Urban Ops

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INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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MARCH-JUNE 2009
Volume 98, Number 2

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This is a challenging and an exciting time for all of us at Fort Benning, and I look forward to serving as your Chief of Infantry as we train Soldiers and leaders to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The Maneuver Center of Excellence is becoming reality, and we look forward to once again training tankers and infantrymen side by side as General George Patton did here on the eve of World War II, where they were to face and overcome challenges they could hardly have imagined.

Today’s urban operations (UO) include some of the greatest challenges that Soldiers can face. And urban combat, a sub-set of UO, can be the costliest of missions in terms of lives, materiel and other resources such as the sheer time it takes to dislodge a determined enemy from his lair. When we add the implications of urban stability and support operations and urban sustainment, we face a significantly more complex challenge. The lessons of Stalingrad, Aachen, Najaf, and Fallujah attest to the collateral damage that ensues from urban combat, but this does not mean that we must avoid going after an enemy who goes to ground in built-up areas. The urban fight, like the conditions of any battlefield, will continue to be won by capably trained, led, motivated, and supported Soldiers. In this Commandant’s Note I want to give an example of an early urban operation in our own military history, discuss some of the objectives of our enemy in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), and highlight unique aspects of the urban fight and our present doctrinal initiatives aimed at revising Field Manual 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. The revisions will better align the manual with FM 3.06, Urban Operations, and we will announce its publication in Infantry Magazine and will publish an article on the new manual in our branch magazine as well.

The U.S. Army’s first major urban combat took place during the Mexican War at the Battle of Monterrey, in September 1846. The city was defended by a numerically superior force of Mexican infantry and cavalry. General Zachary Taylor’s 6,200 men took advantage of cover and maneuver to defeat a force of over 7,000 regulars, cavalry, and militia. Avoiding street movement and deploying infantrymen on rooftops to cover one another, they systematically cleared the city house by house. Soldiers used time-fused artillery shells thrown through windows and placed against walls as breaching charges. The capture of Monterrey was due in large part to the agile, adaptive leaders and men under Taylor’s command. His team succeeded because they understood the enemy, his tactics, and his objectives, just as we strive to understand the objectives of the enemies we face in the GWOT.

One objective of today’s enemy is dominance of information operations. He seeks to inflict and publicize politically unacceptable losses on U.S. and Coalition forces. He also misrepresents his own collateral damage to persons and facilities as having been caused by us.

Another of our enemy’s goals is to offset our technological advantage by acquiring more sophisticated weapons, munitions, and equipment or by evolving ways to degrade our own capabilities. He does this to compel Coalition forces to either realign priorities or commit assets to meet the new threat. Another of his tactics is to attempt to step up the operating tempo. We saw this tactic during the Communists’ 1968 Tet offensive across South Vietnam. The intended result of such a surge in military activity is to force an opponent to divide his forces to meet new threats, to draw against reserves of combat power and materiel, or to destroy morale.

Today’s enemy is resourceful, innovative, and ruthless, but we are inside his decision cycle anticipating many of his moves, and are inflicting serious losses on him. Today we commit considerable resources to urban stability and civil support operations as we understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition within the urban operational framework. We recognize that understanding the complexity of the urban landscape, its terrain, its society, and the infrastructure which sustains it and the need to operate over extended time have replaced the use of massed forces.

At the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS), we expose Soldiers and their leaders to new information drawn from products of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, from the shared experience of students coming out of theater, from the latest USAIS doctrinal publications, and from guest speakers with broad subject matter expertise. We must ensure that Soldiers and leaders go to war with the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures, and that our doctrinal literature is state of the art as well.

The Army is currently testing a process to facilitate the creation and sharing of knowledge via a wiki environment. This will allow near real time, real world feedback from real lessons learned. I invite you to review the Army TTP wiki sites at https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/Portal: Army_Doctrine.

We recognize that urban operations are tough and comprise many aspects in addition to combat, but today we are successfully engaged in full-spectrum operations in the urban setting, and we must capture and share what we have learned. We need your input, and I encourage you to share your thoughts and experiences through Infantry. Follow me!
WEAPON, EQUIPMENT FEEDBACK NEEDED

Surveys a Forum for Soldiers to Share Thoughts, Suggestions

PEO SOLDIER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

The U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier has launched an Internet-based survey system to support its mission to aggressively incorporate Soldier feedback into everything it does.

More than 30 surveys, announced on AKO and available to Soldiers through a link on the PEO Soldier Web site — peosoldier.army.mil — are designed to give Soldiers a forum to communicate their thoughts and suggestions up the chain of command. The surveys cover everything from clothing and individual equipment — gloves, goggles, and battering rams — to individual and crew served weapons such as the M4 carbine and the M110 sniper system.

As the Army continues its efforts to employ the Soldier-as-a-System concept, Soldier feedback is critical. Soldier-as-a-System calls for everything a Soldier wears and carries to be streamlined, integrated, and effective. While the Army’s skilled laboratories, research centers, and contractors develop and modernize the next generation of equipment for the battlefield, everything comes down to what the men and women on the ground actually need, use, and accept as beneficial. Web-based surveys have already proven to be a direct and effective way to shine a spotlight on that essential point of view.

An earlier version of the online survey system was used to gather comments regarding the new Army Service Uniform. PEO Soldier received more than 80,000 responses to this survey alone. Converting such extensive feedback into actionable changes is no simple task. As BG Mark Brown, PEO Soldier, noted, “We had experts from Operational Forces Interface Group (OFIG) do the mathematical and statistical analyses of the responses so that we could categorize the feedback that we received to support good decisions.”

“In meeting battlefield requirements, we find that there is rarely a silver bullet that will take care of all existing uniform or equipment requirements,” said Brown. “It is an integrated process, and we manage the Soldier as a system to get there.” As long as technology improves to create more lightweight, efficient, unobtrusive solutions to the challenges every Soldier faces, PEO Soldier will find ways to integrate these products to improve Soldier capabilities, save Soldiers’ lives, and improve Soldiers’ quality of life.

Soldier surveys are just one of many methods PEO Soldier employs to consistently and innovatively provide the best for the best.

NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM PREPARES TO OPEN 19 JUNE

The grand opening of the new National Infantry Museum and Soldier Center at Patriot Park is set for 19 June. The festivities will begin at 9:30 a.m. with a graduation ceremony and follow with a ribbon-cutting ceremony at 11 a.m.

The museum is located off of Fort Benning Road at 1775 Legacy Way, approximately two miles south of Victory Drive and outside the access control points of Fort Benning. The museum is open 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. Sunday. The World War II Street, Imax Theater, Soldier Store gift shop and Fife and Drum restaurant are already open to the public. Admission to the museum is free.

For more information, check out www.nationalinfantrymuseum.com.
Suicide Prevention: 
The Challenge and the Way

CHAPLAIN (MAJ) TAMMIE CREWS

Considerable media attention is being given to the latest reports of the number of suicides within the Army. This article is the first of a series of articles on suicide awareness and suicide prevention education.

The statistics for the number of confirmed suicides of active duty Soldiers for 2008 are staggering. The media is full of stories; an Army Times headline stated “The Army is Killing Itself.” The Army reported a record 128 confirmed suicides and 15 additional cases under investigation for 2008. Early reports for January 2009 suggest that more Soldiers committed suicide than died in combat. In 2007 the number of confirmed suicides was 115. Ten years ago, the number of confirmed suicides in the Army was 58. Approximately five Soldiers made some form of suicide gesture every day within 2008. The number of suicides in the Army has generally followed the average numbers within the civilian population, but the 2008 figures for the Army have risen above the national average for the first time since the Vietnam War. One Soldier lost to suicide is tragic and is one too many.

Suicide occurs among all groups of people — not just among Soldiers, not just among the unsuccessful or troubled, not just among those who consider themselves to have been marginalized. The thought of suicide can occur to any one of us or to anyone of those whom we care about or to anyone with whom we work, given a set of conditions conducive to thoughts of desperate action.

What causes an individual to commit suicide? What leads an individual to think that the only answer is to end his/her life? The reasons are likely as varied as the individuals who have committed suicide. Completed suicides do not occur just among overstressed deployed Soldiers or those who have a deployment history. Suicides are occurring among Soldiers who have no deployment history. Suicides also occur among those whom we think would never consider ending their own lives. Generally speaking, relationship issues are high on the list of contributing factors. Loss of employment, finances, unusual stress, medications, and alcohol may also be factors. You may be thinking — and rightly so — that people deal with these things all the time and do not attempt or complete suicide. This is true. There is no exact and predictable formula that indicates who will and who will not attempt to commit suicide in any given situation.

What about the families and friends who are left behind? Suicide deeply affects those who are left behind. There is the emotional trauma as well as practical issues of daily living that we must address. And, significantly, there are ongoing issues that may never find resolution.

Soldiers and civilian employees have probably already taken part in a suicide awareness/intervention class as part of a program to begin to address the issue of rising suicide rates. The period of 15 February through 15 March was designated as an Armywide “stand down” for suicide-prevention training. From 15 March through 15 July, there will be a chain teaching effort for ongoing sustained training, services, and support in order to address the issues of suicide at all levels of our organization. The training will focus on three areas: suicide prevention awareness, suicide intervention actions, and post grief bereavement support. The emphasis will be on training to recognize signs of potentially suicidal behavior, understand the risks of suicide, intervention strategies, and knowing how to refer individuals for follow-on support and care. The training will also focus on building resiliency in our workforce in the face of the increased demands placed on it in light of the prolonged global war on terrorism. We must remind our workforce at all levels that it is okay to ask for help during times of distress and personal crisis, and leadership must be committed to decreasing any stigma associated with seeking such help.

The Army takes suicide prevention seriously and will do everything possible to minimize potential risks, not only during this current emphasis, but on a daily basis in the way we conduct business. Suicide prevention is a leadership responsibility, and can easily be built into procedures such as those dealing with discipline, deployment, and training.

Avenues of assistance: The counseling center (chaplain and employee assistance program services), National Suicide Prevention Lifeline — (800) 273-TALK (8255), or www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/Veterans/Default.aspx; National Suicide Hotline — (800) SUICIDE (784-2433); Military One Source — (800) 342-9647 or www.militaryonesource.com; Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline — (800) 984-8532.

(Chaplain [MAJ] Tammie Crews is the post chaplain at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.)
In the article “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,” which appeared in the September-October 2006 edition of *Military Review*, the authors (Dr. Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and CPT Don Smith) described the need for “giving brigade commanders an organic capability to help understand and deal with ‘human terrain’— the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating.” For over a year Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) have been addressing that need in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The teams have supported brigades in numerous ways, including identifying local populations’ needs and perceptions from the “grass-roots” perspective; engaging influential political, military, business, tribal, religious and other cultural leaders to cultivate credible local, provincial and national governing institutions; and identifying the formal and informal centers of gravity and external influences on the local populations through social network analysis.

Operations Attal and Sham Shad, which were conducted in the Paktika province of Afghanistan from November to December 2007, were two of the first fully integrated operations to include a Human Terrain Team. The team successfully engaged and interviewed the local populations to map tribal dynamics, determine effects of coalition forces’ (CF) operations, conduct market assessments, and identify the population’s views on governance. This allowed the team to acquire a more robust and integrated socio-cultural, political, and economic awareness of the brigade’s area of responsibility in order to provide coalition forces with operationally relevant information related to the human terrain, improving the commander’s understanding of the local populations.

Through field research, the HTT was able to support the commander and his staff by identifying developmental, governance, and security issues within the province. Development within the province was in a questionable state, with the local population perceiving that the severe joblessness was due to the government not fulfilling its duty to provide local jobs. Local leaders voiced their concerns that, without jobs, their people were susceptible to taking money and support from adversarial elements. Additionally, households were relying on remittances from distant family members and loans. As noted on an HTT report from Operation Sham Shad, “money earned through work abroad is sent back to families as remittances through the money transfer system (locally referred to as *hawala*), [which] is used to sustain families.” Through applied social science methods, the team determined that a rapid price inflation of staples was straining this *hawala* system. According to the report, analysis by the HTT determined that the price increase was the “primary determinant of whether the local situation was improving or deteriorating; and whether the current government is good or bad.” The team also discovered that the perception of the local government was linked to the price of staples. This analysis of the local populace’s needs was then incorporated into the unit’s planning and local operations, enhancing the development in the province and stabilizing the area.

The team was also successful in identifying the local populations’ perceptions and interactions with local governance. The HTT’s analysis discovered that locals viewed “good” government as one that consults with elders, incorporating the local tribal structure into government decisions. The team’s interactions among the local populace provided the following insights: “All respondents stressed qualities of listening, consulting with elders, fairness, equity, reciprocity, and bringing the government, tribes and people together.” Prior to operations in the area, both Afghan officials and coalition forces held strong perceptions that Paktika province was an isolated, insular area. Once on the ground, the HTT discovered that a portion of the district was actually highly transnational, possessing world views that included concepts of government that came from the Arab peninsula and Afghanistan’s neighboring...
countries. In some areas, this generally younger, transnational population of those who left Afghanistan primarily for work was viewed as the powerbrokers of an area based on wealth, rather than age or family status amongst the tribes. This analysis led the HTT to recommend to the BCT commander a different method of interacting with the local populace; one that did not center on the common assumption that the center of power is based on the elder tribal members of the area.

The HTT was also able to highlight the negative synergistic effects of predatory local government practices on the district population. The effects of this “bad” governance led to the collapse of a district shura and a feeling among a segment of the populace that only the Taliban could protect them. One elder had reported, “People were tired of the Taliban because they beat them. Now, if this government [also] beats them, what should the people do?” The HTT revealed to the BCT staff a case study that Taliban fighters in the area affected some of the population, but the effects of bad local governance affected all of the population. Ultimately, Afghans view the shura as the center of decision making, and the provincial and national governments need to take into account this model. This research analysis was a key planning factor for the brigade to support the need for provincial government officials to strengthen the ties to the local populace by meeting their security concerns. This improved interaction by the provincial government reduced the local populace’s support of the Taliban.

The HTT best displayed this type of cultural analysis in Yousef Kheyl District, where the team was able to assist the brigade in coordinating humanitarian assistance distribution in a more equitable manner. The HTT discovered the problem with the distribution process by interfacing with the local population during Operation Attal. The HTT recommended that the brigade distribute the supplies through the district sub-governor (DSG). This new system was based on the tribal elders supplying a list of village families in the greatest need of support to the DSG, who would then provide the distribution information to the brigade through the Provincial Reconstruction Team. This system was more successful than the previous system by ensuring equitable distribution based on tribal consensus, rather than a less legitimate, western manner. It also provided the brigade with accountability of distributed items.

Lastly, this manner of humanitarian assistance distribution brought the local population to the government and aided in developing legitimacy for the DSG.

Finally, the team was able to address local perceptions on security. The local perception was that there was a direct correlation between the ability of the coalition forces to provide protection for the local leaders and their capability to protect the general population. According to the Operation Sham Shad HTT report, this view stemmed from the fact that “since 2004, Paktika has been the site of numerous attacks on Afghan civilians, including electoral workers, tribal elders, religious scholars and professionals. A number of prominent tribal elders were assassinated between 2005 and 2007, most notably the head of the Sharan tribal shura, a prominent Sharan tribal member, and the head of the Kushamond tribal shura.” These assassinations led to many effects identified by the local populace. These included government officials leaving the province, the local population unwilling to work for or with the government, collapse of the tribal shura and anger at the assassinations. In fact, the report also noted, “One of the more profound effects both described and observed was elder self-censorship and fear of talking openly to both the CF and also to other senior shura members.”

The integration of this human terrain information gathered in the field by the Human Terrain Team provided the brigade’s common operating picture an added cultural perspective. Thus cultural perspective positively influenced the planning and decision-making processes of the unit.

In Sadr City, Iraq, a Human Terrain Team provided extensive support to brigades during local key leader and governance engagements. The activities of identifying, prioritizing and interacting with influential political, military, tribal, business and religious leaders fit perfectly within the Human Terrain Team’s scope as researchers and facilitators of the socio-cultural aspects of the operational area. HTT analysis of key leader engagements were based on the local culture, which assisted the brigade in distinguishing individuals on the basis of tribal and religious affiliation, in contrast to western measures of influence based on occupation, wealth, fame, or success.
The primary focus of the HTT in Sadr City has been the engagement of tribal support councils, neighborhood/district councils and Government of Iraq leaders to assist the brigade in influencing the community into supporting the local and national Iraqi governments. This improved the equal distribution of good governance and government services to the local populace, which increased government services and provided a more equitable distribution of those services to the local populace. A key factor in this success was HTT efforts in the certification of tribal support councils and their integration into the governance of Sadr City. The end-state of this model was a protocol of neighborhood/district council meetings where the executive branch of the Government of Iraq interfaced and engaged with the neighborhood/district council representatives. This cultivated long-term opportunities for reconciliation of disputing factions and helped build credible local, provincial, and national governing institutions.

One HTT technique that greatly contributed to the brigade’s success in Sadr City was a tiered and nested engagement plan within the brigade that engaged the appropriate level power structure with the appropriate coalition leader. An example of this was the team’s idea and support in hosting iftar dinners during Ramadan which incorporated political, tribal, and religious leaders, furthering operational goals and demonstrating the brigade’s support of local cultural/religious traditions.

Examples of an HTT’s extensive and successful support of a brigade’s reconciliation and security efforts occurred in Zarafaniya and Tisaa Nissan. The team there had been successful in assisting the brigade in realizing the need for a balanced approach to lethal and non-lethal operations in this area of Baghdad. To support the non-lethal effects desired by the brigade, the team made use of non-traditional methods to develop a systematic key leader influence strategy, assisted the Civil Affairs units in prioritizing projects to support that strategy, identified and leveraged the current and historical owners of real estate, and supported the brigade’s creation of a reconciliation and security co-op individually and between Sunni and Shi’a populations. The key to all of these tasks was accurate identification of the formal and informal centers of gravity and external influences on both Zarafaniya and Tisaa Nissan. This process was successful in influencing the Zarafaniya and Tisaa Nissan populations to support the local Iraqi government.

The team began by identifying the key leaders in the brigade’s area of operations through council meetings and interviews of the local population. These events allowed the team to start to piece together a social network analysis of leaders and their constituents in the area by “study[ing]...social structure to analyze the patterns of ties linking its members...to understand properties of the social, economic, or political structural environment and how these structural properties influence observed characteristics and associations related to the characteristics.” By engaging both coalition-perceived power brokers (council members) and previously unidentified leaders (discovered through discussions with the local population), the team zeroed in on the true key influencers. Once they had identified these leaders and understood their personalities, they were able to develop an engagement strategy. These engagements, held outside of current council meetings, assisted the brigade in building invaluable relationships which enabled them to address local concerns and needs. This needs analysis allowed the Civil Affairs unit to focus the brigade’s limited resources on projects that provided the most positive effect on the community. This process of identifying the community’s highest priority needs and working these projects with local leaders was a key factor in the brigade’s success.

One of the key issues identified by the HTT through this field research was to identify real estate ownership. Due to the recent violence and forced removal of both Sunni and Shi’a personnel in the area, rightful ownership of land and the return of displaced personnel was the key factor in developing a reconciliation strategy. The HTT was invaluable to the units in the field by identifying major land owners and how the brigade supported the legal process in determining the rightful owners. An example of this was the Bouniya Farm issue. Jaysh al-Mahdi had forced the rightful owner out and was using this large estate as a cache site and a staging point for operations. The recapture of the estate (through the legal process in Karada and enforced by Iraqi Army/coalition forces) and its redevelopment has helped cement a pro-Government of Iraq (GoI) presence, boosted the economy by stimulating agriculture in the area, and increased the legitimacy of both GoI and the legal process in east Baghdad.

The identification of the key power brokers, use of reconstruction projects for appropriate effects, and recapture and redevelopment of lands led to a more amenable environment and improved security and reconciliation. In Zarafaniya and Tisaa Nissan, the key to reconciliation of Sunnis with the current majority Shi’a was increased security, primarily from Jaysh al-Mahdi and other Shi’a militias. The security plan was developed with the assistance of the HTT, which was different from the “Awakening” process seen elsewhere in the country. Instead of bringing primarily tribal Sunni personnel into a pseudo-security force, the unit’s security plan focused on the implementation of the current laws which eliminated any notion of sectarianism or tribalism. This plan allowed estate owners to take part in securing their own personal property. In addition, the security plan linked the neighborhood councils to the Iraqi Army and police leaders to form a security council. The benefits of this plan were they improved local stability, enforced local rule of law, secured rightful real estate ownership, and legitimizing the Government of Iraq. The security plan had secondary effects of economic activity and investment in local goods (specifically agricultural).

The three examples described above keenly display the human terrain system’s dedication to training and deploying Human Terrain Teams to assist combat brigades. This support has taken many forms and used different methodological constructs, leveraging the socio-cultural aspects of the brigade area of operations and creating a clearer picture of the human terrain for both the commander and his staff.

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THINKING BEYOND THE FIRST MILE:
A Look at Interpreters on Combat Logistics Patrols

1LT DAVID E. LEIVA
SGT J. SAAD

In his 2003 book Applied Economics, renowned Stanford University economist Thomas Sowell concludes that politicians habitually fail to look beyond the immediate effects of their economic policies to the long-term repercussions. “Most thinking stops at stage one,” Sowell writes. “Many of the ‘unintended consequences’ of policies and programs would have been foreseeable from the outset if the process had been analyzed in terms of the desirability of the goals they proclaim.”

This essay is not about economics or politics. It is about an asset that is slowly trickling into Army units in theater — translator aides — known simply by their military occupational specialty, 09L. This article is also about the apparent disconnect that exists between the strategic level and the operational level — the most critical piece of the puzzle — where this asset is employed.

More succinctly, here’s one example of how we used our linguist outside of full-spectrum operations, outside any real guidelines, and how necessary it was to think beyond stage one in order to do so.

When SGT J. Saad (name abbreviated for operational security concerns) walked into the motor pool of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, in 2007, it seemed like a prayer had been answered.

Tasked with providing convoy security throughout Al Anbar Province, a 30,000-square-mile-area west of Ramadi that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, our National Guard light infantry unit would have the same unfettered access to the arsenal of our active duty counterparts. The impact was immediate. Saad, a National Guard Soldier, quickly put together a cultural briefing, specifically tailored to Multi National Force – West, that had a sense of freshness and authenticity unmatched in previous presentations. It’s important to note that not only was he fluent in Arabic, but he held a doctorate in American government and public policy and was a former college professor. As expected, his presentation skills were impressive.

Unfortunately, unlike other Army weapons, SGT Saad did not come with an instruction manual on how to be used during combat logistics patrols (CLPs). If the unit were tasked with developing relationships with local sheiks, imams or politicians, his role would be obvious. The question left – what now?

Even in 2002, forward-thinking officers, such as MAJ Paul Schmitt, were posing the same question without satisfactory answers. “Small unit commanders and leaders in an engagement area are often the ones most in need of interpreters, but also often the ones who have the least idea of how to use them properly,” Schmitt wrote for Infantry Magazine while assigned to the Department of Foreign Languages at the U.S. Military Academy.

Clearly, it was time to think beyond stage one. With few exceptions, the evidence provided is anecdotal. A forensic look at this article might reveal fatal flaws in the logic and conclusion. If nothing else, though, perhaps this field research will offer another view. That said, here’s what we learned.

Interpreters: The Public Face

Convoy security, once the sole realm of military police, has quickly fallen into the hands of infantry units, albeit, active or National Guard. One only needed to look at Al Anbar Province to find such examples. Bravo Company replaced a mechanized infantry company of the 1st Infantry Division. Also, a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted convoy movements from Jordan. Both are proof, at least for the time being, that this mission isn’t strictly for the combat support units or the National Guard.

The pragmatic approach would be to place Saad in every convoy, essentially making him the busiest Soldier in the company. But with different squads leaving
at all times of the day throughout the week, picking the best mission would have been a matter of opinion, not science. Among the questions:

* Should he go on long missions through some of Iraq’s named areas of interest or Tier 1 hot spots?

* Would it be better for him to go into locations where there was a likelihood of stops in urban areas or where interaction with Iraqi police and Army was most probable?

* Do we base it on the most recent intelligence?

* What exactly should be the criteria?

We didn’t have a good answer. One thing was for sure, though: If we had seven linguists or translators, it would be a no-brainer to attach one to each squad.

“Interpreters are the public face of the counterinsurgency effort to the local population; on their words hinges success or failure,” wrote LTC John Nagl in the foreword to Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during World War II. “It is far easier to defeat an insurgency with words than with machine guns.”

Nagl, then commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kan., understands firsthand the importance of this commodity. Among the leading visionaries to help “move the Army out of its comfort zone,” he authored several books before recently retiring, including Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and contributed to the Army’s recently released Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.

As a Category II linguist, SGT Saad is a U.S. citizen with a secret clearance. Brigade commands, by doctrine, should have access to 10 to 15 of these linguists.

Here, however, is where the idealism and reality fail to meet. There are 450 heritage speakers in the military today with an additional 150 Soldiers in the pipeline, according to David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Plans and the agency’s senior language authority, said the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides $67 million this fiscal year for initiatives to strengthen and expand the language program. Separately, the QDR provides $50 million over a five-year period from 2007 to 2011 to further expand the O9L program.

In 2006, the Army judged the program so successful that O9L was turned into a permanent MOS with a career path that extended to sergeant major.

**Language Skills = Warfighting Skills**

Michael Dominguez, principal deputy under secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness, told a Senate committee in 2007 that being able to speak to the populace was essentially the only means of prevailing in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.

“We must be able to communicate effectively with and gain the support of the local population within the regions in which we operate,” Dominguez said. “We responded to this shift in the demands of war fighting with a shift in strategy. Language and regional expertise had to be recognized as critical war-fighting.”

Yet, until January 2006, the Command and General Staff School, which produces the service’s future senior leadership, did not have any language course requirement, according to a story published in Congressional Quarterly.

Still, seven years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the most technologically advanced Army in the world is still reduced to graphic training aids and sign language. Even the free Rosetta Stone program available to all Soldiers and a generous language bonus have not been enough to entice Soldiers to commit themselves to learning a foreign language.

**The Big Five**

Unable to figure out the best use of our linguist almost led Saad to learning a skill McGinn and Dominguez probably never had in
mind. But Saad left the headquarters platoon for a line platoon before he could receive a bus license to shuttle Soldiers back and forth.

Saad went out on several CLPs after receiving a license to drive the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle, M1083 Gun Truck and M1151 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheel Vehicle. Completing the missions gave the squad he was assigned to the comfort of knowing they would have the ability to de-escalate any issue on the road. But it did very little for the other squads.

That’s when the idea of duplication became more than a concept. To accomplish more with less, several sergeants and I came up with good practical ways of making Saad more effective. We called it “The Big 5.”

1. Scenario-driven Arabic language skills

Driven by the experiences of NCOs who led the majority of convoys, seven situations were gleaned where an interpreter would have been invaluable. Saad developed a series of simple phrases that could help Soldiers communicate with Iraqi civilians and authorities.

Of course, similar products are readily available, but they use the shotgun approach. And saying “erfah eedeeyek,” which means hands up, is no way to win friends. Particularly when all you need is an inattentive driver to move his vehicle.

Our vehicle, usually an M1117 Armored Security Vehicle, was not the best means of communicating with people on the road. But many of them were equipped with public address systems which provided the added benefit of being able to communicate with some safety measures built in. See Figure 2 for situations and phrases that were identified.

2. Practice Pronunciation and Self-Study

In a November 2008 statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, McGinn stated that all three Service Academies have “enhanced their foreign language study programs to develop or enhance pre-accession language and cultural knowledge. They expanded study abroad, summer immersion and foreign academy exchange opportunities; and added instructor staff for strategic languages.”

And while physical training remains an integral part of basic training, language training is not. Considering the bonuses paid to those who enter the Army with that skill, it might be an inexpensive tool to put into practice, an idea that attracted the attention of at least one Congressman.

Last year, Rep. Vic Snyder, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s panel on Oversight and Investigations, suggested to colleagues that the Marines’ boot camp was the appropriate place to begin language training.

“In the Marine Corps, every Marine is a rifleman and a big part of boot camp is learning to shoot,” said Snyder, a Marine veteran of the Vietnam War. “That’s just...
Ingrained in you, and you know that’s important. Discipline is important, honor is important, shooting a rifle is important. If we think this (foreign language proficiency) is important, then why not have that be from the get-go, from day one?”

The added benefit of slowly filling the funnel of potential linguists within the ranks using a systematic approach might yield only a handful out of thousands. More importantly, it would cost the Army very little.

At Al Asad, good fortune met opportunity, even if it took a little prodding. Saad became an instructor at the inaugural Combat Logistics Patrol Academy run by the 507th Corps Support Group (Airborne), a subordinate unit of 18th Airborne Corps. For a few hours, he taught incoming Soldiers simple phrases. Due to time constraints, a planned lane training scenario, where the Soldiers could practice the language, did not occur. That didn’t dampen the possibilities though.

But what would they do with it afterward? Would their leadership require them to keep the provided “cheat sheet” in their vehicles to be used as needed, like the first-aid pouch?

3. Deciphering Arabic Writing and Intelligence Gathering

This was surprisingly the easiest task we could have thought of. Every time a Soldier went out on the road, it was an opportunity to gather intelligence. With the use of a camera, still shots or video gave almost “real time” data. Particularly, when the intelligence was spray painted on a building or on a 32-square-foot piece of plywood in Arabic. Unfortunately, the insurgent doesn’t necessarily use red paint to indicate warnings.

How difficult would it be to have the convoy commander turn in digital photos of Arabic writing to the intelligence section each time he reported to the operations center? If a linguist was stationed there, he could quickly scan the writings and inform whether the writings were cautions to locals or third country nationals of improvised explosive devices or pending attack. This technique would have been invaluable and falls quite in line with “every Soldier is a sensor.” Most importantly, the multiplier effect of the interpreter’s skill was magnified.

Its application would have been quite simple as well. Over SIPR (Secret Internet Protocol Router), the photos could be sent to various commands with grid coordinates. We were not successful in having this done at the company level, but it worked extremely well for my platoon.

4. Region-specific Cultural Awareness

There’s probably no harder job in the Army than to fake authenticity or expertise, particularly when no one buys it. That was the impossible task of the trainers who were tasked with explaining culturally significant acts and customs. But the Soldiers were neither Arab, spoke the language, nor served in the AO we were being sent.

With little trouble, Saad came to our unit with a PowerPoint that was specifically tailored for MNF-W. Over the course of the deployment, he proved to be very valuable in chatting with other translators, namely, the civilians and those working with Special Operations Forces. This culture is no different than ours: Familiarity breeds friendships. It also led to a better inking as to what was the best method of negotiating certain areas.

When Saad gave his presentation to the CLP Academy, it was legitimate. For the first time, some Soldiers and instructors said, someone who “knew what they’re talking about” was leading the discussion.

5. Combat Logistics Patrols

Of all of the means of using the 09L, the actual convoy is the easiest part. In fact, it’s simply a matter of picking the routes where he might be of most use. As stated previously, there isn’t much science here. It merely depends on how busy the command wants its translator to be. The obvious answer would be to keep him very busy. But this comes with a warning. Unlike civilians who are being paid handsomely, 09L Soldiers are still American Soldiers. We would never consider disproportionately overusing or overworking any one service member, so why here?

When he went out, we used SGT Saad as a driver, but he was also trained to man the .50 cal. In fact, he was an expert marksman on the M4, something few others were. In the scenarios listed earlier, he handled all of them, which is how the list was drafted. But every time he was out with one squad, that meant six other squads had no access.

Conclusion

Here is another point to consider, one that forces the operational leader to think in strategic terms. As noted earlier, the military has had a difficult time recruiting from the ranks of men and women with Arabic and other uncommon backgrounds. The suspicion of the military and other social reasons probably play the biggest hurdles to enticing these “heritage speakers.”

So, I wondered how the recruiting effort would be hurt had Saad been killed or injured. While this is an unfortunate part of the profession, I wondered how much this would set back the big picture in his neighborhood — the very one the Army is spending millions to lure.

As of this writing, the operations in Iraq seem to be waning down, which begs the question as to whether this article comes “too little, too late.” If history teaches us anything, we cannot learn enough from the experiences of those who went before us.

Having searched long and wide for a “best practices” with the use of translators in combat logistics patrols, it proved difficult to locate. So, hopefully this essay has done its job and left something for others to ponder maybe with other conflicts or languages. Perhaps even moved us beyond stage one.
The importance of effective air ground integration (AGI) has grown significantly, and now commanders at all levels have access to an aerial view of the battlefield. However, when used inappropriately, air assets can become distracters rather than enablers, or they can be wasted in a task not appropriate to their current abilities. Effectively integrating and synchronizing unmanned aerial systems (UAS), rotary wing (RW), close air support (CAS), and a plethora of other Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms in support of the ground scheme of maneuver remains a constant challenge. This article will look at the current operational success as a result of effective AGI as part of the tactical scheme of maneuver, and will highlight ongoing challenges from the ground commander’s point of view.

**Operational Environment**

Upon entrance to the Iraqi theater in June 2008, the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division found itself the battlespace owner of three provinces in southern Iraq (Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna). These provinces cover an area of approximately 80,000 squared kilometers, roughly the size of South Carolina. They contain only a few population centers, with a majority of the population living in sparse rural villages and minimal infrastructure in all three provinces. These three provinces were “PIC” provinces, meaning that they were under Provincial Iraqi Control and not being directly governed and secured by coalition forces. The security situation in Maysan province was vastly different than in Dhi Qar and Muthanna. Intelligence indicated that insurgents had freedom of maneuver in the province and were using it both as a safe haven and as a weapons transshipment point. At the time of our rest-in-place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) in July, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry was already in position in Maysan and actively supporting the 10th Iraqi Army Division in cordon and search operations focused in the capital of the province, Amarah. Clearing operations continued throughout July and August, while the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry was quickly relocated from Scania to Maysan and given the mission of countering the weapon smuggling occurring in the remote areas of the province.

Maysan province is the province furthest east and shares its border with Iran. Maneuver was especially impeded in this southeast region of our battlespace due to the presence of swamps, waterways, and other larger bodies of water, which provided food, transportation, and a livelihood through smuggling legal and illegal goods for the various tribes in the area. Many locations were completely inaccessible by ground movement.
AGI in 4/1 CAV Operations

To overcome the terrain and intelligence challenges in our battle space, 4/1 CAV used a combination of several different intelligence tools to create an operational capability to interdict smuggling. Ground movement target indicator (GMTI) data from Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft provided information on possible smuggling routes in the province. This pattern analysis information allowed smuggling named areas of interest (NAIs) to be identified and prioritized for UAS coverage. While monitoring these NAIs, real-time GMTI data was used to cross-cue the Predator onto activity for evaluation. The Predator coverage was a huge advantage over other ISR enablers. This communications relay package enabled the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) to maintain command and control over units encompassing a much larger communications range.

Prior to their arrival in the province, 1-9 CAV trained several border teams on specific counter-smuggling tactics. If suspicious activity was identified through ISR and deemed to be probable smuggling, two possible courses of action were available:

* If nearby patrols were in position to intercept the activity, they were vectored onto the potential smuggling activity through constant communication back to the TOC, which was in direct communication with the Predator operators.

* However, if terrain prevented ground interception, the border teams were also trained on aerial insertion tactics and would set up traffic control points (TCPs) that intercepted the movement of the suspected smuggling operation.

These air-inserted snap TCPs gave the 1-9 CAV commander a very mobile force that could overcome the terrain restrictions in the province. This force was also augmented by a JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Control) team and two JFOs (Joint Forward Observer). This was created specifically in order to support an intelligence-driven interception of hostile movement.

Executing AGI

The 1-9 CAV first employed its ability to tactically interface with overhead UAS support during a sniper attack on a forward operating base in September 2008. Guards on the FOB heard one round of small arms fire but were unable to locate the shooter. Predator assets were quickly retasked and picked up three individuals moving quickly towards a four-door truck. Using a communications relay package, two patrols enroute to the FOB were contacted and given the mission to intercept the truck. The Predator operator talked directly to the two patrol leaders, and this allowed the patrols to intercept and stop the vehicle and secure the individuals. The 1-9 CAV’s hard work on integrating their enablers paid off, Operation Boyne, which also occurred in September 2008, executed four separate traffic control points (TCPs) as part of a counter-smuggling interdiction plan. Human intelligence collection team (HCT) source reporting corroborated other intelligence that indicated that the Jaysh al Mahdi Special Group was moving 20-30 trainees by foot across the border from Iran into Maysan province. The reporting gave the vicinity of where the border crossing would take place, as well as the village where they would link up with vehicles at night. Around 2030, movement was detected in the vicinity of the crossing point, and when cross-cued to Predator coverage, approximately 10 individuals were seen on full-motion video (FMV) crossing the border on foot. Soldiers with the 1-9 CAV proceeded to establish a screen line of four TCPs to interdict vehicular traffic moving farther into the province. A quick reaction force was maintained at the battalion TAC. Routes that couldn’t be covered by ground forces were identified and an ISR plan had to be quickly reworked to include assets that were being fed into the operation, including Predator UAS, Warrior UAS, and a pair of AH-64Ds. All of these assets were being controlled by various individuals to include platoon leaders, JFOs, JTACs, and S2 analysts. As the night continued and ISR assets ran out of flight time or were redirected, an immediate CAS request allowed the operation to continue past the expected end point with support from a pair of F-16s. During the operation, 15 vehicles were stopped and searched, and all occupants were screened using Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE), but no evidence of lethal smuggling or our targeted individuals was found. What was found was a non-lethal smuggling network. While not a successful lethal counter-smuggling operation, it was a good example of AGI as a combat multiplier. The effective use of the various air assets allowed a Cavalry troop to cover a vast area in near real time.

In this scenario, the Predator played a dual role by providing positive ID and FMV of the target and its location, as well

Soldiers with the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment maneuver over a stretch of marshland in the Maysan province of Iraq 23 January 2009.

SSG Brendan Stephens
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CPT Mark Hayes is currently serving as the 4/1 CAV BCT deputy chief of operations (night). Prior to the current deployment he served as the brigade aviation officer for 4/1 CAV. He deployed with 4th Infantry Division to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2006 as an AH-64D platoon leader. He was commissioned in 2004 through the ROTC program at Cedarville University, Ohio.

MAJ Rey Soliz is currently serving as the 4/1 CAV BCT chief of operations. His prior assignments include the serving as the senior AD observer/controller at the Joint Readiness and Training Center at Fort Polk, La., and as a PATRIOT battery commander. He was commissioned in September 1998 after graduating from Officer Candidate School.

Current ISR Issues:
Optimization

Aerial ISR platforms, whether UAS platforms, close air support or air weapon teams, are essential resources in this environment. Intelligence sections can use these assets to confirm or deny activity at an NAI, identify suspicious activity, and establish patterns of life on potential targets. Ground commanders desire the reconnaissance and situational awareness these assets bring to the table for current operations. Thus we are faced with an optimization problem, distributing the precious flight time for each asset against multiple objectives across the battlefield.

These assets must be synchronized as part of an overarching intelligence plan that coordinates closely with current operations and the ground scheme of maneuver. Allocating an ISR asset on an inflexible target deck that is not linked to other intelligence sources, or that doesn’t have the flexibility to adjust to time sensitive targets, is liable to leave the asset burning holes in the sky and producing FMV of a lack of activity on the ground. The end result of this is that troops on the ground are unsupported.

The complexity of the problem should quickly become apparent; competing demands can surface at any time during this process as well as during operations. Without objective standards to prioritize allocation, a common behavior that emerges is to attempt to address every situation as it arises. While having your current operations officer playing the military equivalent of “whack-a-mole” with multimillion dollar aircraft may work in cases where we have overwhelming superiority, it is not the hallmark of the military. It also doesn’t work when you have more NAIs than ISR assets available, or when your area of operations is significantly large enough that the unproductive flight time between successive locations becomes a drain on resources.

The way ahead is to increase the capabilities of our enablers for ground units. Several months ago, a modification to a UAS included a communications relay package, giving every BCT the ability to coordinate operations in real-time at ranges that weren’t previously possible. Other capabilities also need to be pushed out into the hands of ground commanders, including additional sensor packages such as movement or thermal, tagging capabilities, or ID capabilities.

The deficiencies in current UAS design should also be noted. The Raven UAS system could be an excellent tool in the company commander’s hands, but usage levels remain low.

Conclusion

While there are some shortcomings in today’s ISR assets, these can be overcome with clear ISR asset priorities and unit initiative. Simply getting the proper ISR asset in support of a unit is not the complete story. Proper implementation of these airframes capabilities is the missing piece. Much of the success of a single BCT in such a large AO boils down to one simple factor: training. Having gone through two Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and various AGI leader professional development (LPDs) prior to deployment, effective AGI has resulted in a CF presence and response capability anywhere in the AO.
This review essay will highlight the 2008 Arabic book by Dr. Maher al-Charif entitled *Evolution of the Concept of Jihad in Islamic Thought*. The book — an intellectual exploration of the concept of jihad — was published through Mada Publishing Company in Damascus, Syria. Although Dr. Charif’s book covers the period from Prophet Muhammad to the present, this article will discuss the 19th and 20th century influences on the meaning of the term jihad, and how modern political theories like nationalism, national liberation ideology, colonial resistance movements, and the definition of what constitutes an Islamic government altered and steered some on a course towards Islamist political movements, then to radicalization, and violent militant Islamist ideology. Deconstructing al-Qaida ideology can only be done by Islamic argumentation, and Charif offers a book that traces not only the history of militant Islamist ideology but also the people who attempted to counter them along the way. This book was highlighted in the al-Jazeera Web site book review section and represents a 2008 Arabic book of significance to U.S. forces. Such Arabic works matter in the 21st century, as the adversary we face uses fragments of Islam and a narrow group of radical theoreticians to weave an ideology that justifies not only their agenda but the violence needed to accomplish this vision. Part I of the evolution of the concepts of jihad, which covers the 7th century through the late 13th century, can be found in the January-February 2009 issue of *Infantry*.

Colonial Resistance Movements and National Liberation Ideology and Jihad

In the 19th century, jihad (as warfare) merged with national liberation movements, and regrettably the term jihad as war found romanticism and resonance in the case of Abdel-Kader of Algeria resisting French occupation, Ahmed Urabi of Egypt resisting British control, and the Sanussis of Libya resisting the Italians. The terms jihad, national liberation and resistance became part of common discourse in the Middle East and impacted Islamic thinking on the term jihad.

Jamal al-Din Afghani (d. 1892) influenced the Egyptian intelligentsia such as Muhammad Abdu, the Grand Mufti of Cairo, and Saad Zaghlul, the Egyptian Nationalist hero and popular Prime Minister of Egypt. Afghani saw in constitutionalism the means of restricting powers of Muslim despots as well as colonialists. He combined national liberation ideology with Islam as a means of...
ultimately reunifying Islamic lands. Afghani presents a double-edged sword for his anti-colonial stance, and for advocating Islam as a religion requiring rational and free thought to inspire genuine belief. Among his most enduring legacies was his fighting blind imitation and his revival of the Islamic practice of *ijtihad* (analytic reasoning). Afghani preached that the success of Islam was not a result of the sword and cites the peaceful spread of Islam in Yemen. He also points out that the early Islamic conquests of the Levant and Egypt numbered no more than 40,000 troops. On the issue of jihad, he said that *dawa* (evangelism) takes precedence over the sword. His disciple Muhammad Abdu (d. 1905) reformed and modernized Egypt’s education curriculum, adding more modern sciences and western methods to the syllabus. Abdu is a modern militant Islamists’ worst nightmare, who used Quranic argumentation to undermine the narrow views on jihad. As Grand Mufti of Cairo, he was versed in Islamic texts, but corresponded with Leo Tolstoy, visited British philosopher Robert Spencer, and attended lectures at Oxford. He argued that jihad was defensive only, and uses verse 256 of al-Baqara (the Calf) in the Quran, “let there be no compulsion in matters of religion,” and verse 99 of Yunus (Jonah) in the Quran, “will you despise those who believe differently?” and finally verse 142 of al-Imran that advocates that only God knows the martyrs among us. He argued that jihad as warfare was *fard kifaya* (an optional obligation), and the *shaheed* means not only martyr but also witness upon people and their injustices. The English term “martyr” is derived from the Greek *martos*, which means “to witness.” Abdu also argued that the Arabic term *jizya* was not a subjugation tax levied upon non-Muslims but one levied for the maintenance of society, and that both the Persians and Christian Byzantines had taxed all their subjects. Muslims continued the practice to sustain Muslim forces and maintain order.

**Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq Counts the Notion of the Caliphate as the Only Form of Government**

One of Abdu’s most famous disciples was Islamic Judge Ali Abdel-Razaq, who was educated in al-Azhar, Sorbonne in Paris, and Oxford’s schools of Economics and Political

Muhammad Abdu, a disciple of Jamal al-Din Afghani, used Quranic argumentation to undermine the narrow views on jihad.

Science. In his book *al-Islam wa Usool al-Hukm* (*Islam and the Essence of Governance*), he made the central argument that the caliphate was a political tradition not ordained in the Quran or the Hadith (Muhammad’s sayings). Abdel-Razaq believed that the mechanics of government, whether parliament or democracy, were completely left to Muslims. Written in 1925, a year after the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate, he went back to the sources and wrote that the caliphate was a political tradition no more and no less and that the institution was never tied to the survival of Islam as a religion. He asked the hypothetical question, “Was Prophet Muhammad a king or prophet?” Muhammad’s main mission as outlined in the Quran was that of prophet, and every action was designed to advance his prophecy. Prophet Muhammad had what Abdel-Razaq called, “hukumah nabawiyah,” or prophetic governance that was inspired by God and can never be recreated. He cautions readers about mixing Muhammad’s prophecy with his oversight of Medina and eventually all of Arabia, as every act of the prophet was taken to advance the prophecy given to him by God. It is vital to amplify aspects of Afghani, Abdu, and Abdel-Razaq’s writings in the 21st century to effectively counter militant Islamist ideology, which makes reestablishing the caliphate an obligation required of every Muslim.

**Rashid Rida: The Ideological Inspiration for Radical Islamist Thought**

Rashid Rida (d. 1935) countered Sheikh Abdel-Razaq and began an intellectual revolution that altered views on jihad, placed it on a negative trajectory, and inspired Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamiat Islami. Born in 1865, in the Lebanese village of Qalmaan, near Tripoli, he was raised in a religious family and attended religious schools. While studying radical Islamists, Rida assessed the psychological and philosophical characteristics of the militant ideology. Rida began to fully embrace radicalism following the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya and the increasing secularism of the Ottoman Empire. The Libyan invasion by Italy laid bare “The Eastern Question,” or how to stem the tide of European colonialism of Muslim lands by Russia, France, and Great Britain. He saw the Balkan Wars of former Ottoman dominions and the independence of Greece as a new crusader war. Rida wanted to restore the caliphate and impose sharia law (Islamic law) to stop the “crusaders.” Rashid Rida led the attack against reformist Muslim clerics like Sheikh Ali Abdel-Razaq, and in 1927 established Jamaa al-Shuban al-Muslimeen in Egypt — the Muslim youth group charged with enforcing morality and evangelizing Rida’s Islamic ideals. Rida’s work left an indelible mark on Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), the first Islamist political party, and Abu Ala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan (founder of Jamiat al-Islami — Islamic Group founded in 1941). Through Rida and such ideological disciples as Banna and Mawdudi, a development known as *Islam siyasi haraki* or Islamist political movement emerged from the late 1920s onward. This politicized movement changed the dynamics of jihad, further narrowing its definition in public discourse to one of confrontation and violence. Rida was instrumental in unleashing *Islam siyasi* (Islamist politics) or *Islam haraki* (Islamist movement). Rida, Banna, and Mawdudi did not make the distinction between defensive and offensive jihad and advocated a philosophy...
that God accepts no other faiths except Islam. Militant Islamists would give jihad a reductionist meaning, thereby simplifying the concept of Islam itself into a formula of an unending fight until judgement day.

**Sheikh Thalabi: Countering this Radicalization of the Concept of Jihad**

Tunisian cleric Abdul-Aziz Thalabi (d. 1944) was influenced by Abu and traveled throughout the Middle East and Europe in 1931. He postulated that Islam came to bring humankind together, and that is why it recognizes the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) and urges that Muslims not attempt to enter into evangelizing the faith with them except with pure intentions (Quran, Ankabut Chapter, verse 46). Thalabi reviews the Quran and finds that the words for tolerance and forgiveness appear in 36 of the Quran’s 114 chapters and in 125 of its verses. He was troubled by the conversion of the Quran into a book that encourages radicalism, and encouraged clerics to object to this misuse, saying that such interpretations represent “Afkar Dutiyyah,” or narrow mindedness. He discusses the 70 war verses in the Quran, saying that the asbab al-nuzul (exegesis or reasons for revelation) needed to be considered. Thalabi wrote that these sword verses represented a defensive war of survival against the Meccans and that the Quran warns that although violence is sanctioned, not to transgress (Baqara, verse 19). He takes a wider notion of jihad than militant Islamists, highlighting jihad al-nafs (personal moral struggle that is the greater jihad) versus jihad al-adu (warfare against an enemy that is the lesser jihad) and cites the Quran to bolster his argumentation (Luqman, verse 15). Although this observation can be debated, he also makes the argument that the concept of jihad as holy war was borrowed from the crusades, as Muslims before the crusades delineated between qital (killing in warfare) and jihad (struggle). Thalabi also discusses the complexities of the term shaheed (martyr) arguing that it has two main meanings, that of martyr and that of witness. He postulated that the emphasis on witness to God’s justice and laws had been diluted in favor of the concept of martyrdom attained through sacrificing one’s life. Of note, despite Thalabi’s explorations of the concepts of jihad and martyrdom, he did participate in the 1936 Great Palestinian Revolt with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, viewing the British mandate on Palestine and increased Jewish immigration as a defensive sanctioned jihad (war). Why does this matter? For every clerical quotation al-Qaida produces in their audios and videos, this can be countered with clerical quotations from the same and older periods that are more pragmatic and rational. This will add to the cacophony of competing voices, sound bites and slogans, creating a more challenging media environment for militant Islamist groups.

Hassan al-Banna: The Momentum of Radically Defining Jihad

Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (The Muslim Brotherhood), was born in the village of Mahmudiah, north of Cairo in 1906. While in middle school, he established Jamiah Akhlaq al-Adabiyah, the Morals and Behavior Group, to enforce Islamic morals as based on the stringent Hasafiyah Sufi Order. He participated in Egyptian nationalist protests and agitation, and in 1923 entered Dar al-Uloom College, graduating in 1927. A year later he was assigned as a teacher along the Suez Canal city of Ismailiyah. He founded the Society of Muslim Brothers as a social group to aid the impoverished of Ismailiyah, but his vision, as he stated, was to establish, “a pious generation that understands Islam correctly, an [Islam] that is religion and state, piety and jihad (as warfare), and a shariah (Islamic law) that regulates the lives of all people.” He began with his own mosque called Dar al-Ikhwan, an Islamic school, and also formed an Islamic school for girls. By 1932, he had franchised his operation in several towns and cities in Egypt before moving to Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to turn its social movement into a political movement, but they became frustrated by the government and other political competitors like the Young Egyptians with their fascist Green Shirts. Of note, the Muslim Brotherhood sent fighters to the 1936 Palestinian Revolt, the 1948 Imami Coup in Yemen, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The number of guerrillas sent by the brotherhood increased with each successive campaign. By the first Arab-Israeli War, between 5,000-7,000 Muslim Brotherhood volunteers joined the Egyptian Army. The brotherhood also harassed British forces occupying Egypt’s Suez Canal Zone. The Egyptian government straddled the line between encouraging harassment of British forces and participation in the Arab-Israeli War with concerns about brotherhood interference in an internal Yemeni royalist coup.

From a modernist ideological front, 1920s and 1930s Egypt experienced a proliferation of schools modeled after modern western curriculums. In addition, Egypt began adopting the legal codes and institutions of the French Civil Code. This marginalized village clerics and triggered the birth of a grass roots religious industry to handle legal questions, resolve disputes, and meeting educational requirements according to Islamic law. Modernization, materialism, and secularism became sound bites and ideas to fear and led those marginalized clergy to declare apostasy and call for violence. These fears were combined in the language of agitation as many questioned whether European civilization had brought Muslims modernism or a return to colonialism. Banna applied a narrow view of the Quran to argue that jihad (as warfare) was an obligation no different from prayer and fasting. Banna, however, could not get around Baqara verse 190, about not transgressing in jihad (as warfare) and prohibited the killing of women, children, and the elderly who were noncombatants. Of note, Banna’s organization did not follow this injunction and drifted towards justifying violence against all those who rejected Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy and message. Banna attempted to marginalize sayings of Prophet Muhammad that drew a distinction between the lesser jihad (warfare) and greater jihad (leading an individual moral life), saying it was a weak hadith (saying). He dismantled and watered down the efficacy of the
complex meanings and views of jihad, making new revisionist ideologies, such as jihad having three stages. Banna’s three stages of jihad were emotional, then mental, and finally the physical sacrifice. This revisionist view of the term jihad can best be described in a single quote by Banna, “Oh Brothers! The community that perfects the manufacture of death knows how to die honorably, God will lavish them in this life and the hereafter.” Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha and Judge al-Khizindar, who declared the group illegal. In 1949, Banna was gunned down by Egypt’s secret security.

**Abu al’aa Al-Mawdudi: His Vision of an Islamic Government and Radical Islamist Philosophy**

Considered one of the founders of Pakistan, Abu al’aa al-Mawdudi was born in 1903. He began his career as a journalist in 1920. In 1923, Mawdudi published his own magazine and by 1941 he established his own Islamist political party. He was jailed by British colonial authorities but eventually created a model Islamic society, the village of Dar Salam (Abode of Peace) in East Punjab. He advocated the concept of an Islamic constitution and the need for a separate nation (Pakistan) for India's Muslims. When India was partitioned, Mawdudi continued to agitate for a model Islamic society in Pakistan. In 1953 he was sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted, and he was finally released from prison in 1955. In 1964 he was re-arrested and then re-released. His political party, Jamiat al-Islami, was banned. Mawdudi died in 1974 but left a copious amount of material on Islamic governance that continues to inspire adherents of the United States in Pakistan. In his book, *Nazariyah al-Islam wal Hidaya (The Islamic Viewpoint and Internal Peace)*, he explored his theories of hakimiyyah (sovereignty belonging only to God and not man) further by applying verse 40, which says that sovereignty is to God alone and commands that we do not worship [any other gods] except Him. However, this is in the context of Prophet Joseph's confrontation with Pharaoh. Instead Mawdudi used this verse to justify the rule of God, appropriating the interpretation of what that means to himself and his followers. He wrote of a society that delineated between those who believe in Islamic principles and those who do not. Mawdudi also advocated the need for a Muslim vanguard. In his book *Nahu Thawra Salmiyah (Towards a Correct Revolution)*, Mawdudi wrote about the need for a pious group of those who believe in the Islamic view of philosophy, practice it daily, and operate with total commitment. Mawdudi felt that an Islamic revolution could not happen without popular support and the waging of perpetual jihad against jahiliyyah (ignorance) of thought, behavior, psychology, and education. Although Mawdudi inspired many militant Islamist groups, readers should also note how his books defined jihad in a more complex way than al-Qaeda, or even the group he founded — Jamiat al-Islami — does today. Militant Islamists do this by focusing only on selected Mawdudi works that defined jihad (warfare) as an individual obligation no different from prayer and fasting, and that the killing of thousands to wipe away apostasy and *ilhad* (turning away from God) is worth it. He did restrict jihad by holding the view that assaulting or killing women, children, and the elderly noncombatants is forbidden. For Mawdudi, jihad (although warfare) was how he viewed all of Islam, which is revolutionary ideology designed to re-order the entire globe, so humankind can join the party of God. He writes that the delineation of offensive and defensive jihad applies only to wars of national liberation, giving his modernist opinion and adding it to thousands of years of other opinions on the notion of jihad.

**Sayyid Qutb: Western and Islamist Radical Philosophies Collide and Weaved into Militant Islamist Thought of the 20th and 21st Centuries**

Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) represents one of the most important ideologues of Islamist militant thought. It is impossible to understand Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and many other militants without reading Qutb’s work. Although his book *Milestones Along the Road* is considered his political manifesto, only reading his mammoth 15-volume *In the Shade of the Quran* is necessary for a deeper understanding of Qutb and his theories. Dr. Charif does an excellent job deconstructing this complex, contradictory and radical figure. Born in 1906 from a family of farmers in the village of Qaha in Upper Egypt, Qutb’s own personal intellectual journey was an extraordinary one in the context of radical Islamist theoreticians. Being the first in his family to finish university in Cairo, he achieved minor fame for poetry, short romance stories, and literary criticism. However, the pull of nationalist and anti-colonial politics drew him towards protests. The 1942 Sir Miles Lampson Incident, whereby the British dictated a Prime Minister and cabinet to Egypt’s King Farouk, led Qutb to transform his writings towards criticizing Egypt’s monarchy and control of Britain over the country’s internal affairs. In 1942, Qutb joined the Wafd Political Party, being part of the Vanguard of Wafdists. Charif’s book recounts that Qutb grew frustrated with the Wafd Party and joined the Saadists from 1943 to 1945, continuing to agitate for Egyptian nationalism. He had experienced all this before Qutb departed for his two-year fellowship in the United States in 1948. Qutb radicalized during the period from 1942 to 1950, and after returning from the United States, he veered towards the Islamist politics of the Muslim Brotherhood and became editor.
of their newspaper in 1951. Qutb remained in Nasser’s prisons from 1954 to 1964, being released for just under a year before returning to jail in 1965 and finally going to the gallows in 1966. He wrote a total of 32 books, and most of his writings were done under the abhorrent conditions of Nasser’s prisons. He is considered the most important philosopher of militant Islamist theory.

Qutbist theory is quite complex to cover in this expose, but among his central tenants is that Islam signifies the rebirth of human existence and empowers humankind. Since Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924, ending the political institution in place since the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, Muslims separated religion from state and re-entered into a stage of jahiliyah (ignorance) — a state in which shariah (Islamic law) is no longer the law of the land and where God does not reign supreme. Islamic society regressed into a state of jahiliyah that attacks the sovereignty of God. This notion of jahiliyah was borrowed by Qutb from Mawdudi. Qutb’s remedy was to restore uluhiyah (reign of God) and undermine hakimiyyah (the rule of man). Like Mawdudi, whom Qutb corresponded with, they agreed for the need of what Qutb calls Taliah Usbah — a vanguard to rid society of jahiliyah (ignorance) by clinging to the hakimiyyah (rule) of God. He advocated that this vanguard would create a pious society isolated from the corrupt general society. Qutb differed from the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Banna, who sought to address the deficit in Egyptian society religiosity through evangelism and social work. The core of Qutb’s modernist revision of Islam is his claim that the religion can address and rid humanity from the ills of industrial barbarism, culture that is bankrupt of values and the trap of communism.

Like the 14th century radical Islamist cleric Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1327), Qutb clung to the literal word of God called “harfiyah al na’ss.” He accused reformist clerics like Muhammad Abduh of making the Quranic word fit the understanding of the human mind, and this in Qutb’s opinion was a dangerous path that corrupted Islam with innovation. He believed the human mind must conform to God’s will. “Shall the Quran be polluted by a human mind rife with lust, ill-intentions, ignorance, and the multiple views of the mind?” “This,” Qutb espoused, “has only one ending, fawdah (chaos).” Qutb believed a vanguard of pure believers must be created amidst the ignorance that has plagued the globe.

On the issue of People of the Book, Qutb considered Islam the only valid religion ordained by God and uses the Quran verse 85 of al-Imran to justify his view. This is not balanced by verses that call for tolerance of those considered People of the Book. Qutb spoke out against the interfaith dialogue. Qutb writes that the concept of tasamuh (forgiveness) applied to personal dealings only and not society as a whole.

Qutb’s Modernist Commentary on Jihad

Qutb viewed jihad as fighting for God alone and not for personal gain. He reinterpreted jihad as fighting against nationalism, racism and reduced the concept to a perpetual jihad to spread God’s word throughout the globe. He opines that jihad can be reduced to three goals: (1) ridding Muslims of divisions; (2) guaranteeing the freedom to spread the faith; and (3) establishing an Islamic system on earth, as this alone ensures freedom of man towards his fellow man. Qutb uses a modernist interpretation to marginalize the verse “let there be no compulsion in matters of religion,” by saying that those who use this verse to advocate differences between a defensive and offensive jihad, confuse compulsion in ageeddah (Islamic practice) and the need to destroy the materialist system that worships material goods and prevents the worship of God. Qutb uses modernist national liberation rhetoric to say that Islam is not just orthodoxy, but a general declaration for the liberation of man from material or worldly slavery. The goal, according to Qutb, is to wipe away this slavery which then allows mankind the freedom of choice in religious (read Islamic) practice. He then isolates all other Muslims who disagree with his views by saying that only those who move in the name of Islam and undertake jihad (fighting) truly understand Islam, and those who do not join (the jihad) can never understand. As if to make sense of his own life and long incarceration, Qutb advocated jihad as the best form of worship, and that man gives himself and his worldly goods to God for a larger reward (in the hereafter).

Conclusion

It is important to immerse ourselves in the opinions and language of Islamist radical theorists who inspire militant Islamists. We must be cognizant that Qutb, Mawdudi, and Rida all postulated radical opinions on jihad based on modernist interpretations that were impacted by 20th century events. These opinions are by no means Islamic orthodoxy or the final word on what constitutes jihad, an Islamic state, or a good Muslim. Theorists like Qutb must be deconstructed, and their writings exposed as an amalgamation of fragments of modern western philosophy and fragments of Islam weaved into a militant ideology. Books like Charif’s represent an important contribution to highlighting the diverse views and the use of Islamic argumentation to undermine militant Islamist theory, ideology, and sound bites. Such Arabic works must be dissected, discussed and taught in our war colleges, as the adversary exploits individuals with a sense of religion and not knowledge of religion to recruit fighters and elicit financial support. Al-Qaida’s center of gravity is their ideology. The first step is to deconstruct this ideology and expose it as selective fragments of Islam designed to exploit the religion and justify violence that achieves a political outcome.

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The objective of U.S. military kinetic operations always has been to defeat the enemy while minimizing risks to friendly forces, casualties among the innocent population, and undesired collateral damage. Today, more than any era in the past, we have technologies to achieve that objective across the spectrum of conflict. Even successful stability and nation-building operations have brief spikes of intensity, calling for rapid, pinpoint lethality.

Force commanders require, and have asked for, precision indirect-fire capabilities, and the field artillery is committed to providing these capabilities — tactical precision-guided munitions (PGMs), which allow commanders to turn defeat into victory, save lives, and minimize collateral damage.

In his survey of corps, division, and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders, MG Peter M. Vangjel, chief of Field Artillery and commanding general of Fort Sill, Okla., reported that maneuver commanders’ fire support priority was precision. The field artillery has been working diligently to answer the call.

The commander of ground forces in the highly successful surge in Iraq during 2007, then LTG Raymond T. Odierno, commander, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), endorsed the effectiveness of the relatively new 155mm Excalibur and guided multiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS) unitary PGMs, “...they were extremely effective. In fact, GMLRS and Excalibur were my brigade commanders’ weapons of choice.”

A Soldier fires an Excalibur round from the M777A2 during a mission in Afghanistan.

MG (RETIRED) DAVID C. RALSTON
PATRECIA SLAYDEN HOLLIS

PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS FOR BCT COMMANDERS

A Soldier fires an Excalibur round from the M777A2 during a mission in Afghanistan.

SGT Henry Selzer

March–June 2009 INFANTRY 19
We have entered a remarkable era of all-weather, all-terrain precision effects, available to maneuver commanders 24/7, with Excalibur, GMLRS unitary, and the near-future nonline-of-sight launch system (NLOS-LS) precision attack missile (PAM), projected to be fielded in FY12.

**Six Meters and Closing**

Indirect-fire PGMs are proving to be more accurate than the 10 meters required of a PGM. Excalibur and GMLRS test results and combat records of their impacts catalogue their accuracy to within a six-meter radius of intended targets, bringing us closer than ever to the ideal “one-round, one-hit” capability.

As the enemy was being cleared out of Baghdad during the 2007 surge, many ran north to Baqubah in the Multinational Division-North (MND-N) area of operations. MAJ Jack E. Vantress, S3, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry (5-20 IN), the lead task force during Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Baqubah, discussed in an e-mail, on 17 December 2007, Excalibur’s precision and how the task force achieved its desired effects on a two-story building. “We fired two rounds nearly simultaneously... Excalibur’s accuracy was such that the second round entered the building at the same point of impact as the first, thereby achieving the desired penetration to the first floor.”

Employed in conjunction with other joint firepower assets, Excalibur gives the enemy no way out. In July 2007, two Excalibur rounds were fired on a house containing top al-Qaida leader Abu Jurah and 14 other insurgents in Arab Jabour, south of Baghdad. An AH-64 Apache helicopter attacked a vehicle, and as insurgents fled from the rubble, an F-16 dropped two 500-pound bombs to destroy a house three of the fleeing insurgents had entered. The enemy never had a chance.

COL David B. Haight, commander of the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, recently deployed his brigade to Afghanistan. Before he deployed, he ensured his fires battalion had the capability to fire Excalibur. “In June 2008, I went to the Fires Conference at Fort Sill and received a briefing on Excalibur’s global positioning system accuracy. With Excalibur’s pinpoint accuracy, I can put one round into the bad guys’ exact location and take them out while causing minimum collateral damage and safeguarding the Afghan populace. Excalibur was exactly what we needed.”

“We had identified an operational need for Excalibur, so we made the case for M777A2s in the brigade to fire the round — M777s are not organic to IBCTs [infantry BCTs]. FORSCOM [Forces Command] approved the request for the capability and resourced us with 12 M777 howitzers, which our 4-25 FAR [4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment] quickly trained and certified on. The M777 has added the advantage of being lighter than the M198 and is very mobile; we can move it around the Afghan battlefield, sling-loaded under a helicopter to fire Excalibur.”

Excalibur has become a joint and combined effort as both the U.S. Marines and Canadians are using it in theater. In September 2005, 3rd Battalion, 13th Field Artillery (FA), 214th FA Brigade, fired GMLRS in support of MNC-I for the first time in combat during Operation Restoring Rights at Tal Afar and the next day during Operation Safai at the Al Anbar Province. In Tal Afar, eight GMLRS destroyed two insurgent strongholds and killed 48 insurgents from 50 kilometers away. In the Al Anbar Province, six rockets destroyed a bridge frequently used by insurgents.

COL Kenneth J. Lull, former commander, 169th Fires Brigade, Colorado Army National Guard, and the Force FA Headquarters, MND-N, 25th Infantry Division, Iraq, reported experiences with GMLRS during Operation Arrowhead Ripper. “We shot more than 100 GMLRS in support of 3-2 SBCT [3rd Stryker BCT, 2nd Infantry Division, attached to the 25th Infantry Division] in a two- to three-week period — a magnificent round.”

Aided by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), forward observers (FOs), joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), and other detection assets, precision strike suite-special operations forces (PSS-SOF) software can be used to locate the target precisely enough to fire PGMs quickly. PSS-SOF has been incorporated into forward observer software (FOS) and rapidly determines three-dimensional grid coordinates accurately enough to employ PGMs against time-sensitive targets (TSTs) or targets in support of troops in contact.

MAJ Vantress commented in an e-mail, dated 17 December 2008, on the impact PGMs and PSS-SOF had on his task force operations during Operation Arrowhead Ripper, “For both PGMs, our biggest combat multiplier was PSS-SOF. Used in combination with UAVs and FOS, we cut down the delivery time immensely. We loaded PSS-SOF in all our fire support Stryker variants to allow the forward fire support teams to quickly gain fidelity from their observers. Simply put, GMLRS and Excalibur were our weapons of choice in the close urban fight. They saved countless lives... while allowing us to maintain the momentum.”

This speaks not only to precision, but also to responsiveness.

Precision is the “coin of the realm” at the BCT and below. With Excalibur organic to BCTs, PGM allows small unit commanders to gain overmatch and a decisive advantage. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), MLRS or high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) “packages” have supported BCTs with GMLRS — also very responsively.

**Minimum Collateral Damage**

Precision munitions mean more than just accuracy of impact and effects on the intended target; PGMs provide precise effects with minimum collateral damage in the target areas. Commanders can safely employ Excalibur, GMLRS, and, beginning in FY12, PAM, in appropriate circumstances, close to troops in contact for immediate fire missions. These munitions reduce troop standoff distances, giving commanders options such as entering a building to collect time-sensitive intelligence just seconds after the building is engaged.

COL Lull, in an e-mail dated 18 November 2008, shared his experiences with employing Excalibur in Iraq, “We fired 17 Excalibur rounds for the 3-2 SBCT when it cleared Baqubah of insurgents in intense combat during Operation Arrowhead Ripper. In one mission, we fired Excalibur on a known enemy safe house. Although it did not level the building, it killed everyone in the building without harming children who were playing outside in front of the house next door about 30 yards away. Excalibur is an incredible round. I called MNC-I and asked for every Excalibur...
round I could get my hands on.”

In his e-mail dated 16 December 2008, BG Stephen J. Townsend, commander, 3-2 SBCT, Operation Arrowhead Ripper, discussed employing GMLRS to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Baqubah. The alternative was to uncover and destroy the deep-buried IEDs (DBIEDs) or houseborne IEDs (HBIEDs) with successive shots manually emplaced by an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team: “Our pre-assault intel proved quite accurate — that we faced up to 175 DBIEDs and also booby-trapped houses, or HBIEDs, in Baqubah. By the time we were done, we had recorded more than 200 emplaced IEDs inside the city and about 41 rigged houses.

“We were desperate for a solution to the problem of DBIEDs — al-Qaeda had dug in an overlapping network of DBIEDs, the equivalent of a deliberate interlocking minefield in depth. Bottom line: GMLRS worked by neutralizing known and suspected DBIEDs and allowed us to maintain the momentum of our attack with minimum exposure to our force and minimum collateral damage to the Iraqi infrastructure.”

COL Bruce P. Antonia, former commander, Task Force (TF) 5-20 IN, and his Sykes’ Regulars fought in Baqubah three months before the remainder of 3-2 SBCT joined them in June 2008 for the final assault to clear the city. In an e-mail dated 17 December 2008, he described his ability to shoot GMLRS faster than he could air-drop a bomb on HBIEDs, and the level of comfort they developed with GMLRS’ accuracy and effectiveness, “We were in the midst of clearing a neighborhood when one of my companies came upon a confirmed HBIED. I was on the ground with the company commander when he requested GMLRS to attack the HBIED. Because there was direct-fire contact with the enemy, and I was extremely confident in my commanders and all my FSOs [fire support officers], I immediately agreed to the request. After they called in the fire mission, I asked the company commander exactly where the target was — it was two houses to the west of the one we were standing in. The testament to GMLRS is that we called it in on a target 50 meters from our own location with great confidence.”

The United Kingdom (UK) has modified 12 of its M270 MLRS launchers to employ GMLRS unitary in Afghanistan. In the past year, the UK has fired more than 300 GMLRS rockets in Afghanistan with the same 98 percent reliability as U.S. missions enjoy.

**XM982 Excalibur** — This is the first GPS-guided, inertial measurement unit (IMU)-aided weapon that can be fired from 155mm platforms, including the M109A6 Paladin, the M777A2 towed howitzer, and the Future Combat Systems Non-Line-of-Site Cannon (FY17).

Excalibur is an extended-range (7.5 to 24 kilometers) unitary round that is all-weather, 24/7, and all-terrain that has been fired in testing and combat with an accuracy of within a six-meter radius of the target.

Excalibur has two special force-protection features: the round only arms itself when within 30 meters of its aimpoint — extra safety for rounds in close support of troops; and the round has a built-in test that exercises in flight. If it detects a problem, it goes into fail-safe mode and flies to a preplanned alternate ballistic impact point (BIP), but does not detonate.

Its 50-pound warhead has a highly concentrated and predictable fragmentation pattern, optimizing it for urban operations and minimizing collateral damage, allowing it to be employed, within 170 meters of friendly troops in combat. Its nonballistic flight trajectory, which terminates in a near-vertical attack angle, along with its precision, produces concentrated lethality to the equivalent of the M107 high-explosive (HE) round.

Its primary target sets are softer targets, artillery and mortar crews, vehicles, and command posts, although Excalibur has been employed successfully against other targets in support of coalition forces. In CENTCOM, Excalibur has been effective against improvised explosive devices, safe houses, mortar crews, footbridges, and other targets.

**Coming Soon: Moving Target Attack**

In 2012, PGMs will be organic to BCTs, which will add a long-needed capability, PAM, to attack moving targets — a global first.

This U.S. Army-Navy all-terrain, 24/7 missile has an effective range from 500 meters to 40 kilometers. Each of the 15 missiles per PAM container-launch unit (CLU) has an explosive shaped-charge warhead for armored targets with fragmentation for soft targets. PAM is designed to attack armored and lightly armored moving and stationary vehicles, small boats, and some bunkers with pinpoint accuracy. Causing minimum collateral damage, it can be employed in urban/complex terrain less than 110 meters from friendly forces.

PAM’s dual-mode seeker, the semi-active laser (SAL) and infrared (IR) heat seeker, can be used separately or in unison for precision target engagement after its GPS navigation has guided the missile to the target area.

Networked and platform-independent,
PAM is a smart missile. It can acquire specific types of targets in flight and attack them, including moving targets. A missile flies along a nonballistic route to the target to avoid crowded airspace, receiving target location updates while in flight. Each missile transmits a picture of the target back to the control cell just prior to impact.

NLOS-LS completed nine tests in 2008, which have demonstrated its design and performance parameters. During November 2008, at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., PAM used its digital SAL seeker to score a direct hit against a T-72 tank from a range of nine kilometers; two days later, PAM demonstrated its SAL and IR seekers for another direct hit on a T-72, this time from 19 kilometers away.

The U.S. Army is considering an air defense application for this munition, which has tested very well. The variant would fill the requirement to destroy low- and slow-moving UAV and rotary wing threats, protecting the future combat system (FCS) BCT, the future brigade combat team (FBCT), during counterinsurgency operations. No current organic capability protects the brigade from these threats.

The Current Fight

These PGMs are designed to provide commanders the flexibility to manage the precision effects to achieve desired results. Excalibur has a 50-pound warhead and GMLRS unitary has a 200-pound warhead, which can be employed against larger targets, yet both can be employed in close support of friendly troops. Note: PAM will have a 12-pound warhead and will also be employable in close support of troops.

Indirect-fire PGMs allow commanders to attack an enemy mortar crew setting up in downtown Kabul with Excalibur, producing minimum collateral damage, or destroy a two-story duplex with GMLRS unitary, leaving half of the duplex standing. To increase precision strike flexibility, the field artillery is developing “scalable lethality”: a future GMLRS “dial-an-effect” capability.

Commanders have the ability to fire Excalibur from as close as 7.5 kilometers and GMLRS from as far away as 70-plus kilometers. The U.S. Marines in Iraq first gave GMLRS its now-famous title, “70-kilometer sniper rifle.” With the fielding of PAM, the missile can be fired from as close as 500 meters from its target.

Enhancements to Excalibur due in FY10 extend the round’s range to 35 kilometers on current firing platforms. When PAM comes into the inventory in FY12, commanders will have the ability to precisely attack moving targets from 40 kilometers away.

In the past two years, two operational needs statements from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commanders called for a 120mm mortar PGM in theater, another precision strike option to fill a gap. A mortar PGM would be highly mobile, organic to maneuver battalions (therefore responsive), and reduce the system-to-target range while still maintaining a maximum range that ensures munition versatility.

Recently, an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) fires battalion was tailored with attached M777A2s to provide a capability to deliver PGMs in Afghanistan. This organization, for the first time, provides the IBCT commander with the ability to deliver precision munitions without waiting on an external asset to deliver long-range precision.

LTC Michael P. Gabel, commander, 4-25 FAR, 10th Mountain Division, deployed to Afghanistan in late 2008. In an e-mail dated 9 December 2008, he wrote about tailoring his field artillery battalion to fire Excalibur, “My third BCT was in OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] VI and VII. It was the first brigade in Afghanistan to have its rotation extended to 16 months. The good news is we brought back a lot of lessons; for example, the importance of range and firepower in that mountainous terrain.

“During OEF VI and VII, the artillery had to fire its M119 (105mm) howitzers at high angle with maximum charge to get the range required by the terrain. So for our 2009 rotation, we requested and got 12 [155mm] M777A2s — not only to increase our range and firepower, but also to improve our precision and limit collateral damage in urban operations with the Excalibur round.

“We reorganized into a multicapable battalion with 12 triple sevens and kept four M119s for air assault operations. (I turned HHB into an M119 platoon.) We shot 15,000 rounds under this organization in preparation for deployment. I think this multicapable FA battalion organization may be the way to go — it gives maneuver commanders options. We’ll know better after we have been in Afghanistan for awhile.”

These PGMs are not only all weather, but also all terrain, and effective in urban, complex, mountainous, or open terrain. Because of their near-vertical angle of attack, these weapons optimize lethality and minimize collateral damage. Reduced collateral damage permits their use and ability to deliver the desired effect within the rules of engagement (ROE) in some of the most complex terrain.

With Excalibur’s non-ballistic trajectory, it is not limited to clear fields of fire or tied to gun-target lines — it can be fired up to 300 millimeters off the line, and will maneuver to hit whatever target the maneuver commander wants to hit.

U.S. Army and Air Force command systems can be automated to deconflict airspace faster and more accurately than before. The advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) now shares information through the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to Air Force systems to provide airspace information, enabling rapid coordination to deconflict flight routes in the vicinity of a PGM trajectory.

The lower the level of the tactical PGM’s release authority, the faster its fires are cleared. When clearance and control of Excalibur is delegated down to the task force commander, “it is more responsive than CAS [close air support] or attack aviation,” stated LTC Stephen J. Maranian, in an e-mail dated 11 November 2008, whose attached M777A2 battery (from 3rd Battalion, 321st FA, 18th Fires Brigade) fired Excalibur. Maranian commanded 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne FA Regiment, 173rd Airborne BCT (ABCT), Afghanistan, from the summer of 2007 until July 2008.

COL Charles A. Preysler, recent commander of the 173rd ABCT in Afghanistan, said “[Excalibur] worked as advertised. … Once we understood the time required to fire the round, it became clear we needed to get permissions and authorities down to the battalion level.”

Because the risk of collateral damage associated with these PGMs is smaller, PGMs, such as Excalibur and GMLRS, allow the commander to delegate release authority for entire categories of targets down the chain of command.

For large-scale precision, U.S. Air Force PGMs are brought to commanders by their FSO. In addition to the FA suite of PGMs,
commanders have the option of air-delivered PGMs, such as the small-diameter bomb (SDB), with a 250-pound warhead, and the joint direct attack munition (JDAM), with options for 500-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound warheads. These weapons are precise in their destruction of larger infrastructure or concentrations of enemy forces. The only aerial-delivered munition that equals the limited collateral damage estimates (CDEs) of Excalibur, GMLRS unitary, or PAM is the Hellfire missile.

**Excalibur Lessons Learned**

While GMLRS has been in the inventory and well appreciated for several years, Excalibur is relatively new and often unfamiliar to BCT commanders. In his e-mail of 11 November 2008, LTC Maranian further discussed several lessons he learned about Excalibur in Afghanistan, which have been echoed by other FA commanders, “We need to educate our maneuver counterparts that Excalibur is not Copperhead. Copperhead has left some ‘scar tissue’ with maneuver battalion commanders from their days as company commanders as they remember the cumbersome nature of that old PGM. Further, the default is that commanders want to fire two Excalibur rounds in case one fails. Needless to say, the task force FSOs and FSCOORDs [fire support coordinators] need to coach their maneuver commanders that while there are times when more than one Excalibur should be employed to achieve the desired effects, the reliability of this round far exceeds that of Copperhead, and we do not need to default to firing more than one round. Our experience was that Excalibur has an accuracy of within six meters of the target. With the right target selection standards and delegation of release authority to the task force level, Excalibur can provide reliable first-round accuracy for troops in contact when collateral damage must be minimized.”

Other critical lessons, such as intelligence and precise target location, are paramount for employing PGMs effectively. Commanders must have the intelligence that the target is high-payoff and locate the target precisely or the PGM will attack a no-value target or the wrong location precisely. It is also important to know what Excalibur will and will not do — it will not level most buildings, but can destroy rooms inside a building while causing very little collateral damage. This munition is effective against softer targets.

Today, Excalibur and GMLRS provide BCT commanders all-weather, day and night responsive, precision strike capabilities on planned and unplanned targets in all terrain — PGMs that are organic to a brigade or readily available in the ground force. In the near-future, PAM will bring an additional precision strike capability — attack moving targets — to the BCT. Together, they provide commanders precision effects and range options and reduce collateral damage and logistics burden.

The field artillery continues to work on future precision indirect fire as voiced by the current Chief of FA, Major General Vangjel, “As your fire supporters, we are totally committed to giving you the precision strike capabilities you need — we won’t let you down.”

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Patricia Slayden Hollis, until her retirement in late 2007, served as the editor of Field Artillery for 20 years and as the first editor of Fires. She has interviewed more than 80 senior U.S. and international military leaders, one of her most recent with (then) LTG Raymond T. Odierno, commander, Multinational Corps-Iraq. “2007 Surge of Ground Forces in Iraq — Risks, Challenges, and Successes,” published in the March-April 2008 Fires. In 2006, she won the six-state Katie Award and statue from the Dallas Press Club for her interview with USMC LTG John F. Sattler, commander of U.S. and coalition forces during the “Second Battle of Fallujah — Urban Operations in a New Kind of War,” published in the March-April 2006 Field Artillery, among other writing awards. She holds an M.A. from George Washington University.

The authors extend their gratitude to the Fort Sill Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Managers (TCMs) for Cannon and Rockets and Missiles for their excellent support in writing this article.
When picturing urban operations, tanks, large cities, and tight quarters may come to mind. Although urban operations are prevalent in modern warfare, the U.S. Army actually received a glimpse of operations in this type of environment 163 years ago during the Mexican War.

The battle of Monterrey, which occurred 19-24 September 1846 gave U.S. forces a taste of city fighting and allowed them to develop tactics which would be used in future conflicts.

General Zachary Taylor, the future 12th President of the United States, led an Army of 6,000 Soldiers on a trek to Monterrey, starting in Matamoros in June 1846. Accompanied by Texas Rangers, the group used the Rio Grande for part of the journey with most of the infantry “sent to Camargo via steamers, while the artillery and dragoons traveled overland,” wrote Stephen A. Carney, in his U.S. Army Center for Military History brochure Gateway South, The Campaign for Monterrey. In all, it took three months for the U.S. forces to reach Monterrey.

“The city of Monterrey was a veritable fortress. Its buildings were made of stone, with flat-topped roofs and straight streets, making each house a strongpoint,” stated John S.D. Eisenhower in his book So Far From God. In addition, the city had numerous fortifications at critical points around town. The largest was “an uncompleted cathedral, known to the Americans as the Citadel or the Black Fort because of its dark, thirty-foot-high stone walls ....” wrote Carney, who also noted that it could hold 400 Mexican soldiers and about 30 guns. In all, Carney estimated that more than 7,300 Mexicans manned positions around the city.

When they reached the outskirts of the city, the Army was split into two sections: General William Worth would lead half into the western sector of Monterrey, and General Taylor would lead the rest into the eastern sector.

Worth’s forces were the first to be engaged as they clashed with the Mexican cavalry in the western end of the city on 21 September. Some of the American forces took up a defensive position behind a fence, which proved to be a winning tactic in the battle. Worth’s men defeated the 200-men Mexican cavalry in only 20 minutes and went on to take Federation Hill with few casualties.

Things didn’t go as easily for Taylor’s group on the eastern front that day. In order to reach the city from that side, the Americans had to cross about 500 yards of open ground where they would be exposed to artillery from the Citadel and another fortification, La Teneria (tannery).

“In one concerted effort, the regiments rushed across the level ground toward the city. Exposed to artillery fire the entire time, they broke into smaller groups to avoid taking heavy casualties,” wrote Carney. “Once inside the city, the units became further isolated and lost all semblance of cohesion.”

The city’s narrow streets were difficult to navigate, and Mexican infantrymen fired down at the Americans from notches cut into the buildings’ flat roofs. Hearing the gunfire, Taylor sent in more
reinforcements, and the U.S. forces were able to clear La Teneria.

The next day, Worth’s forces continued pushing into the city and cleared Independence Hill and Obispado (Bishop’s Palace) while Taylor’s forces rested and planned their next attack, according to Carney.

On 23 September, house-to-house sweeps of Monterrey started. Using lessons learned from the first day of fighting, the Soldiers avoided the streets and maneuvered through the houses.

“Using picks and crowbars, the men would beat holes in the common walls and toss six-pound shells, with fuses set, into the next building,” wrote Eisenhower. “The explosion would wipe out what Mexican troops were on the bottom floor ... and the troops would then rush up the steps to the rooftop.”

Although it took a lot of time to clear each building this way, the tactic worked well, according to Carney, and Mexican soldiers retreated towards the city’s central plaza. Mexican General Pedro de Ampudia then realized he had no escape route and began proposing terms for a surrender.

In the three days of fighting, casualties on both sides were high; the U.S. forces lost an estimated 120 killed, 368 wounded, and 43 missing while the Mexicans had 367 killed and wounded.

Despite the high casualties, the battle was a great success for the U.S. Army, according to Carney.

“For the third time in four months, it had faced a numerically superior enemy fighting from well-established defensive positions, only to emerge victorious,” he wrote. “The battle at Monterrey also provided practical experience in urban combat. As the war progressed, more operations would occur in heavily populated areas. The need to avoid street by street advances and instead to burrow through the walls of buildings would become principles that U.S. forces would resort to again later in this and future conflicts.”

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Chris Hudgison, an editorial intern with Infantry Magazine from Columbus State University in Columbus, Ga., contributed to this article.
As a platoon leader in A Company, Task Force 2-7 Cavalry, I participated in the battle of Fallujah in November 2004. My story encompasses the triumph, tragedy, and cumulative effects of this battle on the 35 Soldiers of 1st Platoon.

Fallujah became a breeding ground for the growing insurgency in the fall of 2003, its streets consistently taking the lives of the Soldiers and Marines who ventured in. Following the massacre of four contractors in March 2004, a major operation was ordered to quell this insurgent stronghold. This, however, did not go through due to the well laid defenses of the insurgent opposition. Over the course of the following eight months, Fallujah turned into the safe haven, housing notable figures such as Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and many of his commanders. After the USMC’s success in the Battle of An-Najaf against Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in August 2004, notably due to select 1st Cavalry Division task forces, it was a natural result for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to specifically ask for 2-7 CAV in the assault into Fallujah in November 2004.

Alpha Company, 2-7 CAV had the highest of morale following its success in the Battle of Najaf, resulting in numerous awards for valor. I stepped into Alpha Company at the end of the battle, following two platoon leaders’ dismissals. Having to reestablish the validity of an officer in the Soldiers’ minds, as well as fight the daily fight, did not prove as easy as the vignettes from my Military Science classes. As I gained the trust of the NCOs and Soldiers over the ensuing three months, we saw our battalion moving towards the realization that we would be soon assaulting Fallujah. All I had known previously of the city were stories that had filtered back to me while at Fort Benning of four Blackwater contractors being mutilated and hung on a bridge in the city. I had no idea that a few months later I would be among the first Americans to stand on that bridge since that fateful event.

The first rumors about Operation Phantom Fury started reaching us towards the end of September 2004. We were doing our daily 14-hour plus patrols around the rural Taji area. The next thing we knew, our battalion went to fire Bradley gunnery, and my Soldiers were starting to talk about the possibility of another battle. My most memorable time during our week at gunnery was talking with about 10 of my Soldiers. Looking back, my tone of anticipation to fulfill my childhood dreams of combat was ridiculous to this audience of veterans of the recent conflict in Najaf. One of my squad leaders came up to me later, and we had a good discussion about our Soldiers’ reactions to my high level of eagerness. All of those Soldiers knew they would have to fight; that boyhood luster of war that these 19 year olds felt when they first arrived in country was replaced with a deep understanding of the moral, mental, and physical risks that combat held.
After gunnery, we continued our patrolling for a short time as our orders changed multiple times and the timeline to travel to Camp Fallujah moved left and right. Soon we received our official warning order as well as a new platoon sergeant, who hit the ground running. He helped me and the squad leaders get a great handle on all our requirements and assignments of key positions. He put together all the needed logistics and operational requirements for the upcoming battle within days of taking over. This took so much of a burden off me. If he hadn’t been there, I would have been bogged down with this along with the planning the company leadership was conducting.

The initial intelligence reports we received about the enemy situation in Fallujah were quite overwhelming. An estimated 3,000 anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) were said to be operating in the city. This number included multitudes of foreign fighters, disloyal Iraqi Security Forces, well-trained fighters from around Iraq, and disenfranchised local Iraqis who were just tired of the occupation. We expected the enemy to use complex ambushes using debris for obstacles in combination with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct fire ambushes. The risk was also high for well-trained snipers to be operating in Fallujah like the unit had seen in Najaf.

My company’s mission was for Team Apache (the initial main effort) to attack to destroy enemy forces in zone to a major route within the city to enable the attack of Task Force 3/1. Team Cougar, the tank company to the east, would also attack south to protect our flank. Subsequently, Team Apache would attack to seize our main objective, and then Team Cougar would attack to another objective to facilitate the engagement (ROE) briefed by the chain of command were to engage anything in the city that appeared to be a threat. This ROE allowed the troops in the fight to use their own discretion, freeing Soldiers from any hesitancy in engaging targets (it would prove to be very beneficial, as the insurgents were unafraid to fake surrender or death, and then attempt to kill those Soldiers or Marines nearest them).

We arrived in Camp Fallujah on 3 November and knew we would have to wait a while before we began our upcoming operation. The ensuing days were again filled with a constantly changing timeline as to when we were to enter the city. We filled the days with platoon and individual equipment preparation, close quarters combat (CQC) flow drills, and further mission planning. My company commander issued the PLs the final order, and we all were soon locked down from outside communication as D-day was set for 8 November.

From the imagery my commander gave me, I had trouble visualizing the narrow, winding streets around the cemetery in the northern sector of the city. It was unfortunate that a Soldier happened to be sleeping in it, probably the safest place he could have been, when a small piece of shrapnel flew into the bunker and killed him.

On 7 November, Task Force 2-7 moved from Camp Fallujah to our tactical assembly area just a few kilometers north of Fallujah. We staged our vehicles in a company coil and waited while targets within the city were serviced with indirect fire and close air support. At this time, we started receiving attachments: some Special Operations snipers, our joint tactical air controllers (JTACs), and embedded media personnel. We waited for at least 16 hours here, watching hundreds of explosions, as the Air Force and artillery batteries destroyed possible strongholds and vehicle-borne IEDs.

Once the Marines from TF 3-1 breached the minefield in the vicinity of the train station just north of the city, our assault commenced. Once we were to our respective north-south avenues of approach, we turned south and moved along our routes. Unfortunately, 1st Platoon was tasked with moving along a route circumventing the cemetery and winding through a tight neighborhood. With the destroyed vehicles and scattered debris as well as narrow, winding streets, it took us at least an hour to move less than a kilometer in our Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV). I ended up leading our formation because of the trouble the other vehicles had with the navigation in this restrictive urban terrain. While waiting for my Bravo Section to catch up to us, I was scanning through my BFV’s Commander’s Independent Viewer and spotted a three-man RPG team 75 meters away attempting to maneuver on my section. Our thermal sights and 25mm HE rounds quickly ended the threat, the company’s first contact with the enemy in Fallujah.
Our vehicles finally made it to our first objective with minimal contact and pushed on to our primary objective. On our way to it, our CO stopped us at a major intersection, as we had to wait for another unit to get into its position. During this six-hour wait, as the sun rose, the enemy came out in droves. At least eight different RPG teams began firing from all around our positions, and we started the game of cat and mouse — our BFVs firing as they ran between the alleyways and roof tops.

Our primary objective was a school and, as a result, had an open play yard surrounded by open hallways with doors of the classrooms facing the inside. The battalion S-2 templated that this school-complex would be a command and control center for the enemy. As a result, we were expecting a knock-down-drag out, door-to-door fight. Instead the insurgents had retrograded, and again we faced almost no resistance. The only contact at our primary objective was when one of my SAW gunners spotted two insurgents on a rooftop of the objective and quickly killed them. (The photo on page 26 was taken just before this moment.)

When we finished clearing the schoolhouse, we still had two more buildings on our objective to clear; however, we were unable to move to them because of a big wall that separated the main school from the other buildings. Luckily, a tank from our sister platoon was on the other side and crashed a hole through it so we could pass. After clearing the last building, again with no contact, we set up a quick defense, orienting our fires south, and the majority of the platoon quickly went into priorities of work and went to sleep. It was difficult for us to try to stay awake after 36 hours of continuous operations.

Alpha Company’s 2nd Platoon found one insurgent in its last building on the objective. This large open-air building held more than 80 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds, explosive making materials, and multiple RPGs. Just outside the building, 2nd Platoon found a fairly new BMW. Upon further inspection from the outside of the vehicle, the Soldiers discovered the doors were lined with wires on the inside. When we had our attached USMC combat engineers inspect it, they found more than 200 pounds of explosives in the trunk. Although there was no resistance on the objective, we realized then that the building was definitely used at one point as an insurgent facilitation and cache site.

Once the company’s defense was set, we started to receive accurate mortar fire every 10-20 minutes. One round even penetrated the roof of the building we were in and lodged in the cement floor unexploded. Half my platoon would probably have been killed if it had exploded.

Shortly thereafter, my battalion commander and S-3 came to our objective to gain a view of the situation on the ground. I met up with them and escorted them to my company commander’s vehicle, which we had positioned in the center of the objective a couple hundred meters away from a large water tower (which we soon determined was an enemy target reference point). With them came embedded media personnel, and I was immediately snatch for a quick interview at the side of my commander’s vehicle. Only a few sentences into the discussion, a mortar round landed 30 meters in front of me with the reporter in between me and the explosion. This was another close call; the reporter caught the shrapnel from the blast, shielding me from any harm.
Early the next morning, we moved out from our objective as we had completed the battle handover to the Marines from Task Force 3/1. We drove back to our task force assembly area, refueled, and refit ourselves for our follow-on mission. Our CO, in the meantime, received our new order. For the next mission, we pushed further south up to right behind where Comanche Company was and headed west. We cleared these main routes and cleared the two main bridges connecting the city across the Euphrates. We brought with us numerous Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Soldiers and a Special Operations representative to reconnoiter for IEDs emplaced along these bridges.

We encountered a small contingent of enemy fighters while we were in the middle of inspecting the “Brooklyn Bridge,” the now infamous bridge where the Blackwater employees’ mangled bodies were hung after they were dragged through the streets of Fallujah just months before. With two of our squads and a Bradley section, we quickly neutralized the enemy. We then headed south to the “George Washington Bridge.” Here, 1st Platoon again inspected for possible IEDs. Our company then set up an area defense in two tall buildings adjacent to the bridge to settle down for the night and get some rest.

“It is the secret of the guerrilla force that, to be successful, they must hold the initiative, attack selected targets at a time of their own choosing and avoid battle when the odds are against them.”
— Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya, 1966

Our next mission was to come back to a main north-south running route and continue the push south. We spent the next 30 hours sitting on this road while Comanche Company, in front of us, was pushing further south as well. After sitting in our vehicles for a few hours more (having been ordered not to dismount), we conducted survivability drills and moved around to avoid being decisively engaged. However, this soon became insignificant as the insurgents easily maneuvered on us, firing mortar rounds and numerous RPG rounds from narrow alleyways and windows.

Early the next morning, we pushed further south, and as our lead platoon turned west again, we found ourselves in the middle of a complex ambush with intersecting fields of fire. My platoon sergeant’s BFV was hit in the driver’s side, with the driver just narrowly escaping the round that flew a few inches underneath him and into the engine block. All the while, every vehicle in my platoon started to engage multiple targets as they kept presenting themselves in alleyways and in windows. Meanwhile, as my CO’s vehicle turned, an insurgent fired an RPG into the rear of his BFV. He had two JTACs and our attached PSYOPs team in the troop compartment. The round went through an interpreter (killing him instantly), tore through the team leader’s left arm, and flew underneath my CO’s feet in the turret, all while spraying spall and shrapnel into everyone in the vehicle. All we heard over the radio was “5 this is 6, I’m hit.” I quickly scanned ahead and saw where his vehicle was and watched for anyone to react. I saw the driver pop out of his hatch and open the troop door and stumble back at the sight. My section of BFVs moved around his vehicle and dismounted two squads for security as we began to pull the casualties out.

The CO’s driver was pulling out the most seriously injured when my medic and another Soldier arrived and began to triage and move them, all while hundreds of rounds were being exchanged with the enemy all around them. It is a miracle no one else was wounded as we transported the casualties in the middle of the enemy’s kill zone. If we hadn’t had both our rifle squads on the ground engaging targets and also the BFV sections firing their 25mm HE in support, we would have certainly had many more casualties. Once we moved the casualties into a BFV, we evacuated them to a linkup point with the battalion’s medic section.

Because my platoon sergeant’s BFV was barely running and the CO’s vehicle was also severely damaged, the battalion had us move back to the TF assembly area. Here, we refitted and refueled again, and within a few hours, we were back in the city waiting for the company ahead of us to conduct another movement to contact. We then moved only one to two blocks in 24 hours.

The next morning, after seeing insurgents dodging in and out of alleyways and trading fire with them all night, I had had enough. Although the previous guidance was not to dismount, the current situation with our large BFVs being static made the decision to dismount a clear one. The worst thing a mechanized unit can do is be static in an urban environment (even doing survivability drills, we were still relatively in the same location, as it is hard to hide a Bradley in the middle of a four-lane road). One of my section leaders called me and said he saw insurgents running back and forth from a car parked in an alley, and it looked like they had a cache inside it. I requested that we dismount and received permission from the XO.
who was filling in for our CO at the time. We were parked next to a mosque from where we had received fire throughout the night, and I decided to start clearing buildings beginning with the house next to it. We set up a support by fire with my Bradley section, dismounted, and cleared the house. Here we found three sleeping, military-aged males with IED-making materials. We quickly detained them and sent them out to my platoon sergeant. We then moved into and cleared the mosque. From the second floor, we spotted the car that my section leader had reported earlier and fired 40mm rounds into it. Multiple secondary explosions occurred and hundreds of rounds cooked off from the resulting fire. It was such a large amount of explosions that my platoon sergeant, who couldn’t see us due to a wall in front of the mosque, called me on the net and asked how many insurgents we were in contact with.

The platoon continued our clearance of buildings heading back north. We went through two more buildings and found more insurgents, all of them sleeping with their weapons and equipment stashed in hiding positions. The last house we cleared as a platoon should have been a foreshadowing to us as we captured two middle-aged men, one of whom was frantically making a phone call on his cellular phone. Within minutes, my platoon sergeant, still on the main road, called me on the net and said he had an insurgent running into a small house on the east side of the road. He said to send a squad, and he would take it to where he heard the fire. As we ran up to the side street, my BFV turned in front of us and pulled up to four Soldiers lying in the middle of the street.

Third Squad had gone into the third house down the street. The first room was an open kitchen with a doorway leading into the rest of the house. The Alpha team leader entered this doorway, throwing a grenade into the room first. The next thing he knew, there were at least eight insurgents who opened fire with their automatic AK-47s and kicked his grenade back at him. He only got a few rounds off by the time he was cut down by their fire through the thin walls and hit by his own grenade. Although taking two rounds in the arm and serious leg injuries, the TL continued firing from lying in the doorway. Another Soldier pulled him from the doorway and started to pull him out of the house into the courtyard. As he was pulling his TL into the street, this Soldier was shot by a sniper who was in a two-story building across the street. Meanwhile, another Soldier moved toward the side of the house and threw a grenade at 10 insurgents who were reinforcing from the rear of the building. With this grenade and fire from his rifle, he neutralized the reinforcements. He came back to the front of the house and, with the M249 gunner, placed suppressive fire into the house’s doorways so the rest of their squad could retrograde from the overwhelming fire of the enemy.

As the rest of the squad moved out into the street and into the adjacent house’s walled courtyard, the M249 gunner took three rounds from the enemy snipers that were located in the building across the street. The specialist dragged him into the street where the two other wounded Soldiers were lying. Having just been wounded by an insurgent grenade himself, he then lay down next to his fellow brothers and opened fire. He fired magazine after magazine (taking them from his fallen comrades as he ran out) and all his M203 grenades into the building with the snipers across the street. As I ran up to the situation, seeing my Soldiers in a crossfire, I immediately had 2nd Squad open fire into the building with the snipers. It was interesting to see that some Soldiers did not immediately take action, as they were so shocked to see many of their comrades wounded ahead of them. The squad leader and I had to yell at a few Soldiers to get them to take action.
My Bradley gunner, who was parked adjacent to all of this, could not gain communications with us via FM. He opened his hatch and came out on to the turret silhouetting himself on a nine-foot-high Bradley in the middle of the fight. I shouted at him where the threat was in the building across the street from us, and he fell back into his hatch and opened fire with his 25mm cannon. With M203 grenades, 2nd Squad’s fire and the BFV’s 25mm HE rounds, we quickly neutralized the enemy threat in the building across the street. As we started to carry our wounded for evacuation, we received rifle fire and grenades from the original house and sustained two more casualties. Two of us threw grenades and returned fire again, but I determined that we could not gain enough fire superiority with only five Soldiers left unharmed; we needed to evacuate all our casualties (numbering eight now). We then started loading our casualties into the back of my BFV. Once we piled them and my medic into the Bradley, we retrograded back down the street as our tank platoon’s lead tank rolled in to demolish the buildings with its 120mm rounds.

While reconsolidating back in the house with our detainees, I got a call that there were seven people exiting the back of the house where my squad had been ambushed. We ran back, hoping for a little retribution, but these young men (the youngest being around 13 years old) were waving a large white sheet to surrender. We immediately gestured and yelled at them to strip off their clothes (suicide bombers had already killed Marines in other parts of the city) and then detained them. My platoon then took all the detainees that we had not sent up to the holding area (now numbering over 20) and brought them into the mosque. We waited here until our BFVs returned from the casualty evacuation and then took the detainees to the makeshift holding facility the Marines had established. This is when my Bradley gunner told me we had lost the M249 gunner, SPC Jose Velez. For some reason, this didn’t really hit me for a long time; maybe it was because I had thought we had possibly lost a few more Soldiers or because I knew the fight wasn’t over yet and could easily get much worse.

After this firefight, the battalion pushed Comanche Company, the TF reserve, forward of our company’s position, and we established a strongpoint in a house on a major intersection. From here, we ran satellite patrols in and around the area, searching buildings and guarding the area to the rear of our TF’s lead elements. After having been in the lead, receiving many casualties, and then being pulled back to the duty of rear guard, my Soldiers’ morale dropped dramatically. We ended the battle with this mission and thus began the long road to recovery for our Soldiers who had been injured, physically and mentally.

Over the next five months of our deployment, my Soldiers had serious bouts of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. I had read about the symptoms (severe depression, insomnia, and lack of motivation) prior to being deployed but was shocked to see them in real life. Through counseling with our battalion chaplain and consulting with psychologists, my Soldiers would take months to recover (and some continue to deal with PTSD after facing additional deployments).

At the end of the Battle of Fallujah, the members of 1st Platoon earned, in total, two Silver Stars, three Bronze Stars with ‘V’ device, four Army Commendation Medals with ‘V’ device, and nine Purple Hearts. CNN, the History Channel, and three major publications told about the tenacity of 1st Platoon’s men.

Key Lessons:
1. Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks are unbelievably effective in urban terrain at penetrating defenses and gaining a foothold deep in enemy-held terrain. However, due to the three-dimensional terrain of the urban environment, it is paramount to keep the vehicles constantly mobile and have dismounted infantry. They can then mutually support each other. Otherwise, the enemy will easily maneuver using the terrain to their advantage to destroy the vehicles.

2. With dismounted infantry and vehicles in support in urban operations, it is extremely important to have good communications between the two. This will maximize firepower, prevent fratricide, and reduce the probability of one of the two being ambushed.

3. After a unit loses a Soldier or sustains many casualties, it is important to let them grieve, but not for long. Too much time can cause Soldiers to dwell on their losses and lose focus during combat operations.
On 15 December 2006, a single shot rang out from the rubble buildings in southwest Ramadi, and a young Soldier crumpled to the ground. This sniper attack was just one of the many attacks that took place in this area of operations, and in that sense, may seem insignificant. However, it had a tremendous impact on my platoon. The incident is illustrative of the type of engagements typical of guerilla, urban, or insurgency warfare and demonstrates some of the problems inherent in fighting in such an environment. It also illustrates some strengths and weaknesses of my platoon on that particular day.

I was the platoon leader of 1st Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, and we were detached from our parent company and assigned to Team Bulldog (B Company, 1st Battalion, 37th Armor), which was about 11 months into a 15-month tour when we arrived. We lived on a combat outpost (COP) that was a cluster of homes that had been seized and transformed into a base of operations three months before our arrival. Our days here were a haze of endless area clearances, movements to contact, and sit-and-wait ambushes highlighted by almost daily attacks on our COP.

At this point, we had not made any of the significant intelligence or public relations breakthroughs that would follow in only a few months with what would become known as the Awakening. (The Awakening was a movement in the Al Anbar province, led by local sheiks, that would transform Ramadi almost overnight from an intense war zone to a model of progress and cooperation.) We had found no strong allies in the community; we were operating in an informational vacuum. We knew that there was a city surrounding us and that there were people in that city who wanted to kill us. We did not know whether the majority of the people we talked with each day were our attackers, were protecting our attackers, or were just too scared or too ignorant to stand up to them. It was into this environment that my platoon walked out each day, hoping to find a cache or an informant or just someone who believed that we were trying to help.

Ramadi, which is almost entirely made up of Sunni Muslims, was said to be the most dangerous town in Iraq. As both the Iraqi Army and the residents themselves would tell us, those who lived in Ramadi did not suffer under Saddam Hussein. Many lived in
mansion with every modern convenience but now had no electricity, heat in the winter, or running water. Trying to convince them that we were there to help them was difficult. They associated the decline in their standard of living with the coalition invasion and, more recently, the development of COPs, which were usually homes that had been seized but then rented to the U.S. Army right in the middle of their neighborhoods. These outposts naturally drew fire from insurgents, who were perfectly happy to see our usually heavy-handed response, which by the time my platoon arrived, had reduced almost every building within 100 meters of the COP to rubble.

Most of our patrols were census missions. We entered houses, took photographs of the residents to add to our database, searched for evidence of insurgent activity, and usually found nothing. In December, our COP was being attacked regularly, and we were frequently finding or hitting IEDs as well. We were not, however, being decisively engaged as we walked the streets. We attributed this to the insurgents’ reluctance to hit us when they knew we were in a position to maneuver against them. We varied our routes and patrol times as much as possible within our small area of operations. We moved quickly, and we used smoke and armored vehicles to cover our movements. In short, we remained aggressive.

We had been shot at on patrol several times, but it was never accurate or sustained fire. On 15 December, my platoon was engaged for the first time in a well-planned attack by a determined enemy. We were returning from a patrol conducted only a few blocks east of our COP. The day before an Iraqi Army soldier and a U.S. soldier from another platoon had been shot while emplacing wire on our outer perimeter. We were attempting to track down any information on the shooter by visiting the homes around the point where we deduced the shot had come. As usual, the locals claimed ignorance, but my interpreter was able to get several children to tell us that the sniper had let the neighborhood know that he was going to attack and to stay off the streets. They also gave us a description of the sniper and his comrades. We had collected all the information I thought we were going to get and began the walk back home.

We walked back with 3rd Squad in the lead, 2nd Squad in the center and 1st Squad trailing. The Bradleys were one block to the south. Ideally, I would have had one of them to the north side and one to the south, or both on our street, but the rubble and potential for IEDs made it difficult and risky for vehicles to move to our north. The lead elements of my platoon had begun to cross a no-man’s land of wire, concrete barriers and rubble that separated our COP from the neighbors. Our middle and tail elements were walking west to east along a residential street that, because of its proximity to the COP, was only about half inhabited. There was no one in the street, which given the information we had just received from the children made us a little nervous. Someone remarked over the radio that it seemed especially quiet. I answered back that I thought something was about to happen and said, “Keep your rifles up and make sure you throw plenty of smoke when you cross.” It was less than 30 seconds later that it happened.

Our area was almost entirely residential, comprised mainly of one or two story concrete and stucco homes. Except for the excessive trash, bullet holes and six-foot concrete walls, it could have been any neighborhood in America. We came back using a different street than the one we used on the way out. Near the COP, there was a one-block-long area that had been completely demolished by air strikes. There was, in addition to the rubble, a smattering of large concrete barriers to prevent easy shots into the COP. I never liked that area, but in an attempt to switch up entrance points as much as possible, I would use it occasionally. We usually broke into a jog as we crossed and used plenty of smoke.

We were moving east in two columns on each side of the road. I had two Bradleys out that day, which were moving around our perimeter covering our movement. I gave the order for one of the Bradleys and our lead element to throw out some smoke. Just as our lead element began to pass through our wire, a Soldier was shot passing through the smoke screen. It was a single shot, and I, just a few feet ahead of him, initially thought he had tripped and accidentally discharged his M249. Then, we began to receive more gunfire and we realized we were under attack.

We were in a terrible position. We had begun to weave through the concertina wire, rubble and concrete barriers that surrounded our outpost. This cut us off from our Bradleys, making it impossible for them to come directly to us to load our casualty. Worse, we were between the enemy and our Bradleys, which rendered their 25mm cannons useless.

As adrenaline kicked in, time slowed down and for what seemed like minutes — but was probably a couple of seconds — I watched my platoon react in textbook fashion. It was as if we were back in Germany rehearsing our battle drills. If battle drills become a reflex, Soldiers will execute them in combat.

As adrenaline kicked in, time slowed down and for what seemed like minutes — but was probably a couple of seconds — I watched my platoon react in textbook fashion. It was as if we were back in Germany rehearsing our battle drills. If battle drills become a reflex, Soldiers will execute them in combat. Not only does this keep them alive during the first few seconds of contact. I believe it suppresses or replaces fear and timidity which may otherwise occur; this momentum then continues throughout the battle. I found that for most people, just as in athletics, nervousness or fear only lasts a second or two if they are actively participating. I have heard of studies that say only a small percentage of combatants attempt to engage the enemy when under fire. I can’t speak to the entire history of armed conflict, but from what I saw on that day and on the subsequent days we fought in Ramadi, I have to disagree. My Soldiers returned fire in such deafening mass that, were it not for the rock fragments flying from the ground, I would have had no idea we were still under fire. As it was, I could not see the enemy and had to rely on the points and shots of the men around me to deduce their location. In an urban environment, when fighting a small guerrilla force, it is difficult to discern the direction of contact, and the attack usually does not last long enough for anyone to pinpoint it. One of the things I later came to realize is that every Soldier wants to be the one who saw and killed the enemy. I do not think it is conscious, but especially among younger Soldiers, there is a tendency to misinterpret the sights and sounds of the battlefield. This may...
exaggerate their own perceived exposure to danger or their centrality in the conflict. This not only makes it difficult to discern reality when listening to a bunch of Soldiers tell war stories, it makes it difficult for the leader to filter this out and get a grasp of the true situation while he is on the ground (especially as he tries to suppress some of those same tendencies himself).

There were several acts of heroism that day, as Soldiers risked their lives to protect and move the wounded Soldier to relative safety. Almost as soon as he hit the ground, the Soldier behind him emptied his own magazine, ran to the wounded Soldier’s side, picked up his SAW, and emptied all of its rounds in the direction of the contact. He then, without regard for his own safety, covered him with his own body and tried to move him to cover. He was soon assisted by our medic and a few more of his squad mates.

I screamed over the ICOM radio to give orders to my Bradley commanders. They could only make out bits and pieces but knew what was going on and what they had to do. They had to maneuver and come back around to get in front of us. They popped smoke canisters to help conceal us from the enemy and began their movement.

As the Bradleys arrived, one of the gunners said that he could identify an enemy position, and the gunners began peppering that position. Our COP’s quick reaction force was on the scene within minutes and were also engaging targets. One of my Bradleys moved to the wounded Soldier’s position, and his squad loaded him in back.

A tank from the quick reaction force (QRF) was blocking the Bradley’s only exit, and because of the noise and other radio chatter, no one could get the message across to the tank’s crew. Finally, I had to run over, wave him down, and signal to him to get out of the way.

As the lead elements of my platoon reacted to the contact, the rear of our line, which was still a block behind, was attacked by two men in a car with an assault rifle. The Soldiers reacted quickly though and killed the attackers.

As is typical of guerrillas in this type of environment, the enemy did not attempt to stand and fight once we gained fire superiority. The QRF vehicles, under the control of our company commander, were able to seal off their retreat and kill three as they tried to flee. Two more were killed as they tried to drop explosives off the back of a moped. The Iraqi Police brought in a few more that night who were being treated at the hospital for wounds sustained in this action. Since this was the only engagement in the area that day, we were able to confirm their involvement in the attack.

At the company commander’s order, I moved my Soldiers into the safety of the COP once the enemy had been sufficiently suppressed and were being pursued by our armored vehicles. We wanted to stay out and tear through every house within small arms range, but it would have been the wrong move. In film and during training where there is no real danger, dismounts always maneuver on the enemy and kill him where he stands. We learned that most of the time, this is not a practical approach in an urban area. It is difficult to maneuver on an enemy that Soldiers can not pinpoint, and it serves no purpose to have Soldiers storm into the fray when a Bradley or tank can destroy the enemy. As our commander constantly, and correctly, reminded us, it was rarely worth risking the lives of dismounted Soldiers to chase after a fleeing enemy.

Our medic had jumped in the back of the Bradley that was evacuating our wounded Soldier. He broke his hand and received an enormous gash on his head when the Bradley took a sharp turn but still continued working on the Soldier until the ramp dropped at the medical station. The wounded Soldier was given the best care possible by our medic, but his wound was too serious. We learned of his death within an hour, and our lives were changed forever.

When I spoke with the fallen Soldier’s parents the next day, and later when they visited our unit in Germany, they wanted to know if their son had suffered and if he was a victim of some war story exaggeration.
the men who killed him. They didn’t ask if their son’s death could have been avoided. I do not know what I would have told them. I ask myself that question every day.

In the days and months following the attack, I realized that we all had different memories of what happened on the battlefield. The “fog of war” was more intense than I had experienced before and was more than I had imagined it would be. I am not sure that any two of us agreed on the exact direction of the attack or number of attackers. This is not abnormal; there were very few engagements during our tour in which we had a clear idea of the distance, direction, or depth of our enemy.

Several weeks after this attack, we found a sniper position on the rooftop of an abandoned building with perfect line of sight to the spot where the Soldier had been shot. There is no way to know for sure if it was the position used, but the angles match. To my knowledge, that particular house was never engaged. Whether or not we were shooting at all of the correct buildings, the violence with which we reacted to the contact surely caused the enemy to withdraw. The battle drills, which my Soldiers had rehearsed since they joined the Army and we had practiced together, saved lives when the bullets began to fly (on that day and in the days to come). The bravery, initiative, and quick thinking of individual Soldiers made it possible to fight in an ever-changing environment.

When bullets start flying, there is a tendency for everyone to try and jump on the radio at once. Add the noise of the gunfire, which can drown out the voice of the sender or overwhelm the ears of the receiver, and the normal problems that occur with electronic equipment, and it can be next to impossible to get a message across in battle. On top of a strictly enforced and rehearsed radio SOP, leaders at all levels have to consciously attempt to filter out the excitement and emotion and communicate clearly and concisely. This is something we did not do properly. Until that day, despite all of my live-fire training and previous experiences, I did not have any idea the extent to which communications can be degraded in that type of situation.

I often replay the scenes of that day in my mind. What could I have done differently? What will I do differently in the future? What was done right? I should have had my Bradleys in a different position ... I should have had systems in place to reduce radio traffic ... I should have had more smoke ...

The reality of combat is that a leader will never get it 100-percent right. He has to do the best he can with the skills that he has and hope that his mistakes do not cost the lives of those around him. Then, he must honestly evaluate the decisions he made, the weaknesses inherent in his unit, and the realities of combat and devise ways to mitigate the danger.

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From November 2007 to April 2008, the military transition team (MiTT) from C Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division) and the 1st Battalion, 23rd Brigade, 17th Iraqi Army Division successfully applied the clear-hold-build counterinsurgency approach to achieve victory in southern Baghdad’s former insurgent stronghold of Janabi Village.

Located at the pre-Flood civilization of Sippar (or Sepharvaim as referenced in the Bible), the Janabi tribe served as hosts and operatives for al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) for the first five years of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Helping earn the regional moniker “Triangle of Death,” the Yusifiyah corner of the triangle caused some of the worst bloodshed for coalition forces in the war.

Our Deceptively Simple Mission

Our mission was to reconcile Janabi Village; however, the path to that goal was fraught with hazards. By increasing operational duration, recognizing the limitations of U.S. forces and working toward a host-nation solution from the onset, our combined units first reconciled and then built a lasting solution for Janabi Village.

A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment provides security during a mission near Qwesat, Iraq, November 25, 2007. TSgt Adrian Cadiz, USAF

Our Complex Enemy

Several factors significantly contributed to fomenting insurgency in the Janabi Village area. A contributing cause for instability of the region was the Coalition Provisional Authority’s summary disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the simultaneous Baathist purge. This, in conjunction with an epidemic of misunderstanding regarding counter-insurgency in the U.S. military, primed the region for turmoil. The Janabi Village area, as part of the greater Yusifiyah area, was a region in which mid-level officers in Saddam’s favor retired. Baathist participation in local government was strong, and the Baathist purge caused the collapse of civil administration in the area. During this period of turmoil, many locals adopted the title of sheikh either by hereditary right or by status in the community, and these individuals attempted to fill the vacuum caused by the collapse of the administration. These self-appointed leaders had little positive effect and proved susceptible to insurgent recruitment. The population became dissatisfied with the liberating coalition because of the failure of essential services, and pro-insurgent sentiments developed as a result.

The 2006 rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl, along with the execution of her family and the burning of their home by U.S. Soldiers in the nearby village of Hayy al-Thobat proved to be a major catalyst allowing fundamentalist radical forces of AQI and subsequently Jaysh al-Mahdi Sh’ia extremists to dominate the region. While the rape-murder had initially been attributed to local anti-Iraqi forces by the neighbors who had responded to the fire, the news that it had in fact been perpetrated by Americans solidified the Janabi tribal allegiance to AQI in Iraq, enabling the establishment of a full-fledged training facility in the ruins of ancient Sippar and the village.

AQI-affiliated forces, discovering the existing but rudimentary homegrown insurgent network, capitalized on their knowledge and materiel resources while providing funding, recruiting, and information operations assets. The local AQI leadership felt comfortable establishing themselves southeast of Janabi Village in the towns of Sa’id Abdullah and Sobahiya. To the southwest, the insurgents established the village of Shubayshen as a holding area for incoming foreign fighters prior to their assignment to insurgent cells in Baghdad proper. These villages, in conjunction with the Sa’id Abdullah Corridor leading east to Mahmudiyah, formed an essential part of the southern belt of the AQI logistical chain transporting materiel and personnel into Baghdad proper.

Readily available munitions, foreign and local fighters, active tribal support for the insurgency, negative image of U.S. forces due to the acts of a few rogue Soldiers and national dissatisfaction with the liberation formed a volatile mix. This ultimately resulted in two missing/captured Soldier incidents. Admittedly, the situation was far more complex. The implosion response of both American and Iraqi forces and the locals to the incidents further escalated the situation.

The concrete affiliation of the Sunni Janabi tribe with AQI resulted in the expulsion of a portion of the Sh’ia Anbari tribe that lived in the hamlet of Abu Habba immediately to the north of the Sippar ruins. Escalating sectarian and tribal tensions ultimately climaxed when impassioned Janabis expelled Anbaris from their homes in 2005, smashing glass and destroying property in a scene akin to the Nazi Kristallnacht pogrom in November 1938; however, the Janabi incident was on a significantly smaller scale. This, combined with the affiliation of the Anbari tribe to
Jaysh al-Mahdi, created a schism between the two tribes colored by open conflict and mutual harassment. The schism grew wider as local Sh’ia migrated to Jaysh al-Mahdi-dominated downtown Yusifiyah, displacing Sunnis to outlying rural areas. This exacerbated the already dire situation with sectarian issues.

**Dangerous Terrain**

The Janabi tribe effectively isolated itself and the training facility by emplacing a thick defensive ring of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the village. The improvised minefield made maneuver by friendly forces virtually impossible without heavy Engineer and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assets to clear roads, or assurances of safety by local leaders along with the physical presence of a guide through the net. This proved an effective deterrent to coalition and Iraqi operations in the area, leaving air-assault clearance operations as the tactical option with the most acceptable level of risk. Unfortunately, the institutional monomaniacal focus on closing with and destroying the enemy resulted in many clearance-only operations leaving no positive lasting effect on the battlespace by failing to progress to the later phases.

**Friendly State of Affairs**

As the war progressed, the air assault clearance operation became an end instead of a means. Operational planning did not consider anything beyond first order effects. Significant assets were committed to operations, exposing Soldiers to risk with no real gains in territory or influence. U.S. forces incorrectly considered the fleeting terror instilled in the population by incoming helicopters, along with the ensuing harassment during a search for persons of interest, to have a lasting deterrent effect. Unfortunately, when used in an isolated manner, the air assault clearance operation served to dehumanize coalition forces and foment unrest among the population. Occasionally, high value individuals would be detained or caches would be recovered because of an operation; however, on the average, the payoff was not worth the investment. Soldiers across the Army fundamentally misunderstood and derided counterinsurgency and stability and support operations. These theater-wide trends characterized operations in Janabi Village as well as other areas.

**Time and Civil Considerations**

We desired speedy resolution of the Janabi problem; however, we were willing to be patient and let the situation evolve. Attempting to resolve the situation too rapidly prevents desired effects from taking hold. Civil considerations would prove to be an important factor that we would focus on in the build phase; however, learning to navigate the human terrain proved essential.

**Act 1 – Our Naïve Approach**

During the October relief-in-place and in early November, Charlie Company (also called Choppin’ Charlie), 3-187 and 1/23/17 IA conducted three raids into Janabi Village and received enemy contact twice. Each time resulted in finding only a handful of males in the area. The combined forces could only safely enter the village on foot from an Iraqi Army battle position due to the mounted and dismounted IEDs suspected to block key avenues of approach. The handful of military age males living in the village indicated the enemy’s inability to conduct significant offensive operations. If true, this created an opportunity to conduct an extended operation to attempt to do more than simply clear the village. The Iraqi Army commander informed us that he would not risk stationing a permanent element of Iraqi soldiers in and around the village. This necessitated an unorthodox approach to the tactical problem of how to hold the ground once cleared.

We affixed the mantra “not just another air assault” to the operation that would soon be named Operation Iron Crazyhorse. We knew that continued raids in the style of the air assault clearance would not effect a permanent solution in Janabi Village, and that complete isolation of the village would never occur due to the ability of insurgents to blend into the populace. The larger area of Yusifiyah would never be secure with the dagger of the Janabi tribe at its throat just a kilometer south of the Sh’ia urban area of downtown Yusifiyah.

The challenge remained as to who would hold the ground if the Iraqi Army refused. Our first answer came instinctively — send us. We will just do it ourselves with or without our partners. The Rakkasans pride themselves as an organization willing to do the toughest of missions without a second thought. However, we must resist the temptation to follow this course of action in counterinsurgency operations. The notion that an American presence would solve a historic tactical problem should not gain credence in the course of action development phase of the military decision-making process. Despite the apparent ease and logic of the solution from the American perspective, a counterinsurgency is often counterintuitive. T.E. Lawrence’s driving imperative to let the Arabs do it their own way meant that Iraqis had to be the ones to secure Janabi Village. The other element was the Iraqi Police, a 50-man Sh’ia group that performed only a fraction of its required duties. However, the Military Police platoon that served as their Police Transition Team (PTT) had recently completed a portion of a recruiting drive in the areas undergoing reconciliation.

We selected 30 of the best Iraqi Police recruits, ostensibly to prepare for a training exercise. These Sunni recruits would temporarily hold the ground with checkpoints hastily emplaced by the forward support company of 3-187 Infantry. The plan called for U.S. and Iraqi infantry forces to clear the ground with an air assault while Alpha Company, 3rd Special Troops Battalion engineers cleared the routes. Our expectation was that these police recruits would be able to hold the ground for 36-48 hours while Choppin’ encouraged local leaders to emerge from hiding and join the reconciliation movement. We even held out for the possibility that the Iraqi Army commander would recant and decide to place his own forces at the checkpoints. If the checkpoints held, we would continue clearing the route with the engineers and reinforcing each checkpoint with force protection assets.

After establishing the basic maneuver plan for the clearance phase of the village, Choppin’ developed a four-day plan to initiate the reconciliation between the Janabi and their many enemies. If one spoke the word “Janabi” in the Yusifiyah marketplace, schoolchildren would draw their hand across their throat to connote the murderous nature of the tribe. Although we understood the complexity of any progress in reconciliation, we sought to gauge the effects across tribal, government and Iraqi Army lines. We secured tentative buy-in from governmental leaders, who committed in theory to visiting the village once safe. The Iraqi Army and local
tribes, especially the Anbari tribe, scoffed at the possibility of reconciliation in the days leading up to the operation. For the Janabi, we needed to find the tribal leaders, whose names we knew from intelligence reporting. Unlike all of the other tribes, the Janabi leaders had no contact with other tribal leaders, Iraqi government officials, Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, or coalition forces. We would need to entice them to emerge.

The MiTT medical officer would conduct a combined medical engagement (CME) with $30,000 of medical supplies and medication in the village on the second day of the operation. We knew the certainty of significant enemy contact and the distinct possibility of friendly casualties, but we would have to continue with the reconciliation gestures. Each Soldier would have to suppress any emotions or personal feelings about providing aid to people actively trying to kill him. If successful, we planned to bring local Nahia government leaders and a veterinarian to the village on the fourth day of the operation to demonstrate the advantages of reconciling.

Key to success would be every Soldier’s personal understanding of the operation’s purpose and end state. The tone established during the conduct of each raid must indicate respect for the populace. Building mutual respect and dispelling the popular perception of Americans as the root of all evil would be crucial to the reconciliation effort. At the Soldier level, this required restraint in searching houses and interacting with males undergoing tactical questioning.

Unfortunately, we had difficulty convincing the Iraqi Army to commit to supporting anything beyond the clearance phase. In what would become routine, the Iraqi Army commander took a vacation on the eve of the operation. Although highly regarded as a strict and effective commander by both Sunni and Sh’ia tribes and by Iraqi and coalition forces, the Iraqi commander would not commit to reconciling with Janabi Village for an additional six months. His subordinates included a small but competent collection of officers to include four aggressive maneuver company commanders and a brilliant battalion operations officer. Their efforts produced intelligence, and they detained several Janabi insurgents despite their inability to contribute to the reconciliation process until so ordered.

The question of which force (U.S. or host-nation) has the lead is fundamental to every operation, discussion, and resource in a counterinsurgency. U.S. and Iraqi forces must come to a mutual understanding prior to initiating any action beyond closed doors. Experience taught us that a subtle nuance to this issue is to expect the force in the lead to change multiple times during an event. Overall responsibility comes from who is driving the action. If it is American, then the Americans with few exceptions need to take the overall lead. If it is an Iraqi Army directive, then the opposite applies. However, the shifting lead allows both friendly forces to take advantage of their respective talents, equipment, and organization. A night operation with poor illumination might require coalition forces to take the lead in the navigation to the objective phase, but a canal crossing on the final approach may dictate an Iraqi lead during the actual assault due to their lighter equipment load. Furthermore, a casualty taken during initial entry could cause the other force to assume the lead. In contrast to the rest of Choppin’s battlespace, we knew from the onset that coalition forces would be in the overall lead in Janabi Village until the IA committed to the reconciliation.

The maneuver plan for Crazyhorse I called for a platoon air assault with Iraqi Army soldiers to the northeast and east of the village. This allowed the combined force to circumvent the defensive perimeter of IEDs. Simultaneously, another platoon MiTT would stage vehicles at the Iraqi battle position (BP) and infiltrate the village through fields while carefully staying off trails or paths. The engineers, known as Task Force Iron Claw (TFIC), would use a BP to launch their route clearance of the hard surface and dirt perimeter roads with the ground assault convoy (GAC) close behind.

The fighting on Day 1 of the operation was intense but nothing more than expected. The first IED detonated against the follow-on mounted forces at a little after 0500, and TFIC conducted a controlled detonation of the last IED of Day 1 around 2330 hours. However, the only significant enemy contact occurred at 0953 when the PTT, IPs, and IP recruits received several small arms rounds from the man later known as “the Janabi Sniper.” The sniper’s first round struck an Iraqi policeman in the head, killing him. Choppin’ elements moved to the site and led the pursuit of the two-man AQI sniper team along with a handful of MPs, IPs, and recruits.

The sniper attack precipitated the failure of the operation’s goals. Although several IP recruits joined in the counterattack against the sniper, they ultimately decided that no amount of money or prospects of a future job with the Iraqi Police were worth the risk of staying in Janabi Village. Without the Iraqi recruits, police, or army committed to securing key routes into the village and after the discovery of activated IEDs between our forces, we decided to suspend the planned four days of continuous presence. Unfazed by the enemy contact, on the second day we conducted the combined medical engagement with the

Women and children from Janabi Village wait in line to receive humanitarian aid.
women and children that remained in the village. We passed our message of commitment to reconciling the people of Janabi Village throughout the day as the doctors treated the people. Soldiers passed out vast quantities of humanitarian aid to the families of the husbands and fathers that had tried so diligently to kill us the day before.

Little enemy contact occurred on Day 2. It is rare for coalition forces to return immediately after encountering significant enemy contact on air assault clearance operation. The enemy, used to long intervals between U.S. incursions, took the time to reposition and was unprepared for the uncharacteristic return of U.S. forces. We assessed that Janabi Village was not yet ready for reconciliation — largely because AQI still psychologically dominated the village and aggressively intimidated the surrounding area. We immediately began preparing for Crazyhorse II. The enemy did as well.

One of the principles of COIN is to constantly reinvent yourself and modify your patterns if not the actual techniques themselves. Everything about Operation Crazyhorse II would have to look different to the enemy to create confusion and avoid being templated. There are only so many ways to invade a village. The use of a portable footbridge to create our own insertion point was one such technique. The bridge would play a vital role in our freedom of maneuver into the village from the north. The purpose of Operation Crazyhorse II remained the same as before — find the Janabi leadership and begin the reconciliation movement essential to the eventual hold phase. The lead element would emplace the bridge and use it to infiltrate the village. A supporting platoon would similarly infiltrate from a BP, but TFIC and the GAC would initiate clearance along a previously unused route from the north. The plan called for a larger two-platoon air assault to interdict expected insurgents fleeing out of the area shortly after the enemy reacted to the ground forces.

The Iraqi Army commander gave us mixed responses in his level of commitment to the operation. During one discussion, he would commit to permanent battle positions in the village, but the next engagement would garner a more ambiguous response. In our final meeting before the operation, we sensed a new commitment. The conditions appeared to be set, and we had more confidence in the possibility of holding the village once cleared. We would hold it with the Iraqi Army and rotate coalition platoons as we increased the force protection at each of the four planned checkpoints.

During Day 1 of the operation, TFIC encountered seven IEDs, three of which detonated causing one medical evacuation and two damaged vehicles. We discovered a fresh torture site and a significant cache in a partially destroyed portion of the al-Qaida training facility. We also found an IED factory at a potato warehouse owned by a recently killed insurgent leader and prosecuted small arms engagements. The Iraqi colonel surprisingly returned and brought an Iraqi media crew to a BP, which was as close as he would get to the village. To our disappointment, he informed us that he misunderstood our goal and would not be placing any forces in the village after the operation. In his defense, there were legitimate force protection reasons for not garrisoning forces in the village. Furthermore, the conspicuous absence of the tribal leaders was an insult to his authority as commander of the region. Other tribes, even during the deadliest of periods in the war, maintained some form of contact with coalition and Iraqi forces.

A remarkable event occurred on the second day as we began another CME in the heart of Janabi Village. A Janabi sub-sheikh approached our element overwatching the footbridge. He introduced himself and indicated a desire to begin reconciling. Concurrent with the CME, the sub-sheikh assembled a collection of 53 men to undergo biometric testing. Confident that we had achieved as much as possible, we pulled back all forces from the village. We did not quite understand how to proceed, but we knew that the environment had changed. We decided to let the situation develop and plan no more raids or even patrols into the village until the situation developed further.

**Act 2 – Return of the Janabi**

After Crazyhorse II, a group composed of displaced Janabi tribal members met with intelligence assets at a forward operating base in Baghdad regarding the possibility of American support for their return. Although dismissed by the local unit as irrelevant because the issue did not directly affect their battlespace, this group utilized the rival Haraj family of the Ghariri tribe to make first contact with our company. After the Haraj set up a meeting at a patrol base, the leaders of the Janabi group provided coalition forces with a list of 50 displaced heads of families committed to reconciliation. Many of the individuals on the list had positive association with AQI in Iraq.

We began conducting patrols throughout the Janabi tribal areas to engage locals in what was effectively door-to-door diplomacy.
This approach provided those engaged with a sense of investment in the operation and familiarized the skeptical populace with U.S. forces. Subsequent meetings with the Janabi reconciliation leaders, beginning February 9, 2008, involved representatives from the Iraqi Army Intelligence Command, participation from Choppin’, representatives from the al-Baloosh sub-tribe of the Anbari, and the Janabi and Haraj leaders. We observed the initial construction of defensive checkpoints along the north side of the Janabi Run Canal on 12 February 2008, because locals had fears of foreign fighter retaliation after the tribe-initiated reconciliation.

As the negotiations with the displaced Janabi continued, we planned Operation False Prophet, a multidisciplinary operation intended to have the effect of increasing popular support for coalition forces while simultaneously marginalizing individuals providing active support to enemy forces. We achieved these preparatory effects on the battlefield by fusing aviation, indirect fire support, information operations, intelligence, and psychological operations. We kicked the operation off on 15 February 2008. Simultaneously, the first meeting with village leaders occurred at Patrol Base Yusifiyah in the Iraqi colonel’s office. This served to awe the leaders as well as allow the locals to form their own opinions without negative influence. We drove the message home that we were committed to reconciling Janabi Village. We had the means to do so by force if necessary, but we strongly preferred to work through them.

The operation bluntly informed the populace of the Janabi Village area via audio broadcast of the eventual and permanent push that we would be making into the village without providing any information on the date of such an intrusion. This deliberate but counterintuitive violation of conventional wisdom served to prepare the populace psychologically for upcoming change in their village. UH-60 helicopters dropped leaflets over the village; however, due to cumbersome administrative regulations, it was infeasible to have the leaflet designs custom tailored to the target population. Despite this, feedback collected later indicated that the pamphlets were effective.

In order to evoke feelings of shock and awe among the population, we utilized our organic indirect fire support assets. Carefully planned high-explosive fire missions and Lighthorse Scout Weapons Teams contributed to this effort as well, providing terrain denial fires, overwatch, and reconnaissance. F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft provided demonstrations of air power over the Janabi Village area. By executing low-altitude, high-speed flyovers, the air assets forced all local activity to a halt as the locals fixated on the unfamiliar rushing noise followed by a streak in the sky. Following the flybys, the locals discussed the nature of the flying machine. Several fledgling Janabi Sons of Iraq were convinced that the fighters were in fact a new American helicopter. We made no effort to clarify the situation.

While fundamentally simple in overarching concept, execution of the operation required significant amounts of coordination to draw together disparate assets that rarely worked together. In contrast to the common air assault operation, we executed the operation with as many assets as we could resource. Ultimately, the combined effects of False Prophet captivated and positively influenced the population. These effects proved to be critical to the ultimate success of the hold phase in Janabi Village.

Over the course of the next several meetings, the list of Janabis to repatriate grew to approximately 300. The timing of the formation of the Janabi group combined with the serendipitous personnel strength led to the dubbing of the group as the “300” after the iconic film depiction of the battle of Thermopylae. Initially applied to the group in jest, the moniker stuck. Intelligence personnel researched the backgrounds of all 300 individuals. Discussions with the Iraqi Army resulted in a decision to watch but not immediately detain individuals identified as affiliated with or in close association to the AQI organization. This strategy facilitated the supervised return of all 300 without scaring off persons of interest and was in line with reconciliation. As with all reconciliation efforts in the region, the amnesty specifically would not forgive murder or manslaughter. Liability for previous insurgent activity resulting in the death of a civilian by any mechanism would continue. We observed displaced families beginning to return to the area as early as 16 February 2008, just one day after Operation False Prophet.

No real inter-tribal healing occurred until 17 February 2008, when we engineered a meeting of influential members of both the Sunni Janabi and Sh’ia Anbari tribes along the no-man’s land of the Janabi Run Canal. While initially the tribes were antagonistic, eventually someone broke the ice under the watchful eye of the American and Iraqi troops securing the area, and members of both tribes ultimately ended up embracing and raising a Sh’ia Ashura flag together. This critical step towards inter-tribal reconciliation set the tone for later operations in Janabi Village.

Shortly thereafter with the forces of the 300, we executed Operation Crazyhorse III. The first day of the operation consisted primarily of the biometric inprocessing of the 300, combined with a route clearance by TFIC. Notably, TFIC interrogated multiple suspicious sites while only finding one IED, which had had its detonator moved so that forces moving along the road could not trigger it. Prior to the operation, the forces of the 300 had unearthed the majority of the devices and transported them to the east. Members of the 300 turned in some devices and caches to U.S. and Iraqi forces. It was clear to both U.S. and Iraqi forces that the Janabi
had disarmed the village. The IA’s 4th Company commander commented on the abundance of males in the village, describing it as a shocking contrast to the women and children that he had become accustomed to seeing in the village. Regrettably, IA commander called his subordinate commanders ordering them to withdraw a mere two hours after the start of the operation. This action left us in the village alone. The on-scene commander was extremely embarrassed and ashamed when he informed us of his orders to withdraw.

We pressed on, and the second day of the operation was more complex. Biometric inprocessing continued, while members of the 300 who had already been processed kept order. Lighthorse Scout Weapons Teams overflew the site, dropping candy for our children. We like the candy.” The U.S. medics conducted a U.S.-only medical engagement, treating more than 300 locals. We distributed humanitarian aid, and Janabi leaders hosted a luncheon at the home of the Imam. The Imam was widely known for his anti-government rhetoric, and Janabi leadership often spoke of the lack of inhabitants and a broken promise on the part of the sheikh to disseminate information.

To secure the ground further, this operation included the construction of several battle positions along the lines of communication surrounding the village; however, the inability to execute this phase necessitated Operation Crazyhorse IV. To ensure Iraqi Army commitment to the next operation, our brigade commander engaged the IA brigade commander. This engagement resulted in IA brigade commander attaching his own troops to man checkpoints in support of the next iteration.

On 15 March 2008, Zero Day of Operation Crazyhorse IV, 1/23/17 IA brought the majority of the 300 to Patrol Base Yusifiyah in order to document them and initiate the Government of Iraq reconciliation paperwork. This process went smoothly under the control of the Iraqi Army. The act of bringing the 300 to the patrol base forced criminals to face the specter of detention. Despite the biometric inprocessing conducted during Operation Crazyhorse III, none of the 300 had legally reconciled. The leap of faith required in trusting that Iraqi forces would not arrest them demonstrated their personal commitment to reconciliation. The 300 leadership largely facilitated this, facing a colossal effort in coordinating the event. In Janabi Village, an informant from the 300 led us to five cache and IED locations in the ancient ruins of Sippur.

The loss of Iraqi Army support forced the cancellation of the construction phase of the operation. The concept of the operation included the construction of several battle positions along the lines of communication surrounding the village; however, the inability to execute this phase necessitated Operation Crazyhorse IV. To ensure Iraqi Army commitment to the next operation, our brigade commander engaged the IA brigade commander. This engagement resulted in IA brigade commander attaching his own troops to man checkpoints in support of the next iteration.

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Day one involved TFIC conducting route clearance and the construction of two battle positions. The placement and design of the battle positions were a collaborative effort between the 300, the Iraqi Army, and coalition forces. This marked the first time IA commander actually visited the village one kilometer from the patrol base. The following day continued with much of the same, and both days passed without significant incident. The third day built upon the previous two by continuing development of the battle positions and engaging the Anbari tribe about repatriation. The Anbari indicated interest in re-inhabiting their shattered homes; however, they wanted to ensure that the security situation had indeed stabilized and that intertribal friction would be minimal.

**Act 3 – Maintaining Forward Momentum**

With the hold phase essentially complete yet ongoing, we rapidly began to move into the build phase. On 24 March, the Task Force 3-187 IN civil-military operations officer coordinated for agents from Relief International to visit the decimated Anbari hamlet in Abu Habba. Unfortunately, due to the lack of inhabitants and a broken promise on the part of the sheikh to disseminate information, few Anbari were present to receive the patrol. The tribe later took responsibility for the error. The representatives briefly listened to the Anbari tales of woe; however, they decided that the conditions were not right to begin conflict mediation. Despite this mishap, the patrol demonstrated our commitment to and support for reconciliation and reconstruction. Following this, we launched a project to reopen the Janabi School, continued to develop relationships with the population, and continued to facilitate sectarian healing through reconstruction of the Sa’id Abdullah Shrine, a Sh’ia holy site destroyed by AQI in 2005.

**Retrospective**

Our resolution of the Janabi question flipped the existing paradigm on its head by winning local support and holding the area with allied partisans first, then building checkpoints for host nation military assets to secure the ground further. This is in contrast to the general method of clearing, leaving U.S. forces in sector, building checkpoints for host-nation forces, and then...
attempting to win the support of the population. We committed to reconciling a tribe considered a lost cause, and by persistently trying new approaches to the situation, we learned enough to develop a resolution. Our experience in Janabi Village taught us that persistence in achieving our long-term goal, understanding the dynamics of the situation, using conventional assets in unconventional ways, and using small units to engage the populace regularly proved essential.

At the close of each operation, we immediately injected the lessons learned into the mission planning cycle for the ensuing operation. Each built upon the other, and we executed them as the human terrain presented favorable conditions. The three-hour air assault has its place as a disruption tool; however, it has limited long-term effects regardless of its size. Although our early operations failed to achieve our intended end-state, every operation was an attempt to execute all three phases of clear-hold-build. We learned that the phases need not be sequential, but can deliberately overlap in support of one coherent end-state.

Progress gained within the scope of one phase contributes to the success of the others, and planners must consider interweaving all three “threads” into each operation. All too often, U.S. focus is exclusively on clearance, leaving hold and build for later operations. This prevents the realization of a lasting solution because subsequent hold and build operations receive less attention than the familiar clear phase. Clearance operations fit clearly into the doctrinal missions of combat arms forces; however, both historically and likely in the future, these same forces are required to conduct counterinsurgency operations. It is necessary to recognize when the mission has evolved beyond simple clearance, and reconcile the mission with COIN doctrine.

Our approach had both pros and cons; however, given the manner in which events unfolded this approach required the least American manipulation. U.S. combat arms forces only begrudgingly use diplomatic methods of accomplishing goals; however, a native solution to a native problem is the most effective, if not necessarily the easiest or most logical by Western standards. Furthermore, taking a diplomatic and reconciliatory route takes time to produce results. Americans are all too willing to move in and take an area by force. Large-scale operations, while impressive on paper, in and of themselves have limited positive effect on the battlefield. Yet force protection requirements, risk-aversion, and desire for creature comforts combine to restrict the effectiveness of American forces in holding territory. Therefore, a locally based solution is essential.

The local population has a vested self-interest in their own security and prosperity. When the epiphany that resistance is counter to those interests occurs to the populace, friendly forces may then hold ground with marginal active resistance. However, if the population is not prepared to receive the forces, they will perceive the invasion of their territory by friendly forces as a violation of those interests. Proper assessment and management of popular opinion is essential to the success of the hold phase, and “build-style” operations significantly contribute to this.

President Theodore Roosevelt once quoted a West African proverb: “Tread softly but carry a big stick; you will go far.” While he was commenting on foreign policy, the comment directly applies to the execution of counterinsurgency operations. Focusing on securing the population (hold) and winning their support (build), instead of focusing on capturing insurgents (clear), allows for local emotional investment in the solution. Fundamental to accomplishing this is the use of the partnership with host-nation forces, and engagement and collaboration with indigenous leaders. As we learned, U.S. forces need to continually re-evaluate their position, shed their preconceived notions, truly accept and engage their host-nation partners, and value patience and flexibility above all else.

Authors’ Note: The men of Choppin’ Charlie merely stood on the shoulders of the valiant U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers that bought each Yusifiyah battle position with blood and fire. We have the deepest respect and admiration for these units that created the conditions for the eventual victory. We remain humbled by their sacrifices and bravery and wish that they could have tasted the historic success in the final Operation Iron Crazyhorse.

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**Training Adaptive Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations: An Outcomes-Based Approach**

COL Michael A. Coss

"The operational environment, threat, and Army operational concepts have changed. The Army must be a full spectrum capable force. Therefore, Soldiers and leaders need to adapt to new concepts and think about how the Army can train more wisely, efficiently, and effectively."

— Draft FM 7-0, June 2008

The Army links its operational concept to its training doctrine by applying the tenets of battle and mission command to the training process. Employing these tenets to develop and execute training as we would combat or support operations allows us to train as we fight. This training methodology develops Soldiers, leaders and units to conduct full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict, but requires from trainers a new mindset and training aim point. Fort Benning and others in the Initial Entry Training (IET) community have used the mindset and aim point to develop outcomes-based training that provides these adaptive Soldiers and leaders, yet many of our institutional processes continue to impede our efforts and we must reform these processes if we are to optimize our training outcomes.

During the Cold War, we faced a single threat and our mindset focused on developing selected Soldier, leader and unit competencies to defeat it. Our focus was on major combat operations as we believed these task capabilities were easily transferable to achieve success in low intensity combat or peacekeeping missions. In the IET community centralized management valued efficiency and throughput and feared failure at lower levels. This created a virtual assembly line of directed inputs per each program of instruction (POI) designed to produce a Soldier, tank crewman, or fire team member. As a result, our training methodology became process driven vice outcome oriented. This stifled initiative among IET leaders, stagnated the POI and instructional techniques, limited resource changes and empowered managers who have no training responsibilities.

Today, the threats and requirements are different. Those same Soldiers and crews are now required to think on their own and cannot rely on detailed staff planning or continuous leader supervision at multiple levels during task execution. The old process discouraged Soldiers and leaders from thinking and precluded them from demonstrating initiative, but to triangulate the requirements of today’s full spectrum operations they must know how to think, and not what to think, and they must learn to demonstrate initiative at every level. This must occur in training or we cannot sustain it in combat where they are no longer just tank crewmen or fire team members, but also ambassadors on patrol each day charged with making instant life or death decisions, some with strategic consequences.

Our mindset has to change to empower subordinates to take appropriate actions in this environment, and our aim point must shift commensurately so that we prepare them for the proper tasks and transitions they face as they conduct full spectrum operations during this era of persistent conflict. Battle and mission command provide the means to achieve this by requiring commanders to understand what outcome the training needs to accomplish before visualizing, describing or directing how to conduct it. They must know and be responsible for the outcome and need the flexibility to determine how to best achieve it.

Our combat-experienced leaders at Fort Benning are well aware of the requirement to think and act independently using battle and mission command in combat, so we have empowered them to develop and conduct training using these tools. The basic combat training proponent recognized the value of this approach and developed a holistic set of outcomes every Soldier must possess upon graduation. These outcomes, along with specific performance measures, help leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess training and have been approved for use across the U.S. Army Accessions Command.

**IET Outcomes**

Every Soldier:

* Is a proud member of the team possessing the character and commitment to live the Army Values and Warrior Ethos.
* Is confident, adaptable, mentally agile, and accountable for own actions.
* Is physically, mentally, spiritually, and emotionally ready to fight as a ground combatant.
* Is a master of critical combat skills and proficient in basic Soldier skills in all environments.
* Is self-disciplined, willing, and an adaptive thinker, capable of solving problems commensurate with position and experience.

These characteristics and critical combat skills are what Soldiers require to succeed in combat. These outcomes guide commanders, empowered by the tenets of battle and mission command authority, in developing and executing training. They understand, visualize and then describe the outcome they seek in accordance with battle command. They direct, lead and assess using the authority and flexibility provided...
Basic trainees at Fort Benning, Ga., move from compound to compound during a field exercise known as the Final 48.

by mission command. Our training structures must support this or we cannot provide the Army with the Soldiers and leaders required in this era of persistent conflict.

Previously POIs had us measuring how many hours of land navigation a Soldier received instead of measuring how well he navigates. Using the outcomes-based approach to training, we focus on the latter until the Soldier knows and understands the why behind the task so he can execute without supervision. He must know why to employ the individual low crawl movement technique on his own in certain combat situations vice having to be told to do so. Outcomes-based training achieves this and fosters initiative in our leaders who develop and execute the training. The outcomes and leader initiatives have revolutionized our training.

Areas of Innovation in the IET Community

The IET community implemented this outcomes-based approach last year led by Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) at Fort Benning. It soon spread to our other IET brigades due to its success and the mission command philosophy at Fort Benning. By empowering leaders to be responsible for training outcomes, they revamped POIs, instructional venues and techniques, and support structures. This improved training realism and support on the one hand and training instruction and leader development on the other. Applying battle and mission command to develop the proper outcomes in training has fostered the following key initiatives.

Range Realism — Over 90 percent of our drill sergeants have combat experience and wanted our training and ranges to replicate the environment the Soldiers would face in combat. We improved our buddy team live-fire ranges, convoy live-fire ranges and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) facilities to meet their expectations. To add realism we replaced the sandbag “moguls” with realistic battlefield clutter like cars, barricades, rubble and walls. We added gated courtyards and shoot houses to make the simulation even more real for the Soldiers.

Drill sergeants no longer directed the individual and buddy team movements on live-fire exercises (LFXs), but allowed Soldiers the opportunity to select and demonstrate the proper movement techniques and firing positions as they advanced through the battlefield. Soldiers on the convoy LFX were required to react to an improvised explosive device (IED) and assault an objective. They had to select appropriate cover and move properly in the urban environment. MOUT and field training exercises (FTXs) matched the complex environments they would face in combat, including an IED lane that featured the latest array of enemy tactics and friendly avoidance and defeat mechanisms.

Tactical Realism — We further enhanced IET training by linking range improvements to the tactical processes we employ on the battlefield. All training events became opportunities to operate in a simulated combat environment. At the inception of basic combat training, company commanders provided the Soldiers a five-paragraph operations order that described the skills they would need to defeat the enemy on the realistic ranges we had created. Subsequently we issued the Soldiers their individual weapons and began making them accountable for the weapon and their actions.

During training we provided them regular intelligence updates as they transitioned from phase to phase. The training intensity and complexities increased as the notional enemy grew closer to our forward operating base. Training events became combat missions that began with an operations order and required pre-combat checks and inspections, subordinate operations orders and back briefs, rehearsals, execution, and a quality after action review (AAR). We conducted each event with as much tactical focus as possible to increase the realism of the simulation and the retention of the material. Finally, we deployed to a tactical training base to counter the enemy’s advance into our area and conducted full spectrum operations to defeat him.

Cultural Awareness Training — In addition to the tactical training, we instituted cultural awareness training using battle labs with computer work stations designed to immerse Soldiers rapidly into the environment they will face in combat. The training consists of threat and cultural awareness, situational awareness, actionable intelligence, IED training, and combat patrolling.

The computers run software modules that place the Soldiers in a...
virtual environment where they learn to identify commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), report and react to threats including IEDs, conduct greetings or tactical questioning, and take other appropriate action. Each Soldier and leader gains a foundation of knowledge regarding Middle Eastern history and culture and language. Soldiers learn 20 common phrases and greetings and recognition of Arabic numerals to detect suspicious license plates. They refine their reporting and patrolling techniques during FTXs. All of this training enhances their skills and improves their ability to act, react, and respond appropriately in the operating environment.

Marksmanship Training — We implemented new marksmanship instruction to better prepare Soldiers to effectively operate their weapons in combat. Battlefield conditions require confident, competent, and accountable Soldiers and leaders who can think and solve problems, but we found most of our NCOs and officers themselves were not confident or competent with the weapons. To improve their skills, the Asymmetric Warfare Group provided instructors who taught us to focus on why the system worked a particular way and how to master it. The new program now rests on leaders who truly know the material, operate with fewer restrictions, and want to teach their Soldiers.

Soldiers learn why things work and how to apply the fundamentals to different situations. Training incorporates conditions and lessons from current combat operations, begins in a relaxed environment and consists of guided discovery so Soldiers work things out for themselves. We increase the difficulty and stress as they progress and require Soldiers to combine thinking and decision making with shooting. The marksmanship instruction now builds individual accountability, discipline, safety, and problem solving; and the methodology has been applied to other training tasks to improve them.

New Combat Qualification Tables — We are also developing new combat qualification tables to better replicate the actions Soldiers are required to perform in combat. The new standards require Soldiers to engage targets in series and some targets will not “die” unless hit multiple times. Which targets require multiple hits will vary per iteration, so Soldiers can no longer memorize the sequencing of the qualification tables. The test will also require multiple firing positions, magazine changes, forced malfunctions, distances that match combat conditions, and decision making by the Soldiers.

Pilot tests of the new qualification table have only increased scores slightly, but less tangible gains are significant. These include increased confidence with weapons applications in tactical scenarios, more precision in every engagement, very few engagements of “don’t shoot” targets such as civilians on the battlefield, and widespread use of initiative and judgment in positioning and movement. Our safety record has improved significantly with Soldiers committing far fewer dangerous actions involving fratricide or negligent discharges.

Training Resources — To resource our commanders we funded the range improvements, placed night observation devices and close combat optics in the hands of the Soldiers, and exposed them to realistic conditions while wearing the Camelbak hydration system and Interceptor body armor. We also increased realism by using quality simunitions such as the Close Combat Mission Capability Kit (CCMCK). This unit training munitions system provides Soldiers a realistic simulation in close quarters battle and blank fire situations to reduce stoppage and malfunctions. We introduced simulations like the laser marksmanship training system and VICE trainers to rapidly improve their shooting and patrolling capabilities.

Nutrition — If you want Soldiers to train like professionals and perform like champions, then you have to fuel them so they can perform at their best. At Fort Benning we treat every Soldier like an athlete and feed him appropriately. This enables them to lose weight properly and increase strength regularly. In an agreement with the Army Nutrition Center, Fort Benning attached the military nutritionist from the post hospital to the IET reception battalion. This allowed us to proactively impact all Soldiers by providing them nutrition training, revising menus in the dining facilities (DFACs), and providing sustainment training.

This instruction provided basic education on the food groups and proper nutrition techniques required to maximize fitness. In our DFACs we removed fried foods, replaced white with wheat bread, replaced pork-sausage and pork-bacon with turkey, and cut up the fruit to make it more accessible to Soldiers who are rushed. We also added dark greens to our salads to...
increase iron consumption, replaced soft drinks with sports drinks and calcium-enriched fruit juices, and eliminated whole milk by serving skim. A marking system warned Soldiers on which foods were high in fats and guided them to those high in protein and complex carbohydrates. We provided an evening snack and another prior to morning physical training to improve rest and performance. Soldiers lost more weight and waistline, increased their energy levels and PT scores by nearly 100 percent, and reduced illnesses while improving their lifestyle habits.

**Training Instruction** — These initiatives have developed our drill sergeants to be more effective trainers and leaders. This is critical as most are going back to combat soon and must be fully prepared to assume leadership duties upon arrival. We conducted cadre training and certification to prepare them by covering administrative tasks such as range and rappel tower certification and tactical tasks like battle drills, combat lifesaver, combatives, and marksmanship training. This made the leaders more prepared to provide appropriate instruction to the Soldiers, made the instruction more relevant, and better prepared the Soldiers and leaders for combat.

We now have Soldiers and leaders who have experienced the realism they will face in combat. They are more familiar with the culture and language, can effectively operate their weapons with confidence and accountability, have demonstrated competence against a realistic combat qualification standard, are resourced better, and eat properly. We also have leaders who know how to train. These program revisions have been a huge success, yet institutional inertia hinders our efforts.

**Institutional Responses**

Fort Benning empowered its leaders with battle and mission command authority to train Soldiers who will perform more effectively upon deployment. Regrettably, many of TRADOC’s training processes have not kept pace with their needs and instead rely on outmoded POIs and training support packages (TSPs) written years ago. These told our leaders what and how long to train using specific resources, believing that would still produce a well-trained Soldier for today’s conflict. Many of the tasks do not match combat requirements as our leaders perceive them today; but deviations from this script remain centrally managed by those who lack responsibility for the outcome but retain the authority to direct training of less than optimal relevance. Our processes for changing this are slow and cumbersome, often making it more tempting to ignore them than to address the problem.

This out-of-touch system is deeply entrenched among mid-level training and resource managers, some still fighting and training for the last war. The processes still in place provide them the set metrics they need to direct and budget training. This enables them to allocate resources efficiently and plan and program effectively. These resource managers are comfortable and find difficulty in planning, programming, or resourcing the outcomes-based initiatives, as they vary too dramatically among commanders and units.

Fort Benning battled these processes and succeeded in neutralizing many of them by removing POI and range constraints on leaders. We provided commanders license to modify POIs that are inconsistent with our required outcomes. We rewrote those requiring change and substituted lesson plans for the cumbersome TSPs. We submitted these changes last year, but are still awaiting their approval. Likewise, just over a year ago our range regulations still required drill sergeants to use cleaning rods to clear Soldiers’ weapons coming on and off our ranges. These same regulations required Soldiers to carry weapons oriented up and down range, yet in combat they had no such procedures or constraints. It is curious we would use them in training, especially since the average advanced individual training (AIT) graduate sees combat less than three months after graduation.

When we tried to change these we were initially admonished not to confuse training with combat, but combat is exactly what training must replicate to achieve the outcomes we require. We cannot allow rules developed in a different era to continue to impede the development our Soldiers and leaders require now during the global war on terrorism. Our warriors must face complex situations in training and be made accountable for their actions now.

The same holds true for our leaders, yet many of our processes prevent them from achieving the same level of confidence and accountability. For example, the IET marksmanship POI calls for set amounts of ammunition per Soldier per period of instruction. If a leader wants to vary the amount, the institution is not afforded the flexibility to accommodate that. These types of impediments prevent us from properly developing our leaders to manage training and training resources, limit their initiative, and will erode the quality of our leaders and Soldier skills if not corrected. The battlefield requires well-trained and properly prepared Soldiers and leaders, and our training processes and rule-laden procedures are failing both.

**Recommended Changes**

We need to follow our new doctrine and shift our mindset and training aim point by fully implementing the outcomes-based approach to develop the Soldiers and leaders we require in conducting full spectrum operations. Commanders and other leaders are accountable for producing in training those outcomes that will yield success in combat, so we must empower them to use their initiative to plan, resource and conduct the training in a decentralized manner. We should do away with structures and processes that impede this by taking the following actions.

**Allow Trainers to Exercise Battle and Mission Command** — We must empower our leaders to plan and execute outcomes-based training using the tenets of battle and mission command authority. This will improve the training and develop the leaders. Battle command requires leaders to understand the intended outcomes as they visualize training alternatives; mission command empowers them to make choices and direct and lead consistent with the intent. Using these to develop and execute training decentralizes execution consistent with combat conditions and helps develop agile leaders and organizations at every level.

Training time is limited, so conducting multi-echelon training in
this manner makes perfect sense, but we cannot accomplish this using the centrally managed training processes currently in existence. We have seen the vast improvements the outcomes-based approach provides to training and leader development; we must continue to apply it using the tenets of battle and mission command.

Restructure POIs and Approval Processes — We must restructure our POIs to reflect the outcomes-based approach to training. These outcomes will become broad, centralized statements of intent. We must replace the cumbersome, centrally managed bureaucracy that now approves all training changes with more mission-oriented command authority at all levels. This will decentralize the execution of intent and build the initiative and leader skills we require. We must have a POI and lesson plan approval process that is flexible and responsive to the pace and initiative of subordinate commanders. Instead of providing them a rigid set of inputs to follow in training we must foster their development by empowering them to do the same things in training that we expect of them in combat – namely to think on their own and meet the intent within resource constraints.

Each ATC should be empowered to meet outcomes as they determine, and responsible commanders can back brief USAAC to ensure that they remain within the intent. The refined POIs and lesson plans we developed at Fort Benning have more than helped us meet the outcomes we identified as necessary. Without implementing such methods we risk losing a generation of leaders who know what it takes to win in combat. These leaders are now responsible for training the next generation of Soldiers and leaders to be flexible, agile, and fully prepared to meet the conflict requirements of full spectrum operations. If we fail to empower them by using outcomes to guide training, the impact will be irrevocably detrimental to our Army and maybe to our Nation.

Enable Flexible Resourcing — Outcomes-based training requires a more flexible resourcing system. Currently the TRADOC resourcing system is still centrally managed and insufficiently responsive to the decentralized requirements for battle and mission command oriented trainers to develop and implement outcomes-based training at all of our training bases. We must train as we will fight, yet our centrally managed resource process hampers our efforts to achieve this. We must train to sustain, yet our equipment needs must be aggregated and validated at higher echelons. We need the resources now, not in six months when our well-intentioned but risk adverse resource managers may finally provide them.

We must enable flexible and responsive resourcing to meet our training initiatives. These begin with resource managers who move away from measuring every hour of training or bullet fired to mission command resource sets that finally afford subordinate commanders the flexibility they require to experiment and innovate. There is risk in this process, but it can be managed through careful application of the reasonable resource training parameters our commanders already employ when conducting combat missions. They can accomplish the outcome by using a lesson plan that has its own resourcing parameters, not those directed by a centralized management that lacks responsibility for the outcome.

Realign Responsibility and Authority to the Commanders — In operational units commanders train their units. They are responsible for the training and are accountable for the outcome or readiness of the unit. In TRADOC the training is not so complex that we must alter this alignment of responsibility and authority. We do not need committees of experts to develop the plans or train our Soldiers while we hold our drill sergeants accountable for the results at graduation. We must empower our cadre to plan, prepare and execute the training IAW the outcomes-based mindset and aim point set forth in our training doctrine, and they will deliver the results that we — and the Army — need. We have already implemented this change at Fort Benning, and our growing list of initiatives validates its utility.

Conclusion

The Army has made significant strides in improving our operations and training doctrine. The training doctrine is derived from our operations and requires a new mindset and training aim point. Initiatives undertaken at Fort Benning in the IET community achieve the requirements our doctrine requires by using outcomes-based training to provide combatant commanders the Soldiers and leaders they need to win on a battlefield that demands full spectrum capabilities. We must eliminate those institutional processes that limit commanders from exercising battle and mission command in outcomes-based training, or we will fail to produce the confident, competent and accountable Soldiers and leaders that today’s full-spectrum operations demand. We must allow trainers to exercise battle and mission command authority, restructure our POIs and the processes that control them, provide more flexible resourcing, and realign responsibility and authority. If we do, we can deliver the outcomes commanders require when conducting full spectrum operations in this era of persistent conflict.

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BCST: The Army’s Premier Battle Command Systems Task Trainer

MAJ MICHAEL R. SPEARS

Day three of the MRX (mission rehearsal exercise) in the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) tactical operations center (TOC): The battle captain remains focused on the CPOF (Command Post of the Future) in front of him as battlefield events continue to populate his “BCT Events” effort from simulated, subordinate battalions. The Fire Support Cell shouts out, “Acquisition! AO Mustangs!” based on the AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System) display, which immediately causes the brigade staff to execute its indirect fire battle drill. In the White Cell room, a “puckster” continues to provide event injects (events and reports) from his Battle Command Staff Trainer (BCST) computer into the brigade ABCS network...

The introduction of various complex digital Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) across the Army over the past several years has been accompanied by the creation of complicated, and often costly, simulations programs and specialized applications to stimulate the ABCS boxes. Units required a training capability to exercise and sustain ABCS skills to ensure user proficiency and employment of the entire ABCS network. Current simulation programs, such as the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and the Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) serve very useful purposes for major training exercises, but require high overhead for small unit training purposes. Some of this overhead includes external support and extensive lead time for coordination.

As a result of unit requests for ABCS simulation assistance, the National Simulation Center (NSC) initially developed a low-overhead software application, which is now known as the Battle Command Staff Trainer (BCST). Since its creation, the NSC worked with numerous agencies and program managers to transition BCST and ensure mutual capability refinement. The Product Director, Common Services (PD CS), under direction of Program Manager Battle Command (PM BC), now has responsibility to continue development of the BCST. TRADOC Capability Manager-Battle Command (TCM-BC) is responsible for requirements generation and oversight.

BCST enables units to conduct battle staff training on ABCS command and control systems via internal resources with minimal setup, time and effort; and facilitates collective and individual staff training (sustainment and refresher) for specific sections or entire staffs, from battalion through ASCC levels. Significant training opportunities afforded by BCST include: maintain and improve highly perishable ABCS skills, train new battle staff personnel, apply staff coordination drills, battle rhythm development and train-up for exercises/events. This software also provides an ability to stimulate the battle staff reactions to friendly and enemy events, as well as planned master scenario events list (MSEL) injects to initiate staff reactions. BCST should only be used on training networks, never on real-world operational networks — the risk of mixed BCST simulated and real-world operational events is too great!

BCST is a training program that operates on standard personal computer systems with Microsoft Windows XP and is applicable to both Active and Reserve Component units, as well as Battle Command Training Centers (BCTCs). This software application, however, is not hardware or computer, a substitute for ABCS, nor a replacement for CBS, JCATS or other constructive training simulations. These systems, like BCST, were born of necessity and serve a very useful purpose for larger-scale training exercises.

Currently, BCST is provided to Army units through Unit Set Fielding (USF) beginning in December 2008 or via the BCST AKO download site. Based on the approved USF schedule for active and Reserve/National Guard units, the software fielding and New Equipment Training (NET) dates are synchronized with the unit’s input. The computer discs issued during NET include the actual BCST program, as well as a reference disc that have training support packages (TSPs) with specific scenarios. Units that have recently completed USF and ABCS NET may download the BCST program and TSPs from AKO: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/10244567 (AKO users will request access to this site from the BCST POCs listed at the end of the article).

Prior to BCST NET, units should receive all ABCS equipment and complete NET for those systems. During BCST NET, select personnel from the S3/G3 and S6/G6 will receive instruction on how to connect the BCST into the ABCS network, BCST operator training, and exercise scenario skills. Additionally BCTCs and Centers of Excellence will receive the BCST program and NET based on delivery coordination. A tiered support apparatus will provide support to units for assistance with the BCST program to resolve identified issues.

BCST has tremendous potential for any Army battle staff, especially for brigade and battalion levels. BCST provides: a flexible training medium to maintain operator proficiency on their respective systems; flexible training employment; no unit cost and great resources for quality collective training.

Questions and comments may be directed to: TRADOC Capability Manager, ATTN: C2 Branch (BCST), 806 Harrison Drive, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2326; MAJ Michael Spears, michael.r.spears @us.army.mil, (913)684-4505 or Gregory Eddy, gregory.j.eddy@conus.army.mil, (913) 684-4597 of TCM-BC.

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Topics of Interest
Here are a few topics we are highlighting in future issues:

- Marksmanship
- Military Transition Teams
- Mountain Operations
- Cultural Awareness
- Combatives
- Information Operations
- Counterinsurgency Operations
- Training Tips
- Physical Fitness/Training

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“In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it.”

— President Kennedy, 2 September 1963

This is an anthology of essays covering our longest war, the Cold War. Edited by Robert Crowley, the founding editor of MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History and editor of three previous anthologies about the Civil War and the two World Wars and author of several original books including the popular “What If?” series, it contains 27 essays. Of the selected essays, all but four previously appeared in MHQ. Those four are excerpts from books.

The lineup of authors is a who’s who of historians such as Simon Winchester, David McCullough, Dennis Showalter, Victor Hanson, Robert Crowley, and Williamson Murray.

These essays cover the entire 33-year span of the Cold War from the earliest days in the late 1940s to the last gasps of the Soviet empire. In between they examine the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Cuba, aerial reconnaissance, and Berlin. They can be taken in their totality or as individual selections as the needs or interests of the reader dictates. Each is written within the context of the struggle to defeat the worldwide threat of communism in the aftermath of World War II without expanding the Cold War into a World War.

The importance of this book is its reference to the larger strategic issues. A book of essays on the military actions alone would serve no purpose other than the entertainment and education of the reader. While these goals alone are usually intended, the importance of this book is its connections. But to what end?

One may be tempted to look upon the Cold War as a historical period with little to offer us today. To fall for that would be a serious mistake. If anything, this book shows us that America operates on the world stage and that we must take a larger view to every event. It teaches us to put events into a worldwide perspective, to think tactically, operationally and strategically.

Today’s challenges of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, increasing pressures on fossil fuel energy sources, the fundamentalist terrorism, increasing economic might of China, and Russian attempts to reestablish itself as a world superpower are themes that must be addressed strategically.

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The victory may have seemed certain, but there were doubts — then and later — whether it was complete in several respects.

In the unseemly haste to achieve a Madison Avenue type of slogan with a hundred-hours ground war, things were left dangling. The opportunity to wipe out the Republican Guard had passed. The hopes of the Shiites in southern Iraq were raised only to be cruelly dashed. There were those who thought Saddam could and should have been removed, although there is doubt the full coalition would have supported that. Events 12 years later also raise the question of whether Baghdad could have been controlled if seized. However, this work is not intended to cover the broad issues of policy. The focus is on the operational and tactical levels of war. Political and diplomatic decisions are mentioned only to set the stage.

The groundwork is laid by the forging of the post-Vietnam Army, which did make certain whatever victory that was achieved in Kuwait and Iraq. The story unfolds with Desert Shield, planning an offensive, shaping the battlefield, and the climax of the attack — “the Great Wheel.” It culminates with restoring calm after the “Storm.” Each chapter leads off with a personal vignette, which enlivens the narrative. The 70 black and white photographs help as well, but some are a bit dark. Not enough maps is a frequent criticism but is not the case here. Although there is a minimum of military jargon, I found the glossary handy.

BG Scales, who is president/commandant of my alma mater — the Army War College — is well qualified to be director and one of the principal authors of this study project.

There are other works that give a different and/or broader perspective on this conflict, but this book — within its intended scope — is outstanding. It is well researched and readable. Perhaps most important, it gives insights into our conduct of future wars.

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William Freehling is an award-winning historian and author, whose book Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1839 (Oxford University Press, paperback 1992) won the prestigious Bancroft Award, typically considered the highest prize for books published on or about the Civil War. Professor Freehling teaches at the University of Kentucky and for the past three decades sought to understand a single central question: why were the southern states on a path to disunion? This single question led to three decades of reflection,
research, and scholarship resulting in this two-volume history, the second of which was completed in 2007. This is a significant contribution to the political and social history of the antebellum South, and is essential to gaining a deeper understanding of the American Civil War. This book is recommended for those who have already spent time studying Civil War battles. Readers will understand the nuances of the debate over slavery and secession among the Confederate states. For instance, there were Southern leaders who wanted to phase out slavery gradually; other reactionaries wanted to keep the vile institution intact. Virginians understood and reflected on Thomas Jefferson’s views of slavery as a curse, and that God’s justice cannot sleep forever. This attitude would be in total contradiction to the powerful Senator John C. Calhoun from South Carolina, who considered slavery a blessing. The first volume explores differences in the debate over slavery, which the author considers the central corrosive issue of which all other arguments, such as state’s rights, are based. The complexity of the debate over slavery from 1776 to 1854 corroded such wider issues as whether America could spread despotism or democracy as more territories and states came under the jurisdiction of the United States? Readers will learn of how the Gag Rule was imposed as a means to stop the national debate on slavery, a rule that only served to highlight with increasing severity an issue that only seemed to exacerbate the exploitive nature of the institution. The book traces the evolution of Stephen A. Douglas, the Illinois senator and presidential candidate who ran against Abraham Lincoln. Chapters explore in detail the first beginnings of what would be the American Civil War, such as the 1854 skirmishes between pro and anti-slavery militia. This was not made easy by the Supreme Court decision of the Dred Scott case that ruled that any person of African ancestry could not claim citizenship in 1857. The institution was tearing the nation apart, with seminal events like John Brown’s 1859 raid, in which he sought a violent solution to the issue of slavery. The rise of Abraham Lincoln, and his famous campaign speeches on how slavery is tearing at the national fabric of the United States, with his famous “House Divided Speech.” The author takes us on a narrative journey that ends with the firing of the first shots at Fort Sumter in April 1861. From these two volumes, readers can gain a deeper understanding of the American Civil War as it unfolds and the decisions made by both Union and Confederate leaders. An understanding of American history is incomplete without reading about the Civil War, which although a tragedy, made the United States a stronger nation. One may disagree with Freehling on some points, but there is no doubt this is a significant work of scholarship on the events leading up to the Civil War.

**Test Your Knowledge**

1. This French victory early in the war denied Germany the knockout punch it needed to defeat France and resulted in four years of trench warfare:  
   a) First Marne  
   b) Soissons  
   c) Ypres  
   d) Paschendaele

2. Place these battles in chronological order:  
   a) Soissons  
   b) The Brusilov Offensive  
   c) Verdun

3. The size of a U.S. infantry division in WWI was roughly:  
   a) 5,000 men  
   b) 10,000 men  
   c) 15,000 men  
   d) 20,000 men  
   e) 28,000 men

4. First use of poison gas by Germany on the Western Front was at:  
   a) 2nd Battle of Ypres  
   b) Sommes  
   c) Belleau Wood

5. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk resulted in a separate peace between the Central Powers and:  
   a) Russia  
   b) Poland  
   c) Romania  
   d) Hungary

6. This system of defensive barriers extended, by war’s end, from the North Sea to the foothills of the Alps:  
   a) Minefields  
   b) Bunkers  
   c) Trenches  
   d) Barbed wire barriers

7. What brought the U.S. into the First World War?  
   a) German sinking of the Lusitania  
   b) Alleged German atrocities in Belgium  
   c) The Zimmermann telegram  
   d) Diplomatic pressure from France and the UK

8. The U.S. President during America’s entire involvement in WWI was:  
   a) William McKinley  
   b) Teddy Roosevelt  
   c) William Jennings Bryan  
   d) Woodrow Wilson

9. The two German generals whose leadership proved so successful in initial campaigns on the eastern front were:  
   a) Hindenburg and Ludendorff  
   b) Ludendorff and von Moltke  
   c) Von Moltke and Kesselring  
   d) Rommel and Hindenburg

10. Which of the following battles was not fought in WWI?  
    a) Verdun  
    b) Belleau Wood  
    c) Tannenberg  
    d) Brusilov Offensive  
    e) Falaise Pocket

(Answers on next page)

Quiz courtesy of Chris Timmers
Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment plan their next movement during Operation Viper Shake April 21 in Afghanistan.

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ANSWERS TO QUIZ: 1) a 2) d,b,c,a 3) e 4) a 5) a 6) c 7) c 8) d 9) a 10) c