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This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH

Today we are engaged in a counterinsurgency against an innovative and determined enemy whose tenacity and adaptive skills challenge those of any adversary opposing us since Vietnam. Today’s enemy is media-savvy, adapts and employs advanced technology whenever possible, and readily modifies his tactics in an attempt to offset our firepower and mobility advantages. He also screens our unclassified print and broadcast media to glean information on our capabilities and intentions. Today’s COIN fight demands that we recognize the comprehensive nature of the enemy and requires vigilance, flexibility, and resourcefulness on the part of Soldiers and all of us. As we address the realities of the current operational environment we cannot lose sight of the traditional approaches to COIN which have already yielded success, and in this Commander’s Note I want to discuss how we have built upon earlier success in counterinsurgency operations, the impact of cultural awareness in the COIN fight, and how we can assist Soldiers and leaders in their noble cause.

Our government’s aim is to establish and sustain stable governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, free of domination by terrorism and whose stability and security are guaranteed by their own nations’ military and civilian security forces. In his August 2009 Commander’s Initial Assessment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan, GEN Stanley McChrystal recognized the “uniquely complex” COIN environment in that country. He stressed a primary focus on understanding, working with, and protecting the Afghans. This requires that our Soldiers spend more time out among the population, dismounted, active, and visible. GEN McChrystal has based this strategy on four concepts that will enable us to: improve effectiveness through greater partnering with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), prioritize responsive and accountable governance at all levels, gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency’s momentum, and focus them on the areas whose populations are in the greatest danger.

This offers a paradigm for our units who train and partner with Afghan and Iraqi military and police units and who routinely interact with the population. Dealing with counterparts whose culture and belief systems differ from our own can be challenging indeed. We have taken cultural awareness beyond the traditional customs and manners approaches of the past and are now teaching leaders how to gain a clearer picture of the population in the area of operations. We have gained a broader grasp of the connection between security and infrastructure, and can better support the government officials and citizens as we train the host nation’s own forces to secure the communications assets, water and sewage facilities, schools, power plants, and the bazaars that will sustain a return to normal patterns of life.

Our current doctrinal literature reinforces this approach to COIN. The 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, two decades after the COIN field manual that preceded it, bridged the gap between our existing doctrine and the COIN lessons captured from the outset of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, published three years later, has not discarded our traditional approaches to COIN, but instead has addressed them in light of our extensive knowledge gained from the current operational environment. Not limited to small-unit counter-guerrilla actions, FM 3-24.2 improves upon earlier COIN doctrinal guidance by focusing on a broader range of activities that accounts for both changes in Army doctrine and changes in the world and the nature of the enemy and the environment in which he lives. FM 3-24.2 expands the coverage of cultural awareness beyond that addressed in FM 3-24. Cultural competence and situational awareness appropriately appear in the first chapter, and these are threads that run throughout the manual, recognizing the role, potential, and vulnerabilities of the host nation populace. The new field manual is a non-prescriptive source document that can connect and guide commanders of tactical units from platoon to brigade level, and it was written by credible, experienced tacticians who have served in these very types of units in the GWOT.

The way we prosecute COIN will remain the paradigm for conflicts of the immediate future, because of the lessons it offers on the threat and how we are learning to defeat that threat. FM 3-24.2 will be supplemented by the experience we are steadily gaining and the enemy’s own adaptations, because we must evolve to maintain the initiative, and we certainly will.

One force, one fight!
The U.S. Army Combatives School at Fort Benning, Ga., has adopted a new teaching plan.

The Army is revamping the curriculum to take lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and build more effective close-quarters fighters, said Matt Larsen, the school’s director. The goal is to push advanced techniques down to the small-unit level, including basic training.

“We want Soldiers to be agile, adaptive and competent (so) they can adjust to the realities of the battlefield,” Larsen said.

The modifications are based on feedback from across the Army and other factors, he said. More than 900 interviews were conducted with Soldiers who saw hand-to-hand combat in the villages, houses and streets of Iraq or Afghanistan.

Soldiers most often enter small houses and rooms during combat operations, so the Army wants to take the ground-grappling principles taught in combatives and emphasize them from a standing position, Larsen said.

“In the field, the fight is always over weapons and how to maintain control of them,” he said. “That will be taught all the way down to basic training.”

Knee strikes, clinch drills, fighting with weapons and combat equipment, and pushing terror suspects against the wall are among the upper-echelon combatives techniques Soldiers will now be exposed to at lower unit levels, Larsen said.

Larsen said the school will stick with the four pillars — instruction based on universal, foundational, motivational and tactical attributes — that allowed the program to thrive. But Soldiers often struggled to retain knowledge gained in unit combatives training, so adjustments were needed.

Levels 1 and 2 are being changed to the basic and tactical combatives courses, while the basic and tactical combatives instructor courses replace Levels 3 and 4. Under the new construct, the number of training hours at each tier remains the same — 40 in basic, 80 for tactical, and 160 each within both instructor phases.

“Combatives is an integral part of what we do as Soldiers,” Larsen said. “You can’t effectively train in close-quarters combat without combatives. You’re going to need it any place you can be hands-on with potential enemies.”

He said more than 57,000 troops have graduated from the Army Combatives School since its inception in 2002 — including 50,374 (Level 1), 5,255 (Level 2), 1,408 (Level 3) and 564 (Level 4).

For more information, go to the school’s Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/combatives or call (706) 545-2811.

(Vince Little writes for Fort Benning’s The Bayonet newspaper.)
HRC Infantry Branch Talks Transfers, Emerging Trends

CPT JIMMY ROSS

This article includes updates on current topics at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Infantry Branch. Managing officers continues to be our first priority. In addition to managing officers, informing the field on emerging trends and policies is part of our mission as well. In recent months, there have been numerous inquiries concerning force numbers and trends. We are also in the beginning phases of our move from Alexandria, Va., to Fort Knox, Ky. Changes in our Web site have been implemented to reduce less useful information. Each of these subjects will be further discussed in detail. If there are any questions concerning the information in this article, we will be glad to assist.

Branch Transfers

As of 2 November 2009, branch transfers — now known as the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) — are now boarded by the retention office instead of processed by branch. Officers must be a promotable first lieutenant or major with no more than 14 years of active federal service to be eligible in accordance with the latest Military Personnel (MILPER) message (10-082). If an officer is approved for branch transfer, he has a 14-day window to accept or decline. Once an officer accepts the transfer, he will incur an additional three-year active duty service obligation (ADSO). That ADSO begins at the first day of training or upon PCS. A common question asked is: “Does the ADSO augment my existing ASDO?” The answer to that question is “no.” An officer’s new obligation is concurrent with the existing ADSO. Those who are or have participated in Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS), Expanded Graduate School Program (EGSP), or the menu of incentives programs are not eligible until their obligation is fully up. A MILPER message will be published each quarter before the board convenes. A table with each branch by year group will illustrate who is eligible to transfer into a certain branch, and another table will illustrate who’s eligible to transfer out. Officers participating in the branch detail program must go before the board to remain in their detail branch. Packages are to be submitted to OPMD Retention at opmdretention@conus.army.mil. Refer to the MILPER message Web site at https://perscomnd04@army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf for the latest updates. Information can also be found on the HRC Infantry Web site. Branch will continue to assist by answering questions, as well as provide options for career enhancement opportunities.

HRC Web site

You may have noticed the recent changes to the HRC Web site. Last fall, efforts began to alter HRC’s site to make it more user-friendly. The intent is to limit the number of pages before you get to the Infantry Branch portion of the site. It now takes two clicks to enter the Infantry portion. At branch, we are aware of how important the Web site is for communicating to the field. Maintaining accurate information on the site has become a priority for us. Each assignment desk still has its own link to address hot topics, assignments, references, and frequently asked questions.

Infantry Stats

We conducted queries to see exactly how Infantry officers by rank and year group are assigned across the Army. There are more than 6,500 active duty Infantry officers currently serving in the Army. We examine our strength, distribution, promotions percentages, and schools. The total authorized 11A numbers were compared to total number assigned. Total numbers assigned included 11A coded authorizations and immaterials 01A, 02A, and 03A requirements. These numbers were provided by TOPMIS (Total Officer Personnel Management Information System). Immaterial jobs 02A and 03A are Infantry and Armor jobs, such as an Infantry officer serving in a Cavalry Squadron, and vice versa for Armor. Those serving in 01A jobs are positions filled by any officer. At first glance, it appeared that Infantry Branch was overstrength on authorization; that we were over 100% strength for Infantrymen jobs. When these distributions are taken into account, our percentages are significantly lower for those working in 11A coded positions. Additional impacts on this lower percentage reflects officers that are branched detailed, or in schools (Army or civilian). From observing the data we are able to clearly see how Infantry officers are distributed across the Army to ensure accurate assignment placing. Promotions percentages were based on the total number of eligible officers for each available promotion zone (primary zone [PZ], below the zone [BZ], and above the zone [AZ]) from the latest results. There were a total of 121 LTCs eligible for promotion to COL for FY 09. A total of 41 were promoted, of those 9 BZ (7.7%), 31 PZ (26.8%), and 1 AZ (0%). There were 144 total eligible for promotion LTC for FY 09, with 131 promoted. Of those promoted 12 were BZ (9%), 115 PZ (86.7%), and 4 AZ (3.3%). Lastly, total number of MAJs eligible were 154 for FY 10. A total of 134 promoted, 47 BZ (25.9%), 82 PZ (70.9%), and 5 AZ (3%). Based off these promotion statistics, promotion up to LTC looks promising if officers successfully follow the career path outlined in accordance with AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Development System.

In October 2009, the CFD board for year group 2002 convened. Here are some numbers for individuals selected. Up to this point I have been under the impression that whoever was selected for a CFD was forced out. Though there are a few that are, those that appeal after the results are published fall into the low teens. A total of 201 officers in year group 2002 went before the board. A total of 69 officers were selected for a functional area, of the ones that got...
selected, 24 got their first choice, 27 got their second choice, and six got their third choice. There were 12 of 23 that got selected that didn’t put a preference, the rest stayed Infantry. Those numbers selected for CFD represents only CFD choices, not Infantry. To clarify, if an officer got CFDed and received his 2nd choice or 3rd choice, he didn’t have Infantry in his previous choices. In summary, 132 officers remained in the Infantry, 69 were CFDed, and of the ones selected, one could assume that around 12 officers didn’t get what they wanted. Officers that want to appeal now must submit their request to retention IAW MILPER Message 10-082.

Movement to Fort Knox

HRC has started the process of transitioning from Alexandria, which had been its home for 37 years, to Fort Knox. HRC at Fort Knox will consist of Alexandria, St. Louis, and Indianapolis personnel offices combined. Those officers who have been active duty Infantry during the past 15 years may know or have heard of Juanita Walker, the 2LT assignment specialist. She has worked at HRC for 37 years, spending a majority of her time in Air Defense Artillery and Infantry. She has been a part of Infantry Branch since 1994 and unfortunately has decided not to move to Fort Knox. Others who have greatly served our branch and will be missed are Phyllis Harley, who contributed 20 years of service to HRC, and Lee Gray, who has eight years of service. These ladies will be truly missed not only for their knowledge but their dedication and commitment to our branch. Walter Ezar will assume responsibility for 2LTs. Marlena Williams will assume responsibility as LTC HR specialist. MAJ Jake Jacobs and CPT Mike Eliassen are the current assignment officers moving to Fort Knox. They will be augmented with the rest of the assignment officers and civilians in Kentucky. Transition will be between the months of April to August 2010, with the main body moving between June and July 2010. Efforts at HRC and Infantry Branch have been implemented to continue continuity to sustain momentum for taking care of Soldiers and families.

For more information or to contact a member of the HRC Infantry Branch staff, go to https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/mfe/infantry/index.htm.

(CPT Jimmy Ross currently serves as the Infantry Branch Future Readiness Officer.)

VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL VISITS NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM

Of the more than 58,000 Soldiers who died in the Vietnam War, more than 20,000 were Infantrymen. It is fitting that a replica of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall should be at the National Infantry Museum in Columbus, Ga., for Memorial Day.

The original memorial, located in Constitution Gardens adjacent to the National Mall in Washington D.C., was inspired by a member of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Jan Scruggs started the project, which was completed in 1982. It was designed by U.S. landscape architect Maya Lin and receives around three million visitors each year.

Since a pilgrimage to the original isn’t always possible, replicas have been crafted to tour the country. One, the Dignity Memorial Vietnam Wall, is a three-quarter-scale replica. Eight-feet high and 240-feet long, its black, faux granite reflective surface is inscribed with the names of more than 58,000 servicemen and women who died or are missing in Vietnam.

The traveling monument was created by Dignity Memorial as a service to those who might never have the chance to travel to the nation’s capital. One, the Dignity Memorial Vietnam Wall, is a three-quarter-scale replica. Eight-feet high and 240-feet long, its black, faux granite reflective surface is inscribed with the names of more than 58,000 servicemen and women who died or are missing in Vietnam.

The traveling monument was created by Dignity Memorial as a service to those who might never have the chance to travel to the nation’s capital. Since the monument began its travels in 1990, it has been displayed in more than 200 cities across the country, allowing millions of visitors to experience the healing power of the memorial.

“We are so proud to be able to present this sacred display,” National Infantry Foundation MG (Ret) Jerry White said. “I know seeing it, touching it, will be a moving experience for me, and thousands of other Vietnam veterans and their families, too.”

Following its arrival at the National Infantry Museum on 28 May, the wall will remain through 13 June. The replica will be located just east of the museum, along Heritage Walk.
Why is there an article telling you about a counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics field manual? After all, you may have already studied it in one of your training courses. Or perhaps you saw real COIN operations in a past combat deployment, and you don’t need some manual telling you what you already know.

Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, is not simply a training document; it is not only a recipe for ambush tactics; and it is not some highbrow tome about insurgency theories. For any Army leader, it offers practical guidelines to adjust COIN tactics from nation to nation, rotation to rotation, province to province, and village to village. Written by talented, experienced tacticians from platoon to brigade level, and then vetted by Army tactical units as well as by other services and institutions, it understands that misapplied COIN tactics will scuttle much effort and nullify lessons learned in years of unconventional fighting. If you are leading troops in the Afghanistan surge — or if you are still leading them in Iraq — use this new manual to make your outfit part of the solution and not part of the problem.

Overview of FM 3-24.2's Practical Worth

When FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was published in 2006, it received praise for reshaping the Army’s COIN doctrine — so what makes FM 3-24.2 so compelling? Tactics in Counterinsurgency “merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment,” as it incorporates the latest tactics and procedures gleaned from combat operations through 2008. It understands the integrated ‘process’ aspect of COIN as well as the fact that integration applies not only to functions but also to command levels.
Tactics expands upon previous COIN guidance.

FM 3-24.2 breaks from previous COIN tactics guides by focusing upon a broad range of activities instead of only describing military-specific tasks like counter-guerilla sweeps. As such it accounts for changes in the world and changes in U.S. Army doctrine as it focuses upon COIN’s more comprehensive nature. Tactics has no single planning scheme for the successful COIN campaign; instead it gives you matrices to sort out the myriad considerations, currents, and other factors involved in planning your COIN operations. Further, its planning considerations understand the importance of time phasing in this process. And when Tactics discusses how to design measures of effectiveness/performance for your COIN effort, its examples include questions like “How many people registered to vote at the school this week” instead of only combat-related queries like “How many rounds were expended on patrol?”

Tactics adapts many of the precepts of FM 3-24 and other doctrine manuals, and introduces a few new ones. Its first chapter explains how various acronym reference guides seen elsewhere — PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, info, physical environment, time); METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civil ops); ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events) — apply to counterinsurgency operations. For example, in applying ASCOPE to COIN civil operations, Tactics marries a systematic approach with concrete civil concerns to make its civil ops discussion much more than a general admonition to know the locals. To enable the commander to “visualize, describe and direct operations when positional references to an adversary have little reference, such as [during] an insurgency,” the third chapter introduces seven lines of effort:

1. Establish civil security;
2. Support host-nation security forces;
3. Support governance;
4. Establish civil control;
5. Restore essential services;
6. Support economic and infrastructure development; and
7. Conduct information engagement.

One might say these acronyms only create an alphabet soup of competing doctrinal laundry lists. But Tactics provides graphs and models to explain how commanders apply these guides interactively to ascertain their units’ progress and then execute a comprehensive plan for their areas. The lessons apply up and down the chain; and many of Tactics’ illustrative examples describe higher command and staff situations as much as they do small-unit actions in the field.

The lines of effort appear as a recurring theme in later chapters on other counterinsurgency activities. At one point Tactics uses a rheostat chart to emphasize how the various lines rise and fall in priority as the commander’s COIN situation develops (see Figure 1). When applying U.S. Army decision-making procedures to a counterinsurgency and when expanding upon FM 3-24’s COIN targeting and planning methods, Tactics emphasizes the process aspect of counterinsurgency by offering time-assessment tools.

One noteworthy Tactics expansion on FM 3-24 involves cultural awareness. Tactics’ first chapter provides questions for developing a clear picture of the operating area’s people. Questions such as “What is the daily wage of an average worker/laborer? What jobs are considered honorable?” can be telling when one considers a recent Washington Post article on the Afghan Army. In the 9 December 2009 article “General Offers Assurances on Afghan War; McChrystal, Envoy Testify on Hill about New Obama Strategy,” authors Greg Jaffe and Glenn Kessler wrote “that as few as 52,000 soldiers regularly show up for work, because of poor pay and other reasons. In recent weeks, the military has boosted the troops’ pay so that they make as much as or more than Taliban fighters do.”

When addressing insurgency itself, Tactics’ second chapter converts FM 3-24’s comments about the variable nature of insurgency into categories that help the commander “track, categorize, and develop the insurgency’s pattern.” These in turn facilitate use of the lines of effort in applying the appropriate counterinsurgency methods. Of note is Tactics’ differentiation between insurgency components, with emphasis on familiar things like leadership, ideology and types of insurgencies — and insurgency manifestations, which focus upon tactical realities like insurgent vulnerabilities/strengths and the level of insurgent violence.

Figure 1 — Rheostat Approach to the Lines of Effort

“uniquely complex” counterinsurgency environment, but concludes that so far “ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of counterinsurgency warfare.” He charges ISAF to change its operating practices to protect and work with the Afghans directly, even if it entails greater discomfort and risk. All parts of the Afghan counterinsurgency effort require sharper focus upon how things are done. Such comments are remarkable given that we’ve done COIN for several years and even published a new field manual for it in 2006. FM 3-24.2 more directly provides ISAF commanders with guidelines that support GEN McChrystal’s vision.

Where Tactics Expands Upon Previous COIN Guidance

The operator—observer chain includes a great many acronyms and operational methods that you may or may not understand. These are used to focus your efforts on specific areas of the problem. One such acronym is ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events) — apply to counterinsurgency operations. For example, in applying ASCOPE to COIN civil operations, Tactics marries a systematic approach with concrete civil concerns to make its civil ops discussion much more than a general admonition to know the locals. To enable the commander to “visualize, describe and direct operations when positional references to an adversary have little reference, such as [during] an insurgency,” the third chapter introduces seven lines of effort:

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Security TTPs (We Are Still Fighting a War)

Tactics does not abandon security and combat concerns. It understands that power plants, telecommunications, roads, schools, bazaars, and government officials will not interact synergistically if guerrillas disrupt their proper function. As such, Tactics well addresses familiar counter-guerilla combat operations like ambush/counter-ambush and base defense. It then spends time on recent counter-guerilla tactical developments like sniper-defeat, counter-improvised explosive device, and counter drive-by shooting operations. It devotes an annex to intelligence preparation of the battlefield which distills FM 3-24’s counterinsurgency intelligence discussion to those items most pertinent to the tactical leader. Drawing from Special Forces’ experience in difficult counterinsurgency situations, Tactics incorporates some of their practices. For example, the CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability effects, reconcilability, and psychological impact) model helps the commander prioritize combat options when employing limited forces in a big area with multiple threats and tasks.

ISAF, Afghanistan, And Tactics

To support its aim of a stable Afghanistan free of terrorist influence, the Obama Administration’s surge plan gives GEN McChrystal 30,000 more troops, but resources are not his major concern. His initial assessment observed that “focusing on force or resources requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.” For counterinsurgency, the assessment wants primary focus upon protecting, understanding, and working with the Afghans — to “spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armored vehicles and behind the walls of forward operating bases” so that Afghanistan can ultimately handle itself. GEN McChrystal wants efficient, better coordinated operations that well use the resources granted.

To support this strategy, GEN McChrystal introduces four underlying pillars:

1. Gain the initiative against the insurgents;
2. Improve and work with Afghan security forces;
3. Assist improvement of governance; and
4. Prioritize resources to critical areas.

He will apply these to a complex Afghan society with “multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting relationships among those actors,” and thus emphasizes that “no element can be viewed in isolation.” Nor can one concentrate upon one timeframe; instead ISAF commanders must be able to coordinate short- and long-term tasks in an on-going process.

With its comprehensive, interactive guidelines, Tactics tackles interconnectivity in COIN. Its time-task assessment tools use multiple inputs to create chronological snapshots which give commanders at all levels the situational awareness to adjust time-related goals properly. GEN McChrystal’s four strategic pillars fall clearly within the lines of effort that run through Tactics’ pages. Another recurring topic in Tactics involves “Clear-Hold-Build” operations, which likewise well support the ISAF’s population-oriented approach. Beyond “Clear-Hold-Build,” Tactics addresses population issues in most other activities it describes, from tactical planning to building bases. In its chapters on COIN planning and on host-nation forces, Tactics describes the situational roles of other groups; and throughout its pages are steps to support the coordination process. These will help higher-level commanders maximize efforts by not only their own commands, but also by associated groups.

Regarding ISAF’s overall aim of a self-secured Afghanistan, Tactics has chapters on stability operations and on support to host-nation security forces. Again revealing Special Forces’ influence, Tactics includes the MORTEAM (measure, organize, rebuild, train, equip, advise, mentor) guideline in its “support to host-nation” chapter. Its annex includes straight talk about counterinsurgency and/or advisory efforts from two influential experts, David Kilcullen and Lawrence of Arabia.

“That’s All Very Nice, But I’ve Seen This Stuff Before”

For lieutenants and captains who have finished their basic and career courses, note that your study of tactics in a counterinsurgency was an introduction. FM 3-24.2 tackles a way of war, COIN, that demands constant updating — and provides the means to do so. As a COIN task organizer, it especially helps when responsibilities and tactical demands shift during COIN: the captain may have to plan for a brigade; or a colonel may have to work more with ‘operational NCOs’ and ‘strategic lieutenants.’ Indeed for veteran leaders and the higher ranks, Tactics provides an opportunity to avoid misapplying the tactics of a previous rotation to the newest one.

It’s All Yours!

FM 3-24.2 is not prescriptive. It offers no set-piece strategy, no silver-bullet solution, and no checklist that must be applied to all situations. Instead it provides tools to help you better analyze, plan, execute, and revise tactics with other leaders to develop a unique strategy for your area. It retains and promotes a key operational philosophy: on-scene commanders make the assessments and direct the actions. It therefore wants you, the individual leader, to develop and then refine constantly a unique formula which produces mission success.

Tactics gives sergeants, captains, and colonels alike a means to retain situational awareness and tactical agility in the tricky shadow world of counterinsurgency. It also well supports GEN McChrystal’s assessment of how to achieve his daunting mission in Afghanistan. It is a most important document for the COIN warrior.

COL Mark W. Suich is the Director of Training, Maneuver Center of Excellence, at Fort Benning, Ga., and oversaw publication of FM 3-24.2. He received a bachelor’s degree from Edinboro University and a master’s degree in Military Studies (Unconventional Warfare) from American Military University. He served in Operation Desert Storm and in deployments to Somalia and Haiti. His most recent combat assignment was as commander of the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division in southwest Baghdad from 2006 to 2007.

Dr. Douglas N. Campbell is a military history instructor at Fort Benning. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air War College, and received a B.A. from North Georgia College, an M.A. from UNLV, and a Ph.D. in History from Texas Tech University. He is author of The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate, and his military career included A-7, A-10, and F-117 flying assignments in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force.
Shortly after assuming command and after completing my initial assessments of the unit, my command sergeant major and I began formulating a plan to refocus and introduce concepts to improve the battalion — from systems and processes to the quality of training and care for our cadre. The method we chose coincided with the mental process I found myself using to address the challenges, applying logical lines of operation (LLOs). The application of this process has enabled our team to articulate our command focus in time, space, and purpose with the company commanders, first sergeants, and cadre. Further, it has helped define the endstates sought to successfully achieve our unit’s mission as a Basic Combat Training (BCT) battalion.

Logical lines of operation form a cognitive operational framework to define and arrange actions and intermediate objectives towards a desired endstate, unified by purpose. Although LLOs are generally associated with campaign planning, it serves as a viable vehicle to mentally model the linkage of ends, ways, and means. As the method to depict our command focus, it has enumerable benefits in framing where we, as a battalion, need to go and how we will get there.

The four lines of operation we determined as necessary to meet our endstates are training, leader development, cadre wellness, and the safety and security of our IET Soldiers and cadre. These key areas were established based on an assessment of the desired endstates necessary to complete our battalion’s mission to transform civilians into Soldiers that are prepared for combat. Along each line of operation are the intermediate objectives, i.e. focal areas, programs, initiatives, to achieve success and attain the endstate along the LLO.

The most important aspect of our mission is training. In order to develop Soldiers prepared for combat and their first unit of assignment, they must be competent, physically fit, and proficient in select tasks. The cadre responsible to train our Soldiers must also be master trainers who can instill confidence, competency, and values. To achieve this endstate, we focus on several key areas of required proficiency at the individual soldier level such as marksmanship, warrior tasks & battle drills (WTBDs), and combat lifesaver (CLS) skills. These areas, along with physical fitness, represent intermediate objectives which require greater focus and resources to ensure they are trained to greatest extent possible. This focus allows commanders to understand training priorities in a resource-constrained environment with a multitude of obligatory training requirements. Along this LLO, the concept of outcomes-based training and education (OBT&E) is imperative. OBT&E provides an emerging model and methodology to train Soldiers. Not only does it depict the desired outcomes of Soldiers, but it describes the ways in which to achieve and train Soldiers through active learning, problem solving, and the understanding of purpose. In order to leverage training focused on outcomes, we have applied the standard of scenario-based situational training exercises or STXs. These STXs incorporate various tasks linked together within a realistic scenario Soldiers will encounter in combat to train and test both proficiency of key tasks and also critical thinking.

Today’s Soldiers now operate in environments where the lowest-ranking member may be responsible to make decisions that may have strategic impacts. They must be trained and placed in demanding scenarios to test their wit and ability to comprehend the cause and effect of their actions and our expectations of them in the

![Figure 1 — Command Focus LLOs](image-url)
contemporary operating environment. Finally, the quality of training given to our Soldiers is only as good as those providing the instruction. Our cadre and their proficiency in training the numerous tasks within BCT are paramount to the mission’s success. As a unit, we understand the strengths and weaknesses within this system and have developed a detailed program to ensure all of our cadre, regardless of Military Occupational Specialty, are master trainers and capable to provide the best instruction to our new Soldiers.

Perhaps one of the most under-appreciated components within a unit is leader development. In the Initial Entry Training environment a great deal of emphasis is placed on the Soldiers in training but not on the cadre. Junior commanders and NCOs require continuous training focused on their development for both their current and future assignments. Due to the current operational tempo and more rapid promotions, many junior officers and NCOs are propelled into positions of greater responsibility with insufficient experience or training. Shortfalls exist in critical areas such as training management, leadership, tactics and doctrine, and administration. These shortfalls are correctable with a deliberate and sustained leader development program focused on training key competencies expected of Army leaders throughout their service. Many cadre members will return to deployable units in positions of greater responsibility, and the senior leadership must make a concerted effort to ensure they are prepared. Our focus is to develop our junior officers and NCOs through professional development programs (OPD/NCOPD), reading and writing programs, counseling, and developing maneuver live-fire ranges such as the Combined Maneuver Live-Fire Exercise Program, which enforces understanding both the art and science of training. A well-resourced leader development program, sustained over time, builds not only the competency level of leaders within their current position, but postures them for greater success in their military career.

The most noticeable challenge the CSM and I have faced since taking command is the welfare of our cadre. Many of the NCOs and junior officers within the battalion are recent veterans of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority with multiple deployments. Several cadre members, as well as their families, assumed that an assignment in the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) would provide a needed break from the operational force. Unfortunately, shortly after arrival, it becomes apparent that the environment within a BCT is just as demanding as any deployable unit. Hours are long, and weeks consist of working six-to-seven days straight without a break. For many drill sergeants this places an enormous burden on their personal life, especially if they have families. By analyzing the requirements to take care of our cadre and the demands of basic training, we determined that any necessary movement along any line of operation to achieve the desired endstates would require addressing this area first. Our primary purpose along this line of operation is to build a cohesive, disciplined, and motivated organization focused on the mission, the cadre, and family well-being. Achieving success here equates to stable, professionally focused NCOs and officers. Implementing policies that ensure our subordinates conduct high quality training along with providing appropriate supervision while balancing cadre personal time is essential. As a unit, we have invested in certain initiatives that target strengthening the individual and family wellness. These include ensuring NCOs get to the required schools for professional development and advancement, reestablishing a battalion-level Family Readiness Group focused on cadre wellness and communication, offering single soldier and married couple retreats, and other activities such as military formals, leader calls, and sports competitions to build camaraderie and esprit de corps. By simultaneously working on these objectives, we set the necessary conditions to work on the other lines of operation and endstates.

The final line of operation is much broader and addresses the necessary endstate of a safe and secure environment for Soldiers and their cadre to train within. This includes the command and cadre climate that new Soldiers are expected to be part of for their first 10 weeks in the Army. Basic training has changed over the years and so has the manner in which newly enlisted Soldiers are treated. Soldiers require good leadership and a safe atmosphere to train, regardless of gender. Providing this environment, coupled by professionalism and high standards, is critical and ensures that they can learn the necessary skills to be successful in the Army and, more importantly, combat. Key objectives to support this endstate are providing proper supervision and senior leader involvement, which we have established within our standard duty policy and senior leader checks. Our focus also recognizes that in order to train Soldiers well, they require the best facilities and resources available. We continue to strive for the best facilities and training resources for our cadre and Soldiers and employ them throughout the training cycle. Although it is a constant battle due to limited resources, we must ensure that training is first class and the equipment, support, and services on the installation are maximized to support our units’ mission.

In developing our command focus to achieve mission success, we found our LLOs as the best method to provide the needed contextual framework to focus our efforts. The actions and objectives within our lines of operation depict causal relationships that are both linear and nonlinear, and are represented, in some cases, on more than one line of operation because they occur simultaneously and are supporting. We reviewed our immediate objectives many times to ensure their suitability and feasibility to the defined endstates and desired outcomes of IET. We also cross referenced them with our installations’ campaign objectives and found them similar and mutually supporting. As we continue down the road as a new command team with a demanding mission, the logical lines of operation will serve as the road map for our unit to collectively understand where we are going and how we will get there. This most important impact will be the new Soldiers’ ability to rapidly integrate into their next unit as a professional and competent member of the U.S. Army.

LTC Bryan P. Hernandez
January-April 2010
A commander of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) in an Infantry battalion, your job is inherently complex. In dealing with a myriad of sections and platoons all performing various functions, it can become overwhelming at times. This is especially so in an environment that is present in Iraq post-January 2009 and post-June 30 after the security agreement was implemented. As the HHC commander, I had numerous assets at my disposal, the largest property book in the battalion, including equipment and technologies that could provide combat multipliers to each of the rifle companies. I made it my responsibility to figure out how to effectively employ these systems to accomplish the mission.

In conducting combat operations in our battalion operating environment (OE) of Abu Ghraib and Nasir Wa Salam, just west of Baghdad, it quickly became apparent how useful Intelligence, Security and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms could be employed to enhance the ground commander’s mission set. Drawing from the Soldiers assigned to my tactical command post (TAC), which consisted of one Stryker vehicle, the battalion snipers, and various company HQ personnel, I had determined how to more effectively employ ISR assets organic to the company such as the Gas Micro Air Vehicle (GMAV) and Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

My plan was simple. I wanted to streamline the process whereby a company designates a restricted operating zone (ROZ), activates it, and maintains it throughout an operation. I also wanted to consolidate the pilots of the GMAV and Raven into one vehicle, thereby making the team highly mobile and capable of being attached out to supplement any operation. We were able to set this up as a “turnkey package” to any platoon or company that requested it. With this package, the gaining unit had little or no requirements for sustaining our small element. We request the ROZ from battalion, call in the ROZ from our Stryker, operate the UAV, broadcast the feed from the UAV platform to the ground commander’s Stryker, as well as to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC).

We also report anything suspect to the ground commander from the UAV feed. The end result was that the Stryker was turned into a single vehicle UAV employment platform, seamlessly attached to any unit operation.

The ground unit now has an immediately responsive ISR asset above them, observing their disposition and detecting potential targets in a complex urban environment. This asset was the result of weeks of work put in on behalf of my NCOIC of the project, SSG Todd Patterson. We worked at coordinating with the field representatives at Tacticomp, Honeywell, and other technical experts to assist us in our setup of the UAV employment platform. The following is a menu of the various modifications and add-on’s we installed both inside and outside of our Stryker. It not only transformed the vehicle into a mobile control platform for the Raven and GMAV but also acted as a broadcast platform. We simultaneously were able to transmit the feed from the Raven and GMAV, via the various towers set up in and around Abu Ghraib province, to the ground commander and the battalion TOC.
A workstation was created in the left-hand side of the passenger compartment of the Stryker, opposite the radios, in much the same way a TACP (tactical air control party) Stryker is set up. This was designated as the UAV ground station from which the UAV could be flown, and the ground controller could observe the flight path and video feed, maintaining communication with all units during an operation. The setup would have been better accommodated with a command or TACP variant of the Stryker, where there are seats facing outward toward small work stations with ruggedized laptops and monitors. In either platform, the ground controller and UAV pilot sit next to each other and work closely together. This allows them to adapt to mission changes or receive requests from the ground commander, with whom the ground controller is speaking with via SINCGARS.

The Tacticomp system provides an information transmitting platform that offers many applications to enhance our UAV Single Vehicle Employment Platform concept. Real-time video can be transmitted from our platform to other vehicles, ground commanders and the battalion TOC using Tacticomp towers. We have incorporated the following features from Tacticomp in the platform. The basic vehicle install includes the following:

**8db Omni Directional Antenna:** This antenna is permanently mounted on the vehicle. Although larger antennas (10-13db) are available, they require additional planning factors and were not required for our application.

**VAP (Versatile Access Point):** This 8-inch by 8-inch box is powered by the vehicle, backed up by a battery, and acts as the wireless router, and video injection point for Tacticomp operations. This is where the video-producing platform (GMAV or RAVEN) is connected. Additional video feed is imputable from many other sources.

**T-1.5:** (x3) These are handheld systems — essentially ruggedized PDA units — that can be used to view video, view maps, send text messages, and conduct voice communications with the addition of a head set and ground controller. These are helpful when the unit you are providing support to does not have Tacticomp installed in their vehicles. The ground commander can remain mounted, or dismounted, and view all feeds transmitted from the UAV. The ground commander can also communicate to the ground controller, who is sitting next to the pilot, and direct the UAV where to go, what to look at, and what to focus on.

**T-6 Ruggedized Tablet Computer:** This unit allows viewing and recording of the UAV surveillance video feed. A headset is available and allows communication to all similarly equipped Tacticomp holders with headsets. Free text is an option, maps, and video feeds from multiple sources, such as a remote weapons station (RWS), J-lens and other surveillance platforms can be selected for viewing from a drop down-menu.

**Battery Charger Unit:** This unit charges four batteries that power the T-1.5, and provides backup power to operate all Tacticomp portable devices.

**Tactisite:** Similar to the Land Warrior system, this system is provided to ground commanders so that they can instantly view the UAV feed. This helps establish better situational awareness, as well as identifies...
any potential threat detected by the aerial system.

**Tacticomp Controller:** This controller allows remote control of the T-1.5, and the use of the headset for voice communication to the pilot and ground controller, as well as any other Tacticomp user with a headset.

**Ground Control Station Pack:** Before we developed the Ghostbusters pack, we had to wrestle with four different pieces of separate equipment. This made dismounted operations awkward. The new pack allows the ground data terminal, the T-1.5, and the unit that the pilot uses to control the aircraft to be truly portable. In addition we attached a video converter module (VCM). The VCM relays the video feed from the Raven or GMAV to the UAV employment vehicle. We mounted these four systems on an old ALICE rucksack frame. All four of these systems are attachable to your MOLLE gear; however, combat Soldiers must carry much more than just the GCS. He must also contend with his personal equipment and basic load as well. The Ghostbusters pack was developed out of necessity and made the pilot’s combat load manageable.

The aforementioned systems, working together for a well-trained pilot and observer, bring UAV assets to the lowest echelon possible, that of the ground commander.

**GMAV or Raven video is transmitted to the UAV employment vehicle and other locations following the paths shown in Figure 1.**

The parameters for operating UAVs are evolving slowly. On numerous occasions, ROZ and flight plans have been cancelled due to misunderstandings of the GMAV’s capability. What brigade aviation elements (BAEs) may not yet understand is that the capabilities of the GMAV allow it to work in conjunction with air weapons teams (AWTs), Shadows, Predators, and most other air traffic in the airspace. Additionally it is capable of flying in adverse conditions, and when air is “red.” Even with low visibility, the GMAV is able to fly low enough to provide cover for a dismounted element, or to use its camera to over watch specific targets. If nothing else, an object as peculiar looking as the GMAV in flight deters the enemy and makes them think twice about conducting an attack.

Two combat operations demonstrate the success of this concept. B Company, 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment was tasked with a counter-IED (improvised explosive device), counter-IDF operation during limited visibility. They were task organized into three Stryker vehicles and the attached UAV employment platform. The ROZ was coordinated, called in, and controlled by the Soldiers assigned to my TAC. Red Platoon of B/2-112 IN conducted a security halt, around the UAV employment vehicle, and my Soldiers set up the GMAV. We launched, and immediately flew the route of the counter-IED patrol. The GMAV flew the entire four-mile route, moved south to cover a canal noted for cache emplacement, and landed successfully. By conducting this type of operation using the GMAV, we were able to keep Soldiers out of harm’s way by getting a better view with the infrared camera to detect potential sub-surface IEDs or cache emplacements that the human eye would not have been able to detect. Additionally, we were able to produce excellent imagery of each site and the route for future operations.

The second operation in which the UAV employment vehicle was assigned was a similar counter IED/IDF patrol. Once B/2-112 IN exited, the platoon leader received an order to assist a nearby EOD team in the detection and disposal of a suspected IED. The platoon arrived, set up an outer cordon, and the UAV team quickly set up the GMAV and began to conduct their operation. The GMAV pilot, SSG Patterson, was able to assist the outer cordon in detection of possible triggermen, as well as assist EOD in a better top-side view of the potential IED.
Within the change of mission, we were able to quickly set up and launch the GMA V with little difficulty. Working in conjunction with the EOD team’s robot, SSG Patterson was able to quickly determine that the suspected IED was nothing more than a tire with some trash in it.

These are just two of many successful operations supported by the UAV Single Vehicle Employment Platform. With more attention given to the notion, and perhaps an MTOE change, the concept will further evolve. A command or TACP variant Stryker should be dedicated; the manning requirement would be a driver (11B), vehicle commander (11B), a ground controller, two pilots trained on both the GMAV and Raven UAV systems (11B), and a communications specialist (25B). A Soldier designated and trained on all the peripheral Tacticomp systems and equipment (25B) is also needed. Lastly, two Soldiers would be assigned as the dismounted security element (11B).

It remains to be seen how far the Army’s use of UAVs will unfold. My assumption is that we are seeing just the tip of the iceberg. New prototypes of the Raven and GMAV will roll off the production line frequently as the Army’s use of UAVs matures. A newer version of the GMAV is already out and has an upgraded camera, which locks onto a specific target.

My hope is that this article assists other units in establishing their own UAV employment platform and gives them a recipe of how to do it. As technologies emerge making UAVs lighter, faster, smaller and stronger, the sky really is the limit.

During one mission, the GMAV flew the entire four-mile route, moved south to cover a canal noted for cache emplacement, and then landed.

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The author observes while SSG Todd Patterson pilots the GMAV in support of a joint clearance operation in Iraq.
The Army and Air Force quickly determined that the concept of the tactical air control party (TAC-P) with its minimal number of joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) personnel was inadequate to support major combat operations in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. Simply put, there are not enough JTACs to cover the battlefield. Over the past several years, the Field Artillery communities of the Marines and the Army have made efforts to push the capabilities of close air support (CAS) down to lowest level utilizing the joint fires observer (JFO) concept. The JFO is not meant to bypass the requirements of a qualified JTAC, but augment the ability of maneuver units below the battalion level to provide timely target information when the JTAC is not present in the target area.

This methodology to support the JTAC in the current operating environment yields successes, but as we reduce the number of forces and transition to an advisory role, we must look beyond the artillery community in order to ensure CAS capability continues to be a combat multiplier on the battlefield. Given the fire support structural design shortages currently inherent in ground combat maneuver battalions, the expanding area ground units must operate in, and the lack of training outside of the fire support community, ground commanders must shift their reliance for CAS from the JFO and empower small unit leaders to assume the role.

The fire support element (FSE) of maneuver battalions currently is not up to the JFO task for providing terminal guidance support below the company level. The current modern table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) provides at best one forward observer (who may or may not be JFO qualified) to each platoon, and the heavy BCT cannot even do that. The equipping of the FSE further supports the assertion that the company level is the lowest by providing only one laser designator per company. When combined with the ever increasing requirements of company and battalion command post operations, it is likely that the employment of CAS at the company level must be a predetermined decision by the commander in order to ensure the JFO is specifically placed with the unit conducting the operation.

This company commander CAS decision is in direct contradiction to how forces both currently conduct operations in the current OE and are likely to conduct operations as a member of an advisory and assistance brigade. The majority of combat force activities take place at the platoon level conducting patrolling or specific operations within a company area of operation. Often platoon, section, and squad leaders are the executors with eyes on the ground, and the likely requestors of enablers such as fire support. Because these small unit leaders are the likely consumers of CAS, efforts should be made to facilitate their ability to employ CAS as described in the JFO methodology.

The JFO Course (JFOC) is currently offered at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.; Fort Sill, Okla.; and Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany; and should be expanded to support small unit leaders within maneuver companies. Currently, course requirements limit the training to field artillery personnel or members of reconnaissance units. Use of virtual training devices such as the JTAC Training and Rehearsal System (TRS) dome should be expanded or integrated into ground tactical trainers such as the engagement skills trainer (EST) or close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) to support training of maneuver leaders. Furthermore, efforts must be made to adjust equipment allocations in unit MTOEs to reflect changes in communications and terminal guidance technologies in order to promote air-ground integration congruent with the JFO “Eyes and Ears” concept.

Whether or not small unit leaders become JFO certified is irrelevant. Familiarity breeds confidence remains the basis of my argument. Although JFOs are an asset to the integration of air and land firepower, everyone acknowledges that the commander on the ground makes the final call when the circumstances warrant. Employing CAS will continue to be a critical requirement given the dispersion of ground forces and the need to provide indigenous forces with enablers to reinforce their efforts. Commanders and maneuver leaders at all levels would be served well to empower their subordinates with preparation and training to employ CAS before it becomes on-the-job training.

MAJ Scott P. Knight

Soldiers with the 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment determine a grid coordinate during a live-fire exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C., on 11 June.
"The only way the mortar team was able to evade your pursuit was by digging in, a tactic that does not play well to their strengths, and making it only a matter of time before you found them.”

— Joint Multinational Readiness Center Observer/Controller

The contemporary Infantry heavy weapons company and its assault platoons bear little resemblance to its anti-tank counterparts of just 10 years ago. The integration of new technologies such as the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) and the RQ-11 Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has transformed weapons companies into a much more capable and dynamic assault force within brigade combat teams (BCTs).

In light of the recent publication of FM 3-21.12, The Infantry Weapons Company, and the development of the find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) methodology, maneuver leaders at all levels must take the opportunity to reflect upon lessons learned from recent deployments to challenge and push the evolving limits of what assault platoons can provide to full spectrum operations.

This article is an attempt to promote discourse and facilitate leader understanding of the capabilities and limitations of an Infantry weapons company, in general, and an airborne Infantry weapons company, in particular. The findings and recommendations outlined in this article are based upon my own experiences as the company commander for Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division for more than 16 months. In light of my own experiences in training and after observing other weapons companies during their own mission rehearsal exercises, I found that weapons companies are often misunderstood and unnecessarily doctrinally constrained by their legacy “anti-tank” role with the seemingly defensive tasks of blocking and screening. However, a better understanding of this company’s capabilities and its organic assets can enable maneuver commanders at all levels to further exploit the contemporary assault platoon or weapons company in the conduct of full-spectrum operations.

SPC John Cole of Company, 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, mans the AS during a company attack.

Jan 2010

INFANTRY 15
**Composition**

Similar to the Infantry weapons company outlined in FM 3-21.12, an Airborne weapons company is comprised of four assault platoons, each with two squads of vehicles comprised of two gun trucks each. However, unlike the platoons depicted in FM 3-21.12, an assault platoon in the 82nd Airborne Division does not have organic Javelins. Alternatively, platoons have the capability to mount on their gun trucks up to two each M240B 7.62mm machine guns, M2 .50 caliber machine guns, MK-19 automatic grenade launchers, or TOW ITAS. They also have one cargo HMMWV and HMMWV trailer. That assault platoon is comprised of the platoon leader (O-2), platoon sergeant (E-7), section sergeant (E-6), and two squads consisting of the squad leader (E-5), two gunners (E-4), two to three riflemen/drivers (E-4), and two assistant gunners/drivers (E-3), for a total of 18 personnel.

Within an airborne brigade combat team (ABCT), assault platoons provide invaluable capabilities as far as maneuver, firepower, and overwatch. With the potential need to transport or secure casualties, detainees, or noncombatants seeking protection — and with the ever-present need to reinforce or react to contact throughout the perimeter — every single gun truck serves as a battalion-level asset. In theater, gun trucks afford the battalion with a means of transporting and immediately placing into operation a variety of key assets, including the Raven. With organic weapons systems, the airborne assault platoons greatly enhance an ABCT’s ability to find, fix, and finish the enemy. As far as finding the enemy, the ITAS itself provides an assault platoon with an unprecedented ability to scan an engagement area, engage a variety of threats, and can effectively fix, if not finish, a motorized enemy. Additionally, the MK-19 also provides increased dead space coverage well beyond the M203 within rifle platoons. All three of these systems enhance an assault platoon’s ability to close with a suppressed enemy, and under more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), the M240B can supplement the ability for that platoon to finish the enemy. One section, mutually supported or overwatched by another element, can scan more open terrain than multiple dismounted platoons. Granted, the absence of the Javelin system decreases the specific anti-tank capabilities of the airborne weapons company compared to that depicted in FM 3-21.12. However, the introduction of the M240B into the weapons configuration does provide assault platoon leaders with a wider menu of munitions to conduct escalation of force and consequence management within the unique ROE following an airborne assault.

Despite the capabilities of the airborne heavy weapons company, there are several key limitations. The greatest constraint for an organic weapons company is manpower. Although having four platoons provides an added capability as far as the number of maneuver elements, each of those elements is considerably smaller than a rifle platoon and thus more affected by taskings or personnel shortages, particularly leaders. In a four-vehicle convoy, this would facilitate an absolute maximum of nine dismounts, leaving only gunners scanning sectors, drivers monitoring the radio, and one TC to command and control the vehicles, with no backup personnel to react in the event of a downed gunner. This limits the assault platoon’s capacity to engage with the population to the same extent as a dismounted rifle platoon, particularly in an urban setting.

During an extended deployment, once environmental morale leaves into the troop-to-task, this number quickly deteriorates to five to seven dismounts. Within an airborne operation, assault platoons face several major challenges and variables. Depending upon the assembly procedures, it may take up to an hour to have one section fully-mission capable, and up to two hours to have one entire platoon’s vehicles into operation. Second, assault platoons can quickly dissemble and have difficulty covering initial objectives in the event of a damaged vehicle. This can force truck crews to operate dismounted, which may necessitate a task organization change on the ground depending upon the mission for that platoon or company, a contingency that should always be included in planning and rehearsals.

**Manning and Training Priorities**

Within an airborne infantry battalion, a weapons company should be the first company filled with all key leader positions, ideally leaders with previous experience at their current pay grade. Though a rifle platoon has more than twice as many personnel and four squads to command and control, the complexity of the many different assets available and potential mission sets for an assault platoon demands experienced and mature leadership. In order to place leaders where they can have the most impact on the battalion-level fight as far as where they may end up on the battlefield and the volume of effects that they directly control, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should already have served in that capacity in rifle platoons. Section sergeants should also already have served as weapons squad leaders in rifle platoons. Weapons companies are often task organized such that individual platoons or even sections operate decentralized in order to support other company or specialty platoons. This requires a mature leader who can inherently operate away from organic leadership and provide sustainment training and weapons support to other leaders potentially less familiar with that platoon’s or section’s capabilities.

Additionally, the second- and third-order effects of leader vacancies have more serious consequences in a weapons company. For instance, in the absence of one E-6 section sergeant, one of the two E-5 squad leaders must serve as the section sergeant, leaving an E-4 as a squad leader and vehicle TC. That E-4 is now responsible for one of the four types of mounted weapons systems, three different dismounted weapons systems, two radios, a blue force tracking (BFT) system, three other personnel, and would potentially be the senior individual present in a decentralized escalation of force incident. Alternatively, an E-4 in a rifle platoon that serves as a team leader to fill an E-5 vacancy is responsible for three different weapons systems and three other personnel. Battalion commanders
need to look closely at the officers and NCOs who serve in their heavy weapons companies in order to fully leverage the available assets and mitigate the inherent limitations of the smaller platoons. Though assault platoons are often task organized such that they fall under rifle companies while conducting sustained combat operations, I recommend against the practice of decentralizing the assault platoons to fall under rifle company headquarters prior to the execution of a full training cycle with the weapons company consolidated. With the complexity of the equipment in an assault platoon, and given the constraints on training sites that can afford an opportunity to train with those systems, assault platoons’ manning, training, and equipment is best supervised by a single company headquarters. I had the opportunity to go through an entire training cycle with all four platoons, allowing us to follow the progression from the Raytheon ITAS Operator’s Course, to the ITAS Basic Skills Trainer (BST), to firing live TOW missiles at Camp LeJeune, N.C. Only after completing this cycle had all four platoons had enough supervised training on each of the weapons systems to afford them the capacity to effectively decentralize throughout the battalion task force to provide weapons and anti-tank overwatch and reconnaissance support.

Airborne heavy weapons companies must prioritize the training on the ITAS, the one remaining organic anti-tank weapon system. I cannot overemphasize the importance of maintaining proficiency for gunners on the ITAS. Without this proficiency, the company lacks the ability to finish an armored vehicle, severely inhibiting its capacity to impact the F3EA at the battalion level. Because I was very unfamiliar with the system when I assumed command, I sought out the assistance of the Raytheon contact team at Fort Bragg to provide higher-level training. My company had not used the ITAS on the previous deployment to any large extent, and the last training support package on the system had been conducted in the fall of 2006. I contacted the Raytheon team concerning its 54-hour ITAS Operator’s Course. This course proved to be extremely valuable in the level of understanding my gunners acquired as far as the system itself and the current munitions in theater. Each BCT should schedule this course semiannually for all ITAS gunners, as it is designed to train approximately 25 personnel and would ensure that new gunners have baseline proficiency with the system. Raytheon also provides a four-hour leader’s course oriented towards maneuver commanders and S-3s who may command and control assault platoons. After firing more than 100 TOW missiles during its last 14-month rotation to Afghanistan, the 173rd ABCT recommended that every gunner fire a live TOW missile prior to deployment. BCTs must make every effort to afford maximum opportunities to fire TOW missiles. Only by placing an annual training event on the calendar to ensure that all ITAS gunners fire live munitions can a unit ensure that proper emphasis is being place on retaining this vital skill set, particularly in the event of a conventional conflict.

All Infantry commanders, and particularly weapons company commanders, must also stress UAV training. The quality of the imagery has improved dramatically just since the original fielding of the RQ-11 in 2005. I made the Raven a priority for training and have almost reached the standard of having two qualified operators per platoon. After experimentation with battery life and sustainable flight frequency, I find that with eight operators (who can rotate according to their assigned duties and responsibilities) and two complete Raven aircraft systems, barring major maintenance issues it is possible to sustain 8-12 hours of flights per day with minimal impact on the platoon manning. Those 8-12 hours, accompanied by an ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) matrix, can provide innumerable benefits as far as area or objective reconnaissance, pattern of life behavioral monitoring, and route reconnaissance for patrols. Even more important than the maintenance of their flying proficiency is the routine communication between squad- and platoon-level leaders and Raven operators, which also serves as a means of developing junior leaders who constantly train in a combined-arms atmosphere. Only through routine interaction during all collective training events can leaders understand the capabilities and limitations of the Raven and ensure that operators understand how they can best support those leaders.

Employment of Assault Platoons
Cordon and Search Operations — The primary advantage that a weapons company has in conducting a cordon and search derives from the integration of the ITAS and the Raven to provide effective overwatch and early warning of enemy activity. In an urban environment, leaders must do a cost-benefit analysis of whether or not to mount the ITAS if they lack the ability to mount both the ITAS and an automatic weapon system. With the limited field of view that the gunner has in the ITAS optic, he sacrifices breadth of coverage for specificity. With regards to force protection, especially for improvised attacks like the RKG-3, gunners would be unlikely or even discouraged from opening up with the heavy weapon system first, and would most likely end up engaging with the M4 in the turret. Thus, even in an urban environment there may still be merit to mounting an ITAS with an M4 also in the turret, even if it means having one less M240B, MK-19, or M2 in that environment.

Whenever possible, one ITAS vehicle should be centrally-located within the cordoned area to scan the surrounding area for activity, particularly at night. The optical zoom would make it possible, even during the day, for the gunner to identify anyone attempting to take pictures or video the operation, or possibly personnel serving as early warning. For daytime operations, leaders need to assign very clear NAIs or points of interest to the gunners due to the limits of their field of view. At night, however, gunners would have more freedom to move quickly through their designated sectors of fire, given the clearly visible thermal image that personnel would give if they were observing or attempting to initiate contact through windows or doorways. Even personnel well back from the window itself can be observed, and a very quick determination could be made as far as gender, body positioning, the presence of threatening materials or hostile intent. In addition to scanning from the inside of the cordon to observe activity, the ITAS can also be used to monitor and scan the exfiltration route.

For operations like the cordon and search
It can provide overwatch or route reconnaissance for the infiltration significant task organization and security challenges.

trucks must be manned, then individual assault platoons face battalion quick reaction force (QRF) readiness status. However, if engage the population and operate independently with an adequate operating entirely dismounted, an assault platoon can effectively personnel, barely enough for a local national engagement. When combat operations this more realistically becomes four to six have six to nine dismounts available, though during sustained absolutely ideal circumstances, a mounted assault platoon may dogs, Civil Affairs team, etc.) that require additional security. Under where dismounts are a planned portion of the operation, the best tactic we found for command and control was for the platoon leader and FO to be part of the dismount element, with the platoon sergeant remaining with the vehicles. This allowed the platoon sergeant to supervise the overwatch element and the sectors of fire for the weapons, and it also affords him the most flexibility as far as either maintaining the platoon casualty collection point (CCP) at the pre-designated vehicle or to move the CCP to the point of injury for medical evacuation, while providing him the more robust communications platform possible between the ASIP on a poweramp or through an expedited BFT message to the higher headquarters.

One major disadvantage with weapons’ direct involvement in cordon and search operations pertains again to the number of dismounts, particularly if there are other enablers (military working dogs, Civil Affairs team, etc.) that require additional security. Under absolutely ideal circumstances, a mounted assault platoon may have six to nine dismounts available, though during sustained combat operations this more realistically becomes four to six personnel, barely enough for a local national engagement. When operating entirely dismounted, an assault platoon can effectively engage the population and operate independently with an adequate battalion quick reaction force (QRF) readiness status. However, if trucks must be manned, then individual assault platoons face significant task organization and security challenges.

The UAV should also be incorporated into the cordon and search. It can provide overwatch or route reconnaissance for the infiltration route, or simply observe the objective. Though the RQ-11 does emit an audible noise, a technique called the “silent approach” can be used to drift from a high to a low altitude using the motor minimally. This ability to identify personnel moving inside or outside of the intended perimeter can have a significant impact on intelligence development. After the operation, the UAV can also be integrated to overwatch the objective area to gather atmospherics for any potential enemy personnel that seek to intimidate members of the local population.

**Deliberate Raids**

An assault platoon’s organic assets also facilitate the execution of deliberate raids. During the platoon situational training exercise (STX) during our mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), platoons were tasked to conduct a deliberate raid on a known enemy compound after confirming the presence of weapons smugglers. After conducting a terrain analysis using the BFT circular line of sight (LOS) tool, platoons identified an ideal overwatch position that was out of earshot for the enemy, approximately 600 meters away to overwatch the objective. Using the ITAS, platoons could easily confirm or deny the presence and activity of the weapons smugglers and have a variety of means to find, fix and finish the enemy. With a confirmed LOS, the long range optics make it possible to determine the exact composition, disposition, and strength of the personnel on the compound, well beyond heavy PAS-13s or “three bys” organic to rifle platoons. The ITAS can also greatly enhance the effectiveness of indirect fires, either by confirming pre-planned targets or using the laser range finder (Far Target Locator [FTL] available in theater) to receive an immediate and accurate distance and direction. In conjunction with a 10-digit grid from the BFT, forward observers can call in an accurate and expedited call-for-fire mission through the instantaneous polar information. Units with the 173rd Airborne Brigade found this tactic to be highly effective, usually placing indirect fire rounds on target with just one adjustment.

Beyond reconnaissance and overwatch, the platoon can use the ITAS to engage a hardstand building with minimal collateral damage. The 173rd again pioneered the usage of the ITAS against buildings. The bunker buster munitions now available in theater, combined with the accuracy of the ITAS, significantly mitigates historic collateral damage concerns. With a positive identification and an ROE that would afford this type of engagement, a target can be conclusively identified and engaged by the same sensor-shooter. The patrol leader can also use the connected video screen to observe what the gunner is seeing in their optics and provide firing commands to the gunner. Finally, if the intelligence that may be obtained on the objective warrants a tactical call prior to finishing the enemy on the objective, then the assault platoon leader has an optimal array of capabilities, particularly if the UAV is airborne, to find, fix, and, if the tactical callout is unsuccessful, finish the enemy on the objective.

The combination of speed and overwhelming firepower can also provide a mobile support by fire that can immediately establish superiority of fire and effectively fix the enemy. Thermals can then be used to continue to assess any movement on the objective before ever dismounting and using the vehicles for cover to the
objective area. Though an assault platoon may be a likely candidate for the routine or permanent PSD for battalion or higher-level leaders given its size on paper, this role may not make full use of its capabilities unless it is part of a deliberate tactical command post. Even up to three or four kilometers away from an objective, if a line of sight with the objective area is possible, senior leaders riding as part of a convoy with an assault platoon could have direct control over the UAV ISR before, during, and after the operation through the on-board Raven operator, and would have a robust capability to identify targets for indirect fire and provide intelligence updates on the objective area.

**Search and Attack Missions**

Airborne heavy weapons companies and assault platoons are best suited for search and attack or deterrence missions, particularly in non-urban environments. During my own MRE, we integrated the Raven UAV and our ITAS to conduct a search and attack mission on a mortar team operating in wooded terrain. Though we were unsuccessful in destroying or detaining the individuals involved in this instance, our pursuit was highly effective in denying the enemy’s ability to use the terrain outside of the towns to conduct indirect fire attacks, decreasing the number of attacks from 10 in the previous 48 hours to zero in the subsequent 48 hours that we conducted the search and attack missions. The integration of the UAV and the usage of the ITAS in a rural environment demonstrated the potential for conducting combined operations at the company level to dominate the three-dimensional battlespace. These operations also emphasized the potential for the airborne heavy weapons company to conduct purely offensive operations in order to dominate the surrounding battlespace.

The current tracking mechanisms for the Raven during mounted operations, even if the takeoff and landing areas are different. When conducting these search and attack missions, on multiple occasions, I designated primary and alternate takeoff and landing sites. We would launch from one position, and then have the antennae projecting through the turret of a HMMWV, with the assistant operator ensuring that the directional antennae continued to communicate with the aircraft. This afforded us an opportunity to use the full battery power, usually 45 minutes to one hour depending upon wind, to attempt to pursue possible enemy with an internal aerial platform under our direct control. We would then set up a hasty security perimeter when we needed to land the aircraft, change out the battery, and then resume the operation. In concert with the ITAS, the UAV provided the company with multiple means of identifying the enemy or, at a minimum, severely restricting his movement.

The actual maneuver of forces looked very much like a company-level bounding overwatch. In one particular operation within two hours we effectively dominated approximately 15 square kilometers with just three platoons, destroying the one enemy element present within that battlespace. We routinely used the LOS tool on the BFT to identify higher, open terrain where we could emplace a stationary force with a retrans COM 201 and an ITAS scanning designated terrain, while the bounding element would seek to cover dead space or canalize possible enemy mortar teams into the line of sight of the stationary element. Communication and a common operating picture were critical during these operations. With a stationary Raven team back at the COP or with the overwatch ITAS element, all platoons involved in the operation would receive updates on the location of personnel or vehicles in the battlespace and could provide near real-time 10-digit grids for possible enemy locations. In the absence of previously developed NAIs, these patrols converted a traditional movement to contact into a deliberate search and attack, with the Raven providing information on possible enemy activity which could be confirmed by the overwatch ITAS element or the maneuver element.

After the operation, we learned from the observer/controllers that the only means the mortar team had of evading our pursuit was by digging into the terrain. Given their propensity to remain mobile and blend into the population in this Afghanistan-based scenario, this severely limited their freedom of movement and their ability to disrupt friendly operations via indirect fire attacks.

**Defensive Operations**

The assault platoons have even more potential in enhancing a company or battalion-level defensive position. Whether as part of a FOB defense or the establishment and expansion of a lodgement during an airborne operation, assault platoons have the ability to enhance a unit’s ability to conduct engagement area development.
PROFESSIONAL FORUM

With the use of the BFT, an assault platoon can do a detailed map and imagery reconnaissance of the potential defensive position or likely avenues of approach. This contributes directly to the identification of the primary and contingency engagement areas. The assault platoon also has more options as far as weapons systems to ensure that dead space is covered through the use of the M203 or MK-19, and that multiple kill zones are established with a defense in depth. The mobility and storage capabilities of the gun trucks provides the airborne assault platoon with the ability to quickly emplace and retrieve obstacles, and also to conduct physical reconnaissance of the engagement area and any dead space to plan and integrate indirect fires. BFT then affords a quick opportunity to graphically depict the entire patrol base and the indirect fires plan for the higher headquarters.

In the event of a unit conducting an extended ground assault convoy over the course of multiple days, the Raven can work in conjunction with the ITAS to provide overwatch of the surrounding area and provide a means of early warning to maintain the initiative even when conducting a mounted patrol base or even a short halt. In these instances, ensure that an unobstructed runway of approximately 75-meters long by 25-meters wide is available, and take into consideration the approximate 10 minutes it takes to conduct preflight testing. The Raven and ITAS in concert can facilitate the establishment of a vehicular patrol base, which we did at the company level during our MRE. By burying our 3K generator and conducting a cold-start every two hours and running the vehicles for 20 minutes to maintain the vehicle battery life, and by camouflaging our vehicles and choosing a position off of the main lines of drift but with overwatch of those lines of drift, we were able to minimize our physical and audible signature and establish a robust and effective defensive position.

If another nation was to request the assistance of a coalition force where we would be establishing a base of operations within friendly borders and projecting forces in a stability and support capacity, conducting counterinsurgency operations, or in training role supporting and assisting host-nation forces with full-spectrum operations, higher-level planners should take into consideration these capabilities, particularly in site selection for forward operating bases or combat outposts. On open terrain — either in the mounted or, ideally, in an elevated dismounted position — the ITAS could provide a constant means of reconnaissance and observation for key avenues of approach. Perhaps the best position for such an operating base would be in an open rural environment or on relatively high ground where the ITAS could see 3-5 kilometers in each direction, severely limiting a potential adversary’s ability to conduct harassment operations on the outpost itself or emplace IEDs along key routes. This would also severely impact the enemy’s ability to influence the local population by mitigating the danger they face purely due to their proximity to coalition forces compounds.

The Way Ahead

As far as potential improvements or enhancements of current capabilities, BCTs should receive the ITAS with FTL capabilities starting in the fall of 2010. Raytheon should also consider adding a target designation capability to the system. In the event that a gunner or leader on the ground identifies a target that would be more appropriately engaged by close air support or attack aviation. Or if he simply wants to draw the attention of other gunners or dismounts in the area towards a potential target, then a large IR (hellfire equivalent or larger) would allow a gunner to do just that. The 173rd ABCT has found a way to mount a PEQ-2 to the ITAS system as a means of designating sectors of fire or to provide an IR signature, but a much larger designator would greatly enhance the systems potential as a reconnaissance or ISR asset for the battalion.

As far as the Raven, battalions should look closely at the task organization of their companies with respect to Raven operators and the push for company intelligence support teams (COIST). Two qualified operators per platoon could also serve as COIST personnel. That way the personnel responsible for developing NAI’s and analyzing patterns of life within the company are also the same individuals operating the Raven and executing the ISR synch matrix. Another course of action that should be explored at the battalion level in airborne units includes pushing additional UAVs to the assault platoons as the primary means of transporting the asset and as the elements most likely to be operating remotely. Any push for COIST or battalion-level UAV elements within weapons companies, however, would require additional manpower given the primary constraint for those elements.

Given the uniqueness of a weapons company and the sheer breadth of missions it can execute, leaders at all levels should ensure that they understand the specific capabilities and limitations of the systems that make it a highly lethal and dynamic force. Whether the commander’s intent is to defend friendly structures through a more comprehensive defense and ISR plan, to more closely monitor activity in adjacent buildings in an urban environment, or to pursue the enemy when he chooses to separate himself from the population, an assault platoon has all the tools to facilitate or even individually execute almost any mission in the contemporary operating environment.

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The United States’ involvement in Iraq and challenges from Iran compel a greater understanding of the complexities of Iraqi as well as Iranian military and political history. We can no longer ignore the patterns of Iranian and Iraqi history which stretch for centuries. It is vital that America’s war colleges delve into obscure disputes such as those between the Ottomans and Safavid Persians. Iraq, known before the 20th century as Mesopotamia, has always been the scene of superpower struggles for centuries: the Greeks versus the Lakhmids, the Romans versus the Parthians (able horsemen, the Parthian could fire a bow while mounted, giving the term Parthian and now parting shot). The Sassanid Persians fought in Iraq first against Christian Byzantium and then the Arabs unified by Islam. Then Iraq would be the stage for rivalries between the Ottomans and the Safavid Persians. The Cold War (1945-1991) engulfed three monarchs of Hashemite Iraq (Kings Faisal I, Ghazi I, and Faisal II) and the Shah of Iran. Fears of Iranian penetration pitted the Republic of Iraq against the Shah, and those fears were amplified with the successful coup that brought the Islamic Republic of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. Fears now include not only the expansion of Iran, but the export of revolutionary and radical Shiite political doctrines.

Despite Iraq being the scene of so much historical violence from 1554 to 1975, there would be 10 major agreements signed between Iraq (or Mesopotamia) and Iran (or Persia). Nabil Khalifah, a then-recently graduated Arab student of Islamic civilization, wrote two books, one on Lebanese historical culture and the second on Saudi petroleum politics. His third book — the subject of this review essay — was published in 1983 and was part of his undergraduate thesis. It is a historical analysis of these 10 agreements between Iraq and Iran. Khalifah attempted to address the central issues that have resulted in conflict between these two regional powers from 1554 to 1975. He published his work under the title *Ruyah Jadeedah lil Harb al-Iraqiyah al-Farisiyah* (*A New Assessment of the Iraq-Iran War*). It is important to pause and note that this Arabic book was published three years into the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989). The book was self-published in Beirut and can be found through inter-library loan by citing Library of Congress call number 84962304.

Works by Arab intellectuals and graduate theses of military significance that are printed into books are important to analyze. They offer American military planners a method to better understand the region from the vantage and culture of those living, writing and reflecting on conflicts within the Middle East. It is not important to agree or disagree with a point of view, but to learn, study and become acclimated to the perceptions, as well as the overt and covert hostilities between Iran and Iraq over the centuries. This review of Khalifa’s work will not highlight his views on all 10 treaties, but introduce readers to the main points of his book with a focus on the sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq from the 16th century to 1975. Once identified, these tensions can be monitored and managed, as we balance the complexities of political-military affairs in the Persian Gulf.

**Religious Issues**

A key guarantee for any Persian ruler, since Shiite Islam became the state religion in Persia (now Iran) under Shah Abbas I in 1508, was to secure unmolested access to Shiite holy sites under Sunni control such as Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and Mecca and Medina in Arabia. This would be the central focus of the Amasia Treaty of 1554. The treaty was negotiated to stop the harassment of Shiite pilgrims by Ottoman government functionaries, villagers and Sunni tribes. Shiite pilgrims were robbed of their valuables on their way to Karbala from Persia or in northern Arabia as they

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**Persian-Mesopotamian Relations:** Religious and Territorial Fault Lines from the 16th Century to 1975

COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, U.S. NAVY

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Figure 1 — Map created between 1934 and 1939
made their way to Mecca.

The Nadir Shah Treaty of 1746 focused on getting Ottomans to acknowledge their responsibility for the concept of aman (safe-passage or safety and security) of guests visiting Ottoman domains as pilgrims. The focus of the treaties of 1554 and 1746 were geographically centered on access to Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. The Ottomans captured Mesopotamia gradually from 1534 and wrested the entire region from Persia by 1555. The Ottomans (a Sunni power) now controlled the holy sites of both Shiites and Sunni Muslims to include Mecca and Medina in Arabia as well as Karbala and Najaf in Mesopotamia. The Ottoman capture of Shiite holy shrines in Iraq from Persia necessitated a renegotiation of the treaty of 1554 and renewed hostilities between Persia and the Ottomans. Sunni dominance of Shiite holy sanctuaries in Iraq would continue from 1555 until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The capture of Karbala in 1556 so outraged the Shiite community that skirmishes broke out between Persian and Ottoman forces. By the 19th century the Ottomans and Persians massed large formations, a stand-off that required the intervention of Britain and Russia, who organized the Eruzurum Talks. These talks resulted in two treaties in 1823 and 1847. The second Eruzurum Talks began in 1843, but it took four years for an agreement to be reached between Persia and the Ottomans on the status of the holy sites and the status of the Shiite Hawza (clerical cluster) in present-day Iraq. Persian demands during the second Erzurum Talks included:

- Protection of Shia traders and pilgrims within Ottoman domains;
- Abolishment of discriminatory practices against Shiites in Ottoman law courts;
- The right to establish Shiite mosques in Ottoman domains;
- Security to worship in Medina and Mecca in Arabia and Najaf and Karbala in Iraq; and
- Ease restrictions on rights to bury Shia in or near holy shrines, an imposition placed in the 19th century under the pretext of lack of space.

Persia’s military incursions and harassment of Ottoman-controlled Basra as well as Mosul were designed to force a reaction — recognition and respect for Shiism. In reality, both the Ottomans and Persians fanned the flames of sectarianism. Complicating Shiite rights in Sunni Ottoman dominions were the Kaab tribe who left the central Arabian region of the Najd and settled in what would be eventually named Arabistan (land of the Arabs). These Sunni minorities were discriminated against in Shiite-dominated Persia.

The Strategic Port of Muhammara

The Port of Muhammara (now Khorrarmshahr) located on the lip of the Shatt al-Arab waterway fell in the region of Arabistan. Tribal histories in this region matter, and this port was established by Ghaith ibn Kaab, of the Kaab tribe, likely in the 10th century. This port would evolve and expand to the modern ports of Umm Qasr and Abadan combined. The strategic importance of the Port of Muhammara would be magnified when the Mamelukes of Egypt fought a titanic struggle against the Muslim Mongols over control of the Levant in the 13th century. This diverted trade to the Persian Gulf, making the Port of Muhammara a valuable asset. The port would be an autonomous region ruled by the Kaab Tribe, and there were no organized or enforced tariffs. The Port of Muhammara quickly evolved into an open port for Arabs, Turks, Persians and Europeans, with the Kaab tribe sandwiched between the great powers of Persia and the Ottomans.

In Ottoman times, higher tariffs were levied on British goods, and the autonomous tribal confederacy of Muhammara exploited this by ignoring the Ottoman decree. In the expansion of the port during the late 19th century, the name Khurramshahr/Muhammara was applied to this trade zone. It became a vital strategic asset bringing in goods from the Persian Gulf and into Persia, Mesopotamia and the southern Levant. The Kaab tribe now led the tribal confederation of Muhammara, and its control of the port was encouraged by Britain to declare independence from Ottoman suzerainty. The Sunni Kaab Tribe saw in this the ability to maintain autonomy, by eliciting a new power (Great Britain) in its survival against the Ottomans and Persians. This was perhaps the earliest instance of the British providing protection for the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, and what would evolve into the Trucial Coast. In World War I, the British would use their relationship with the Sheikh of Muhammara to flow British Expeditionary Forces into the Port of Muhammara to protect Persian oil fields and the refinery in Abadan, and open a military campaign against Germany’s ally Ottoman Turkey.

Ottoman and Persian Regional Jealousies

The book details the subconscious and conscious jealousies between Persia and the Ottomans that would carry over well into present day. We have already highlighted that Iraq was a nation that possessed Shiite holy places that Persia did not have. In addition, Iraq boasted larger cities than Persia and had more cultivatable marsh and flatlands versus the mountains of Persia. From the Persian perspective, all trade, development, agriculture and holy sites seemed to be going towards Mesopotamia. Trade was of great interest throughout the region’s history, and the book highlights the Mesopotamian saying, “The Persian makes pilgrimage to trade and trades to make pilgrimage.” This adage captures in a few words the importance of unimpeded access of Shiite Persians into Iraq and then onto Arabia. The author highlights the following issues from studying the multiple agreements reached and broken from 1554 to 1975:

* The 1746 Nadir Shah Agreement has as part of its components Ottoman taxation, an issue resolved when an agreement was struck in which Persians would not be taxed unless they earn a profit or engage in trade within Mesopotamia.

* In 1823, it was agreed that a one-time tax of four percent be levied per visit on Shites from Persia visiting Mesopotamia.

* There were a bevy of tariffs on Persian goods, and then in 1843 there was a cancellation of all tariffs and taxes except the four-percent tax. Trade equality between Ottoman Sunni and Persian Shiites was a matter of discussion.

The underlying Persian tension was that the Ottomans controlled the vital transportation links for pilgrimage and trade. Iraq also enjoyed waterways, rivers, and flatlands that made transportation much easier for those pilgrims and tradesman.
Persia by 1843, sought to assert control of those routes through negotiation, a condition that would not last, as negotiations were only viewed as a temporary truce with the Ottomans. Many in the west failed to realize that the agreements and negotiations in the region were merely another form of warfare.

Geographic Border Flashpoints

American military planners should also study the three strategic geographic regions that have been contested between Iraq and Iran. These geographic regions were among the agenda items between Sunni and Shiite regional powers from Ottoman times to Saddam Hussein. The book defines these geographic flashpoints as:

(I) Suleimaniyah in the north: The Persian side is mountainous, and Persia has guarded Iraqi access into Iran itself and Turkey. This is why the Kurds would be pawns in the power struggle over dominance of mountain passes between Persian Shiite and Arab Sunni powers.

(II) The Zehab region in the center: This offered a direct route into Iran from central Iraq and vice versa.

(III) Muhammara and Ahwaz region of the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the South: This provided access to the Persian Gulf, and various rivers and tributaries. It was a flashpoint of warfare for centuries, to include the last major conflict, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989). In Operation Iraqi Freedom, one key objective was the quick control of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, which allowed a logistical beachhead to be established.

Border Tensions in the 19th and 20th Centuries

The 1847 Second Treaty of Erzurum drew the borders between Persia and Ottoman Iraq under the auspices of Britain and Russia. In addition, the borders agreed to in this treaty have remained relatively intact to this day. The reason every agreement between Persia and Mesopotamia never endured was because although these agreements were on paper, the intention for peace and settlement was never present and could only be described as a cold peace. This cold peace between the Ottomans and Persians involved inciting Kurdish and Sunni insurgencies in Persia and Shiite agitation in Ottoman Mesopotamian provinces. To demonstrate the sensitivity of even a few kilometers between Persia and Iraq, the book highlights this case. In 1911, the Shatt al-Arab Waterway line of demarcation moved 7 3/4 kilometers from the center through negotiations, and in 1937 it moved 7 3/4 kilometers of the Thalwig (Water Demarcation) Line into the Iranian side of the coast towards Abadan. The reason for the breakdown and tactical duels over the Shatt al-Arab was that the Persians used the Shatt al-Arab waterway without giving Iraq land in Qasr Shireen that the Iraqis felt they were entitled to and negotiated for (although this is debatable) both in the Shah’s time and in the time of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1975, this line was again discussed and the Algiers Agreement redrew the line in favor of Iran. This explosive combination of centuries of jealousy and obsession of gaining minor advantage between Sunni and Shiite on the fault-line between Iraq and Iran was exacerbated when Shah Reza Pahlavi and Iran was transformed as one of two pillars of American security interests in the region, the second pillar being Saudi Arabia. Provided with American arms and equipment, Iran evolved into the fifth largest army in the world, and Iraq would be marginalized making the Baathists look towards the Warsaw Pact and Arab nationalism to counter America’s favor of the Iranian regime.

It is important to pause and understand the lack of options thrust upon the United States, with the announcement of the withdrawal of British forces east of the Suez by 1971 (an announcement made in 1967). The Twin Pillar Policy, developed by the Nixon administration, was designed to have a Sunni and Shiite regional power police the region, but this disrupted the balance of power in the region, placing significant players like Egypt and Iraq at a disadvantage. Flush with modern weapons, Iran began to flex its military muscle in the Persian Gulf, taking physical control of the islands of Abu Musa, as well as the Greater and Lesser Tunbs from the United Arab Emirates. Iran made blustering statements
claiming Emirate of Bahrain and the Shatt al-Arab waterway as its territory. Saddam Hussein cancelled the 1975 Algiers Agreement in 1980, the Iraqi Baathists used the pretext of Iran not returning 150 square kilometers of Qasr Shireen, a negotiation point the Iraqis believed they had gained. This combined with the fear of the spread of Khomeinism and the Ayatollah’s labeling of the Baathists as apostates as well as Iranian support of world Islamist Liberation movements led to a strategic decision by Iraq to pursue a more hostile policy against Teheran. But the new Islamist radical regime in Iran altered the dynamics of the region, with Iran marginalized by the United States and scaring the Arab world, Iraq found an opportunity to assert its dominance in the Persian Gulf region. In many ways Saddam had misread internal events within Iran and chose not to take a more covert option for dealing with fights between Ansar Khomeini, radicalist hardliners, and the Revolutionary Government of Iran. A covert approach of supporting factions within the Iranian Revolution would have been a better option for Iraq, than direct action, the choice Saddam made when he invaded Iran in 1980.

Saddam viewed Iranian command and control in the early months of the Iranian Revolution to be completely eroded and looked on as Iran purged its top generals for even a perceived loyalty to the Shah. Economically Iran’s oil industry was in tatters, and the demonization of both the United States and USSR left Iran isolated. Saddam also saw the balkanization of Iran’s minorities as the Kurds in the north and Arabs of Arabistan in the south began challenging the authority of the central government in Tehran. This was brought on by internal skirmishes as the Iranian revolution took on the trappings of an Islamist version of the Reign of Terror, except the terror was perpetrated by hardliners wanting to impose a fundamentalist Shiite regime upon all Iranians. Under this instability within Iran, Saddam could have stimulated revolts among the Kurds and disgruntled minorities of Arabistan to the Southwest and Sunni Baluchistan in the southeast. Both are not without risks; tension between the Iranian-Pakistan borders would have diverted attention from the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan. Empowering the Kurds on either the Iranian, Iraqi, Turkish or Syrian borders was always a delicate gamble, as empowered autonomous Iranian Kurds could hypothetically foment insurgency in Iraqi Kurdistan. Instead Saddam chose to invade Iran, deluding himself that it would be a quick victory in which he would have the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway and Arabistan.

**The Iran-Iraq War**

The opening gambit of the Iran-Iraq War were Iraqi forces engaging in a dual thrust through Qasr Shireen and Sumar in the North and Arabistan in the South. Thirteen Iraqi divisions were allocated for the initial attack, with five crack divisions as the lead attack force to control the Arabistan/Ahwaz region of Southern Iran. The central focus of the opening shots of the Iraqi ground war against Iran in 1980 was the control of the flatlands. With control of these, armored and mechanized columns could flow with ease, leaving the Iranians the northern mountainous regions and marshes in the south past Basra. Another tactical objective for Saddam’s General Staff was to push Iranian positions away from artillery range of Iraqi cities. Iraq’s initial assault pushed 10-30 kilometers east of the Shatt al-Arab banks. Saddam hoped to:

* Topple the Khomeini regime;
* Receive territorial recognition of Iraq’s primacy over Qasr Shireen in the north and the Shatt al-Arab in the south; and
* Demonstrate Iraq’s supremacy over the Persian Gulf.

The war instead drew down into a stalemate and a static trench defense using 20th century weapons of war. Iran’s immediate objectives were:

* Quickly reconstitute its forces;
* Break its political and military isolation to access weapons and parts from any source even if it was Israel; and
* Galvanize and mobilize the massive Iranian population, an advantage Iran always enjoyed over Iraq.

No war simply involves two sides. The case of the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1989 is no exception. Arab Sunni Muslim states saw it as a means of containing Persian Shiite ambitions. Israel saw it as a covert means of containing Iraq’s Saddam Hussein who craved nuclear weapons, and saw Iraqi armor in support of Jordan in any future Arab-Israeli War as a threat. Israel also contended with Iraq’s support of Palestinian rejectionist groups as an internal threat to Israel. Egypt saw the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to bolster its credentials as a moderate Arab power, and begin the rehabilitation of relations with the Arab League, damaged by Egypt’s peace accords with Israel. Syria saw an opportunity to undermine a rival Baathist regime in Iraq. Iran’s hard-line policies and irrational public statements were betrayed by desperation for American military spare parts, it used American hostages to negotiate a much needed infusion of arms.

Iran’s mullahs turned the essence of the conflict into one of Persian nationalism and playing on the victimization imagery that is inherent within Shiite Islam. Its mandate became to rid the globe of oppressors of the earth starting with Saddam. Iraq could never win a drawn-out conflict with Iran, due to demographic factors and lack of strategic depth of major Iraqi cities to include Baghdad and Basra. The book breaks down the numbers why Iraq could not afford a drawn-out war with Iran (see Figure 4).

Syria, a Baathist competitor, all but sided with Iran when it closed down Iraq’s oil pipeline that took Iraqi oil to Banyas, Syria and Beirut, Lebanon for shipment around the globe. This was a blow to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Ratio</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>242,000</td>
<td>514,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Depth</td>
<td>400 km</td>
<td>1,300 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coastline</td>
<td>100 km</td>
<td>1,500 km</td>
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<td>Oil Potential</td>
<td>9.6 billion barrels*</td>
<td>23 billion barrels*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Reserves</td>
<td>31 billion barrels</td>
<td>58 billion barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Reserves</td>
<td>2.75 million cubic ft</td>
<td>490 million cubic ft</td>
</tr>
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* per year

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Figure 4
Iraq’s ability to sustain a war of attrition with Iran. Desperate, Iraq explored pipelines through Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea or through Turkey. Iran began amassing massive human wave assaults and withdrew formations along its border with the USSR, directing them against Iraq. By the summer of 1982, Saddam realized he could not have the ultimate victory he and his advisers deluded themselves could be achieved. In late June 1982, Saddam ordered the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory gained in 1980. This did nothing to change Khomeini’s personal agenda and determination to continue the war. The Ayatollah’s demands made it clear he did not want to seize any serious opportunity for peace in 1982 and would continue the war for another six and a half years. Among Khomeini’s demands:

* $150 billion in compensation;
* The removal of Saddam Hussein (regime change —the Iranian terms for regime change were more stringent than what the United States demanded on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Khomeini wanted the removal of Saddam and his entire cabinet of ministers); and
* Permission to allow Iranian forces to traverse Iraq to engage in war against the Israelis in support of any wider Arab-Israeli War.

The terms dictated by Khomeini led Saddam to ask for United Nations peacekeepers in July 1982 along the Iran-Iraq border and to confirm that all Iraqi units have left Iran. Saddam wanted United Nations forces to enforce a cease-fire. Both Iran and the United Nations refused these proposals. That same month (July 1982), Iranian forces carried out Operation Ramadan, a massive assault on Basra. Although a military failure, the Iranian assault should have worried Saddam, for Iranian military planners abandoned the futile attempt to attack through the marshes in favor of human wave assaults on key strategic objectives.

**Conclusion**

The balance of power between Iraq and Iran in the past and now rests upon Iraq joining a union of Arab Gulf States as a counter to Iran. For only through a common collective such as being part of the Ottoman Empire or support from Arab Gulf States during the Iran-Iraq War, can Iraq match and deter Tehran economically, demographically, militarily, and strategically. When Iraq became a quasi independent monarchy in 1921 and then a nepotistic dictatorship under the Baathists, it could never successfully counter Iran alone and particularly in any war of attrition.

Books by Arab authors on Iraq’s political and military history along with those written by Persian authors in Farsi (the Persian language) need to be translated, assessed and understood by future American military planners. This allows American policymakers and military leaders the ability to enter the nuances, language and perceptions (right or wrong) that individuals both allies and adversaries from the region hold. Obscure titles in Arabic such as the one featured in this essay written 25 years ago by a recently graduated Lebanese university student are vital as the United States undertakes a long-term commitment to the challenges of the Middle East. Khalifa’s book highlights the tribal, historical and sectarian issues that Iran faces, which include Kurds in the North, tribes of Arab origin in the south, and Sunnis Baluchis along the border with Pakistan. Web sites offer a revealing look into emerging and established separatist movements among these groups that threaten Iran’s territorial integrity, it is vital that the United States be cognizant of these groups which add instability to an already tense region. This instability is not helped by a reactionary Shiite fundamentalist government in Iran.

By liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein, the coalition has broken centuries of Iraq’s history in which cruel leaders have governed the region. In addition, its geographic location combined with its resources has made it the stage for numerous wars of great powers. The United States has for a single moment in Iraq’s long history given the Iraqis the opportunity to break this cycle. In the end, it is up to the Iraqi people to seize the moment and defy centuries of history by evolving into the Arab world’s first multicultural true democracy or regress back into the pattern of Iraqi history of being dominated by dictatorships and manipulated by regional powers. The men and women of the United States armed forces have done something truly extraordinary, provided the Iraqis a small window to break their historical cycle of violence and oppression. The success of Operation Iraqi Freedom is still debatable, but America has in the end succeeded in turning the tide of history long enough for the Iraqi people to make a choice. In the end, success or failure will be the result of the choice of Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people.

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A Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the spring of 2008 to the Salman Pak area of Baghdad. The company was comprised of an infantry headquarters section, two mechanized infantry rifle platoons and the battalion scout platoon.

In the contemporary operating environment, it has been demonstrated that company-level fusion cells are an increasingly effective tool that enables company commanders to respond to and neutralize threats within their area of operations while also creating a more detailed and comprehensive picture of their key terrain — the local population. Commanders who do not emphasize the implementation of this concept face challenges that would be less daunting and much easier to handle if the time were taken to train personnel to utilize the fusion cell concept at the company level. These challenges include understanding complex tribal associations and regional dynamics, maintaining a relevant and comprehensive picture of lethal targeting in zone, and executing effective relief-in-place operations within the company itself and when the unit is replaced at the end of its deployment.

Given that the population is the key terrain in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, understanding tribal affiliations and family trees is essential. The fact that areas of operation (AOs) for land-owning companies are getting bigger enforces the point that a dedicated intelligence cell in the company will be needed just to get a functional understanding of who’s who in an area. Knowing who leaders are, whom they trust, who they are related to, and if they are an asset as opposed to a liability are just a few questions that must be answered and then presented in a way that can be used and submitted to higher in order for COIN operations to be successful. Also, seeing how tribal affiliations fit into the greater picture of regional dynamics is a key task. Small unit leaders gather this information through
company priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and local leader engagements, but obtaining a working picture of the entire company AO is too large of a job to be done well by the company commander alone. A dedicated intelligence section eases this burden.

The fusion cell eases the tracking and distribution of lethal targeting information. Though lethal operations are often considered a shaping operation as opposed to a decisive operation in the COIN fight, they are still a vital step in the path between a fully mature insurgency and a safe and stable society. The information gathered by small unit leaders and synthesized in the fusion cell makes it much easier for the company commander to react to new threats and anticipate future problems in his AO. Company fusion cells reporting to task force S2s facilitate higher quality
targeting information at the task force and brigade combat team levels, which pays dividends for the maneuver units on the ground as well.

Most company teams experience a transition in leadership at some point in the deployment. Company commanders and platoon leaders are often switched out and move on to other duties while the company is deployed. Even after a well-executed transition new leaders will still have questions that need to be answered about the people and the enemy in zone. Even more vital then intra-unit moves is the transfer of authority between outgoing and incoming units.

Illustrating the usefulness of this tool, this article will give an example of its implementation by A Company, 2-6 IN, 2nd BCT, 1st AD. The fire support officer (FSO), platoon leaders, and company commander will each share their experiences working with the fusion cell and identify some specific instances of when the fusion cell aided in the accomplishment of the company’s mission and how it operated day to day.

FSO (Fusion Cell OIC)
Fusion Cell Structure and Development

Company fusion cell teams are most often led by the company FSO who is supported by his fire support team (FIST) section. My team included myself, my fire support NCO (FSNCO) and one 13F Soldier; the rest of my 13Fs were pushed to the maneuver platoons. At one point I had a night crew that was another NCO and Soldier. However, even though the extra personnel was nice, it’s important to remember that it’s all about working with what you have. Depending on what we were doing, the commander would either task me or my FSNCO to find an answer to whatever problem we wanted to solve.

Coming fresh from the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and being tasked to manage a fusion cell team, there were many questions I didn’t have answers to; the first and most obvious was “what is a fusion cell?” We were basically a company-level S2 shop and started off producing graphics by utilizing the tactical ground reporting (TiGR) system for the corresponding maneuver platoon that requested it. From there stemmed more products which eventually made it seem as though we were acting more like a service shop than an intelligence shop; it was frustrating. This lasted for about the first three months, and even though we were helping the company, my team didn’t really feel that we were contributing to the fight as much as we could. This all changed in August. We moved from a product development phase and into more of an offensive phase.

My FSNCO began to formulate a names of interest (NOI) list by logging every local national (LN) we encountered into an Excel spreadsheet. This was an extremely slow process at first, but if it is done from the beginning it can pay vast dividends to the company and higher after several months of data entry. There were many columns under our list that we could search by, but there were four main entries we searched under (first name, middle name, last name, abu name). The purpose of dividing the names into separate categories is that it makes the searching much more efficient. For example, if there is a report stating that the first name is Hussayn, the middle and last name are unknown and the abu name is Jasim, it will only take seconds to search by the sections of names rather than if they were grouped together.

Our team began transitioning from being a product-making support shop to an offensive tool. Making products became a framework operation that wasn’t needed as much, while targeting and link analysis became the main effort. This was the main cycle of our lethal targeting:

1. Reading the intelligence summary (INTSUM) and looking for names particularly in the collected data and tactical reports (TACREPS) that applied to our company operating environment (OE);
2. Going through our NOI list and other link diagram charts we had made to see if there was a match;
3. Compiling the information and presenting it to the commander;
4. Developing the PIR for the platoons to go out and obtain; and
5. After we had a good base of information on the target, we would send it up to the TF.

On today’s battlefield, I have found that the overall data management is really what makes or breaks a good fusion cell. Being able to reference a name or key locations in a timely manner will greatly augment the fight at the company level.

In addition to this, our duties included making a daily read book from all the patrols and intelligence summaries for the day, managing our interpreters (phone calls to local leaders and giving them their SP time for the next day’s mission), managing the task force census operations, developing our company PIR to distribute to the platoons, managing all of our Sons of Iraq (SOI), and having myself or my FSNCO accompany the commander on every mission he went on. Reading patrol debriefs and going out of the wire gives an entire different view of the OE. In addition to all of the previously mentioned duties, we also conducted a monthly artillery and mortar registration every month (we would switch mortar and artillery between C Company).

Since I was considered the “effects guy,” I was also in charge of being the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) pay agent for the company. This meant I was paying money out to local leaders for jobs they did for us. One example was a public works contract for 30 workers who picked up the trash on the street to mitigate IEDs. Later in the deployment we started a micro-grant program where small business’ that needed some extra materials could submit applications to get extra funding.

Doing intelligence is definitely an acquired taste and more like a strange form of art. Every piece of information a patrol receives and brings back to be processed may not seem like it means anything, just like a spot on the wall. However, the more time spent in the area means more information, which means more spots. Eventually these spots will start to form a picture of what is going on. Having a clear picture equals being able to know what the next step is.

This was the basic groundwork on what our fusion cell did to be effective and help out the maneuver platoons. Although there are many different ways to accomplish the mission, the following examples given by each platoon leader were some of the tactics that worked with our company.

Scout Platoon Leader
Knowing the Population

In the first few months of the deployment, one the company’s biggest non-lethal targeting operations was reigning in and imposing a set of rules upon the Sons of Iraq. This was part of a battalion-wide effort to organize and control the SOI. In my platoon’s
AO, there were six SOI contracts that employed more than 600 local nationals. Just a few months earlier, these men were critical in driving out al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) from a hotly contested region. By midsummer though, the area was secure, and it was time to move on. Despite knowing this was not a permanent solution or lasting institution, many local nationals were reluctant to return to their farms. They remembered the bad times and did not want to give up their easy, profitable job of standing by a roadside checkpoint with an AK-47. Alpha Company and the Gator Battalion worked with local sheikhs to reduce the number of SOI. This forced local nationals to return to their farms and other previous jobs, getting the local economy back on track. Once the number of SOI was reduced, it was time to implement new, tighter control measures. The old ID cards were collected, preventing unemployed SOI from walking around the streets with their AK-47s claiming to be working. We established permanent, static checkpoints. Mobile patrols were eliminated. Finally, new ID cards and uniforms were issued, turning the SOI into a quasi-private security company.

At the company level, the SOI was the fusion cell’s baby. In one lone, sweltering week, hundreds of SOI were processed. This entailed photographing, recording names, and collecting biometric data. Then the real work began. The line platoons dropped off the data at the company command post (CP), leaving the fusion cell to correlate and create a useful product. The fusion cell managed dozens of different contracts that employed hundreds of LNs. They stored biometric information, checkpoint data, and contract status for each sheikh, SOI supervisor, and worker. The fusion cell created, printed, and laminated hundreds of ID cards. The platoons rapidly distributed them, giving the new SOI legitimacy. Eventually, the SOI was handed over to the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Iraqi Army, but the SOI the GOI managed was a vastly different organization than the SOI originally in the company’s AO.

Another large task for the fusion cell was to store census data. One of the battalion’s framework operations was a census of the area. In addition to being a powerful tool for mapping the human terrain, the census delivered the intangible benefits of letting LNs interact with coalition forces and see the men behind the body armor. So, while individual local nationals saw CF’s friendly faces in a personal environment, CF gathered PIR and collected data on the population. Each adult male was entered into the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) system. The head of each household also answered a questionnaire. Upon returning to the COP, questionnaires and HIIDEs were turned into the fusion cell. Using a unique data organization system, the fusion cell tracked which houses were missing data and which houses were complete. Doing the census provided an easy cover for an informal cordon and search of a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) house. Once that house was visited, would-be insurgents realized their fingerprints and residences were logged, deterring them from future activity.

When a few houses had to be revisited for a cordon and search or for a raid, the data collected during the census was invaluable in helping plan for the raid. A CF platoon from within the battalion had already been on the ground, collected data regarding who lived in the house, and taken pictures of the males and building’s entrance and layout. This was a great tool for mission preparation. On one occasion, our company was tasked with conducting a raid in Charlie Company’s AO. Charlie had been doing an all-day cordon and search. Alpha Company’s fusion cell could coordinate with its Charlie Company counterpart and access data on the target house. So, even though no Alpha Company units had been to that house, they knew the layout of the village’s block and the house’s courtyard. Another example occurred just before a SIGINT raid where the planned infiltration route came from the south. One of the platoon leaders remembered the entrance to the courtyard was on the north side of the house. If the current plan was used, the assault element would have had to run around the block. With this information, a new route was used, and the assault element moved onto the objective quickly and effectively.

1st Platoon Leader

Lethal Targeting

In COIN, lethal targeting is a shaping operation rather than a decisive operation, but it is still a critical part of overall success. The A Company fusion cell made significant contributions to lethal targeting by developing target packets and combing intelligence from census operations with lethal missions. The cell was adept at identifying both friends and enemies and providing line platoons the necessary information to neutralize targets.

The fusion cell’s census data was an
invaluable resource for forming the comprehensive intelligence from often fragmentary battalion reporting. A battalion-level report might indicate that, in a conversation between Abu Ahmed and Abu Mohamed, Abu Abdullah, an SOI member from village A with many brothers in the SOI, was preventing him from planting IEDs. Fusion cell could then examine the census data from village A and find out who had children named Ahmed, Mohamed, and Abdullah, and then began to narrow down their identities. In a case very similar to that described above, fusion cell was able to identify one of the potential IED emplacers and the SOI who was preventing IED emplacement. This was doubly valuable because A Company then not only knew the enemy in village A, but also knew an SOI member who was committed to security and could possibly be used as a future source. With the census data, the fusion cell was able to piece together such intelligence on a daily basis.

Combining census operations with company intelligence also fostered better mission execution. For example, battalion intelligence identified a house in our AO as the home of a possible AQI intelligence cell member. The A Company census tracker identified the house and showed that only partial information had been gathered on the occupants as some of the males had not been home during the initial visit. During the next census operation in that village, 1st Platoon returned to the house to gather additional data, but this time conducted an informal cordon and search in which we observed the exits in order to see if anyone attempted to leave the house upon our arrival and conducted a search of the house rather than the standard walk-through. Nothing was found, but 1st Platoon gathered more complete information on the occupants and it was believed that such unexpected appearances by CF act as a deterrent to insurgents.

A Company’s fusion cell combined battalion intelligence with company intelligence, generated from knowledge of the population, to facilitate better planning and execution of lethal targeting. This allowed our company to correctly discriminate threats from the general population and execute raids to neutralize these threats.

**3rd Platoon Leader**

**Leadership Transition**

As a new platoon leader, I met my platoon down range halfway through their 15-month tour in Iraq. I had not yet heard of the company fusion cell concept. I knew little about what resources and capabilities the fusion cell could offer a new platoon leader to facilitate better mission planning. The support and input that they offered greatly enhanced my mission planning and executing ability.

Shortly after being given my platoon, I was tasked to conduct a joint patrol with our local Iraqi Army (IA) unit in order to clear a known road that contained several suspected IEDs on it. Prior to executing the mission, the fusion cell contacted the IA commander in order to coordinate for the patrol. The fusion cell also provided me with detailed maps of the targeted area, since I was still fairly unfamiliar with the area of operations. Lastly, the fusion cell was able to provide me with the latest intelligence on the known and suspected enemy presence within the area. Three weeks before conducting this mission, a HMMWV from our company had hit an IED in the same area. Thus, the fusion cell was able to provide me with a copy of the debris from that mission, which allowed me to better understand what to look for on this and future missions, in terms of IEDs used in our AO.

The IED clearance mission went off well, and by having the fusion cell leader out on the patrol as well, he was able to document and note all of the IEDs and their detonators as they were found. The success from the initial route clearance mission led to a second joint patrol with the IA and this mission too proved to be a success. The difference between the first and the second mission, however, was the fact that the fusion cell produced and distributed a slide show which covered all of the IEDs and the detonators that were found during the first mission. Thus, my men were better prepared and enabled to look for and find the IEDs on the second mission. Upon completion of the second IED mission, the fusion cell once again made and distributed an IED slide show for everyone in the company to learn from. This dissemination of enemy TTPs, subsequently helped ensure everyone’s safety when moving around the company’s AO.

**Company Commander**

As this was my second command in Iraq, I had some previous experiences with trying to identify, understand, and fight the enemy. In my previous deployment, I had command in two different zones of operation. The first was the most peaceful of the task force’s zones and the next was arguably the most active. In my first zone I had a FO who helped to collect and analyze the intelligence we gathered in zone. In my second, I did not have someone to do that piece for the first few weeks as the FSO was wounded in action and not replaced until later. I had to learn to become my own company intelligence section. It was tough. Most of my mental energy was spent trying to develop my understanding of the enemy: what he was trying to accomplish, how we stop that, how we target him and how we ultimately succeed. I learned a thing or two and decided to implement those lessons in my second command. Fortunately, my company had a fusion cell that was open to my guidance and worked to make it happen. They made my job easier and allowed me to focus on the problems in our zone. By doing the things previously discussed in the article, we succeeded as a company team. We helped to continue the work of our predecessors and set our replacements up for greater success.

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**CPT David Liebmann** graduated from Liberty University and was commissioned in May 2006. He served as platoon leader of 2nd Platoon, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry and executive officer for A Company, 2-6IN during the deployment. He is currently the S-4 for the 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry.

**1LT Christopher Ploss** graduated from Texas A&M University and commissioned in May 2007. He served as the company fire support officer for B/2-6IN for the entire deployment. He is currently a fire direction officer in the 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery.

**1LT Stefan Hasseblad** graduated from Columbia University and was commissioned in July 2007. He served as platoon leader for 1st Platoon, B/2-6IN during the deployment. He is currently an XO in C Company, 3-4 IN.

**1LT Karl Gunther** graduated from the University of Oregon and was commissioned in June 2007. He served as the platoon leader for 3rd Platoon, B/2-6IN during the deployment. He is currently the platoon leader for Scout Platoon, 3-4 IN.

**CPT Brendan Collins** graduated from Boston College in May 2006. He served as the 2nd and Scout Platoon Leader during the deployment. He is currently attending the Military Intelligence Captains’ Career Course.

**MAJ Augustine Gonzales** graduated from the United States Military Academy in May 1999 and served as the commander of A Company, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry during OIF 05-07 and the commander of A/2-6IN during this deployment. He is currently the commander for A/3-4 IN.
By nature, counterinsurgency (COIN) is a complex, always changing, and multi-faceted process. Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines COIN as any military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. In this article, I will focus on the economic, political, and civil actions — and to a certain extent on the psychological actions. As with any complex problem, all of these elements are linked so I will discuss other actions as well. Long-term success in counterinsurgency operations depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule (FM 3-24).

Economic/civil development falls into several broad lines of effort:
- Infrastructure development,
- Economic supplementation,
- Employment initiatives, and
- Reconstruction/refurbishment.

Infrastructure development involves building the system for basic services that will facilitate economic growth and ensure basic health. Examples include water purification plants, electrical grid improvement, sewage system construction/repair, and hospital construction/refurbishment. Economic supplementation includes micro-grants and micro-loans — anything that will get capital into the hands of the business owner or operator for use in store or factory improvement. Employment initiatives are programs focused on either the direct creation of jobs or training in different vocational areas. Finally, reconstruction/refurbishment is the repair of key infrastructure that was damaged/destruction during the ensuing conflict.

The first step in starting any non-lethal targeting cycle is to identify problem sets. In our company, this was done through thoughtful discussion by leaders in a weekly meeting. Problem sets revolve around cell structure, tribal/religious rift lines, significant acts, census data, and the current infrastructure status. The identification of problem sets is a careful deliberate process, and the application of non-lethal effects and lethal effects should be coordinated and selected appropriately to threaten and eventually defeat an insurgent cell. A simple but effective indicator of a possible problem area is the atmospherics displayed by the population as they react to the national security forces. It is important to note that coordinated lethal and non-lethal targeting may not occur in the same neighborhood; lethal effects may be targeted at a cell while non-lethal effects may be targeted against recruitment for that cell in a different neighborhood. Generally speaking, non-lethal targeting is utilized prior to lethal targeting because it is also used to identify targets for lethal operations.

Once a problem set has been identified, a specific non-lethal solution set must be chosen. These will inevitably fall into the four lines of effort in the broader economic/civil development framework. A strong solution set will involve all lines of effort, even if minimally. An example of a strong solution set was seen when dealing with an insurgent cell in the Mada’an province. This cell was targeted with non-lethal means before sufficient intelligence for lethal operations had emerged. Targeted micro-grants were distributed to local shop owners who had a high level of interaction with the local population (barber shops, restaurants). The local governance paved roads that went into the village off of the main road. Through the local sheik, a water pump was built to provide irrigation water to 30 families near the site of several hostile acts. After one to two weeks, the attacks stopped and the National Police obtained sufficient information to arrest three suspects in the attacks.

Non-lethal targeting does not necessarily involve fiscal investment by coalition forces. It is commonly said that anything done to a 50-percent standard by host nation forces is better than 100-percent by a foreign force. The same applies to non-lethal sets; anything that is done by the local government is better than something done solely through our fiscal involvement. Pressure applied to the local councils and provincial councils can affect decision...
making to push government investment into the lethal problem set regions. This approach has the added benefit of allowing the local government to determine the most useful improvements to make to the region given their knowledge of the population needs. An example of this is quid-pro-quo tactics at the local governance level. After assessing the top five to 10 needs of the area, set milestones where certain coalition forces projects and certain local governance projects are completed before work can continue towards the next milestone in a specified neighborhood.

Employment initiatives have the most universal application and possible effects of any of the non-lethal solutions. Creating or promoting jobs can preempt the formation of the insurgent cell or prevent it from becoming lethal; it can also cause members lower in the cell structure to leave the cell, and it can possibly provide intelligence on what they have seen. There are several forms of employment initiatives: public works programs, vocational training, and big business investment. All three programs provide jobs, and all three have positive and negative attributes. Public works programs provide jobs instantaneously. The workers can be hired quickly and require no real training before beginning. They are simply given manual labor tools and a responsible leader, and they begin cleaning and clearing streets and canals. The downside to public works programs is that they are not sustainable. They require reoccurring costs to maintain the employment, and the moment those funding sources stop, the employment discontinues. The other issue with public works is that they are not glamorous or viewed as being of sufficient status, so some of the population may still be drawn to insurgent cells as opposed to public works programs. Vocational training has the benefit of being sustainable. After a three-or-four month period of training, trainees can be picked up by government or private employers for permanent positions. Vocational training is also instantaneous; after an investment is made, it may be several months before sufficient capital can be raised to hire more workers. A good example of this is the opening of heavy oil pipelines to a local brick factory. The output of the factory was eventually increased by this single investment because once sufficient capital was established to open a new set of furnaces, more workers were hired.

The most resource intensive non-lethal solution is the improvement of infrastructure, but it also has the greatest impact on the areas with little or no services provided by the government. This is usually conducted in areas that are targeted by insurgent cells for recruiting. Infrastructure improvement must be completed in a manner which allows the most efficient use of resources. For the investment to be fully realized, the government must take full responsibility for it when completed. The project must be visible to the populous when completed, and projects should be identified for tactical value. A good example of an infrastructure project is the installation of solar lights, which contribute substantially to an area by increasing market activity and reducing the likelihood of IED emplacement. Another example is supplying generators to provide electricity. If the generators are placed carefully, key engagement areas can be taken away from the enemy.

Economic supplementation is an effective tool if used correctly, and generally speaking it is not used correctly. The gains made by micro-grants and local government micro-loans can only be realized if certain things occur. First, they must be given to the right neighborhood. Second, a quality control program must be established; and third, the grants are given to the right businesses in the right quantity. For example, often times an excessively large grant will have negative impact; the recipient may close his shop to spend his money somewhere else. These grants will come in three varieties:

- A coalition forces micro-grant (will be discussed in detail later);
- A coalition forces-backed loan (effective in developing confidence in the economic and financial infrastructure); and
- A host nation micro-loan.

When host nation micro-loans are utilized, the only issue remaining is to get those loans into the right area. An effective example of coalition micro-grants is the use...
of a micro-grant fair. Such a fair was successfully conducted in the spring of 2009. The project began with small vouchers advertising the fair and limiting the number of attendees. On the event day, a detailed interview/application process was undertaken with each applicant to determine if the business had a strong business plan and a high potential intelligence gain; Figure 2 shows an example of the evaluation process. The business plan review involved assessing the amount of preparation that was taken prior to the workshop and assessing the value of the use of the grant for actual business improvement. For example, we would not provide a grant to stock someone’s shelves. The potential intelligence gain was assessed by looking at the average number of customers that attended the business each day, and which area the people are coming from. Each candidate also was assessed by a Human Intelligence Collection Team for viability as a source. If the individual was not going to talk to the CF about information that they overheard, then they would not be a great candidate from an intelligence-gained standpoint. The workshop tool allowed the company to screen more candidates and bring more enablers (PSYOP, HUMINT, background checks) to bear on each possible micro-grant. Effective implementation of micro-grants through a micro-grant fair can provide improvement to the economy, provide positive IO for CF/ISF, and provide intelligence gained to facilitate lethal operations.

The use of non-lethal targeting is a powerful tool, but it must be done as carefully and deliberately as lethal targeting is done. Non-lethal targeting requires that monetary flow to the company level be regulated and regular. Resources must shift to the more violent areas and local governance must be in place to take over as an area improves. A good non-lethal targeting program will be linked at every level with lethal targeting, and just as intelligence drives operations and operations drive intelligence, non-lethal targeting must drive intelligence and intelligence must drive non-lethal.

**Figure 2 — Micro-grant Assessment Worksheet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Customers (Daily)</th>
<th>Customers Known</th>
<th>Lethal Metrics</th>
<th>Source Assessment</th>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Non-lethal Metrics</th>
<th>Business Plan</th>
<th>Business Type</th>
<th>Econ</th>
<th>Positive IO</th>
<th>Intel Gained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oday</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>%50</td>
<td>No interest</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firas</td>
<td>YY</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>%50</td>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td>Families</td>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Food(meat)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CPT Thomas J. Woodard currently serves as the commander of the Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 170th Infantry Brigade. He deployed in 2008 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom first as a platoon leader and later as executive officer of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry. He received a commission from the University of Missouri at Rolla in 2006 and received a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering. He graduated with honors from the Special Warfare Language School where he studied Arabic.

Iraqi workers work on the roof of a shop in Sadr City’s Jameela Market. Many shop owners were able to rebuild their stores through micro-grants.
It’s a date that will be remembered as a true turning point in Iraq — 30 June 2009. It marked the first step towards a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declared a national holiday as U.S. forces (USF) withdrew from more than 120 bases located throughout cities of Iraq. Combat operations resumed shortly after 30 June in rural areas, with the caveat that all missions require approval from Iraqi security forces (ISF). ISF now has sole responsibility for protecting Iraqi cities while USF have taken on a smaller role serving as both military advisors and providing support as enablers for current ISF operations. This is a historic victory for both U.S. and Iraqi forces that presents a new and complex operating environment for Infantry leaders and Soldiers.

With ISF taking the lead on conducting combat operations in Iraq and the mission becoming less kinetic, the American Infantry Soldier had to ask himself, “What do I do now?” With the realization that ISF is now in charge, the leadership of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry took on the difficult task of redefining the role of the American Infantryman in Iraq. In addressing this new problem set, Company C, 1-24 IN explored and identified different avenues to engage the local population and ISF leaders within our area of operations (AO) — AO Centurion.

Prior to 30 June, the Infantry led the way in all full spectrum operations in Iraq. However, a rifle platoon’s actions were now dictated by the needs and desires of ISF and the local populace. ISF consists of the Iraqi Police (IP), which assumed control of high population areas, and the Iraqi Army (IA), which took responsibility for the more rural regions. USF, as outlined in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), were required to stay out of densely populated areas to reduce coalition signature and respect the IP’s authority. In some unfortunate cases, the IP denied or blocked USF access to Iraqi cities due to a variety of reasons. Several ISF elements saw this time as a way to exert their newfound authority and to boost their confidence in the eyes of the populace, which was arguably a good thing, despite the frustration it created within some USF ranks. Due to the decreased role of USF in Iraqi cities, more interaction and a closer working relationship needed to be established between USF and the IA, while still maintaining a working relationship with IP forces as well.

To ensure coordination between U.S. and Iraqi forces, coalition patrols were approved by ISF leaders one day prior to execution and required an ISF escort when in villages or cities. ISF also reserved the right to refuse USF entry until they received approval from their chain of command. On multiple occasions C/1-24 IN patrols were held for up to an hour at checkpoints or outside IP stations while waiting on permission from ISF to proceed. Due to prior negative experiences with American forces within AO Centurion, some Iraqi villages preferred limited interaction and assistance from USF. Infantry leaders had to ensure that their Soldiers understood this shift of USF to the role of enabler to aid in the success of ISF operations. It was finally time for the ISF to take responsibility for security operations in their own battlespace.

While Iraqi autonomy had to be respected, C/1-24 units continued to engage local leadership and consulted with them to identify where our Infantrymen could best be employed. We dramatically increased our situational awareness and the ability to affect the operational environment by establishing a close relationship and communication with ISF and local leadership. The following example of a Centurion platoon demonstrates how this relationship and communication can influence a situation. While speaking with Iraqis in the streets of a small village, it immediately became apparent that there was a great dislike and distrust of USF due to a series of misunderstandings with the previous unit. To rectify the situation, the platoon leader coordinated a town meeting at the local IP station to discuss the issues that were negatively affecting the relationship between USF and the populace. This IP station was chosen because it provided a secure meeting site for the ISF to contribute and voice
sparing. The IA could not patrol the cities, streets unilaterally, it was done very sparingly. The USF could technically patrol through the area with local leadership. Though squad leaders discussed current operations outside the building where the KLE is taking place, the second section could accomplish a second task and purpose that mutually supports the PL's decisive operation. There are several options as to how the second section can support the overall mission. They could act as a roving patrol which provides increased security and an additional maneuver element, or they could assess key infrastructure close to the meeting area and talk with the local populace.

As the American Infantryman's role in Iraq became increasingly non-kinetic, one of the biggest post-SOFA obstacles for Infantrymen was fighting the perception that Infantrymen were no longer doing the job for which they joined the Army. Soldiers in the Infantry signed up to close with and destroy the enemy, and virtually every training event prior to deployment focused on forging a lethal unit. The majority of C/1-24 IN patrols were key leader engagements (KLEs) with ISF, and generally consisted of all riflemen and machine gunners pulling security outside the building where the KLE is taking place. Instead of simply pulling security outside the building where the KLE is taking place, the second section could accomplish a second task and purpose that mutually supports the PL's decisive operation. There are several options as to how the second section can support the overall mission. They could act as a roving patrol which provides increased security and an additional maneuver element, or they could assess key infrastructure close to the meeting area and talk with the local populace to bolster relations and become familiar with the local geography (both human and geographical terrain). After the PL completed his KLE, the platoon linked up at a predetermined location and the entire element remounted the vehicles. The goal of this system was twofold; it broke up the monotonous routine of the Soldier in an attempt to stem the tide of boredom and complacency and it maximized the platoons’ patrol efficiency and information-gathering capability, falling in line with the saying “every Soldier is a sensor.”

Another issue that rifle platoons faced was the bruising of egos, pride, and esprit de corps when ISF asserted their dominance. In the words of one team leader, “Why does the most powerful army in the world have to ask permission to go on patrol?” Infantrymen, especially those with previous OIF deployments, were accustomed to going wherever they wanted to accomplish the mission and many times in the past considered the IA to be a nuisance if not the outright enemy. The IA demanding to know where a platoon is going can appear to be demeaning to the American Infantryman, and though Soldiers understood the SOFA, they often struggled with its limitations. The solution to this problem starts with the understanding that the modern Infantryman has to be a thinking warrior and realize that while USF might no longer conduct unilateral operations, the enemy can still be destroyed by advising, influencing, and training ISF. ISF primacy is a crucial and historic step for Iraq, and rifle platoons must grasp the importance of ISF taking responsibility for their country and understand that with ISF success future Iraq deployments will no longer be necessary. As the 1-24 IN commander often said, “You don’t want to be coming back here in 10 years.” Clarifying the USF role in current operations in Iraq helps Soldiers understand their jobs and the mission overall. While the American Infantryman should embrace that he is a part of the most elite fighting force in the world, he must also understand his role in accomplishing the mission, which, in this case, was a supporting role to the ISF.

Keeping Infantrymen informed on the specifics of every mission is also essential. Each pre-patrol ramp brief included the agenda of the meeting to keep the Soldiers abreast of current issues in the AO. Armed with this knowledge, team leaders and

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hen, avid, imsey and another Soldier ass out candy to raqi children.
Soldiers can engage their ISF counterparts at the IP station or IA combat outpost while the PL engages the ISF commander. Often a rifleman or SAW gunner pulling security next to an IA soldier at the gate can gain valuable information about the IA, enemy, or area that might not be shared in the KLE. These observations will be shared more readily if the Soldier can relate them to the mission and the KLE agenda. Soldiers may have a different perspective of the ISF unit based on the behavior of the IA Soldiers, the conditions of their weapons and equipment, and how they interact with their superiors. During a KLE, the commander of the ISF unit often presents a facade to gain a favorable reflection of himself and his unit; a more realistic and complete picture can be obtained by using the observations of the lower enlisted.

The individual relationship between a rifle platoon leader and his IA counterpart has a significant impact on operations and must be constantly developed. One of the ways to build this relationship is to respect the IA’s authority over its AO. As mentioned previously, to ensure ISF were aware of USF presence in IA/IP battlespace, all patrols were approved by ISF and the landowner was notified of the coalition presence. If communication could not be established with the ISF unit who controlled the battlespace, C/1-24 units stopped at the first IA checkpoint and notified the leadership of the mission’s intent and destination. Another method used to develop relations between USF and ISF was to involve the Iraqis in planning and developing operations. By including ISF leadership in the planning process and incorporating their suggestions, ISF was more likely to approve the operation and take ownership of it. Building a solid relationship is crucial for the fact that more intelligence can be obtained regarding significant activity and receiving battalion priority information requirements. Communication and bolstering of USF/ISF relations was essential along the entire chain of command in order to be effective, and both sides stand to greatly benefit from this interaction.

Expanding on the above, ISF and USF both have strengths that when combined can greatly increase the success of current operations. The IA naturally has more information and intelligence sources and can understand many local situations in a cultural context. USF has more manpower, better maintained equipment, a vastly superior supply system, and leadership that is capable of planning more complex operations. USF can provide a myriad of assets to support operations, which include attack and lift aviation, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, signal intelligence (SIGINT) assets, military working dogs, and close air support. Many ISF units began to realize this and started to request USF support for IA driven/led operations. Unilateral USF operations at this point are almost nonexistent, and the shift to bilateral operations was not only a requirement but a necessity. Instead of simply giving the IA a time and place to link-up for a joint operation, C/1-24 integrated them into the planning process and listened to their suggestions and contributions. By building more obvious operational security concerns, it is a risk that must be accepted in order to strengthen the partnership and professionalize ISF.

This method of planning operations was used to great benefit in the following example experienced by C/1-24. In an effort to confirm or deny enemy activity in the area, the rifle platoon leader wanted toemplace observation posts in a mountain range along suspected enemy avenues of approach. A meeting was held in which USF/IA discussed in detail the location of the observation posts, possible avenues of approach, and other aspects of the mission. The IA had a much better understanding of the area as they patrolled it constantly, and as a result much better local intelligence was gathered which enabled the creation of an accurate situational template. Also, as the PL engaged the IA commander, the USF battalion commander and company commander concurrently coordinated with the IA battalion commander to ensure the mission had the cooperation of the IA. This allowed for a smooth execution of the mission, as the platoon had the full support of the IA chain of command.

The development and professionalization of ISF is closely linked with the joint operations discussed above and also joint training. ISF conduct training at the battalion level regularly and have made great progress. However, a greater emphasis must be placed between joint training between ISF and USF to both increase the proficiency of ISF and bolster relations. C/1-24 supported IA training by going to IA COPs and conducting blocks of instruction on battle drills, marksmanship, combatives, combat lifesaver, and mortar firing. The IA were usually very receptive to the idea of conducting joint training, but often logistical and manpower issues cut the classes short or limited the number of participants. Another factor negatively impacting joint training was the extreme shortage of IA ammunition and training aids; many IA soldiers had not fired their weapons since basic training. While the acquisition of ammunition was difficult, marksmanship fundamentals were still taught without firing any rounds through the use of dume and washer drills. Joint training is crucial to increase the capabilities of ISF, and improvisation will often be required on the part of USF due to the lack of IA/IP supplies or training aids.

Gone are the days when USF ruled the cities, towns, and villages of Iraq. The American Infantryman must embrace his new role as a partner with the ISF in order to dominate the battlespace and ultimately succeed. While this can be frustrating and challenging for the Soldier who has joined the Army to close with and destroy the enemy, it is undoubtedly a sign of impending victory in Iraq. With full withdrawal of USF from Iraq on the horizon, understanding this new role will allow the American Infantryman to continue to impact and shape the battlefield and ultimately accomplish the mission.

CPT Matt Russell served as the platoon leader for 3rd Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment during the unit’s most recent deployment as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is currently attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He was commissioned through Clemson University in 2006.

1LT Bill Helmsing served as a platoon leader in C/1-24 IN from May 2008 until January 2010. He is currently serving as the executive officer in C/1-24 IN at Fort Wainwright. He graduated in May of 2007 from U.S. Military Academy.

1LT David Kinsey is currently serving as platoon leader for 2nd Platoon, C/1-24 IN. He graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 2007 with a bachelor’s degree in Psychology.

1LT Charlie Timm served as a platoon leader in C/1-24 IN and deployed to Diyala Province in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from May-Sept 2009. He graduated in May 2008 from the U.S. Military Academy.
Today’s armed forces have become fixated on technical or equipment-based solutions to tactical problems. The Cult of Arms is excellence in the research, development and application of paramilitary and military science through soft technology. It is the Software of War (SoW) that is essential for maintaining the ability to wage successful wars of all types. The SoW is not software in the traditional application. It’s not the computer code required to run many advanced weapon systems but ideas on the application of weapons against an enemy. The SoW includes the methods, processes, techniques, and procedures that are performed in order for the hardware of war — weapon systems — to function and be employed on the battlefield. Without software, computers and weapons would be useless — objects with no utility.

The kernel or core of the SoW is a culture promoting professionalism, cohesion, mission-oriented command and control and hard realistic training. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) — the primary algorithms in the SoW — are methodologies, processes, and ways of thinking that the armed forces use to apply weapons on the battlefield. Through the minds of warriors, the code for the software of war is written and tested during training and proven in combat.

Evolution of Ground Warfare

The automatic machine gun and artillery fire were the primary dangers to infantry units during the early 20th century, and during WWI these weapons were difficult to move and were primarily stationary weapons. Such massive immobile firepower ensured that positional defensive warfare would dominate confined geographic areas such as the Western Front of WWI. The massive casualties and stalemate at the front forced military thinkers to find ways to effectively transition back to mobile offensive action. New tactics and weapons began to appear identifying two clear evolutionary paths in modern ground warfare.

The first is the equipment focus of the western methodology, clearly evident since WWI. Working off the premise that equipment saves men, western powers have historically put hardware ahead of software. The West’s first response to any military problem or challenge is to develop a new piece of equipment. Traditionally unable to sustain substantial battlefield casualties, Western political leaders shy away from risky situations or methods and gravitate toward more predictable solutions. For example, using remote-controlled or autonomous vehicles of every kind in attrition-based tactical and operational techniques. In conventional battles, this methodology has proven successful; however, in counterinsurgencies and low intensity conflicts, it has opened another politically charged issue of collateral damage. Critical to an equipment-focused methodology is making weapons that are foremost effective but are also easy to use and maintain, reliable under field conditions, and producible in a sufficient quantity to make an impact on the battlefield.

The second is the methodology of tactical and operational prowess such as that employed by the German Army in WWI and WWII. The small Reichswehr was starved of every possible piece of equipment in the interwar period but evolved tremendously in the software of war. Working off the principle that sweat saves blood, the Germans developed modern combined arms organization with superior training, command and control and leadership, overcoming initial equipment inferiority. This is not to say that any army that is tactically proficient can overcome an enemy with superior weapons alone; it must also be comparably equipped. However, the equipment need not be the very best or latest that money can buy it; simply has to be good enough. Functional, rugged and reliable equipment in the hands of well-trained and motivated soldiers is the holy grail of success in battle. Weapons development and procurement in a software-focused military is led by tactical innovation where new weapons are designed supporting new techniques and solving specific problems with no methodological solution. Technological innovation follows as a matter of course through the primacy of the SoW; the Wehrmacht introduced the armored personnel carrier, assault gun, assault rifle and deployed the most feared crew-served machine guns and tanks.

Weapon systems have gotten more advanced, complicated and expensive to design, manufacture, and train with. The disposable M72 Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 26/27 and AT-4 are cheaper and easier to manufacture then...
Functional, rugged and reliable equipment in the hands of well-trained and motivated Soldiers is the holy grail of success in battle.

A perfect example of this is Soviet weaponry produced during and after World War II such as the T-34 tank, the PPSh-41 submachine gun, AK-47 assault rifle, and the RPG-7. Contrarily, the Wehrmacht introduced many new and very effective weapons whose efficacy could not be fully realized suffering from mechanical reliability issues under field conditions and complex engineering and manufacturing requirements; most notably the Mark-VI Tiger tank and the StG-44 assault rifle. Advances in less sophisticated weapons that are tough, reliable, cheap to manufacture and train with, and capable of sufficient battlefield performance will unlock the cult of arms.

The Cult of Arms

An organization’s culture or work environment is critical for establishing the necessary norms and atmosphere for men to become warriors. Professionalism, unit cohesion, and command and control are the essential cultural aspects for creating warriors who can succeed in combat. The zero tolerance mantra of today is causing inexplicable damage to America’s ability to wage war. Military bureaucrats will succeed in punching their ticket all the way to retirement as long as no embarrassing mishaps take place on their watch. Any mistakes can be either covered up or the service member hung out to dry depending on the repercussions felt by the individual’s chain of command. This has also negatively affected training to the point that simple training injuries are no longer tolerable. This ridiculous situation is further compounded by the lack of credibility and respect the military profession has from society at large.

Professionalism — A profession is judged by the quality of those who choose to pursue it and the standards and requirements to enter, maintain membership and to excel within that profession. In spite of need, standards must never be compromised. The best of those in the armed forces, officers and NCO, must view their responsibilities as a sacred duty demanding tireless improvement, innovation, creativity and professionalism — total commitment. The military officer and NCO are the pinnacles of professionalism. They are entrusted with a sacred duty to build men out of the youngsters coming to them for military service. Entrusted with the ability to lead the nation’s youth in life-threatening situations is the greatest responsibility anyone can be given. It is their duty to mentor and develop Soldiers into warriors as well as fine men. The selection, educational standards, training and promotion criteria of this cadre must be vigorous and based on ability, achievement and character. The military is not a welfare system providing a comfortable retirement for those that “punch their ticket;” it is service for the good of society, a noble lifestyle where the weak and selfish need not apply.

Core skills define a professional and his profession. The warrior’s professional body of knowledge begins with infantry skills, tactics, weapons, and the ability to improvise, innovate, and exercise good judgment during the chaos of operations. How to conduct a military and paramilitary operation from inception through execution in all environments is critical. The military education emphasizes field operations advancing toward the command of larger units while including a mix of international assignments and academic study in branch specific knowledge. A warrior’s civilian education must be technically focused on hard sciences and engineering. Modern weapons are increasingly complex offering many capabilities that must be understood completely if they are to be employed with maximum utility. From here, it is an open avenue for academic exploration focusing on strategy development through understanding politics and international affairs, national security issues, and the use of armed forces in world affairs.

The professional warrior must constantly seek self improvement involving physical, mental, and spiritual growth. Everything that can be of benefit to a military member and the growth of excellence under arms cannot be addressed through military training alone. This is where individual pursuit of art, literature, music, science, traveling and varied experiences provide the
necessary interdisciplinary knowledge required for solving complex problems and growth as individuals. The human weapon is a warrior dedicated to the profession of arms; the art and science of armed conflict. It is being mentally and physically fit, an expert on the martial body of knowledge and possessing sufficient interdisciplinary knowledge broadening problem-solving abilities.

**Unit cohesion** and comradeship is created during training and solidified at the front forming lifelong bonds between warriors. It is the glue that holds an army together during the trials of war forging it into a mighty machine. The shared experiences of hard training, life at the front and soldierly honor (being able to rely on each other no matter what) forge the military primary group. In the Summer 1948 issue of *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz state in their article “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in WWII” that soldiers in the same squad, platoon and company form the military primary group, bound by the expectations and demands of that group. Warriors of the same unit that endured hard training felt great pride in their accomplishment, which, is only surpassed when recognizing they’re combat proficiency after successfully applying their skills at the front. This created a sense of membership to a proud organization that not just anyone could join. These proud warriors crave challenge and relish being the focal point of battle. Their strong sense of belonging and solidarity is intensified by sharing life at the front. The every day frontline experience is characterized by the misery of constant exposure to the elements, being unable to wash or get clean clothes, living with no personal privacy, filthy conditions without shelter, lack of adequate rest or food and the constant fear of being killed, having to kill, or failing ones comrades. Warriors can only endure this environment with the support of their comrades and faith in their leaders. As the executers of orders, company grade officers and NCOs are the link between a nation’s battlefield intent and the action necessary to accomplish it. The leader’s ability, military competence, and a sincere concern for his men’s well-being creates trust. Units bound by comradeship — which Stephen G. Fritz describes in his book *Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in WWII* as “loyalty, mutual obligation, willingness to sacrifice, pride, a sense of duty, even love…” felt between soldiers — would fight with great determination. Every effort should be made to keep men together in the same unit from recruit training through post-deployment retraining and redeployment. The same officers and NCOs that train a unit must lead it in combat and conduct retraining incorporating lessons learned at the front before the next frontline rotation.

**Command and Control (C2)** — An army’s C2 apparatus is another vital aspect of military culture forming warriors into fast, flexible, and lethal teams. C2 is the overall command climate pervading an armed force for the direction of operations. It is a decentralized system allowing warriors to wage war with the outcome dependent on skill, leadership, and daring. C2 is the glue binding professionalism, unit cohesion, training, and TTPs together providing the environment where it all is allowed to work. Pivotal to this concept are mission-oriented orders and reconnaissance-pull.

A mission-oriented order system assigns goal- or intent-based orders rather than directive-based orders defining tasks and how-to instructions. Operations embody what the Germans developed in the interwar period called mission tactics. Commanders assign missions and objectives based on their desired battlefield result; they provide additional support as required but leave the details and tactics of accomplishing that desired end state to subordinate leaders. The basics of radio communication, hand and arm signals, flares, messengers and predetermined action queues all must be mastered in order for the on-scene commander to move his troops at the speed of thought when favorable or dangerous developments emerge during an engagement. Assigned objectives and axis of attack are sufficient controls during operations; the use of phase and boundary lines stifle momentum and limit tactical flexibility. Mission-oriented order systems create the norm of risk taking and responsibility for actions taken as well as the understanding of mistakes as learning points during training. Decision making is decentralized to company grade officers and senior NCOs with eyes on unfolding events, dangers, and opportunities. At critical points of main effort, more senior level commanders may be on scene pushing critical tasks with more resources and urgency, boosting moral.

Reconnaissance-pull (recon-pull) involves maximizing battlefield intelligence driving the orientation of the battle. In the field this concept uses recon units to probe for gaps in enemy lines or routes of approach and then “pull” friendly forces through these paths toward their objectives. Reconnaissance determines the axis of advance and can cause shifts in the main effort when dangers and opportunities are discovered. It is more than this field concept, however, revolving around the critical role of intelligence driving fighting forces. Recon-pull depends on a complete field intelligence system: identifying what is required, the means to collect it, analyzing it, the commander’s ability to plan based on it and junior officers acting on it as well as a commitment to operational security. The more questions answered the better; however, this should not prevent operations from taking place. Combat will always be conducted with numerous unknowns and that is where innovative combat leaders with decentralized authority can capitalize on the opportunities presented. The system must be fast, accurate, and continuously working allowing constant battlefield updates. Mission-oriented order and recon-pull systems allow battlefield forces to strike at the enemy’s weaknesses seizing the initiative, maintaining momentum, and providing adaptability. Decision making is made at the speed of thought where the action is taking place and the battle decided.

**The Combined Arms Task Force (CATF)** is the basic organizational structure for ground operations. Modern combat requires a mix of arms and weapons that through maneuver exploits the capabilities of each while protecting their weaknesses. Combined arm operations at battalion/company level and above employ infantry, tanks, artillery and aircraft in combination, using each arm’s strength to engage the enemy while protecting each others’ weaknesses from enemy action. Similarly, at company/platoon level and below, combined weapon methodology — a varied weapons mix of automatic weapons, rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, hand grenades, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles, demolition charges and man- and vehicle-portable crew-served weapon systems — allows the infantry platoon, squad, or team the ability to engage and defeat a wider variety of targets and accomplish more missions.
then if they were armed with standard small arms alone.

The battle group should be about the size of a regiment/brigade. The modern division of close to 20,000 men is way too large and clumsy. Ideally 5,000-9,000 men should be built from various companies and batteries. Armor, infantry, artillery, assault guns, anti-aircraft weapons and helicopters are combined with sufficient logistical and engineer support for sustained operations. The companies would be formed into multiple reinforced battalion-sized elements, the CATF according to terrain and mission. The layers of inter arm support have been proven successful in combat throughout the 20th century. The mission-specific CATF has been the most successful combat formation because of its combined arms structure, adaptability to terrain and enemy situation, logistical independence and ability to integrate the varied formations necessary for mission accomplishment. Reinforced or regular company-sized elements building into the CATF will themselves be composed of similarly built assault groups (AG). The infantry fire team and vehicle or gun platoon/section will supply the basic building block of this organizational structure enabling maximum flexibility across conflict types.

Leadership and the authority to command come from exemplary ability. They don’t come from the uniform or from a rank or position but being an example in the field. Leadership is the process or art of influencing people to accomplish the mission because they want to not because they have to. It is also the ability to make on-the-spot decisions exercising professional knowledge and experience in fluid situations. This is accomplished through trust, mutual respect, innovation, and cohesiveness. Leaders must look after the physical and emotional needs of their Soldiers by creating a sense of belonging to a tight-knit family and judging them not by their rank, name, or honors but by their character and performance. They must be fair and treat everyone equally. Officers and NCOs must be duly considerate of their Soldiers’ lives and any loss of life under their command must be minimal and justified. Although rank gives them the authority to give orders, it does not make them a leader. People do not follow rank; they follow knowledge and good judgment. Building an effective team through leadership qualities such as values, character, fairness, trust, respect, and mentorship make elite units with the ability to accomplish any goal.

True leadership makes followers want to succeed and achieve great things while offering mentorship and the fruits of the leader’s experience. True leaders take pride when their subordinates excel, inspiring trust. We must train our young officers and NCOs to be warfighters and leaders not bureaucrats. Bureaucrats excel at making checklists, Power Point slides and adding endless rules and procedures to control their subordinates. Severely lacking are the critical skills required to conduct high tempo operations under constantly changing circumstances. Initiative, trust, team building, taking responsibility and innovation become lost in the avalanche of paperwork, doing it by the book, self interest and pointing fingers when things go wrong. The zero-defect mentality creates leaders that are more afraid of making mistakes than they are of exercising initiative. How can leaders with this mentality win on the battlefield?

Making on-the-spot decisions during an engagement and thinking on your feet are the providence of leadership possessed by men of vigor, courage and strong character. Maintaining the initiative and uniting all available forces at the point of decision demands cool, competent, bold, imaginative and opportunistic leadership. Every officer, NCO and Soldier must be trained and competent exercising leadership at one or two grades above his peacetime rank.

Officer and NCO selection must be based on field abilities from the ranks of the enlisted or through an intensive officer preparation course for those entering through Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate School or from a Service Academy. The gentlemen’s officer corps is a thing of the past where a university education is required. A man’s ability to command troops on the battlefield is determined by character and leadership. While being university educated is certainly
Training

The main objective of military training is developing proficiency in the tactics of conducting military operations enabled by suitable warrior culture. These methods are designed to enable outnumbered, outgunned, and technologically outclassed armies to prevail on the battlefield with minimal friendly casualties. An integrated training program must be tough and realistic stressing tactical flexibility and creativity through the use of mission-oriented orders, reconnaissance pull, modified battle drills, and mobile assault training. A complete training program understands that armies exist to wage war, and the product of any military training program must be competent warriors who are taught how to think not what to think. During times of war, constant reports from the front should help form the basis of future exercises and lessons learned should be incorporated as quickly as possible to warriors heading to the front. The program must focus on producing Infantrymen. The greatest military utility is achieved when all elements of a formation can contribute combat power or raise the tooth-to-tail ratio when necessary. After attending basic combat training, I think there needs to be a light infantry course (LIC) all warriors attend before beginning branch-specific training.

Light Infantry Course

Light infantry is the foundation of all armed forces. They can operate in all types of terrain and conflict types. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are essentially battles between light infantry. Police forces are paramilitary light infantry units and the primary counterterrorism asset. They are also the cheapest units in terms of equipment requirements to form because men can only carry so much and still be effective in combat. This corresponding lack of heavy equipment forces the light infantry to be highly skilled. And that highly skilled infantry warrior is what is needed.

Operating Principles: Cascading Operability, Modified Battle Drills, Mobile Assault and Goal-Oriented Physical Fitness

Cascading Operability. First Soldiers must master individual military skills then integrate those skills into the two- and four-man team, the two fire-team squad, and finally into the assault group. These skills need to be trained and mastered over desert, forest, mountain, and urban terrain in all weather conditions. In the construct of the LIC, this training will take place in the terrain found at the location of the training facility with more specific environmental training taking place later. The training follows in sequence building upon previous knowledge and skills. For example, some tasks learned individually are then integrated within teams and squads. Movement under direct/indirect fire, each Soldier’s place and responsibility in formations, using cover and concealment to move securely and stealthily are essential individual skills which must be integrated within team/squad capabilities. First aid also an individual task requiring team/squad integration when forming aid and litter teams during operations. Reacting to ambushes, indirect fire and contact, crossing danger areas and encountering IEDs are all team/squad tasks that build upon the warrior mastering his specific piece of the pie and being able to cover other pieces as casualties are incurred.

 Modified Battle Drill. Standard battle drills are used as lecture tools and a foundation for experimentation. Modified battle drill training is a force-on-force exercise using a noticeable means of assessing casualties allowing trainees to track how well they are performing and where they need improvement. Speed, stealth and deception are used to measure a TTP’s level of surprise while allowing constant improvement, optimizing a TTP’s efficacy. TTPs experimentation must seek to limit friendly casualties providing a means for rapid battlefield action. American trainees are force fed doctrine and offered little or no latitude in experimentation for improving technique and the overall quality of tactical maneuvers. This is why Soldiers must be taught how to think and not what to think. Emphasis must be placed on a leaders’ ability to make sound decisions appropriate for the tactical problem he faces. The mission must be accomplished as fast as possible and with as few casualties as possible preserving combat power for further operations; how that is accomplished is open to the leader’s discretion. Modified battle drill training seeks flexible responses to the most widely encountered battlefield situations such as breaking contact, reacting to an ambush, crossing danger areas, hasty attack, meeting engagements and movement to contact.

Mobile Assault. Characterized by surprise, flexibility and rapid mission accomplishment mobile assault tactics revolved around the reconnaissance and
combat patrol. Raids, ambushes, security and reconnaissance patrols must be practiced day and night focusing on achieving positional superiority over the enemy employing friendly weapon systems with maximum effect. The fundamentals of troop formations and movement utilizing cover and concealment, the effects of weather and terrain, communications, noise and light discipline, observation, detailed attack and withdrawal planning including main and alternate routes and redeployment in the event of unplanned contact; all geared toward flexible and decisive mission accomplishment. Critical to the successful mobile assault is the formation’s ability to maneuver gaining positional superiority over the enemy accomplishing its mission with minimal friendly casualties.

**Goal-Oriented Physical Fitness.** Combat physical fitness goes beyond the standard calisthenics, running, and hiking by incorporating assault and obstacle courses. Effectiveness in combat is the goal of physical training with all activities designed to achieve this end. Pursuing a rigorous physical fitness program of calisthenics and running is the basis of any military fitness program; however, when preparing for combat, training in events that the tasks to be performed under fire is a goal-oriented physical fitness program. These incorporate assault courses involving orienteering while negotiating obstacles and shooting exercises for time.

**Course Phases**

**Individual Phase:** This training phase focuses on the necessary individual warrior skills essential to successfully engaging enemy units. Warriors must become proficient in cross-country orienteering, weapons care, function and employment, camouflaging equipment and personnel, movement techniques utilizing cover and concealment under direct and indirect fire, tracking and stalking, communications (both visual signaling and radio operation), first aid, hand-to-hand self defense, advanced marksmanship, and demolitions. After establishing a solid shooting foundation, warriors move into walking combat shooting, first dry firing and ending with fast live-fire drills. This phase culminates with planning mobile assault operations in the classroom.

**Team Phase:** Tactical exercises begin with the issuance of the operations order or fragmentary order and are conducted at the terrain board. After the proper troop leading procedures are followed, the mission is executed at the terrain board as if the unit was in the field. Proper radio procedures are observed with the instructors acting as higher headquarters and introducing enemy contact, etc. From this point the combat shooting exercises are done in two-man teams, then four-man fire teams, and finally with a mixed weapon squad. Movement, communication, tracking and stalking techniques are refined and built upon as team and squad patrolling missions begin. Operational security becomes a religion as formations conduct reconnaissance and screening missions as well as ambushes and raids. Teams/squads are taught how to break contact, conduct hasty attacks, cross danger areas, plan assaults and other necessary TTPs. All unit positions are rotated allowing every warrior to learn the requirements of each position within the formation, which will develop leaderships skill and ensure the team will continue to function as casualties are taken.

**Assault Group Phase:** During this phase, warriors gather into mission-specific task forces up to reinforced platoon-size elements for advanced patrolling operations and exposure to the use of combined arms. Including armor sections, assault guns and calling for and adjusting indirect fire and combat air support during offensive and defensive operations. Using direct-fire weapons in force-on-force exercises that produce a visible effect (such as paint balls) reinforces tactical necessities such as the need to find appropriate cover while moving. The AG conducts force-on-force engagements guided by the modified battle drill and mobile assault techniques where the standard TTPs will be tested and refined based on the operational results. Absolute freedom is allowed during these exercises combined with detailed after action reviews to determine what TTPs actually work in this simulated combat based on the combined arms standard and most current contemporary operating environment. Particular attention must be paid to maintaining the AG’s cohesion during operations, while occupying an assembly area, and then quickly reorganizing for follow-on missions and preparing against counterattacks. The troops will learn and understand that in combat certain things are relative. For example, they will be aware of various troop formations such as the wedge and column and their place within those formations; however, they will learn that their position is more directed by terrain and available cover and concealment.

**Tactics**

TTPs are the soft technology created as ways of acting in and employing weapons in combat. Successful TTPs are often recorded in military doctrine, standardizing training and ensuring that winning methodologies are disseminated to the armed forces as a whole. Training and fighting from a standard doctrine was an outstanding concept in theory and very successful in practice for the Wehrmacht in between World Wars I and II. The doctrine should not stifle flexibility by being presented as the only right way of doing something. It should focus on concepts to guide warfighting TTPs, not dictate how things should be done. Concepts such as combined arms and mixed weapons, mission tactics, task force or battle group organization embodying decentralization, unit integrity, maneuver, intelligence and leadership stand as the pillars of warfighting. Using terrain board and field problems, combat leaders should be evaluated on tactical dilemmas not based on the textbook answer but on the soundness of the leader’s assessment, judgment, and overall thought process.

Doctrine should be a bottom-up development process where officers are free to copy and experiment with TTPs from all over the world in force-on-force or terrain board simulations. They can then disseminate their findings to other officers and NCO discussing the merits of each maneuver. If the TTP can withstand further experimentation and peer review, the officer is obligated to publish it or otherwise pass it up the chain of command. This process is faster during war as effective TTPs are adopted regardless of what’s written in doctrine. This doctrine development system also prevents units in the field from being predictable and allows situational uniqueness depending on the threat. Expanding on some of these concepts, it is evident how TTPs emerge from doctrine as guidance not law. Leadership is most effective when the leader is at the point of main effort employing creativity, improvisation, flexibility and initiative to operations; otherwise it’s simply management. Maneuver relies on
the travelability of terrain, mobility allowed by a network of roads and highways and leadership yielding speed and surprise. Various techniques and procedures have proven themselves throughout history and are worthy of becoming doctrine, but they need to be broad enough to guide operations not dictate them. For example reconnaissance pull, deep penetration, timely counter attacks, suppression and volume of fire, coordinating fire and maneuver, reinforcing success, bold thrusts, and economy of force have been identified as pivotal aspects of many operations and provide the backdrop for the development of modern TTPs that are flexible and situational.

Focusing junior officers and NCOs on their primary responsibility of TTP development is necessary for them to learn their current positions while maintaining them in grade, which allows for mastery of the position. Company grade officers and NCOs seeking to become masters of their trade must first serve as apprentice and journeyman as part of a comprehensive combat leadership training and mentorship development program. Giving warriors just enough time to learn the basics of a job then moving them out for other duties is counterproductive and part of the “ticket punching” mentality. Officers should perform three years as combat platoon leaders, not including training before becoming eligible for promotion. Captains should serve four years as line company commanders not including staff rotations. A series of tactical and operational competency examinations will also be given establishing eligibility for promotion once the prescribed time in grade is reached. Additionally, the total percentage of officers in the armed forces should not exceed six to seven percent.

**Conclusion**

Historically since the First World War the United States has maintained an attrition-based warfighting methodology. Attrition allows a nation capable of producing massive amounts of arms and equipment with sufficient population although operationally and tactically inferior to prevail in combat. The Soldiers of an attrition-based system need master few unsophisticated military skills. This methodology is based on bureaucratic control and predictability presenting little risk for commanders seeking a fall back protecting their career in a zero defect system. Maneuver warfare is riskier requiring leadership not management! The software of war must be up to the challenge if a comprehensive military system of operational and tactical excellence is desired. Armies focusing on software will only require weapons that are good enough to defeat a technologically advanced but tactically uninitiated enemy. This poses a serious threat for the United States as tactical proficiency continues to take a back seat to fancy new gizmos while our enemies focus on the SoW and have access to weapons that are good enough.

Through the discussion of the critical elements in employing efficient and effective armed forces I hope to refocus priority where it should be, on the Software of War and dedication to the Cult of Arms.
For over seven months he had been patiently waiting for the right moment. His reconnaissance patrols had determined the number of Americans, their daily routine, and they could often smell what was being served in the mess hall on any given day at the forward operating base (FOB). His combat patrols harassed and inflicted casualties on incoming and outgoing convoys that used the main supply route, one which served a string of FOBs. In July a group of less than 100 lightly armed Soldiers and civilian contractors operated and bivouacked outside the fire support range of the FOB. Yet they were still close enough for a quick reaction force (QRF) to sally out to their relief. His objective was the complete destruction of the QRF in a “baited trap ambush,” and if the situation developed the destruction of the FOB. His strategy was to induce the QRF to sacrifice security for speed in order to rescue the combat outpost before it was wiped out. The QRF in their haste would get strung out the length of the relief route. Along this route were several large naturally camouflaged kill zones. They were large enough to conceal hundreds of his men. Strung out in these kill zones, the Soldiers would be fighting in small unsupporting teams. They would face attacks from multiple directions. Panic would take hold and unable to function as a cohesive force, they would cease to exist in less than 15 minutes. He figured the combat outpost might last half as long. Once the fighting ended, he could begin his psychological warfare campaign. Any wounded would be tortured to death and all the dead Americans would be displayed. A similar operation seven months before was a total success, and he was sure tomorrow would be no different.

It was the start of a new month — August — so it was the 49 enlisted men and three officers of Charlie Company’s turn to rotate outside the FOB. CPT James Powell, commander of C Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry made an estimate of the situation. He did not like what he saw. Mission requirements had the civilians scattered into three work parties over a mile requiring squad-size elements to be posted with two of them. So that left him in the fourth position — the combat outpost with a reserve force of just 24 infantrymen led by 1LT John Jenness. The good news was A Company, whom they were relieving, and the civilians had not neglected their tactical duties during the previous weeks. They had selected and prepared a fine defensive perimeter on key terrain that permitted observation of the work sites, most of the road, excellent fields of fire, and was centrally located to the three dispersed work sites. Observation/listening posts (OPs/LPs) were well placed and alert. As long as the infantrymen stayed alert, they had a fighting chance to get to the combat outpost and assume their assigned positions.

It is several hours before beginning morning nautical twilight on 2 August 1867. “He” is Red Cloud, an Oglala Chief and for now task force commander of the Tetons (Lower Bands) of the Dakotas (Sioux). The Tetons are comprised of the bands of Oglalas (Wanderers), Brules’ (Burnt-Thighs), San Arcs (No Bows), Hunkpapas (They who camp by Themselves), and Minneconjous (Those who Plant by the Water), according to Richard I. Dodge in his 1877 book The Plains of the Great West and Their Inhabitants. Cheyenne (Cut-wrist) and Northern Cheyenne tribes have also allied with Red Cloud. His operation is in the movement phase. Each band is being guided to their selected positions. A leader’s recon over several days determined the best sites to conceal the war parties along the route the QRF is most likely to take in the relief effort. Although the combat outpost is always alert, Red Cloud’s large force could easily have taken it in the night. The astute Red Cloud wants a fight in the daylight so the lookouts in a watchtower on a hill and those in the FOB blockhouse five miles away can see...
and hear the attack on the combat outpost. The lookouts then can sound the alarm and dispatch the QRF from the FOB — Fort Phil Kearny (15 miles south of present-day Sheridan, Wy.).

The outpost’s mission was to cut down trees to provide lumber and fuel especially for the upcoming winter. The 40-plus civilian contractors were lumberjacks, teamsters, and mule skinners. Each morning after stand-to and breakfast, one group of teamsters in a wood train hauling logs and cordwood loaded the previous day heads back to the FOB with 2LT Francis McCarthy’s escort detail of 12 Soldiers. A second group of lumberjacks and 13 Soldiers in an empty wagon train departs for the woods to cut down trees (this is called a pinery). This pinery was by a creek about a mile from CPT Powell’s combat outpost. Several hundred yards from the pinery 300-plus mules were being rotated off the wagon teams. They were kept in a grazing, watering, and resting herd by the third party of mule skinners with no Soldiers. The fourth and final group was in a defensive perimeter (the combat outpost) made up of 14 wagon boxes removed from their carriage and wheels and placed on their bed in an oval perimeter end-to-end with seven on each side. (A wagon box is similar to the bed of a large pickup truck just slightly longer. Its side walls are about four feet high, and the lumber used to construct the box is generally two inches thick). A small gap between wagon boxes was left to permit a man to slip through but block horses, mules, or cattle. At each end of the oval was a wagon box left on its wheels with bows and canvas (a covered wagon). Here, a month’s worth of food, supplies, spare clothing, extra weapons, and ammo were stored. Some of the extra barrels and sacks were placed in the gaps between the wagon boxes. Outside this perimeter were tents which quartered the soldiers, civilians, and served as a mess.

At the same time Red Cloud’s braves are moving into position, a civilian teamster R.J. Smyth and his buddy ride out the gate of Fort Phil Kearny to hunt deer. Shortly after sunrise they spot smoke signals in some distance hills and immediately decide to start back to the fort. They hadn’t gone far before they discover the Tetons are between them and the fort, according to Cyrus Townsend Brady in his book Indian Fights and Fighters. They don’t realize they have discovered the assault element for the fort’s QRF.

Eighteen-year-old PVT Samuel S. Gibson is part of the 13-Soldier escort for the lumberjacks at the pinery. Once there he is put in charge of a three-man OP/LP. As he completes a sunshade for what he knows will be a hot August day, PVT Garrett yells, “Indians!”

It is about 0700 hours on 2 August. Seven mounted braves are in single file trotting toward them at an oblique angle. Still no shot has been fired. Estimating their range at 700 yards Gibson sites his target, squeezes the trigger and manages to drop a horse which throws its rider (E.A. Brininstool, Fighting Indian Warriors). Gibson orders Garrett to watch for signals from the outpost and he sends PVT Deming over to the pinery to alert the lumberjacks and Soldiers. He can see hundreds of Indians and more seem to be materializing every second. Scattered shots were now ringing out. Simultaneously several hundred dismounted adolescent brave horses were given the task of running off the mule herd. The mule skinners stood fast and kept the herd in control until 60-plus experienced mounted braves stampeded the herd and the mule skinners. With the way to the wagon boxes blocked, the mule skinners made for the wood train as it headed back to the FOB. PVT Deming returned and reported that the lumberjacks and the other Soldiers in their detail were making for the wood train. PVT Gibson was reluctant to abandon his post. Yet he and his buddies were on foot about a mile from the defensive perimeter of the wagon boxes. The enemy was mounted. They had completed their mission of early warning. They had to leave now. A stray mule Skinner leading his pony on foot joined them as they started at a brisk walk toward the wagon boxes. Two would cover fire as two moved. They were being over taken so they started running, but still in bounds. While they could keep the pursers directly behind them at bay, it became obvious that the mounted braves would get ahead of them and cut them off. The reality was they were going to lose the race and their scalps. The mule Skinner had the only horse and could mount and make a run for it. He chose to stay on foot with the Soldiers, continue to fight, and share a common fate.

With the first shots CPT Powell and 1LT Jenness readied the defensive perimeter by having the Soldiers put extra rifles, tools, ammo, sacks of flour, corn, cracker boxes, bundles of clothes, tent and wagon canvas inside the wagon boxes. Seeing the group of mule skinners hotly pursued as they made a break for the wood train, CPT Powell led part of the reserve force on foot to fire on the braves from behind. His attack is successful because the mounted braves turned to attack his force.

Watching from a nearby hill, Red Cloud has his “commo chief” signal (with a small pocket mirror) the QRF ambush sites NOT to attack the 60-plus mule skinners, teamsters, lumberjacks, and escorting soldiers of the wood train. They were still pursued by other bands of braves that managed to kill four Soldiers and four civilians. These braves also served as decoys to lead the QRF into the ambush. The remaining 50-plus Soldiers and civilians from the wood train, mule herd, and pinery reached the covering cannons and guns of Fort Phil Kearny after a five-mile running fight. Red Cloud is confident his main ambush force has not been compromised. Seeing the passage of so many back to the fort, Red Cloud thought the QRF would surely think the route was clear and they will race out into the jaws of his ambush.
PVTs Gibson, Deming, Garrett, and the mule skinner are still making an unobserved and unsupported withdrawal. They are moments away from being ridden down when a 21-year-old SGT Max Littman spots the attackers. He was putting a sack of flour in a wagon box when their movement caught his eye. He drops the sack, grabs his rifle and leaps out of the wagon box. He sprints toward the group for about a hundred yards, drops to one knee and begins to deliver a covering fire that drops several braves and horses. His fire rolls back the envelopment. The exhausted OP/LP team and the mule skinner still leading his pony reach the perimeter shortly after CPT Powell and his team returned. Somehow under a hail of bullets and arrows none of CPT Powell’s force or the OP/LP team sustained a single casualty. Within minutes the deer hunting party of R.J. Smyth and his buddy enter the perimeter. CPT Powell’s force of 29 infantrymen and three civilians are now totally surrounded by thousands!

A perimeter designed to be held by 100 must be held by 32. The original plan was for 1LT Jenness’ platoon of 24 to serve as the reserve and on order move to achieve fire superiority in a critical sector or to counterattack a breek. CPT Powell quickly readjusts the available manpower. He assigns 15 men to defend each side of the oval wagon box perimeter and directs 1LT Jenness to the other end. With his field glasses 1LT Jenness surveys the field and spots what he is sure to be Chief Red Cloud and his “staff” on a distant hill to the east. With colored cloth and mirrors, they are issuing what is in effect a “frago.” The LT shouted this information to CPT Powell at the other end of the perimeter. The CPT knew the assault would soon begin. A low rumble was heard coming from the piniery, and then hundreds of mounted braves emerged from the trees. CPT Powell gave the order, “Men here they come! Take your places and shoot to kill!”

Rain-in-the-Face was a young “company grade” chief of the Hunkpapa band. He and his braves were riding in the tribe’s assigned position in the attack. He would have preferred to be at one of the big ambush sites waiting for the ORF. But he did as directed thinking the attack wouldn’t take long. They were going up against the slow moving and slow firing “Walks-a-Heap” (what the tribes called the Infantry). He wore his war bonnet and just a loin cloth on this hot day. His face, chest, arms, thighs, and pony were painted for war. He knew the Soldiers thought the colors and designs were whimsical decorations, but in fact they follow a definite pattern. Each design and color has a meaning. Along with the headdress, it denotes “rank” or status, combat experience, and especially band or tribe (since each band uses different battle drills). Any brave can identify a different band on the battlefield and the combat experience the group has by the war paint. This is similar to the way we mark units and skills on our uniforms, vehicles, and aircraft.

He and his braves were in the middle ranks of the assault formation, which was picking up speed. The front of the charge was the honor position. (In this position, you don’t have to eat dust, you can see the enemy, and no one is in front of you blocking your shot.) He started to see the wagon boxes but still didn’t see any Soldiers. Because the oval shape objective presents only a small area to the Tetons, the assault line started to channel in toward the center forcing Rain-in-the-Face and the Hunkpapas to slow down, pushing them deeper into the formation. The line formation was being compressed into a column. As this occurred the number of Soldiers facing braves started to equal out.

The attackers thought that as soon as the Infantrymen fired their first volley they would then have to stand up to reload. Only chiefs (officers) and a few sub-chiefs (sergeants) would have revolvers and not have to stand up. The others, they thought, would have to expose themselves to reload. At that time, the braves would then return fire, and with their greater numbers they would surely drop most of the Soldiers. The Soldiers fired when the attackers were at 300 yards, but it wasn’t much of a volley (just over 17 shots). Then a steady stream of fire came from the wagon boxes, but the braves pressed forward with the assault. They smelled the black powder, the dust, and the blood of men and horses. Those braves and horses hit in the front slowed the momentum of the assault. (It was just like being in a battalion run. When the front slows, the trail companies often compress and come to a complete stop.) From the level of fire being unleashed, it appeared that there must have been hundreds of Soldiers in those wagon boxes. Once the braves were close enough to see through the smoke and dust into the beds of the wagon boxes, they were surprised that they could see almost no Soldiers. The Walks-a-Heap draped canvas from side board to side board for concealment. The braves urged their war ponies forward to jump the wagon boxes, but the horses balked at jumping the four-feet high double wall of the wagon boxes. They slowed right in the middle of the kill zone. At 50 yards, the accuracy and the volume of fire coming from the infantrymen broke the charge. Rain-in-the-Face and the other bands withdrew and tried to recover as many of the fallen as they could.

For all the thoroughness and daring Red Cloud scouts had displayed in the previous months, they had missed one small but important piece of intelligence. On 10 July 1867, a large resupply convoy brought in food, blankets, clothing, tools, and 700 Allin conversion breech-loading, single shot Springfield rifles and a hundred thousand metallic cartridges. With these rifles, instead of having to stand and reload, a Soldier could remain in a covered and concealed prone or kneeling position, fire, and reload in two-to-three seconds. Plus, the metallic cartridges could be handled rougher and offered a more reliable and consistent performance over the old paper cartridges of the muzzle loaders. The paper cartridges had a tendency to degrade over time, exposure to the elements, and sweaty hands.

An undeniable and overlooked component of C Company’s survival up to this point was the seamless handover and preparation from A Company, 1-27th Infantry two days before. During their stay, the men of A Company bored firing holes in the outward facing side of the wagon boxes to cover their assigned sectors of fire. A Soldier could lie on the wagon bed site and shoot without exposing himself. Their commander’s obstacle plan called for placing the wagon boxes on their beds instead of their side. This covered and concealed the Soldiers’ backs from attacks from the opposite side of the perimeter and would block braves on horses from riding into the combat outpost. He also had placed the combat outpost on the northern edge of the plain so he could see the work sites and most of the road. On the northern edge, less than 100 yards away,
was a shallow erosion ditch, then a gentle acclivity with broken ground. To the east, west, and south was flat, open grassland that extended a half mile or more in these directions (Roy E. Appleman, Chapter 12: The Wagon Box Fight, Great Western Indian Wars).

Over the previous weeks, the mule herd had grazed or stomped away the prairie grass on this plain removing any possible concealment for crawling and had eliminated the fire hazard. The combat outpost had near perfect observation and fields of fire.

CPT Powell further improved the outpost by having his men line the wagon boxes with sacks of flour and corn, and bundles of canvas and clothing, which helped stop bullets and flying wood splinters. Some canvas was draped over the wagon boxes for concealment and shade. Seven ammo boxes, each holding a thousand rounds, were opened and evenly placed around the perimeter so everyone was close to a resupply point. Each Soldier filled his pockets and hat with as much ammo as he could hold. This was in addition to the 40-round basic load of the cartridge box and belt.

There was one other bit of intel that every Soldier knew and Red Cloud didn’t. There would be no “quick” reaction force. The total annihilation of CPT Fetterman’s 80-man QRF in December 1866 had resulted in a change of tactics. Against standing orders NOT to pursue across a phase line, CPT Fetterman crossed the line in pursuit of the decoys. The 20 mounted Cav troopers pulled away from the 60 dismounted Infantrymen armed with muzzle-loading rifles. Strung out nearly a half mile in small groups when the ambush was sprung, the Soldiers were overrun in minutes. The QRF would only come after careful assessment of the situation. The realization was the QRF, or more importantly the fort, could be the main objective. With no more than 400 “for duty” Soldiers available, detaching a force big enough to do the job would expose the fort to attack. CPT Powell and C Company would get no immediate help.

Red Cloud saw the attack being repelled and reassessed his tactics. This resulted in a lull that curious Soldiers used to start poking their heads above cover. 1LT Jenness left his position to check his men. In quick succession four Soldiers were hit from fire coming from the rise to the north. The braves were skilled marksmen and could hit a Soldier who exposed himself. 1LT Jenness and two others were killed, a fourth was hit in the shoulder. The Soldiers quickly learned to move only when necessary, then crawl and be fast. They did just that as they readjusted the perimeter to cover the sectors of the fallen four and to get ammo.

CPT Powell wondered if 28 men were enough to defend his perimeter as the braves would surely come again and seek the weak spot to penetrate. Once inside the perimeter, the sheer number would win the hand-to-hand fight. Somehow he must outgun the braves at the point of attack without creating an exploitable gap. He lost his second in command and wondered if he had overlooked something. He had, but so had Red Cloud. In his preparation, he left the tents (each about the size of a GP small) standing on the south, creating a dead space almost up to the wagon boxes. In the first attack the braves chose not to use the tents to mask the attack because they could not see the objective. Simultaneously, almost everyone on the battlefield thought or said, “The tents!”

Within seconds four Soldiers (one being PVT Gibson) sprinted out of the perimeter and started slipping the ropes off the stakes collapsing all but a distant one. Somehow none of the four were hit,
and they assumed their positions as nearly 700 braves on foot raced toward them.

Red Cloud saw how the line had collapsed into a column and that the horses would not jump the wagon boxes. The field was littered with dead and wounded men and horses becoming an obstacle to a horse charge. Hence this attack would be on foot, plus braves did not take up as much space as a horse so he could get more in the same space. Sheer weight of numbers would sweep the infantry away. Again the braves pressed the assault, rushing past fallen comrades and horses. They will not balk when the critical time came to leap into the wagon boxes.

R.J. Smyth and his partner were skilled scouts and frontiersmen and were teamed up with the famous explorer and mountain man Jim Bridger (who is watching from the fort). They were the final protective line. Smyth was armed with two lever action, seven shot Spencer Carbines and two Colt revolvers. His partner was allotted eight Springfield rifles, and one soldier had the sole purpose of making sure the rifles remained loaded. Just as it looked as though the human wave would reach the wagon boxes and the fire can’t get hotter, Smyth quickly and accurately fired each Spencer then the Colts, and the wave of braves melted away.

As the attack receded, fire from the north once again limited movement in the perimeter. Flaming arrows were used, but there was no grass to burn, and the Soldiers put out any that hit the wagons. Some hit and burned manure left by the mules and horses. This smoke burned the throat and increased the thirst already acute from dust and a hot August sun. Many Soldiers had neglected their canteens and did not carry them. PVT Gibson had a full one as he left the OP/LP in the morning and had carried it all the way back to the wagon boxes. He shared it with two other Soldiers in his position. But now as the rifles began to overheat and foul from the black powder cartridges, the water was used to cool and clean the rifles. Those who did not have water blew and fanned the breeches to cool them. Then using shirt tails, they wiped off the carbon.

After the lull, another foot charge came from a different point of the compass. Red Cloud looked for any weak spots, but there were none. The pattern was repeated the rest of the morning. Red Cloud forgot about ambushing the relief force. He wanted to break the “Walks-a-Heap medicine.” His Oglala and several other bands had been at the ambush sites all morning unengaged. He recalled them all. His nephew and most likely his future successor led the sixth and final attack that would sweep away the Infantry in the wagon boxes. He shared it with two other Soldiers in his position. But now as the rifles began to overheat and foul from the black powder cartridges, the water was used to cool and clean the rifles. Those who did not have water blew and fanned the breeches to cool them. Then using shirt tails, they wiped off the carbon.

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Some of the sides of the wagons were nearly shot to splinters. The 7,000 rounds were nearly gone after five full assaults. Some of the rifles were so hot the rounds cooked off in the chamber. The barrels were blistering the Soldiers’ finger tips, and with the barrels so hot they couldn’t be wielded as clubs. They had no bayonets. For CPT Powell and C Co., this was it. The Infantrymen took hunting knives, axes, and hatchets and stuck them into the side boards or the bed of the wagon to keep them close. When the ammo was gone, it would be hand-to-hand combat.

Red Cloud’s tall nephew was at the apex of the massive wedge formation of braves approaching from the west on foot. The Oglalas were right behind him followed by other bands of Teton and Cheyennes. His large size and full war bonnet made him a target. He was cut down, but the wedge pressed on. The infantrymen of C Co. continued to mark their targets, but it seemed as though it was having no effect. The braves pressed on. Ammu was critical and the braves were almost to the point where they could have leapt into the wagon boxes and then met their foes face-to-face, hand-to-hand. Rifle bullets thrusl several braves at this close quarter. The wedge of braves finally broke at five feet. Red Cloud then gave the order to recover the wounded and dead and to depart.

From Fort Phil Kearny, the gates then opened and a compact formation moved out. A howitzer did a recon by fire. The red legs knew a bursting shell would stampede Indian ponies. If they were concealed along the route, the shell would flush them. They fired a few shells, waited, and then bounded forward a quarter mile at a time. CPT Powell observed the Tetons massing off in the distance. He heard the booming of the howitzer. Finally C Co. spotted the cavalry screen followed closely by the Infantry, the howitzer, and several wagons. C Co. started cheering. Some started to leave the perimeter, but CPT Powell ordered them all back to the security of the perimeter. Finally, MAJ Benjamin F. Smith and a 100-man QRF arrived at the wagon boxes. It was around 1300 hrs. MAJ Smith hadn’t expected to find anyone alive. MAJ Smith and CPT Powell were awed at the numbers of braves off in the distance. They quickly decided to load the two wounded and three dead into the wagons and make for the FOB. After getting a drink and an ammo resupply, C Co. and the QRF walked the five miles to Fort Phil Kearny uncontested.

Measure, countermeasure, change comes quick. In the few weeks prior to the wagon box fight, the leadership, technology and tactics of his adversary had changed. Red Cloud drew off to ponder the changes, fight off challenges to his leadership, and to adapt. The death of his nephew left an opening for another young combat leader — Crazy Horse.

Politics and money had kept the Infantry inadequately armed with muzzle loaders even though large quantities of “repeating rifles,” breech loading rifles, and metallic cartridges were in storage from the War Between the States. The loss of CPT Fetterman’s team seven months before forced the rearming of the Bozeman Trail forts. This drove a change in the tactics from standing in open firing lines to fighting prone or kneeling from a covered and concealed position. Due to the discipline and the marksmanship skills of the Infantrymen in Charlie Company, the full potential of breech loading rifles was realized. Credit also must go to the capable and cool leadership of CPT Powell, who recognized how technology had changed tactics. He was able to lead his men to quickly and successfully employ both in combat. Victory was also the result of a young Pvt. Gibson, who did not wait to be ordered to do something. He was well trained on the battle drills, the standard operating procedures, and how to size up the situation and execute a solution without waiting for an order. It was also SGT Littman who saw something his superiors didn’t and immediately took corrective action. It was a mule Skinner who knew what every Soldier knew, to have any chance they would have to fight as a team.

LTC (Retired) Michael E. Reichard

TRAININ N TES
“DO NOT SET A PATTERN!”

Soldiers deployed to combat usually have that maxim drilled into their minds from day one. It is very relevant and makes sense. The enemy notices everything a unit does in the streets of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan. Someone is always watching, and furthermore, someone is always reporting. When establishing a pattern of regular patrol schedules, traveling favorite routes or even a using favorite patrol technique, the enemy gains knowledge on our vulnerabilities, and then we are forced to fight the enemy on his terms, in a reactionary way. These reactions only further reinforce our patterns. React to ambush, react to contact (direct, indirect, and IED) are battle drills, actions executed with little thought or guidance. While battle drills are extremely important, they generally look the same. Key to success in combat is to seize the initiative; make the enemy fight on our terms. This is basic Army doctrine and conceptually nothing new to commanders. However, deliberately setting a pattern can help us regain the initiative.

The Boyd Cycle is a conceptual breakdown of American fighter pilot combat tactics, and it argues that every time a pilot reacts to a given situation he becomes more vulnerable to his opponent. Also known as the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop, Air Force COL (Retired) John Boyd theorized that “conflict is a series of time-competitive observation, orientation, decision, action cycles … If one side in a conflict can consistently go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the other, it gains a tremendous advantage,” according to William S. Lind in his book The Maneuver Warfare Handbook. The enemy combatant falls into a reactive mode versus a proactive mode, losing the initiative. Essentially, rapid execution of the OODA loop is a way to establish and retain the initiative.

Currently, we are fighting an insurgency, a combatant group that is hard to identify and therefore hard to observe. If we cannot observe our combatant, we lose the OODA loop race from the start. COL Boyd observed that American pilots were “very successful during the Korean War. They achieved a kill ratio of 10:1 over their Chinese and North Korean opponents … In traditional measures of aircraft performance, the principal communist fighter plane, the MiG-15, was superior to the American F-86 … but in two less obvious measures the F-86 was superior to the MiG. The F-86’s bubbled canopy gave its pilot very good outward vision, and the F-86 could transition from one action to another much more quickly than the MiG,” according to Lind. Despite the superior abilities of the MiG, success centered on observation and transition.

From an enemy’s perspective, we are very easy to observe. We wear uniforms, we have heavy, noisy vehicles, and we are slow from wearing 70 pounds of gear. Despite our superior abilities, we cannot observe or transition fast enough to win. Our enemy, however, can easily orient on us. They know the terrain much better than we do, and they know where they can hide or where to run, exploiting unit boundaries with restrictive fire lines. The enemy decision portion is easy: yes or no. The action part is easy as well since, so far, we have been forced to fight on the enemy’s terms. So why not act?

How can we regain the precious initiative? How can we force the enemy to fight us on our terms when it seems like despite our technology, discipline, money and superior training, the enemy keeps us reacting? A solution is to win the OODA loop race from the start. When we deliberately ignore our own doctrine or principles, we exercise tactical judgment. Sometimes that requires establishing a pattern carefully and exploiting it.

This process can be very simple or extremely complex. It begins with identifying what patterns we have already established. Write them down. “First Platoon went on patrol at this time to this place along this route.” Continue this process to establish a discernable pattern. Use 2nd Platoon to identify the locations from where 1st Platoon’s patterns can be observed and pick the best three. Next, identify positions where 2nd Platoon can be observed. That is the location of possible observation points (OPs), a camera, or an ambush. Continue business as usual with respect to the established pattern. It is now possible to more effectively observe the enemy. The decision point now is whether an observer is a threat or not. Is he a triggerman for a command-detonated IED, or is he strictly a feeler? The answer determines the action forthcoming.

The model of observing the observer is overly simplified, but the concept is sound. While my company was responsible for the city of Old Baquba in the Diyala Province of Iraq, we deliberately established a pattern that offered our opponents a sense of comfort among us. This pattern began with identifying our habits.

Since these terrorist cell leaders doubled as Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), they routinely invited us over for lunch to discuss legitimizing their program in the hopes of getting paid. In turn, we would have them over for lunch as well. As they
came to the joint combat outpost (JCOP), they were thoroughly searched and disarmed before being invited in. This pattern of disarming “our guests” prior to entry into the JCOP became routine, as did their reaction.

We oriented our culminating operation toward exploiting their reaction. Once we had enough sworn statements, discovered caches and evidentiary pictures to incarcerate, we invited the terrorist cell leaders over for lunch to sign their contracts to legitimize their organization.

To best exploit the leaders’ reaction, we arrayed our forces to achieve a quick and safe detention of both the leaders in the JCOP and the subordinate soldiers in the CLC houses who were still armed. Furthermore, we needed to decide on how to fill the void left by our detained guests. The action portion of the cycle is simply the warfare and tactical academics involved with such a mission.

In the case of Operation Goodfellas, we employed simultaneous raids once the leaders were detained. The remaining houses were broken into sub objectives and assigned to each of the platoons based on platoon boundaries. Once the company commander gave the “go-code” over the radio, signaling that the leaders had been detained, the platoons began sequentially raiding houses. We disarmed each house and left behind a small security detachment to secure the detained occupants until the mission was complete. Once all the CLC houses were secured, we re-seeded the void with trustworthy CLCs, spent several hours sorting through sworn statements, and processed the detainees.

The art is balancing the patience required to establish a pattern safely while winning the OODA cycle race. Establish the pattern; observe the reaction; orient the mission toward exploiting that pattern and that reaction; decide how to act and when; and, finally, take action in a manner appropriate to the situation: in essence, exploit the pattern. This is one possible way to regain the initiative.

The critical points of the OODA loop are the first two and the ones we, as Soldiers, struggle with: observing and orienting. Soldiers are very good being decisive and taking action, which is specifically why we are so good at fighting. To observe, we must first identify. Identifying the threat has proved to be one of the hardest things to train. Seizing and retaining the initiative are paramount in winning battles. Success at Battle Drill Six is a matter of repetition and resources. Knowing the point of origin of enemy sniper fire is a function of experience. Orienting does not always mean pointing a weapon. Although it can include physically orienting your vision toward the enemy, it also means orienting combat power toward overwhelming the threat; how to exploit the pattern or the reaction. Superior observation and orientation skills are paramount in winning the OODA race.

At the time this article was written, CPT Michael Mostaghni was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. His previous assignments include serving as a Stryker platoon leader, company executive officer, and company commander with the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash., which deployed to Baghdad and Baqubah, Iraq, from April 2007 to June 2008.

The author states that the purpose of this book is to fill an alleged long-existing void by covering the perspective of the lower ranks. He does a good job reflecting the views of all levels — as found in outgoing letters (before the days of censorship) and personal diaries (before these were prohibited, as in recent conflicts). Extracts from these are intertwined with the factual narrative to give color to the tale. There was dissension at various levels throughout the war and the opinions on these are enlightening. The author has written an earlier book about Winfield Scott and is an admirer, but not everyone loved “Old Fuss & Feathers” and this is well covered. Johnson stresses that he doesn’t try to cover the Mexican side. It’s too common to make this choice because of intended emphasis, space requirements, or the inconvenience of obtaining foreign sources.

However, to the extent possible, the history could have been rounded out by the Mexican order of battle, battlefield dispositions, brief bios of key figures, the attitude of different segments of the population to another foreign invasion, and the feeling about the loss of a third of the country with nominal compensation.

He also chose not to cover, in detail, the period after the capture of Mexico City. This is understandable though since the peace negotiations and the ultimate Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo are what the six-month campaign was designed to achieve. The point is well made that Scott, throughout, used the sword-and-olive-branch approach. He did not attempt to overthrow the Mexican government but rather wanted a responsible one with which to negotiate and to help maintain order.

The maps are of varying quality, and some are hard to read. The pictures help tell the story. In the absence of a better map, the table of distances from Vera Cruz to Mexico City is a useful reference. The 17 pages given to a roster of officers at just one point in time would seem to have limited appeal. The list of those who served in the Mexican War and made general in the Civil War (on both sides) could have been more interesting by taking the short time and space to show the grades achieved.

Over the years, I’ve read a fair number of accounts on this conflict but still learned some new details and perspectives from this. It is a readable, understandable coverage for someone starting out — keeping in mind the parameters.


The threat of explosive ambush in the form of landmines, booby-traps, and improvised explosive devices (IED) has been inherent in every war in American history. However, IEDs dominate the war in Iraq to an unprecedented extent. Chris Hunter, a retired British Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) soldier who operated in southern Iraq in 2004, writes Eight Lives Down. EOD Soldiers in both the British and U.S. armies have the unique mission of rendering safe IEDs. This is the first memoir written from an EOD Soldier’s point of view.

This is a suspense-filled, fast-paced memoir that competes with the best-written war or crime novels. It is a cat and mouse story that blurs the lines to such an extent that one is not sure whether Hunter is the cat or the mouse. He risks life and limb to defeat IEDs while the bomb-making networks personally stalk him, targeting him for death. The author does an excellent job of bringing readers into the deadly, pressure packed world of the EOD Soldier in Iraq. Those unfamiliar with this world, especially those susceptible to an old-fashioned war story from a slightly different angle, will love Eight Lives Down. Others may be disappointed.

Considering this is a memoir, one expects the writer to be the center of events, but Hunter takes this to dizzying heights. One can almost see the perpetual spotlight shining upon his every movement. He is center stage at all times. Others, when mentioned at all, are supporting cast members, frequently nameless or at best with only a first name, whose actions and contributions amount to nothing except when he steps to the fore to coalesce their efforts to a successful conclusion. Despite his relatively short deployment — four months — in a comparatively quiet area, he presents a picture of skewed intensity in which he alone makes the streets of Basra safe for humanity.

Despite handling a relatively low number of missions, or taskings as he calls them in British parlance, he complains about an overwhelming operational tempo. Even his family serves his self-aggrandizing purpose. He serves up a continuous menu of complaints from his self-absorbed wife more concerned with her own burdens than with his safety, as he tells it. This is particularly nauseating considering that in my experience most Soldiers’ wives are the real strength in an Army family. Even if true, his wife deserved better treatment.

The most disappointing aspect of Eight Lives Down is that it paints a stereotypical portrait of the EOD Soldier as an adrenaline junky, a cross between self-appointed hero and God, rather than the highly dedicated, well-trained professionals that I knew during my 28-year career as a U.S. Army EOD Soldier.


America’s War Colleges have started to incorporate lessons on Operation Iraqi
Freedom. At the national security policy level, those lessons include the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003. There will no doubt be many debates, discussions and writings from America’s future military leaders, particularly those who must study national security decision-making. To get a full breadth of understanding how the United States came to commit troops to Iraq, it is important to read divergent sources. This includes the memoirs of GEN Tommy Franks, Ambassador Paul Bremer, George Tenet, and Iraq’s postwar Finance Minister Ali Allawi to name but a few. Another necessary volume is the subject of this review, the memoirs of former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.

Feith offers a very well-written and comprehensive account of his time in the Pentagon’s number three position from 2001 to 2005. He opens his book with 9-11. He was abroad on official business, and as events unfolded he desperately attempted to return to the United States. Aboard the long flight, he, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense William Luti and General John Abizaid penned an outline of proposals that would be refined into initial ideas placed before the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the President. The book contains intimate details as to how the interagency and National Security Council would debate evolving war plans which would be refined into Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The section on Iraq contains the infamous declassified memo entitled the “Parade of Horribles,” a memo dated October 2002 that summarizes all that could go wrong “in an American military intervention in Iraq. Before making judgments and reaching conclusions, it is recommended Feith’s book be among those future American military planners read as they understand how America’s national policy is made and what lessons can be learned from Feith’s experiences.


Throughout our history, we’ve had units raised for specific purposes with different weapons or a varied method of transportation. The unique characteristics of the 1st SSF made this particularly poignant. The unit was bi-national with both U.S. and Canadian soldiers so these bonded brothers went different ways.

The book finished with a chapter on its homecoming and then an epilogue, and the latter tells of selected former members of the force. Much of the work is devoted to individual stories and anecdotes which add color and some historic perspective. A good part is given to the initial training at Fort William Henry Harrison near Helena, Mt. There is some useful biographical data on a few key players. The maps are adequate and some of the pictures are entertaining. Nadler made good use of his sources. I’m not sure if he has added anything significant to them. However, anyone with a particular interest in the Black Devils may find new minutiae here.
Two Soldiers with the 1st Cavalry Division provide security at a traffic control point in Taji, Iraq, on 12 December 2009.

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