Counterinsurgency: Success in a Dynamic Environment (Page 1)
COIN: On-The-Job Learning for the New Platoon Leader (Page 25)
An Introduction to Arab Culture: A Brief Synopsis for US Soldiers (Page 39)
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COUNTERINSURGENCY:
SUCCESS IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT

C onstant change is a defining element of today’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Any technological, tactical, or informational advantage of either side soon evokes responses and countermeasures to offset it. While an enemy, without ready access to technologies commensurate with our own, may not be able to immediately develop countermeasures, his tactics can evolve more rapidly. In tribal societies, such as those in which coalition forces now operate, the insurgent also takes advantage of local connections and relationships, and we must determine how to seize and retain the initiative if we are to be successful. In this Commandant’s Note, I want to review our own experience and that of other nations in dealing with insurgencies and highlight some of our recent initiatives that offer approaches to COIN which address the fight in the context of today’s operational environment.

While the global war on terrorism (GWOT) may not represent a paradigm for all future wars, it does nevertheless offer lessons as to the nature of present threats and how we can more effectively deal with them. We have gained a better appreciation of the importance of the population and its culture. We have also developed new approaches to understanding an enemy, his motivation, and his commitment. We have learned these lessons before. Our Special Forces and advisors lived with, trained, and supported tribal leaders of the diverse cultures in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against the Vietnamese Communists, and today in the forbidding terrain of Southwest Asia their successors operate among the tribal and ethnic populations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The cultural awareness training which we employ today draws upon British forces’ experience in the three Afghan Wars from 1839 until 1918, during World War I, and in WWII. During World War I, Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence served with Arab irregular troops against forces of the Ottoman Empire, contributing to the defeat of the Ottoman Turks and their German allies in Arabia. Beginning with his early Arabic studies and experience as an archeologist in Syria, Lawrence had recognized the uniqueness of the culture and learned what it took to work effectively within it. His “27 Articles,” originally published in The Arab Bulletin in 1917, and Seven Pillars of Wisdom offer insights into a society whose religion and family, clan, and tribal loyalties, feuds, and rivalries are significant to this day. General Vo Nguyen Giap considered Lawrence’s observations his gospel for battle, and Lawrence’s insights also found resonance among American advisors in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Today’s military transition teams tasked with training Iraqi and Afghan military and civilian agencies have likewise drawn upon his suggestions for dealing with their counterparts. Today our Soldiers and leaders employ both traditional approaches to COIN and an understanding of the cultures and realities of their respective areas of operation as they aggressively prosecute the GWOT, and we have just published a manual that captures our understanding of successful counterinsurgency operations.

Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, bridges the gap between the way we have traditionally approached COIN and the realities of today’s operational environment. The manual is an up-to-date, practical source document for units conducting counterinsurgency operations. It introduces five key concepts of counterinsurgency and presents a comprehensive approach to COIN. This manual addresses concepts of security, governance, economics, and information engagement in a manner relevant to brigades, battalions, and companies. One of the fundamental aspects of FM 3-24.2 is its introduction of COIN lines of effort (LOEs) as a tool for units to link multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. The new manual recognizes the uniqueness of each insurgency and encourages commanders to modify LOEs according to their own situation by combining them, dividing them, or by otherwise using them in the manner that can best defeat the insurgency. The manual presents a detailed discussion of the components and manifestations of an insurgency, and thus offers a means to better understand the operational environment. It also describes types of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that take place in the course of a counterinsurgency. Particularly relevant to today’s operating environment is the manual’s discussion of the training and mentoring of host nation security forces, which focuses on the mission of Soldiers and leaders serving on military transition teams. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is another difficult but integral part of COIN, and the FM 3-24.2 addresses the challenges and difficulties of properly conducting an IPB.

The global war on terrorism is a period of persistent combat against a determined and tenacious enemy, and we must continue to capture and apply successful tactics, techniques, and procedures as we retain the initiative to defeat him. FM 3-24.2 reflects this application of lessons learned over the past decades and the wisdom of our earlier field manuals, and offers an azimuth that will ultimately yield victory. FM 3-24.2 is now available online at the following AKO link: https://www.army.mil/suite/folder/15648151, and I encourage you and your subordinates to read it at your earliest opportunity, incorporate it into your operations, and give us your feedback. Follow me!

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL BARBERO

January-February 2009

INFANTRY 1
The Combined Arms Center - Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., has released a new handbook aimed at formalizing procedures for one of the most difficult periods any leader might encounter — transitioning into a new position of leadership.

The Leadership Transitions Handbook provides leaders at all experience levels a systematic approach to transitioning into a new position, according to CAL officials. They said the book provides an approach that can be tailored to meet the needs of both new and experienced leaders.

“The challenges of leadership are often greatest when there is a leadership transition, resulting in a shift in roles and responsibilities,” said COL Bruce J. Reider, director of the Center for Army Leadership. “While the Army transitions leaders with regularity, it has not formalized this significant event in its leader development process. It is imperative that leadership transitions occur efficiently and effectively particularly during this era of persistent conflict and high operations tempo.”

Preparing to take command or to transition to any new position of responsibility is a natural progression for Army leaders and is something that has always been taken seriously by those designated for it, but there has not been a systematic or standard approach that is taught or used to guide young leaders during this period of transition.

Conducted properly, the transition period can lay the groundwork and provide a framework for action that helps minimize uncertainty and create the conditions for success, CAL officials said. Having a plan for the transition ensures leaders can maximize the opportunities and mitigate the challenges that arise during the process, they said, adding that the new Leadership Transitions Handbook will help make these transitions more successful.

Sections in the Leadership Transitions Handbook include:
• Understanding yourself and the organization;
• Conducting an initial assessment and building credibility;
• Team building and establishing routines; and
• Sustaining organizational operations.


A recent extension of retention control points (RCP) means Soldiers in the rank of staff sergeant and above will be allowed to serve the Army longer, should they desire.

An All Army Activities (ALARACT) message, dated November 8, spelled out the changes to retention control points. The changes, which became effective November 1, increase RCPs for E-6s and above by as many as three years in some cases. The ALARACT also changes the maximum age for enlisted Soldiers to 62 years.

The increase in RCP — called “high year of tenure” in the Air Force and Navy — is a force-shaping measure meant to allow experienced noncommissioned officers to stay in the Army longer.

“This is not designed to address any specific shortage,” said MSG Patrick Johnson, retention operations NCO with Army G-1 at the Pentagon. “Rather, it is to provide an avenue for our experienced NCOs to stay in longer if they wish, and to stabilize the force longer. It’s good for the Army and good for readiness.”

The change to RCP applies to active-duty Army Soldiers and to reserve-component Soldiers in the Active Guard Reserve program. Changes have been made to the RCP for Soldiers in the grade of E-6 and above, and include:
• SSG, 23 years
• SSG (Promotable), 26 years
• SFC, 26 years
• SFC (Promotable), 29 years
• 1SG/MSG, 29 years
• 1SG/MSG, (Promotable), 32 years
• CSM/SGM, 32 years

The RCP defines the maximum time a Soldier may stay in the Army at a certain rank. If a Soldier in the rank of staff sergeant has served 26 years and hasn’t been promoted to sergeant first class, he or she must retire. The ALARACT additionally says a Soldier must leave Army service at the time of their RCP or age 62, whichever of the two comes first.

(C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.)
A redesign of the Army’s NCO education system (NCOES) will bring its curriculum closer to what has been taught to officers in the past, said CSM Ray Chandler of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA).

Chandler and his staff have the lead in making changes to courses taught at the Army’s 30 NCO academies worldwide. He said the changes are on schedule to be implemented by September.

The changes include renaming the Army’s intermediate-level NCO courses. The Basic NCO Course, known as BNCOC, will become the Advanced Leader Course. The Advanced NCO Course, or ANCOC, will become the Senior Leader Course.

“We’ve got a better-educated NCO corps than ever before,” Chandler said, “so we’ve had to update the curriculum to take advantage of that higher education level, to support the full spectrum of operations in this era of persistent conflict.”

The updated courses will better prepare Soldiers for greater decision making and leadership responsibilities required in the global war on terror, Chandler explained. He said the new NCOES curriculum will focus more on the kind of critical thinking and problem-solving skills formerly reserved for officer-level instruction.

The Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, is the Army agency charged with implementing the NCOES transformation. As the academy’s command sergeant major, Chandler has been at the forefront of that effort.

The new curriculum is being tested now at Fort Knox, Ky., and Fort Benning, Ga., and Chandler said it is expected to be ready for all of the Army’s NCO academies by September.

“What we’ve been charged with is providing a cadre of flexible and adaptive leaders,” said Fort Benning’s Henry Caro NCO Academy commandant, CSM Zoltan James.

“A lot of these guys are leaders who have been in combat; they know what the fight is, and it gives them a forum for capturing and sharing that knowledge,” James said about the new curriculum. “We put NCOs into situations where they need to think for themselves, instead of providing them answers based upon a training plan. We have changed our training culture by using that process.”

Curriculum at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy is also being adapted to reflect the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., said Chandler.

“CGSC has made its entire curriculum available to USASMA, which is in the process of adapting our curriculum to meet their needs,” said CGSC Deputy Director, Marvin L. Nickels. “Adapting applicable portions of our curriculum will save them time. More importantly, it makes lots of sense for the Army’s field-grade leaders and most-senior noncommissioned officers to share a common frame of reference.”

Sharing that frame of reference, Chandler said, is exactly what the updated sergeants major course aims to facilitate.

“We have a very large gap between what CGSC teaches its majors and what we’ve been teaching sergeants major,” he said. “We want to marry those two skill sets together to capitalize on both their experiences to better support the commander.”

While the NCOES redesign aims to meet the needs of the Army in the global war on terror, it focuses equally on the professional development needs of Soldiers.

With the new curriculum, Chandler said they are better and more educated Soldiers when they graduate.

He also said the increase in the curriculum will provide Soldiers more college credits.

(Chris Gray-Garcia works for the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.)
The Defense Language Institute has developed a “Headstart” program to help deploying troops gain skills in Arabic, Pashto and Dari — languages spoken in Iraq and Afghanistan.

With conflicts ongoing in these two nations, there’s a need for at least some Soldiers to have knowledge of the languages spoken there. A recent study by the House Armed Services Committee highlighted the need for increased language capability in the armed forces.

“Only a small part of today’s military is proficient in a foreign language and until recently there has been no comprehensive, systematic approach to develop cultural expertise,” committee members wrote in their report.

The Defense Language Institute’s Headstart program is one path that can help Soldiers develop language skills. Headstart is a computer-based, self-directed language learning program aimed at military members getting ready to deploy. The program offers lessons in five languages: Dari, Pashto, Persian Farsi, Mandarin Chinese, and the dialect of Arabic used in Iraq.

The self-guided program takes between 80 to 100 hours to complete. After completing the course, Soldiers should be able to hit the ground in a new country with enough language skills to conduct business and have limited communication with civilians in the local language, according to the DLI commandant.

“You’d be able to take care of the survival-needs level of speaking requirements,” said COL Sue Ann Sandusky, commandant of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. “Even effectively conduct conversations and ask questions about a broad range of topics and understand a significant amount of the answers coming back. You’d certainly be able to communicate if you worked through the program.”

COL Sandusky said Headstart begins like every language program, in that all new language learners will need to learn numbers, colors, quantities, key verbs and key verb constructs. But the Headstart language program is designed primarily for military members on military missions so the program is designed from that perspective.

“It’s basic language learning in a military context,” she said. “Every beginning student learns to count, and the basic military language student needs to learn to count too — but we can contextualize that in a way that it is meaningful. What are you counting? Are you counting money, houses, people in a crowd?”

Each Headstart language program is made up of two sections: “sounds and script” and “military.” The sounds and script portion of the program involves 10 modules that help Soldiers learn the four “modalities” of the language: reading, writing, speaking, and listening in the target language.

Module 1 of the Dari language program introduces students to the letters of the alphabet. Those characters are then broken down by letters that are similar to the English alphabet and letters that require students to learn a new sound. Subsequent modules introduce country names, telling time, weather, making appointments and topography. The lessons are broken into different interactive games involving word-matching using the Dari language script.

The second portion of the Dari language software, which is military themed, involves speaking and listening. Soldiers using the program will learn key phrases that might be used in the situations they could encounter in Iraq. In one module, users learn phrases and questions related to landmarks. “What city is this?” “This is Kandahar.” “What is the name of this village?” “This village is Asad Khyl.”

When DLI developed the Headstart program, the faculty put special emphasis on the military application of language, said Pamela Combacau, dean of technology integration at DLI.

“The main reason we are developing this is that there is a need for this and there is nothing like this,” Combacau said. “There is a need to train on language in specific military situations, and since our Soldiers are warfighters, they don’t have time to go through general global knowledge. This is a program for a specific purpose, not to teach a general language, but for the specific purpose for predeployment.”

The lessons in the military portion show questions and phrases in English and in Dari script. The program also shows transliterated phrases, where the Dari words are spelled out in Latin letters, so students can better learn to pronounce the words.

The Headstart program also includes links to online “field support modules” (http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org) that cover an array of cultural topics on nearly 40 countries. The cultural information is produced by members of the DLI staff and is largely original material, said Combacau.

All five language versions of Headstart are available from the DLI’s Website at http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org/products/headstart/ and are also available on CD-ROM. Nearly a million copies of the Iraqi Arabic and Dari language programs have been distributed so far.

(C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.)
ARMY DEVELOPS RADIO FOR INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS

JASON BOCK

The ability to communicate through voice, digital message or simply by position, is arguably the most critical capability for Soldiers of today’s Army.

From the highest level down, communications is an asset that no Soldier should be without.

With this concept in mind, the Joint Program Executive Office Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) has developed the Rifleman Radio as part of an effort to bring secure, networking capabilities to a level that previously had no means of intra-squad communication.

During a series of exercises last November at Fort Bliss, Texas, representatives from JTRS and the 1st Armored Division incorporated the Rifleman Radio’s capabilities into training situations to evaluate the effectiveness of the system within its target Soldier audience.

“The Rifleman Radio will be the first time that we bring a networking radio into the force and right down to the individual rifleman,” said COL Daniel P. Hughes, the program manager for JTRS Ground Domain. “It provides a capability for us to bring a secure radio to the individual rifleman, so that he can now speak to his leadership and send his location into the network.”

The radio represents an enormous increase in capability, technology, and security for the Soldiers in forward operations, who are currently not issued radios and instead use hand signals to pass information.

“Right now, the individual Soldiers and their squad leaders are the biggest haves-nots within the communications arena,” said MAJ Tracy Mann of the TRADOC Capability Manager for Tactical Radios. “This capability will allow squad leaders and team leaders to talk directly to their subordinates, and their subordinate leaders to be able to command and control their individual squad and platoon battle troops.”

MAJ Mann, the TCM-TR lead for Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit radios (HMS), was a firsthand observer of the training exercises at Fort Bliss.

“We’re revalidating those lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom,” Mann said. “We just need to continue to improve and refine this radio so we can get the best possible capability to the individual Soldier.”

By employing a National Security Agency (NSA) Type 2 certification, the Rifleman Radio offers controlled but unclassified communications a Soldier can employ without requiring security clearances. The NSA Type 2 encryption bars classified information from being passed during transmissions and makes secure information more difficult for enemies to intercept.

In addition to voice communication, the radio also supplies a commander with a GPS picture of his squad members through a Position Location Information (PLI) display. At Fort Bliss, the 1st Armored Division used the GPS features of the Rifleman Radio in a shoot-house situation. Squad leaders positioned outside of a darkened room were able to locate and identify the positions of each member of their team through the PLI.

“The best thing about the whole system and the PLI is you actually zoom in on the battlefield and see your guys’ exact locations,” Hughes said, “which is definitely a plus for command and control. I can be somewhere else and see my assault element.”

The Rifleman Radio is being developed as a stand alone system but will integrate into the Ground Soldier System Ensemble platform, providing mission planning, execution, and situational awareness capabilities to squad team leaders and above. The Rifleman Radio will also be interoperable with the other suite of JTRS products being developed including the Ground Mobile Radio and HMS Manpack radio, to provide the needed connectivity to higher echelon command elements.

Because the Rifleman Radio is a networking radio, it can provide a greater range and increased effectiveness for secure one-on-one communication by Soldiers, while conserving power and maintaining signal strength. As long as a user can touch someone in the network, it’s not necessary to send a radio signal two or three kilometers to establish communication.

This “chain-like” assistance when it comes to communicating across great distances can contribute greatly to the conservation of battery life.

Hughes is also confident that the program’s target Soldier audience will have little-to-no difficulty adjusting to the addition of a radio to their suite of equipment. The Rifleman Radio is interoperable, software programmable and upgradable and employs the Soldier Radio Waveform. It is ruggedized and light, includes a convenient push-to-talk, and a hands-free headset.

By bringing individual communication capabilities to the Soldier in a user-friendly package, on a secure network, the Rifleman Radio should play a key role in reducing fratricide, enhancing the ability of the Soldier to conduct operations, and providing a capability that does not exist in theater today.

JPEO JTRS is trusting in the concept that bringing the Soldier at every level into the communications network will allow the Soldier in theater to get more information to the right place at the right time; and thus help enable commanders to make effective decisions.

(Jason Bock is a staff writer for the PEO C3T [Command, Control, and Communications Tactical] Chief Knowledge Office.)
The suicide of SPC Jamie Dalton, an infantryman in B Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, in 2006 shocked everyone who knew him. Many of the warning signs weren’t evident in Dalton’s behavior or the things he said to friends.

“I couldn’t believe that he had killed himself,” said Ronie Dalton, his mother. “It was the last thing I would have ever thought about. I never worried about him ever taking his life.”

Soldiers he served with said Dalton was a well-liked, competent Soldier, who was cool under fire and could be depended on.

“If you were in the worst place on earth, he was the guy you wanted beside you,” said SSG Robert Butler, one of Dalton’s best friends. “As a Soldier, he knew what he was doing. He knew tactics and weapons, he could drive anything, and he was an expert marksman. There was nothing he couldn’t do.”

In high school, he was an accomplished student, a national merit scholar and a good athlete, earning a starting position on his high school football team. After high school, Dalton surprised his family by deciding to join the Army.

“He was such an individual we were surprised when he joined the military,” his mother said. “He was such a strong-willed person.

“We found that he loved the Army, though. He loved the adventure.”

However, Ronie said she saw subtle changes in her son when he returned from his second deployment from Iraq and confronted him about it.

She said her son talked about some intense and gruesome things he had seen during his combat tours in very matter-of-fact tones.

“Looking back, I can’t believe we thought that what he was saying was normal, but that is how Soldiers cope with things,” she said. “They see things that would horrify many of us, but they adjust to it in order to survive. I think it is tough for some people to reintegrate into what most people consider normal.

“I asked him about PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) because it was a hot topic at the time, but he said he didn’t have anything like that,” she said. “He thought he might have a little combat stress, however. He said that when he drank he could become really angry or emotional and that he would have to pay attention to it.”

Before his second deployment, Dalton was demoted from sergeant to specialist after failing a drug test and transferred from A Company to B Company.

“Being away from Hardrock (A Company) was tough on him,” Butler said. “During the next deployment, I know it tore him apart when he learned that some of his brothers had been killed and he wasn’t there to protect them.”

Aside from a few conversations and off-hand remarks about his wartime experiences, Dalton seemed to be adjusting well when he returned from his second deployment. He went out with his friends and attempted to stay connected with his family. Butler said that Dalton was looking forward to getting his rank restored and returning to A Company.

Which makes the events that happened on April 14, 2006, all the more puzzling and disturbing.

Ronie said Dalton was out with friends that night, and by all accounts, drank too much. Turning down several rides back to Kelley Hill, Dalton took a cab back to his barracks.

After arriving at his room, Dalton was surprised when he learned that some of his brothers had been killed and he wasn’t there to protect them.

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After arriving at his room, Dalton went into another Soldier’s room to get something to eat. Soldiers who served with him said Dalton frequently did this. He would grab a few things and leave some money on the counter and apologize the next day. Most of them considered it funny and harmless.

“He always knew he could come into my room and take whatever he wanted,” said Butler. “What was mine was his. It wasn’t a big deal.”

That night Dalton entered the room of a Soldier, who had just arrived from basic training and wasn’t aware of Dalton’s late night habits. He called the military police.

The MPs detained Dalton. Dalton wanted to change clothes before they took him away. The MPs allowed a runner to escort him up to his room.

He changed and grabbed a revolver and returned to the battalion day room with the runner. Dalton showed the weapon and told people to leave. Those who stayed in the room were told to sit on the couch. As they watched, Dalton took his own life.

The event shocked everyone in the brigade.
“When I found out the next morning, I couldn’t believe it,” Butler said. “I was shocked and hurt. I couldn’t explain why it happened.”

“He wasn’t someone who was bitter or lashing out,” Ronie said. “That night something shifted inside him. He wasn’t planning on it.”

Both recognize that alcohol was one of the factors that caused this tragedy.

“I know if he had been sober that he wouldn’t have done it,” Butler said.

“Obviously, there was some trauma in my son,” Ronie said. “Maybe there were some things that were bothering him that weren’t evident, even to him. That night, the alcohol was like lighting a match to that straw that was hidden inside him. I also wonder if a part of my son was worn down; if he had just had it.”

Butler said he has quit trying to understand why his friend ended his life.

“There is really nothing to figure out,” he said. “Who really cares why? It doesn’t change anything. There isn’t a reason that anyone can give me that will make me understand. I quit searching for reasons why a long time ago.”

There isn’t a day that goes by that Dalton’s family and friends don’t wish he was here with them. Ronie left California to be closer to the side of her son’s life he rarely spoke about.

“I moved to Columbus to incorporate who he was into my life,” she said. “I wanted his loss to be life affirming. Just because he is gone doesn’t mean he still isn’t a big part of my life.”

Butler said that every suicide brief reminds him of his lost brother.

“It seems like I have a suicide brief once a month and it reopens the wound every time,” he said. “I question myself every time. How did I not see it coming if he was so close to me? This guy was so close to me. Did I miss the signs? It’s horrible.”

These questions will never be answered because the person who can answer them is gone. The chaplain of the 3rd HBCT, MAJ David Lile, said that Dalton’s suicide was preventable.

“The main part of the tragedy that played out was brought on by alcohol,” he said. “Alcohol can numb your sense of reality and make people unable to grasp the fullness of life. Alcohol, like any depressant, doesn’t give you an accurate sense of how things really are around you.”

Lile said he believes Dalton allowed his problems to overwhelm his decision making that night. He hopes other Soldiers will use the suicide to see that life’s problems should not limit their view of its value.

“Life is complex,” he said. “It’s not easy. If we reduce it down to situations, we can lose sight of that. The tragedy of that situation was that SPC Dalton didn’t allow his life to be lived out in its fullness.”

If your buddy or someone you know is thinking about suicide or showing warning signs, take it seriously.

Remember ACE!

**Ask your buddy:**

* Have the courage to ask the question, but stay calm.
* Ask the question directly, such as, “Are you thinking of killing yourself?”

**Care for your buddy:**

* Remove any means that could be used for self-injury.
* Calmly control the situation; do not use force.
* Actively listen to produce relief.

**Escort your buddy:**

* Never leave your buddy alone.
* Escort to the chain of command, a chaplain, a behavioral health professional or a primary care provider.

For more suicide prevention resources, go online to:

* http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/suicide/
The requirement for a company (CO) battle staff type of organization has been validated by thousands of companies during the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, U.S. Army doctrine has not caught up to current operations: "The company CP (command post) normally consists of the company commander, his radio operators, the fire support team (FIST) consisting of the fire support officer (FSO), fire support sergeant, and forward observer; and the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) sergeant along with possibly other personnel and attachments (XO, 1SG, or a security element). The company CP locates where it best supports the company commander and maintains communications with higher and subordinate units."


While nothing in FM 3-21.10 could be considered incorrect, the doctrine does not go into any functional detail. Reading the doctrine a commander could draw the conclusion that his command post exists ONLY to maintain communications and to perform battle tracking. We know this is not true.

In order to close this gap in doctrine, the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) developed an SOP for CO battle staffs and a plan to train them. This article will focus on the
manning, equipping, and training of the company battle staff in preparation for a deployment to the Iraq theater of operations.

The concept of creating timely, specific, reliable intelligence from raw data at the CO battle staff level has been the primary objective of 5/2 ID (SBCT) in defining the roles and functions of personnel in the battle staff. The challenge exists in identifying those personnel capable of accomplishing the requisite tasks of the CO battle staff, training those Soldiers (individual and collective, digital, etc.), and ensuring they have enough stability to benefit from the training and serve on the battle staff during the unit’s combat deployment. Because the rifle company (Stryker or otherwise) does not enjoy the luxury of a diverse MOS-base, intelligence analysts and linguists must be selected from the ranks, trained, and groomed. While a fact that will require the diversion of important resources from other key tasks to realize, countless after action reports (AARs) and lessons learned reports state that CO battle staffs will pay dividends in unit efficiency and effectiveness.

In principle, the CO battle staff’s primary function is to use digital and analytical tools to update the company-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to provide updated and useful intelligence to the commander, and to help commanders develop courses of action. A key component of this is the requirement for comparative analysis; the CO battle staff should mine, organize and utilize historical data in order to make rapid, accurate assessments of the current area of operations and recommend logical courses of action to the commander. By maintaining situational awareness via radio traffic, FBCB2 communication (and now Land Warrior messaging), the CO battle staff is tasked to update a myriad of digital systems, redundant analog systems, and report information and intelligence to higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements.

The challenge commanders at every level face is how and where to compromise in order to best meet mission requirements. For 5/2 ID (SBCT) the SOP prescribes roles in order to train the members of the battle staff. The majority of the personnel 5/2 ID (SBCT) has identified as minimum force for a CO battle staff are consistent with current doctrine — the company commander, company executive officer, company first sergeant, company fire support officer, company CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive) NCO, and the company communications chief (commander’s RTO). The 5/2 ID (SBCT)’s SOP has specified the role of the CO battle staff and has broadened the minimum force requirement to include the senior language-enabled Soldier (LES), Stryker Battle Staff NCO (SBSNCO), tactical site exploitation (TSE) technician, and equal opportunity leader (EOL). Of the members of the battle staff mentioned above, the CBRNE NCO, LES, and SBSNCO have been recapitulated, or in other words, specially trained to execute a mission not consistent with the CO modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

In the 5/2 ID (SBCT) model the company battle staff is organized into three functional groups. The command group consists of the CO CDR, 1SG, and CO XO, similar to a battalion or brigade command group. The company intel support team (IST) consists of the CBRNE NCO, senior LES, and TSE technician. The CO IST maintains the CO IPB. The negotiation team consists of the CO CDR, senior LES, and the EOL. The CO XO gives directions to the battle staff and supervises. When he is not present in the command post, the SBSNCO is in charge. The CO FSO and communications sergeant perform their traditional roles and assist the commander in developing a course of action and executing those COAs as applicable.

The 5/2 ID (SBCT) commander made the training of the LES (118 Arabic linguists at the platoon level; 101 complete, 17 in training) a top priority. In the LES program selected Soldiers (Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Logistics) receive training on Arabic language skills four days a week for 10 months at the Fort Lewis Language Center. The program provides an invaluable asset to the rifle squads who serve as collectors every day. The brigade sustains this training through constant practical application and scenario training. The program has trained as many as three conversationally fluent Arabic linguists in each of the rifle companies in fewer than the 18 months the brigade has existed.

The 5/2 ID (SBCT) also educated at least one NCO in each company on basic staff functioning via the Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Stryker Battle Staff NCO Course, which is taught at Fort Benning, Ga. Graduates are armed with a broad exposure to intelligence collection, data management, pattern analysis, and tactical operations center (TOC) function examples.

The requirement is that the Stryker Battle Staff NCO manages the operations of the CO battle staff and takes ownership of the digital and analytical systems that are currently being fielded to the companies (FBCB2, DARPA and Ascend Intel’s Tactical Ground Reporting System [TIGR], Palantir, Land Warrior).

The TSE technician has specialized training that combines evidence collection and intelligence support. In addition to the CO technician, the brigade will have more than 30 specialized teams with special equipment to conduct TSE once fully equipped.

In the 5/2 ID (SBCT) model, the SBSNCO works closely with the CBRNE NCO. The CBRNE NCO serves as the chief of the intelligence support team. The brigade SOP directs that the companies’ 74-series NCOs be retrained as intel analysts and run the company intel support team. All CBRNE NCOs attended an intelligence course from the Military Intelligence schoolhouse at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Armed with a fundamental course in general analysis operations, the CBRNE NCO briefs the enemy situation, route status, manages products such as pattern analysis, link diagrams, significant actions (SIGACTs), and the company’s ISR synchronization matrix. He is also the individual who debriefs patrols after conducting operations and manages the initial analysis and subsequent transport or exploitation of materials gathered during the unit’s tactical site exploitation. This task is accomplished by working closely with the companies’ TSE technician and senior LES (whose understanding of culture and language provides initial and immediate insight to
Soldiers trained in rudimentary intelligence analysis. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center offers a nine-week MTT to train company intel analysts. All company CBRNE NCOs were required to attend the training and thus form the backbone of the company intel support team. This enables the company commander to turn information into a target and a target into a mission. The CO IST can also package the information for analysis by the battalion S2. This increases the likelihood that a time sensitive target can be executed successfully. Identification of the CBRNE NCO has been contentious with brigade leaders and others outside of the brigade. Due to the unique training requirement and the fact that so many are required, the brigade commander felt it was necessary to identify an MOS for these duties. The underlying message is that developing and implementing a plan as early as possible in the life cycle of a BCT is critical to the success of its company battle staffs.

The company battle staff must be prepared to operate from a fixed or mobile configuration. Below we outline requirements to run a battle staff from a fixed site. The mobile battle staff works from the CO CDR and XO’s Strykers. The CO CDR normally has the CO FSO and senior LES while the XO has the SBSNCO and IST NCO (CBRNE). The systems for SA are FM radio nets, FBCB2, and stand alone computers. The FBCB2 is the primary tool for “seeing first.” The physical presence of the key members of the battle staff forward with the CO CDR assists him in “understanding first.” The battle staff uses the FBCB2 as the primary reporting tool to keep their higher headquarters informed. By establishing preset buttons and preformatted messages, the battle staff ensures that all addresses are set correctly and no important information is neglected.

As with anything that the Army does, the first step of training is individual training. Soldiers who man the CO battle staff must understand how to operate tactically as a battle staff as well as be technically proficient at their jobs. We continue to identify requirements as we train; so the individual training requirements evolve as well. Below is training that we have validated in training CO battle staffs:

1. **Military Intelligence Mobile Training Team (MI MTT).** The CO battle staff requires
to great effect for several years now. This training was focused toward the CO IST NCO (CBRNE NCO).

6. Palantir. Palantir is a database analyses software program that allows the CO IST to do link diagrams and query for specific information requirements. The software is much easier to use than Intel specific tools and therefore appropriately suited for non-MI Soldiers. Each company is connected to the larger network so information is shared throughout the brigade.

7. LES. The LES course is a 10-month Arabic language and Iraqi culture course taught at the Fort Lewis Language Center. The goal is to create Soldiers that are functionally proficient in Arabic in reading, writing, listening, and speaking. Our goal is to have at least five LES per company. These Soldiers can be used to interpret, translate, and analyze information that is in Arabic. Due to their cultural training, they can also be used to help Soldiers and leaders avoid cultural pitfalls that can inhibit interaction with local nationals and help commanders predict how local nationals may act. This can be used in targeting and other ways to facilitate mission accomplishment. The senior (best) LES is a member of the company command post who can help the commander understand the culture and improve targeting. Most of the Soldiers selected for this program are E-4 and below, but some NCOs have attended and one MI officer is currently enrolled. There are 118 Soldiers in the brigade in some phase of training: 101 as Soldiers selected for this program are E-4 and below, but some under understand the culture and improve targeting. Most of the company command post who can help the commander mission accomplishment. The senior (best) LES is a member of act. This can be used in targeting and other ways to facilitate nation nationals and help commanders predict how local nationals may avoid cultural pitfalls that can inhibit interaction with local

8. Intelligence Warfighting Function Training. This is training that teaches an LES how to think like the enemy and hence help a commander determine how to attack or engage the enemy. LESs are particularly well suited to this role as they already have a good working knowledge of the culture and language of the people a unit may be engaged with. In addition to language training they attend predictive profiling, Arab media training, Red Team training, and tactical questioning training. Selected Soldiers also attend terrorist immersion training (Mirror Image). Commanders may send their CBRNE NCOs to any of this training as well.

9. FBCB2 Training. The FBCB2 is the primary SA tool at the company level within the SBCT. The SBSNCO and any other Soldier in the CO battle staff must be proficient in using and troubleshooting the system.

10. Negotiations Training. Company EOLs are trained using several programs run by the state of Washington: the 40-hour Dispute Resolution Center Mediation Training Program and two-day state negotiation training. These courses certify them to conduct mediation between employer and employee but more importantly to our requirements they teach negotiation skills. The EOL is thus prepared to assist the company commander in devising his strategy for a planned negotiation.

The 5/2 ID (SBCT) CDR designated six key training tasks that he wanted every CO battle staff to accomplish by the end of our initial collective training. These tasks were:

1. Battle tracking;
2. Conducting patrol briefs and debriefs;
3. Collecting combat information and immediately performing a rudimentary analysis;
4. Building link diagrams;
5. Developing targets for proposal to BN/BDE; and
6. Providing INTSUM/OPSUM to BN.

In conjunction with I Corps Mission Support Training Facility (MSTF) at Fort Lewis, 4-23 IN BN and the 5/2 ID (SBCT) staff planned, resourced, and synchronized a collective training strategy. The training was divided into Modular I - Instruction (MOD I-Instruction), Modular I CPX (MOD I CPX), and Modular II (MOD II).

The MOD I - (Instruction) is conducted by the MSTF staff. The instruction focuses on basic battle staff operations and outlines how to set-up and operate a CO battle staff. It covers battle tracking, information management, communications, and other basic battle staff functions that are traditionally executed by a CO CP. It places the CO battle staff at a baseline standard so that they can handle the added complexity that the more advanced digitally-based MOD(s) require.

The MOD I CPX is a one-day simulation CPX conducted at the MSTF. MSTF staff and the training unit provide a white cell higher planning, resourcing, and oversight. This MOD’s training is focused on the “analog” or traditional roles of a CO CP. It is this CPX that sets the battle staff up for success when they execute the more complicated MOD II (CO digital CPX).

MOD II (CO digital CPCPX). It is a four-day exercise that is conducted in the MSTF CO CP bays. The entire CO battle staff must be present for the training. This is the best chance for the company commander to prepare his battle staff to meet his objectives. For the companies, this training incorporates all the systems, hardware, and software that a CO battle staff may use. The 5/2 ID (SBCT) focused on exercising the following systems to provide commanders with the best situational awareness possible: FM comms, FBCB2, TIGRNET, and Access-Pro (later replaced by Palantir).

Training units are expected to come to this training fully trained in all the systems that they will use during the CPX. The white cell and HICON is provided by the training unit. We decided that the
training unit’s battalion S2 and S3 is best able to drive and control the CPX and they are assisted by the MSTF staff. JCATS is the system we used to drive the training. In our case the training scenario is built and maintained by the MSTF staff so that any unit can use the products.

The four-day training construct for MOD II battle staff CPX is as follows:

1. Day 1: Preparation and support system training day. This includes white cell and HICON training. CO battle staff will be read into the scenario and will set up their battle staffs. Remedial/initial training on TIGR network or Palantir can happen this day.

2. Days 2 and 3: Simulate 12 hours of operations.

3. Day 4: This is the final day of training. The outcome is target nominations made to the BN HICON by the company commander. It concludes with a CO battle staff AAR facilitated by the training unit’s HICON.

After this collective training, units understand the level of proficiency of battle staffs with respect to commanders’ key tasks.

Current MTOEs do not adequately support CO battle staff operations. The 5/2 ID (SBCT) has identified the following equipment requirements:

1. Hardware.

   a. Laptop computers to run TIGR and Palantir; associated servers so that the information is available to any unit in the SBCT.

   b. Stand-alone FBCB2. While a battle board is needed as a back up, the FBCB2 is the standard in our SBCT for companies to track patrols and send combat information up and down. Current MTOE does not provide the company a stand-alone FBCB2. It is forced to come up with a field expedient way to bring the FBCB2 into the battle staff, normally the 1SG’s FBCB2. This is a poor substitute.

   c. Wireless SIPRNET. There are many functions at the CO battle staff that will require them to have SIPRNET connectivity: HIIDE data, patrol reports, INTSUMS, etc. In order for companies to have SIPRNET connectivity, the solution 5/2 ID (SBCT) is pursuing is the Harris Corporation LOS radio. It allows the CO battle staff to have SIPRNET connectivity and push reasonably sized files in a short period of time. This radio is currently being employed by a SBCT in Iraq.

   d. Flash drives. Flash drives allow the CO battle staffs to move information quickly when distance is not an issue.

   e. Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS). Power fails, sometimes for several hours or longer. Computer batteries are good for 1-2 hours. Loss of computers and other automation in the CO battle staff reduces the CO battle staff to minimum information management. Not to mention critical information can be lost that may take hours to recreate. UPS can extend the CO battle staffs effectiveness until the power is restored.

   f. Digital camcorder. Visual records of debriefs are far more accurate than dictation. Accurate records are needed so that information can be referred back to in answering questions that over time become clouded and tainted by normal human frailties. This documentation can also be used for 15-6 investigations that all units will encounter in their tours of duty.

2. Software: TIGR, Palantir, and Microsoft Office. This list is what 5/2 ID (SBCT) has determined will best support its targeting and C2, but is not “the” definitive requirements for a CO battle staff. New equipment, software, and tools are constantly being required by the boots on the ground and developed by private industry.

   Outside of the specialized equipment and software listed above are the mundane, but needed supplies/equipment to make the battle staff functional. The short list that we have developed is:

   ■ Proxima. The CO battle staff has to have a way of displaying critical information.

   ■ Tent or shelter. Some battle staffs can be in a “hardstand,” other battle staffs will not be so fortunate. We use a GP Medium or SICUP for our battle staffs to help provide an environment that the battle staff can operate in for long periods of time and in all weather.

   ■ Environmental control (air conditioning and heat).

   ■ Generators: all this equipment takes power.

   ■ Other equipment: tables, chairs, tough boxes (for storage and transport of equipment), extension cords, surge protectors/power strips, light sets, battle boards, office supplies, floor tarps (for temporary usage, plywood for long term).

The goal for all CO battle staffs in 5/2 ID (SBCT) is to give the company commander situational awareness, answers to C2IR, and other information requirements that enable him to “see first, understand first, act first, engage decisively, and re-engage at will.” The company battle staff is a proven combat multiplier. It is possible to effectively prepare a CO battle staff for operations in the Iraq theater of operations. It is not cheap. The 5/2 ID (SBCT) model for manning, equipping, and training a CO battle staff is a significant commitment of resources. It additionally requires outside assistance such as TRADOC support and home station installation resources. With the support of commanders and senior enlisted leaders at all levels, it can be accomplished. It must be a priority.

**PROFESSIONAL FORUM**

**12   INFANTRY   January-February 2009**
Not Just Beans and Bullets Anymore ...

THE NEW ROLE OF THE INFANTRY PLATOON SERGEANT

SFC JAMES R. KELLEY

Upon entering the Army, I distinctly remember my first platoon sergeant, a big imposing man who stood in front of my platoon and led from the front in every aspect. Then came my first platoon live-fire exercise, and the man who had stood in front of my platoon was suddenly behind me — with the weapons squad assisting with the support by fire and identifying possible locations for the casualty collection point. I specifically remember asking my squad leader at the time why the platoon sergeant was not on the assault and being told that while in the rear the platoon sergeant runs the show, but in the field he only needs to worry about “beans and bullets.”

While the proper location of a senior member of a unit during an assault can be argued to great extent, that is not the purpose of this article. I think back to the first time I made contact with an insurgent. My story is not uncommon and has been told and retold a thousand times over. A unit on patrol is engaged, generally by an improvised explosive device or rocket-propelled grenade followed with small arms fire. This elicits an immediate response of suppressive fire by said unit and concludes when the enemy breaks contact and fades into the surrounding civilian populace. Following the reconsolidation and re-organization process, the enemy killed-in-action, if there are any, are processed and the unit continues the mission. It was after this first experience that I noticed what would later become the single greatest challenge I would face throughout multiple deployments — maneuver. Unlike all those live-fire exercises I had participated in, the enemy never stayed around long enough for me or anyone in my unit to maneuver, close with, and destroy him.

The 300-Meter Fight and the Battle to Fix the Enemy

Over the course of my military service, I have attempted to affect this part of the fight, but it wasn’t until I became a platoon sergeant that I was afforded the opportunity. Looking back at that first platoon live fire, I should have been able to see this all along. Squad leaders and the platoon leader are more than capable of running the battle 100 meters to the front. I have always believed that given well-trained subordinates, the platoon sergeant should not have too many duties in the fight. It is in this environment that I set out to achieve what I had always hoped to — to affect the 300-meter fight, the fire to fix the enemy. It was during my last deployment that I found what I believe is the new role of the platoon sergeant in the current fight: shaping the fight to give your subordinates the opportunity for success on the modern battlefield.

The old Army model of fixing the enemy exists on the premise that your foe desires to fight and is locked in a conflict of attrition, the fight to the end. Today’s counterinsurgency is not locked in a war of attrition but more of a war of publicity, negating the need to fight to the end when the average insurgent can hit hard, fast, and walk away. From a publicity standpoint, one American casualty is just as effective as forcing the withdrawal of the enemy from a strategically advantageous piece of terrain; so why stay and become fixed when your objective has already been achieved? Additionally, the old model of assault-utilized organic fires, generally the weapons squad, to fix the enemy by fire until the maneuver squads could provide their own local support by fire (SBF), then assault. On the modern battlefield, the collateral damage considerations coupled with the conclusion that the majority of engagements are going to be initiated by the enemy renders the process of establishing and utilizing an SBF element in the traditional role obsolete. It is here that I realized as a platoon sergeant with no need for traditional SBF where I would be best situated on the battlefield, bringing any and all necessary assets to the fight in order to afford my squad leaders the opportunity to maneuver and destroy the enemy.

Building a Platoon Fires Team

I set about accomplishing this goal by first separating my fires team (forward observer and RTO) into two separate forward observers. Most fires teams consist of two fully qualified forward observers so the only challenge was obtaining the necessary communications equipment to cover both FOs. Once this was accomplished, the platoon leader and I were now armed with FOs, allowing fires to be called from two areas on the battlefield instead of one. If splitting the fires team had not been an option, I would have made the argument that the fires team should maneuver with the platoon sergeant considering his general positioning on the battlefield should be somewhat removed from the 100-meter fight. My next act was to make a list of all the assets available to me on the battlefield. Crossing the full spectrum of integrated fires (indirect fire, rotary/fixed wing assets, ISR platforms) coupled with the organic fires of my platoon, I then familiarized myself with capabilities and limitations of each asset.

During the planning process, my platoon fires team and I utilized imagery of the objective to discuss what assets would be available, when they would be available, and in what areas each asset would be best utilized if contact was made. Going back to the collateral damage considerations, 155mm artillery would obviously not be
very useful in Sadr City or Kabul in an engagement with the “average” insurgent four- to eight-man direct action cell; however, the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) could be better suited for destroying structures in heavily populated areas. Armed with this knowledge, the platoon leader, fires team, and I conducted our own fires rehearsal. Each rehearsal lasted approximately 15 minutes and consisted of one to two mock engagements, what would be utilized, and who would be responsible for the control of each asset. As a group we found it necessary to assign specific duties after one FO juggled mortar and artillery fire on a target while rotary wing assets came on station. Following that engagement I was principally left to control rotary wing assets (generally the easier of all the assets and the one with the least amount of formalized control techniques). While the platoon leader and later the squad leaders were present at these rehearsals, it was never expected that any of them would be required to control assets considering that their focus should be on the 100-meter fight.

Application of a Platoon Fires Plan

Utilization of all these assets can be determined on the ground at the time of contact. The following are simply the general guidelines used by my fires team throughout our last deployment to Iraq. The majority of the areas we operated in were small villages (75 to 100 structures) surrounded by farm fields and palm groves. Upon making contact organic mortar fire would be placed behind the enemy in an attempt to prevent egress to the rear and any ISR available (at a minimum a Raven system was always available) to track enemy movement. If on station, rotary-wing assets would be used to either destroy the enemy or “push” them into our assault force and if in range a call to alert higher artillery (155mm and GMLRS) and fixed-wing assets would go out. This early alert would significantly reduce the response times of those assets if they were needed later in the fight. In a perfect scenario rotary wing and the platoon’s organic fires would destroy the entire enemy force and the engagement would end. In the event this occurred, ISR and rotary wing assets would be utilized to conduct a further sweep of the areas outside the engagement searching for enemy evacuation vehicles and medical evacuation or counterattack teams. If we were not able to push the enemy in the direction we desired, we found that his general tactic was to move to a building and attempt to blend in to the populace. When this occurred ISR and all other available assets would be used to observe the structure (now deemed hostile due to the occupants) and isolation would be emplaced while a “tactical call-out” of the building would occur. Given the opportunity to surrender, a full-scale escalation of force would be applied until all enemy had been detained or destroyed. It is during this phase of the engagement that the initial call for fixed-wing assets and GMLRS can greatly benefit the unit because those assets may be on target by the time you decide in what capacity they are going to be used rather than requesting them after the decision has been made. Once again, these are only examples of how each asset could be used; actual use will have to be determined by each ground force commander.

Conclusion

Over 15 months of dismounted combat operations, I observed a significant increase in my unit’s success rate during enemy engagements. What began with a squad being engaged by the enemy and ending with zero to one enemy destroyed quickly changed to entire enemy direct action cells being destroyed and on occasion the discovery of additional enemy personnel, enemy vehicles, structures, and weapon caches when ISR was utilized to locate pre-positioned support teams across the battlefield. One note is that the duty of fighting the 300-meter fight does not necessarily mean a platoon sergeant has to be present on every patrol. Four squads leaving a patrol base at different intervals does not allow for the platoon sergeant or platoon leader to be on every patrol, nor is their presence necessary. Proper battle tracking and use of available imagery allowed me to bring assets to the squad in contact before I was actually “boots on the ground” in the fight. When I initially became a platoon sergeant, I felt almost as if I was being taken out of the fight. It wasn’t until I decided to shape the battlefield the way I wanted it that I was able to inject myself “into the fight” without overwhelming the leadership of my subordinates.
"Growing Pains"

The Army’s Transition to Two-Level Maintenance

ALAN C. WYATT

In the 1980s and 90s, executive officers (XOs) with their maintenance officers and technicians constantly struggled to get equipment evacuated, inspected, and accepted by support units. Simultaneously, these leaders managed an enormous organizational workload resulting from scheduled services and command maintenance periods. Maintenance leadership constantly dug for work order and supply status in preparation for the regularly scheduled and lengthy maintenance meetings that occupied the majority of their time and efforts. An abused priority system in both maintenance and supply prevented support from focusing efforts on the most immediate needs, and personal intervention was constantly required. The level of effort required by XOs to manage equipment maintenance in the complex four-level system was certainly excessive when compared to the amount of resources available in the support structure.

Transformed modular forces have been built with a new maintenance system, two-level maintenance, which is designed to address many of these maintenance frustrations. The Army maintenance transformation plan explains the conversion from a four-echeloned maintenance structure to a two-echeloned structure. This article will explain the new concept, the revised processes, and address some of the challenges units are facing in the implementation of this transition.

Why Change?

First, let us examine the reason for change. Our previous maintenance system was characterized by the term “Fix Forward.” In this system, support echelons were pushed forward to make repairs and return equipment to the user as close to the point of failure as possible. Maintenance tasks were accomplished at the lowest level possible. If the task exceeded the resources of a particular level, either it was evacuated to a higher level or higher-level assets were sent forward to complete the repair. Specific capabilities existed only at certain levels, which required the Army to deploy three echelons to have the full range of capabilities in a theater of operations when the Army deployed. This resulted in a large maintenance footprint, which required an even larger logistics footprint to support all of the additional maintenance units. The previous system, which was developed during World War II, has served the Army well; however, with new technologies in information, maintainability, diagnostics, and the speed at which we can move personnel, equipment, and parts, we needed to commensurately update our processes.

Why Is This New System Better?

Consider this example of a typical maintenance action. Under the four-level maintenance system, an operator identified a class III leak from a differential output seal. The operator annotated the fault on the DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet) during the after operations checks, and the fault was then reported to organizational maintenance by turning in the 5988-E upon closing the dispatch. Receiving a 5988-E with a deficiency, organizational maintenance verified the fault and began the process of evacuating the truck to support. Prior to evacuation, all unit-level faults had to have been corrected. A Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) generated work request was produced. Since the vehicle had a “not-mission capable” (NMC) fault, the commander had to “Circle X” the fault or tow the truck to support. The support unit’s inspection section would then conduct an initial acceptance inspection to verify the

A mechanic with the Mississippi National Guard works on an RG31 mine protected armored personnel carrier at Camp Liberty, Iraq, October 16, 2008.
fault, but would most certainly identify additional shortcomings for the customer unit to correct. The vehicle would then be taken back to the customer unit’s location to correct these faults, then back to support to verify the corrective action, and so on … By following the “by the book” instructions (FM 4-30-3 dated July 2004) to correct this fault, the unit executed 78 total steps — 47 of which were merely updating records — and the vehicle was transported to or from the support shop four times. Figure 1 is a comparison of the steps necessary to complete the evacuation and repair process in the four- and two-level systems.

In an effort to get systems repaired and reduce system down time, critical steps were often bypassed. Figure 2 is a simplified comparison of the steps necessary to complete a repair action in the two different systems and shows the reduction in evacuations and redundant inspections by implementing the two-level maintenance (TLM) system. With the merger of unit and direct support (DS) maintenance, the process is much more streamlined; redundancies in paperwork, evacuations, inspections, and verifications are reduced, providing reduced repair cycle time with greater efficiency in all processes.

The TLM system is different in that it introduces a “Replace Forward/Repair Rear” concept rather than the previous “Fix Forward” philosophy. This employs maintainers on the battlefield to identify a faulty component and replace it, thereby returning equipment to the fight more quickly and leaving the lengthy time-consuming repair work to the next echelon.

The new TLM system combines the previous echelons of unit and DS maintenance to form field maintenance (Figure 3). Field maintenance is focused on returning equipment to the battle quickly by troubleshooting a system to isolate and replace the malfunctioning component. This previous system would attempt to repair components as far forward as possible. In the TLM system, replacement will take place within brigade combat teams (BCT) and repairs will generally be done at echelons above brigade (EAB). Field maintenance consists of the tasks necessary to bring the system back to an operational status and return it to the fight.

The previous echelons of general support (GS) and depot maintenance are now combined to form sustainment maintenance (Figure 4). Sustainment maintenance tasks are focused on the overhauling, rebuilding, and repairing of components, assemblies, and modules and then returning them to the supply system. Modular BCTs will have no sustainment maintenance capability. Most repair tasks, previously DS, have been shifted to the sustainment maintenance level. Ideally, sustainment maintenance activities will provide support to the supply system from the continental United States. However, in an effort to return equipment to the supply system as quickly as possible and support surges in demand for critical readiness drivers, sustainment maintenance activities may be located anywhere in the supply chain.

**On-System and Off-System**

Field maintenance can be categorized by the term “on-system.” On-system maintenance focuses on returning end items, systems, or sub-systems to a fully mission capable status. On-system tasks include preventive maintenance services, diagnostics to identify faulty components, replacement of these components, and battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR). All maintenance activities...
in the Army will do field maintenance, even sustainment activities. Field maintenance is the maintenance a unit does on its own organic equipment. A limited number of our previous DS repair tasks will continue to be performed at the field maintenance level due to their criticality in sustaining equipment readiness. We will refer to those tasks as “near system” and thus field maintenance tasks. A good example of a “near system” task is the repair of line replaceable units (LRUs). This task is technically the repair of a component and would be located in sustainment maintenance. However, due to its criticality in maintaining equipment readiness, the decision was made to keep this “near system” task in the BCT, thus making it a field maintenance task.

Sustainment maintenance tasks can be characterized by the term “off-system.” These are the maintenance tasks necessary to return components, modules, assemblies, and end items to the supply system. Sustainment maintenance activities will perform diagnostics and repairs of components, modules, or assemblies.

This segregation of on-system and off-system tasks has transferred the lengthy time-consuming repair work off the battlefield and back to our sustainment echelon, of which Army Materiel Command has responsibility. This allows the maneuver commanders to focus on the fight. Additionally, these improved business processes will reduce the logistics footprint and eliminate redundancies and unnecessary steps.

Implementation
The changes needed to implement two levels of maintenance have stretched across all levels of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). For example, maintenance doctrinal publications have been updated; unit structure has changed to merge the previous organizational and direct support organizations; and Soldiers have been retrained from organizational or direct support mechanics into multicapable maintainers. However, many units are not sure if they have all the necessary components to operate under the TLM concept, and many are not sure how to tell.

To evaluate an organization’s ability to conduct maintenance under the TLM concept, go to the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Ordnance Concepts, Army Knowledge Online (AKO) collaboration site (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/folder_V.do?foid=7515524), and open the TLM Scorecard. The scorecard will provide commanders with a mechanism to evaluate each of the DOTMLPF areas for the essential components necessary to conduct maintenance under the TLM concept and provide a red, amber, green result.

Summary
The Army has provided many new enablers to assist in the performance of maintenance in this new two-tiered system, such as the tools, automation systems, facilities, and training. However, all these things are not necessarily required to implement TLM. To perform the task you only need the tools and the training. TLM is a simpler, more streamlined system that gives commanders more control of their maintenance resources and assets. Leaders at all levels must learn the new system, understand the capabilities, and implement this system.

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Evolvment of the Concepts of Jihad in Islamic Thought

CDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

Islamist political thought as it relates to jihad has evolved over the centuries, and this essay will highlight Dr. Maher al-Charif’s 2008 Arabic book, *Evolution of the Concept of Jihad in Islamic Thought*. It was published by Mada Publishing Company in Damascus, Syria, and is an intellectual exploration of the concept of jihad as warfare, not the wider meaning of the term which encompasses individual moral struggle. This exposition will focus on Charif’s work from the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE to the death of Ibn Taymiyyah in 1263 CE. This book was highlighted in the al-Jazeera Web site book review section and represents a 2008 Arabic book that could be of significance to U.S. forces.

This book is exactly what is needed for America’s military planners as it exposes readers to the complexities and disagreements on what is referred to as *Ahkam al-Jihad* (Rules of Jihad) to reveal how militant Islamists today weave an ideology from fragments of Islam. This review essay is not an apologia for Islamist political thought. It is, however, an introduction to the possibility of fighting militant Islamist ideology using the contradictions and complexities of Islam. It is an introduction to the nuanced differences between Islam, Islamist political thought, and militant Islamist ideology as it relates to the concept of jihad as warfare. These nuances are the new tools needed to disaggregate militant Islamist ideology from Islamist political thought and these two from the wider religion of Islam.

The Development of the Rules of Jihad

The first opinions and commentary on jihad, known as *Ahkam al-Jihad*, appeared in the 8th and 9th centuries CE and laid out the rules of Islamic warfare. These Islamic rules came two centuries after Prophet Muhammad’s death and were derived from the study of 70 war verses in the Quran, coupled with Prophet Muhammad’s example, in particular his wars with the Meccans that occurred between 622 and 632 CE. The expansion of the Islamic empire led to new complexities and a re-definition of warfare and its conduct. Abdul-Rahman al-Awzaee (707-774 CE), who existed during the reign of Walid ibn Malik of the Umayyad dynasty, was the earliest scholar obsessed with jihad as warfare and considered an early commentator on the subject. This period saw rapid expansion into North Africa and Spain, while at the same time an attempt to stabilize the Umayyad Empire, using regular military incursions to suppress people already conquered but rebelling against Umayyad authority. These rebels could be Muslim and non-Muslim, with much of the stabilization focused on frontier areas of conquest. Combining religious scholarship with the realities of constant military incursions in the Levant, Awzaee commented on such matters, as Muslims allying with non-Muslims, the issue of noncombatants, treatment of wounded enemy, prisoners, and spoils of warfare. He also discussed and wrote about how and when to conclude a truce, and the issue of *jizya* or the taxation on non-Muslim subject peoples. Going back to the evolution of the notion of jihad as offensive warfare is important to begin the process of deconstructing 21st century al-Qaida pseudo-intellectual interpretations. Awzaee operated under the interpretive understanding that jihad as war during the time of Prophet Muhammad was *fard ayn*, a collective obligation incumbent upon all Muslims as the society created by Muhammad in Medina and more importantly Muhammad’s theological mission were in peril. After the stabilization of Muhammad’s prophecy known as *istiqrar al-shariah*, it became *fard kifaya*, an obligation that if carried out by a sufficient number, excuses the rest from the obligation. Awzaee commented that if an adversary attacks and you fight a defensive war then jihad becomes a collective obligation, he also said that jihad becomes a collective obligation only if sanctioned by the clergy.

“The need to translate, analyze and debate Arabic works of military significance is vital as the United States engages in a long term effort of undermining the influence of violent extremism. Events in Mumbai demonstrate not only the need to assess the tactical and operational elements of violent militant Islamist groups, but their underlying ideology, and ways in which they manipulate the narrative to justify their violent actions. CDR Aboul-Enein is making an important contribution in understanding the nuances, and details of militant Islamist ideology through his lectures and writings on this subject for Defense Department personnel and deploying units. For years, he has highlighted Arabic works of military significance, and in discussing this work with me, I agree that Dr. Maher Charif’s work on the evolution of the concept of jihad in Islamic thought, represents the Arabic book to highlight in 2008. I applaud the U.S. Army’s Infantry (Magazine) for providing CDR Aboul-Enein’s work a forum from which to help stimulate debate and discussion on the philosophies of our adversary. This will also begin our own understanding of the narrowness of militant Islamist thought when compared to Islam, even in the realm of what constitutes the rules of jihad.”

— Gary Greco

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He commented that consulting non-Muslims in times of war is permitted as long as Islamic rule was in the majority, and it is frowned upon (not forbidden) where apostasy reigns. Awzae azed sanctioned the killing of women and children, but only if they were combatants and forbad the killing of women and children taken prisoner. He used verses in the Quran that sanction warfare, but warns against transgressing the bounds of warfare. Awzae azed prohibited the Muslim armies from killing the aged, blind, and slaves, as long as they were noncombatants. He forbade the burning of captives, the cutting down of trees, and advocated sharing the spoils of war with non-Muslim allies. His view of jizya is not what is financially derived from non-Muslims, but the opportunity to conduct dawa or evangelizing the religion of Islam as a result of interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In 804 CE, Muhammad bin Hassan al-Shaybani, a Kufan scholar, from Iraq, provided the earliest commentary on hostilities towards the kuffar, or infidels. Dividing the world into Abl al-harb (the people of warfare), Abl al-ahd (the people of the truce), and Abl al-Baghy (those Muslims who rebel against Islam). Regarding Abl al-Baghy, these were Muslims who sowed dissension, and God commanded reconciliation first, before resorting to hostilities. Early Muslim scholars derived these opinions from the Ridda Wars and verse 9 of al-Hujairat, which warns that killing Muslims is not authorized unless they resort to violence first. Another label for Abl al-Baghy was Abl al-Ridda and consisted of those who left Islam or ceased paying the Zakat (poor tax) upon Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 CE. These delineations were not inherent in the founding of Islam; however, it is from these delineations created decades after Muhammad’s death, that the bipolar concepts of Dar al-Harb (Abode of War) and Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) were made.

These scholarly distinctions and when they came about in Islamic history are either ignored or suppressed by militant Islamists today. It is vital these commentaries be revived to highlight the ignorance of violent militant Islamist ideology. In the end, this is a war of history are either ignored or suppressed by militant Islamists today. It is vital these commentaries be revived to highlight the ignorance of violent militant Islamist ideology. In the end, this is a war of history are either ignored or suppressed by militant Islamists today. It is vital these commentaries be revived to highlight the ignorance of violent militant Islamist ideology. In the end, this is a war of

The Early Meccan and Medina Clerics of the 8th and 9th Centuries

Maalik ibn Anas (d. 795 CE) and the Meccan as well as Medina clerics had different experiences than their counterparts in the Levant. Commentary on jihad as warfare was limited among the Arabian clerics of Mecca and Medina. The Meccan clerics of the 8th century CE like Ata ibn Abi Ribah, Amru ibn Dinar, and Ibn Jareeh took different views on jihad as offensive warfare. When asked if ghazw (raiding) was an obligation incumbent upon all Muslims, Abi Ribah replied that he did not know. Maalik ibn Anas, founder of the Maaliki School of Sunni Islam (one of the four schools of Sunni Islam), opposed sneak attacks, night attacks, and advocated that calling people to Islam before initiating hostilities against non-Muslims was a requirement. He forbade the tactic of istiqtal (best described as suicidal missions); his reasoning was that Islam was sent to mankind as a mercy and to propagate life in the service of God. Maalik limited jihad to only those who are physically and mentally able; he derived this from a saying of Prophet Muhammad narrated by Abdullah son of Omar (the second Caliph). When he offered fealty to the Prophet, he would always add the statement: “to those who are capable.” Maalik did add the commentary that jihad is like being in perpetual fasting or praying until it is concluded but did not derive this from any original Islamic source; this was his opinion that has been codified into Islamic discourse. If you are the violent militant Islamist adversary, you can focus on this single statement by Maalik or look at his commentaries on Akhlaqiyat al-Jihad or conduct of warfare; he derived this from his understanding of Prophet Muhammad’s advice sending out a military expedition. In it he warns to conduct raids in the name of God, in God’s way, to wage war on those who have abandoned God, but not to be excessive. Maalik also derives his commentaries on the conduct of jihad from Abu Bakr (the first Caliph) warning to Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan who warned not to kill women, children, the elderly, livestock (except to eat), cut trees, drown prisoners, burn prisoners, or be excessive or cowardly. Maalik added that the killing of captives without the permission of an Imam (cleric) is forbidden.

Who is a Martyr?: Intentions of Jihad as Warfare

The issue of who is a martyr preoccupied early Islamic thinkers, and entire volumes have been written on the subject known as Hukm al-Shahadah (Rulings on Martyrdom). The central theme of these works is that the answer to this question relies solely on the person’s intentions, and these intentions are known only to God. There is a hadith (saying or action) of Prophet Muhammad that called upon his followers to pray for a fighter who fell at the Battle of Khaybar, saying he raided livestock in God’s cause; he was not a martyr. A disciple of Maalik is Imam Shafei (d. 820 CE), founder of the Shafei School of Sunni Islam. Ahmed ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali School, called Shafei the most learned man in the Quran and Sunna (way of Prophet Muhammad). This statement from Hanbal is important, as the Hanbali School is where most Salafis, both fundamentalist and militant, today derive their core inspiration, to include the infamous Wahabis of Arabia. Shafei recounts that Muslims in Muhammad’s time were not allowed to engage in jihad during the first 10 years of Muhammad’s 23-year prophecy, known as his Meccan period. It was only after exhausting the call to God’s faith, followed by the Meccan genocide of Muslims that God permitted Muhammad first the act of migration. After migration the sanction to wage war was only granted after it became apparent the Meccans could not allow Muhammad and his Medinese alliance to remain intact. Shafei highlighted that only when Muhammad’s society and more importantly his prophecy were in peril that war was allowed. He uses verses 39-40 of al-Hajj (The Pilgrimage) in the Quran to argue this nuanced point. Shafei also utilized verse 216 of al-Baqara (The Calf) to argue that jihad was not a fard (obligation) but was mu’ah (permissible and optional), stressing the nature of jihad as offensive warfare as fard kifaya (an optional individual obligation). It was Shafei who first wrote about the need for a fighter not to be indebted to participate in jihad. He used a saying of Prophet Muhammad in which he turned away a young
man from participating in a military expedition, citing that one needed his parent’s permission to participate in jihad, and used the Prophet’s sayings to bar the infirm, the sick, the impoverished, the blind, and the elderly from participating in jihad, reinforcing his writings with verse 91 of al-Tauba and verse 61 of al-Nur (The Light). Responding to the needs of the time, Shafei did call for an annual jihad against adversaries so that Muslim forces would not atrophy and to be in a constant state of military readiness, but these are his opinions and unlike previous writings are not reinforced by any Quranic verses or prophetic sayings. He did continue to discuss that jihad’s central objective was to bring monotheism as articulated by Muhammad’s message and not to fight the enemies of Islam, he reinforces this view with verse 33 of al-Tauba (The Penitence). The right to proselytize Islam takes precedence and fighting those who deny this right is the purist form of jihad.

Shafei also commented on the jizya system, the tax levied on non-Muslim subjects, and delineated a different tax level for those of the People of the Book versus those who are idolaters. For those who received a divine revelation such as the Christians and Jews, he wrote that the jizya would not apply to women, children, slaves, and the mentally ill. He advocated that they be allowed to pay the jizya and that there should be no compulsion in matters of religion, a Quranic injunction. Shafei discussed the issue of hudna (truces) and viewed them as temporary and limited, and uses the time limit of 10 years, like that set between Prophet Muhammad and the Meccans, also known as the Treaty of Hudaybiah.

Other Opinions on Jihad: Evangelism Versus Warfare

Tabari (d. 923 CE), considered the Herodotus and preeminent historian of the Muslim Arab world, attempted to reconcile the differences between the Shafei and Hanafi Schools of Sunni Islam. He coined the phrase, “deen wahid, shar‘aa muta‘idda,” one (Islamic) faith, different Shariah (Islamic legal) interpretations. Sheikh Sufyan al-Thawri wrote of the dangers of undertaking jihad and neglecting all other Islamic obligations and emphasized that Muhammad’s main message was that of dawa (evangelism) and when prevented from doing this he resorted to warfare. Abu Hanifa (d. 974 CE and founder of the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam) left the most radical exposition on jihad and warfare, arguing that all of the land is for God and his followers, where God does not reign supreme then there is oppression and jihad becomes obligatory against all those who deny Prophet Muhammad’s message. Although this interpretation from the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam suits our adversary today, Abu Hanifa made jihad an obligation on all Muslims except for slaves, women, and children. There have been many instances where al-Qaida and its affiliates have used women, and the mentally infirm in their campaigns of terror, and this was seen vividly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Abu Hanifa advocated the cutting down of trees and burning of an adversary if it was in the interest of Muslims. He did advocate the need to call non-Muslims to Islam before waging war, which may explain Bin Laden’s and his associates’ audio and video appeals for non-Muslims to convert, to give his heinous acts the veneer of Islamic legitimacy. However, the depth of al-Qaida’s use of Islamic law is so shallow they have neglected whole corpuses of Islamic scholarship on the rules of jihad, and instead pick and choose what is convenient to rationalizing their violent extremism.

Ibn Taymiyyah: Altering Islamic Thought on Jihad

No understanding of the evolution of jihadist thought is complete without discussing Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1327 CE). He would set the concept of jihad towards a more radicalized trajectory. Born in Harran, Syria in 1263 CE, he would study Islam and mathematics in Damascus, and see firsthand the impact the Mongol invasions and the Crusades had on the decline of the Islamic civilization. Five years before Ibn Taymiyyah’s birth, Baghdad was sacked and the Abbasid Caliphate collapsed. The Mongols were locked in a seesaw struggle between the Mamlukes in Egypt over control of the Levant. He would participate in the Battle of Shaqjab, a key battle that stopped the Mongols from sacking Damascus. Ibn Taymiyyah would be cognizant of the canonical Crusades of which there would be eight from 1095 to 1291 CE. He would demonize Christians and Jews without delineation between combatants and noncombatants. Ibn Taymiyyah incited and fought Shiite sects and wrote fatwas (Islamic opinions) declaring war on Muslim sects. He hated the Sufis, the process of kalam or Islamic philosophical discourse, bid’aa or what he perceived as innovations, and was against anthropomorphism. He established groups that would enforce morals on the street and his preaching was so divisive that he would die in a Damascus dungeon in 1327 CE. He argued that although the Mongols had converted to Islam, they retained their Mongol customs and laws, known in his writings as Yasa Laws, and therefore have not completely accepted Islamic law entirely; they are thus apostates. Ibn Taymiyyah has been the subject of much criticism for his stance, but what made his opinions take on a life of their own and reach into 21st century militant Islamist ideology is his persecution and death in prison. Sayyid Qutb, the modern ideologue of militant Islamist theory, fancied himself a modern incarnation of Ibn Taymiyyah when languishing in Nasser’s prisons from 1954 to 1964.

Ibn Taymiyyah was heavily influenced by Ahmed ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali School of Sunni Islam who advocated a return to the na‘ss (original sources) and the use of giyas (analytic reasoning) to adjudicate the authenticity of these original sources. Ibn Taymiyyah waged war on philosophy and abhorred the search for hidden meanings of the Sunna and the Quran. He stressed na‘ss...
(original sources) over aql (interpretative reasoning). Ibn Taymiyyah was a proponent of the caliphate and considered the governance of fellow Muslims the greatest obligation of faith. He wrote that the wilaya (the state), a term not original to early Islam, had two cornerstones — qiw’aa (strength), and amana (security). Under qiw’aa, the state could declare war which required strength of character and heart on the part of the caliph. In addition, the state must have the strength to enforce and execute God’s laws. What militant Islamists ignore is Ibn Taymiyyah dividing the historicity of jihad into Meccan and Medinese. Jihad al-Makki, or the Meccan Jihad, occurred with reason and knowledge. Jihad al-Madani occurred by the hand and with steel. In Ibn Taymiyyah’s book al-Siyasa al-Shariyyah (the Perfect Polity), he wrote that God did not sanction warfare until the migration from Mecca to Medina. He saw jihad in phases, first was to conduct dawa (evangelism) and when prevented from freely preaching Islam, wage warfare. This is why there is disagreement among Salafis over the methodology of al-Qaida; not all Salafis are violent Sunni militant Islamists, but all violent Sunni militant Islamists tend to be Salafi. One of the key nuances is the issue of evangelism versus outright warfare. Ibn Taymiyyah uses the Quranic injunctions of al-Hajj verse 39 and al-Baqara verse 216 that jihad was necessary for all areas that received Muhammad’s message and refused to accept it so as to prevent fitna (dissent). Using a singular and select reading of the Quran such as al-Saf verses 10 through 12, Ibn Taymiyyah extrapolated that jihad was one of the most important obligations in Islam and precedes the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), prayer, and fasting as this is the ultimate form of submission to God. This highlights the dilemma of the Quran: that one can emphasize 70 of the sword verses and make this the basis of a warlike lifestyle. That’s the process militant Islamists take today, but they in turn neglect 98 percent of the text that is 6,236 verses. Those verses that are inconvenient are subjected to naskh (abrogation), but the way militant Islamists apply abrogation is pseudo-intellectual and self-serving. One cannot abrogate a verse of the Quran without understanding past verses clearly to gain an appreciation why the newer verses are better; it is not simply cancelling out whole swaths of the Quran based on expediency. In Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinion, the Imam (leading clergy) were to be the wakil (keepers) of jihad. He saw in the involvement of the clergy, the need to sanctify warfare, to manage its carnage, limiting the killing of women, children, and the elderly. Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Taymiyyah advocated People of the Book to convert or pay the jizya and did not delineate between women and children members of the other protected philosophies. But then Ibn Taymiyyah did not spare Muslims his wrath, and wrote to the Egyptian Sultan Ibn Qalaun inciting war against the Mongols, calling them zandaqah (heretics whose Islamic teachings harm the Islamic community). This is the part that stimulates militant Islamist thinking on takfir, declaring Muslims with alternate views apostate. Elements of Ibn Taymiyyah that today’s militants suppress is his division of jihad into jihad al-ibtida (wars of choice) and qital al-itirar (wars of necessity). The first made jihad fard kifaya (a limited obligation) and the later fard ayn (a collective obligation). Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings are copious, yet he summed up his radical philosophy into three themes:

**Kitab** (literally the book, but meaning the sources) — By this Ibn Taymiyyah meant the fundamental knowledge of religion, and the literal readings of texts. He would be tossed into prison for believing literally the human attributes of God, which was considered by the Mutazilite clergy to be an analogy, and assigning God human attributes is to humanize God, the almighty.

**Mizan** (literally scale, but meaning balance) — By this Ibn Taymiyyah meant upholding the rights of contracts between members of the Islamic society.

**Hadeed** (literally steel, but also meaning restriction or regulations) — This is perhaps the only emphasis militant Islamists obsess upon, and Ibn Taymiyyah was clear in his meaning as placing limits upon the disbelievers and hypocrites (Muslims considered apostate such as Shiites, Sufis, and Mutazilites).

Ibn Taymiyyah not only inspires al-Qaida, but was the source of inspiration for Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahab (d. 1792), the founder of Wahabism. His commentaries on the state and the need to have a clergy sanction an upstanding Muslim to govern other Muslims, made its way partly into Ayatollah Khomeini’s (d. 1989) Islamist political theories.

**Conclusion**

This review essay covered the early discourses on the concept of jihad and its evolution from the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE to the death of Ibn Taymiyyah in 1263 CE. It demonstrates the need for us to become more aware of the nuances in discourse on jihad and gain a comprehension of the history and theological development of jihad that exceeds our adversary. By highlighting these diverse classical Islamic views and even by taking clergy militant Islamists hold dear and exposing aspects of their writing which are suppressed, we can begin to deconstruct al-Qaida and their affiliates ideologically. We cannot simply throw up our hands intellectually by either oversimplifying Islamic discourse, or by saying it is alien, too hard, or difficult to understand. GEN John Abizaid called this a “long war.” Since it is a long war, we have all the time to catch up in our understanding of the pseudo-intellectualism of our adversary. The notion of jihad would change again in the era of European nationalism and the race for colonies in Africa and the Middle East; it is here we see the amalgamation of western philosophical thought like the Nazi favorite Heidegger, anti-secularism, with Islamist militancy to weave the theories of Sayyid Qutb. It is vital that we educate future American military planners in the nuances of this philosophy, as these are the new weapons of the 21st century.

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What, another counterinsurgency manual? Didn’t the Army and the Marine Corps just publish one in 2006? If I am a company commander preparing to go to Afghanistan, should I read FM 3-24 or FM 3-24.2?

In October 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command published Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. Now an approved field manual, this unclassified manual stresses a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations by tying concepts of security, governance, economics, and information engagement together for brigades, battalions, and companies. The document brings to the forefront five key concepts to the practice of counterinsurgency by identifying COIN lines of effort (LOE), expanding upon clear-hold-build operations, discussing the importance of securing the population during COIN, creating tactical-level planning horizons in COIN, and helping units better understand the enemy they are fighting through the components and manifestations of an insurgency. It also describes typical offensive, defensive, and stability operations in a counterinsurgency, as well as providing a framework to train and maintain Host Nation security forces. Due to a quick writing and vetting process, the manual was first designated as an FMI, or a publication that provides expedited delivery of urgently needed doctrine.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, did a superb job of crafting the Army’s and the Marine Corps’ approach to counterinsurgency from the strategic and operational level. However, the U.S. Army lacked a current, practical manual for small units to use during counterinsurgency operations. Until now, Army and Marine Corps tactical leaders had relied upon FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, published in 1986. However, FM 90-8 focused exclusively on combat operations against guerrilla forces, as well as missing two decades worth of doctrinal updates. Drawing from
One of FM 3-24.2’s foundations is the concept of COIN LOEs. By combining FM 3-24’s logical lines of operation; FM 3-0’s, Operations, concept of lines of effort; and FM 3-07’s, Stability Operations, concept of stability lines of effort, FM 3-24.2 creates a tool for units to link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose — cause and effect — to focus efforts towards establishing operational and strategic conditions. The COIN LOEs — establish civil security, establish civil control, support to host nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct information engagement — help commanders and units prioritize and synchronize actions over an extended period of time, as well as assess the effectiveness of operations. Although each LOE can contribute to the defeat of an insurgency, often civil security and civil control must be established prior to fully developing the other LOE. Since each insurgency is unique, FM 3-24.2 retains the flexibility for commanders to tailor the LOEs for their situation by combining LOEs such as economics and restoring infrastructure, or splitting a LOE apart, such as dividing rule of law from governance. The LOEs provide commanders a means to achieve unity of effort, prioritize assets, and balance their actions to secure the population, establish a legitimate local government, and defeat the insurgency. Figure 1 depicts seven counterinsurgency lines of effort.

**Counterinsurgency Lines of Effort**

A clear-hold-build operation is a full spectrum operation that combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees during each phase. This type of operation was used successfully by the French in Algeria and French Indochina, where it was called *tache d’huile* (oil spot); by the British in Malaysia, where it was known as the Briggs Plan; and by U.S. forces in Tal Afar, Iraq, where it was described as a clear-hold-build operation. In the clear phase, offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive operations are stressed; and in the build phase, stability operations are preeminent. However, in each phase the other two operations play complementary roles. For instance, in the hold phase, the unit may focus its defensive operations on securing the population, while also conducting raids on insurgent leaders, as well as restoring a local well to provide water to the village. Figure 2 shows the change in the balance between offense, defense, and stability operations during a clear-hold-build operation.

**Clear-Hold-Build Framework**

Finally, the manual stresses the importance of securing the population through living forward in small bases, executing populace and resource control (PRC) operations, and conducting regular patrols to disrupt insurgent actions. This manual contends that the most important of these is properly locating bases for both U.S. and host nation security forces that provide security to the largest number of people possible, disrupt insurgent activity, and secure key locations and lines of communication. Often, these bases are located amongst the civilian population, much like a neighborhood police station. PRC operations are government actions that concentrate on protecting the populace and its material resources from the insurgents, denying insurgents’ access to the population and material resources, and identifying and eliminating the insurgents while doing so. PRC operations could include enforcing curfews, establishing movement restrictions, maintaining check points, supervising a block or village committee, registering weapons, and rationing critical
Finally, reconnaissance or combat patrols collect information and provide security by disrupting insurgent operations.

FM 3-24.2 establishes a concept for planning horizons during COIN by blending the theories of FM 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*, and FM 7-0, *Training the Force*. Using long-range, mid-range, and short-range windows, the FM proposes brigade, battalion, and company planning timelines for each planning horizon. It also suggests a quarterly operations brief as an azimuth check on the progress brigades, battalions, and companies have achieved, as well as a means to encourage learning and adaption across the unit. For example, a brigade combat team (BCT) might craft a yearlong long-range plan, a three-month-long mid-range plan, and a one week short-range plan.

Despite seven years of fighting an insurgency, the military has struggled with lumping the enemy into one large, amorphous group, be it “a few dead-ender’s,” former regime elements, anti-Iraqi forces, Al-Qaeda, anti-Afghanistani forces, or the Taliban. Just like politics, all insurgencies are local. Each group possesses its own characteristics and follows certain patterns. This manual helps Soldiers categorize and understand the insurgency by encouraging an analysis of each insurgent group’s components and manifestations. The three components of an insurgency — its five elements, or the five groups of people that participate in an insurgency; its eight dynamics, or eight categories that define an insurgency; and one of the six insurgent strategies that it is following — help leaders comprehend the organization that they are battling. The three manifestations of an insurgency — its tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities — are the visible outputs of an insurgency that provide counterinsurgent units a way to develop the insurgency’s patterns. Taken together, the components and manifestations help units to reduce the uncertainty around an elusive enemy and defeat it.

**The Components and Manifestations of an Insurgency**

In addition to the five key practices, the manual provides a means to understand the operational environment; describes types of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted during a counterinsurgency; and discusses the training and mentoring of host nation security forces. FM 3-24.2 also illustrates the challenges and difficulties of conducting a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield during a counterinsurgency. Furthermore, the manual explains tactical site exploitation, sniper operations, base defense operations, and company intelligence support teams. A short reading list of other counterinsurgency documents for leaders confronted with significant constraints on their time is also in the manual.

FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, provides brigades, battalions, and companies a practical guide to achieving a comprehensive approach to successfully waging counterinsurgency operations over a significant period of time. For tactical leaders, who may not have time to read the entire manual, focusing on the five key practices — the sections on the counterinsurgency lines of effort, clear-hold-build operations, securing the population, planning horizons, and the components and manifestations of an insurgency, should prove particularly useful. As one reviewer stated, FM 3-24.2 “will be a great benefit to units in the field.”

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**Figure 2 — Clear-Hold-Build Framework**

**Figure 3 — Components and Manifestations of an Insurgency**
After completing the Infantry Officer Basic Course (now Infantry Officer Basic Leadership Course) and Ranger School, I was thrown into a unit that had few seasoned leaders and many new Soldiers. The turnover rate is surprisingly high inside of line platoons following deployments, and most units are afforded just one year to prepare for the next deployment. It is vitally important to train the Soldiers of your platoon to operate in the tough environment of Iraq or Afghanistan. It is also important to continue your own personal development through training, reading, and personal interaction. Based on my own experiences and a few secondhand experiences, this article addresses things I wish I had known prior to deploying as an infantry platoon leader. Some of the advice is a result of successes that I had and some is the result of failures.

Train Up

My battalion hired an Iraqi who now lives in the United States to teach us basic Arabic before deploying. Each platoon sent three students to the class for about eight hours a week for about five weeks. Those who were particularly skilled in picking up languages came out of the class capable of speaking rudimentary Arabic. Those who lagged were at least able to speak key phrases and were familiar with the dialect and key vocabulary. Arriving in Iraq with this skill paid great dividends. Iraqi security forces (ISF) leaders are used to seeing new Soldiers arriving and having to readjust and fumble through a new relationship with a new unit. Being able to speak pieces of the language may give you instant credibility. A solid working relationship with the ISF early on will go a long way. By spending time with Iraqi Army units and supporting them, we made great strides beyond the intelligence collected by the prior unit within the first three months of the deployment. Language skills can also cut through some of the intimidation that some Iraqis feel as we dismount our large vehicles and attempt to converse with them.

Understanding the Iraqi culture can be difficult for one who has grown up in a starkly different culture. Punctuality and straightforwardness are prized in our culture but are less important to the Iraqis. Conversely, they highly value hospitality, respect, and family. It is important to always take the time to make small talk with visitors before talking about business. Many houses that we visit offer Chi (tea) within moments of the first introduction. It is important that we are also hospitable when we have visitors on our base. The elders in the community are afforded much respect, and as an officer you will be afforded great respect as well. Sheikhs with great wasa (power and influence) should be received the way that you would receive your brigade commander: accommodatingly, with respect and sincerity. Sheikhs are rarely as assertive as your brigade commander, and you are the one with a plan and agenda so don’t mistake respect for a chain of command.

The Iraqis’ emphasis on family is the core strength of the tribal system. The tribes operate as a pseudo-Mafioso system where sheikhs deal with the problems of their people, and people in neighboring tribes often have feuds. Families operate as one unit much more than western families do. In my platoon AO (area of operations) we have nine volunteer Sons of Iraq (SoI) groups with approximately 50 men in each group. The men do not receive any wages for their work, but that is not a considerable concern because the other men in their families continue to farm their families’ land.

By simply understanding how names are structured in Iraq, you will have unlocked a critical database of information and networks. Each man will have a unique first name. His middle name is the first name of his father, and his last name is the first name of his grandfather. Therefore you can immediately be clued into tactical questioning about his sons, brothers, cousins, etc., if you have any knowledge about anyone in his family. We were able to detain one high value individual (HVI) just through name recognition and simple information gathered through a conversation with the HVI’s cousin. Additionally, many Iraqis go by a nickname. Usually their nickname is “Abu (the name of their son).” Abu simply means “father of” but by using this information we have also been able to positively identify some insurgents during tactical questioning. Some insurgents are only known by their nicknames so if you can acquire their son’s names, then you can verify if the suspect is...
really the one that you are looking for.

As you prepare to deploy, your unit S2 is most likely already processing information about your future AO. Establish a relationship with your S2 before you deploy and routinely stop by to soak up information about the area. Do not wait to figure out what specific area your company or platoon will be assuming; instead learn about the whole battalion’s AO because the enemy’s TTPs are very fluid (as are the plans of commanders making assignments for battlespace owners). You will inevitably have a wide variety of missions under your belt by the time that you leave, but you can get a sense for some of the more common patrols specific to your area. For example, if you have a large rural area containing many HVI s you may do more air assault raids. If you have a smaller area with an emphasis on training Iraqis, you will do almost all joint patrols. If you have an area where the roads are unsafe, you would be wise to start getting in the mental and physical shape to walk long distances with heavy gear.

Send requests to your S3 shop for maps as soon as possible so that you and your leaders can start to learn the area. Request maps that have American and Iraqi names for the roads, key infrastructure, mosques, schools, waterways, tribes, towns, and districts. The more overlays that you can gain access to, the better prepared you will be. Being familiar with these names before you assume control of the area will help you interact with the locals, ISF, and the unit that you are relieving in place. As helpful as this information is, it will probably be 75-percent correct at best. Information that is gathered during patrols through a translator, passed to companies, and then passed to battalions often turns out to be a painful game of “telephone” where accurate information becomes misleading and downright wrong. With this in mind, try to
establish communication with the PL or CO that you will be replacing. If you have access to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) computer get your own e-mail address, and the unit on the ground will probably be happy to send you as much information as you request.

Find your brigade tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team (THT) and introduce yourself. Ask for someone to explain to you the requirements for developing HUMINT and turning it into a useful tool beyond simply gaining knowledge. While deployed, you may learn of an insurgent, find him, arrest him, and then he will immediately be released if you do not have a “case” on him. It can be a frustrating process to learn on the ground, so become familiar with the THT personnel and introduce them to everyone who gives you information when you do arrive in country. Do not rely on them to gather all of your information for you, but realize that the court systems will care what the THT personnel write about suspects much more than what you know to be true. Talk with the team about what it takes to make a detention stick, and find your battalion legal representative and ask him the same questions.

While training up for a deployment, you will inevitably be very busy. Do not be afraid to power some of the training and supervising down to your NCOs and take some time to deliberately seek this information and build the relationships that have been mentioned above. The counterinsurgency fight is happening at platoon and company levels, and the assets that are out there should be used for maximizing YOUR fight and not just for the larger unit that the “assets” report to. The BCT concept makes these personnel more accessible to you than they have been in the past, but you must reach out and find them because they will probably not seek you out.

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment fight fire to a reed line that contained several caches of small arms and IEDs.
Getting To Know Your Area

When you arrive in your AO, you will spend about two weeks with the old unit learning their daily routines and signing for equipment. During this time you would be wise to listen to every bit of advice about your area. You may disagree with some of what the old unit did, but make sure that you ask questions about the reasoning behind the decisions that they made. The unit may have learned some hard lessons which drove their decisions that may not make sense to an outsider. Get physical and electronic copies of everything they had done to include maps, overlays, briefing outlines, debriefs, ConOps, load plans, SOPs, meeting agendas, intel reports, area atmospherics, target packets, phone number lists, and anything else that they can offer.

Interpreters are a powerful tool that can drive you to be truly successful or wasteful. You need to get to the point where you and your interpreter are a tight team. When you first arrive in country, spend as much time with your interpreters as you can. These men put themselves in great danger for a relatively small paycheck to serve their country. Initially make sure that you personally keep the interpreters informed of patrol times and give them an idea about how long they will be gone. Ensuring that you personally keep them well informed will go a long way in building their trust. If an interpreter trusts you, he is more likely to say exactly what you mean rather than slightly altering it to be more in line with what he thinks. If you find that an interpreter is modifying what you are saying into something that you did not want to convey, make it clear that you will not accept this. Since many interpreters are older than you are, you can talk through them and the older generation is more likely to respond to the senior Iraqi interpreter rather than some young foreigner. However, if you and your interpreter are clearly having problems working together, the local national may not trust either of you, and so he certainly will not put much stock in the final words of the interpreter. Many interpreters have worked in the same AO for extended periods of time. Do not hesitate to ask them about history of the area, suitability of routes, past significant activities (SIGACTs), or anything else that you may think they would remember; they are a great source of continuity. Despite your best efforts to understand the culture, you will not learn all of the intricacies. Ask your interpreter to inform you of cultural expectations and to quietly correct you if you offend someone.

Early in the deployment explore the different options that you have following the detention of an individual. If you catch an insurgent in the act of emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED) or any other kind of hostile act, it is relatively easy to ensure that the insurgent is locked up for a long period of time. In Iraq you will probably have two different options for which direction you will send the detainees. The U.S. prosecution of detainees generally requires a greater amount of reporting and evidence, but the sentences are usually longer and less likely to result in a corrupt early release. If the case is not as strong, you may choose to send the detainee through the ISF detention system for processing. Work with your battalion and your ISF partner to determine what the expected requirements are for detentions. Once you have determined this, start building three separate lists: targets, developing targets, and persons of interest (POI). The targets are the insurgents who you are confident could be easily processed and detained for a long period of time through your own system. Targets usually have large amounts of reporting on them and are usually more difficult to capture. Developing targets are usually active participants in the insurgency, but there is relatively little or generally vague reporting on them. The developing targets will be the ones that you must decide which detention process you will pursue. POIs generally are undetainable but have a very slight amount of reporting on them or are just guilty by their association with a target or developing target. POIs often become reliable sources of information for THT. Although you cannot keep them locked away for long periods of time, you may be able to bring them back to the base and let THT question them further.

Once you have established these three lists, review them frequently, keep updated on new reports that appear on them, and use all of your contacts to gather more information on them through THT. Memorize the names of the persons on the list and seek pictures of them. Always carry a copy of the names and pictures on you and use every opportunity to ask locals if they know the people you are looking for. Many of the locals are scared of U.S. forces, and to them we arbitrarily drive around in our large vehicles and occasionally arrest a bad guy. Often the locals seem surprised at...
Continued Operations

The more time that is spent in an AO the more familiar you will become with all aspects of the area. I highly recommend that each platoon be assigned specific AOs within the company AO during the first few months of assuming the battlespace. You will become intimately familiar with the terrain, tribes, feuds, history, and patterns of life specific to your area. Do not fall into the previous unit’s boundary lines simply for continuity. If after a few months of operations you refine tribal lines or SIGACTs demands a boundary shift, do not hesitate to accommodate the area rather than the previous unit.

During the deployment you will regularly interact with Soldiers of various other MOSs who you previously had very little contact with. Many of these people will fulfill the combat support and combat service support roles that are critical to keeping you shooting and moving. Building a solid working relationship with these people early on will pay great dividends in the long run. Personally show interest in the jobs and work that the support personnel offer you; they will appreciate the attention and be more likely to help you out when you are in a pinch.

Mechanics will be a critical enabler for you. While driving 20-ton vehicles through rough terrain in 130-degree heat, you will inevitably break some parts and find yourself waiting for the trucks to be fixed. Personal visits from the platoon leader are usually more helpful at speeding up the progress to get a truck fixed, but even more so if you have visited before any problems arose just to introduce yourself, ask about their hours, recovery equipment, staffing, etc. The mechanics may also be more willing to help out with special projects like “Iron Maiden” targets or modifications to keep low wires from catching on the tall antennas.

If you are on a small base, the most important relationship to maintain that can affect your men’s morale is with the cooks. The cooks can drain your platoon by pulling KP, cooking bland and repetitive food, and offering few and strict hours. On the flip side cooks can minimize the requirements for KP, offer flexible hours, and cook special meals, thereby improving your platoon’s morale.

The supply personnel assigned to your company will be capable of ordering much more during a deployment than while in the rear. You should offer to help with the ordering process to ensure the items that you need are ordered.

THT Soldiers will need your help in gathering the information that they need to be effective. Take the time to introduce them to the important leaders and locals who are forthcoming with information. The THT elements are often a frustrating group to interact with because they gather a lot of information and it often seems to never make it to the user — the infantry platoon leader. A reasonable request to make of THT Soldiers is for them to personally deliver any reports that they generate regarding your area to ensure that you receive the information as soon as possible.

If your company has a tactical operations center (TOC) or command post (CP) that is held accountable for information within your AO from your battalion and you have a permanent TOC staff, they will appreciate you keeping them well informed. If you offer them details of your missions and operations, they will be appreciative because they will be well equipped to handle the constant questions from battalion. In return, they will not bother you on the net as often, and they will be more likely to filter out some of the questions that do not need to be asked in the middle of a patrol. Likewise, personal calls to the battalion battle captain before the bigger missions to give him the details will help him in his interactions with the commander and XO. Also, this will draw attention to your mission, and if assets are suddenly handed to your battalion (such as aircraft), you will be more likely to receive those assets. You will probably work with the same aircraft teams for many months and you will probably never meet them face-to-face unless you are on the same base. Air mission briefs (AMB) are helpful tools to synchronize missions where aircraft are used as a lift asset, but you will probably not be afforded face-to-face communication with the pilots flying ISR ([Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] — usually UAVs), Scout Weapons Teams ([SWT] — OH-58s), or Attack Weapons Teams ([AWT] — AH-64s). Try to find contact information for these individuals to share mission graphics with them in order to give them better situational awareness.

If you have taken advantage of the opportunities to learn about the culture before you deployed and listened to your interpreters, then you will probably impress the locals with your understanding and respect for their culture. Many people will be impressed with even a little bit of Arabic in the form of appropriate salutations. Iraqis do not expect us to assimilate to their culture, and you can take advantage of this to some degree. Just as the Army has a unique culture in the United States, it is also unique in Iraq. By being an American and a Soldier, the locals will recognize that you are very business oriented and very busy. Take the time to remove your sunglasses and accept some Chi if you have the time, but don’t feel obligated to eat at each house that offers food. Otherwise you will be very full and get very little done. Feel free to blame your culture for your actions, but only if you have proven yourself knowledgeable and respectful of theirs. You can even instruct
As the enemy learns your patterns and understands how to target you, do not be drawn toward his tactics. The enemy usually does a good terrain analysis and chooses to target you in a place that would be difficult for you to target him before, during, or after the attack. The enemy usually makes use of a good terrain analysis and chooses to target you in a place that would be difficult for you to target him before, during, or after the attack.}

For all patrols you and at least one other person should take notes on the who, what, where, when, and why. Detailed notes and pictures will make your operations much more streamlined and efficient in the future. Everything that your platoon does should be recorded in a debrief, and you should personally retain all information that is gathered by your platoon. While conducting raids gather all materials that may be incriminating and any photos that are in the house. You can use those photos with sources to identify targeted individuals that were not home at the time of the raid. Also, have a Soldier who is dedicated to drawing the layout of the rooms and the houses on the objective. Any house that is entered should be added to a centralized company database that can be used while planning for raids or patrol bases for long duration patrols. At a minimum, the database should include a picture of the house, a picture of all cars, a sketch of the rooms, and any distinguishing characteristics. An even more useful reference tool is a census database (to be discussed later).

In addition to a database, create a space where captured items can be catalogued and stored. Much of the items taken off of objectives will seem like worthless junk, but on occasion you may need to refer back to items that were captured. An additional tool that can be used to help with documentation is a digital voice recorder. They are relatively cheap now and will eliminate any confusion about exactly what was said during leader engagements or tactical questioning on an objective. You can also use it to check on interpreters that you suspect are translating incorrectly.

Iraqis know that the U.S. military has large amounts of money at their disposal. Some, however, do not seem to understand that each platoon does not carry around thousands of dollars to be spent however they like. You will probably have requests for medical evacuations for terminally ill patients. You will probably also encounter people who ask you to buy them air conditioners and refrigerators even though the whole area only has two hours of electricity a day. As time passes the U.S. Army regulates how much money is spent by units more and more. The Iraqi government is now putting money into the hands of the local government to do much of what the Americans previously have done. Ensure that the local sheikhs attend city council meetings where they can learn the proper way to apply for and receive government funding and subsidies. Likewise, if locals approach you with a problem that can be solved through local resources, point them to their sheikh for assistance.

As the enemy learns your patterns and understands how to target you, do not be drawn toward his tactics. The enemy usually does a good terrain analysis and chooses to target you in a place that would be difficult for you to target him before, during, or after the attack. Infantrymen, and especially infantry leaders, have a tendency to aggressively pursue the enemy and find themselves turning toward gunfire rather than turning and running from it. This is an appropriate reaction, but do not mistake being in danger with pursuing the enemy. IEDs are sometimes emplaced in a defensive manner around homes or bed down locations, which would indicate you are close to the enemy. However, most IEDs are emplaced based on the enemy’s pattern analysis of you. Therefore, increasing activity in the vicinity of SIGACTs will not necessarily support your cause. One pathway to success is to make the locals feel safe enough to come to you when they have security concerns. When an IED detonates on a large and sophisticated American vehicle and the vehicle must be towed away, Americans can look weak and ineffective against simple tactics from the perspective of a local. To challenge our appearance as weak, a natural reaction is to increase our presence by patrolling the area much more often. If this is to be done, ensure that patterns are changed; otherwise, the same threats will cause more destruction and make us look not only weak but also dumb. This seems like common sense, but I have personally seen Americans lose face with Iraqis through persistence in driving down the same road several times despite multiple IEDs rather than driving off road in that area. The bottom line is that unseen Americans are still more trusted than vulnerable Americans who cannot even secure themselves.

The U.S. Army at war has great assets available to it. There are billions of dollars dedicated to bringing technology and innovation to the battlefield. Your battalion and brigade will permanently have assets organic that can be used as combat multipliers. At the division level there are assets available that are seemingly endless. If you know the Army has something in its inventory, do not hesitate to request it. Even if you are not sure, ask anyways because you are probably not the first to think of it and it may indeed exist. There are even Rapid Equipping Force offices on some of the larger bases that custom design equipment for the needs of the units. In any attempt to secure equipment or assets never accept a “no” answer from a single person and keep trying.

Most company commanders are busy enough with leader engagements and meetings that they do not have enough time to micromanage you on a daily basis. This is a great benefit of being deployed, but if you are afforded this opportunity seize it and never let it go. If you prove yourself as a proactive leader, you will be able to develop your own intent and run with it which is usually the commander’s lane. Be careful to nest your intent within the intent of your company and battalion; otherwise, you will find yourself committing “Sphere of Influence Fratricide” where different promises are given by different leaders in the same unit. If you are given this chance, do not be afraid to take some risks as long as they are mitigated and the potential benefit is weighed against the risk. Some decisions that you make may be unpopular such as blocking roads, empowering certain tribes that have been helpful more than those tribes that have been less helpful, or staying in people’s houses as a patrol base. If you have a project or operation in mind that has never been done before but you have sufficient intelligence, knowledge, and insight to justify the decision, do not be afraid to take the chance. An example is the large-scale destruction of abandoned houses that were in my AO. Many people had fled the area because it was unsafe and left their houses for insurgents to sleep in, store caches in, and stage from. For a long time I was denied permission to destroy abandoned houses unless explosives were discovered in the house, and then naturally the
house would come down as the explosives were destroyed. After some time permission was granted to reduce the abandoned houses, and a systematic census of the houses included marking all of the abandoned houses with a large X. We slowly began to destroy these houses and very quickly there were no more caches being discovered in the houses. Due to the destruction of just a few houses and a number of other contributing factors, the safety in the area improved dramatically and we were able to leave the remaining abandoned structures standing. Soon families started to move back into the houses.

In the Army we have a very rigid chain of command that recommends all information flow through pre-established routes. In the very decentralized environment that we have established in Iraq those channels may not be in place. Because many companies operate on satellite bases away from their battalion's base, the visibility of operations and concerns is much less than intended. Therefore, you should not pass up an opportunity to communicate with the decision makers when you have a chance. You should know your battlespace better than any other individual, and you should be able to articulate the concerns that you have for the area. Similarly, no one will share the passion that you have for the area, so if you are attempting to get approval for a project, be your own spokesman. If you need approval from a battalion XO or battalion commander, ask your company commander to make an introduction for you and then voice your concerns for the project. Similarly, if the brigade commander visits your area, do not hesitate to tell him your ideas and difficulties. You have a very limited amount of time for your concerns to be heard, so it is worthwhile to voice your concerns as long as you are well founded.

One organizational change most units have adapted for the counterinsurgency fight is the company-level intelligence office. Some intelligence shops only consist of one person while others consist of several Soldiers, NCOs, and an officer (usually the fire support officer). Very rarely do the company intelligence representatives have formal training in intelligence. Help guide these shops to meet your needs. Many intelligence representatives think that they should be analysts and give you assumptions about the area. Later in the deployment that may be feasible, but especially early on it is important that the shop learns to simply develop accurate information and process that into something usable for you. There is a variety of information that should be forwarded to the intelligence shop and a variety of products that should be expected from that shop as depicted in Figure 1.

Use your own knowledge of the area and rising patterns to stay ahead of the enemy. If you know that two geographical areas are linked to the same cell and a new TTP arises in one AO, assume that it will arise in the other AO. Similarly, you must anticipate the next logical move that the enemy will make. You will undoubtedly work with several ISF units in your area. Each unit will have unique skills, experience, and capabilities. Take the time to learn each of these groups so you can determine the amount of oversight and training you need to provide to these units. Some local IP or IA units may know the area very well and have long established relationships in an area. If the area is thriving and you have no reports of corruption within the unit, do not feel as though you must keep a short leash on this unit. In our area there was an Iraqi Army unit that had been operating in the area for a long time. Initially they oriented us to our battlespace and as they gained credibility with us, we gradually allowed them to operate more and more autonomously. This freed up many patrols and we were able to concentrate on other areas of more pressing concern. The desired end state is for the ISF to operate autonomously, and it is important for us to reward good work by decreasing our overbearing oversight and allowing the unit to operate freely in the battlespace.

Two topics which have consumed much of the deployment and could demand separate articles to address are Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups and census operations. Both topics involve headaches and can require tedious work, but they are crucial parts of the counterinsurgency.

CLC groups, also known as Sons of Iraq (SoI) or “Sahowa” (Awakening), have been established in many of the Sunni neighborhoods throughout Iraq. One frustration about the Sahowa movement is that it must happen at the appropriate time. The local populace must feel safe enough to step forward and advertise that they are siding with the coalition forces. Likewise, areas that are truly secure have little need for the force. CLCs are never established in lieu of other Iraqi security forces; instead they are established in addition to the existing security forces. Wisely, the Army sanctions this very untraditional (but certainly not unique) approach to security.
in which there are very few mandates, little training, and limited command structure. If you can convince local sheikhs to be the commanders for these groups, that is a natural way to have immediate credibility for the group. In some cases the sheikh may be untrustworthy, unhelpful, or even in jail. If you have an area that needs a CLC group but you cannot use the local sheikh, find and appoint a local that is willing, smart, and a natural leader. In two cases we did just this in the hopes that an area with a crooked sheikh could have a reliable leader to unite around. The locals eventually swarmed to join the group, and now bring their issues to the CLC leaders and even refer to them as sheikh. Although the CLC leaders have not been accepted as traditional sheikhs, they do have much clout or wasta and are roughly equivalent to the American “new money” version of a sheikh.

The CLC groups will have a high turnover rate, especially if they are unpaid, but when a new member is hired it is important to walk through the same vetting process every single time. CLC groups will have much greater knowledge of the terrain and personnel that live in your area and will offer endless amounts of HUMINT to further your own understanding of the area. A closely watched CLC group will dramatically increase your effectiveness. However, the CLC groups will probably have a much lower discipline level than you would hope. Many of the CLC groups are unpaid, and unfortunately there is no such thing as a free CLC group. The CLC will possibly take money as a toll, deny passage to or harass outsiders, or even facilitate the enemy’s movement. None of the options are good, and they should be stamped out at first proof, but they should be anticipated as a cost of establishing these checkpoints. If the area is stable enough that these groups would cause more problems than good, it would be wise to avoid establishing them.

A systematic census of all of the residents is another staple of current counterinsurgency operations being conducted in Iraq. Each unit has its own SOP for the process and the details that work best for their purposes, but any way it is done takes a significant amount of time. My suggestion is to make the process as thorough as possible to eliminate any repeat visits to a single house. With the biometrics database being used, the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) is an integral piece of equipment that unmistakably keeps a record of personal and biometric data stored in a national system. This piece of equipment should be used on every adult male in every house despite the tedious work it requires. The system itself has some faults (especially in the heat of the Iraqi summer), but it was the sole piece of evidence that led us to a VBIED maker. The system works for its intended purpose, but unfortunately the data stored in the HIIDE cannot be pulled out and used for an external census database to be kept on a normal SIPR computer. Some units choose to gather data little by little day after day by randomly stopping by houses. Others prefer to lock down entire neighborhoods until the census is complete. Both options have benefits and drawbacks, and the outgoing unit can probably advise the best method for different pieces of the AO.

I have recommended work that goes beyond the duties and responsibilities of a platoon leader. This counterinsurgency fight rests heavily on platoon leaders and company commanders. There will be missions where your men pull security for you as you interact with local leaders, and there will be missions where you maneuver squads to help them clear buildings. You as a platoon leader are not always the main effort, but you will always be an integral piece of any mission.

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This article describes the planning and action of a combat patrol conducted on the island of Samar during the Philippine Insurrection at a time when the U.S. Army was gradually breaking away from rigid, centrally controlled operations conducted by battalion and regimental commanders to smaller operations commanded by company officers and noncommissioned officers. The new generation of leaders, men who gained their combat experience in Cuba, China and the Philippines, were just beginning to develop new ideas on how to employ their squads and platoons as independent forces instead of small parts of a larger force.

Since the beginning of our Army, patrolling actions belonged to the cavalry. Our experience with locating an elusive foe in the American West both before and after the Civil War had only confirmed this outlook, and those junior officers who had fought in these engagements remained convinced that it would be always so. But as we soon found out in the tropics, the cavalry was seldom employed to any great extent because its horses were ineffective; this was work for the dismounted infantryman and it had to be learned from scratch. There were no definitive procedures outlined in manuals for a patrol leader to follow; all was left up to local experience that might vary from regiment to regiment. In this particular instance, the company commander put into action all of his recently gained knowledge of the enemy and the local terrain. Despite many obstacles, the commander made the best of the situation with a carefully thought-out plan that would allow him an opportunity to engage an elusive guerrilla force with his disciplined troops.

Background

By early 1901, the fighting on the large island of Luzon had been won with the capture of the insurrecto general, Emilio Aguinaldo. Campaigns on several other islands were winding down, but Leyte and Samar were just now coming to the forefront against the resourceful and energetic guerrilla leadership of Vicente Lukban. Since his arrival in the interior of Samar where he set up his headquarters, Lukban was able to combine his few assets (about 200 men) with the diverse, independent bands that soon would create havoc for the few, overworked American forces. His campaign was ruthless but effective.

Prior to that spring, the taming of these two islands was on the commanding general’s “backburner” due to a lack of men who could be spared to conduct a serious offensive effort. BG Richard P. Hughes, the department commander, had only a token force of seven infantry companies and one artillery battery stationed in six of the larger ports on the 5,276 square mile island, and troops in two of these cities (Calbayog and Catbalogan) were surrounded by the rebels and under frequent sniper fire. In May Hughes received some relief with the arrival of three battalion-size units on Samar, and he immediately launched an aggressive incursion to the interior to deny Lukban’s forces their food supply. Crops were destroyed, ports closed, and all watercraft (less fishing boats) were seized. The following month a battalion of the 9th U.S. Infantry arrived, fresh from duty in China; these he planned to station in company-size garrisons at the mouths of the major waterways that led into the jungle interior. From these points, strong patrols would be dispatched along main and secondary rivers to keep the enemy off balance and away from his food supply.
Natives living in the interior would be encouraged to relocate to the major garrisons along the coast and live peacefully until the guerrillas were defeated.

In August the two remaining battalions of the 9th were released from guard duty in Manila and were warmly welcomed by Hughes who positioned them along the coast and in the villages on the inland waterways. Their arrival proved to be bittersweet as Hughes had to release two cavalry squadrons and, as he soon discovered, the present for duty strength of the newly arrived companies was low, only about 70 percent of their authorized strength (three officers and 105 men). This would only get worse as many of the men were due to be discharged within the next four to five months. To exacerbate the problem, many of the more experienced junior officers were absent from their companies, serving elsewhere on the island. On the plus side, the 9th was coming from a year’s duty in China; they were healthy, well rested, and eager for action. They were battle tested having fought on Luzon for 12 months and in China where they were bloodied at the capture of Tien Tsin (see “’Keep Up the Fire’ — The 9th Infantry in Coalition Warfare” in the September-October 2005 issue of Infantry Magazine) and physically tested on the exhausting march to capture Peking.

The Company

E Company of the 9th Infantry arrived with the initial contingent in mid-June and was assigned to the coastal town of Tarangnan, some 20 miles northwest of Catbalogan, the capital city. Tarangnan had always been a poor coastal village, and in the 18th century it had been the subject of many raids from the marauding Moro tribes of the southern islands. The inhabitants were forced to move to the more secure village of Dapdap on the Gandara River, a few miles inland. Here the people would remain for about 100 years until the arrival of the Spanish who provided security and allowed prosperity to return with profitable abaca (hemp) trade.

The commanding officer (CO) of the company was CPT Francis H. Schoeffel, a 34-year-old native of Rochester, N.Y., and a 1891 graduate of West Point where he played tackle on its first football team and also on its varsity baseball team. He was a veteran of the regiment’s campaigns in Cuba, Luzon, and China and had commanded the company for almost three years. He was energetic and thoroughly enjoyed command duty; he looked forward to the independence of his new duties and its added responsibilities. He was quite tall for that time (over 6 feet, 1 1/2 inches) and remarkably fit; he expected his men to be able to keep up with him. It is interesting to note that within two weeks of their arrival at Tarangnan, he had the men build a small gym and exercise apparatus so they could work out.

Upon landing, he put his men to work immediately, setting up the barracks in an old convent and a dispensary in an old schoolhouse. Part of his command was put to work unloading the ship of their three months worth of supplies. Small patrols were dispatched under his only officer to work in the lay of the land while he and a few men went throughout the town confiscating all small boats.

Schoeffel was authorized two officers to assist him, but his first lieutenant was serving as a company commander for a company elsewhere on the island. His second lieutenant was 29-year-old George W. Wallace who had grown up on the Plains, the son of a cavalryman. The two had a complete, trusting relationship and Schoeffel considered himself most fortunate to have him. Wallace, like his CO, was a “go-getter” and was exceptionally brave. He had been recommended for the Medal of Honor for actions on Luzon in 1900 and would receive the medal in 1902.

Attached to the company was 1LT William W. Calhoun, an Army doctor who had served with the regiment since the Santiago campaign of 1898. With one hospital corpsman, Calhoun ran the dispensary and was responsible for the company’s health and advised Schoeffel on matters of sanitation. He also treated the company of Filipino Scouts stationed in the town as well as the civilian population as much as he could. Normally, Calhoun or his corpsman would accompany the patrols.

The composition of the NCO cadre had changed considerably since the regiment first landed on the islands in 1899 when the squad leaders (corporals) averaged over six and a half years of service while the section sergeants averaged about six years of service. The first sergeant and the quartermaster sergeant were more experienced, both on their fourth enlistments. But the hard campaigning had taken its toll on the older men, and by the time the men landed at Tarangnan all but one of the corporals were first termers while the sergeants averaged less than four years service. Both the first sergeant and quartermaster sergeant were on their first hitch.

The Enemy

E Company had much to learn about its new enemy, but the Soldiers learned fast. They discovered that the Samarninos were more primitive than the insurgents on Luzon, yet tougher and much younger, some as young as 12 years old. Physically, they were short and muscular. They had few firearms, and most of the rebels did not know how to use them. However, they were most adept with the fighting bolo and dagger and frequently were armed with both. Some carried long sticks, which they jabbed to make their opponents lose balance, thus allowing others to pounce on their enemy. They liked to fight in swarms and surround their enemies, darting in and out, jabbing and slashing. They seldom attacked unless they had the advantage of surprise to overcome the American firepower of the .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifles (called Krags by the men). Once the Soldiers were able to use their weapons effectively, the rebels tended to melt into the jungle as soon as they could. Some of the independent bands were members of the Dios Dios sect, a group...
of religious fanatics who were utterly fearless because they believed they were divinely protected. With this attitude, they tended to fight like demons and would continue fighting despite taking enormous casualties.

The natives were ingenious at laying dangerous traps and snares for the Soldiers. They employed numerous pitfalls with sharpened stakes in the bottoms. These were frequently smeared with poisonous herbs or putrid meat to cause infections to the unlucky victim. A second device was the spear trap that employed a bow to propel one or more objects to impale the unwary Soldier. A third popular device was the release of a heavy log to roll downhill to sweep away Soldiers walking along a trail.

Troop movement was restricted to the rivers or a very few trails, and these were always under observation by natives who would sound a warning to the guerrillas, usually by signals blown from a conch shell or bamboo horn. It was extremely difficult for troops to travel anywhere without hearing signals announcing their arrival. It was very difficult, if not impossible, to surprise the rebels.

**The Tactical Situation**

By September Hughes believed the campaign was progressing satisfactorily and he had good reason to think so. There had been many successes. Numerous patrols crisscrossed the island keeping the rebels on the move; crops were destroyed, denying much needed food to the enemy in the hinterland. Lukban’s headquarters had been attacked resulting in the capture of the chief’s family and most of his documents. The rebels scattered, and Lukban had been wounded, barely escaping. Hughes was not an “armchair” general and frequently accompanied the patrols until he had to quit after breaking a leg. But besides being a fighter, he sought ways to end the campaign with minimum losses and hardships on his men and the friendly natives. His efforts to pacify the natives were not overly brutal as he “allowed every man who would come to us and take the oath of allegiance to do so. Then he was treated as a friend and trusted and was fed.” However, those who wished to remain insurgents would be hunted down and captured or killed. As a result, many civilians moved into the larger towns and took the oath of allegiance.

Accordingly, he moved his headquarters to the island of Cebu where conditions were not good and required more and more of his attention. From Cebu he planned to continue directing affairs on Samar. On September 24 he wrote LTG Adna Chaffee, the Army commander, that the campaign on Samar was “promising” with improvements “growing slowly but surely.” Four days later events would prove him wrong and would set into effect drastic actions that triggered harsh conditions for the native population. It would also lead to a rapid end to the conflict.

On Sunday morning, September 28, C Company Soldiers in Balangiga were enjoying their breakfast when they were surprised and overwhelmed by several hundred bolo-swinging natives in a daring raid planned by the villagers. Three officers and more than 44 men were hacked to death before a few brave men were able to secure their Krag rifles and drive off the enemy. All the survivors could do was gather up their wounded (many of them helpless), secure a few boats, and row their way to the nearest garrison some 25 miles away by open sea. This affair (termed a massacre by all the national newspapers) created a flurry of activity and caused both rage and fear on Samar, especially as many of the bodies were mutilated and most of the weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition were missing. Three more infantry battalions and a battalion of U.S. Marines were rushed to Samar, and the pacification program was scrapped. LTG Chaffee was livid, calling for harsher methods “based on distrust of everybody.” He ordered stockades to be erected at every garrison and outposts established to preclude any more surprise attacks. Americans were to be “stern and inflexible.” And above all, the missing weapons must be recovered immediately.

Two weeks later a 46-man detachment of Schoefl’s company located on the Gandara River came under a similar attack when several hundred members of the Dios Dios sect attempted to surprise the men at breakfast. This time the weapons of the Soldiers were within easy reach and ready to use. Despite the initial surprise, the men fought the insurgents with rifles and bayonets and routed the fanatics, killing more than 80 of them. The Americans had 12 men killed and eight wounded. One of the dead was the first sergeant who was in command at the time. The Americans recovered three of the missing Krags which certainly pleased Chaffee. From this affair, Schoefl learned three things: first, the unsharpened bayonet issued to the men was inadequate and the men did not like using it. Two of his men died because they could not withdraw the weapon from the impaled fanatic who would hang on until help came. A third Soldier also found himself in this predicament and was severely slashed but lived to tell his story to Schoefl. From now on, rather than using the bayonet in close combat, the men would use their rifles as clubs. A second lesson concerned the difficulty the Soldiers encountered reloading their weapons as the thimbles on the cartridge belt where individual rounds were stored tended to contract in size when wet. Unfortunately, the commander was unable to do anything about this problem which was not solved until the Army developed the clip system of reloading rifles. Lastly, he discovered that after the attack, many of the men continued to

![Soldiers of C Company, 9th Infantry Regiment were attacked by bolo-swinging natives September 28, 1901, in Balangiga on the island of Samar.](image_url)
show signs of nervousness due to the vicious nature of hand-to-hand fighting. Only by maintaining strong leadership and discipline could these emotions be overcome.

With LTG Chaffee applying pressure on the commanders to bring in Lukban, the commanders in turn pressed the village leaders to assist them by either bringing in the rebels or providing information on their whereabouts. The Presidente (mayor) provided Schoeffel with guides and workers to assist the Americans. The guides proved to be effective, but the workers could only be depended upon to provide labor and could not be trusted to provide any fighting capability. Occasionally the mayor would pass on information, although it is not known if any of the information was useful.

To offset the losses experienced by the regiment, companies of Filipino scouts were formed from natives of other islands to fight on Samar. These men were trained by discharged American Soldiers who received commissions in the new organization; the native troops were given uniforms and weapons and soon they received high praises for their work throughout the islands. In November a company of Filipino scouts under LT Lang was assigned to Tarangnan to work under Schoeffel.

The Plan
In mid-December, Schoeffel received word that a band of insurgents were north of Tarangnan along the Gandara River; most importantly, one of the members was said to be “an influential Filipino, one of Lukban’s most active agents.” E Company had tried in the past to nab him but he had always eluded the patrols in the tidal swamps. Schoeffel wanted him badly. It was also reported that the group had several rifles and this provided added incentive.

When it came time to select the men for his patrol, Schoeffel did not have many choices; his company had been reduced to 37 men present for duty (including several sick men), and so he was forced to limit the number as he still had to provide a strong garrison security force. By now there was little squad integrity as men were departing almost daily for Manila where they were to be discharged. He selected two squad leaders — Corporals John H. Russell and James Gaughan. Both were in their early 30s, recently promoted and were mature, steady and dependable. As his assistant, he selected SGT John P. Swisher, a 32-year-old veteran of all of the company’s battles on the islands and China. The 14 men appeared to have been selected at random; all had been with the company at least a year except for PVTs Thomas Clark and Philip Bradley, who reported two weeks earlier. Clark, however, was a seasoned regular of 21 years service. Fortunately, Schoeffel did have LT Lang’s scouts which he planned to use to good advantage.

For his plan, Schoeffel recognized that he would have to do something unique to penetrate the Gandara without notice otherwise his efforts would be as fruitless. The river entrances were under constant watch by young boys who were quick to sound their conch signals that were audible for well over a mile. He decided to use Lang as a decoy and draw the attention of the nearby rebels, directing him to take 18 scouts, and with a large number of Tarangnan laborers, to precede E Company’s patrol, making no attempt to conceal their movement. He was to land at Dapdap and build fires that could be easily spotted. He was then to send the native laborers into the surrounding rice fields and collect and bag the rice. Meanwhile, Schoeffel’s men would slip into the river behind Lang and move upriver for another mile and a half to the village of Talinga; then they would work their way back to Dapdap and try to come in behind the insurgents, taking them by surprise. He believed the rebels would concentrate their men near the town, focusing all of their attention on Lang with the view of attacking him at the first opportunity. He was confident that his plan had a good chance of success.

Schoeffel planned to personally lead the patrol as this would probably be the company’s last operation from Tarangnan. The week before, he had received orders alerting him to the fact that the company would soon move to a garrison further inland. He directed LT Wallace and the two senior NCOs to start preparing for the transfer of property and so none of them were available for this action. The other NCOs were too inexperienced for an important operation such as this one. Besides, the CO was quite familiar with the terrain as he had worked over the area around Dapdap at least four times prior to this patrol. He was the logical choice.
The Movement

The two parties were awakened at 0200 hours on December 24 and fed a quick breakfast. Lang’s boats departed Tarangnan in darkness, and by 0530 hours they stepped ashore in Dapdap and built a large fire as ordered. Schoeffel’s three boats followed at a discreet distance, and he was pleased to hear the enemy loudly announcing Lang’s force while his entry appeared to escape detection.

Sometime around 0700 hours, the three craft quietly arrived at the swamp edge of Talinga, and the men slipped into the jungle away from view. The boats then retraced their route to Dapdap where the rowers reported to Lang. E Company moved inland and started their climb of a hill behind Talinga from where Schoeffel would be able to observe the area and the trail leading into Dapdap. He positioned himself with a small advance guard of three men and a trusted guide nicknamed Jocko, an older man with a thorough knowledge of the area and an expert at detecting the deadly traps his men had encountered on more than one occasion.

By 0800 hours the patrol approached the crest of the hill when Schoeffel ordered a halt while he and the men in the point worked their way carefully to the top. Removing his field glasses, Schoeffel systematically examined the countryside, especially the trail leading down to Dapdap. Satisfied, he motioned to SGT Swisher to bring the remainder of the men and the natives to the crest.

Before them lay a hogback ridge descending to another hill. The trail for the most part was open but then it entered tall, dense Cogan grass growing on both sides of the trail. Here the path narrowed to about 18 inches and would force the men into a single file. The men were to be especially alert as they entered the Cogan grass; if the weaker advance section came under an attack, the men in the rear would rush forward and lend their assistance. There could be no hesitation — action must be violent and swift. Bayonets were not fixed; the men were to fire their five rounds from the magazine and then taking advantage of their size and strength, use their rifles as clubs and beat back the enemy.

The Action

Jocko stepped out first, followed by Russell, PVT John Marr, CPT Schoeffel and one other Soldier. Swisher and 10 men followed while the natives under a man named Angel, brought up the rear. Not long after entering the tall grass, Jocko stopped momentarily and then let out a loud grunt and fell forward, his intestines spilling out from a large bolo wound in his gut. A split second later CPL Russell sounded the alarm before he was cut in his legs; falling backwards, he managed to fire off a round and kill one of his attackers. Marr was hit several times, fatally, in his front and back and would die within an hour. Schoeffel for some reason did not have his pistol drawn but nevertheless, kept his wits when attacked. Being an accomplished boxer, he sidestepped the first man and dropped him with a powerful blow with his fist. He quickly drew his pistol and shot his dazed opponent in the chest; he then turned to face three more natives rushing to him. He killed two of them while the third fled. Turning around he noticed movement from the first man he had shot and was surprised to see him still alive. Not only was he alive, but this time, despite his wound, he was faster than Schoeffel, cutting the CO deeply in the back with his bolo and giving him another slash before crawling away into the safety of the grass. Schoeffel barely felt his wounds as he then moved over to the dying Marr and retrieved his weapon and continued the fight.

There were probably 75-100 zealots in the Dios Dios band, most of them wearing their distinctive red caps with chin strips and carrying their amulets and charms about their necks or in their hats to protect them from the American bullets. This was the same sect who had attacked the company two months previously on the Gandara River. It would appear that their plan was to hit the smaller advance element and overpower it quickly while the bulk of the group lay in wait for the Soldiers in the rear to rush forward to the aid of their comrades.

Hearing the heavy fighting in front of him, Swisher urged his men forward. The men followed his orders to the letter and quickly were at the head of the column, but the price had cost them dearly. Swisher, CPL Gaughan and PVTs Joseph Weippert and Frank McAndrew were cut down and fell by the trail, dead of multiple bolo and dagger wounds. Others were hacked as they ran the gauntlet with only three men, PVTs Benjamin Antry, Nathan Fisk and Edward Butler arriving unscathed. A fourth man, Arthur Bonnicastle, an Osage Indian from the famous school at Carlisle, Pa., was slightly wounded, owing his good fortune to his cartridge belt which absorbed the full force of a vicious bolo blow to his midsection. These four men, having expended all of the rounds in their magazines, had clubbed their way forward, cracking the skulls and limbs of the insurgents who swarmed about the survivors. It was now up to these four and Schoeffel to do the fighting as none of the others were sufficiently strong to shoulder a weapon. Here they prepared for a second assault they feared would soon come. They stood back-to-back and poured round after round into the grass to discourage their attackers. Within five minutes the affair was over, their foes having slunk away in the tall grass, leaving their dead behind. Schoeffel was still conscious but was unable to stand and was sick to his stomach. He gave orders to retrieve the dead and wounded and bring them to the front where they could be treated. They were collected and placed within a tight circle. One man, PVT Clark, was missing.

The natives at the rear of the column were now brought forward. Only Angel, their leader, and a handful of others had responded to Swisher’s orders to come forward. Angel was dying and two others were wounded and out of action. When the others were asked why they did not rush forward, the natives lamely responded that they had only bolos and feared they would be mistaken as enemies and shot down by the Americans.

The Consolidation

Schoeffel sent the prearranged signal to LT Lang to come to their assistance and was relieved to hear the return signal. However, it would take Lang’s party about an hour to reach the survivors. In the meantime, the wounded were made comfortable and given first aid. For some unknown reason, no corpsman accompanied the patrol, leaving the first aid duties to the few healthy men. A small search party was sent out to find the missing Soldier. Bonnicastle soon found him at the bottom of the hill, barely alive suffering from severe bolo wounds to his head and stomach, lying next to two...
rebels whom he had killed. He was brought to the circle to join the seven other severely wounded Soldiers. Marr was dying, and PVT George Bedford was the next worst case having multiple wounds to his back, head, chest, and arms. The tough 35-year-old Soldier would survive the grueling trip downhill, the boat ride home but die 10 minutes after reaching the dispensary in Tarangnan. PVT George Claxton, an Irishman with over 10 years service in the regiment, had numerous gashes about his arms and suffered arterial bleeding. On arrival at the dispensary, LT Calhoun was forced to amputate his arm, but Claxton died on Christmas Day having lost a massive amount of blood.

The other three Soldiers — CPL Russell, PVTs Bradley and Daniel McPherson — were luckier. Although they had many bolo wounds, they were to recover within a few months and return to duty. Schoeffel’s wounds, though not considered serious at the time, proved difficult to treat. Especially serious was a deep gash to his left buttock. Schoeffel continued to be nauseous, and it was later learned that he had been jabbed in the groin by a fanatic armed with a pole.

Lang put his scouts to work cutting down bamboo for the litters. He went about and counted 37 bodies in the vicinity. The men gathering the litter poles counted another 15 rebels along the slopes of the hill.

The Return

When all was ready, the five dead Soldiers (by now Marr was dead) were carried on the backs of the natives. The seven litter cases were borne by the natives also while Lang and his scouts led the way down the hill. Before reaching Dapdapa, Clark expressed bringing the death count to six men. The wounded were carefully placed in the barotas and the slow trip home began. Finally at 1400 hours the small boats limped into Tarangnan where Doctor Calhoun went to work immediately. LT Wallace dispatched 1SG Gaylord Connelly to regimental headquarters with information on the attack. Enroute Connelly encountered a gunboat that carried him the rest of the way. His report initiated a flurry of activity at Catbalogan and all available men of L Company under LT Gibson were gathered and placed on the gunboat along with 25 Filipino Scouts under the command of LT Caulfield. A second surgeon along with the regimental chaplain also embarked, and the ship sailed at 1830 hours to reinforce E Company.

CPT Schoeffel’s wound proved far more serious than anyone thought at the time. His sciatic nerve was damaged and he was forced to retire in 1903. He was recalled to active duty as a lieutenant colonel in World War I and ran the Port of Embarkation at Hoboken, N.J. CPL Russell recovered from his wounds and was discharged the following March as a sergeant. He reenlisted for one more hitch, this time as a hospital corpsman. He returned to his Boston home, dying in 1951. PVT McPherson also reenlisted for an additional three years and then went back to Houston. PVT Bradley (whose real name was Andrew Fleming) remained in the service until his death in 1916. PVTs Antry, Fisk, and Butler remained with the regiment and went back to their hometowns when their enlistments expired. PVT Bonnicastle later became the first sergeant of the company and then returned to the Indian School at Carlisle. He soon married and returned home to Pawhuska, Okla., where he became involved with many of the tribal affairs, eventually becoming the chief of his tribe in 1920. He died in 1923.

CPT Schoeffel’s plan was a good one and made excellent use of the elements of surprise, violence, and control. He dealt a punishing blow to this particular band of rebels who would not be heard from again for a long time to come.

Epilogue

LTG Chaffee continued to press his troops and within three months the island was secure with most of the rebels making arrangements to come in and surrender their weapons. Lukban’s headquarters was attacked again in February and this time he was captured. This action broke the back of the insurgents and soon they drifted into the American camps to surrender. Finally in late April, the last group of them capitulated and laid down their arms. By this time, E Company and the rest of the regiment were heading for Manila where they would soon sail for San Francisco.
For centuries our nation’s military leaders have studied the ways of our adversaries. Professional Soldiers understand that knowledge of one’s adversary is essential to success on the battlefield. For conventional conflicts this may consist of studying the enemy’s tactics, doctrine, and equipment capabilities. In a counterinsurgency, however, the populace is the key terrain; servicemen must study the people and their culture to succeed. According to William D. Wunderle in his book *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for U.S. Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Cultures*, an in-depth understanding of a people’s culture improves a unit’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations by providing servicemen insight into the intent of individuals and groups in their area.

Although the United States has been fighting in Iraq for over six years, the average serviceman still lacks the appropriate level of cultural awareness necessary for conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East. This lack of cultural understanding by U.S. servicemen often leads to animosity and hostility among Arabs and contributes to a negative image of the American military. This low level of understanding can often be attributed to inadequate training prior to deployment. Often servicemen are lectured on the “do’s and don’ts.” “Shake hands with your right hand.” “Don’t use the left hand for contact with others.” “Don’t point with a finger.” “Don’t debate religious issues.” These basic behavioral guidelines lack the appropriate context for cultural understanding.

Wunderle wrote that in order to develop the critical thinking skills necessary to understand how Arab culture might influence an operation, a serviceman must have a firm understanding of Arabs’ thought processes, motivating factors, and other issues. There are literally volumes of books dedicated to this subject, and leaders should read as many as possible prior to deployment. As T.E. Lawrence wrote in his 27 Articles, “The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them.” Not all servicemen have the time or motivation to conduct such a thorough study, however. This article is designed for them. While nothing can substitute a dedicated study of Arab culture, this article will attempt to bridge the gap between simple graphic training aid (GTA) cards with lists of “do’s and don’ts” and the volumes of books dedicated to the study of Arabs.

**The Islamic Faith**

While it is neither true that all Arabs are Muslims nor are all Muslims devout, there is no greater influencing factor on the Arab way of life than that of Islam. In Arab countries, there is no separation between church and state. As a result, Islam plays a critical role in nearly every aspect of daily life in the Middle East. Because Islam plays such a significant role within Arab society, it is important that U.S. servicemen have a basic understanding of the faith and the beliefs behind it.

Islam originated during the early seventh century BC in the city of Mecca, in modern day Saudi Arabia. It derives from the teachings of the final prophet Mohammad. While an ordinary man, Mohammad was believed to be a witness to the word of God, or “Allah.” He taught his followers to submit themselves to the will of God; thus people that practice this faith are known as Muslims, or “one who submits to God.”

Today, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world. If it continues to grow at its current rate, it will be the most widely practiced religion in the world by the year 2020. The text of the Islamic faith is known as the Qur’an (sometimes printed Koran). The Qur’an is considered to be a self-authenticating and closed text, meaning nothing may be added or taken away. It is divided into 114 units known as “suras,” which are similar to the chapters of the Bible. Suras are not organized chronologically; instead they are organized according to

*An Introduction to Arab Culture: A Brief Synopsis for US Soldiers*  
CAPTAIN KEN SEGELHORST
length with the longest first. Overall, the Qur’an is a relatively short religious text in comparison to the Bible. This short length allows dedicated Muslims to memorize the entire work. A Muslim’s Qur’an is of great religious importance to them. It occupies a place of honor within an Arab’s household and is often wrapped in cloth. Servicemen should be aware of this when conducting searches in Muslim homes and avoid handling the Qur’an unless absolutely necessary. Under no circumstances should a serviceman deface or otherwise dishonor the Qur’an as such an act may generate strategic repercussions.

The five pillars of Islam represent the faith’s basic tenants. They are the obligations by which Muslims strive to abide by. The five pillars are Shahada, Zakat, Salat, Sawm, and the Hajj. The Shahada and Zakat are fairly straightforward. The Shahada is the belief that there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his messenger. The Zakat is the giving of alms to the poor; this normally consists of two and a half percent of a Muslim’s annual income. The other pillars are slightly more complex.

Salat is the ritual prayer performed by Muslims. Muslims execute five salats a day. There is no set time for these prayers but typically they occur early in the morning, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and evening. Prayers vary in length from two cycles in the morning to four cycles in the afternoon and evening. In some circumstances the second and third salats are combined, as well as the fourth and fifth, bringing the number of salats a day from five to three. Muslims may make up missed salats by praying in private. Additional prayers, or salats, are required for religious festivals, funerals, and other special occasions.

Muslims prefer to conduct their salats in the presence of other Muslims. They often pray in neighborhood mosques throughout the week and at larger communal mosques on Fridays. While mosque architecture may vary widely from region to region, there are a few common characteristics. First, there is a minaret from which prayer call, or “adhan,” is voiced to the local community. Second, one wall will always face Mecca. This wall is known as the “qibla” and is the direction to which Muslims will face during prayer. Within the mosque, prayer is led by an “imam.” These religious leaders possess a great deal of influence within their communities and can prove an invaluable ally when conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Sawm is the daytime fast during the month of Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim calendar. During Ramadan Muslims cut themselves off from worldly distractions in order to become attuned to God as the only ultimate reality. From dusk till dawn they are not permitted to eat, drink, smoke, or have sexual relations. They also make an extra effort to avoid sins such as lying, slandering, and committing acts of anger. During Ramadan one may expect Arab Muslims to be more irritable than normal due to their physical state. Servicemen should show respect by not eating, drinking, or smoking in front of Arabs or offering them such.

The final pillar is the pilgrimage to Mecca, or the Hajj. Only about 10 percent of Muslims make the trip into modern day Saudi Arabia to visit the historic city during their lifetime. Those that make the trip take great pride in the experience and earn the title of “Hajji” (Hajja for women). The pinnacle of the experience is said to be the circling of the Ka’ba. The Ka’ba is a black cube believed to be a replica of the house of God in the seventh level of heaven. Pilgrims circle the Ka’ba counterclockwise seven times; this represents that God is at the center of their lives. During the annual pilgrimage, the Hajj can be a significant issue for servicemen in the Middle East. Problems generated from large numbers of Muslim pilgrims traveling through a unit’s area of operations must be foreseen, planned for, and overcome.

Muslims often enjoy discussing religion with non-Muslim westerners. Many are curious of western culture and feel a sense of duty to share information on Islam. Religious discussion may even lead to a suggestion to convert to Islam. Servicemen must be prepared to politely reject the invitation to convert. Servicemen may state they cannot consider conversion because it would offend their family; Arabs will tend not to argue against this as family is an essential part of their culture, according to Margaret K. Nydell in her book *Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Modern Times*. Most Arabs will also understand the rejection if a serviceman is a devout Christian or Jew, as both are viewed as “people of the book.”

**Arabic Language and Communication**

While multiple languages exist within Arab culture, Arabic is the written and spoken language of more than 150 million inhabitants of the Arab world. Arabic is the language of Islam. It is the language which the Qur’an was originally transcribed; therefore, Muslims view it as superior to all other languages. According to Wunderle, Arabic ranks only second to Japanese in terms of its sensitivity to context, meaning that one word may have several conflicting meanings depending on the context of its use. This means one could have several native speakers translate an Arabic document and result in as many different translations. This should be kept in mind when relying on linguists to translate written or recorded materials. Important materials should be translated by multiple linguists and their products compared to verify the content of the piece.

Communication with Arabic speakers requires the ability to “read” beyond what is being said and relies heavily on the understanding of nonverbal cues. Body language takes on extra significance in Arab culture. Arabs tend to be very melodramatic. One must pay special attention to the hand gestures, eye movements, touching, and emotions of Arabs during conversation. They may raise their voices or pound their fist on the table during dialogue. They are not normally as angry as they appear, however.

*An 1st Infantry Division Soldier watches as an Iraqi Army soldier speaks with a civilian during a combined patrol in northwest Baghdad.*

Brian Tierce
The use of emotion simply demonstrates deep and sincere concern for the subject of the discussion.

While Arabic tends to be a difficult language for Americans to learn, every effort should be made by American servicemen to learn the basics. This cannot be emphasized enough for counterinsurgency operations where the populace is the key terrain. Simple greetings and pleasantries can easily be learned by our servicemen and pay huge dividends when communicating with Arabs. While the knowledge of key phrases will not allow for in-depth conversations with Arabs, it demonstrates the serviceman’s respect and willingness to learn about Arab culture and language. Such a gesture will not go unnoticed by a host country national.

Most communication between U.S. servicemen and Arabs will be done through interpreters, either American linguists or foreign nationals. Interpreters should be positioned to the side and spoken through, not spoken to. This means servicemen should maintain eye contact with the Arab they are trying to communicate with rather than looking to the interpreter when speaking. Servicemen should also remember the importance of using emotion in Arab culture; Americans are often viewed as being “coldhearted” by Arabs for their lack of emotion, according to Nydell. Linguists should mirror their serviceman’s tone and attitude in order to help convey the desired sentiment. Servicemen should speak with poise and repeat important points for emphasis. If statements are soft spoken and made only once, Arabs will question a serviceman’s convictions.

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While Arab society values men more so than women, U.S. servicemen should not underestimate the influence and power of Arab women. Arab women control many aspects of the household. They manage the children, and sometimes arrange marriages. Arab men show great respect for their mothers and must make every effort to obey their wishes. So while it appears that men make all of the decisions within an Arab society, they are undoubtedly influenced by the women in their lives, especially their mothers. For this reason, U.S. servicemen should treat Arab women, especially female elders, with the utmost respect as it may help to influence Arab men.

While servicemen should be respectful to Arab women, they must strike a delicate balance. Servicemen should refrain from showing too much interest in an Arab’s female family members. They should not ask an Arab man about the well-being of his female family members. They should not show too much interest in an Arab’s elders, with the utmost respect as it may help to influence Arab men.

Arab Marriage and Women

Marriage in Arab society is essential to maintaining strong families. Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslim men, whereas Muslim men may marry women of any faith. This is to ensure that the children grow up in a Muslim household. Males normally marry in their late teens, with females being the same age or several years younger. In many Arab circles a dowry must be paid to the woman’s family in order to validate the marriage. As many as one-third of marriages are arranged between cousins; Arabs feel this helps maintain strong family ties. As a result, genetic problems result in nearly 10 percent of these marriages, according to Nydell. While many westerners associate Muslim Arabs with polygamy, the practice has become less common in modern times. Muslim polygamy was originally approved by Mohammad during the seventh century A.D. after early Muslim battles left many families without providers or breadwinners. While this custom is still practiced in rural areas of the Middle East, polygamy amongst Arabs is far less common than most westerners like to believe.

The rights of Arab women are often a topic of discussion by international human rights activists. Arabs claim Muslim women are separate but equal. In reality, their treatment varies largely from country to country. Some things remain relatively the same across the board in regards to Arab women. They must remain in separate parts of mosques and cannot lead a congregation in prayer when men are present. They receive only half the inheritance of a son; this is justified by the fact that daughters will marry and have a husband to support them. Due to the fact sons take care of their parents in old age, boys are preferred to girls in Arab society. While men can bring honor to an Arab family, women, by nature, can only bring dishonor and shame.

The Arab Family

The family is the base of Arab culture and society. Nothing matters more to an Arab than the protection and honor of his family. Family takes priority over an Arab’s village, tribe, and country. It is every Arab’s responsibility to look out for the welfare and integrity of their family. This loyalty influences all aspects of an Arab’s life. Arabs will often put the welfare of their family before their own, as the group takes precedence over the individual in Arab culture. Arab families are patriarchal and hierarchal, meaning that fathers and elders dominate control over the family. The larger the family the better, as large families provide possible economic benefits, especially in regards to sons who will be responsible for caring for their parents in their old age. The larger the family and the more sons an Arab has, the more prestige and power his family earns.

Being that the family is such a source of pride for Arabs, servicemen should be encouraged to talk about each other’s families when conversing with Arabs. This has proven to be an excellent means of breaking the ice and building relationships with Arabs. Servicemen should remember only to speak positively of their families. If a serviceman’s parents came from humble or disadvantaged upbringings or the serviceman dislikes his parents or relatives, he should keep such information private, according to Nydell. When talking about children, servicemen must keep in mind that most Arabs will not understand the concept of planned families. Servicemen should not say they do not want more children or that children are too expensive, as comments of this nature may be misconstrued by Arabs.

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While servicemen should be respectful to Arab women, they must strike a delicate balance. Servicemen should refrain from showing too much interest in an Arab’s female family members. They should not ask an Arab man about the well-being of his wife, sister, daughter, or mother; instead
servicemen should ask, “How is your family?” Males should refrain from touching or talking to Arab women if possible, instead using female service members to communicate. If servicemen must address Arab females, they must do so in a respectful manner. Older women should be addressed as “Hijjiya.” This is similar to “ma’am” but shows even more respect in Arab society. Younger women should be addressed as “uKhtee,” which means “my sister” and is similar to saying “miss” or “ma’am.” It is important that servicemen treat Arab women properly to prevent negative exposure within the populace and to avoid possible repercussions taken against Arab women by their male relatives to maintain family honor.

**Business Meetings**

Arab culture is extremely relationship focused. Success often relies on who you know and the strength of relationships you have developed. Nydell wrote, “A good personal relationship is the most important single factor in doing business successfully with Arabs.” When conducting a business meeting with Arabs, servicemen should not rush into matters of business. Arabs mistrust people who do not appear to have an interest in their personal well-being and will likely reject any business proposals if they feel hurried or pressured into them by U.S. servicemen. Instead, time should be spent drinking chia and exchanging pleasantries in order to build rapport and demonstrate an interest in the Arab. Servicemen may find it helpful to keep notes on important and influential Arabs they interact with on a regular basis. Notes should include number and age of children, family origins, and other family information that can be plugged into conversations in order to demonstrate the serviceman’s sincerity and help build stronger relationships. While pleasantries may go on for longer than desired, it is important for servicemen to avoid looking at their watch during meetings with Arabs. Doing so may suggest to an Arab that you consider them unworthy of your time. Wait until a lull in the conversation before bringing up the true purpose of your visit.

**Arab Hospitality and Guest Etiquette**

Servicemen must know how to behave and what to expect when a guest to important Arab social, political, or military leaders. In Arab culture, generosity and hospitality should be expected and demonstrated by the host. The most important components of hospitality are formally welcoming a guest, offering the guest a seat, and offering something to drink. When offered a drink by Arabs, servicemen should accept at least a small amount to show esteem and respect to the host. The drink most often served is Arab tea, called chai. When offered a meal, a host will often invite you to stay longer. This is simply proper etiquette and should not be taken literally. A serviceman may stay a few additional minutes but should not over stay his welcome.

Business meetings and social gatherings may consist of a single course eaten by hand. In urban areas, the meal may consist of several different courses eaten with utensils. Servicemen should follow the lead of the host, using his right hand to eat whether using utensils or not as the left hand is viewed as unclean. Servicemen should expect to be offered second and even third helpings of food and should politely accept at least one additional helping. Those more comfortable with Arab culture may begin by refusing additional helpings, only to allow themselves to be won over by the host’s hospitality. This is known as a ritual refusal and is the custom in Arab culture. While taking an additional helping is polite, servicemen should not eat so much as to suggest there was not enough food prepared; this can be embarrassing to the host. After the meal, when preparing to leave, a host will often invite you to stay longer. This is simply proper etiquette and should not be taken literally. A serviceman may stay a few additional minutes but should not over stay his welcome.

When servicemen invite Arabs to a meal or social gathering they must keep these rules of hospitality in mind. Foods must be Halal, which means lawful according to Islam. Haram, or unlawful foods and drinks such as pork and alcohol, should not be present, whether meant for Arab guests or not. When planning a meal for Arabs, do not plan the amount of food needed too thoroughly. An over abundance of food should be presented as a show of hospitality and generosity. Leftovers can always be consumed later.

**Favors and Requests for Help**

Servicemen confronted by Arabs making requests for favors or help are often placed in a difficult predicament. On one hand, servicemen should realize that in a counterinsurgency the populace
is the key terrain and everything possible should be done to win their hearts and minds. On the other hand, as in the case of Iraq, we must work to make the Arabs autonomous and capable of operating without our assistance. To assist servicemen placed in this kind of predicament, it is important to understand the Arab etiquette for such a request.

If asked a favor, Arabs will generally try to help. If the request appears unreasonable, illegal or too difficult, an Arab will often hear out the request and offer to help. This offer is often an empty promise, however, and later the Arab will express his regrets and try to make up for it by offering to do something different for the requester in the future. It would be bad form for an Arab to openly refuse a favor when asked. Instead, an oral promise, even without intent of being carried out, has its own value within Arab culture. This means that U.S. servicemen should not take Arab responses to such requests at face value. When Arabs say “Yes” to your request, they are not necessarily saying that the action will be carried out; they may just be exercising good Arab etiquette. That “Yes” could simply mean, “Yes, I understand you,” rather than “Yes, I will.”

While Arab etiquette may require an oral promise to help when asked a favor, U.S. servicemembers must be particularly careful not to commit when put in this situation. While we should not turn our backs on all requests for help made by Arabs, servicemen must thoroughly examine the potential impact of their commitments. Servicemen should never make promises which cannot be fulfilled. While servicemen should remember they are there to help the Arabs, they are not there to do their work for them. The best way for the U.S. to help Arabs, as in the case of Iraq, is to train them to use their own government channels and resources. This will lessen their dependence on U.S. forces and prepare them for life without American influence.

Constructive Criticism and Confrontation of Facts

When working with Arabs, it may be necessary for servicemen to offer criticism and advice from time to time. This is especially the case with the various types of U.S. transition teams currently embedded within Iraqi military and police forces. Much care must be taken when offering Arabs criticism. Constructive criticism does not translate into Arabic. Arabs often feel that criticism is a personal attack on them. Criticism should always be conducted in private and never in front of an Arab’s subordinates. To offer criticism to an Arab in a tactful manner, a serviceman should always start by pointing out the Arab’s accomplishments and positive attributes. Praise at least part of their plan, then offer suggestions on how to improve it in a tactful manner, giving the appearance that changes are a simple modification to their plan. As T.E. Lawrence suggested, “Always approve them (their plans), and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion.”

While providing constructive criticism to Arabs can prove difficult, confronting them about errors or mistakes can be even more frustrating. One must remember that to Arabs, honor is more important than facts. Arabs will rarely admit to errors openly if doing so will cause them to lose face. Even when faced with contradictory facts, many Arabs will deny having made a mistake and will begin to talk in circles in an attempt to shift blame for the mistake or deny it was ever made in the first place. This can be extremely frustrating to U.S. servicemen as they try to establish facts. While there is no easy way around this cultural trait, it is best circumvented by confronting the Arab in private, presenting contradictory facts in a non-hostile manner, and in such a way which allows him to save face.

Fatalism and Time Hacks

Fatalism is the belief that humans cannot control all events; some things depend on “God’s will,” or fate. While fatalism is more prevalent among traditional Arabs, it remains a serious issue for U.S. servicemen when working with Arabs. To Arabs, fatalism is a means of absolving themselves of responsibility and maintaining their honor while Americans often see it as a catchall scapegoat for poor performance or failure. When something goes wrong Arabs often state, “Inshallah” or “God wills it.” By stating this, they are claiming it was out of their hands and the outcome was the will of God, thus absolving them of all responsibility. Servicemen must do their best to demonstrate that Arabs have more control over their fates than previously thought, without undermining the Islamic faith or the power of God.

Fatalism also leads to a tendency to accept current circumstances as they are and wait for them to change by the power of God. This school of thought can be extremely meddling during reconstruction, as in the case of Iraq. Rather than take on the challenges faced by political and social reconstruction, many may stand idly by and...
wait for the country’s situation to change, by what they believe to be the power of God. Such a lack of desire to help the situation can be extremely frustrating to U.S. servicemen as they work to stabilize an Arab country.

Where U.S. servicemen will encounter fatalism most frequently is in regards to time. Arabs do not view time as fixed and rigidly segmented as we do in the United States. When planning a meeting with Arabs, do not expect them to arrive on time. To most Arabs there is no such thing as hard times. Times serve more as general guidelines as to when a meeting is to take place. They will not rush themselves to arrive on time; if they are late, it is attributed to the will of God. This often results in Arabs being what we would consider fashionably late. Moreover, setting a specific time to meet an Arab does not necessarily constitute an appointment. Often no disrespect is meant by the Arab’s failure to show; it simply means that “God willed something different,” according to Wunderle.

Arab tardiness and disregard for time is unacceptable for military operations however. U.S. servicemen working with Arab military or police units must demand that time hacks be met. Servicemen should never take “Inshallah” for an answer when planning timelines. While demanding of precise times may appear unreasonably impatient to some Arabs, it is essential for successful military operations. To teach Arabs the importance of time hacks and keeping to a timeline, servicemen must sometimes use “tough love.” Request an Air Weapons Team (AWT) for an operation with the Arabs. When the Arabs fall behind their timeline due to “God’s will,” send the aircraft back. When asked where the aircraft are, explain to them if they had kept to the timeline they would have had aircraft, but due to their tardiness, they were sent elsewhere. This will result in more timely execution for future operations.

Classes within Arab Culture
Most Arab countries have three distinct social classes. The lower class consists of the urban poor, peasants, and low-ranking soldiers. The middle class consists of moderately prosperous merchants, landowners, teachers, government employees, and military officers. The upper class is made up of royalty and large influential families. While conducting counterinsurgency operations, servicemen will regularly interact with Arabs of each social class.

Undoubtedly influenced by their fatalist beliefs, Arabs accept the social class to which they were born and make little effort to rise from one class to another. There is an old Arab proverb which states, “The eye cannot rise above the eyebrow,” which means the eye cannot change its position in life, nor can an Arab. In the United States and other western societies, people strive to improve their station in life, but the same cannot be said for most lower class Arabs. Arabs generally accept their station in life and the inequality associated with it. Even in the rare occurrence an Arab is able to move up the social ladder, there is little respect for the “self-made man” in Arab culture. It will take several generations for a family which has improved its station in life to gain the respect of its new social class.

Upper class Arabs are not unlike the upper classes of western society. They are often well educated, demand respect from others, and are elitist in nature. While many servicemen view Arabs as uneducated and unintelligent, this is not the case. Many upper class Arabs have degrees from prestigious universities, including Ivy League schools in the United States. For this reason, servicemen should never underestimate an Arab’s education or his ability to speak English. When working with upper class Arabs, it is important to show respect for their hierarchy and rank within society as they can bear a great deal of influence.

It is important to address Arab social classes in regards to the Iraqi military. In the days of Saddam, the Iraqi military was very top heavy. Officers came from the middle and upper classes and personally took charge of everything, giving little trust or responsibility to NCOs or the enlisted men which came from the lower classes. Today, undertones of this still exist as the United States helps to rebuild the Iraqi military. Rather than viewing NCOs as the backbone of the military, many Iraqi officers still view enlisted men as being members of the lower class and incapable of responsibility. To help defeat this attitude, U.S. officers should reinforce the importance of NCOs. Whenever an officer meets with an Iraqi military counterpart, he should bring one of his NCOs and suggest the Iraqi officer does the same. The U.S. servicemen should work to get the Iraqi NCO involved in the conversation, asking for his input on the topic of discussion. This, in conjunction with the exchange of information and ideas between American officers and NCOs as viewed by the Iraqis, should help to reinforce the importance of the NCO within the Iraqi military.

Arab Honor
Arabs live in an honor-shame based culture. They take their honor extremely seriously and will kill to defend it. The significance of Arab honor outdates their religion and has served as their culture’s defense mechanism for several centuries. Infringements of honor are not easily forgotten. Even today, families in the Middle East wage personal wars on one another for wrong doings committed decades earlier. In many instances, the only way an Arab man can restore his honor is to shed the blood of his enemy.

As the U.S. military will undoubtedly continue to operate in the Middle East for the next several years, we must learn to treat Arabs with honor and respect. When we increase an Arab’s honor, we gain a valuable ally in the fight for the local populace — the key terrain in any counterinsurgency.
Over the last several decades, a suite of shoulder-launched munitions (SLMs) has been fielded to provide Soldiers with the capability to defeat light armored vehicles, bunkers, and other field fortifications. Recent reports from the field, however, indicated that the performance and purposes of these munitions were not well understood, and often surprised and impressed Soldiers when they were implemented.

After investigating these reports via the Center for Army Lessons Learned, post-combat surveys and interviews with Soldiers, the Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) — life-cycle manager of U.S. Army SLMs — learned that most Soldiers had minimal training in using these munitions, and that misapplication was a major factor in their mixed reactions. Other Soldiers were not even aware that some of the newer firepower existed, which led to numerous operational needs statements, all calling for redundant capabilities. Clearly, there was a need to get the word out to the field and address Soldiers’ concerns.

**Range of SLMs Available**

For many years, the M136 AT4 Light Anti-armor Weapon has been the primary lightweight anti-armor weapon for close combat operations for the U.S. military. Its High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warhead is capable of penetrating armored combat vehicles with devastating effects. An improved version, the AT4-Confined Space (CS), was fielded in limited quantities to provide the same HEAT warhead capability and to allow Soldiers to safely engage targets from enclosed spaces. The M141 Bunker Defeat Munition (BDM) was fielded in the late 1990s to defeat light infantry threats protected by masonry walls (concrete and brick) and field fortifications (caves and earth/timber bunkers). It employs the same High-Explosive Dual-Purpose rocket as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon and is capable of destroying a wide variety of urban targets. Originally intended to be used as a contingency item, the BDM proved to be an excellent choice to provide an antistructure capability for light infantry forces in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, the M72 Light Attack Weapon (LAW), ideal for conditions where Soldier mobility is paramount, was no longer being issued to regular Army units. The M72 LAW also uses a HEAT warhead to defeat lightly armored targets. Further advances to the M72 LAW had been developed and fielded to other services but were not available for the Army.
Training Enhancements to Provide Increased Effectiveness

With the approval of the Army SLM Strategy in 2005, the Vice Chief of Staff tasked PM CCS with the formulation of an SLM new equipment training (NET) team to educate deployed units on the capability and availability of existing SLMs. PM CCS and the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) began to examine SLM training enhancements that will help educate units on the capability and availability of existing SLMs, emphasize the importance of safe handling and operations, and assist in establishing a basis for a long-term training approach to support future SLM capabilities. In addition, the Army was asked to examine ways to reduce the number of full-up tactical munitions used for training purposes. To achieve these objectives, PM CCS pursued a multifaceted approach and established a NET team, which was made up of representatives from PM CCS; USAIC; the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center; and the contractor, to ensure that Soldiers have the latest instruction and training on SLMs before going into combat. The SLM NET team began efforts to communicate with deploying units and establish priorities for training.

Rapid Acquisition Process Is Launched

To quickly acquire the critical training support and resources needed to establish a successful training program, PM CCS requested that an urgent contractual action be approved to immediately streamline the acquisition process.

“As a result of that urgent contractual action, we were able to quickly pull together a NET team, including trainer certification, as well as the training support materials. It really expedited the contracting process, allowing us to get this training to the Soldiers quickly,” noted Santo Lombardo, chief of the PM CCS Pyrotechnics and SLM Division.

Once the NET contract was awarded, the team rapidly completed instructor certifications, acquired necessary training aids from the contractor and updated the training support packages. Within two months after contract award, the NET team was on the ground training their first unit — Soldiers from 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska.

Since that first training session, the SLM NET team has conducted many more events at locations including Fort Campbell; Fort Lewis, Wash.; and Fort Polk, La. Classes have expanded to host as many as 75 Soldiers, and more than 12 training events at 10 different locations have been completed, both CONUS and OCONUS. Seventeen brigade combat teams with more than 1,095 Soldiers have also been trained.

“We conduct surveys after each NET event,” said Lombardo. “Soldiers have provided great feedback, which we have used to further refine both our training approach and our training strategy for the future. It’s great to see the process working.”

The Army’s Best Kept Secret

From the initial training feedback, it was clear that many Soldiers were not aware that the M141 BDM even existed. There were numerous instances, videos and reports of the M136 AT4 being used to engage insurgents protected by walls or other similar structures. There were also reports of Soldiers employing the M141 BDM minutes after reading the operator’s manual.

“The AT4, which is primarily designed for armor, was being used against structured targets,” stated COL Ray Nulk, PM CCS. “The BDM had a similar situation. It’s meant for structured targets, but was being used against armor. So, the feedback we received was that these systems were not effective. Soldiers should get the proper instruction to help them determine the right tool for the right job.”

“People just weren’t aware that the technology exists in the Army inventory that can take out urban, field-expedient-type targets,” said Lombardo. “From an urgent release of the AT4-CS, a modified version of the M136 AT4, we learned that Soldiers liked the fact that they don’t have to expose themselves to enemy counterattack when they fire it from the safety of an enclosure. We think we’re addressing a lot of the users’ concerns by fielding these two systems to support today’s combat operations.”

Training the Trainer

Current SLM training consists of a block of instruction for M136 AT4 training and AT4 qualification with a 9mm subcaliber training launcher. Successful qualification with the AT4 would also qualify the Soldier for BDM and other SLMs. Collaborating with the Picatinny Arsenal Munitions NET team and Talley Defense Systems (contractor for the BDM), the SLM NET team introduced a training program that would provide theater-bound units with comprehensive information and experience they could take into the field and propagate among their units.

As part of the SLM NET, Soldiers receive train-the-trainer instruction on all SLMs. The students participate in both classroom and hands-on training, including firing subcaliber trainers with realistic backblast and noise to emphasize safety. The training events culminate in a live-fire demonstration showing Soldiers the
proper effects of each weapon.

Eventually, this ad hoc training solution will be transitioned to the Army institutionalized training. All aspects of SLM safety, employment and doctrine will be incorporated into standardized classroom instruction for Army basic, NCO, and leadership courses.

**New Weaponry on the Horizon**

Since the approval of the Army SLM Strategy, the M141 BDM and AT4-CS have become Army Programs of Record and have been incorporated into Army doctrine. The M141 BDM, M136 AT4 and the existing inventory of the M72 LAW are all available for use, while the AT4-CS will be materiel released in 2008 for the Army. In response to urgent operational needs from the field, the Army is releasing a limited quantity of the improved M72 LAW, called the M72A7.

“We are finally in synch from a warfighter, requirements and an acquisition perspective,” said Nulk. “We are putting together long-term production contracts that will be flexible enough to support dynamic changes in both warfighting and training requirements. We are addressing the users’ immediate needs by urgently fielding critical warfighting capabilities and providing critical training.”

In addition, the Army is striving to reduce training and logistical complexities associated with multiple SLMs. A new munition, called the Individual Assault Weapon (IAW), will address the need for a multipurpose munition that will ultimately weigh as little as 10 pounds and provide lethal effects against threats protected by a variety of structures, field fortifications, and light armored vehicles at distances up to 300 meters.

“The IAW will be a single, multipurpose system that will replace a myriad of capabilities found in individual SLMs,” said Lombardo. “Capabilities will also include the ability to fire from inside an enclosure, protecting the Soldier from small arms and other counterfire. Once fielded, the IAW will be a combat multiplier by providing superior firepower down to the lowest organizational levels.”

This new SLM capability will not be available until approximately 2011, further emphasizing the importance of support and sustainment of currently fielded systems. “We need to listen to and support our Soldiers,” concluded COL Nulk. “We have changed a paradigm that has existed for many years. We owe it to our country, our men and women on the battlefield and to ourselves to make sure that each Soldier has the best equipment, training, and support needed to win the fight. We hear you loud and clear and are executing to meet your needs.”

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**A Different Way of Thinking**

75TH RANGER REGIMENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Lewis, Wash., recently conducted Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) training and testing immediately after redeployment from its most recent combat tour. The methodology for preparation and testing was a little out of the Army’s norm. There were no details for extensive site preparation, no sand bags to be filled, no camouflage nets erected, and no signs to be made. This EIB had minimal individual test stations and no ready lines or post-test holding areas. Most of the testing was conducted in lanes and replicated combat conditions as much as possible. The battalion conducted all planning and coordination required to conduct this EIB while deployed, and it obtained approval to conduct the testing under the new concept from the EIB committee at the U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Ga.

The purpose of EIB training and testing, which has not changed from its inception in the 1940’s, is to create an evaluation that tests the individual skills required to survive on the battlefield and to ensure proficiency of the individual Soldier to support collective training. For at least the past 25 years, maybe longer, this has equated to EIB training and test sites which consisted of individual test stations. This allowed for refresher training just prior to conducting the individual tasks. Although this is certainly adequate

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One of the tasks on Lane A is to conduct a ballistic breach with a shotgun.

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Courtesy photos
to test an individual task, it is stand alone, meaning no tasks immediately precede or follow that individual task, with only the stress of conducting one task at a time.

The senior NCOs of the battalion wanted to take a more aggressive approach to EIB testing. Over the past few years, they have observed the EFMB testing concept the Ranger Regiment runs where individual tasks are conducted within lanes and follow a logical scenario a medic might find on the battlefield. These EFMB lanes were a series of individual tasks evaluated in immediate succession by a set group of graders per lane. The NCOs decided EIB testing should also replicate combat conditions. The men should know the tasks and perform them to such proficiency that they could do them under the stress of combat conditions without hesitating to think, even if the conditions around them changed each time. They also realized they were wasting time during EIB site set up by creating an elaborate EIB site and everything that goes with it: from printing thousands of sheets of paper, creating numerous signs and boards, filling sand bags, raking leaves to creating individual stations and erecting tents and nets. EIB set up, training, and testing was conducted in two weeks from start to finish.

The CSM’s intent for EIB is what drove the planning process and ultimately led to the task list, lane scenarios, and execution of the EIB under a different concept. Figure 1 is taken from the initial draft of the concept for planning.

The concept was really pretty simple: identify the tasks to train on and evaluate in order to directly support the battalion’s mission, and then create lanes which grouped the tasks together logically. The secondary effect that was intended by creating a new concept was to force the training for the tasks to take place off the EIB site by the squad leaders. Based on this, they formed four lanes (Alpha thru Delta) and an incentive-based testing methodology.

Lane Alpha (1 thru 5) consisted of eight assault and self-aid tasks conducted in a logical sequence which depended on the lane conditions, where stress and pace were controlled by opposing force role players and enemy contact. This lane was the assault lane.

Lane Alpha was the assault lane and consisted of eight assault and self-aid tasks.

Lane Bravo (1 thru 5) consisted of eight medical buddy-aid and communications tasks conducted in a logical sequence, controlled by prompts from the grader to create stress conditions. This lane was the medical lane and conducted in an environment that allowed it to be tested during the day, but replicated limited visibility by choosing rooms where the casualty was located so no light was available. This lane had a dual purpose lane as it also served as Ranger First Responder (RFR) refresher training.

Lane Charlie (1 thru 5) consisted of six call-for-fire and communications tasks conducted in a logical sequence, controlled by prompts and graphic measures to create stress conditions. This lane was the call-for-fire lane and conducted in an urban environment, controlling fires against targets in an urban area.

Lane Delta consisted of the remainder of the individual tasks that did not neatly fit into a lane concept, including navigation.
Figure 2 — Lane Training Tasks

Lane A (Assault Tasks)
* Load, fire, reduce stoppage, and clear the M4
* React to contact (fire and correct malfunction of M4)
* Conduct individual movement techniques (Use of cover in urban environment)
* Conduct ballistic breach with shotgun
* Employ offensive grenade (flash bang)
* Enter building/clear a room as member of a team
* Control PUC (persons under control) using language phrases
* Conduct self aid (tourniquet to extremity)

Lane B (Medical Tasks)
* Put a MBTR into operation
* Evaluate a casualty
* Open and maintain an airway (unconscious patient)
* Control external bleeding (trauma dressing)
* Treat life-threatening chest wound
* Manage or prevent shock
* Package casualty for evacuation (CASEVAC)
* Call for CASEVAC (9-line request)

Lane C (Call-for-Fire Tasks)
* Put a PRC 117F into operation
* Establish SATCOM communications
* Identify own location on map or imagery
* Identify target on a map or imagery
* Call for and adjust organic fires (mortars)
* Call for and adjust rotary wing fires

Lane D (Navigation, Foot March, Individual Task Training)
Concept: The concept of this portion is to test the Ranger’s ability to plot a route and navigate using technologies available to him on the battlefield today. The Rangers must move over land for extended distances (12-20 miles) in full fighting gear while maintaining the ability to perform individual tasks under the stresses of physical exhaustion and limited visibility. All these tasks will be conducted during hours of limited visibility.
Tasks to be trained:
* Load waypoints and route into Toughbook CF-18 (or laptop computer)
* Transfer waypoints route from Toughbook CF-18 to GPS device
* Print map/imagery using field printer (demonstrated capability; provided by grader once verified)
* Conduct the following individual tasks at each point:
  - Mount, put into operation, and adjust PVS-14/15
  - Load, fire, reduce stoppage on a M240B
  - Load, fire, reduce stoppage on a MK46
  - Put a LAW into operation and engage a target
  - Put thermal into operation and identify S-vest or S-belt
  - Engage targets with an RWS (.50 cal)
  - Set head space and timing on the M2 (.50 cal)
  - Navigate over land using only map and compass
  (Conducted at point 10 after individual weapons station is complete)

This lane was conducted only at night, and night vision goggles were used for all tasks except for those related to loading the routes in the computer. These were conducted in a shelter at the navigation and movement starting location with limited light available.

The standard prerequisite tasks were also modified. Instead of conducting a 12-mile foot march and land navigation event separately, these tasks were rolled up as part of Lane Delta to better maximize time as well as increase the level of stress on the land navigation course by extending the distances. Weapons qualification was conducted allowing the use of assigned aided-vision devices working off of Change 4 to FM 3-22.9 (dated: 13 September 2006). The Army APFT was administered as directed in USAIC Pamphlet 350-6.1 (dated: 1 February 2007).

The methodology behind the EIB test was to create an environment where the squad leaders had to be proactive and creative in training their men. They would not be afforded the opportunity to train on the EIB site, so they had to find other locations to train and manage time and materials to conduct their own training. A pre-test incentive was also created to motivate squad leaders to train their Soldiers intensely and thoroughly from the beginning. If the Ranger was a first time “go” for a lane during the pre-test phase of EIB testing, the Ranger would not have to retest that lane during the test day the following week.

The testing sequence for lanes also created stress. The normal sequence for a company was the company would start on Lane Charlie testing call-for-fire skills, with a block of time by platoon. The squads would then move off the EIB site by platoon and have time for training of upcoming lanes. The company would then test on Lane Delta that evening and walk anywhere from 12-20 miles while testing the Rangers’ navigational skills and cognitive abilities under stress during other individual tasks along the way. The company would then start testing Lane Alpha the next morning at 10 a.m. This would put prolonged stress (about 36-40 hours of testing, training, and movement) on the Ranger, testing his ability to function while fatigued. If the Ranger did not pass a lane during the pre-test, he had to negotiate the lane again during the test week. A “no go” on a task constituted a “no go” on the lane. Lanes Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie each consisted of five sub-lanes, which simultaneously conducted the same individual tasks. Each of the sub-lane conditions, however, were slightly different with varied OPFOR placement and conditions, making the Rangers adapt and think.

There were challenges in the planning and execution of this concept. The major challenge with conducting a lane concept was standardization. Each sub-lane had a pair of graders evaluating six to eight individual tasks in rapid succession. This required the graders to be experts at all tasks on their lanes and know the performance measures without having to read them off a sheet. The lane NCOIC also had to ruthlessly enforce the same evaluation standards on all five sub-lanes. With the ambiguous flow of tasks from one to the next, this proved to be the most challenging part to the whole training event.

There are pros and cons to conducting EIB testing and training using a lane concept.

The pros are:
- It takes less site preparation time and material; maybe up to
a week less time and hundreds less man hours for set up. EIB testing lasted two weeks from start to finish, which included lane set up, validation, practice days per company, pre-test, and test.

- Training is managed by the platoon and conducted by the squad leader, not EIB station grader, resulting in more intense training and leader development.
- The individual Ranger can perform all individual tasks under multiple conditions, under stress, and without preparation prior to execution.
- This concept requires less graders overall.
- It is possible to do the administration almost completely paperless.

- The leaders and candidates were challenged by the change in the EIB concept and increased their efforts to ensure success.
- Lane graders have more ownership of developing their lanes to achieve the training requirements, and therefore took a lot of pride in making their lanes thought provoking and challenging.

The cons are:
- There is a potential of lane grading standards to be slightly different between sub-lanes, so vigilance is the key to preventing this from happening.
- Training effectiveness is almost solely reliant on the desire or talent of the squad leader to train his men to standard. It will be very apparent who took the time required to be successful at the tasks when tested, and who did not.
- The ability to perform the tasks under the lane conditions are much more challenging and could result in far fewer EIBs being awarded.
- It’s hard to break away from doing EIB a certain way when it has been unchanged for decades; senior leaders get used to seeing things or doing things one specific way, and changing that vision is hard.

Leader development was a key implied task for this EIB. The responsibility for training was on the squad leaders; success of their men during testing was directly linked to their ability to train them first to conduct each task to standard, then to be able to do several tasks rapidly without practice to standard, in limited visibility in some cases. The development for the NCOs was learning how to create training that ensured their men were successful later under test conditions.

As a result of the changes in training and testing for EIB, the Rangers can perform individual combat-related tasks more efficiently under stressful conditions, which will support the collective tasks for the next combat deployment train-up. It took less time to conduct EIB, but the end result in training proficiency, both for the individual competing for his EIB and for the leader who trained him, is significantly higher. Theoretically, this concept can be done anywhere by a battalion-size element that has two weeks to conduct EIB.

God Willing: My Wild Ride with the New Iraqi Army can teach Soldiers about some of the challenges they may face while deployed to Iraq. It details the time in which CPT Eric Navarro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reservist, and nine other men were attached to a battalion of the Iraqi Army as advisors. The main focus of the novel focuses on the psychological boundaries that Navarro had to cross during the deployment. The most poignant of these deals with the phrase “Insha Allah.” These two words translate to “God willing” or “If God wills it.” This basically means that, no matter what a person does, an outside factor (God, Allah, etc.) always has the final say on what happens. If a Soldier misses a target, it is because it was God’s will for the Soldier to miss. It doesn’t matter that the Soldier had never received marksmanship training.

Two other concepts unique to the Iraqi people are their perception of time and their reliance on the context of a given situation. Time is not as important to an Iraqi as it is to an American. What is important to an Iraqi is who is doing the talking and the context of what is being said.

The lessons learned in one location don’t necessarily carry over to another. One example of this was the question of where the Iraqis use the restroom. If they were not told where they could go, they would go wherever they pleased. When Navarro and his fellow advisors had to move the battalion from its original headquarters in Fallujah to a new base in Habbaniyah, much of the progress made in showing the Iraqis where they could relieve themselves had been made moot. One anecdote had an Iraqi relieve himself behind a line of port-o-johns. The port-o-johns were originally designed with the American mindset in which you sit down. Iraqis do not sit as much as squat over a hole and use water splashed from their right hand to clean themselves. This was solved when port-o-johns were put in place that were used in the fashion that the Iraqis were used to.

Problems with the native population were the tip of the iceberg. The job given to them was important but Navarro’s group, “The Drifters,” often lacked aid from the military. The only cultural information they received was given to them shortly after arriving in Kuwait. CPT Navarro had the foresight to study some of the language, but his group lacked a translator for a very long time. When they were around other U.S. forces, they were seen with disdain. To the minds of some Soldiers, any Iraqi in the Iraqi Army could be an insurgent in disguise. Navarro and his fellow Marines were guilty by association. One of the biggest problems was that sometimes it was difficult to find out just where or who was giving orders. All these outside forces affecting their operations in Iraq often made the drifters adopt the “Insha Allah” mindset, sometimes in jest, sometimes as the way to explain some of the more bizarre happenings they were involved in.

Navarro often uses vulgar language, but it doesn’t hurt the novel. I would recommend this book to any member of the armed forces who will be working closely with the Iraqi Army. Reading the anecdotes from the book in tandem with knowing about the Iraqi mindset may help to make the transition of life among Iraqi soldiers a little easier.


Although he is an active duty U.S. Air Force officer and an assistant professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Mark Ethan Grotelueschen demonstrates considerable knowledge of the U.S. Army and its methods of operation in World War I, particularly its field artillery, about which he has written in a previously published book.

(I must now admit that as an Infantry rifle company commander in World War II in Europe, I counted greatly on our supporting artillery and on our battalion fire support officer. But he could never claim to have on hand or nearby the amounts of artillery ammunition available to our World War I divisions. The thoughts on the latter’s barrages simply amazed me when reading this book.)

Here, the author’s aim, the target of which he clearly hits, is to cast a new, brightened light on the writings that have appeared on our AEF. He also writes that “few operational histories of the AEF’s major campaigns have been written.”

After going through the operational actions of a number of our divisions in different actions, he believes, quite strongly, “the American Army in France was not the powerful and smooth running machine” General Pershing and others claimed. He does give those units some credit by concluding his book with “there could be little doubt that its reliance of firepower has been one of the Great War’s fundamental legacies on American combat doctrine.”

(An interesting note: The Field Service Regulations of 1923 changed the meaning of the word “Infantry” to “the arm of close combat” and would no longer be restricted to just the “rifle and bayonet.”)
the two. Unfortunately, he uses the wrong word to identify that connection. “Partner” has a number of meanings. In business and matrimony, the terms and conditions are spelled out by law. In dancing and certain sports, the cooperative effort has accepted practices. “Friend” doesn’t do it either. That implies a certain equality and a relaxed enjoyment of each other’s company that didn’t exist here. They were never buddies or boon companions or even social associates to any extent. The necessary deference and respect led to formality in their dealings.

“Mentor” covers part of what Marshall did with Eisenhower but not enough to warrant using it as part of the title. It pertains to teaching, guiding and advising a disciple and perhaps acting as a supporter and advocate, and even using influence on his behalf.

It was suggested that there was somewhat of a father-son relationship between the two and here we dip into Stygian and Freudian waters. Ike’s dad wasn’t much of one and he may have been looking for a father figure. Certainly his numerous unofficial communications to Marshall could be seen as a plea for parental approval. Marshal had no children of his own but did his best as paterfamilias to his friends. That is not a full list of the family he called his own. His surnames also included leadership related to his professional life. Of course, MacArthur, Stilwell or other theater commanders got enough sleep.

The connection was a military one. The close link started when Ike joined the War Plans Division ([WPD]—later Operations Division [OPD]) as an assistant in December 1941 and became division chief in February 1942. Marshall was Chief of Staff and WPD/OPD was the most important of the five General Staff sections so they worked closely together in the way they both learned at Leavenworth and practiced thereafter. They both had General Staff experience at several levels.

In June 1942, Eisenhower went overseas as commanding general of the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and then became Allied Commander for the planning and conduct of the invasion of North Africa. This created two lines of connection to Marshall. As theater commander, he reported to the C/S of the Army and received instructions through him. It should be emphasized that the Chief of Staff is not a commander and is not in the chain of command. The title of this book is incorrect in this respect, too. This is not a semantic hairsplitting but part of the reaffirmation of the Constitutional principle of civilian control of the armed forces. As an Allied commander, Ike received his strategic directives from the combined Chiefs of Staff and reported to them on operations. Marshall was but a member of that collective body — though he had a very strong voice.

The book does a good job of showing how the relationship develops during the war as Eisenhower feels more independent and gains self-assurance. There is no original research involved, but Perry makes good use of the sources he lists, perhaps with some conjecture and hearsay evidence. The work is beset by many minor mistakes on such things as facts and figures, dates, titles and grades held at a particular time. The maps are clear and help in understanding the operations. I have only two complaints here. I served in the Thunderbird Division from 1942–45 and think it should be identified as “Okla” rather than “British.” For Overlord, the British Airborne Division was the 6th, rather then 3th (sic). Among the photographs, three are of German leaders. In addition to these, or in place of one, there might have been one of Fox Conner who, rightly, is mentioned frequently. Overall, this is an entertaining and readable effort.

**Test Your Knowledge**

1. In WWII, a German officer referred to this group of American Soldiers as “Devils in Baggy Pants.” These Soldiers were members of:
   a) The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
   b) The 505th PIR
   c) The 187th PIR
   d) The 325th Glider Infantry Regiment

2. The most numerous awards of the Victoria Cross (the British Empire’s equivalent of the Medal of Honor) occurred during this battle:
   a) First Battle of the Marne (WWI)
   b) Rorke’s Drift (Boer War)
   c) Second Battle of the Somme (WWI)
   d) D-Day, Normandy (WWII)

3. A legion in the army of ancient Rome comprised approximately how many men:
   a) 10,000
   b) 6,000
   c) 16,000
   d) 8,000

4. The Soldier from the 82nd Division who was credited with killing 33 German soldiers and capturing another 132 (and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor) was:
   a) Alvin York
   b) Charles DeGlopper
   c) Charles DeGlopper
   d) Audie Murphy

5. Admiral John Rushworth Jellico’s flagship at the Battle of Jutland was the HMS:
   a) Redoubtable
   b) Invincible
   c) Repulse
   d) Iron Duke

6. The Allied airborne operation in Holland in September of 1944, which was designed to cut off enemy forces from Germany and shorten the war, was Operation:
   a) Market Garden
   b) Varsity
   c) Overlord
   d) Bayonet

7. The poison gas phosgene was first used in WWI at the battle of:
   a) Ypres
   b) Verdun
   c) First Marne
   d) Paschendale

8. This 10-month WWII battle was launched by the German general Von Falkenhayn to “bleed the French Army white.” We know it as:
   a) Second Marne
   b) Meuse Argonne
   c) Argonne
   d) Verdun

9. We were Soldiers Once, and Young is the eyewitness account of LTG (Retired) Harold Moore’s combat experience in Vietnam in the area known as:
   a) Dien Ben Phu
   b) Cu Chi
   c) Ia Drang Valley
   d) Saigon

10. The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir took place during the:
    a) Korean War
    b) Vietnam
    c) WWII – South Pacific
    d) WWII – South China theatre

(Answers on next page)

Courtesy of Chris Timmers
Chinook helicopters fly in to take Soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division back to Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, following a mission November 4.

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