharp limitations placed upon such activities, they accomplished a great deal before winter. This, and the previous local solution of pressing problems, seemed to prove that there is more than one way of killing a cat or of saving an infantry school.

**More Challenges**

In June, Colonel Paul B. Malone was recalled from duty with the Army of Occupation in Germany to become assistant commandant of the Infantry School of Arms. He was also to act as representative of the War Department to acquaint Congress with the necessity for and the objectives of the school and to induce that body to approve the project. Colonel Malone’s duties in Washington as liaison officer between the War Department and Congress began in July and extended over a period of eight months. One of his first acts was to begin the preparation of a digest of information on matters relating to the school plan for the members of Congress. The importance of an infantry school in the Army’s educational system was cogently demonstrated by an analysis of the American casualties of the World War. This showed that the infantry suffered 89 percent of the combat casualties and indicated certain deficiencies in training. A school for the infantry, he argued, was an absolute necessity, no matter what the size the Army was to be. By a brief discussion of the general features of existing Army posts, cantonments and camps, he proved that the Camp Benning area was the only available one which fulfilled the requirements of an all-year-round infantry school. He outlined an organization plan and the new character of training for commissioned and noncommissioned personnel of the three components of the Army. He procured the approbative statements of such eminent soldiers as Generals Hunter Liggett, Robert L. Bullard, and Charles P. Summerall. Among others, endorsements of the scheme were given by the chief of the tank corps, then a separate arm, the director of air service, the chief of the militia bureau, and by two influential civilian organizations, the Military Training Camps Association and the National Rifle Association. About 200 infantry officers and several officers of other arms participated in the work of acquainting Congress with the necessity of completing the Camp Benning project.

An impetus was given to the school’s instructional activities on July 10 when two classes of noncommissioned officers began a three-month course. On September 5 another class of officers arrived for a physical training course of one month. With two classes of officers and two of noncommissioned officers in session at one time, the school presented a scene of bustling training activities, as the authorities no doubt had intended it should, when Colonel Malone conducted a congressional inspection committee to Camp Benning in the fall.

The study, which the general staff had begun on the question of infantry training, resulted in a definition of policy which was announced in War Department general orders on September 25. The infantry was to have its own special service school which was “to develop and standardize the instruction and training of officers in the (techniques) and tactics of their arm of the service.” The infantry’s school was to operate under the supervision and control of the chief of infantry, who was directed to draft special regulations for the conduct of the school. General Farnsworth, assisted by Colonel Malone and Colonel Monroe C. Kerth, at once began the preparation of the regulations, and in January 1920, submitted a draft to the War Department.

On September 30 the class which began in March (a course which should have ended in June) finally graduated. A new class of recent West Point graduates arrived on October 1. On October 15, the remainder of the 29th Infantry arrived from Camp Shelby. Colonel Eames was placed in charge of the school’s department of experiment on November 1 and was designated a member of the Infantry Board on December 24. Mobile Laundry Unit No. 5 arrived on November 5, but it did not operate until the following year. General Pershing came to Camp Benning on December 10 to inspect the school. Seas of mud, overflowing streams, liquid roads, and a sodden camp, awaited him. The inundation, which resulted from a downpour of several days’ duration prior to his arrival, is known to this day as the “Pershing Flood.”

At the close of 1919, the infantry’s school had made little advancement toward permanency, and, friendless and forlorn, was still floundering in a quagmire of uncertainty.

The new year, 1920, began with little promise, and January was void of accomplishment until the 23rd, when General Farnsworth sent the draft of the new school regulations to the War Department. The importance of this document in shaping the character of the school was not evident, however, until several months later.

The month of February had, in previous years, held a singular significance for the school. February 1920 was to be no exception, for on February 11 officials received the War Department order which invested it with the dignity of a distinctive title, “The Infantry School.” February 20, 1920, will ever remain a red-letter day in the history of the Infantry School, for it was on this date that Congress approved the plan to retain and develop Camp Benning. The promise of support for the school plan which Representative Anthony of Kansas and other members of the committee had
given to Colonel Malone when they visited Camp Benning had not been an empty one. At last the status of the Infantry School was definitely fixed and plans for its conduct and development could proceed with confidence. From February to April, plans for clothing the school in its new character as the Infantry School were being perfected along the lines which had been indicated in the tentative regulations which General Farnsworth had submitted in January. These were approved and published by the War Department as Special Regulations No. 14, dated April 22, 1920. In them were prescribed the new organization of the Infantry School, the duties of its staff and departments, the classes of students and the manner of selecting them, the courses for the respective classes and the methods by which they would be carried out. Some idea of how far the process of evolution had advanced the character of the Infantry School beyond that of its antecedent of 1907, may be gleaned by a comparison of the respective objectives and organizations of the two schools. The immediate objective of the earlier school was to raise the marksmanship standards of the Pacific Division by giving to “selected officers and enlisted men a higher degree of practical and theoretical instruction in the use of small arms than it is practicable to obtain at posts, with a view to making them better instructors and thereby increasing the fire efficiency of the organization to which they belong.” The school staff at this time consisted solely of an officer in charge and an assistant instructor. More comprehensive were the purposes of the later school. “The chief aim of all courses will be to develop in the student the quality of leadership and the capacity to instruct others. Instruction in research will form part of each course with a view to developing the habit of independent investigation and thus arriving at conclusions by analysis and deduction,” reads a paragraph in the special regulations of the 1920 school. For the organization of the school, the latter prescribed a commandant, an assistant commandant, a secretary, a director for each of the four departments, and such instructors and other assistants as were required. The scope of instruction of the Infantry School had grown, almost immeasurably, from a curriculum limited to subjects related to marksmanship and musketry, to the whole field of (techniques) of the numerous modern infantry weapons, the tactics of all units to, and including, the reinforced infantry brigade, and the cooperation of infantry with other arms. Students for the Monterey school were drawn from a limited area and command, while the Infantry School of 1920 was opened to the infantrymen of all three components of the Army.

With its new investitures of title, estate, and career, an era of renaissance had begun for the Infantry School. It had not yet recovered its strength but it no longer had to expend all its energy in a struggle for the right to exist. In the spring of 1920, several small increments of demonstration troops were added to the garrison. The 32d Balloon Company came in March, the 344th Tank Battalion and Company D 7th Engineers in April, and a detachment of the air service with 10 airplanes in May.

On June 5 Colonel Eames departed from the Infantry School to take up new duties elsewhere in compliance with orders which had been issued in April. On July 31, General Farnsworth was relieved as commandant to become the Chief of Infantry, with the rank of major general.

Brigadier General Walter H. Gordon was appointed his successor, and he arrived to take command on September 20.

The school year of 1920–21 was the first in which were conducted the prescribed courses of the modern Infantry School. Since the issuance of the special school regulations in April, the War Department had added to the mission of the school the requirements of training efficient commanders and staff officers for all units, and of preparing officers for the advanced training given in the general service schools. The new courses, amplified to the additional requirements, were scheduled to begin on October 1, but unsettled conditions in the service made it so difficult to assemble the students that the classes did not commence until November 1. An exception was that a group of recent graduates of the military academy who arrived in time to begin the basic course on October 1. This group was carried as a separate class throughout the school year as it had advanced too far in its work to be merged with the other basic group upon the latter’s arrival. Approximately 650 regular officers reported for enrollment in the four classes, the field officers, company officers, and the two basic classes, but the actual enrollments were reduced somewhat by the necessity of using prospective students to fill vacancies in the school staff and post organizations. A national guard class, the first of the three-month courses for this component, began on November 1.

Two important demonstration units were added to the garrison in this month. The medical demonstration detachment of seven officers and about 100 enlisted men, assembled from five corps areas, arrived on the second. On the 20th, the 1st Battalion 83d Field Artillery arrived after an overland march from Camp Knox, Kentucky.

Despite the hampering effect of the primitive environment in which it was carried on, the instructional work of the school proceeded steadily. Classes came and went. Courses were improved little by little as experience indicated where changes for the better could be made. By 1921 the school had acquired enough experience in the extensive fields of its work to justify a revision of what might be termed its character, Special Regulations No. 14. By this time, the school had also undertaken the revision of several training documents and the preparation of others. On January 31, 1921, the first class of National Guard officers graduated. Another class began a similar course on March 1, which terminated...
near the end of May. All the regular courses ended on June 30 after a two-week extension to compensate for the late opening of the classes in the fall of 1920. In October the regular courses for 1921-22 began with 439 students enrolled. An indication of the broadened character of the school’s training program was the commandant’s recommendation in August 1921 that in addition to the 29th Infantry at full war strength, there also be a battalion of field artillery, a battalion of tanks, a company of engineers, an observation squadron, a medical demonstration unit, a pigeon loft and a balloon company stationed permanently at the Infantry School as demonstration units. However, the schedule of troop demonstrations had to be curtailed considerably. This setback in the training scheme was due to the reduction of the 29th Infantry to a two-battalion regiment, the disbandment of the medical demonstration detachment, and the withdrawal of the air service detachment. In 1921 the majority of the regular Army students were newly commissioned and, according to the assistant commandant, Colonel Paul B. Malone, “knew little of the unwritten laws of the service.” Nevertheless, they apparently entered into their studies wholeheartedly, for Colonel Malone pays them high compliment in the school’s annual report. “On the whole,” said the colonel, “the conduct of the classes was excellent, the morale high, and the feeling that a great work for the Army had been accomplished was general, almost universal.”

This evidence of student esprit appears to have been a circumstance of conspicuous brightness in an otherwise gloomy year. Besides the disheartening problems associated with the living conditions of Camp Benning, General Gordon was confronted with others of totally different character but of equally disturbing influences. One of these was the problem of adequate transportation service between Camp Benning and Columbus. The schedule of the one daily train which the Central of Georgia Railroad operated to and from the camp, was wholly unsuited to the needs of the majority of the garrison, which found itself interred during its hours of freedom from duties. This circumstance was regarded as a golden opportunity by a number of individuals who forthwith engaged in the business of transportation between the camp and the city. Soon scores of nondescript vehicles, operated by persons of no particular responsibility, were haphazardly engaged in carrying passengers between Camp Benning and Columbus. General Gordon desired the establishment of a reliable transportation system to displace the unregulated jitneys. Accordingly, negotiations were begun with the management of the Columbus street railways. An offer of the free use of the government’s tracks to the camp was made to the company. This did not appear to be sufficient inducement, and the street railway company asked, in addition, that it be given a monopoly on all passenger and freight transportation, and a guarantee that the government would reimburse the company for any deficit incurred in operating the line. The latter point could not be conceded and the negotiations fell through. With the street railway company eliminated, Columbus’ interest in the camp transportation system seemed to be limited to a small circle of automobile dealers and independent vehicle operators. However, when a proposal to establish a regular passenger bus line between Camp Benning and Columbus was made by a Mr. Howard of Atlanta, the subject at once became a matter of community concern. In May 1921, a counterproposal offered by the automobile dealers of Columbus was laid before the Camp Activities Committee, a local citizens’ organization. The committee recommended Mr. Howard’s proposal as the better one and recommended that General Gordon accept it. This he did, and the Howard Bus Line was given the exclusive automobile transportation privilege between the camp and the city. The contract did not become effective until August as General Gordon allowed the independent operators 90 days in which to withdraw their service.

Another problem of no mean proportions was the constant readjustment of all activities which was made necessary by the growing shortage of enlisted personnel. This was particularly evident in 1921 following the promulgation of the War Department’s order which permitted the discharge of any soldier who desired to leave the service. This state of affairs was, of course, one which local authority had to accept with such grace as it could. However, in midsummer of 1921, General Gordon made emphatic protest against a proposed reduction of one-fourth of the force of nurses at Camp Benning. “If we had modern quarters for our families, officers and enlisted men,” he said, “the necessity for hospital accommodations would be very much less.”

Constant criticism by casual, but high-ranking observers did little toward lightening the general’s cares. “The personal appearance of the officers at Benning is the worst we have seen in the army,” is a criticism transmitted to the harassed commandant by the Chief of Infantry.

As a final, but by no means all-inclusive recital of the minor burdens borne by General Gordon, a list of some of the ill-starred events of this year will be illuminative. In March, during a firing exercise, a tank fired a six-pound shell into one of the officers’ quarters in Block 23. Just a few days later an artillery shell fell on the railroad near Harp’s Pond and a civilian workman narrowly escaped death or injury. In the same month a violent storm destroyed wire communication lines, unroofed buildings, moved some from their foundations, and damaged a great amount of subsistence and other supplies. In May, a fete day, whose program included a ceremony, demonstrations, a baseball game, and a public reception, was broken up by another violent storm. In June the local water supply dried up and it was necessary to improvise a temporary source of supply. On October 27, President Harding and his party visited Camp Benning.

While no untoward incident occurred, the plans for the presidential visit had to be curtailed to a great extent. A gloomy outlook for the future was prophesied by General Farnsworth in this same month when he wrote, “It is becoming increasingly difficult to get personnel, money and materials for Benning. This is not because of any opposition to Benning, but because of the necessity for economy in the army. The economy is real economy and not simply talk about economy.” Only a year before General Gordon, viewing hopefully the immediate future, had written to General Farnsworth, “I feel, too, that we are meeting successfully the crisis that the Infantry School is now going through and that in another year the troubles of today will be forgotten in the improved conditions and in the school’s success.” A vain hope, indeed, as it turned out to be, but at the end of 1921 General Gordon was regarding the school’s prospects for the forthcoming year with optimism and courage unimpaired.
With its riflemen, grenadiers, and SAW gunners, the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) rifle squad carries a significant amount of firepower to the battlefield. Two of its potentially most lethal weapons systems are the M2 machine gun or MK-19 grenade launcher, either of which can be mounted on the Stryker itself on a Remote Weapon System (RWS). The focus of a Stryker infantry battalion is the dismounted infantry squad, supported by the Stryker (FM 3-21.1, ch. 1-1). Direct fire support from the Stryker’s M2 or MK-19 is a vital part of the dismounted attack, and accurate fire from the Stryker can be a devastating weapon when applied by a proficient gunner-vehicle commander (VC) team.

Mastery of RWS skills greatly increases the lethality of a SBCT rifle squad. In order to prepare vehicle crews, particularly gunners, for Stryker gunnery, FM 3-22.3 specifies numerous prerequisites that crews must complete before executing the gunnery tables. Customers must complete target acquisition practice, weapon mounting and dismounting, range card (handwritten and digital), and combat vehicle recognition before executing practice and qualification tables (FM 3-22.3, Chapters 9-9 and 9-10). The purpose of this training is to build proficiency at these fundamentals before putting a crew through gunnery evaluation. Unfortunately, our battalion was not able to meet the time-intensive prerequisites specified in FM 3-22.3. Battalion-resourced pre-gunnery training consisted of two M2 familiarization ranges, with a MK-19 range having to be cancelled due to training conflicts. Companies were instructed to have their crews complete the SGST (FM 3-22.3, App. C-3), which consisted of several PMI tasks such as assembly/disassembly, headspace and timing, etc.

The lack of pretraining for gunnery was clearly evident when crews executed the practice and qualification tables. Lack of familiarity with their weapons systems also impaired some crews’ effectiveness when dealing with weapon malfunctions, especially MK-19 malfunctions. Experience demonstrated the need for rigorous application of SGST standards at the battalion level.

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**Planning**

Chapter 10 of FM 3-22.3 specifies the requirements for Stryker gunnery practice and qualification tables. The FM requires that for an M2-equipped Stryker, at least one day and one night target must be at a range of 600 meters or less, and one day and one night target must be at a range of 1,400 meters or more. MK-19-equipped Strykers must engage one target at 800 meters or less and one target at 1,500 meters or more. Targets are all exposed for 60 seconds, but Chapter 10 requires that Strykers have significantly less time to pull into a firing position and engage the target. The FM also specifies that one engagement by day and by night must be fired using only manual traverse. For ammunition, Chapter 10 allocates 21 rounds per target for M2 Strykers, and 8 rounds per target for MK-19 Strykers. There were 23 total targets for all day and night tables, which meant that each vehicle was allotted 483 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition or 184 rounds of 40mm ammunition. M2 gunners received ammunition DODIC A557 (4+1 ball-tracer mix) and MK-19 gunners...
received either B584 (TPT) or BA12 (TPT chalk).

When planning the gunnery tables, we followed the basic examples and guidelines found in FM 3-22.3. Also, we included an additional engagement condition under which the gunner simulated running out of ammunition, having to reload with engagement time running. Tables VI and VII each had five day engagements and four night engagements. All Table VI engagements were fired from stationary positions. Some Table VII engagements were fired from the quick halt. A matrix of the engagements can be found on the next page. In order to receive a “GO” on an engagement, M2 gunners had to hit each target presented in the engagement. MK-19 gunners had to either hit each target or hit within five meters of the target, simulating the five-meter bursting radius for a 40mm high explosive (HE) round. The impact was observed by the tower evaluators and graded accordingly. Crews had to score three out of five GOs for day Table VII and two out of four GOs for night Table VII to be considered a GO for Stryker gunnery.

Execution
Due to operations simultaneous with Stryker gunnery, we had a minimal range staff to execute gunnery. The officer-in-charge (OIC) and range safety officer (RSO) manned the tower and gave
incoming crews the range orientation and safety brief prior to execution; they also gave crews their radio prompts during the gunnery tables. Three evaluators (all 19K staff sergeants — selected due to their extensive gunnery experience) took turns watching the execution of the lanes on the range tower’s FLIR (forward looking infrared), recording the scores, and giving the completed crews their after action reviews (AARs) after each table. We had four safeties (19K sergeants — also selected for their gunnery experience) who rode in each vehicle as it executed the tables, both to ensure crews followed all safety procedures and to observe crews’ engagement methods and offer advice during AARs. Two Strykers executed each table simultaneously, with four to six Strykers firing daily. At the beginning of each engagement, the OIC would give a radio prompt to the vehicle commander, which would read as follows:

“C22 this is Tower, you have enemy troops in your sector to the right of TRP 2; engage and report, out.”

The VC and gunner would then begin scanning, with engagement time beginning when the target became exposed.

There were several difficulties that we encountered while executing gunnery. First, when weapons systems had malfunctions, we had a mechanic from our battalion’s combat repair team who was at the range and tasked with weapons repair. When conducting future gunnery training, we will also ensure that we have ample maintenance assets on-hand to correct any malfunctions that occur due to the heavy firing that weapons endure during gunnery. Rigorous application of the SGST would also help alleviate malfunction-related hindrances by allowing some malfunctions to be corrected by operator immediate action.

Almost every crew had to recycle through the ammunition supply point (ASP) for additional ammunition after completing the day tables, using almost twice the amount of ammunition allotted. Some of the less-experienced gunners used entire boxes of ammunition just to zero their weapon systems. For both M2 and MK-19 Stryker crews, the allotment of ammunition should be increased significantly, with amount of rounds per target varying based on the type of target, the range to target, and conditions under which the crews are firing. Recommended adjustments to ammunition allocations can be found in the table above.

There were few problems with the ammunition itself. DODIC A557 (.50 cal 4+1) created an excellent thermal and visual signature for gunners and VCs to use to adjust their fire onto target. BA12 (40mm chalk) created an excellent visual signature by day, but at night its impacts could be observed only by the range tower’s

### TABLE VI DAY

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RECOMMENDED AMMUNITION ADJUSTMENTS

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<td>+4</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>NBC: +4</td>
<td>Troops: +0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Manual: +6</td>
<td>Vehicle: +4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FLIR, making it almost impossible for gunners to adjust their fire. B584 (40mm TPT) created a far better signature at night. The tables themselves also required some adjustments during execution. One of the adjustments was the reshuffling of the manual engagements to the end of each table. Also, we found that the ammo-change condition proved to be of limited value. Due to a higher than expected rate of ammunition consumption, many gunners had to change ammunition boxes without being prompted to do so, making the artificial condition redundant.

For future gunnery training I would create two separate tables for MK-19 and M2-equipped Strykers. The ranges and types of targets presented during the tables need to correspond to the contemporary operating environment that most of the crews will experience when deployed. The majority of engagements in theater by Stryker units occur at short range against insurgent infantry in urban environments. Examples of possible revised gunnery tables can be found to the right.

CONCLUSIONS

The battalion’s gunnery tables yielded excellent training and good lessons learned for all who participated. If executed in accordance with FM 3-22.3, Stryker gunnery requires weeks of well-planned and focused training on fundamentals such as target acquisition, RWS zeroing, and adjusting fire onto target. However, most of the Stryker crews had done little more than an M2 range prior to executing gunnery, and some had done no prior training at all. If it had not been necessary to devote the bulk of the training time to preparing for the other training events, Stryker crews could have gained greater proficiency in gunnery fundamentals; proficiency that would have paid great dividends during the gunnery tables and in combat.
Recently, a former company commander of mine, who is now a tactical officer at the United States Military Academy, asked me what I would share with cadets who were soon to be commissioned. I reflected back to my time spent as a platoon leader in Fallujah, Iraq, and Gardez, Afghanistan. The two deployments were on opposing ends of the spectrum of Army operations. Countless combat operations, typically cordon and searches targeting both Saddam loyalists and insurgents, characterized our time in Iraq. As a battalion, we were in contact daily. Our mission in Afghanistan was to facilitate the country’s first ever national elections. It was, arguably, a stability and support operation. While the battalion was in contact on more than one occasion, operations there were nowhere near as intense as those in Iraq. Despite the differences in the two deployments, I have identified some common principles that when applied at the small unit level, led to mission success. These principles are versatility, aggressiveness, and safety.

Army doctrine is full of concepts, definitions, and terms. As a cadet at the United States Military Academy, as a second lieutenant at the Infantry Officers Basic Course (IOBC), and again as a captain at the Infantry Captains Career Course, I’ve studied and used mnemonics to memorize and learn concepts such as the Principles of War, the Tenets of Army Operations, and the Elements of Combat Power. That being said, what I do not intend to do is undermine doctrine or force junior leaders to remember three more “principles.” I would like to illustrate, based on experience, why these principles are important and how they can contribute to mission accomplishment.

**Versatility**

FM 3-0, *Operations*, defines versatility as the ability of Army forces to meet the global, diverse mission requirements of full...
spectrum operations. Leaders and Soldiers at all levels must be able to quickly transition from full spectrum to stability and reconstruction operations. In April 2004, our battalion redeployed from Iraq after nearly a year of a fairly intense operations tempo (OPTEMPO). In August of 2004, we were rapidly deployed to Afghanistan. We expected our junior leaders to make the transition, including new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs), seamlessly. The contemporary operating environment (COE) mandates that junior leaders also understand the environment in which they will be operating. Often, it is a second lieutenant or even a staff sergeant who is speaking to an indigenous person on behalf of the Army. In Afghanistan, our platoon was deployed to secure a polling site in Sayed Karam. As a first lieutenant, I held daily meetings with the tribal elders and the mayor of town while my squad leaders worked hand-in-hand with the chief of police. Leaders must be versatile enough to understand the cultural, political, social, economic and religious aspects of the operating environment and potentially be able to communicate their understanding to indigenous personnel.

Small unit leaders must also be able to perform unique missions for which they may not have been trained. For example, the enemy in Iraq prefers to attack coalition forces using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed along the roadside. A second lieutenant, I was never trained on “react to IED.” I was, however, taught how to react to a near ambush. With the help of NCOs and experienced Soldiers, we were able to develop SOPs for reacting to IEDs based on existing doctrine. Leaders must be able to apply what they have been taught (doctrine) to what they have to do, using the assets they have. That being said, we must learn and understand not only the capabilities of our own units, but also those of the units fighting on our right and left. My task organization for the polling center security mission in Sayed Karam, Afghanistan, included my platoon (an airborne anti-tank platoon), two Marine squads, a 60mm mortar section, a Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) team, a combat camera team, and an interpreter. The typical second lieutenant or sergeant first class does not know what a Marine Corps assault squad brings to the fight or how far and long a Raven UAV can fly. We had to be versatile enough to incorporate these assets into our team to accomplish the mission. This is particularly important because in the COE, platoons are operating in company-sized battlespaces with company-level assets and companies are operating in battalion-sized battlespaces with battalion-level assets. Small unit leaders need to be students of their craft and be able to operate independently in areas much larger than they are accustomed to with assets inorganic to them.

**Aggressive**

Small unit leaders must be aggressive. “Aggressive” does not mean “shoot first and ask questions later,” but rather the desire to take the fight to the enemy. Every leader in the Army must embody the Warrior Ethos. Equally important is his ability to instil this into his subordinates.

What does this mean for the small unit leader? It means that if he makes contact, he must aggressively react to it. Use fire and maneuver to fight the threat, not to get away from it, but to eliminate it. In stability and support operations (SASO), this translates into projecting an aggressive posture to prevent an enemy attack. When all Soldiers are pulling 360-degree security, when weapons are at the ready, and when helmets, eye protection and IBAs are worn properly and fastened, units present an aggressive posture. An aggressive posture prevents attacks, and displays professionalism and discipline. From August 2003 through March 2004, the battalion area of operations (AO) for the 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, was a large swath of land in Iraq’s Anbar Province that included Al Fallujah. The majority of the units that were ambushed with catastrophic results in that AO were nonaffiliated combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. These units typically had a poor defensive posture; in general, crew served weapons were not properly manned and tactical convoy procedures were not followed. The enemy is a thinking enemy and understands discipline. He would prefer to engage a “soft target.” To the enemy, a soft target is identifiable by a perceived poor level of discipline.

**Safety**

The third principle is safety. Safety is not just for training or for making sure Soldiers come back in one piece from a long weekend. Safety includes common sense, force protection and sound, responsible decision making. Safety must be instilled at the lowest level. One of the best ways to stay safe is to provide realistic training for Soldiers. When NCOs and junior officers plan and execute realistic training it instills confidence in even the most inexperienced Soldiers. A confident Soldier is less likely to be unsafe. The first time a Soldier maneuvers while a support by fire element is engaging should not be “downrange.” Our battalion deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan with minimal notice, yet we ensured that every Soldier who deployed had undergone a minimum of squad live-fire training. The live-fire training was realistic; it incorporated newly developed TTPs such as mounting and dismounting HMMWVs, which was fairly new for an airborne infantry battalion. Additionally, it is important to take administrative measures for force protection. These
include personal hygiene and tasks as simple as taking malaria prophylactic medication. In Iraq, my platoon “lost” several Soldiers due to dysentery and rashes caused from animal and insect infestations. On one occasion, an NCO had such poor personal hygiene that a weasel was actually sharing his sleeping bag with him. We became aware of this only after the NCO came down with a rash. Something as simple as ensuring your Soldiers keep themselves clean can be a force multiplier.

On the tactical side, being safe means mitigating risk and not giving the enemy any “freebies.” In both Afghanistan and Iraq, one of the enemy’s most dangerous capabilities are IEDs. In Iraq, a second lieutenant from a sister unit was killed while personally inspecting a suspected IED site along a main supply route (MSR). The officer literally walked to within 20 meters of the emplacement. His death could have been prevented by the use of optics and other assets. For example, in Afghanistan, we were able to utilize the Raven UAV to reconnoiter our routes to detect IEDs and small arms ambushes.

Another example of tactical safety is aggressively patrolling within a 10-kilometer radius of friendly operational support bases. For the enemy to place accurate mortar and rocket indirect fires on us, he must be within 10 kilometers. Rockets and mortar attacks are frequent and casualty-causing occurrences in both Iraq and Afghanistan. By patrolling this ring, we can reduce the enemy’s ability to emplace these systems.

Finally, it is important to remember that the COE and current OPTEMPO now make it necessary for units to be responsible for larger AOs. For example, as a platoon leader operating in Afghanistan, I was responsible for an area that would typically be controlled by a company. Platoons are occupying company-sized battlespaces; companies are occupying battalion-sized battlespaces and so on. This means that small unit leaders are responsible for securing large patrol bases and safe houses. In Afghanistan, lieutenants and platoon sergeants are establishing and operating from safe houses. They must understand how to establish good defensive plans. They need to know now how to plan a defense, employ weapons systems in the defense, and maintain good communications. These are key elements of force protection when operating in small units separate from the main body.

It is obvious how the principles of versatility, aggressiveness, and safety can contribute to mission accomplishment. By no means are these principles all encompassing, and they are not intended to replace doctrine or add to it. In fact, all of the principles are discussed in one form or another in a modern Army manual or publication. The aforementioned principles are simply one officer’s summation of what enabled his unit to be successful in the COE under varying conditions. Today’s Army is full of combat veterans. The majority of Soldiers have at least one, often two or three, deployments to either Iraq or Afghanistan under their belt. It is of vital importance to our Army that this experience is passed on to the inexperienced Soldier and future commissioned leaders.

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Book Provides Additional Insight into Bin Laden’s Past

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

In an effort to make readers aware of street literature and Arabic books about Usama Bin Laden, Infantry Magazine is featuring a third in a series of review essays that will introduce American military readers to unique perspectives and information on Bin Laden. The Al-Qaeda leader and the movement he has created are much too important to ignore what is written about him both in Arabic print and on the internet.

This third essay will explore the work of Khalid Khaleel Asaad who in 2000 published Muqatil Min Makkah: Al-Qissa Al-Kamila lee Usama Bin Laden (Warrior from Mecca: The Complete Story of Usama Bin Laden). This book is a 388-page expose on the myriad of connections Bin Laden has had with Afghan Mujahideen commanders, Sudanese government officials, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and much more. The title is a misnomer, as it is not entirely a complete biography, but it does contain a better picture of Bin Laden’s early involvement with the Soviet-Afghan War and less information about the battles in which he participated, like the Defense of Jaji and the Battle of Jalalabad. What it does offer is some insight into Usama Bin Laden as a planner, organizer, political operator, and perhaps one of the better discussions on his closeness to the Sudanese government.

This is the author’s third book on Bin Laden, with a 1991 book on Usama Bin Laden in Saudi Arabia and a 1994 biography of Usama Bin Laden’s father, Mohammed Bin Laden, both written in Arabic. There is no biography on Asaad, but he seems to be an investigative journalist and independent writer. His 2000 book, which is the subject of this review, was published by Al-Alam lil Nahsir Publishers out of London, a place whose liberal asylum laws has made it a haven for Islamist militant rejectionists until the recent wave of attacks on the London transportation system. This review essay demonstrates that jihadist literature and biographies of major Islamist militant figures can be found not only on Arab street corners but a few blocks from a London pub as well.


This particular book discusses the gradual involvement of Usama Bin Laden in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Bin Laden’s odyssey began 17 days after the Soviet invasion on Christmas Day 1979. This places Bin Laden’s first foray seeking out what he could do for the jihad in mid-January 1980; he was 21 years old. His first actions were not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, where he donated $3 million to Pakistani Islamist organization Jamiat-e-Islami (The Islamic Group) to be distributed to Afghan mujahideen (jihadists, but at the time, during the Cold War, American officials would have considered them freedom fighters). Between 1980 and 1983, Bin Laden made frequent trips between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, looking for ways to contribute directly to Afghan fighters. In 1983, he arrived in the Pakistan frontier town of Peshawar on the Afghan border and donated $5 million to Afghan mujahideen groups. During this period he invested another $5 million to create a pipeline for young Arabs to volunteer for the Soviet-Afghan War. The book outlines several pipelines:

(1) The Bin Laden Foundation and Construction Company in Cairo, Egypt, used its experience of moving a massive amount of Egyptian laborers to work in Saudi Arabia to export Egyptian jihadists to Pakistan and then onto Afghanistan. They would arrive first in Jeddah, stay at a transit house called Bait Al-Ansar (House of Volunteers), and await further transfer to Peshawar. Bin Laden at this stage had direct control of this pipeline and not the other two.

(2) The World Muslim League at the time maintained 1,112 offices and projects worldwide. During the start of the Soviet-Afghan War, they began with humanitarian work, creating 15 clinics in Peshawar for Afghan refugees and facilitated in bringing 900 Arabs (300 of whom were Egyptian) into Afghanistan including Mohammed Shawky Islambooli, older brother of President Anwar Sadat’s assassin Khalid Islambooli. The World Muslim League, an arm of the Saudi government, provided $180 payments for volunteers, processed passports, and typically kept the Arab volunteers in Jeddah for two weeks
(3) The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood advertised and raised funds for the Soviet-Afghan War. They created pipelines as well for those wanting to participate physically in the jihad against the Soviets. Their primary source of recruitment was Egyptian university campuses. The Muslim Brotherhood drives became a distinct counterculture and a jihadist revival that swept up hundreds of students. The book also highlights how clerics in Egypt began weaving the name of Usama Bin Laden as a leader and organizer of jihad in Afghanistan.

It is important to pause and realize that these pipelines to Afghan jihad were not separate and distinct, but complemented one another in bringing Arabs to the front in the fight against Russian forces. Arab security and intelligence agencies, which had battled jihadists aggressively since the 1967 Six-Day War, saw in these pipelines the opportunity to rid themselves of Islamist militants with the hope that they would not return from fighting the modern forces of the Soviet 40th Army. Waiting for these Arabs were representatives of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Usama Bin Laden. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who was killed in a 1989 car bomb in Peshawar, established Maktab Al-Khidmat lil Mujahideen (The Services Office for Arab Fighters, Maktab Al-Khidmat for short), the first establishment to undertake the organization, reception, and orientation of these young Arabs. Known as the fighting cleric, he also brought Sunni Islamist militant groups to the United States in the mid to late eighties, and as Bin Laden’s former professor at King Abdul-Aziz University, served as his mentor. Maktab Al-Khidmat would be the template Bin Laden would use to establish Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden brought organizational as well as administrative skills, fundraising, and military talent to the organization. Due to numerous complaints of the inefficiency of Maktab Al-Khidmat, Bin Laden organized it with:

- **An Administrative Committee** that was responsible for the clothing, feeding, and lodging of Arab-Afghans; and
- **A Travel Committee** that arranged visas, flights, and caravan routes from Cairo to Jeddah, on to Peshawar, then finally to Afghanistan, and back. They also perfected medical evacuations of wounded mujahideen, both Arab and non-Arab, to major treatment facilities in Saudi Arabia.


Usama Bin Laden would use his experiences of organizing Sheikh Azzam’s offices for Arab jihadists to not only become a major executive of this organization, but also to form his own stand-alone training camps in 1985 called Massadah Al-Ansar (Lion’s Den of Companions). These camps were located in the Afghan mountain region of Jaji near the southeastern border of Afghanistan close to the Pakistan border (Read the Infantry Magazine’s July-August 2006 article “Street Literature on Usama Bin Laden Part II: The Soviet-Afghan War Years A Review of a 1991 Street Autobiography of Bin Laden,” for details on Bin Laden’s establishment of Massadah Al-Ansar and the Battles of Jaji and Jalalabad). What is not clear in many Arabic accounts about Bin Laden is when he ventured out on his own away from his mentor and spiritual professor Abdullah Azzam, and if Azzam objected to Bin Laden establishing his own camp. What is clear after 1985, is that Bin Laden remained in Pakistan and Afghanistan on a more permanent basis. He initially focused his efforts on building Massadah Al-Ansar and recruiting Arab, Asian, and African fighters to this unit. After participating in the defense of Jaji from Soviet assault in 1986 and then the Battle of Jalalabad in 1987, he returned briefly to Saudi Arabia to conduct fundraising. Bin Laden’s effort at creating Massadah Al-Ansar is a clear indication of his desire to elevate Arab support from financial and logistical to direct combat.

The book devotes a chapter to Bin Laden and his fighting of the Soviets. Although it lacks tactical detail, the book does show how the introduction of more modern weapons increased the lethality of the Afghan mujahideen fighters and exponentially raised the potency of Afghan...
insurgency tactics against the Soviets. As an example, the book cites how when AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) were made more available to the Afghans the morale, quality, and quantity of attacks on Soviet forces increased. When provided SAM-7 anti-air shoulder-fired missiles, this elevated their confidence and tactical options. From 1979 to 1984, the bulk of modern weapons fielded by Afghans fighting the Soviets were either captured or stolen with the complicit cooperation of Afghan communist regulars who deserted to the Afghan mujahideen factions. The book cites the 1982 Soviet military operation in the Panshir Valley when the Russians, as if on parade, demonstrated their armored might to frighten the Afghan fighters. This only stiffened Afghan resolve and led them to assess the Russian formation for lethal hit-and-run targets of opportunity. Soviet infantry carried anti-tank weapons when the Afghan mujahideen had no tanks. The book contains a unique chapter dealing with Bin Laden’s arrangements to import weapons from China into Afghanistan. These weapons included Kalashnikov assault rifles, RPGs, 82mm anti-tank guns, 12.7mm machine guns, 14.5mm anti-air guns, 81mm artillery guns, 107mm rockets, and BM-12 rockets.

Another military deal mentioned in the book is Bin Laden’s arrangement to import surplus Syrian military uniforms and equipment into Afghanistan, a connection he would use later to provide uniforms to the Sudanese Army. This makes sense as Bin Laden’s mother and first wife come from a prominent Syrian family. This combination of fundraising, engineering capability and ability to access military equipment and bulk supplies on the world market in addition to his fighting experience, organizational skill and leadership is unique and demonstrates that should Usama Bin Laden be neutralized it will be highly difficult to find anyone in Al-Qaeda with such diverse talents and cultivated connections.

**Evolution of the Radicalist Afghan Mujahideen Factions**

The book traces the ideological foundations of the mujahideen factions that fought the Soviet Union and benefited most from Arab and Pakistani support to those Afghan leaders who espoused the jihadist gospel of Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). Among the early jihadist Afghan leaders and spiritual founders of many of the more violent of the dozen mujahideen factions was Afghan Sheikh Gulam Mohammed Niazi, who would later rise to be Dean of Islamic Jurisprudence at Kabul University. Niazi received his Islamic training at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University and became closely linked with the Islamist politics of the Muslim Brotherhood during its repression under Egyptian strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Niazi returned to Afghanistan in the late ’60s and his hard-line Islamist worldview stimulated professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, as well as students Abdul-Rab Al-Rassul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmetyar. These students demonstraned against the Afghan monarchy of Zahir Shah in 1972, calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. In 1969, the four formed an organization at the university Jamiat-e-Islami, in which Professor Rabbani was head, Sayyaf his deputy, Hekmetyar his operations chief, and Niazi the overall spiritual advisor. They would serve as a bulwark against pro-communist student unions; even Hekmetyar would spend time in jail, on the charge of murdering a known communist student leader. Hekmetyar would not last long in Afghanistan, beginning his political career with the murder of a Communist student leader Saidal Sokhandan in 1972. Jamiat was violently anti-secular but it is within these student groups that the Jamiat-e-Islami led by Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami (The Islamic Party) led by Hekmetyar in exile in Pakistan were born. These two organizations would become the most violent and intolerant of the dozen mujahideen factions fighting the Soviets and would receive the lion’s share of support from Pakistan’s Inter-Serve Intelligence Department (ISI). Today, Hekmetyar is among those wanted by the United States; he currently lives in Iran, skirting the Iranian and Afghan border.

These groups of mainly Pashtun tribesmen married up with their Pakistani counterparts and shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would call a significant meeting of all like-minded student groups in Peshawar to declare a formal jihad against the Soviet Union. Among the items on the agenda for discussion was Rabbani arguing the futility of direct combat against Soviet forces, and Hekmetyar pushing for a suicidal jihadist commitment as the only remedy to free Afghanistan from the Soviets.

**Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Soviet-Afghan War**

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the book discusses the closeness by which Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was involved with jihadists. It is important to realize the times, and the United States as well as Arab allies caught in the grip of the Cold War did not object to violent extremists directing their anger and jihad against the Soviet army. Deputy Murshid (Supreme Guide) Omar Tilmisany was given a full-honor reception by Pakistan’s dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who was convening a major convention of the Afghan Jihad Commanders within a year of the Soviet invasion. The Muslim Brotherhood established offices for donations and recruitments not only all over Egypt, but also in Kuwait and Peshawar. The Islamic Medical Union in Egypt recruited doctors to serve in the jihad and conducted massive humanitarian drives for the Afghans. The Afghan jihad commander Sayyaf was a key speaker in the 1986 convention of the Islamic Medical Union in Egypt. Islamist radical educators led by the Muslim Brotherhood penetrated schools in Afghan refugees centers in Pakistan infusing children with a politicized Islamist world view and new recruits for the Afghan mujahideen factions. The book alleges that the Muslim Brotherhood with funding from Usama Bin Laden opened an Islamic College of Jurisprudence in 1985. This was a time in which Bin Laden created Massadah Al-Ansar and had 280 fighters under his own command called the khurasa (silent) brigade, his fighters were divided into two groups: an assault group led by Mohammed Islambooli (brother of Anwar Sadat’s assassin) and a support group. The support group’s tasking was to defend Massadah Al-Ansar, fire mortars, and man anti-air weapons and artillery. The support group were given training in on surface-to-surface missiles, this group was led by Ahmed Attiyah Zahrani.

The first assault led by Bin Laden in 1986 and witnessed by Sayyaf saw his group decimated by overwhelming Soviet and Afghan communist firepower. This led Sayyaf to comment that
Arabs did not make worthy fighters. Bin Laden licked his wounds, recruited and developed his network of caves at Massadah Al-Ansar in the mountain region of Jaji.

**KHAD (Communist Afghan Intelligence) Tactics**

*Khedamat-e Etelea‘at-e Dawlati* (KHAD) was the feared Afghan Intelligence apparatus modeled on the Soviet KGB and in the service of the Soviet intelligence and the Afghan Communist regime. KHAD existed from 1978 to 1992 and the book highlights a few of its tactics against Afghan Islamist fighters that included:

- Co-opting an Egyptian cleric of Al-Azhar University, Abdel-Rahman Al-Najar, to conduct an official visit to Afghanistan and declare the mujahideen a group of highway bandits.
- KHAD operatives spreading into Afghan refugee camps in order to spread disinformation with the objective of stimulating tribal warfare.
- Assassination attempts on key jihadist figures like Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmetyar (all three were close to Usama Bin Laden).
- Characterizing the mujahideen factions as bandits, highwaymen and drug dealers not interested in state policy but enriching themselves.

These techniques seemed to cause the jihadist fighters and their leaders the most consternation, according to the book which devotes considerable pages to these four KHAD counterinsurgency operations.

**Bin Laden’s Sudan Years (1991-1996)**

Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi is an eloquent Sorbonne-educated lawyer and cleric who is fluent in English, French, and Arabic. He is also a founding member of Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) and a key advocate of establishing an Islamist state in Sudan. Turabi in collaboration with a cadre of army officers, among them General Omar Bashir, sought to rule Sudan on an Islamist model, after deposing the long-reigning dictator General Jafar Numeiri and creating ideal conditions for Islamist militant terror to thrive. Turabi and Bin Laden have known each other well since 1982, and the book offers amazing details of Bin Laden’s relationship with the Sudanese government during his five years in Sudan after his exile from Saudi Arabia.

Bin Laden’s first order of business in Sudan was to pay $5,000 to become a Consultative Member of the National Islamic Front. He then made the rounds of Sudanese ministries, visiting officials from the ministries of health, agriculture, industry, and trade to assess the variety of investment projects in Sudan. Bin Laden also married Turabi’s sister Maha, and through his connections with him that stretch back to 1982 was granted access to all Sudanese government officials and business elite. Bin Laden was given an exemption from import duties and he imported $35 million in German construction equipment, with an eye to construct bridges, roads and housing. He made a $10 million contribution to an Arab-Afghan relief fund in Sudan designed to resettle those jihadists who fought in the Soviet-Afghan War and could not return to their respective Arab countries. The book states that he created a total of 23 military training camps in Sudan, judging from his extensive land holdings this number of camps is within the realm of the possible. The book also postulates that Bin Laden sought out projects that Arab governments left uncompleted and sought to finish the job himself as a means of garnering popular support from the people and government. Projects left uncompleted by Arab governments include:

- King Fahd Road linking Port Sudan and Khartoum. Bin Laden completed the 700 kilometer road and renamed the Tahedit (Challenge) Road.
- Port Sudan Airport was a joint project in which the Saudi government and Bin Laden competed to take credit (Bin Laden provided $30 million in financing and sustainment costs for the airport).
- Mosque left unfinished by the Kuwaiti government in Juba, extreme Southern tip of Sudan that is a transportation hub for Nile traffic going to Uganda, Kenya and the Congo (formerly Zaire) was finished by Bin Laden.

Bin Laden spent and lost a fortune in Sudan. The book discusses the following transactions, with Bin Laden evolving into an emergency bank fund for the sanctioned Sudanese government:

- Completing the Atbara-Khartoum Road (500 kilometers).
- Opening Al-Shamal Bank with $50 million in return for 1 million acres of land in Korofdan in the south and western Sudan (Darfur).
- $80 million desperately needed by Sudanese leader Omar Bashir to import wheat and avert food riots.
- Hospitals, daycares, eldercare, a stadium.
- Financial guarantor of an arms deal between the cash strapped Sudan and Iran.
- Imported Syrian army surplus uniforms and field equipment for the Sudanese Army.
- Paid for oil on behalf of the Sudanese government.

Bin Laden was offered a Sudanese diplomatic passport, and Sudan’s policy of requiring no visas for anyone coming from a Muslim country allowed him to bring remnants of his *Massadah Al-Ansar* group to Sudan. What finally led to the Sudanese expulsion of Bin Laden, which was not easy for Khatoum that had come to rely on his financial leverage, were several factors:

- Attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia strained relations between Sudan and its powerful neighbor to the north.
- U.S. pressure on the Sudanese to exile or bring to justice Bin Laden as more and more terror attacks were linked to him and his group.
- Saudi pressure as Bin Laden was issuing threats on the life and person of King Fahd from Sudan.
Bin Laden was running weapons from Sudan to Egypt via the camel caravan routes and providing them to Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group in Aswan which then distributed them throughout Egypt.

**Conclusion**

The book continues with Bin Laden and the Taliban, which is poorly written and not as detailed as his previous years in Afghanistan. The author seems obsessed with the conspiracy theory that Bin Laden was supported and encouraged by the CIA and then turned on them when he felt abandoned by the agency. There is no sourcing in this book or basis to back up this assertion; common wisdom is that the CIA operated via the Pakistani ISI (intelligence) which doled out material and financial support to the Afghan fighters, favoring the more militant Hekmetyar, Rabbani and Sayyaf triumvirate.

What can be learned from this Arabic biography?

1. Bin Laden’s gradual ascent to his current position as leader of Al-Qaeda includes going through initial failures and learning from his mistakes.

2. Bin Laden, although he surrounds himself with older mentors through the years (Zawahiri, Turabi, Atef and Azzam) is influenced by them, but he does have his own strategic and tactical vision such as leaving Azzam’s group to venture on his own in creating an Arab fighting force to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan.

3. Wherever Bin Laden may be hiding, look to the lessons learned from his Sudanese odyssey, and rest assured he has the loyalty of his protectors cemented by marriage, money and tribal connections. It was not easy for Sudan to rid themselves of Bin Laden and it was also not easy for Taliban leader Mullah Omar to give him up after 9-11.

4. Pay close attention to the many ways in which Arab fighters were exported to Afghanistan. Many were brought in using the efficient processing methods of importing laborers from third world countries to the Gulf. The pipeline was diverted to Afghanistan and instead of laborers; jihadists were given a chance to travel to Afghanistan.

5. Running as independents, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood captured 88 seats in Egypt’s 454 seat parliament in 2005; we ignore the history of this organization at our own peril. Note the capabilities highlighted in the book the Muslim Brotherhood brought to the Soviet-Afghan War and their ability to turn militant should the need arise. They cannot be allowed to politically participate in Arab governments, while expressing their approval of violence as a means of political expression.

Books like Asaad’s must be assessed, analyzed and debated, with efforts to highlight Arab views and perspectives about America’s main adversaries. American military planners must begin to enter the decision-cycle of our enemies and reading and highlighting excerpts from Arabic biographies of jihadists allows for the acquisition of the vocabulary, personalities and places inherent in the jihadist movement. Much like America’s obsession with Russian military doctrine and policies during the Cold War, this conflict will require the same focus on Arabic books by allies who fight jihadists, adversaries who support jihadists, and the enemy — the jihadists themselves.

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**Weapons Corner**

**The School of Musketry:**

**Two Rifles That Made a Difference**

In the history of the U.S. Army Infantry School, progress springs from lessons learned, often from discovery of a new enemy capability or a technological gain of our own. Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur established the School of Musketry in 1907 because of shortcomings that he and others — among them Teddy Roosevelt — had identified during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), and the Boxer rebellion of 1900. U.S. Regular Army Soldiers and New York and Maryland units in Cuba in the Spanish-American War carried the Krag-Jørgensen U.S. Magazine Rifle, Model 1896, (pictured at right) chambered for the .30 caliber U.S. cartridge, commonly referred to as the .30/40 Krag. Militia (National Guard) units in Cuba carried the single-shot Springfield .45/70 rifle whose black powder round left a smoke cloud that betrayed the shooter’s position and invited return fire. Realizing the range advantage that the smaller, faster 7x57mm Mauser round offered, the government replaced the .30/40 Krag with the .30 caliber Model 1903 Springfield (pictured at left), but retained the heavy round-nosed 220 grain bullet. When the German Army adopted a light, pointed (Spitzer) bullet for their 7.92x57mm Mauser service rifle in 1905, our own ordnance technicians were quick to recognize the advantages of increased velocity, flatter trajectory, and range, and in 1906 the service cartridge held a 150 grain pointed bullet with a muzzle velocity of 2700 feet per second. The .30/06 was to remain our service cartridge for over five decades, until replaced in 1957 by the 7.62x51mm standard NATO round. The Springfield and its cartridge were still in use in a sniping role during the Vietnam War. The Rod Bayonet on the Springfield shown here was only issued until 1905, when the M1905 knife bayonet replaced it. Since that time, all U.S. rifles have had knife bayonets.

*Photos courtesy of the National Infantry Museum.*

**Comparative Ballistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartridge</th>
<th>Bullet Weight In Grains</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Muzzle Velocity Feet per Second</th>
<th>Muzzle Energy Foot Pounds</th>
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<tr>
<td>7x57mm Mauser</td>
<td>175 Gr.</td>
<td>RN, FMJ</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>2055</td>
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<tr>
<td>.45-70 Gov’t</td>
<td>500 Gr.</td>
<td>RN, Lead</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>2270</td>
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<tr>
<td>.30/40 Krag</td>
<td>220 Gr.</td>
<td>RN, FMJ</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30/03</td>
<td>220 Gr.</td>
<td>RN, FMJ</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30/06</td>
<td>150 Gr.</td>
<td>SP, FMJ</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>2428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RN= Round Nose     FMJ= Full Metal Jacket  SP= Spitzer, Pointed Bullet

Some call the Korean War the forgotten war, but even less remembered is the five-year period preceding that event — from the country’s liberation from Japan to the attempt by the northern part of the peninsula, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), to reunify the Hermit Kingdom. This is the first in a two-volume history of the Korean War. Highly respected military historian Allan Millett is eminently qualified to fill this gap. He has used sources that will be new to most readers.

To provide the setting, he begins by reviewing the political history of Korea under Japanese rule, 1910-1945, with emphasis on the rising nationalism starting in 1919 when self-determination was sweeping the world. Before the start of the that period, President Teddy Roosevelt had emerged as the greatest American villain in Korean history by sacrificing them for the benefit of Japan in 1905 — and winning the Nobel Prize for it. Hopes were raised in due course Korea shall be free and independent.” In August of that year, the incomplete war in China by President Wilson at Versailles, only to be dashed. This was followed by a struggle for liberation. The complete war in China that started in 1937 and the wider Pacific War starting in 1941 heavily impacted this colonial possession as it was severely exploited. The latter war gave the United States a chance to reverse the betrayal of 1905 and, at the Cairo Conference of November 1943, the final communiqué that “in due course Korea shall be free and independent.” In August of that year, the 38th parallel was established as a field occupation. The Americans moved to make Korea a United Nations responsibility, and that new world body soon established UNTCOK (UN Temporary Commission on Korea). Their efforts were to no avail for unification and the Republic of Korea declared its independence on August 15, 1948. The formal declaration of the DPRK followed on September 9, 1948. This was followed by growing hostilities between the two entities. A number of critical events occurred in 1949 and early 1950. The PRK built up its armed strength with assistance from its Communist neighbors. American forces departed, to be replaced by an advisory group. The People’s Republic of China achieved its independence and was ripe for external adventures against imperial threats. The Soviets tested their first A-bomb and the global balance of power was changed for the next half century. NATO was created and the groundwork was laid for an invasion from the North — and it came! The book serves as an object lesson about the unintended consequences when signals are misread on both sides and is useful for anyone wishing to broaden their understanding of the Korean conflict.

Perhaps because it didn’t happen, the story doesn’t include the planned invasion of Korea. When resistance was anticipated, it was contemplated that an entire field Army would be required, rather than the single XXIV Corps that was used for the occupation. The headquarters chosen was Tenth Army which had been activated in June of 1944 under Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner for an invasion of Formosa, but was diverted to Okinawa in April 1945, where he was KIA, June 18. He was replaced by General Vinegar Joe Stilwell, who was the first four-star since Pershing in August 1918 to assume command at that grade (others served time on the job and some never made it). In addition to XXIV, he was to have a Commonwealth Corps. Left without a mission, the Tenth was deactivated October 1945, and Stilwell returned to the U.S. for a brief tour as President of the War Equipment Board before becoming CG of the Sixth Army at the Presidio of San Francisco in 1946 to his death in October.


The Gift of Valor is the 2004 story of a Marine who died trying to protect his buddies from an attack while on patrol in Iraq. In January 2007, President Bush awarded the Medal of Honor to Marine Corporal Jason L. Dunham who saved the lives of two Marines when he dove on top of a grenade. Starting from a typical story of a Marine unit bonding as men train together, play together and experience hardship, Phillips develops his story by introducing each Marine involved. The story of Dunham turns out to be a good primer for what to do when under fire: fire suppression, drag your wounded to safety, and finally, take out the enemy or get the hell out of the area. The basic skills have to be sharp. If you wonder what could happen if your convoy is attacked, this account is a good place to start exploring the “what if” scenarios to prepare you and your Soldiers.

The process of conducting mortar round crater analysis is advanced and is described as a method of pinpointing where the insurgents set up mortar to fire their rounds. This does not help at the time, but after several mortar round incidents, you begin to see traffic patterns in the city.

The second half of the book details how a team of medical Soldiers tried to save Dunham after an initial triage placed him in an area for those expected to die. While not intended as a medical text, this account gives a good idea of how the doctors deal with severe head wounds and the many difficulties of surviving such a wound.
The Gift of Valor is more than just a tribute to a young Marine’s selfless sacrifice, it is a glimpse into life and death on the battlefields of Iraq.


Our present experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan tend to blind us to the realities of 19th century irregular warfare conducted by the U.S. Army.

The author is a serving U.S. Army officer who has made an in-depth study of that kind of warfare and how it was conducted during our Civil War. He is quick to disabuse us of making any specific connection between yesterday’s irregular war (asymmetric, as we call it today) and today’s guiding principles. In studying this book, it is well to keep in mind the author’s frequent use of certain terms. But before he starts his campaign studies he spells them out in some detail in pages 6-9. He also stresses the fact that “as a reflection of military thought in the mid-19th century ... the legacy of irregular warfare had a solid basis in historical example and military theory of the time.”

I agree with the author’s belief that most of the historical studies prepared since 1865 “have been flawed by inadequate definitions of unconventional warfare and a lack of analysis of the relationships and interactions between guerrilla and conventional military operations” during the Civil War.

In clarifying the war behind the lines between 1861 and 1865, Mackey has waded through a mass of material to gain his objective in a convincing manner. After an excellent introduction, which prepares the reader for his chapter organization and writing, Mackey divides his overall area of operations into three distinct parts: Arkansas, Virginia, and Tennesse/Kentucky. For each section, he tells us of the operations by both Confederate and Union forces; the major leaders on both sides, such as Thomas C. Hindman, Marcus L. Harrison, John Singleton Mosby, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest; and each army’s methods of operation. He completes his final step to his objective in a fine wrap-up chapter titled: “The End of the Uncivil War.” His chapter notes, bibliography, and index occupy their usual locations.

I heartily recommend this book. And if you are a Civil War buff who believes there is nothing new to be written or learned from this conflagration, read this book and then tell me, honestly, if you still feel the same.


Gordon Rudd wrote his doctoral dissertation on the humanitarian intervention to save Kurdish refugees in Iraq in 1991 and converted the dissertation into this book. Rudd, who had served with Special Forces and infantry units in the U.S. Army, taught national security studies and served as a Department of Defense historian after retiring.

After Desert Storm ended, about one million Kurds and other refugees fled their homes from the advancing Iraqi Army in March and April 1991. An estimated 500,000 Kurdish men, women and children fled to the mountains of southern Turkey. The harsh weather conditions and lack of necessary supplies caused much suffering and death. Rudd’s account focuses on how the U.S. military organized, planned and deployed to deal with the massive problems that came with such a large number of refugees.

The book reads like a converted dissertation, sometimes hiding the fascinating story of saving refugees behind the dry style of academia. Outstanding content, however, makes this human catastrophe guidebook required reading for officers assigned to work humanitarian or disaster relief missions. The organizational details alone will save precious man-hours in setting up a response effort to similar catastrophes.

The United Nations planning was inadequate considering the huge numbers involved in the Kurdish refugee situation; prepositioned stocks of food, water, and shelter were wiped out within a week. An alert order was sent on a Friday night to Air Force Major General James Jamerson and by Sunday, the first airdrops of supplies landed in the refugee area. The 10th Special Forces Group was deployed and worked on the immediate problems of water pollution, poor sanitation, and malnutrition in an attempt to stop the high death rate.

The joint task force staff came into the crisis with no formal doctrine and no operational plans for a massive humanitarian assistance operation. The Special Forces were required to walk a fine line in providing security from armed militia groups and bringing humanitarian aid to the refugees.

If you take brief notes while reading Rudd’s work, the result will be a rough guideline for a humanitarian intervention, such as:

1. Assign sectors to an SF “A-team;”
2. Organize refugee camps by establishing drop zones, landing zones, identifying the leaders of the group, establishing work parties, establishing food distribution, medical care distribution and basic field sanitation for disposal of waste;
3. Create a clean water source and organize the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide various forms of assistance; and
4. Organize immunization clinics to prevent disease outbreaks as well as organize meetings to pass information, promote security, understanding and the eventual relocation of refugees.

The humanitarian story has many useful pointers throughout such as sending more communication support initially to cut through the chaos and create order. It also discusses the task force’s efforts to bring in clean water and identifies which efforts worked better than others.

Humanitarian Intervention is an invaluable guide to running large scale humanitarian operations. Every officer should get a copy, read through it highlighting the lessons learned, and keep it on their professional reference bookshelf at least until retirement. This guide to setting up humanitarian operations could save a lot of trouble and lives during the next humanitarian crisis.
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