Training Tomorrow's Infantrymen
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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In recent Army Training and Leader Development guidance, the United States Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr., pointed out that we can expect the present era of persistent conflict to include elements of irregular warfare and asymmetric threats. Training the Army demands ingenuity, innovation, and an understanding of the operational environment in which our Soldiers will serve. The transformation underway in our Initial Entry Training (IET), the three-phase Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), COE-related changes within the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), changes in the program of instruction (POI) and weapons of the U.S. Army Sniper School, and changes to the Ranger School POI all point to the realities of the contemporary operational environment (COE) and our determination to graduate Soldiers best suited to fight and win in that environment. In this Commandant’s Note I want to discuss how the Infantry School is preparing to meet current and future contingencies.

Fort Benning and Fort Jackson have worked closely to transform all Initial Entry Training. The first goal of this is to shape the attitude, character, and behavior of each Soldier. The Soldier’s Creed is the basis on which he gains a positive attitude toward himself and the Army; he modifies his behavior to meet Army task standards; and our Army’s values, ethics, and discipline provide a foundation upon which to build his character. The IET transformation focuses on outcomes-based training in which Drill Sergeants mentor their new Soldiers as they develop their attitude, behaviors, and character within a positive training environment which stresses Army values. Additionally, all graduates of IET are certified as Combat Lifesavers, their advanced rifle marksmanship training includes close quarters marksmanship, and they have met a new combat qualification standard that focuses on COE situations. They have also received comprehensive training in combatives and cultural awareness and language instruction targeted on the COE. They have also operated as members of a fire team.

In describing leadership as the integrating element of combat power, GEN Casey highlighted the importance of adaptive, agile leaders, and noted that we need to think differently about how we develop those leaders. In this regard, the BOLC implemented in 2006 represents a major transformation in our officer education system. BOLC I consists of pre-commissioning training and education, BOLC II represents initial military training for officers, and BOLC III includes branch-specific technical and tactical training and education. An Army Accessions Command BOLC Conference in April 2008 defined six overall BOLC Outcomes: Values and Ethics, Leadership, Officership, Personal Development, Technical Competence, and Tactical Competence. BOLC cadre mentor, train, and coach the junior officers while in training. But graduation from BOLC III is not the end of the process. Leaders at the officer’s first unit of assignment will continue to mentor and guide the officer.

The U.S. Army Sniper course is expanding its instruction to prepare students for the modern battlefield. Direct input from deployed snipers, new instructor input on modern threats and techniques, and new survivability and lethality skills are all aimed at meeting the challenges of the COE. Students today receive six additional hours of urban training and learn to employ aerial imagery and UAV reconnaissance. The M110 Semi Automatic Sniper Weapon has replaced the M24 as the primary sniper rifle. Firing the same 7.62×51mm NATO round as the M24, the M110 lets sniper engage multiple or fleeting targets with greater speed and accuracy, and its enhanced night vision capability reminds our enemies that the U.S. Army continues to own the night.

The Ranger Training Brigade continues to aggressively incorporate the COE into training while stressing leadership fundamentals. During the Benning phase, students conduct intelligence-driven missions on IED cells against OPFOR in Middle Eastern garb and execute numerous insertions and extractions with rotary wing aircraft. In the mountain phase COE-related training includes further intel-driven missions on IED cells against OPFOR in all Initial Entry Training. The Florida phase increases the level of realism, with urban operations training, student patrols out of combat outposts, the mission of targeting an insurgent leader, and students employing attack aviation and AC-130 gunships.

Future wars may be fought on different terrain and against other enemies. However, the lessons we are learning about cultural awareness, civil-military and combined arms operations, counterinsurgency, combat leadership techniques, airmobile operations, and countless other aspects of our profession prepare us to simultaneously execute offense, defense, stability and support operations as we prosecute the global war on terrorism.

Follow me!
The Army is transforming in a number of ways despite being heavily engaged in a complex fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this issue of Infantry you will learn how the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) is transforming to meet the needs of the operational force. The Chief of Infantry describes a some of the significant changes here at the Home of the Infantry and you can be assured each of our 54 courses has improved and adapted in order to maintain relevancy in the operational environment. If we are to provide our Infantrymen with the best possible training, there must be a corresponding transformation in all three training domains — organizational training, institutional training and self-development.

As the institutional training domain transforms, it is important for leaders to maintain awareness of those changes in order to efficiently develop organizational training and provide direction with regard to their Soldiers’ self-development plans. Units cannot afford to waste time retraining individual skills when it may not be necessary or when refresher training may suffice. For example, a platoon sergeant may be aware that three newly arrived Infantrymen have completed all requirements for the Combat Lifesaver Course (CLS) and successfully met all requirements for GFT (Ground Fighting Techniques) Level I while in One Station Unit Training (OSUT). The platoon sergeant might decide to conduct an informal assessment of those Soldiers’ skills and retrain a few skills rather than enroll his new Soldiers in two full weeks of training. Because he is aware of what the institution is training, the platoon sergeant can more effectively allocate valuable training time when and where it is necessary.

Ideally, the institutional, organizational and self-development training domains overlap and will cover everything an Infantryman needs to know. In reality, there are likely to be gaps, yet it is difficult for leaders to cover those gaps unless they are fully aware of what is or will be trained in each of the domains. The institution cannot train everything everyone would like because there are not enough training days or resources. Therefore, leaders need to know what we are training in the Warrior Leader’s Course and other levels of NCOES. This will enable leaders to address any gaps in unit training or within directed self-development training. In the near future, we will append this information to the Infantry Professional Development Model (PDM) available at https://ataim.train.army.mil. Until then, leaders may contact the Henry Caro Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) at Fort Benning for updated information regarding the NCOA Program of Instruction (POI). Similarly, leaders should be familiar with the skills their Soldiers learn in our functional courses in order to effectively leverage their skill sets during unit training.

The self-development domain is also transforming and in the near future will be an integral part of NCOES. Soldiers will soon be required to complete a significant distance learning component before or during the resident phase of each level of NCOES. This Structured/Guided Self-Development (SSD/GSD) will vary in length with each military occupational specialty, however it will be a graduation requirement that all leaders should track to ensure their Soldiers complete it within the appropriate time. The Army Career Tracker is arguably the most significant self-development transformation initiative in the Army Leader Development Program (ADLP) today. Having submitted a Program Objectives Memorandum as required, the Army Career Tracker is approved and fully funded through FY15. The Career Tracker will empower Soldiers with career planning and goal setting tools, leader generated education/training recommendations, College of the American Soldier communications, and tools for leaders to track Soldiers’ self-development. Until these initiatives are fully operational, leaders should continue to encourage Soldiers to aggressively engage in self-development within operational constraints.

Even after the SSD/GSD system is in place Soldiers will continue to engage in self-directed learning and development. Leaders should recognize that not all Soldiers are equally self-directed. When leaders establish the expectation for their Soldiers to engage in post-secondary education or other types of education, Soldiers will recognize their Army values lifelong learning. One might argue that certain degree programs are not relevant to the Soldiers duties and therefore not a priority. I submit most higher education is clearly relevant and required in order to be successful in the operational environment. However, when developing our Soldiers because they will learn how to think critically, and be better prepared to think when faced with ambiguity or in complex situations. For these reasons, as we develop Soldiers and NCOs, we should attempt to improve their readiness and capacity for self-direction in the context of the self-development domain. Once they gain the desire for lifelong-learning, and realize they are responsible for much of their own development, we will unleash their potential as agile and adaptive Warriors and Warrior leaders who can operate effectively in even the most ambiguous and complex situations. Now, as in the past, America’s security is in the hands of our adaptive, broadly-skilled and lethal Infantrymen. They have never failed us, and they never will. Follow me!
ECWCS IMPROVES SURVIVABILITY, COMFORT

DEBI DAWSON

Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier’s Generation III Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (ECWCS) is now a part of the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The system, which is fielded to all Soldiers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, is a 12-piece, seven-layer system that allows the Soldiers to dress up or down to their own comfort levels to accomplish their missions without being cold or overheating.

GEN III ECWCS is rated to perform in weather 40 degrees above to 60 degrees below zero. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Cavoli, commander of the 10th Mountain Division’s 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, has firsthand knowledge of the benefit of having the appropriate clothing for the extreme cold weather conditions in Afghanistan.

“During Operation Mountain Lion I found myself praying for bad weather, the first time in my military career I was actually begging for a cold front to come through. I knew my Soldiers could handle it and the enemy couldn’t,” said LTC Cavoli. “ECWCS allowed my men to outlast the enemy on their own terrain. When the enemy was forced out of the mountains due to the bitter cold to take shelter, that’s when we got them.”

If all the Soldiers in a unit are wearing the same layers, then that defeats one of the key features of the system. Soldiers come from across the country. Those growing up in Maine or Alaska might have different needs for comfort than those who grew up in Georgia or Texas. This system meets all those needs. Uniformity is important and is built in through the use of the Universal Camouflage Pattern and Foliage Green throughout the system. Hook and loop tapes for rank, name and U.S. Army also add to uniformity, according to Ron Pollack, the Quality Assurance Analyst for Product Manager Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM CIE).

Guidelines to make the most of the system are included in the technical manual issued with the system. A use and care manual is also provided, along with a period of instruction on the proper wear and fit of the system.

The seven-layer ensemble provides many options for personalization and includes the following 12 pieces:

* Lightweight Cold Weather Undershirt/Drawers are constructed of “silk weight” moisture-wicking polyester.

* Midweight Cold Weather Shirt/Drawers are constructed of polyester “grid” fleece. They will provide light insulation for use in mild climates as well as act as a layer for colder climates, and they provide an increased surface area for transporting moisture away from the Soldier during movement.

* Fleece Cold Weather Jacket acts as the primary insulation layer for use in moderate to cold climate.

* Wind Cold Weather Jacket acts as a low-volume shell layer, optimizing the performance of moisture wicking along with insulation layers when combined with Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) and/or Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in mild to transitional environments such as desert day to desert evening. It is made of a lightweight, windproof, and water-repellent material. Design features include full-zip front, draw cord at the bottom, shoulder pockets, and a no-hood simple collar.

* Soft Shell Cold Weather Jacket and Trousers replace the ACU in extended cold weather environments. They are made of a highly water-resistant, windproof material that increases moisture vapor permeability over current hard-shell garments. The garments provide a reduction in weight, bulk, and noise signature during movement.

* Extreme Cold/Wet Weather Jacket and Trousers include a waterproof layer for use in prolonged and/or hard rain and wet conditions.

* Extreme Cold Weather Parka/Trousers are used in extreme cold weather. They are highly water-resistant and windproof to provide wind and moderate moisture protection. They provide superior warmth and high compactability, low weight and low volume, and are sized to fit over the body armor during movement or static activities requiring maximum insulation.

Unit feedback should be directed to the Combat Development Directorate at the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA, according to Pollack, while individual comments can be submitted at PEO’s Web site at www.peosoldier.army.mil.

(Debi Dawson is the Strategic Communication Officer for PEO Soldier.)
INFANTRY NEWS

2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference Set

The 2008 Infantry Warfighting Conference will be held September 15-17 at Fort Benning, Georgia. The theme for the conference is “The Infantry: Heart of America’s Army in the Contemporary Operational Environment.” For more information, go online to www.benning.army.mil and click on the Infantry Warfighting Conference link or go to www.fbcinc.com/infantry

For more information, contact the IWC Operations Cell at BENN.DOT.Confops@conus.army.mil or (706) 545-4624/5868/0927/8891 (DSN 835-4624/5868/0927/8891)

USAMU Soldiers Win Olympic Gold Medals

Two Soldiers with the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) at Fort Benning, Georgia, have captured gold medals during the 2008 Olympic Games.

Specialist Walton Glenn Eller III of the USAMU Shotgun Team captured the gold and set two Olympic records in men’s double trap August 12. Shotgun shooter Private 1st Class Vincent C. Hancock set two Olympic records and prevailed in a four-target shoot-off to win the gold in men’s skeet August 16.

SPC Eller, who finished 12th at the Sydney Games and 17th in Athens, entered the final round four targets ahead of Italy’s Francesco D’Aniello with a qualification score of 145, setting a new Olympic record.

After missing his first pair in the final, Eller ended up shooting 45 out of 50 targets and finished with a total score of 190 targets, setting another Olympic record and taking home the gold.

“I was so happy after I won, but I didn’t know whether to cry, smile or jump up and down,” said SPC Eller. “After my performances in the last two Olympics, I really wanted to come here and bring home a medal for the U.S. This is definitely one of the greatest moments of my life so far.”

PFC Hancock, 19, shot an Olympic record 121 of a possible 125 targets in five qualification rounds and took a one-target lead into the final. During the final, Hancock missed his 20th shot and finished regulation tied at 145 with Norway’s Tore Brovold, who shot a perfect round to force the shoot-off.

“It made me more determined,” PFC Hancock said of missing the low target flying out of the sixth station. “Sometimes I need something to boost my determination to get to that next level, and that’s what happened. I would have liked to have shot 25 and won the gold outright, but I couldn’t have asked for a better shoot-off.”

(Taken from reports by Tim Hipps of the Family and MWR Command Public Affairs Office and Mary Beth Vorwerk of USA Shooting.)
LOOKING AHEAD TO THE SHORT FIGHT:

BAIS GIVES TROOPS EARLY WARNING

DAWN K. KENNEDY

The fog of war has become an overworked phrase to describe the lack of information at the command level during combat. That lack of timely information, however, exists at all echelons and is most acute at the small unit level.

First employed during the Vietnam War, unattended ground sensors (UGS) for intelligence and security were used to address the need for data on enemy movements. The employment of passive electronic defense technology, has its roots along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The first primitive electronic UGS provided military intelligence and local security for missions conducted along what would become known as the McNamara Line, named for then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. While the majority of those sensors were air-dropped into position, some very effective sensors required hand emplacement by unconventional forces.

A big challenge facing leaders today is providing force protection for their personnel. The current FM 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, states the second fundamental Tactical Principle of Advantage: “Leaders continuously employ security measures to prevent the enemy from surprising them. Infantry platoons and squads should be especially concerned with their own security.”

Force protection has been and will continue to be a priority in any operational environment; Soldiers need to deploy with all the available technology that can increase their protection status.

While there are a variety of UGS systems available for use today, most of those systems are employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over great distances as higher echelon Military Intelligence assets. In contrast, the Battlefield Anti-Intrusion System (BAIS) AN/PRS-9 is an organic asset designed specifically for early warning and force protection for platoons and small detachments.

With a nominal two-kilometer standoff radio frequency detection and transmission range, a small unit can detect intruders, classify either as personnel or vehicles, and transmit the alert allowing time to prepare the necessary course of action whether interdiction, surveillance, or engagement. The system can also be used with other unmanned assets, such as a small unmanned aircraft systems for video eyes on the enemy. This capability has been demonstrated at numerous demonstrations, joint experiments, and during actual deployments. More than 700 BAIS systems have been fielded to units to date, and feedback from theater of operations has been uniformly positive from leaders, Soldiers, and force protection officers.

In February 2008, the following feedback was received:

“We placed six three-sensor systems on a forward operating base (FOB) that had been taking intermittent rocket fire. Shortly after emplaced, the FOB detected a squad-sized element moving into an area of a previous point of origin (POO). The insurgents were able to launch only two of their five rockets causing no damage to the installation, and the FOB was able to successfully engage the enemy and drive them off leaving un-fired rockets behind. Since that engagement, the FOB has not sustained any additional indirect fire attacks.”

This feedback demonstrates that the unit used BAIS to provide situational awareness and then responded to the detected threat. Increased situational awareness provides small unit leaders with additional time to develop an appropriate response to detected threats entering their area of responsibility (AOR). Though it was specifically designed for the small unit, up to 63 sensors in range can be monitored on one channel which makes monitoring at company or battalion level possible.

While the current BAIS production system continues to meet the identified needs of the Soldier and small units, there is a modernization plan underway to provide a remote programming capability and a built-in repeater to increase range and standoff capability. This modernization program, which was part of the original requirements, will begin testing a follow-on production system in early 2009. The new system promises to be lighter, more capable, have a greater period of operation on the same power, and still be more user friendly than the current system.

(Dawn K. Kennedy provides Computer Sciences Corporation support to the U.S. Army Product Manager, Force Protection Systems and to the Combat Developers, Electronics & Special Developments Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Infantry Center.)

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The ‘So What’ in Junior Officer Education Today

COLONEL TERRY L. SELLERS

"New lieutenants are first rate. They are experts at few things other than figuring out EVERYTHING. The lieutenants can think — and that’s what we need: thinking leaders who are confident, fit, and willing to make a decision with little information about the issue at hand or experience dealing with the issues. They are comfortable with an 80-percent solution now vs. a 100-percent solution never."

Compilation of serving battalion and brigade commanders’ written feedback from the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) survey conducted by the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in Fiscal Year 2007

In June 2006, Officer Education System (OES) transformation made a giant stride forward with the formal implementation of the three phases of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). BOLC I consists of pre-commissioning training and education. BOLC II occurs immediate post commissioning and is generally considered Initial Entry Training for officers falling under the broader title of Initial Military Training. BOLC III (Infantry BOLC in the case of infantry officers) is the follow-on to BOLC II that covers branch-specific technical and tactical training and education. Each branch and center conducts BOLC III based on Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and branch/center commandant guidance.

Given the nature of the current operational environment and the overall progress of Army Transformation, the next logical step in junior officer development was codifying changes in the OES. The programs of instruction implemented in June 2006 for BOLC were the result of several experiments and pilot programs conducted at Fort Benning, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and a few other locations. Two years after formal implementation, more than 13,000 junior officers have completed the BOLC II program at either Fort Benning or Fort Sill. Regardless of the number of graduates and implementation timeline, the field remains confused regarding what BOLC and specifically BOLC II is and is not.

To place BOLC II in the appropriate context, one must first be familiar with the overall BOLC Outcomes (see Figure 1). The overall BOLC Outcomes were developed at the April 2008 Army Accessions Command BOLC Conference. The purpose of the April conference was to review the common core task list for all phases of BOLC. The assembled group from Accessions Command, Cadet Command, U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Federal Officer Candidate School (OCS), BOLC II sites (Fort Benning and Fort Sill), and BOLC III sites agreed to approach the common core task review after adopting an outcomes-based approach to training. Therefore the initial step was to determine the overall BOLC outcomes and subsequently develop nested individual BOLC I, II and III outcomes. The outcomes were developed along six lines of operation consistent with the latest version of FM 6-22, Army Leadership, and previous discussion regarding core BOLC competencies. The six competencies were Leadership, Officership, Personal Development, Army Values and Ethics, Technical Competence, and Tactical Competence. As common core tasks were reviewed, they were linked to one of the six competencies as well as one or more level of BOLC. Each task included in a specific competency for a specific BOLC level was also labeled with the level of training, familiarization, proficiency, or mastery that the task could or should be trained to achieve the desired outcome.

Based on feedback from graduates of the BOLC II program, it was clear that inbound students, students in the course, course graduates, and receiving units in the operational force did not understand what BOLC was designed to accomplish. Additionally, new cadre members were struggling to understand what BOLC was designed to accomplish for the OES. In addition to the newly approved BOLC Outcomes, the 199th Infantry Brigade, command and control headquarters for BOLC I, II and III, developed a simple chart to illustrate how outcomes might be leveraged (see Figure 2).

Figure 1

Overall BOLC Outcomes

- A team member possessing the character and commitment to live the Army Values and Warrior Ethos;
- Confident, adaptable, mentally agile and accountable for own actions and able to act with the commander’s intent;
- Grounded in the core competences (leading, developing, and achieving) capable of serving the modular force in full spectrum operations;
- Physically, mentally, spiritually, and emotionally ready to fight as a ground combatant;
- Proficient in basic military skills required of a junior officer (BOLC);
- Self-disciplined, willing and an adaptive critical thinker capable of solving problems commensurate with position and experience.

The 199th looked at the mission statement for BOLC and with the desired outcomes in mind developed Figure 2 to illustrate the “what” and “how” of the profession of arms. “What” is really the science and knowledge that an officer must have proficiency in order to be competent and confident in the role and duty as an officer leader. “How” is really the art of applying the science/knowledge to novel situations and environments. We need and want junior officer leaders to effectively
and innovatively solve problems. Correctly coached, taught and mentored, the junior officer should achieve the desired outcome and require less and less science reinforcement as they progress through the discrete phases of BOLC. Successful completion of each phase of BOLC theoretically enables the junior officer to analyze and handle increasingly more complex problem sets in and out of the operational environment.

**Basic Officer Leadership Course I**

BOLC I encompasses the training that officers receive during their pre-commissioning experience. This training is generally associated with the respective commissioning source, such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC); USMA; OCS or direct commissioning in selective branches. The outcomes for BOLC I (Figure 3) acknowledge that newly commissioned officers have all of the enthusiasm but virtually none of the experience required to conduct their duties as a commissioned officer.

**Basic Officer Leadership Course II**

BOLC II is a six-week course that trains, educates, and acculturates second lieutenants to develop competent, confident, and adaptable officers able to lead Soldiers in any environment. The course acculturates junior officers into the profession of arms. This phase of BOLC gradually inspires officers to accept more and more personal responsibility and transition from whatever they were previously to newly commissioned members of the profession of arms. The six-week course raises officers of all branches to a common baseline in warrior tasks and battle drills. Additionally, the course cross-levels the knowledge and experience of disparate commissioning sources to create an environment of teamwork and cooperation. Officers transform from mere participants in training events and operations to leader participants that focus on planning, synchronizing, and resourcing training events and operations. Lieutenants learn individual responsibility, self-discipline, and self-respect and actively demonstrate and live the seven core Army Values.

**Basic Officer Leadership Course III**

BOLC III is the branch-specific phase of training for each newly commissioned lieutenant. Depending on the branch, BOLC II may be the last location prior to arrival at the first unit of assignment in which the junior officer is trained and practices leadership in a field environment. Branch/center commandants are responsible for oversight on program of instruction (POI) content and desired outcomes that will effectively achieve technical and tactical competence. BOLC III is conducted as soon as practical following completion of BOLC II.

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**Figure 2**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competent / Confident</th>
<th>Adaptable / Agile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHAT</strong></td>
<td><strong>HOW</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Practical Applications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Training</td>
<td>Collective Training</td>
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**Figure 3**

**BOLC I Outcomes**

- **Values and Ethics**
  - * Newly commissioned/appointed officer who knows and understands Army Values and begins to demonstrate them;
- **Leadership**
  - * Demonstrates knowledge of core leadership attributes and competencies and applies fundamentals of leadership at team and squad levels;
- **Officery**
  - * Understands and embraces the concept of officerry;
- **Personal Development**
  - * Understands responsibilities of an officer for self-development (physical, mental, spiritual and emotional) outside the institutional and organizational domains;
- **Technical Competence**
  - * Possesses fundamental knowledge and understanding of basic military skills and Army management systems required of a junior officer;
- **Tactical Competence**
  - * Possesses basic military skills and demonstrates knowledge of the orders process and troop leading procedures while executing small unit tactics;
  - * Experiences an introduction to Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and fundamentals of Army operations.
Certainly one of the by-products of the approved BOLC Outcomes is expectation management for the in-bound and in-session students. Previous student complaints centered on the seemingly redundant tasks that officers received training on in BOLC I, BOLC II and BOLC III. As previously stated, the outcomes are validation that junior officers are not experientially prepared or professionally mature enough immediately upon commissioning to assume all of their expected duties and responsibilities. BOLC provides the foundational training in a sequential and progressive manner to ground junior officers in Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD), imbue them with the warrior ethos, transition them from participants to leader participants to leaders, and finally fully embrace and actively demonstrate the Army Values.

A second by-product is the broader understanding by the BOLC cadre of their key role and broad responsibility to effectively train, coach, teach and mentor these junior officers during every phase of BOLC. Further, they must understand that each phase is inextricably linked to the previous and next phase of BOLC. Ultimately the linkage continues to the first unit of assignment. Cadre today are influencing and impacting the near, mid and long term professionalism and competence of the Army based on the solid foundation built during BOLC. The professionalism that each cadre member brings from his respective branch and/or Military Occupational Specialty is significantly improved during his tenure and transferred back to the respective branch or MOS upon PCS from BOLC.

Lastly, a third by-product involves the leadership at the first unit of assignment. The developmental process is not complete as junior officers depart their BOLC III sites. Additional development is necessary and required from the Soldiers, NCOs and officers at the first units of assignment and during training, operation, and combat deployments. In this manner, unit leadership knows via the BOLC Outcomes what a junior officer should be capable of and what his experience has been. Therefore informed leaders will have tempered their expectations and will devise additional training and development appropriate for their junior officers.

This short overview of the BOLC program cannot possibly answer all of the questions that remain in leaders’ minds. The cadre from the 199th in partnership with other BOLC sites stands ready to address your questions and comments. Additionally, we invite you to investigate our Web sites and products as well as visit Fort Benning and the BOLC I, BOLC II, and BOLC III programs resident in the 199th Infantry Brigade.

The 199th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia, on June 27, 2007. He is a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He previously served at the Naval War College, first as a faculty member in the Joint Military Operations Department and then as a student.

COL Terry L. Sellers assumed command of the 199th Infantry Brigade.

Figure 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOLC II Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values and Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Junior officer who demonstrates Army Values and applies them to personal and professional decision making;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies core leadership attributes and competencies, and demonstrate proficiency at team and squad levels;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Accepts and demonstrates new roles and responsibilities as a member of the profession of arms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies responsibilities of an officer for self-development (physical, mental, spiritual and emotional) outside the institutional and organizational domains;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Understands responsibilities to inspire self-development in subordinates;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Practices the application of technical aspects of warrior tasks and battle drills;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies Army management systems and sustainment functions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies troop leading procedures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies critical thinking and problem solving;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Understands and applies warrior task and battle drills and fundamentals of Army operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOLC III Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values and Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Junior officer who embodies, lives and defends the Army Values;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Possesses attributes and competencies to assess, train, and lead in their first unit of assignment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Applies roles and responsibilities at first unit of assignment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Demonstrates self-development and an understanding of the life-long learning process for themselves and future subordinates;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Advances personal and professional development as the future of the Army;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Demonstrates technical skills proficiency for individual branch integration as a member of the combined arms team;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* As a leader applies Army management systems and sustainment functions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Makes appropriate decisions based on doctrine (includes troop leading procedures), assessment, critical thinking and judgment to provide a solution to a tactical problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Functions as a leader in employing warrior task and battle drills and branch-defined technical and tactical skills;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Adapts TLPs and problem-solving skills to branch specific mission support requirements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Executes branch defined missions in support of full spectrum operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them maximum latitude to accomplish the mission successfully.”

— FM 3-0, Operations

Since we were attacked on September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in the Global War on Terrorism. As an Army, we have determined that we will be in a state of persistent conflict with an operational environment that is complex and multidimensional with battles fought predominantly within population centers. The current strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan has small units living among the population in combat outposts while clearing their areas of operation, holding the physical and human terrain, and building national capacity. These conditions are further compounded by the current operational tempo and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle that has an increasing number of Soldiers graduating from Initial Entry Training (IET) and deploying to combat within 90 days without completing the Soldierization process at their unit. To win under these circumstances, our units require flexible and adaptive leaders and Soldiers who are capable of thinking and exercising initiative on the battlefield from the moment they arrive. IET at Sand Hill on Fort Benning has responded to this challenge and is currently producing the leaders and Soldiers capable of winning in this environment.

Observations and Analysis of the Previous IET Program

The previous IET program established in the 1980s focused on mass producing Soldiers in the most efficient manner possible. This methodology assumed identical experiences would produce identical training results. Trainers believed that if all Soldiers attended the same training, conducted in the same way using the same script, then they would emerge with similar capabilities. This methodology also relied on centralized planning using a set program of instruction (POI) that directed what to train, how long to train, and how to do it using set scripts and procedures believing this would produce the capabilities required.

Our POI metrics focused on the inputs to training rather than outcomes. The POI and other applicable training base regulations directed the rules and procedures for conducting the training. This resulted in trainers who focused on whether or not a Soldier attended six hours of land navigation training taught in accordance with procedures specified in the POI versus whether he could read a map or navigate from point A to B. This condition often led our trainers to train to time and not to standard, leaving little time in the POI for remedial training. This resulted in a “check the block” mentality and did little for developing the leader or Soldier initiative required in combat and in accordance with our doctrine of battle-focused training.
Additionally, because of the diverse educational background of our Soldiers, trainers applied a lowest-common-denominator approach focused on attaining the minimal standard among all. The mind-set was that operational units would complete the training process for the Soldiers prior to having them perform as members of a team or squad in combat. Given today’s operational environment, this methodology was not producing the quality, thinking Soldiers our units required; nor was the time available later to accomplish this task prior to deployment to combat.

Making the IET Transformation a Reality

Fort Benning, the proponent for Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT), worked closely with Fort Jackson, South Carolina, the proponent for Basic Combat Training (BCT), to transform all IET training. The proponent leaders agreed upon these principles to guide the required transformation. First, the primary outcome of IET is to shape the attitude, behavior, and character of the Soldier. Trainers must instill the right attitude in Soldiers based on the Soldier’s Creed, assist Soldiers in modifying their behaviors to meet Army task standards, and build their character based on our Army Values, ethics, and discipline.

Second, trainers would focus on the end result or outcome vice the training process itself. This product-oriented principle is linked directly to our term “outcomes based training.” In other words, trainers were not accountable to an outmoded POI, but to ensuring the Soldier could meet the agreed upon outcomes. Simply put, a training outcome is what a Soldier should be able to demonstrate as a result of his training. For example, the Soldier knows and understands the Army Values rather than just accepting and demonstrating a willingness to live by the Army Values. These outcomes have been divided into upper and lower level outcomes and link directly to intangible attributes and tangible skills.

Intangible attributes are the basis for upper level outcomes. They are those attributes that commanders most desire in their Soldiers for combat such as confidence, accountability, initiative, thinking skills, problem solving, awareness, and responsibility. Training can always affect these attributes based on the presentation and quality of training for the Soldier and his interaction with his trainer. It is important for trainers to challenge Soldiers to solve problems. This, in turn, promotes learning through self-discovery once a Soldier masters the basics.

Lower level outcomes are those tangible tools, or the infantryman’s skill set, that are the focus of the majority of our individual common task training. These skills include first aid, marksmanship, land navigation, communication, individual and team movement skills, and gunnery skills to name a few.

Third, IET would be a continual process with expected levels of progression at major (specific) phase points.

Fourth, IET would be centered on training individual Soldiers but conducted in a group setting.

The Current IET Graduate

IET trainers completely redesigned the BCT and Infantry OSUT POIs based upon the IET principles discussed above and what they thought Soldiers should be able to do to meet the challenges of the operational environment upon graduation. We agreed that each graduate will demonstrate the following upper level outcomes: an acceptance and willingness to live by the Army Values, perform as a member of the team, the discipline and self-confidence to operate as a ground combatant, an ability to recognize and solve problems appropriate to his circumstances and level of responsibility, working or operating under stress, possessing confidence at graduation that he has been challenged and can continue to grow personally and professionally, and demonstrated proficiency in key lower level outcomes (see below).

The primary aim of BCT and OSUT is to develop the Soldiers’ attributes and character in addition to their key task proficiency skills. These former characteristics are somewhat intangible and difficult to measure in terms of quantifiable metrics; however, they are observable and can be assessed by the cadre. For instance, does each Soldier work well with the other members of his squad? Does he always contribute fully to accomplishing his share of a task? Throughout a training cycle, the constantly evolving answers to these questions will help the cadre assess how well the Soldier displays teamwork. Similar circumstances allow cadre to measure the other characteristics as well.

The lower level outcomes are the easiest to develop and measure because they are the hard skills that the Soldier has to be able to perform as a warrior in a small unit. Trainers identified the requirement to be proficient at the following key basic tasks:

* Is physically fit (including foot marching);
* Demonstrates the basics of how to take care of himself in the field, in adverse weather, and in stressful conditions;
* Is constantly aware of his surroundings and alert to potentially significant changes;
* Is able to hit what he shoots at;
* Handles weapons competently, confidently, and safely, whether using blank ammunition or live;
* Can perform lifesaving battlefield first aid;
**The Current IET Environment**

In order to train Soldiers to meet desired attitude, behaviors and character outcomes, trainers had to establish the right training environment. Under transformation, trainers immerse new Soldiers in a positive environment where they can consistently provide opportunities for Soldiers to demonstrate the Army Values and proper conduct. Drill sergeants mentor and teach the new Soldiers and are responsible and accountable for developing their Soldiers’ attitude, behaviors, and character.

The positive environment encompasses a consistent embodiment of Army Values with appropriate conduct by exemplary role-model trainers (company cadre including the drill sergeants). It also establishes an environment where standards and expectations are clearly communicated, achievable, and consistently and equitably enforced. This environment has created a positive drill sergeant/leader-to-Soldier relationship where each Soldier can be mentored and feels he is a valued member of the team.

Drill sergeants are challenged to train Soldiers to adhere to standards through self-discipline rather than by enforced discipline. Drill sergeants are now expert trainers who guide the Soldiers to learn through self discovery and reward them for continuing to exhibit those behaviors through their self-discipline. This positive, motivational training enhances Soldiers’ initiative and task retention and replaces the negative techniques previously used to modify their behaviors.

Drill sergeants strive to enable every Soldier to achieve the performance level each is capable of achieving according to their potential. They continually assess and modify tasks, activities, and conditions to accommodate the progression and current abilities of each Soldier. Even though training is conducted in a group setting, it is focused on the individual Soldier. Learning is a continual process with levels of progression throughout each phase of training. If Soldiers are not progressing, then they receive remedial training that may include restarting them in a later class to repeat training. As Soldiers progress through certain levels, the cadre increases their privileges. The environment and training method changes have provided this transformation of the IET product — your Soldier trained and ready for the fight upon arrival at first unit of assignment.

**Summary of Key Changes**

After completing the redesign, we made several key changes in the POIs that further improved the quality of our leaders and Soldiers. These benefits accrue directly to the operational units once their new leaders and Soldiers arrive. First, all graduates depart IET as certified combat lifesavers trained as battlefield first responders. You can expect a confident Soldier ready to perform buddy-aid when required.

Second, the new POI improves basic rifle marksmanship, adds
additional advanced rifle marksmanship training including close quarters marksmanship, and adds a new combat qualification standard that replicates combat requirements. The combat qualification standards are not finalized but will include firing from behind barricades, correcting malfunctions, rapid reloading using cover and concealment, and other techniques that require thinking and build confidence in our Soldiers. You can expect IET graduates to be competent, accountable, and confident with their weapon under stressful and realistic conditions.

Third, Soldiers receive more effective fire team training. This training focuses on moving as a member of a fire team, reacting to contact, and entering and clearing a room. It is then reinforced and validated during the battle march and shoot, buddy team and fire team live-fire exercises (LFXs) and the convoy LFX. These LFXs replicate many of the conditions our Soldiers will soon encounter in combat.

Fourth, Soldiers receive more effective training conducted by their drill sergeants on situational awareness, weapons proficiency, communications, land navigation, escalation of force, fundamentals of defense, and detect and react to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We conduct all of this instruction at the small unit level rather than in company-sized classrooms and embed it throughout the cycle.

Fifth, Soldiers receive more combatives training, and if they meet the standard, depart IET level 1 or above certified. This dramatically enhances their confidence and aggressiveness needed in combat.

Sixth, many Soldiers receive cultural awareness training that makes them aware of Middle Eastern history and geography, provides them basic Arabic language skills, and better prepares them for future patrolling requirements.

Finally, the new POI marks a substantial cultural change in how IET trainers conduct BCT and OSUT training. It focuses on training fewer things better. It also changes the way trainers assess proficiency. They focus more on values, teamwork, and discipline while conducting training under more realistic conditions similar to those found in the operational environment. The training methodology requires sustained proficiency throughout the training cycle and not just at end of instruction like the “end-of-cycle testing” conducted under the previous POI. Our linkage to the operational Army is critical to ensuring our training remains relevant. IET trainers rely heavily on the feedback from operational commanders, Center for Army Lessons Learned products, Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) training courses and materials, and the recent experience of our newly assigned cadre, mainly drill sergeants. Our IET program is meeting the need posed by today’s operational environment.

“Today’s dangerous and complex security environment requires Soldiers of character. Their character and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Soldiers train to perform tasks while operating alone or in groups. Soldiers and leaders develop the ability to exercise mature judgment and initiative under stress. The Army requires agile and adaptive leaders able to handle the challenges of full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict.”

— Draft FM 7-0, Training the Force
June 8, 2008

Our Soldiers continue to win on the battlefield, and Sand Hill’s new training environment and methodology provides leaders and Soldiers the opportunities they need to demonstrate the initiative and thinking skills necessary to succeed in combat. The current training is focused on less tangible outcomes, but delivers the high quality, thinking product our commanders and units require in combat. You will continue to see these leaders and Soldiers demonstrating the character and values our operational units require to fight and win our nation’s wars during this period of persistent conflict.

COL Michael A. Coss commands the 192d Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. He previously served as the CJ3 of Combined Joint Task Force-76 in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and as G-3 for 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He commanded 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry during Operation Joint Forge and served on the Joint Staff as a CJCS Planner during Operation Allied Force.

COL Daniel A. Kessler commands the 198th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning. He previously served as director of the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, U.S. Army Infantry School. Other assignments include serving as the deputy commanding officer of the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division and commander of the 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment.
The mission of the NCO Education System (NCOES) is to provide training to selected Soldiers on the technical and tactical competencies to perform their inherent occupational requirements in the areas of: leadership duties, responsibilities and authority, maintenance, training management, warfighting skills, and knowledge and behaviors to perform in table of organization & equipment (TO&E) and equivalent table of distribution allowance (TDA) units.

The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) is where junior leaders are prepared for their first leadership positions as team or section leaders. This non-MOS specific course is changing and adapting to the needs of the operational Army by providing more hands on, warrior-focused training and leadership skills. WLC reinforces small arms weapons training and is grounded in the warrior tasks and drills. By introducing more advanced course content at the squad level, the course is more relevant to the global war on terrorism and lessons learned from current operations.

The Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) for infantrymen provides NCOs with progressive and sequential tactical and technical training which is relevant to infantry Soldiers’ duties, responsibilities, and missions which will be performed in operational units after completion of the course. BNCOC will change its name to the Advanced Leaders Course in October 2008. BNCOC’s core training builds on each individual’s experience gained in previous training and operational assignments. Infantrymen’s BNCOC is divided into two parts: CMF 11 Common Infantry Training and CMF 11B Specific Training. CMF 11 Common Infantry Training puts two Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) — 11B and 11C — in the same learning environment. Many basic skills are reinforced throughout BNCOC such as performing land navigation (day and night), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) operations, vehicle maintenance, and forward observer procedures. Once the Soldiers separate to their CMF 11B/C MOS’s, they begin to hone their MOS-specific skills. The 11B train on Javelin operations, demolitions, warrior battle drills, combatives, combat orders, platoon tactical operations (Close Combat Tactical Trainer), situational training exercises (STX), and small arms proficiency training (SAPT). The 11C Soldiers conduct their own MOS-specific tasks such as the tactical employment of the infantry mortar platoon, fire support planning, forward observation procedures, fire direction center procedures, maintenance, and survey techniques.

In addition to the Soldiers trained on-site at Fort Benning, BNCOC also provides mobile training teams (MTTs) that train at other installations upon request. This saves the installation and the Army approximately $3,000 for every Soldier trained. For the fiscal year the BNCOC MTTs saved the Army over $2 million for the 689 Soldiers trained during this year. Also, since most Soldiers have been away (deployed) from their families the MTT gives the NCOES Soldier and their families more time to spend together reducing the stress of being away from their families for school and increasing their quality of life.

The Maneuver Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) will change its name to the Senior Leaders Course (SLC) in October 2008. The SLC focus is on MOS technical skills at the platoon and company levels. SLC will also help to prepare NCOs to assume their duties as a platoon leader by incorporating critical tasks from the current First Sergeant’s Course and the Battle Staff NCO course into the SLC in order to prepare NCOs to serve on battalion and brigade combat team staffs. The SLC at the Infantry and Armor Schools will continue to be a Maneuver SLC in that all 19 and 11 series NCOs will continue to train together as they now do in Maneuver ANCOC. Both ALC and SLC focus heavily on the guided experiential learning model, outcome-based education, and practical application exercises in order to achieve the educational objectives.

Mastery (formal evaluation) — the student can accomplish the task alone, to a set standard and time; requires repetitive training and multiple experiences. Proficiency (informal evaluation) — the student can solve the problem or execute the task with some assistance: the aid of another NCO or officer, a checklist, decision aid, or a manual. Understanding (checks on learning) — the student can explain and/or demonstrate a strong understanding of the task and knows how to acquire further information on the task. NCOs must be adaptive leaders, critical & creative thinkers, armed with the technical, tactical, administrative, and logistical skills necessary to serve successfully at the platoon and company level.

Augustus J. Francis, Sr, currently serves as the Chief of Training for the Henry Caro NCO Academy at Fort Benning, Georgia. He retired from the U.S. Army after 24 years of service. He has a master’s degree in Human Resource Management from Troy State University.
Since 1952, Ranger School has prepared Soldiers for leadership positions within our Army. The primary mission of the Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) is to conduct the Ranger course to further develop the combat arms skills of officer and enlisted volunteers whose primary mission is to engage in close combat and direct fire battle. The RTB will return to the Army a mentally and physically tough leader able to plan, organize and conduct small unit combat operations in any environment. The RTB has looked for opportunities to incorporate elements of the contemporary operational environment (COE) in both Iraq and Afghanistan into existing training while continuing to stress the fundamentals of leadership.

The Benning Phase, which is the crawl stage of Ranger School, focuses on the basic skills which will be needed throughout the course. Examples of COE-driven changes include incorporating intelligence-driven missions which focus on improvised explosive device (IED) cells. Opposing force (OPFOR) uniforms include clothing commonly seen in the Middle East. Finally, numerous rotary wing insertions/extractions are conducted replicating operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As students enter the mountain phase of Ranger School, they receive additional COE-related training. Students continue to receive intel-driven missions while the number of air assaults during this phase increases. Truck movements into the mountains are interrupted by IED strikes and ambushes. Ranger students are trained to secure the damaged vehicle and begin the evacuation process on injured Soldiers injured, all while fending off a determined OPFOR.

Finally, during the Florida phase of Ranger school, the level of realism involved in the scenarios is increased. Urban operations (UO) training is done in mock-ups, teaching Soldiers room clearing techniques. Student patrols are conducted out of combat outposts against a complex OPFOR. Students are given a targeting package detailing an insurgent cell leader whom they track throughout the phase. Students talk and direct attack aviation in support of their missions, to include AC-130 “Spectre” gunships. Ranger training in Florida culminates with an attack on a multi-floor objective where the target is finally captured.

The fundamentals, which allow a Soldier to be successful regardless of the COE, continue to be the focus within Ranger School. These fundamentals produce a competent and confident Ranger leader that is physically and mentally tough; embodies the Ranger and Soldier’s Creeds; and is able to plan a mission, organize men and equipment for combat, and execute/lead a combat mission regardless of the environment. The RTB will continue to look for ways to use the COE within the framework of Ranger School.
SNIPER SCHOOL UPDATE:
Changes Reflect Ever-changing Face of Modern Battlefield

CAPTAIN JASON R. LOJKA
STAFF SERGEANT THOMAS M. APPLEDORN

Sniper School has the unique role of not only teaching its students a skill but teaching a whole new skill set. The five-week course gives graduates the tools to be effective in an almost entirely new job. The implementation of the M110 Semi Automatic Sniper System (SASS) and the ever-changing face of the modern battlefield drive the need for instruction to grow parallel to modern tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The U.S. Army Sniper School has made several changes to the current program of instruction (POI) that will shape sniper graduates to more effectively deliver long range precision fire and collect/report battlefield information.

Currently, the course’s 443 hours of instruction focus on the following areas: field sketching, target detection and selection, range estimation, sniper marksmanship, organization, use and employment of snipers, command and control, mission planning, camouflage and concealment, stalking, and the selection, construction and occupation of sniper positions. Additionally, snipers are challenged by four record fire events, where they must pass a marksmanship qualification to move on in the course. They fire unknown distance, moving and snap targets, moving and snap targets during limited visibility, and M107 .50 caliber unknown distance. These events, in conjunction with numerous written exams and quizzes, ensure that graduates have developed a good working knowledge of both the weapon systems and the techniques involved with employing them.

The school has recently identified several areas where training could be tailored to more effectively prepare snipers for the modern battlefield. Through new instructor input on modern threats and techniques, as well as direct feedback from deployed snipers, the new POI addresses areas where new skills can be trained to increase the survivability and the overall lethality of a sniper team.

The M110 Semi Automatic Sniper System, which will soon replace the existing M24 as the primary sniper weapon, gives snipers an ability that they previously did not have with a bolt action rifle. The ability to rapidly engage multiple or fleeting targets with greater speed and accuracy allows more flexibility in employment, as well as more survivability and increased overall combat power. The M110 still utilizes the same M118SB or LR precision ammunition as the M24 Sniper Weapon System, which is a 7.62 x 51mm NATO. The M110’s accompanying PVS-26 gives snipers an in-line night vision device which uses the magnification of the day optic. Since it is simply a light intensifier in front of the existing scope, there is no risk of “losing zero” by removing the day optic. The PVS-26 is also compatible with the M151 spotting scope. This gives the team a 40 power night vision device, greatly increasing the ability to distinguish targets during hours of limited visibility. Additionally, the M110 comes equipped with a detachable weapon suppressor, thus reducing the signature of a round being fired by 31.8 decibels without affecting the muzzle velocity or accuracy.

To accommodate the new weapon system, the school has developed and implemented two new record fire events. In addition to shooting unknown distance and day/night moving targets with the M24, students will be required to pass these marksmanship gates with the M110. Students will now have the fundamental base, having shot the M24 deliberately to extended ranges, as well as the ability to quickly reduce multiple or fast-moving targets. The transition from shooting the M24 to the M110 is not a difficult one. The same basic marksmanship fundamentals and relatively similar optics apply. The marksmanship focus for the M110 will be shorter, faster engagements, fully exploiting the weapon’s semiautomatic capabilities and training students for real-world engagements in built up areas such as Iraq.

Another tool that is emerging is the Horus Vision ATrag MX Ballistic Software, coupled with a personal digital assistant (PDA). The software allows management of multiple weapon systems and multiple shooters. The ability to quickly index targets and have interactive data at a glance is proving itself an invaluable tool.

To complement the M110 training, students receive an additional six hours of urban training. They must plan and organize a mission using aerial imagery and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
Reconnaissance. This culminates with a concealed movement exercise where they are required to execute their plan by moving into a position in an urban environment as a 4-6 man team, set up a room hide, provide security and fire under observation without being detected.

The course now offers a challenging 457 hours of instruction testing the students with five record fire events, 32 fieldcraft events, 75 hours of conferences and lectures, and four hours of written examination. Graduates are now more prepared to face the challenges of the modern battlefield.

In today’s contemporary operating environment of Iraq and Afghanistan the need for well-trained agile and adaptive snipers is highly critical. The Army identified the need for an improved weapon system that can be used in that environment, and the U.S. Army Sniper School is evolving its TTPs and POI to meet the new emerging threats.

CPT Jason R. Lojka commands C Company, 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia. SSG Thomas M. Appledorn is an instructor/writer at the U.S. Army Sniper School at Fort Benning.

In addition to the resident course, the Sniper School also offers a mobile training team package where instructors are sent to a unit’s home station to complete training. For more on the MTT, see page 17.

Sniper Competition Set For October 16-23

The Eighth Annual U.S. Army International Sniper Competition is set for October 16-23 at Fort Benning, Georgia. The competition will be hosted and administered by the U.S. Army Sniper School, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment and the U.S. Army Infantry Center. The competition will be conducted regardless of weather conditions and is designed to physically and mentally challenge sniper teams from all over the world.

The objective of this competition is to further the sniping skills of all participants. Competitors from different units and different countries will be able to exchange techniques and tactics during the event.

Competitors must be organic two-man sniper teams with proof of sniper training. Every sniper team will participate in 10-15 combat-related events. The following are examples of some sniper skills that will be tested:

Field firing. Each team will be tested on its ability to successfully engage targets of unknown distances with a primary (long gun) and alternate (spotter) from 0m-1100m (day/night) as well as engagements with secondary weapon (pistol) from 0m-50m. Each team will also be tested on its ability to compensate for cold bore/clean bore shots with the primary weapon (day/night). This will take place during more than one event.

Advanced marksmanship. Each team will engage moving targets at varying speeds and distances (day/night) with individual weapons. Each team will also be required to engage targets using alternate firing positions. This will take place during more than one event.

Field Craft. Each team will be challenged on its abilities to select a route, move into a firing position, deliver a shot, and exfiltrate undetected while under continuous observation. Each team will be challenged on its abilities to construct a field sketch, detect concealed targets, and estimate range to targets and items without the aid of a laser range finder.

For more information, visit the Sniper School’s Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/197th/courses/sniper/index.htm or contact Captain Jason Lojka at (706) 545-7507 (DSN: 835) or e-mail jason.lojka@conus.army.mil or Sergeant 1st Class Jared Van Aalst at (706) 544-6006/6985 (DSN: 784) or e-mail jared.vanaalst@us.army.mil.
More than 2,500 years ago in the Grecian city-state of Sparta, military training was viewed with such seriousness that 12-year-old boys were taken from their mothers and entered into military service where they remained until after their 40th birthday. The Spartans also had a unique way of supporting their allies in a time of war. The Spartans sent leaders and trainers. If an ally required aid, they did not send their entire army; they sent one or a small group of soldiers to train and lead their ally’s army. How effective was this method? The results speak for themselves as the most powerful military force of the time, Athens, was soundly defeated by the smaller, less experienced city-state of Syracuse with the help of the Spartan commander Gylippus. The U.S. Army has a similar method for training units preparing to deploy who may not have the time or funds to send all of their Soldiers to Fort Benning, Georgia, for training: the mobile training team (MTT). The MTT offers a time and cost efficient alternative to resident training at Fort Benning. The current operations tempo of the global war on terrorism creates an environment where training time, family time, and refit time are constantly competing. With only 12 to 15 months between deployments, every day is valuable. The MTTs provided by the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning enable units to maximize their post and pre-deployment training time and funds. The MTTs provide some unique advantages over traditional on-site Fort Benning training in that they provide the same quality trained Soldiers to units through mobile and flexible courses and present both the units and the Army with a cost and time efficient alternative.

The 197th offers a variety of courses that are currently fielded as MTTs. There are seven courses offered by the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment: Bradley Fighting Vehicle Master Gunner J3 and A3, Mechanized Leader ODS and A3, Stryker Transition, Stryker Leader, and Stryker Master Trainer. The 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment currently offers 12 courses: Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator and Master Trainer, Sniper, Sniper Employment Leader, Long Range Marksman, Short Range Marksmanship, Small Arms Weapons Expert, Javelin, Anti-Armor Leader, Infantry Mortar Leader, Combatives Level III, and Indirect Fire Infantryman (BNOC). In total the 197th Infantry Brigade offers 18 courses that are MTT capable and deliver quality training to any military installation in the United States and abroad. In the past three years alone, MTTs have trained more than 4,200 service members with 13 different active duty Army units, three National Guard units, three Special Operations units, and two Department of the Navy units.

The MTT also offers unique flexibility and adaptability in that they can tailor the courses to meet a commander’s specific needs. During post and pre-deployment training time frames, a unit’s schedule is overfilled with training events and mandatory deployment requirements. MTTs adapt to a unit’s schedule and if dictated by the supported commander, condense the course to fit a specific training period or training requirement. Although deviating from the program of instruction (POI) for a specific course might not allow a Soldier to earn an additional skill identifier (ASI), it does allow the meat and potatoes of each course to be taught in a time-constrained environment. In addition to adjusting the POI schedule, MTTs operate in any training environment around the globe. MTTs frequently travel overseas and to combat theaters in order to conduct courses. Just recently, a two-Soldier MTT returned from Afghanistan where they trained National Guard cooks and mechanics on how to operate 120mm mortar systems in order to perform their own force protection. Within the first week of instruction, the National Guard Soldiers were defending their outpost by utilizing their newly acquired skills of providing effective
MTTs provide unique advantages over traditional resident training. They provide the same quality trained Soldiers to units through mobile and flexible courses and provide the Soldiers, the units, and the Army with a cost and time efficient option. No matter where Soldiers are stationed — from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Camp Corregidor, Iraq — MTTs deploy and train Soldiers to standard. In addition, the MTTs retain an amount of flexibility that allows adaptation to current combat TTPs, a commander’s schedule, and to future deployment AOIs. Time and cost savings provided by MTTs are undeniable and during a high operations tempo, the advantage offered is immense. For further information regarding MTTs offered by the 197th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia, unit operations officers can contact the 197th Operations Officer at (706) 545-4816 or DSN: 835-4816.

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In Iraq, companies fight like battalions. In dealing with the rush of information associated with this fight, C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, developed some tools to enhance their troop-leading procedures (TLPs).

The Problem
Information dominance wins the peace in stability operations at the company level. In an urban counterinsurgency (COIN), getting there “fastest with the mostest” means calling all the key local players with your story before they get another less helpful story from someone else.

Even then, the locals see reality through a lens which is their own local context (see Figure 1). This context includes their historical narrative, their job and personal experiences, what their neighbor and family are saying, and even their daily mood. Reality perceived through this lens is their perception.

But commanders who reflect reality directly to the perceiver, as in a mirror, become reality to the locals. Since what is being reflected is true, then the locals think that the commander somehow has played a part in creating it, and, thus, knowledge is power. This is one of the true mysteries of working across cultures, and the effect is magnified in unstable environments.

The problem is that in order to take advantage of this effect, the commander must detect, analyze, and communicate these ground truths. The best way to do that is through systematic operations focused on the information fight. This article describes the process of collecting information, analyzing or making sense of the information, and targeting patrols to get more information.

Planning Targets and Detection
There are three parts to this problem: the detecting (patrolling), the analyzing, and the communicating. The system described here assumes conditions where a company owns battlespace and spends its time achieving its mission relatively free of taskings from higher headquarters. The system is influenced by the effects-based processes (Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 04-14 - Effects Based Operations Brigade to Company Level) and from intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as well.
Begin planning from your mission analysis (Figure 2). The effects you plan to achieve can come from:

1) Tasks to subordinate units in higher’s order;
2) Your daily/weekly status update to battalion; or
3) Some sort of battalion or brigade lines of operation.

Within these broad effects, brainstorm and list your targets. Targets are people, places, or cells that you want to affect. For each target choose a doctrinal task and purpose statement that points at the broad effect you want to accomplish.

There are several types of targets. Kinetic targets are areas or enemy personnel to interdict and they become platoon raids. Reconnaissance targets and zone reconnaissance patrols leading to area reconnaissance patrols answer questions which lead to kinetic targets. Information operations targets become operations where coalition force (CF) leaders build rapport with key local individuals like neighborhood leaders or security leaders. Human intelligence (HUMINT) targets obviously are those where you seek to gain information from people.

The significant targets go into a target list (Figure 3), a “playbook” of possible targets organized by effect, by line of operation, or major tasking depending on how you organize your company’s concept of operations.

Load targets for actioning into your weekly patrol matrix (Figure 4) which forms the meat of your weekly operations order (OPORD).

Platoons receive the weekly OPORD verbally and conduct their own TLPs producing platoon OPORDs. A backbrief ensures platoon leaders understand the task and purpose for the target from target bank cross-referenced on the patrol matrix.

**Analyzing the Information**

Following the patrol, the platoon leader posts his debrief on an Army Knowledge Online-SIPRNET (AKO-S) forum, and the intelligence and effects cell uses the gathered information to update the company’s four analysis products: the network template (NETTEMP) (Figure 5), the cell analyses (Figure 6), the target packets, and the informant template (INFORMANTTEMP). These updated products are always available for platoon leaders or battalion S-2 cells on an AKO-S portal.

A NETTEMP is a cross between a doctrinal template and a network analysis, and is designed to be a one-pager that leaders can reference on patrol to check for names and relationships. The NETTEMP has boxes denoting identified or suspected cells, and within the boxes are identified or suspected names associated with the cells. Where significant, lines are drawn to denote key relationships, and information can be color-coded to show reliability.

The cell analysis dissects each cell on the NETTEMP doctrinally on a one-pager that helps the company understand motivations of the enemy to predict future actions. The cell analysis considers:

1) Objectives,
2) Ideology,
3) Leaders,
4) Organization,
5) Recent activities,
6) Most likely course of action (MLCOA) methods, tactics and situation template, and
7) External support.

Target packets are usually standardized at least at battalion level. Constantly updating and making target packets at a company level on key people and places and making them available on the AKO-S portal ultimately saves time and captures key information.
The INFORMANTTEMP is a handy one-page reference that shows what locals are reporting information to which company leader (spheres of influence), how reliable they are (by color), and how to contact them. Just as the Army sees every Soldier as a sensor, the company commander sees every local with a cellular phone as a sensor. A couple of phone calls made to confirm or deny a report is faster and safer than moving a platoon to the site.

The four analysis products are your place to go to assess whether you are being effective on your targets, and to modify from there for your next planning cycle.

Communicating to the Company and to the Community
AKO-S is easy to use after some initial (1-3 hours) set-up, and having all company debriefs and products available 24-7 is invaluable during continuous operations. However, nothing substitutes for the weekly face-to-face at the company OPORD. The company fire support officer (FSO) should lead the intel and effects cell or another lieutenant can do the job.

Communicating with the community means working the phones with your company sphere of influence. Devolving groups of locals down to platoon leaders and below facilitates rapid detection and communication. Phone calls and face-to-face meetings are the best methods of doing Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), because current regulations limit the effectiveness of products like pamphlets or newsletters. Additionally, in many urban areas, e-mail is increasingly prevalent, so there is a possible opportunity there as well.

Lessons to Learn
Authority over Information Operations, (currently presided over by division headquarters) should be released all the way down to company headquarters. Information fratricide is less of a hazard and easier to remedy than is currently being taught. It is interesting to note that company commanders in direct fire contact can call for Hellfire missiles but can’t print their own leaflets after seeing hostile propaganda that updates itself by the hour.

Companies also need more computer power and resources to handle the information glut. Line of site (LOS) hardware provides many company outposts with internet and data communications to higher headquarters, but of course, companies need more bandwidth (like everyone else) so they can transmit imagery (especially Google Earth) and graphics at rates that facilitate company information operations.

CPT Kevin Hadley is currently commanding C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which recently redeployed from Iraq. He is a 2002 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.
The Care Team Concept

CHAPLAIN (LTC) TIMOTHY E. SOWERS
MAJOR JOSEPH F. PRIDGEN
CHAPLAIN (CPT) TRACY N. KERR
SPECIALIST BEN HUTTO

“This extraordinary war in which we are engaged falls heavily upon all classes of people, but the most heavily upon the soldier. For it has been said, ‘all that a man hath will he give for his life,’ and while all contribute of their substance, the soldier puts his life at stake, and often yields it up in his country’s cause. The highest merit, then, is due to the soldier.”

— Abraham Lincoln, March 18, 1864
Speeches & Letters of Abraham Lincoln, 1832-1865

On May 8, 2007, a U.S. Army combat patrol was attacked on its way to a meeting in Jisr Diyala near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. The lead vehicle of the patrol from the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3rd Infantry Division (ID) was hit by an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) roadside bomb, killing two of the three Soldiers inside. The 22-year-old gunner, Specialist Saul Martinez, an infantryman with 3rd HBCT’s Headquarters Troop, was the only survivor in the vehicle. Martinez’s legs were both severely damaged and he had multiple lacerations and shrapnel wounds. He was quickly strapped to a backboard and taken by helicopter to the 28th Combat Support Hospital in the International Zone. SPC Martinez remembers most of the incident clearly, but more specifically, the help his fellow Soldiers provided.

Martinez recalled, “I remember lying there asking God to help me and they were there...The doctors told me I was on the verge of (death) every hour of every day. They explained that they had to put me under so they could control my body. I was really close to not being here.”

Martinez was heavily sedated; he woke up nine days later at Walter Reed Army Medical Center with his wife Sarah by his side. Two days after waking up, Martinez would have his other leg amputated due to injuries sustained in the blast. Martinez’s recovery at Walter Reed was a good experience for him.

“I got great care there,” he explained. “If I would have gone anywhere else in the world, I would have died. They took such good care of me ... I have nothing but good things to say about how they took care of me and my wife.”

Soon after his last surgery, Martinez was transferred to the Naval Medical Center in Balboa, California, to begin his physical therapy. Throughout his recovery process, SPC Martinez’s progress and issues were monitored and resolved by the 3rd HBCT “Care Team.”

Figure 1

The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID conducted aggressive, intelligence-driven combat operations in Mada’in Qada during its recent deployment in Iraq. During the deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom V, the 3rd HBCT commander, Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., instituted the “Care Team” concept for the brigade to properly care for wounded Soldiers and the families of the fallen Sledgehammer heroes. The brigade established the Care Team to ensure Soldiers like SPC Martinez were not left to fight their life-changing injuries on their own. COL Grigsby wanted the Sledgehammer Brigade to be a brigade that never forgot its fallen and always supported its wounded.

The Care Team personnel developed and implemented a systematic method for the 3rd HBCT commander to identify and track problems, maintain regular contact and provide support to the brigade’s 178 wounded Soldiers and their families, as well as the families of the brigade’s 30 fallen heroes. The team helped provide both groups with the support they needed during and after the deployment.

The Care Team met to provide updates to the commander on all wounded Soldiers and survivors. Similar teams met at the Multi-National Division-Center and battalion levels as well. The 3rd HBCT Care Team focused on helping to meet the spiritual, physical, emotional and professional needs of the wounded Soldiers in the brigade. The Care Team, under the guidance of the brigade
commander, command sergeant major, and executive officer, consisted of key staff members who were subject matter experts in these areas (see Figure 1).

During the deployment the following leaders played critical roles in the Care Team:

The 3rd HBCT Care Team was chaired by the commander, COL Grigsby. The team provided him with a “desk-side” briefing using a simple binder, which remained with the commander and was continually updated by the brigade chaplain.

Brigade Command Sergeant Major James Pearson provided input on necessary policy changes and helped focus the team’s efforts into areas which needed additional attention. Major Dewey Boberg, the brigade executive officer, managed the efforts of the Care Team members to accomplish the mission and meet the commander’s intent.

Chaplain (LTC) Timothy Sowers, the brigade chaplain, served as the primary staff proponent and brought together the products from the various team members. COL Grigsby chose the chaplain to serve as the primary staff proponent for the Care Team because of the special emphasis of a chaplain’s mission: to nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. CH Sowers kept a record of each fallen hero and wounded warrior. As the primary staff proponent, he collected the information from the different team members and ensured the brief was scheduled and prepared for the commander. The chaplain was the key link to ensure accuracy and coordination in the care for all Soldiers tracked by the Care Team.

Major Cynthia Majerske, the brigade surgeon, and Captain Steven Jones, the brigade medical operations officer, addressed the specific circumstances of each wounded Soldier and the status of medical support at all combat outposts and patrol bases. Additionally, Captain Ewa Garner personally contacted each wounded warrior, no matter where they were located—in theater, in a medical treatment facility in OCONUS, or in a medical facility in the United States. Garner spoke with Soldiers to ascertain the progress of their treatment and recovery, issues or concerns with records or patient administration, status of filing for Traumatic Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance (TSGLI3), and many other problems.

The medical professionals on the team forwarded regular medical updates via e-mail from various venues. The entity known as Joint Patient Tracking Application (JPTA) tracks treatment, diagnosis, locations and pending transfers of all wounded in action (WIA) patients. JPTA forwarded information as patient treatment and situations changed. The division staff forwarded daily generic hospitalization reports regarding inpatient information from medical facilities around the world. Rear detachment personnel distributed both WIA and NWIA information to the medical operations officer every two days. The medical operations officer maintained direct contact to patient information through non-secure and secure phone lines and liaison notification officers (LNOs) in theater and Germany. Once Soldiers were transferred back to CONUS, the rear detachment command channels tracked their status. The medical professionals of the Care Team navigated the vast and complex flow of information and kept the commander properly informed on the status of wounded Soldiers and surviving family members.

Captain Angela Mobbs, the brigade mental health officer, advised the commander on the status of specific cases, compiled statistics showing current trends, and outlined her priority of effort based on her workload and the commander’s guidance. She maintained a list of Soldiers on duty restrictions due to mental health and combat stress-related symptoms as well as those who were then returned to duty. CPT Mobbs tracked those Soldiers who were evacuated from theater to ensure they received mental health treatment in CONUS as well as those who were late deployers due to medication stabilization and other psychological factors. Command-directed evaluations were tracked and compared with other team members to determine if any underlying trends were affecting the brigade. This provided the commander with a comprehensive view of the morale and psychological status and health of wounded Soldiers, “at risk” Soldiers, and the unit as a whole.

Major Carla Simmons, brigade judge advocate, and Captain Paul Lloyd, brigade trial counsel and operational law attorney, provided statistics on the number of Soldiers requiring legal assistance in the areas of marriage, legal separation, divorce, child support, and other related matters. They also provided statistics on the types of misconduct resulting in courts-martial, non-judicial punishment, and administrative separations under AR 635-200. With this data, leaders were able to identify negative trends and react accordingly. The analysis also showed various concerns of Soldiers at different times of the year. For example, during the course of the year there was a spike in the number of Soldiers seeking legal assistance for divorce. The commander was able to compare statistics with the lawyers, the mental health representative and chaplain to better assess concerns within the brigade and develop a plan to help Soldiers cope with specific issues. Through this collaborative effort specific Care Team members could identify high risk Soldiers and advise commanders at all levels. This allowed the command to be proactive and help Soldiers in need of professional assistance.

Major Joseph Pridgen, the brigade adjutant, tracked the submission and presentation of Purple Hearts; monitored the submission of Bronze Star medals, combat badges, posthumous awards and promotions; tracked shipment of personal effects (PE) and letters of sympathy and condolences to the next of kin. Shipment of PE was a time-sensitive mission requiring close coordination with the mortuary affairs section (for shipment of WIA and KIA PE) and postal unit (for use of official mail for non-combat related PE). It was vital early in the deployment to establish an official mail...
account and educate leaders on the procedures to inventory, pack and ship the various categories of PE. He also worked closely with the brigade chaplain to produce periodic letters to the brigade’s wounded warriors to express the commander’s and the sergeant major’s on-going concern and appreciation for their valiant sacrifices.

Mr. Jim Messer, the brigade safety manager, and 1st Lieutenant Donald Dryer, the brigade safety officer, ensured relevant safety issues were discussed and addressed during Care Team meetings. The safety personnel provided detailed tracking information on accidental trends both within the brigade and within the Iraqi theater of operations. Messer and Dryer oversaw all accident investigations, especially in the areas where brigade Soldiers were injured, to find and eliminate the root cause of accidents. The safety personnel were responsible for raising the safety consciousness of the Soldier and encouraging Soldiers to make safety a part of everything that they do. Safety also oversaw safety audits and inspections on FOB Hammer and the surrounding outposts and patrol bases. The information that was collected during these inspections and investigations was shared during the Care Team meetings to help identify areas that could be influenced in the future and prevent predictable harm to our Soldiers. One area where safety focused on the positive aspects of Soldier safety included the brigade’s safety awards program. This program included awards such as streamers and certificates to battalions and subordinate units. For individual Soldiers, safety awards included medals, coins, safety-related gifts, phone cards, and personal recognition by the commander. This brigade’s safety awards program was so successful that it was adopted by the entire division and has resulted in brigade Soldiers being personally awarded coins and certificates by the division commander.

Each member of the Care Team brought a unique perspective. Similar to pieces of a puzzle, when all the perspectives were combined, the picture emerged for the command group. With the command group possessing this holistic picture, leaders were able to ensure awards were presented in a timely manner, personal effects were tracked and returned to the Soldier, and Soldiers were properly cared for on a variety of levels and their sacrifice not forgotten.

For the Soldiers continuing the fight every day on the streets of Iraq, the commander and sergeant major could also see which units were experiencing the greatest amount of stress. As they analyzed data from different team members and gathered information from the chain of command, they could develop an even greater picture concerning the morale and strength of the brigade. This helped to ensure that the greatest resource, Soldiers in the Hammer Brigade, were cared for, valued, and appreciated by the command for their sacrifices.

Through their selfless service, Soldiers of the Sledgehammer Brigade demonstrated their commitment to the Army and nation. COL Grigsby and CSM Pearson wanted the brigade to be fully committed to supporting those Soldiers. They felt the leadership of the brigade could not be replaced by the technology and bureaucracy that can be inherent in the casualty system. The Care Team was a vital tool to ensuring that the brigade never forgot those who gave the full measure and always supported those who carried serious injuries into the rest of their lives.

Slides were used to track each fallen hero and wounded Soldier evacuated from theater. The purpose of the slides was to accurately portray the severity of the Soldier’s injuries, note improvements, and record any concerns. The slides also enabled the Care Team to track the wounded Soldiers’ progress and issues (see Figure 2).

Each contact with the Soldier or family was listed in chronological order to show progress made. It was encouraging for everyone to read the progress, especially after witnessing such horrific events. Concerns were noted and the brigade leadership could address and quickly fix these issues through various means (see Figure 3).

The chain of command continually updated “contacts made” or the different “touches” with each Soldier or family. This allowed the command to share information in a quick and concise way. One battalion in the brigade, although task-organized to a different brigade, had effectively used these slides to maintain their Sledgehammer connection. Lieutenant Colonel Troy Perry, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, personally called wounded Soldiers each day. In fact, his staff daily called three or four Soldiers, continually tracking and updating care team

**Figure 2 — Sample Care Slide**

![Sample Care Slide](image)

**Figure 3 — Sample Care Contact Slide**

![Sample Care Contact Slide](image)
Chaplain (CPT) Tracy Kerr participated in the development of the Care Team for 2-69 Armor Regt. “I am both humbled and honored to have managed the process during OIF V,” said Kerr. “Our command created a way to minister to our wounded Soldiers, their families, and those whose loved ones died in combat. Taking personal responsibility for Soldiers within our military family means that we invest in them in during their darkest hours as well as their most vibrant ones. Wounded Soldiers received systematic communications in order to meet their personal needs. The company or battalion command communicated with each WIA on a weekly basis. We were able to assist with issues regarding health, awards, family and personal effects through these contacts.”

Healing not only took place for the family, as the command demonstrated care and concern during times of distress, healing also occurred for the combat Soldier still on the front lines.

CH Kerr went on to say, “It cannot be overstated that the need for frequent contact is greater within the first few months. Many of our wounded Soldiers were immediately concerned with their comrades left in the fight. Continued communication offers a real healing value as Soldiers share camaraderie and process the fight left behind.”

Troops on the ground were able to track the progress of their friends with whom they had shared traumatic events. Troops on the ground received the highest boost in morale through the discovery of a wounded friend scheduling to get married in the future. These systematic moments of healing contributed to the Army as a whole. These systematic moments of connecting with our wounded demonstrated what commitment and faithfulness are supposed to look like within a healthy family. It aided in keeping the brigade Army Strong through simple acts of kindness.

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SPC Saul Martinez attaches his prosthetic leg after climbing a 30-foot wall at Naval Medical Center San Diego October 12, 2007.

and a sensitive response.

“The families within our battalion have responded in the most appreciative ways through our communicating efforts. Many families shared their continued support through care packages, thoughts, and prayers for the troops left in the fight,” said Kerr. “Simple calls each quarter or proximate major holiday help families to realize that they continue to be valuable part of the Panther family. Our battalion received calls for memorial videos, memorial plot corrections, locations, and even expressions of appreciation through honor received from Division Tree-Planting Ceremonies in memory of their fallen loved ones.”

The commander and command sergeant major tracked the progress of SPC Martinez since the EFP attack on May 8 through the Care Team. Initially the Care Team provided encouragement to SPC Martinez and his spouse by calling and tracking his progress. The Care Team was instrumental in ensuring his personal belongings and TA50 were returned to the United States. Additionally the S-1 tracked his award and ensured he received orders. The commander was able to quickly monitor these actions during meetings as he reviewed each slide. Soldiers and commanders alike then visited SPC Martinez during R&R leave, constantly reminding Saul and his wife that they will be always part of the Sledgehammer team.

War forces each of us to go beyond the normal realms of life. One cannot say enough concerning the courage, patriotism and sacrifices each Soldier makes in the service of our country. Every day, Soldiers face the possibility of death or painful wounds. When Soldiers are injured during combat operations, it is vital to assist them in finding healing for their bodies, minds and spirits. As President Bush said about our wounded in 2003, “They’re the finest of our citizens. If you spend any time with these young men and women, you know that whether it’s on the battlefield or in the hospital, our men and women are always thinking of one another.”

The 3rd HBCT Care Team embodied this spirit — Soldiers looking out for other Soldiers — and allowed a brigade combat team to systematically track wounded Soldiers and resolve their problems. The 3rd Brigade Heavy Combat Team will never forget the sacrifices made by Sledgehammer Soldiers.
"As a small unit leader, you should only be doing two things: Leading Soldiers and small units during battle...Preparing Soldiers and small units to fight the battle."

— Colonel Dandridge “Mike” Malone

If you have been in the Army more than a year or two, I’m sure you have been inundated with what the keys to success are to best prepare your team to go back into theater. I’m sure it has included a lengthy checklist of tasks at various levels that you must “get to” during a very crowded and abbreviated Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. However, after over 20 years of service, including leading a small squad-sized tactical command post (TAC) over hundreds of miles during Desert Shield and Storm, commanding a rifle company in combat in Somalia and an Long Range Surveillance Detachment in Haiti, and most recently
a reconnaissance squadron in Iraq in southwest Baghdad for the last 15 months, my priority has not changed. **Your most important task is development of your small unit leaders.** It will be their ability to call the audible in football quarterback fashion across five lines of operations confidently, timely, and for the most part accurately that will determine your unit’s success.

A primary focus on small unit leaders and the small teams they lead remains paramount to all other priorities in a brief ARFORGEN refit. These leaders’ technical proficiency remains half of the equation but not the most important part. It simply is the art of solid decision making, the art piece, which will make or break the success of a small team. Can this sergeant to lieutenant leader make repetitive quality decisions by calling the audible to adapt to situations that may not fit a template he received in his early leadership training? Of course they have to, and they generally have already been doing so. However, with the stakes in Iraq as high as they have been as we enter our fifth year of war, this select group of individuals will remain the essential piece in determining if the improvements we have achieved in the last year become lasting. It will require these leaders to operate with the wisdom normally expected of a much senior leader. And it is essential that battalion-level leadership concentrate extensively on this endeavor.

To support this thesis, I turn to the recently published FM 3-0. Chapter 4, *Elements of Combat Power,* posits that “leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power.” “Effective leadership can compensate for deficiencies in all the warfighting functions because it is the most dynamic element of combat power.” “Effective leadership must display character, presence and intellect.” This is leadership at all levels and is probably most important at the lowest level. If the strategy is not quite right, these guys at the lowest level and their ability to figure it out will always save the day. This ability to figure it out first resonated with me when I heard General H. Norman Schwarzkopf describe after Desert Storm that we could have won with **their** equipment because of our leadership. His remark clearly indicates where he ranked the importance of leadership. Therefore, despite a busy and short ARFORGEN cycle the battalion commander must keep small unit leader development at the top of the priority list.

**How to Build This Small Unit Leader**

Unless your small unit leader is a complete anomaly, he will come to you with the basics and may be slightly advanced based on the examples he had from his commissioning source. To adequately prepare most of your leaders for the graduate level of war you will have to provide them repetition. There is no secret, no 15 minutes a day to lose pounds, no shortcut, no go to sleep and have the education and experience melded into this young leader’s mind to allow him to act with true wisdom. It is simply the old-fashioned way — repetition presented under varying conditions.

Today much of our institutional knowledge is infused into our NCOs by on-the-job training (OJT), passed to them by the excellent example of a senior NCO or officer, or picked up through self study. In the contemporary operational environment (COE), this simply is inadequate to allow him to operate at the graduate level of warfare required of him. His first stab at institutional knowledge will come at the Warrior Leader Course, the Basic NCO Course (re-designated the Advanced Leaders Course in FY09), or the Maneuver Advanced NCO Course, (re-designated the Maneuver Senior Leader Course in FY09). If he has learned his lessons well, is near the top of his class and has a rotation or two to theater under his belt, he has gained invaluable experience; however, he is still incomplete, as he probably has not had time to refine his thoughts, think academically about what he has experienced and get closer to true wisdom before it is time to jump into the next round. He tends to quickly become inundated with a philosophy of improvise — adapt — overcome. He may have even had a chance to partially exploit his efforts academically through some self study, but he remains with only half to two-thirds of the wisdom equation: lots of experience but still lacking the time to think about what he has experienced.

For our young officer his preparation is normally the exact opposite of his NCOs’, unless he is a prior service enlisted Soldier. He has been imbued with many theories of leadership and maybe had some of the same good examples that the young NCO had but nevertheless lacks the experience. In theory, it would seem to balance out just like years of old, experience on the enlisted side versus academic credentials on the officer side combined to produce wisdom of action. The problem is that we are requiring this wisdom of both sets of our junior leaders, NCO and officer. So the question remains, how do we address this?

In our unit I first seized on concepts that the entire team was familiar with — the Army Values and the Soldier’s Creed. I used these as the bricks and mortar to bind these two
sets of leaders together. We would combine experience with academic knowledge to really produce wisdom. It was not enough for our leaders to be able to recite these words: they had to be true believers and live them. Once we achieved this we provided additional guidance to give them a common purpose by adding our own five core values to the Army Values.

From the Army Values and our unit core values, I added repetition of a simple arithmetic formula I picked up a long time ago, again inspired by Colonel Malone: SKILL x DRILL x WILL (the most important piece) = the KILL. Since getting the KILL was not always our objective, especially going to a counterinsurgency (COIN), I replaced it with EFFECTIVENESS. So, to the Army Values, we added our five core values. The first was marksmanship and realistic maneuver live fires, the second physical training, the third mental and physical toughness, the fourth personal and technical education, and lastly reconnaissance skills. The command sergeant major (CSM) also kept a top 10 list of important individual tasks that were periodically rotated to ensure we remained skillful at our base level tasks. Nothing revolutionary perhaps, but values that we actually lived and — most importantly — practiced every day. It became repetitious, but not boring as in something that was simply recited. We said it in formation; we said it at awards ceremonies; or we said it at the completion of a 25-mile road march when we were near physical exhaustion. And I must admit it became sort of religious, but it resulted in a collective power that only hard training and shared discomfort could produce. Slowly the two sets of leaders were being melded together, sharing their strengths with each other and preparing themselves for the incredible leadership challenges that would require their collective and individual wisdom upon deployment.

Repetition and constant exposure to our themes were the simple elements in building an unmatched chemistry within the squadron. We did more Leader Professional Development exercises instead of just Officer Professional Development drills, including many sergeants and above in these events to point out that the leadership team absolutely had to work together to produce the wisdom I was after. We still did things to build strength and maintain spirit within the officer and NCO corps that were normally run by me or my CSM personally. The Soldiers had to see me and the CSM practicing what we preached, and our leaders quickly understood the kind of effort we required. Leaders that arrived at the unit who did not understand what we were trying to do either raised their standards, fell by the wayside or were put into positions not requiring constant leadership expertise. Our theme of SKILL x DRILL x WILL allowed us to move to higher levels with our leadership.

This spawned self-development in our young leaders as they hungrily grabbed at more material on their own, reinforcing the initiative I demanded from them, further reinforced by the prime leadership examples set by the squadron. These two things (self-study, quality role models) combined with planned small unit leader professional development classes gave us the repetitions in DRILL style, to provide our small unit leaders with more SKILL. When we trained, each leader was given multiple opportunities and exposure to different scenarios and multiple runs to allow him to add to his

I demanded that each task, no matter how small, be executed with initiative and discipline. While the lessons were cheap, I allowed for initiative to rule so these leaders could better learn from their mistakes.

Iraq. As a squadron commander my way to keep this going was simple: reinforce my themes every chance I got. My main disciples were, of course, the CSM, executive officer (XO) and S3 triumvirate. We took this message to the troop commanders and first sergeants and it spread. I would personally reinforce this every chance I got, at PT, observing training, meetings or whatever. The Soldiers needed to see me doing it, they had to hear me saying it, they needed to read it in writing through e-mail and get the same message from my other senior leaders no matter what position they held in the squadron. Eventually this attitude permeated down and across to each and every Soldier in the squadron.

I demanded that each task, no matter how small, be executed with initiative and discipline. While the lessons were cheap, I allowed for initiative to rule so these leaders could better learn from their mistakes. They also realized that discipline did not necessarily mean everyone had to get it done the same way or hang their kit off their trucks the same way. The ultimate goal was for the job to get done and for Soldiers to think about how they were organizing their kit, truck or other weapons system to be most effective for the mission. If they did use their heads and could explain it, for me that was an indicator that we were moving closer to my desired end state of wisdom. Naturally, most of my questioning revolved around seeing if my leaders were thinking.

Further products of this approach also spread as loyalty, confidence and trust were increased one Soldier, one small unit leader, one small team at a time. Now we were getting somewhere. Or, as spelled out by an anonymous source in the Infantry Journal of 1948, our collective appointments as small unit leaders were clearly being ratified in the hearts and minds of the men. With collective chemistry, mature confident leaders with an iron WILL were able to not just survive a 15-month deployment but also excelled at their missions. Our leaders and Soldiers were passionate about our team and you could see it in everything they did. Passionate, disciplined and operating with complete initiative.

Building Chemistry and How to Measure It

The base for the creation of this more capable small unit leader, who was comfortable calling the audible and getting it right 9 of 10 times, was nearly complete. But the hard part was to figure out how to measure its continuance. Again taking from FM 3-0, I used measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE). Were my leaders doing the job within the wide margin of commanders intent that I had given them and most importantly were we effectively getting the job done? Unlike the laborious staff task of measuring success over large periods of time over five
difficult lines of operation, measuring if your leaders and small teams have good chemistry and were operating collectively with wisdom is really quite simple.

The garrison and training environment gave multiple planned and unplanned opportunities to measure this. The first of these measures could be measured at PT. I personally required my leaders to plan detailed PT plans to not just improve PT scores but to make us more physically able in combat. In this case the execution of these tasks and the innovation I viewed told me we were getting it. Although a gym is nice and you can repetitively target muscles used on patrol, simple rocks, ropes, vehicles, steps, various parts of your kit and various other “torture devices” could all be combined with a wonderful natural environment full of woods and streams to target all those muscles that needed improvement. My leaders never let me down, increasing their collective imaginations with more innovative ways to change the conditions, repeat it and still get the mission accomplished. This was precisely the kind of innovative thought I needed.

Our leaders explained this was not punishment but the hard work needed to improve the team, and of course, they had to lead it. Too many times we see talk about leading by example, but it truly has to be to lead it. Too many times we see talk about other conditions and encouraged their Soldiers to talk about yet more scenarios they could face, and talk out what they would do. Yet another indicator of success in our endeavor was leaders acknowledging that not all the Soldiers came to them as “A” students and they would have to in some cases tailor their approach to get the most out of their team. And finally the small unit leader used his A students to improve his C and D students to take their game just one — and in some cases two — levels higher. When you see this happening during PT, after hours or even on the weekends, you know your team is going the right way.

Now, many of the measures of effectiveness could be missed if you’re not looking for them. So, just like a good scout has to be able to pick up on human traits or nonverbal signals, you have to train yourself to look for them. For instance, using my PT analogy again, how did we conduct fall out operations on a run? Before we viewed other indicators of getting it right as sergeants and lieutenants repetitively explained the tasks, conditions, and standards and actually spent the additional time with the Soldiers who did not get it at first. This takes incredible patience, perseverance, and persistence for your small unit leader as he wants to get out and run with the studs, but spending the time on less physically fit Soldiers is a sign of maturity. They also spent time talking about other conditions and encouraged their Soldiers to talk about yet more scenarios they could face, and talk out what they would do. Yet another indicator of success in our endeavor was leaders acknowledging that not all the Soldiers came to them as “A” students and they would have to in some cases tailor their approach to get the most out of their team. And finally the small unit leader used his A students to improve his C and D students to take their game just one — and in some cases two — levels higher. When you see this happening during PT, after hours or even on the weekends, you know your team is going the right way.

Now, many of the measures of effectiveness could be missed if you’re not looking for them. So, just like a good scout has to be able to pick up on human traits or nonverbal signals, you have to train yourself to look for them. For instance, using my PT analogy again, how did we conduct fall out operations on a run? Before we progressed, the first stages normally involved choice four-letter words to supposedly provide encouragement to the malefactor who had fallen out. Ultimately, this might make the guys still in formation feel good, but it really did not have a positive effect on the fall out. The effectiveness meter is going in the right direction if the squad or section goes back to get the guy, carrying him if need be, until eventually the fall out feels enough dedication to do the extra work needed to stay with the team. In fact, nothing will stop him from improving himself. This fall out may never be an A student, but again your leaders have created an environment where this fall out has at least moved one step higher than he thought possible and will add to the effectiveness of the team. Strive to have bigger ears and a smaller mouth and you might be tuned on to how one Soldier at a time, specifically the D student, is being integrated into the team. Now the hard part for you at battalion level is how to figure out to give the A student more repetitions to improve him as well.

Another indicator is one you may not consider on first glance, but which is just as important, and that is socialization. Do you have Soldiers going downtown alone or are they going in Ranger buddy or fire teams? Do they collectively check each other from getting into trouble or take care of rehabilitating a Soldier back to the team if he has gotten into trouble? When you have a squadron formal, do you have to create an advertising campaign to get the team to go or is the team clamoring to go and in fact go in droves, because they are damned proud to be on your team? These are all indicators. Perhaps another more quantifiable measure is simply the reenlistment rate. Again, ask your Soldiers why they are reenlisting, specifically your first termers. They will tell you that their first Army team is great, it has changed their lives, and despite the hardship they will do it again. These are simply wonderful sounds to the ear. In the squadron our team achieved 300 percent of our prescribed reenlistment mission for our first termers, best in both the 10th and 3rd Infantry divisions of which we were a part. Naturally, we were getting it.

Other training events can also be used as indicators. Again just look a little harder at taking measurements. We spend a lot of time quantifying our readiness. Leave this to your staff because statistics are
The demands of daily patrolling, deaths, injuries and various other factors — expected and unexpected — naturally will work to break the WILL of your small unit leader, and he must recognize this.

important: more experts on the range, better effect with your mortars, et cetera... But you need to measure what is only quantifiable by viewing human action. In this case I used how we were conducting our ranges. God forbid if the first one you view is being run like the first one I experienced as a basic trainee in 1982, where I was positively controlled through each movement. If it is being run in this controlling fashion, then change it. You are going to expect your leaders to make big boy decisions, so repetitively implement big boy rules on the ranges. I expect initiative and discipline, so give them the chance to practice the repetitions on the range. The onus for safety is on the small unit leader of each team who has explained the purpose of the Soldier drawing and loading his own ammo, keeping his safety on until ready to engage, and keeping the muzzle in a safe direction on his own accord. The tower does not need to do this. I mean, heck, we train kids to hunt safely at the age of 10 or less, so why not with our Soldiers who we are going to expect a lot more out of?

As we progress our leader explains why we are spending so much time on various ranges and repetitively changing conditions. And then he moves to the science of accuracy, and talks short range and long range marksmanship, engagement of partially exposed and moving targets with various systems both day and night from various positions in buildings or in the field. Just one trip to the range will tell you if this is working. And when you get back to the rear is the team still talking about how they are going to do more of it? Are they talking about hunting, weapons, paintballing, or are they going downtown by themselves because they don't really think they are part of the team?

But it could be even more simple than that. How does the small team take care of its own? It's raining and two members are out on an LP and their rucks are not covered. What happens? Does the team take care of them by covering their rucks? Or if they miss chow, does the team take care of them? Again, small indicators, but ones you need to look for to see if your small unit leaders and the small teams they lead are getting it.

**Battle Command and Point of the Spear leadership**

“The commander’s will is the one constant element that propels the force through the shock and friction of battle. Soldiers may approach that point when fear, uncertainty, and physical exhaustion dominate their thinking. It is then that the commander’s strength of will and personal presence provides the moral impetus for actions that lead to victory.”

— **FM 3-0, Operations**

Let us assume that the leaders and small teams are built right and many of your small unit leaders are now operating with the wisdom of a much more senior leader. Now your unit is deployed and you have to keep it going. Now you must translate your broad commander’s guidance from training to the actual combat zone and allow your leaders to exercise their own piece of battle command. At the center of this challenge I never deviated from my understanding that personal WILL or their state of mind and team chemistry is what I had to monitor. According to Ardant du Picq’s **Roots of Strategy, Book 2** in “Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle,” battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an Army — its personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand — without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat.

My leaders’ WILL remained the critical element of combat leadership. Fifteen months of continual stress doing various diverse tasks along five lines of operation is quite a test. Keeping the small unit leader calling quality tactical audibles and keeping himself and his team functioning with the same high levels of discipline and initiative as when it entered country is the challenge. The demands of daily patrolling, deaths, injuries and various other factors — expected and unexpected — naturally will work to break the WILL of your small unit leader, and he must recognize this.

As a battalion commander I spent a lot of time being seen, still gauging performance and effectiveness and not to nitpick, but to ensure I had the best platoon leadership package on the street every day. To effectively do this I spent a lot of time outside the wire not just talking to the locals but to my platoons. Only in this way could I really understand their problems and see how it was affecting their performance. I explained why I was out in the field so often and why it was so important to keep the best team out on the street. Most of them understood and in fact felt comfortable with and appreciated my presence. It still remains an art, but my presence was what they grew up with in training and what I gave them in combat. Consistency of action and spending most of my time talking to my leaders, at night, in the motor pool, at patrol bases, in CPs or where ever. Mix this with the art of seeing but not being seen and you have a good indication of how the team and their leaders are doing. In most cases, level of performance is most evident after taking a punch — after Soldiers are injured or killed — and seeing how you and your small team leaders provide the WILL to get back up and get after it. This is probably the most critical indicator of all.

One of our experiences happened the night after the squadron had three Soldiers killed in an IED attack. That same night a different platoon in a different troop not far from the site where the Soldiers were killed identified three IED emplacers on the spot. They engaged and killed two of them and wounded and detained a third. As the enemy dead lay there the platoon sergeant simply said, “That one
was for Bravo." Yep, we were still doing all right.

As the platoon that was hit was put back together, they professionally and meticulously started building the relationships needed to establish an informant network instead of blindly swinging in large roundups to assuage our collective pain of troopers lost. No “cowboy up” occurred, just back to discipline and initiative. Each trooper was instructed and helped along by leaders and mental health professionals to develop his own coping mechanism to deal with the range of emotions from rage to sorrow, so when they were on a mission again they were mission focused. As I watched our leaders, I realized we were still doing OK. But I could not have detailed this unless I was out there. FM 3-0 notes that the commander’s forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger. It also allows an assessment of subordinate unit performance, including leader and Soldier morale.

These were tough times, yet the team was built of flexible brick. Flexible enough to remain focused on our main objectives of building our informant network, training and working with our Iraqi Army compatriots to selectively kill or detain insurgents to provide the security and control needed to make gains in the other lines of operation. Watching this team take a punch to the face like a Soldier’s death and move on to these other things is really the most incredible thing I experienced and have experienced in all my deployments. However, there were times that physical exhaustion and stress were accumulating enough that required you to take action.

To maintain the best platoon leadership package on the street remained the challenge. Everyone has a tipping point and some small units leaders may have started to lose the edge, were injured or on leave, or perhaps had to testify against someone you had detained. Within the squadron our pool of additional small unit leaders was small, and we generally received a trickle of new leadership throughout the rotation. But I maintained a small level of flexibility that allowed me to tweak the platoon leadership packages. My focus was on the platoon leaders generally, and the CSM was equally meticulous on the NCO leadership which we generally had less flexibility on. However, by our relentless measurement we made quality, precise leadership changes when needed.

With the platoon leaders, the first place I looked for new leadership was at the company XO’s. In most cases they had already been successful platoon leaders and generally because of the earlier inculcation and focus of our expanded leadership training efforts were hungry to return to a platoon. Newly arrived lieutenants were carefully assessed on their ability to quickly step into a platoon without the benefit of the earlier training and lead it successfully. NCO leadership positions were generally taken out of the staff, but the officer/NCO team in a platoon was carefully evaluated to get the right team chemistry.

**Redeployment and Getting Back into the Training Cycle**

Careful management of your NCOs by your CSM and the officers by yourself will accurately project what will be left of the team for the new leaders upon redeployment. This data is invaluable and allows the incoming leadership to prepare to fill major holes in the battle roster. Most leaders look at this time as one of turmoil and tribulation; however, I looked at it as the time to clearly identify who was ready to step up. For a unit such as ours that was totally created from scratch, this just seemed like a natural change to take advantage of again getting the repetitions in for your emerging young leaders. Your young privates and specialists of the first go-around are now your leaders for round two.

It is a great opportunity for them to get the repetitions they will need to provide the temporary leadership needed as the team transitions. With your ample help and liberal commander’s intent, you will allow them to build and learn the lessons again while the lessons are largely on the cheap in comparison with the higher stakes when lives are on the line.

The only thing you as a battalion commander have to provide is an open and unvarnished environment of communications, showing a personal passion in the work at hand, the events to give them the repetitions and the overhead to underwrite the mistakes that they will invariably make. As an investor, this remains a cost well spent that will pay the dividends you need a year down the road when that same small unit leader is making mature, sound, accurate and timely decisions, and calling audibles as needed to fit the situation.

In summary, your focus as a battalion commander preparing to take your outfit back to war is simple. Concentrate on training your small unit leaders and preparing them for the graduate level of learning and wisdom required of them while deployed. It will remain their WILL and ability to exercise battle command as a professional as the ultimate weapon, not the myriad of other things put on the ARFORGEN chart that supposedly are more important. Repetitions every day and getting the most out of the days’ daily tasks are how you will achieve this expert ability in your junior leaders. You and your disciples — the CSM, the XO, S3 and company commanders — must measure and gauge the progress of this most important task, reinforce your measures of performance if they are not being met, and recommend changes to direct one Soldier, one leader at a time. During battle you must be seen, yet practice the art of seeing without being seen. When the chips are down, it remains your own WILL and physical presence as the difference maker, and it is not found from a TOC behind a computer screen. As your team conquers the deployment, look again at your small unit leadership and identify what the team will look like for the new battalion-level leadership. And finally set the conditions that allow the new emerging leadership to immediately start the process all over again by giving them the repetitions, encouragement, and personal involvement that will stay the team for success in round two.

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Offensive Disruption: Separating the Enemy from the Population through Lethal Fire and Maneuver

Captain Chris Hammonds

Our aircraft touched down mid-morning on May 12, 2007, on a small landing zone inside of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Tillman, which is located in Lawara Mundi, Afghanistan. The flight from Khowst was just minutes to my new home for the next 15 months, and I had no idea of the significance of my impending role as commander of the remote FOB. Within 12 hours of hitting the ground, I was quickly introduced to the strategic importance that the forces operating from there hold.

Acute surveillance from adjacent observation posts detected the movement of more than 40 heavily armed enemy personnel. The enemy formation was quickly fixed by a barrage of artillery and mortar fire from the FOB. This action allowed time for the muster of a combined arms strike incorporating close air support, attack aviation, organic and attached indirect fire assets and a synchronized joint Afghan and American ground assault element. The end result of the 12-hour engagement was 25 confirmed enemy killed and 15 others wounded or missing.

The subsequent exploitation of the engagement area suggested the enemy’s objective was deep within eastern Afghanistan. Several other large-scale enemy infiltrations in this area were attempted throughout our deployment, but due to the heavy losses suffered, each successive attempt involved fewer personnel and focused its objective much closer to the border. As the deployment progressed, we noticed an increase in enemy activity originating within Afghan territory. It was apparent that the enemy had sidelined its massive movements through this area and had adapted by sending smaller al-Qaeda, Hiqqani Network and Taliban facilitators to gain momentum with small homegrown enemy elements already present in Afghanistan.

In this article, I share my experience commanding the counterinsurgency effort throughout Gayan, southern Spera, eastern Orgune and northern Bermel Districts of Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Specifically, I emphasize the unique challenges that my unit and I faced along the northern Waziri border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. I have baselined my experience in the fundamentals of contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, but focus on our ability to stay on the offensive and disrupt enemy efforts to attack our formations.

COIN In Afghanistan

Conducting COIN operations in eastern Afghanistan, as anywhere, incorporates a balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The contemporary insurgency in the north Waziristan border region of Spera, Gayan and northern Bermel has its own unique context. The region’s proximity to resource-rich training and staging areas in Pakistan and the inconsistency of Pakistani military interdiction of cross-border enemy operations are compounded by the fence-riding apathy of the Afghan Waziris. As commander of this problematic area, I was charged with bolstering local support for the fledgling Afghan government and further developing the way ahead to a new and somewhat contemporary existence of the people living here. In accomplishing this daunting task, I was forced to utilize every lethal and non-lethal weapon available.

The typical linear progression of counterinsurgency operations — from separating the enemy from the population to transforming the environment — occurred in multiple layers and was extremely diverse even across the small area of operations (AO) assigned to my unit. Progress was measured by “net gains” as opposed to “total victory.” In other words, no one battle ever decided the ultimate success or failure of our efforts in any particular village. Where one village was receptive to a particular method along the spectrum, another would be adamantly opposed to a similar technique.

The focus throughout the deployment remained on the people, but was facilitated by the significant lethal success we experienced across the AO. The number of enemy we killed was the least effective measure of success. However, our ability to provide freedom of...
maneuver to our main effort of engaging the local populaces and winning of hearts and minds was gained through a planned offensive disruption.

I could write a book on the complexities of our counterinsurgency efforts, but instead will focus on our most notable successes in separating the enemy from the population through lethal fire and maneuver. The following paragraphs take you through our successes and failures in hopes of affording similar or follow-on commanders the ability to build on our gains in this one aspect of COIN.

**Separating the Enemy from the Population**

Consistent presence was necessary to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver throughout our area of operations. As I mentioned before, the stages of counterinsurgency occurred in layers depending on the region we visited. To address this issue, each region of our AO was labeled based on the relative threat present there.

No area was completely permissive, but areas sustaining the least number of historical attacks and those with no recent reported enemy activity (within 90 days) were labeled as green. Semi-permissive areas that typically were affected by temporary or transient enemy elements and had experienced isolated attacks on U.S. and partnered Afghan forces were represented as amber areas. Non-permissive areas where known enemy formations were either embedded in the population or remained due to sheer isolation from our firepower were labeled red areas.

Each area was met with different planning and preparation requirements utilizing the broad assessment tool above, the range of our weapons systems (relative battlespace), the terrain and the number and type of enablers we were able to acquire prior to each operation.

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**Staying on the Offensive**

The best defense is a good offense, and in my experience in command at AO Attack it was no different. The second that we became static or developed a pattern, we were attacked and had to regain the initiative. This was apparent in both defensive screening roles (such as at our observation posts) as well as on patrol. While maintaining force protection on the FOB or conducting screening operations of the Lawara Dashtah, it was important to maintain thorough historical data of recent attacks.

The idea that the enemy can only attack you from so many different locations and ways is true. A solid terrain analysis, understanding of the capabilities of your on-hand Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and access to historical data are powerful tools in determining the enemy’s most likely course of action. This general targeting method coupled with an active hostile intent direct and indirect fire plan was extremely effective in disrupting many attacks on our fixed positions.

On patrol, whether conducting key leader engagements or infilling to a deliberate offensive operation, we always tried to maintain an element of disruption. Whether this effect was achieved by task organization or the specific scheme of maneuver, it enabled my company to meet the enemy on our own terms and truly defined the overall success of our fight. Again, I believe that our success in the AO can largely be attributed to addressing all real-time ISR and terrain analysis with a bold disruption element.

During May and June of 2007, accurate
indirect fire attacks on our FOB were a daily event with 107mm rockets and 82mm mortars impacting inside the wire on multiple occasions. The Q-36 radar acquired the majority of the points of origin to the south of the FOB while corresponding signal intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) reports indicated that the cell was operating out of a village near these points. In response, I planned a series of key leader engagements there and in adjacent villages as not to lead the enemy to believe we were targeting one specific location. Simultaneously, I inserted a joint platoon deep into the mountains overwatching the villages.

Though the key task for the element was to determine the pattern of life for the villages after our engagements, we were also able to determine the most likely routes of enemy infiltration to their attack positions from their perspective. While moving to a final overwatch position of the village of Mamadi, this maneuver paid off. Just as the sun was setting on our third night, a rocket cell moved to establish a nearby firing point. Assuming the mounted leader engagement patrol was the only coalition element operating in the area, the enemy began their attack completely unaware of our movements.

Due to our position on a steep hillside, the cell was able to fire six rockets from a BM-1 launcher at the FOB. However, because we witnessed the launch, I was able to quickly provide ample early warning to my company command post (CP) that enemy rounds were inbound. I subsequently called for a 10-round sweep-in-zone from attached 105mm Howitzers on both the enemy rocket launch site as well as their suspected choice of egress. The counter-battery proved extremely effective and on target, wounding two of the members of the cell while canalizing them into the telegraphed egress route. While continuing to adjust their position, we effectively fixed the enemy element for follow-on attack aviation which engaged and killed them at close range.

Keeping the enemy guessing where all of our elements were located was just as psychologically destructive as seeing their comrades killed en masse. As the deployment progressed, we began to exploit this success by developing it as a consistent tactic with multiple methods of execution.

Disruption was achieved through simulated vehicle breakdowns and long-range dismounted patrols paralleling mounted infiltration to objective (OBJ) areas. Covert dismounted overwatch of humanitarian aid distributions and key leader engagements also proved successful. Additionally, the establishment of forward SIGINT collection OPs to complement static assets operating out of the FOB was an extremely effective means of finding the enemy first.

This effort was more than just a doctrinal overwatch, it was a calculated preemptive counterattack at a time and place for which the enemy was unprepared.

**How to Win**

Two good examples come to mind when taking advantage of the enemy’s poor signal security (SIGSEC) practices. While conducting refit from extended operations in Spera District throughout early September, enemy elements began organizing an attack on FOB Tillman. VHF intercept of enemy courses of action and consolidation of forces were received from our static Prophet team on a nearby observation post. After analyzing the lines of bearing and signal strengths of the transmissions, it was apparent that multiple enemy OPs were reporting on coalition activities and providing early warning of our movements. In order to drum up more traffic and further expose the locations of the enemy, I ordered the establishment of a forward dismounted SIGINT OP three kilometers west of the FOB. The establishment of the OP allowed the company to receive “cuts” of the enemy location placing their positions to the west and south of the new OP.

Just as I began to develop an offensive indirect fire plan to disrupt the impending attack, the forward OP came under heavy small arms fire. The OP commander’s quick reporting along with the CP’s analysis of the enemy locations, allowed for an immediate and overwhelming response from 81mm mortars out of the FOB as well as heavy weapons from the OP’s supporting vehicular patrol base. The contact lasted approximately 30 minutes whereby the enemy element was repelled and several were wounded. Throughout the fight, only one U.S. Soldier on the OP was wounded after being hit by an AK-47 round that lodged in the night vision goggle mount of his helmet.

Despite the fact that the OP came under fire first, we still met them on our terms. The analysis of their location and isolation of their assault element by the emplacement of the OP caused them to initiate the attack prematurely. This action exposed the enemy’s precise locations and ultimately disrupted their ability to focus combat power on our elements.

Towards the end of September this tactic was again successful. This time, multiple disruption elements were utilized to ensure our mission success. The purpose of the company patrol was to facilitate a shura with the mayor and elders of Gayan regarding the increased amount of direct fire and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on American and Afghan forces in the Gayan Valley. The shura was conducted at the ASG and ANP-held firebase in the north end of the Gayan Valley. It is important to note that at the time, terrain restricted movement to and from the firebase on a single infil and exfil route, making it a favorite target of enemy ambushes and IEDs.

The company minus element was task-organized into two sections. The lead element cleared the high ground adjacent the route to an overwatch position which supported the HQs and security element for the last two kilometers into the shura site. Deception was built into the plan as the overwatch element conducted a hasty reconnaissance of a spur route west of the overwatch position before simulating a vehicle breakdown back at the junction of the two routes. Before the recon deception effort stepped off, the security element at the shura site established a SIGINT OP to provide VHF cuts of the enemy as they observed both the shura and the deception element.

The combination of deception with overwatching collection again gained us the advantage we needed to find and fix the enemy first. To exploit the upper hand, two five-man dismounted recon and surveillance patrols were conducted to clear the dead space surrounding our OPs and as a deception effort. These elements never ventured outside of support from heavy weapons to ensure that immediate suppression could be achieved in the event they were engaged first.

As the shura and supporting humanitarian aid (HA) distribution came to a close, imminent threat VHF intercepts began to pour in through our SIGINT OP. The enemy voice traffic referenced the movement of our deception element as their target of opportunity. With this information, I
directed all elements to take cover and observe all likely enemy locations based on the line of bearing (LOB) provided by our signal collection asset. According to analysis of the LOBs, it appeared as if an ambush was being established on both sides of our egress route.

Shortly after receiving the enemy traffic, our eastern recon and surveillance (R&S) patrol supporting the deception effort made contact with five heavily armed enemies in a wash paralleling the simulated vehicle breakdown site. One enemy was brought down immediately at a range of 20 meters with M-4 and M-203 fire while the four other fighters bounded east under heavy PKM fire and hand grenades while sustaining multiple gunshot and fragmentary wounds themselves. The element in contact was supported 200m to the west on the opposite side of the route by another R&S patrol with M-240B fires.

While situational awareness was being relayed, HQs and the security element moved to support the element in contact in attempt to cut off the enemy’s egress route to the east. While attempting link-up, the remainder of the enemy ambush consisting of approximately 10 fighters engaged the reaction force from both sides of the wash. First contact was made from the high ground to the west of the route, followed by close range PKM fire on the rear vehicle in the convoy from the east. Lead elements out of contact maneuvered to the edge of the kill zone to support with 60mm mortar fires on the high ground, while attached Afghan National Police and their mentors assaulted through the machine gun position to the east.

The contact resulted in the death of the enemy commander of the operation, four confirmed enemy wounded with several others being wounded in the subsequent contact on our reinforcements. In this example, the deception effort generated situational awareness on the enemy location which led to the isolation of the ambush’s main effort that lied in wait in the adjacent eastern wash. The contact made by our R&S patrol successfully disrupted the enemy’s ability to mass fires on our element in a complex ambush as we exfilled the shura. Only one U.S. Soldier was wounded throughout the one-hour firefight, sustaining a gunshot wound to his wrist.

Our failure to observe the benefit of continuous disruption always resulted in our loss of the initiative. We were extremely lucky on multiple occasions to not sustain significant losses that were directly attributed to our inability to disrupt or lack of maneuver. It was easy to let the terrain, climate and the high operational tempo draw us into a complacent and static posture.

**How to Lose**

Early in the deployment, a recognized road was nonexistent in our AO. Mounted travel from village to village was executed along track in stream routes that resembled something out of an off-road magazine more than a passable maneuver lane. While patrolling to Torah Wrey in June, we sustained two broken ball joints and two severed half-shafts on the same vehicle that kept us stationary in a canyon for nearly three hours.

OPs were immediately established, to protect the repair site, but no attention was paid to the route ahead of us. Essentially, we had local security but could not account for even the next kilometer of route between us and our objective. Though the OPs to the north and south had excellent observation, they were stagnant and could not address the multitude of infil routes and firing positions immediately enroute to our OBJ.

After several hours, the vehicles were fixed and we continued to push toward our objective. Not 500 meters from the break-down site, the rear section of the ground assault convoy (GAC) was engaged with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire from five enemy personnel on the northern wall of the canyon.

Traveling overwatch allowed the lead element to flank the enemy as the trail element suppressed with heavy weapons and RPGs from our attached Afghan element. Two A-10s were on station from the outset of the attack which further discouraged the enemy from staying and fighting us, but they were unable to acquire their egress. After firing 60mm mortars from the lead section, the enemy broke contact and successfully exfilled without a scratch. We were lucky… all six enemy RPGs missed their mark by inches and only one Afghan soldier received minor shrapnel wounds in the engagement.

Though the reaction to contact was nearly textbook, the contact could have been avoided altogether. I quickly learned to conduct hasty enemy analysis producing most likely and most dangerous courses of action at every long halt. We then took the offensive to clear those infil lanes and firing positions. As opposed to emplacement of static OPs, we maneuvered with overwatch through R&S elements to take the enemy’s options away from him before he had a chance to set up.

Another incident occurred in the vicinity of Torah Wrey in October that had similar results due to our lack of initiative. This time, the patrol was conducting a long halt while the leadership and Afghan forces executed leader engagements and a village assessment of the surrounding gals. The patrol base was situated at the junction of two major washes with dense cornfields surrounding the vehicle patrol base and overwatched by high ground to the northeast and due south. I made the call to strong point the south end of the patrol base with heavy weapon primary directions of fire covering the high ground to the south that I assessed as the most likely enemy attack by fire location.
Additionally, I maintained the majority of my dismounts to cover our flanks from close range assault from the surrounding cornfields. We had sustained a substantial close range ambush from a cornfield earlier in the deployment that destroyed a vehicle and drove me to pay more attention to these highly concealed areas.

As the key leader engagements ended and the HQs element made its way back in the southern end of the patrol base, an attack was initiated from the high ground to the south. Again, several RPGs and a heavy amount of small arms fire rained down on the patrol base before our heavy weapons could begin to suppress. Though a 105mm target had been established on the high ground, weak communications with our CP at FOB Tillman prevented a timely immediate suppression mission from being executed. Instead, we again relied on our 60mm mortars in direct-lay to further suppress and force the enemy to break contact. Due to the location of the patrol base in relation to the attack position and its linear configuration, it was difficult to quickly maneuver on the element and they successfully egressed without incident. Attack aviation arrived 20 minutes after the contact ceased and were unable to reacquire the enemy element.

Considering the key leader engagement and village assessment took nearly an hour and a half, I believe a clearance of the most likely enemy attack positions would have been well worth my time and would not significantly have degraded my capability to defend the patrol base. One thing is for sure, my lack of maneuver ensured the enemy had a chance to find a suitable firing position and to fire first. Our inaction placed us on the defense from the start and at considerably greater risk of sustaining multiple casualties as the enemy element was afforded the opportunity to mass their firepower. If it were not for poor enemy marksmanship and an overwhelming powerful reaction from our gunners, things could have definitely turned out for the worse.

I can’t emphasize enough the importance of understanding the capabilities and employment techniques of all finding and fixing assets you are allocated. All of these assets play a key role in degrading the enemy’s ability to focus combat power. However, be it CAS, attack aviation, ISR, indirect fires or non-lethal fires, they cannot stand alone in reaching this effect. They are never properly applied to reach a suitable course of action to counter the enemy without an intimate knowledge of your terrain.

It is important to stress that terrain analysis from your CP alone is not sufficient. You must know the ground as well as the enemy does. A 1:50,000 map of Afghanistan’s mountainous regions does not do the terrain the justice it deserves. Every opportunity we had to gain the high ground, walk the washes and cuts and look back at our positions from the enemy’s perspective, we took advantage of. We made mental and digital records of as many portions of the AO as possible. This supported the reconnaissance principle of patrolling by attempting to “never go anywhere for the first time.”

Understanding that the enemy is an opportunist, it was critical to remain active, taking away his options and avenues to strike first. Our ability to disrupt the enemy effectively provided freedom of maneuver to our main effort on every mission. As a result, we were able to focus the majority of our efforts on the more complex and more effective non-kinetic aspects of the counterinsurgency. As a complement to our lopsided kinetic engagements, we exploited the success through a strong Information Operations campaign. This created great confidence in the joint U.S. and Afghan force’s ability to secure our areas and in-turn produced larger and larger amounts of actionable HUMINT.

Throughout the deployment, we made a conscious effort to meet the enemy on our terms. We ensured he was never able to bring the full power of his weapon systems to bear on our formations through active disruption. Our spin of basic infantry maneuver doctrine was nothing earth-shattering or really anything that hasn’t been done before. However, it was effective and the cost-to-benefit resulting from these efforts was miniscule. Our persistent disruption throughout the deployment resulted in extremely low friendly casualties throughout an excess of 30 enemy direct fire and offensive engagements.

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*Paratroopers with the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry conduct clearing operations. Gaining the high ground allowed the Soldiers to maintain the initiative at all times when dismounted.*
Weekly clearance patrols which included consistent interaction with the local populace strengthened interpersonal relationships between the coalition forces (CF), Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and locals. They created opportunities for intertribal cooperation and fostered the creation of positive relationships between tribes. Finally, they assisted in establishing the conditions necessary to utilize Civil Affairs projects in building vital infrastructure for life sustainment without the need for future coalition assistance.

Commander’s Overview
The company had just finished its last kinetic operation and we were informed we were going to partner with three Iraqi Police (IP) units and one Neighborhood Watch force (now Sons of Iraq). I was worried about how our Soldiers would make the transition from kinetic operations to working with Iraqis who just a few months prior were on the other side. Those worries turned out to be unwarranted, because our Soldiers made the transition smoothly without any issues.

Our area of operation (AO) for the most part was very supportive of coalition forces, just as most of the Anbar Province was at the time. Two of our three infantry platoons were assigned an IP station each and one was assigned two. We did not live at the IP stations like most police training teams (PTT), but spent most of our time with the IPs. At the time we provided them with everything from food, water, fuel, and training.

After months of hard work, the last of the active terrorist cells were removed or went underground in our AO, and it was time to figure out how to keep them out and locate the ones who went underground (sleeper cells). First we set up a series of IP checkpoints along all the main supply routes (MSRs), alternate supply routes (ASRs), and next to critical infrastructure (schools, mosques, and sheiks’ houses). We then cleared our area of operations of all known improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons caches. Once that was completed, we began weekly clearing patrols with the IPs. They were not doctrinally correct clearance operations in any way but were very effective. Each platoon would pick a sector of the area of operations and conduct a clearance once a week. We would walk our entire AO in about a month’s time.

For the patrols, the IPs would get on line, and we would get behind them providing any support they might need. Most times we would have attack aviation on station, and this would give the IPs the confidence that they could handle anything that came their way. It would also let the local populace know that the IPs had everything in our arsenal at their disposal.

Some would argue that this was a terrible waste of the IP’s time, and they should be concentrating on training to become better policemen. We agree; it is very important to train the IPs to become a professional organization using Iraqi Police liaison officers (IPLOs) and traditional police training such as weapons training, investigation techniques, detainee handling procedures and the rule of law. These clearance operations, however, remained vital...
searched. We found quickly that once the individuals as their house was being information hand bills to pass out to search area. Our fire support officer made well received inside of the homes in the neighborhoods, and they usually were very caches, they knew who didn't belong in the collection. They knew where to look for searches and human intelligence (HUMINT) proved extremely effective at cache interaction with the locals. The Iraqi Police because nighttime patrols minimized IP their limited night-vision capabilities, and during daylight hours largely because of long before IPs planned every mission and coalition forces. Nevertheless, it did not take same way the missions did — led by support, but if we could not conduct the mission with them for whatever reason they continued the mission without us.

The Mission
Once we identified the area we were going to clear, we would do the initial coordination at the IP station. We met with the IP chief and normally his training officer. We told them the area we wanted to search, and they told us the number of policemen they could provide for the mission. Once the initial plan was set, we met at our combat outpost (COP) to conduct the rehearsal. The rehearsal usually took place on a sand table and consisted of the IP officers, the leaders of the platoon conducting the mission with the IPs, the commander, first sergeant, and executive officer (XO) to sort out any last minute logistical issues. Mission rehearsals were new to the Iraqis and began much the same way the missions did — led by coalition forces. Nevertheless, it did not take long before IPs planned every mission and led the rehearsals.

Our IP missions were primarily conducted during daylight hours largely because of their limited night-vision capabilities, and because nighttime patrols minimized IP interaction with the locals. The Iraqi Police proved extremely effective at cache searches and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. They knew where to look for caches, they knew who didn’t belong in the neighborhoods, and they usually were very well received inside of the homes in the search area. Our fire support officer made information hand bills to pass out to individuals as their house was being searched. We found quickly that once the hand bills made it into the hands of local women everyone knew about them the next day. The force multipliers we utilized during and after clearance missions included humanitarian assistance (HA) supply drops and military working dog teams, which are excellent assets for locating caches in the cooler months. During the mission our Soldiers moved behind each IP element, allowing us to assist in maintaining command and control, provide reports to higher, and most importantly employ our enablers such as attack aviation. Most of these missions covered an area two kilometers wide and five-to-seven kilometers long and would take several hours to complete, barring a cache or an IED find.

Each platoon conducted clearance patrols in their individual areas of operation and each platoon leader used the same basic patrol to accomplish extraordinary results which spanned the company’s sector, but more importantly crossed tribal boundaries.

Part of the Community (3rd Platoon)

Soon after the weekly clearance patrols began, it became apparent that they were catalysts for change. The most apparent and immediate changes came in the form of physical security, which we used as a means to bettering the community. Security provided our Soldiers the opportunity to interact with locals on an interpersonal level. It allowed our Soldiers and the local populace the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of exactly what and who we both were fighting for.

These clearance patrols would occasionally yield old caches, IEDs, and ordnance. However, the most amazing results that my platoon saw from doing these patrols and spending every day with these IPs and local nationals were the relationships built between American Soldiers and Iraqi citizens. Over time, I began to hear local nationals calling out both myself and my Soldiers by name. Our IPs would talk to locals, introduce us, and I would end up being invited over for tea or dinner. It was during these invites and interactions where the time we spent with our IP unit and local nationals would really pay off. We would hear about the real concerns that would drive Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects by our company projects officer, receive intelligence about the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) activity and eventually would get the idea to form local councils.

Many of the problems that faced American forces in the beginning of this war were amplified when we, as a foreign force, came up with our own solutions. This strategy was doomed to fail. By building these crucial interpersonal relationships, we met the local nationals’ chosen leaders (sheiks, imams, police chiefs, business...
Our company spent hours a day talking and socializing with these men. It was not uncommon to spend three hours coming to a conclusion that could have been reached in 15 minutes. By giving these men the respect of coming to them for solutions to local national problems, it accomplished several things for our forces in the area. First, it bought the respect of their leaders. Taking the time to come to them first and ask for help or offer ours made them feel important, respected, and ultimately more eager to cooperate with my company. Second, it bought the respect of the local nationals who could no longer ignore the fact that we were not an occupying force bent on running their lives or changing their culture. Residents of Hamdiya, a local town, would see us working and talking with the leaders they respected, followed, and trusted. Thus, the people of Hamdiya and the rest of our AO cultivated a sense of trust for the Americans who they perceived as advisors supporting their leaders. Finally, Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems, no matter the outcome of the decision, were always a plus. If their solution succeeded, it strengthened the leaders in the eyes of their people, bolstering sheiks’ support for coalition forces. If their solutions failed, it was not the Americans’ fault, and the sheiks were held accountable by their people, who demanded more effective solutions.

During these clearance missions, we collected vital data and feedback. We learned the terrain where individual families lived, scouted future projects, and assessed the tribal atmospheres. In time, the local Iraqis who once opposed our presence through violence and noncooperation began calling my Soldiers and me by name. I often wondered about their change of heart and concluded that our daily interactions tipped the scales. It is easy to hate and oppose the idea of America when all they see are Americans locked away inside vehicles or comes in the form of a cordon and knock in the middle of the night. After countless clearance missions and joint operations with IPs, it dawned on me that our security was no longer measured by a body count but by the strength of our relationship with the local populace. It became too hard for them to hate and fight against an ideal when they saw and interacted with Soldiers they knew on a daily basis.

**Insight into the Tribe (1st Platoon)**

One of the most important and lasting effects of our clearance patrols was the insight it provided into intertribal politics. The relationships we formed in each platoon area of operations provided the company with a more complete picture of not only our relationship with the locals but of their tribal relationships with one another and the inevitable conflict between each tribe. The clearance missions again served as a conduit for change and a new approach to CF involvement in tribal politics.

The joint clearance patrols served multiple functions and were an overwhelming success. As the local population became more comfortable with our presence, we began seeing why Iraq is a complicated and difficult battleground. My platoon drew the difficult task of overseeing two IP stations. Normally this would not pose any significant issue except that the two IP stations were in Albu Obaid and Zuweah in the Anbar province. These two particular tribes were constantly at odds with one another. As the area became more secure, and the local populace more comfortable with our presence, the underlying issues that affect everyday life rose to the surface. These tribal disputes allowed terrorists to move in and manipulate the population. The tribal fissures were a source of tension in neighborhoods closest to tribal boundaries, and as a result security was weakest in these areas. My platoon took on the challenge to bridge this gap and prevent future relapse into conflict.

Our goal has always been to create a stable environment for the local Iraqi government to take root. Iraq is riddled with unique tribes with distinctive beliefs that sometimes clash. We constantly endeavored to separate issues that should be handled by the local Iraqi government from the issues which required coalition involvement. In the end we discovered that every issue in Iraq needs to have an Iraqi voice and the coalition supported the local leadership’s decisions inasmuch as they remained congruent with our end state of a secure and self-sustained civil society.

As our platoon conducted these weekly clearance operations, the locals would constantly bury us under a tide of issues and complaints. We gained their trust and were treated as well-respected members of the community. We needed to support the local community, but at the same time distance ourselves from the issues that needed local leadership. Family disputes that last generations should be handled by the local sheiks and not coalition forces. The systems were already in place; we just needed to give some power back to the local government. My platoon used the local sheiks to handle a vast majority of the tribal arguments that arose between people. We helped give the power back to the people of Iraq, and by doing so came one step closer to a unified peaceful nation. The family heads helped to create representative councils that ensured the health, safety, and education of everyone in the community. Now that each tribe operated effectively, our goal became creating better relations between these two neighbors.

We used these clearance missions as a way to force the IPs from both Obaid and Zuweah to interact with each other. The two IP chiefs were forced to plan together, and the two communities were forced into each other’s lives. This met resistance at first, but as the weeks drove on, the two communities began trusting each other. A local farmer would talk to a passing IP even if he was from the opposite tribe. Each IP chief would offer trucks and IPs to help the other if the need arose. Locals looked toward the sheiks to solve local issues and the IPs to keep them safe. Coalition forces are still held in
high esteem, but Iraq is now looking inward for the solutions to its problems.

Projects for Peace (2nd Platoon)

One by-product of security and cooperation is tribal self-sufficiency. We accomplished this through careful project management over multiple tribal areas. Projects began as a way of getting money back into the hands of needy locals. They provided money for those who, in the absence of any other form of income, might resort to planting IEDs for money. Over time the projects evolved into long-term solutions to infrastructure and life support systems sustainment. Our security patrols provided the company opportunities to better assess the community’s needs and deliver the most vital projects to those in the most dire need. The rapport we earned with the local leadership through consistent security patrols allowed us a voice in the sheik council and provided us the ability to guide the effective use of projects within the community.

The joint security patrols and clearing operations produced a bond between the local ISF and my platoon’s Soldiers and in turn opened the minds of local leaders to usher in a period of reconstruction for Albu Bali. The establishment of security and stability by the local ISF allowed for local leaders to open their minds and work together to rebuild the local infrastructure.

Some projects were the immediate result of clearance operations. As the platoon — along with the IPs — cleared the canals, which lay like cobwebs across the town, we saw an opportunity to contract the labor necessary to clean and make the canals more effective and useable. A project was later designed to have local sheiks clean out their canals. A $500,000 project was laid out in which all 14 sub-tribal sheiks would receive a contract, ranging between $20,000-60,000 to clean out their own canals. The canal clearance missions succeeded in that locals appreciated the beautification of their town as well as the added security they provided by riddling the canals of caches and unexploded ordinance.

Other projects were later granted as well including funds to clean and repair its initial infrastructure. One of the routes had been badly damaged by enemy IEDs. These projects helped to level off large craters and clean it of debris. Another major project was designed to help compensate some 300 local ISF who were not hired as part of the 200-man paid police force. A project was instituted to hire 100 of these men as an armed fixed site security force. These men would guard key infrastructure in the village. Sites included schools, mosques, and the water treatment facilities. This security force received about half the amount of money than that of an IP but was enough to keep them employed, providing for their families, and part of the security solution in the AO until future jobs opened.

Over six months of operations, from what began as security patrols with a few local Iraqi Police came long-term solutions to security, stability, and a self-sufficient community. The key to this success, however, is not a simple doctrine. It requires adaptable leaders and Soldiers able to transition seamlessly from kinetic to humanitarian operations.

In Conclusion

In the daily reports most of the patrols were listed as Nothing Significant to Report (NSTR), but becoming part of the community, finding Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems, and gaining insight into the intertribal workings is far from NSTR. It is hard for any community to allow a member to be harmed in any way, and so becoming part of the community provides us with security. Insight into the tribe allows one to better understand the real problem behind the symptoms. Once the Iraqis start solving their own problems, there will be less need for American Soldiers on the ground, and that will bring us closer to our overall objective of a free and democratic Iraq. It is very important to train the Iraqi Police on the tasks that will eventually turn them into a police force that resembles one in the United States, but anyone who said these clearance missions were a waste of time and resulted in nothing significant to report doesn’t realize what winning really looks like.

Iraqi Police link up with coalition forces prior to a clearance mission.
Many units arrive at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, unprepared to integrate aviation support into their operations. Army leaders understand the five-paragraph operations order and mission brief, but ground leaders frequently neglect to use this format when briefing aviators for mission support. As a result, the briefings to supporting aviation units lack proper format and content, which ultimately leaves the supporting aviators without a common operational picture (COP) of the mission and its impact in the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) area of operations.

Ground commanders know and expect the benefits of the aviation support in the close fight, but do not train their units on the fundamentals of coordination with aviation units. Many would admit that they do not know what AGI (air ground integration) means. This lack of familiarization frequently leaves ground elements and aircrews fighting the same fight but poorly integrated, resulting in poor mission coordination and therefore less than ideal execution.

As a force multiplier, aviation can provide significant combat power for ground commanders when used properly. Ground maneuver commanders use AGI to synchronize aviation support into their concept of maneuver and communicate mission information to supporting aviation elements. Like any supporting effort, aircrews must have specific mission details in order to execute the ground commander’s intent. A trend observed at the NTC is that ground commanders and leaders are not familiar with the fundamentals of AGI prior to arrival and are therefore not prepared to coordinate with aircrews during combat missions. The purpose of this article is to emphasize the necessity and simplicity of AGI readiness.

Observations
The failure to integrate aviation assets starts with mission planning and extends through execution. Ground leaders routinely overlook the fact that aviators need mission details no different than their own organic elements. Examples include a mission statement, concept, intent, graphics and control measures, and a task and purpose. Ground leaders tend to provide an informal

*Aviation can provide significant combat power for ground commanders when used properly*

Journalist 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, USN
overview of the mission rather than crucial information when briefing aviators. Due to this lack of integration, aviators often end up executing missions without details such as a specific recon objective, a universal urban area numbering system, a list of locations and limits of named areas of interest (NAI), and a timeline for mission execution. This reduces the aviation influence on the ground scheme of maneuver, and can also cause confusion on the objective and even fratricide in the case of conflicting building numbering systems. Ground leaders can easily maximize the effect of aviation support by conducting proper AGI planning prior to and even during mission execution.

Over a period of several training rotations, observer controllers (OCs) at the NTC have observed examples of poor AGI briefing techniques. In one incident after conducting a pre-mission brief with his company, a ground commander stood in the middle of his carefully prepared terrain model and gave the supporting pilots an abbreviated concept statement that did not include his intent or scheme of maneuver for the attack aviation team. He then proceeded to ask questions about the aircrew’s capabilities during the mission without giving them a mission statement, intent, task, or purpose. Unfortunately, this style of AGI brief is closer to the norm rather than the exception.

On another mission, the ground commander gave an abbreviated brief to the crew chief, instead of the pilots, regarding his intent for aviation support. He only told the crew chief that he wanted route reconnaissance (recon) for his movement to the objective, then aerial security for the duration of the mission. He failed to provide the aircrew his maneuver plan, recon objectives, a timeline, a task and purpose for the aircrew, the location of the objective, and even a mission statement. This left the aircrew without situational awareness pertaining to these critical mission details. In this instance, the air mission commander (AMC) advised the ground commander that she needed additional mission details in order to provide specific aviation support. The ground commander then returned to provide a more thorough brief.

Even though many ground commanders have trouble integrating aviation, many do not. During these same rotations, OCs observed a number of examples of well-planned AGI. In one case, the ground commander provided an outstanding AGI package to his supporting aircrew by providing them a copy of his mission graphics and briefing them completely on his plan of execution. He clarified his concept of maneuver and aviation support, the aviation task and purpose, and his personnel recovery (PR) plan. He concluded with a brief back rehearsal in order to confirm that the aircrew understood his intent.

In general, the lack of coordination with supporting aviation teams points to the fact that most ground leaders are unfamiliar with AGI, and therefore do not train AGI at their home station. These leaders can greatly improve their combat readiness by becoming familiar with the essentials of AGI.

**Essentials**

“Planning is the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his subordinates his vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he expects to achieve.”

— FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production

The ground commander uses AGI procedures to communicate his intent to the aviation supporting effort. AGI starts with the ground commander’s concept of execution and must integrate aviation throughout the planning process for proper synchronization. In order for aviation to augment the commander’s combat power, supporting aviators must completely understand the ground maneuver plan and the commander’s concept for aviation support.

The best way of communicating his plan to supporting aviators is for the ground commander to conduct a standard five-paragraph operations order (OPORD) brief, given to aircrews as the air mission brief (AMB). The ground commander should include the supporting aviation team as a maneuver element. Observers at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) routinely note that ground units that track aviation like one of their own maneuver platoons are most successful in AGI. This requires ground leaders to include aviators in the planning and briefing process and to provide them with all mission details, including their intent and concept of operation for both ground and aviation elements, task and purpose, graphics and control measures, communication (commo) plan, and end state.

Prior to executing operations, the aviation task force, in conjunction with the BCT brigade aviation element (BAE) and the ground task force, should establish the minimal essential planning information required in order to dedicate aviation assets to specific missions. Suggested planning requirements include timelines, graphics, concept and objective sketches, imagery, landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) locations, target list worksheet, no fire/restricted fire areas, and the command and control (C2) plan. Aviators also need to know the marking techniques for friendly, enemy, and target

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliberate</th>
<th>Hasty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground to air:</strong></td>
<td>1. Situation update</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-paragraph OPORD and brief, all mission details and products, rehearsal</td>
<td>2. MTGCRD elements</td>
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<td>*Pre-mission planning and coordination</td>
<td>3. Friendly, enemy and target locations, description, and marking technique</td>
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<td><strong>Aircrew to ground:</strong></td>
<td>4. Location of Lzs/Pzs in case of contingencies</td>
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<td>Number of aircraft, time on station, munitions number and type, number of casualties they can carry, aircraft marking</td>
<td><strong>Aircrew to ground:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Pilots participate in pre-mission planning when possible</td>
<td>Number and type of aircraft, time on station, munitions number and type, number of casualties they can carry, aircraft marking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1 — Essentials of Deliberate and Hasty Coordination**
### General Comments
- Aviation assets have limited station time: use your aviation efficiently.
- Task organize aviation assets as a maneuver element.
- Maintain communication with aviation units as other maneuver elements.
- Give specific task and purpose.
- Weapons systems can cause collateral damage.
- Weapons systems cannot differentiate between friendly and hostile personnel.
- Plan should not be dependent upon aviation.
- Plan for aviation on all missions.

### Aviation Missions
- Security (area, screen, air assault)
- Attack (hasty, deliberate, shaping, decisive, close combat attack (CCA))
- Reconnaissance (zone, area, route)
- Defend

### Aviation Tactical Tasks
- Destroy
- Block
- Neutralize
- Defeat
- Delay

### Employment
- Direct fire
- Observation
- Reconnaissance (zone, area, route)
- Security

### Operational Graphics
- Attack by fire (ABF)
- Support by fire (SBF)
- Battle position (BP)
- Observation post (OP)

### Communications
- Use command net, maintain communication with air mission commander (AMC)
- Ensure you have primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications (PACE)
- Other aircraft may monitor alternate frequencies (fires, platoons, operations, and intelligence)
- Use plain and simple language
- Rehearse with aircrews if possible

### Aircraft Check In
- Call sign
- Number and type aircraft
- Ordnance on board and laser code
- Current location and ETA
- Time on Station
- Task and purpose
- ABF/BP

### Check In Brief

#### Supported Unit Attack Brief
- Unit identification and call sign
- Target description
- Target location
- Type of mark / laser code
- Location of friendly forces and unit markings
- Proposed ABF/BP (include direction of fire)
- Fire support (include control of fires and clearance of fires)
- Threat situational report (SITREP) (not limited to ADA systems)
- Support unit attack helicopter control measures and anti-fratricide measures

### Clearance of Fires
- Establish communications with aircraft
- Ensure aircrew knows task and purpose
- Know subordinate unit locations
- Pass information per check in brief
- Ensure ROE criteria is met

### Marking Techniques

#### Day
- VS-17 panel
- Smoke
- Star cluster
- Signal mirror
- Reverse polarity paper / panel
- Laser designator
- Combat identification panel
- Tracer fire

#### Night
- Infrared (IR) strobe
- Spotlight
- Chem light on a string (buzzsaw)
- IR spotlight
- IR laser pointer
- Laser designator
- Combat identification panel
- Tracer fire

*You must know your unit's location.*

### Aircraft Capabilities

#### AH-64 A/D
- Optics: TADS (FLIR), video recorder
- Weapons: 30 mm cannon (300-600 rounds), 2.75 inch rockets (20-38), Hellfire missiles (4-8)
- On station time: 2.5 to 3.5 hours

#### OH-58D
- Optics: Day TV, video recorder
- Weapons: .50 cal MG (300 rounds), 2.75 inch rockets (7), Hellfire missile (2)
- On station time: 2 hours

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**Figure 2 — AGI Smart Card**
positions, who has authority for clearance of fires, applicable aviation rules of engagement (ROE), the ground commander’s PR plan, and if there are any restricted operating zones (ROZs) in effect (CALL Handbook 04-16, Cordon and search, July 04, p. 108).

The more information aviators have regarding the mission, the better support they can provide. Ground leaders can also keep radio traffic to a minimum by ensuring that aviators have all necessary mission information before mission execution. The air mission request (AMR) or pre-mission brief techniques best serve this purpose. The minimum essential information requirement will vary with the type of mission request. For example, attack teams conducting hasty support of troops in contact (TIC) need less information than assault aircrews planning a deliberate limited objective air assault.

The preparation of a five-paragraph OPORD brief, which includes the supporting aviators in the planning and preparation, is the best approach for coordinating aviation supported missions. When time does not allow deliberate preparation, the hasty mission brief (i.e., a close combat attack [CCA]) request over the radio, must still provide as much information as possible to supporting aviators in order for them to maximize the effect of aviation support. The pneumonic “meeting card” (MTGCRD) serves as a mental checklist that simplifies the minimum essential details required for aviators to execute support for ground missions. The MTGCRD includes the mission, task/purpose, graphics and control measures, commo plan, rehearsal, and downed aircraft recovery team (DART) plan. Figure 1 outlines ground and air briefing requirements for deliberate and hasty mission coordination.

The benefit of the MTGCRD elements of AGI is that ground leaders can pass this information over the radio.

Mission: Provide aviation support team with mission statement.

Task/Purpose: Deliberate task and purpose for aviation support.

Graphics and control measures: All graphics and control measures pertinent to missions. If necessary, refer to ground reference points, buildings, trees, etc. in order to provide a COP to the supporting aircrew.

Commo plan: All possible elements of communication, including frequencies for the ground commander and all necessary supporting elements.

Rehearsal: Can be difficult during hasty mission request. When possible, pilots read back instructions for hasty AGI. If more time is available, leaders can use a more developed rehearsal.

DART and Personnel Recovery plan: Plan for recovering aircraft and isolated personnel.

While many ground commanders do not understand the technical details of performing specific aviation missions, they can still provide an adequate mission statement by establishing the desired outcome of the aviation support. Leaders executing AGI can best accomplish this by using the simplest terms possible, such as “Destroy the [target] at [location].” Once the supporting pilots understand the intent, they can execute the task appropriately in order to accomplish the mission.

The rehearsal is essential to understand between the ground commander and the supporting aviation unit. Both the air mission commander and the ground commander can use a variety of rehearsals ranging from a verbal brief over the radio to a full dress walk through using a terrain model to ensure all parties understand the mission and their role in the successful completion of the mission. The use of a rehearsal is critical to AGI because it identifies points of uncertainty in the ground and aviation units’ understanding of the operation.

Army units have produced significant amounts of documentation highlighting AGI techniques and lessons learned, including several Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publications and unit AGI material such as the 3ID Warfighter Handbook. These resources present valuable techniques and are available for units to implement in their training. One example is the AGI smart card (Figure 2) and target handover event matrix found in the CALL Handbook 04-16, Cordon and Search, July 04, page 111-112. This smart card serves as a checklist for coordination with aviation elements, providing an effective baseline of AGI procedures.

The AGI smart card includes minimal essential items based on their importance. The initial check in, for example, sets the conditions for success by alerting the ground commander to the supporting aviation team’s call sign, total number of aircraft, ordnance available, and time on station. The ground leader then updates the aircrew on applicable items as shown. Ground leaders can use the AGI card as a planning checklist as well as a quick reference for aviation employment, clearance of fires, marking techniques, and communications, as shown on the card.

In passing mission information, both aviation and ground leaders should utilize the “push/pull” method of passing mission information. If either the ground or the aviation element has information the other leader needs, that leader needs to “push” it to the appropriate unit. For example, aircrews notify convoy commanders regarding enemy activity or obstacles along their route, and convoy commanders push enemy surface to air (SA) weapons reports to the aircrew as soon as they detect the threat. On the same note, if either element needs specific information, that leader should “pull” it, meaning he should request it from the appropriate source until he gets it. Leaders can construct a continuous situation update by requesting information from other units.

Once deployed to a combat theater, ground mission commanders will rarely conduct face-to-face coordination with supporting aircrews prior to missions. At best, ground units may see a liaison officer (LNO) during mission planning from the supporting aviation unit. Rather, ground units will use air mission requests (AMRs) to request aviation support and inform aviation units regarding mission details through their respective BCT. Units send AMRs from the battalion S3 to brigade staff for approval and tasking, with further coordination through the BAE, the division, and the combat aviation brigade (CAB). Following approval, respective units make further coordination as necessary through various means in order to ensure mission success. The Army Command Post of the Future (CPOF) collaborative planning system best facilitates this process. Another way to refine the plan is for units to exchange LNOs to coordinate in person.

When using the AMR process, ground units should include as much detailed mission information as possible to include mission statement, task and purpose, graphics and control measures, communications plan, time for rehearsal, the DART and PR plans, the commander’s intent and concept of maneuver, as well as a copy...
of the applicable OPORD. This prevents aircrews and ground leaders from using valuable mission time clarifying details over the radio during execution. Ground and air elements then conduct further mission refinement via radio on site during mission execution.

Both ground and air teams often experience communication problems during mission execution. Ground leaders find that they can best communicate with aircrews if they fully integrate them into the ground scheme of maneuver and both ground and air elements have a common terminology. Leaders can ensure success in communications by developing a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan for frequencies and radios, ensuring they have redundant methods of communication should any one method fail.

AGI Home Station Training

To prepare for close combat, basic tasks must be completed during home station training. FM 3-04.126

The time to train AGI is not the day of the fight. Rather, the time to train AGI occurs as part of normal unit training during the months before deployment. This training will produce high payoffs in familiarizing unit leaders on AGI and preparing them to work with aviation teams during combat missions. Figure 3 depicts the development and resources supporting home station training.

During AGI training, units can train leaders on the full sequence of mission operations, from pre-mission planning through execution and debriefing. Ground leaders will improve their comprehension of aviation capabilities by becoming acquainted with aviation manuals and CALL publications that refer to AGI, as well as their supporting aviation unit’s standard operating procedure (SOP) and AGI Smart Card. Unit leaders can use academic classes to familiarize both ground and aviation personnel on AGI procedures, highlighting information essential to successful coordination of aviation supported missions. Important topics include mission brief format and content, and the capabilities of Army tactical aircraft. As a baseline of familiarization, unit leaders should use their unit’s tactical SOP (TACSOP) and an AGI smart card similar to the one shown in Figure 2 to ensure they include essential information during AGI training.

Once they have a good understanding of the AGI process, key leaders can integrate AGI into their normal home station training. For example, units can coordinate aviation support for all training, including situational training exercises (STXs) for cordon and search missions, reconnaissance, combat mounted patrol missions, and convoy operations, with the intent of training AGI skills. AGI lanes can also focus on hasty operations, requiring ground leaders to utilize the essentials of hasty AGI. Ground leaders can maximize the benefit gained from aviation support if their AGI battle drill competence reaches down to the lowest level and is as common as that of the call for indirect fire battle drill. Sergeant’s Time Training is an example of such a training opportunity, and the results of this competence have already paid off in the combat theater. For example, aviators returning from Afghanistan relate stories of junior enlisted Soldiers conducting AGI in order to direct aircraft during CCAs, air assaults, and even to call air strikes from Air Force close air support (CAS). Units can improve their AGI skills by including AGI in their TACSOP.

Conclusion

Units may not have the luxury of face-to-face coordination in the combat zone. Ground commanders will use AMRs to request aviation support and will find themselves conducting AGI over the radio once the aircraft arrive on station. Having trained on essential coordination tasks and conducted familiarization with aviation units long before deployment, ground leaders will be ready to add the combat power of aviation teams to their capabilities in the close fight.

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  - Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Cordon and Search Handbook Number 04-16 (July 2004)
  - CALLCOMS 10003-78447, Reference Battle Drills
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When the article was written, MAJ Rob Taylor was serving as an observer controller for the Aviation Trainers (Eagle Team) at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. He is currently assigned to the Defense Language Institute studying French and Portuguese as a Foreign Area Officer.
The concept of the squad designated marksman (SDM or DM) first surfaced in the draft M16 field manual, FM 3-22.9, and FM 3-21.9, *The SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* in late 2000, early 2001. These early requirements are also reflected in the requirement for a designated marksman rifle variant of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW). Since then, the global war on terrorism has underscored the need for designated marksmen, but further development of the three elements of the designated marksman requirement — material, training, and tactics — have been fitful. Each element alone has very little chance of making a meaningful impact on today’s warfighter. Combined, they make the designated marksman a formidable threat.

During the war, Soldiers and leaders have determined that a precision engagement gap exists at the small unit level, but have struggled to define what that gap is. For the purposes of discussion I will use the following definition of the designated marksman’s requirements:

1. The capability to effectively place rounds into the Neck/Head Lethal Zone (4” wide x 8” high) as defined by FM 3-22.9, Chapter 7.
2. Current small unit weapons are perceived to not possess the accuracy to provide the precision engagement of the lethal zone required at 100-300 meters most commonly encountered in Iraq.
3. Many Soldiers/leaders believe the current 5.56-mm weapon systems lack the accuracy to quickly index and engage targets between 300-600 meters frequently encountered in Afghanistan.
4. The requirement has emerged to engage (interspersed with noncombatants) improvised explosive device (IED) operators, suicide bombers, and enemy marksmen within 300-600 meters that require immediate central nervous system (CNS) engagement to reduce unit and noncombatant casualties.

“"I agree that there is a marksmanship gap at the unit level from 300-600m as mentioned and believe the designated marksman at squad level is a possible answer to this. In Afghanistan, we had multiple engagements (I would say vast majority of our engagements) with the enemy (were) from beyond 300m. A lot of engagements took place on our resupply convoys/vehicle patrols. The enemy in these cases always had the high ground because all roads in my AO were in river valleys and followed the river on the valley floor. The terrain was too steep to possibly make a road on higher ground. With the enemies high ground advantage, it was like they were shooting fish in a barrel. They only had to spend a quick second exposing themselves to dump a magazine of AK ammo down in our general direction before dropping behind cover or the crest of the ridge or hill they were on and out of our sight and then they would just repeat until we brought indirect fires on them. Rifle fire/crew served weapons was of little effect on them in most cases. I attribute this to three reasons. Lack of marksmanship ability past 300m for which our standard weapons are zeroed at, lack of knowledge on how to engage or lead a moving or pop-up target, and angle firing."

— Staff Sergeant John Hawes, C Troop, 3-71 RSTA, 10th Mountain Division

**Material**

The current M16A4/M4 is a very accurate weapon with proper training and ammunition selection. However, commanders continue to ask for a better material solution to the DM’s requirements. A thorough discussion of how to address material improvements is impossible within the context of this article. However, refining the weapon platform through improved configurations, a matched optic, and ammunition will increase the DM’s capability. The objective is to provide for more consistent shot placement in order to destroy the enemy.

**Rifle:** Accurizing the M16 family of weapons is a common practice that has been applied by the service rifle teams and civilian shooters in competition for over a decade. The most common solutions have already been applied to the Special Operations MK12, Marine Corps Squad Advanced Marksman-Rifle (SAM-R), and the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit’s (USAMU) Designated Marksman Rifles. The Crane MK12 is being qualified for 1.75-inch 5 shot extreme spread groups at 100 yards suppressed with MK262 ammo. The USAMU-built rifles are qualified for 10-shot groups smaller
than 3.28 inches at 300 meters, with MK262 ammo. The USMC’s SAM-R rifles are built to a 2 MOA specification, with MK262 ammo. The methods to do so are not hard and generally consist of a “match grade” trigger, free-floated barrel and a “match grade barrel.” I say generally, because each variation has subtle differences as shown by how their accuracy is defined. These specialized rifles do produce improvements over the base M4/M16. However, without an underlying training program and supporting tactics those improvements may not be realized by the unit.

**Target Detection (Optics):** Target detection begins with scanning your sector looking for what doesn’t belong. Scanning crowds with the optic on your rifle is no way to make friends in any country, so what do you do? The current issue M24 Mini-Binoculars can provide the DM with a lightweight 8X ability to scan. The greatest advantage of the M24 is that Soldiers are able to scan for longer periods of time at a higher magnification and greater field of view then they would be using a rifle-mounted optic. The M24 also provides a ranging reticle for range estimation and adjusting indirect fires.

Once a threat is detected, you need to be able to engage with your rifle optic. Many of the advantages over the M4 with ACOG of the MK12 SPR and the SAM-R are provided by the use of a higher powered magnified optic, then the 4x ACOG. The two most commonly encountered optics for use by the military designated marksman are the Trijicon ACOG and the Leupold Mark 4 MR/T. Each optic has its advantages and represent a compromise. Selection needs to reflect the TTPs of the unit and the level of training committed to sustaining the units’ DM program. Key considerations when selecting the optic are ranging, ballistic holdover’s, and the ability to quickly detect and acquire the target. Low power 4x optics appear more stable when firing off hand or in other nonstandard firing positions. High-powered optics provide more precise target identification and target engagement.

**Trijicon ACOG Rifle scopes:** The Trijicon ACOG (TA31RCO, M150 RCO, or TA31F) is the most common magnified optic currently being employed by the Army and the TA31RCO for the USMC. SOCOM SOPMOD Block II uses a TA31ECOS version that adds an unmagnified red dot sight. The ACOG offers a very simple ranging reticle that incorporates a bullet drop compensator (BDC) in one reticle. The ACOG’s illuminated reticle also allows for use of the ACOG at close quarters nearly has fast as the M68 Close Combat Optic. The standard issue sights are 4X magnification, but larger 5.5X or 6X versions are also available (TA55: 5.5x50 or TA648: 6x48 Trijicon ACOG). Both versions offer common training with the issue TA31RCO/TA31F and are worth considering verses the more complicated Mark 4 MR/T scopes. The commands assessments of their requirements really determine the proper choice.

**Leupold Mark 4 MR/T Rifle scopes:** Leupold Mark 4 MR/T’s are most commonly found on the SOCOM MK12 SPRs and the USMC’s SAM-R (and the M110 SASS). The selection of this optic reflects an operational employment different from the Army. The Marine Corp’s standard optic is the ACOG, unlike the Army’s M68. With that in mind, a higher-powered scope such as the 2.5-8X MR/T for the SAM-R makes sense. Unlike the ACOG, the MR/T is typically used by extremely well-trained designated marksman. It is a specialized optic that is not well suited to close combat work, but extremely good at intermediate range work. Its higher magnification allows for more precise target selection and to some extent improved target detection. Depending on the reticle, range finding, and ballistic hold over’s, the MR/T will require more
advanced training than either the Trijicon or Aimpoint (M68).

Ammunition: Great debate continues on the accuracy of 5.56-mm M855 (standard ball 5.56mm) versus MK262 ("match grade" 5.56mm). Using published reports, it is often hard to sort out the truth due to the use of different data points for comparing information. For example in a Crane NDIA brief on the M855 vs. MK262 Iron sighted M16's with M-855 are compared to MK12's with MK262. In that example MK12 with MK262's accuracy is clearly superior to M885. However, if you were to make a composite of M4 with ACOG vs. the MK12 both using MK262 you see very close performance. Indeed a summary showing the M4 w/ACOG & M855 vs. MK262 is the best comparison. The comparison of the M4 with ACOG vs. the MK12 SPR shows that with MK262 ammo the standard Army issue M4 is mechanically capable of meeting the requirements outlined above.

However, MK262’s improved accuracy comes at a cost of penetration over M855. M855 will penetrate hard targets at slightly longer ranges, for example, 3/16 ASTM A36 mild steel; M855 at 315 yards versus MK262 at 256 yards. Again, this means that commanders have to balance their mission requirements against the material they use to accomplish the task. In both loadings, inconsistent terminal effectiveness on the enemy underlines the importance of good shot placement.

Training

Proper training and shooter selection within a TTP-driven program are more important than any of the material solutions.

"The main factor units need to address in developing their DM Program is the training. The skill set given to the shooter will determine his ability to engage targets consistently at distance effectively. Good marksmanship is not 40/40 on a pop-up range but rather the ability to place rounds in the same spot time after time. A shooter with an understanding of a good body position, what the round is (doing) during the external phase of ballistics and proper eye (to) sight alignment, he will be effective consistently. But a shooter who doesn’t understand how to properly point the rifle and fire it without movement will never be effective regardless of the optics or modifications made to a rifle. The concept is simple but the ability to train this is lost because of short cuts engrained in current marksmanship programs. The current M4 is capable of meeting the DM needs as long as the shooter has the proper skill set. It is far less expensive to teach a skill set than to equip shooters with a system they are unable to effectively use because they can’t properly point the rifle and fire it without movement."

—1st Sergeant Scott Baughn

Former commandant of the 10th Mountain Division’s Light Fighters School

Training is the one variable that the commander can control. An intense pre-deployment focus on developing the fundamental skills, stabilizing the designated marksmen in position, and a sustainment program focused on the designated marksman’s advanced skills while deployed, are a must. Too often, Soldiers are selected as designated marksmen, sent to school for training and then return to their unit and assume other duties. In designing a sustainment program, the commander will need to overcome several institutional issues beyond stabilizing the Soldiers.

SSG Hawes outlined the following shortcomings: “Lack of marksmanship ability past 300m for which our standard weapons are zeroed at, lack of knowledge on how to engage or lead a moving or pop-up target, and angle firing.” Each of these are difficult tasks for commanders to get at, in particular while deployed. Moving target ranges are not normally designed as rifle ranges. Ranges for angle firing from extreme elevations, such as rooftops or hilltops, are rarely available. Very few posts have more than one range designed to require Soldiers to engage targets between 300-600 meters, as frequently encountered in Afghanistan. Even fewer have...
a range designed for engaging small fleeting targets such as IED operators, suicide bombers, and enemy marksmen within 300 meters interspersed with noncombatants, such as often encountered in Iraq. With this in mind, institutionally we need to look at how our range complexes are developed and institute some of the lessons learned into their design.

**Tactics**

Failure to develop a sound set of operational tactics for the employment of the designated marksman will decrease his effectiveness.

First, the DM is NOT A SNIPER. Some of the skill sets are transferable, but the DM is not a sniper. Tactics are very complicated and vary by many factors based on the AOR and level of training of the unit. Doctrinally the few references available are in conflict.

The DM’s role is well-defined in FM 3-22.9, *Rifle Marksmanship*: “The primary mission of the SDM is to deploy as a member of the rifle squad. The SDM is a vital member of his individual squad and not a squad sniper. He fires and maneuvers with his squad and performs all the duties of the standard rifleman. The SDM has neither the equipment nor training to operate individually or in a small team to engage targets at extended ranges with precision fires. The secondary mission of the SDM is to engage key targets from 300 to 500 meters with effective, well-aimed fires using the standard weapon system and standard ammunition.”

Under this definition the use of a highly tuned precision rifle such as the USMC’s SAM-R or the SOF MK12 SPR presents a risk. Is this rifle system the right thing to have in a Soldiers’ hands when clearing buildings? Are the M14 based systems that are being promoted the right answer? Deployed as a member of the clearing squad, an M4 based solution would appear to be the better choice.

FM 3-21.9, *The SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, states: “Designated Marksman. The designated marksman acts as a member of the squad under the direction of the squad leader or as designated by the platoon leader. Although normally functioning as a rifleman within one of the fire teams in a rifle squad, the designated marksman is armed with a modified M4, 5.56-mm rifle. He is employed at the direction of the squad leader or reorganized with the other squads’ designated marksmen into a platoon sniper section. He is trained to eliminate high-payoff enemy personnel targets (such as enemy automatic rifle teams, antitank teams, and snipers) with precision fires.”

This definition opens up the possibility for a different material solution. I disagree with the proposition that the DM is well-suited to counterniper/sniper duties. If, however, you accept the DM being consolidated at the platoon level, such as under the weapon squad leader, then different material solutions are possible. Use of the Javelin Gunners with specialized rifles, such as the MK12 or SAM-R, is one possible solution. DM’s could then be task organized to support the squads, or remain under the control of the weapons squad leader to provide supporting fires and overwatch for the platoon. Other 7.62mm solutions such has the M14 Enhanced Battle Rifle or the Special Operation MK14 also have advantages that could also be explored.

**Balancing security with civilian interaction is key for units patrolling in Iraq.**

**Conclusion**

The designated marksman is a great combat multiplier. Properly trained, equipped, and employed DM’s are devastating to the enemy on the battlefield. If they are improperly trained or employed, they are just another guy on the battlefield. Does your unit need the latest MATERIAL advancement in Optics, Rifles, and Ammunition? Maybe. Will your TRAINING program alone allow you to dominate the battlefield? Maybe. Without sound TACTICS within which to employ your DM’s, will you realize their full potential? No. Only by pursuing a balanced approach and fully examining requirements and committing resources to those requirements will you truly achieve MISSION SUCCESS — (Material x Training)/Tactics = Mission Success.

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There has been a book published about the Civil War for every day of the nearly 150 years since this country was torn asunder by that conflict. That means that by 2015 there will have been nearly 55,000 Civil War books published. One would think that the final word on the Civil War has been written, but publishing houses continue to crank them out. For any book to make an impact it must offer either new information or a unique perspective. With a title like *Men of Fire: Grant, Forrest, And The Campaign That Decided The Civil War*, this book promises to be one of those. It is a promise unfulfilled.

This book is a mundane recitation of well-known facts packaged in a less than convincing premise. The author claims that the battles of Forts Henry and Donelson were a “‘Battle of the Bulge’ without overcoats.” That’s a cute allusion without basis. His idea that the battles “decided” the war seems to be rooted in Ulysses S. Grant’s resulting rise of military fortunes. Although a significant factor in the war, Grant’s brilliance was a facet of his character completely apart from those particular battles. He makes no convincing claim that the battles themselves were militarily significant. If anything, these battles set the conditions for the increasingly brutal battles to come. They reinforced Grant’s belief that the war would be short, a faulty but widely shared idea he held only until the bloodbath of Shiloh.

The author’s focused appraisals of Grant and Nathan Bedford Forrest is at best apples and oranges attempts to create some linkage between these two leaders where none exists. The idea that Forrest, an insanely brave tactical commander who may not have attained his true potential as a military leader, compares with Grant, a determined strategic master who rose to the supreme leadership of the largest army in U. S. history up to that time, is dubious at best.

Hurst’s analysis of Grant shallowly tills this already well-plowed field. The author heavily relies on Grant’s often reported but highly suspect reputation for drunkenness and his financial troubles as the explanation for his stubborn nature and motivation to succeed. It is a pseudo-psychological analysis that attributes Grant’s genius to his need to overcome past failures. While this may have been a factor in Grant’s success defending mention, the author’s nearly 25 references to Grant’s drinking leave the reader with the impression that he is relying on it solely.

The author previously wrote a biography of Forrest so his analysis of the man is uniformly positive. The vision of Forrest in this book is one of leader with a high level military acumen that generally conforms to the popular image of the man rather than the more accurate depiction of Forrest as a small-time raider with often spectacular but transitory impact on the enemy. He also soft peddles Forrest’s post war membership in the fledging Ku Klux Klan as a “believable legend.”

Overall, this book is a good read with questionable notions. One may turn to it for the sake of discussion, but it is hardly a definitive treatment of either the campaigns or the leaders. *Men of Fire* is not likely to attain a notable position within the body of Civil War historiography.

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Delendo est Carthago seemed the ultimate in imposing defeat until mutual assured destruction (MAD) came along, but salted soil and radioactive residue both raise doubts about such successes. Victory is a tricky word with many imprecise meanings. More important is what comes next. What makes a satisfactory outcome after the surrender, cease-fire, and peace treaty? There are a number of events that may happen: disarmament, reparations, loss of sovereignty and/or territory, change of government and/or system of government - both political and economic, and imposition of a new religion. Getting away with minimum damage may be a sort of victory. All of these may sow the seeds of future discord.

Martel uses case studies of the conclusion of past conflicts to illustrate the complexity of deciding when there is a winner but fails to extract the full value of these lessons. We celebrate the achievement of our independence but forget the failure to accomplish a major war aim. Despite the valiant efforts of Montgomery and Arnold, we did not add the Canadian provinces to these United States. We failed again in the War of 1812 (didn’t even get close this time) and settled for a draw. Luckily, impressment and the blockade had become moot questions and the British had their second string at Ghent, so the peace terms were better than we deserved. The invasion of Mexico was an unprovoked war of conquest where we limited our objectives only because we didn’t want to chew off more than we could handle. The highly populated area of Nova Espana had shown what they could do against an imperial power in securing their independence. Our Civil War was supposedly to preserve the Union and abolish slavery, but the evil of Jim Crow persisted for another century. The Spanish-American War gave Cuban independence, albeit with the strings of the Platt Amendment, but only exchanged colonial masters for Guam, Guantanamo, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. We did eventually pull out of the Philippine Archipelago but not until our bases there had apparently threatened the flank of the Japanese advance to the south and caused their attack on Pearl Harbor. Among our goals in the Great War were a world safe for democracy and peace among nations. No comment is needed about their durability.
In WWII, a measure of victory was established by the requirement of unconditional surrender, but it was immediately compromised by the terms given Italy and later those given Japan. In Korea, we receded from harsh demands to the acceptance of a truce with a third-rate power. At least things didn’t accelerate to a global nuclear war; the independence of South Korea was preserved and she has since become a major economic power. North Korea, on the other hand, remains a festering sore, threatening world peace. About all that can be said about ‘Nam is that more dominos didn’t fall and, again, no worldwide war. The Cold War was a prolonged confrontation rather than a “hot” one, and the conclusion was marked by a combination of circumstances.

Today, we’re confronted with the situation where we’ve achieved success in military operations in two theaters, but the future seems less promising. Victory against non-state adversaries is difficult for conventional forces to accomplish and measure but is not impossible. I didn’t expect the author to have a cure-all for getting through the quagmires we’re now mired in but did hope for some useful historic precedents. Martel’s background at the Naval War College and at RAND raised my expectations. Perhaps they were too high, although I did pick up some new and interesting information and perspectives on the subject.


Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN

The Vietnam conflict is one that cannot be avoided when studying American military history, strategy, and national policy. There are two books worth reading that enable a deeper reflection on how the United States makes decisions and prioritize threats to its national security. The first book is 

Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam by Kathryn Slater, an associate professor at the University of San Diego. She takes a closer look at the French, American and South Vietnamese policies that led the United States to inherit the Vietnam War from the French. The focus is the decade of the 1950s to 1963. French officials exhausted by World War II and wanting to maintain its colonies in Algeria and Indochina sought American military equipment. To that end, Paris redefined the argument not in terms of preserving its colony, but as a bulwark to stem the growing tide of communist encroachment in Vietnam. The arguments made include that France’s commitments to her overseas possessions prevented her from contributing fully to NATO. External events like the start of the Korean War and domestic politics like the communist scare driven by Senator Joseph McCarthy would also shape Vietnam policy, with the United States sending the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in September 1950. MAAG would be a permanent fixture throughout America’s involvement in Vietnam and would, from its inception, take over the training of Vietnamese military officers and pilots. Readers will learn that Vietnam, a war associated with the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, was actually fiercely debated as early as during the presidency of Harry Truman. The book ends in 1963, with the transition of South Vietnam’s social, economic and military programs from the reluctant French to the United States. According to the author, South Vietnamese President Diem, a Catholic, manipulated not only the French and American governments but utilized senior Catholic officials to influence policy. It is an excellent read as to the forces that drove the United States towards a course of action.

The Naval Institute Press has re-issued in soft cover a classic on America’s involvement in Vietnam. General Douglas Kinnard first published The War Managers in 1977, and it reports on the views of over 60 percent of U.S. commanders in Vietnam from 1965 until the start of America’s departure in 1973. This is a difficult read, but vital if we are to understand new ways to measure success in America’s future conflicts. Some themes that come out of Kinnard’s work included a disconnect between tactical successes against North Vietnam and the politico-military strategy of the war. Measures of success from the American perspective was gains on a map, and then body counts; this meant nothing for a protracted quasi-guerilla war of national liberation. Other criticism include shaping the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) into an American fighting force instead of capitalizing on the thousands of years of Vietnamese fighting methods. The book raises questions on how the military should interact with civilian leaders, and that the Huntingtonian model of a clear separation between military and civilian affairs is not realistic. The book also discusses many little known facts of the Vietnam War, such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s creation of a special office for Vietnamization, which the book considers to be a good idea that seemed to inject civilian control of policy options for the war, but ended up being a coordinating office. Kinnard sent 173 questionnaires to flag officers serving in Vietnam, and got over a 60-percent response. Their taking the time to answer this survey provides future American military leaders insight into how better to serve the United States and the senior leaders of its Executive Branch.
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*Specialist Daniel Herrera*

Iraqi children gather around a 25th Infantry Division Soldier as he patrols the streets of Al Asiriyah, Iraq, August 4, 2008.