Movement and Maneuver: A Vision for the Future
The Strategic Squad: The Way Ahead
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This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

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The Infantry rifle squad is the centerpiece of our effort in the global war on terrorism. The close-quarters fight can best be executed by dismounted squads trained, equipped, and resourced to take the fight to the enemy on his own turf under any conditions, day or night. The squad operates decentralized from higher headquarters, under mission command, and demands the best of our small unit leaders. In this Commandant’s Note, I want to discuss our consideration of the squad as a strategic formation, offer a review of what the squad and its firepower have looked like over time, and talk about the future squad concept and the criteria that will define it. This overview will conclude with a discussion of the all-important human dimension of the squad.

Today’s enemy is determined, tenacious, and innovative, and when we go after him we are not looking for parity of force or a fair fight. What we want is an overmatch at all levels. The Encarta Dictionary defines overmatch as having the ability to be superior enough to defeat or surpass somebody or something. To create overmatch on the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan, and presumably in the future the squads must have the ability to influence the fight with close combat supremacy, mobility, firepower, combative proficiency, protection, and overwhelming lethality. Unless we can assure the squad of a combat overmatch comparable to that claimed by our other maneuver forces, we cannot apply the squad’s full combat potential against an enemy. We will achieve this overmatch starting with a bottom-up review, beginning with the Infantry squad formation and working upward to optimize the means whereby it is to be resourced and trained. Our brigade combat teams and Infantry battalions and companies have gained enhanced capabilities to provide the commanders quick access to information which increases their ability to influence their battlespace. Historically, decisions that most affect the squad have been among the last made because the structuring and resourcing of the force has been planned from the top down, which has not always allowed for an abundance of resources by the time the squad comes up for consideration. The shortest (or fastest) decision cycle in the Army is the squad leader who just made contact. He must decide quickly on what to do — he requires the development, training, and materiel to help give him near perfect situational awareness. We need to resource and address the squad as the strategic formation it is and consider it as a system while we synchronize the acquisition process. We must evaluate the squad as a collective unit capable of achieving the synergistic effects combat demands, and understand that everything they carry makes them more effective than they would be without it.

The 12-man squad of World War II comprised a squad leader, 10 riflemen, and an automatic rifleman. The nine-man squad in the contemporary operational environment (COE) consists of the squad leader, two fire team leaders, two grenadiers, two automatic riflemen, and two riflemen. What is significant is that — aside from technological upgrades to the Soldier’s equipment, including weapons and the load he carries, he still fights, communicates, orients himself, and moves much as did his counterparts in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. We can do better.
The future squad leader will have at his disposal the handheld battle command device that integrates each Soldier into the squad network and affords him vertical and lateral connectivity. The squad leader can view real-time satellite imagery and three-dimensional map products and download timely human and signal intelligence data to enhance situational awareness. Even more important, his squad will all be on the network, which will allow the squad’s senior commanders to provide enablers to the squad’s fight as required and create that environment of overmatch. Additionally, with this access to the information required to visualize the battlespace the squad leader can tailor his logistical requirement and tactical load. A semi-autonomous load-carrying system will reduce Soldier fatigue and mobility restrictions and allow them agility even on demanding terrain.

This effort is not just to add more equipment to the squad. More importantly, we must ensure that our leaders are better prepared to lead on the complex battlefield and that the squads are trained continuously and consistently to maintain a high rate of readiness. The terrain in the COE has a profound effect on the morale, stamina, and capacity of Soldiers to accomplish the mission, and we are examining the cognitive, physical, social-cultural, and moral-ethical aspects that determine the human capacity and limitations that the human dimension of the squad comprises. Foremost among these are leader development and building of a cohesive team, followed by the tactical and technical proficiency that can only arise from a fully trained and empowered unit. Commitment to the Army values can sustain the warrior spirit, and greater awareness of the cultural, civil, and language characteristics of the COE can help build confidence by dispelling uncertainty. These skills can only enhance Soldiers’ situational awareness and contribute to the development of a cohesive team. The human dimension of our profession is every bit as important to the Army as the Soldiers who defend our way of life. The bonds forged during shared danger are with us for the rest of our lives. These bonds are not unique to Soldiers in combat; the Army’s Family members are like no others due to the perceptions of shared risks, the necessity of maintaining a home while the sponsor is deployed, and the joy of homecomings. This element of the human dimension will receive its own share of attention as we work diligently to design, train, and field the Infantry squad as a strategic formation. I welcome your comments and suggestions as we move ahead with this vitally important initiative. Follow me! One force, one fight!
MCoE BOOSTS SQUAD AS A ‘STRATEGIC FORMATION’

VINCE LITTLE

The Army wants to turn dismounted tactical small units into overpowering forces on the battlefield and eliminate the enemy’s comparable effectiveness at that tier. The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) is playing a key role in making it happen.

Companies, battalions, and brigades have a significant edge in combat but seem to rely on squads as the “strategic formation” to execute at the point of attack in today’s complex operating environment, said Jeff Arneson, a strategic planner with Fort Benning’s Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate. That means most engagements — and casualties — occur while Soldiers are moving as tactical small unit members.

“Our adversaries have forced us to operate that way. They want to get us in a fight where we don’t have the overmatch we have in our mounted formations,” he said. “We’re not being challenged in our mounted formations because of the overmatch we possess there. When you look at the contemporary operational environment, they want to try to fight you where there are limited capabilities. The dismounted squad is where we are more vulnerable. And that’s where missions are occurring today in Afghanistan and Iraq to a lesser extent.”

Arneson said dismounted Infantry squads have emerged as the centerpiece of the tactical fight and will remain a focal point in operations for years to come. Connecting dismounted squads to an already existing network used by mounted formations is a top MCoE priority.

“If you’re on a vehicle in theater, you’re usually well connected with access to the network. The minute you step off that vehicle, you’re usually not,” he said. “There have been major upgrades in equipment, and individual Soldiers are more lethal today. But the way dismounted squads operate has not really changed that much since World War II. They’re still operating with a paper map and FM radio.

“When our dismounted squads are in a combat situation, they don’t have all the situational awareness their mounted counterparts have. We want to bring that dismounted squad into the networked Army. That’s the objective: Get them into the existing network so they have the same overmatch capabilities their mounted counterparts have.”

Elevating the tactical small unit and treating it as a strategic system is a major priority, said MCoE and Fort Benning CSM Chris Hardy. The initiative puts greater emphasis on providing the capabilities, training, and leader development needed to enable the squad to meet current and future battlefield demands.

*A Soldier with Company D, 1st Battalion, 181st Infantry Regiment secures an area during a mission at the Bala Hisar Citadel in Ghazni City, Afghanistan, on 29 March 2011.*

Photo by SrA Courtney Witt, USAF
Mortar crews have started receiving new lightweight 60mm mortar systems that are approximately 20 percent lighter than previous versions.

The Program Executive Office (PEO) for Ammunition fielded the Army's first M224A1 60mm Lightweight Company Mortar Systems to the 1st Special Forces Group in Fort Lewis, Wash., in June. Eventually all former legacy M224 systems will be replaced with the new lightweight systems.

"At the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, the average load for a 60mm assistant gunner was 122 pounds," said Peter Burke, PEO Ammunition's deputy product manager for Guided Precision Munitions and Mortar Systems. "Our program goal was to reduce the weight of mortar systems as much as we could to take some of the weight off of his back."

The M224A1 fires the complete family of 60mm ammunition, such as high explosive, smoke, illumination, infrared illumination and practice cartridges. The 60mm’s first major redesign since the 1970s has reduced the overall weight by 20 percent or 9.3 lbs.

"This new 60mm delivers improved portability while maintaining the existing rate of fire, range, and tube life of the former system," Burke said.

A team from PEO Ammunition and the Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) was able to shave off the weight through a combination of using different materials and reducing the number of components.

The cannon tube on the new system is made from "Inconel," a nickel-based material, as opposed to steel. Inconel is just as strong as steel but significantly lighter. It also has better wear characteristics and has the potential for a longer service life, although additional testing and evaluation is required before the service life can be extended past the current round limit.

The bipod, which holds the cannon steady at the desired elevation and angle, was also completely redesigned. Through changes such as incorporating the lighter but still high performing materials of aluminum and titanium into the bipod, the team was able to reduce the bipod weight by 17 percent.

In addition to a reduction in weight, the bipod's new design requires less maintenance. One of the major upgrades included gears that do not need to be lubricated by grease and oil.

"So instead of squirting grease in there and then worrying about dust and sand mixing with it and gunking it up, now we’re using Kevlar and other self lubricating material coatings so there’s no grease required and the components still move like they’re supposed to move,” Burke explained.

Another improvement to the bipod is the addition of self-locking legs that lock in both the open and closed position. The former system had a chain that held the legs in the open position. It was also used to chain the legs together for transportation.

A cross-level bubble has also been built into the bipod to assist the Soldiers in positioning the cannon to achieve accurate leveling needed for proper targeting.

(Audra Calloway works for the Picatinny Arsenal Public Affairs Office.)
RESILIENCE APP RELEASED

VINCE LITTLE

An online program aimed at strengthening Soldiers’ resolve and behavioral health skill sets in pursuit of their objectives is now available.

The Resilience App features a multitude of resources to help service members, Army civilians, and family members optimize performance, build strong minds and bodies, and develop better coping mechanisms for traumatic events. The voluntary tool emphasizes setting and reaching personal goals within Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF).

Videos, Web links and practical exercises are included in the training and education package, said Sam Rhodes, a training specialist with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine action officer for developing the Resilience App. This latest initiative is the app version of the Maneuver Center of Excellence Resiliency Goals Book released in December.

“It gives individuals the ability to set multiple outcome-based goals,” he said. “They can establish priorities to accomplish those goals. It also provides actions and beliefs to assist in the accomplishment of those goals.”

“Currently, we are giving a majority of Soldiers resilience training. Resilience goal setting is another tool to help focus the energy in a positive way.”

The Army’s CSF program was established in 2009 to cultivate the five dimensions of strength: emotional, social, spiritual, family and physical. It’s based on more than 30 years of scientific study. The Global Assessment Tool, a 105-question self-appraisal survey, is part of CSF and mandatory for all Soldiers. Family members and Department of Defense civilians are also encouraged to use the tool.

The individual Resiliency Goals Book is a Fort Benning concept being looked at for possible use Armywide, post leaders have said. As the Army tries to stem the rising tide of suicides in its ranks, the Resilience App could help troops suffering from or vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, said Rhodes, a retired command sergeant major who served for 29 years and deployed to Iraq three times. He was diagnosed with PTSD during his final tour in 2005.

He now shares his experiences and struggles in speaking engagements around the country. Last year, he wrote a book titled Changing the Military Culture of Silence, which chronicles his own battle with PTSD and suicidal thoughts.

“CSF and the Global Assessment Tool helps thousands of Soldiers who attend training across the Army,” Rhodes said. “The Resilience Goal Setting App may touch millions who we never see — they are the ones who are getting away and need this app.”

The Resilience App is available for download at the App Store and iTunes. An Android version is expected out sometime in early July.

(Vince Little writes for the Fort Benning newspaper, The Bayonet.)

SUBMIT AN ARTICLE FOR PUBLICATION IN INFANTRY

Infantry Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, and experiences while deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past.

If you’re unsure whether a topic is suitable, please contact us. We can let you know whether we would be interested in the article and can also give further guidance. Our fully developed feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 3,500 words, but these are not rigid guidelines. Shorter articles can be used in our Professional Forum and Training Notes sections.

Sketches, photographs, maps, and line drawings that support your article are encouraged. When you submit your article, please include the original electronic file of all graphics (jpeg, tiff, PowerPoint, etc.). Please also include the origin of all artwork and, if necessary, written permission for any copyrighted items to be reprinted.

Authors are responsible for ensuring their articles receive a proper security review through their respective organizations before being submitted.

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For the foreseeable future, our Army will continue to operate in complex environments that challenge Soldiers, leaders, and organizations. While much of the current focus is on Afghanistan and Iraq, Army forces must continue to train, equip, and organize to conduct full spectrum operations — simultaneously combining offense, defense, stability and civil support operations. This view of the future provides the direction for the movement and maneuver concept (MMC). The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver 2016–2028, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-6, is nested with The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) and The Army Operating Concept (AOC) and carries forward the two central constructs introduced in the AOC: combined arms maneuver and wide area security (WAS).

Challenges of the Future Operating Environment

The current operating environment will continue to evolve, presenting ground forces in the future with an ever increasing challenge to defeat irregular and hybrid enemies that are connected by cell phone, computer network, and satellite phone technology. In most cases, support from the local population in defeating these threats cannot be assumed. In addition, the possibility of major combat operations remains real.

The future operating environment will include adversaries ranging from well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped conventional military formations experienced in close fighting to irregular and hybrid forces. Our most likely opponents will continue to be irregular forces, extending from trained insurgents focused on local or regional regime change or global jihad to criminals and tribal groups focused on maintaining power within their local areas for economic reasons. In some cases these enemies will work together, forming a hybrid threat that combines conventional...
and unconventional units, equipment, and tactics. Regardless of makeup or aim, however, the enemy will continue to be adaptive and networked, employing a range of weapons and technologies along with conventional and improvised weapons.

Tribal culture — the natural wariness of the population toward outside forces — will cause local-nationals to remain uncommitted to the United States forces or their own government unless they can be assured of long-term security and economic subsistence. This complex and ambiguous environment, in which our forces fight a determined enemy while securing the population and setting conditions to enable the success of local and national governments, represents one of the greatest challenges of future maneuver.

While we expect the dominant operating conditions in the near-term and midterm to look much like our recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the possibility of high-tempo major combat operations is real. For example, it may be unlikely that an attack on U.S. forces by a well-equipped standing nation-state will occur, but the unstable global conditions make highly plausible a hostile-nation attack on a U.S. allied state. In this situation, our heavy maneuver forces could face the challenge of deploying rapidly to defeat a well-equipped, well-led, and well-organized opponent.

Addressing the Future: Vital Maneuvers

The future will require us to employ the movement and maneuver concept, which is based on the premise that the central focus of the force will dominate the close fight; at the same time, it recognizes the need to protect the population and calibrate the amount of force used in areas where we must set the conditions for an ally to succeed. Maneuver forces must be able to execute combined arms maneuver to defeat the enemy, while conducting wide area security to protect the civilian population and set the conditions for a stable environment.

Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy and defend land areas; to achieve physical, temporal and psychological advantages over the enemy; and to preserve freedom of action. It builds on traditional combined arms (Armor, Infantry and Artillery) and maneuver (moving to positions of advantage), and it emphasizes the need for agile and adaptive leaders who understand the complex environment and combine the warfighting functions — as well as leadership and information in combination with joint and allied partners — to defeat our enemies and protect our friends. The Army conducts combined arms maneuver throughout the full spectrum of operations.

Combined arms maneuver is characterized by:
- Networked units conducting decentralized operations;
- Understanding the enemy’s networks;
- Conducting continuous reconnaissance to seize and maintain the initiative;
- Developing the situation through action;
- Maintaining proficiency in the close fight; and

• Fighting jointly.

In addition to considerations for the application of lethal and nonlethal combat power, combined arms maneuver includes recognizing the importance of understanding and defeating the enemy’s physical and electronic networks and employing the capabilities of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) team. It is a method of operating — combining capabilities that applies at the operational and tactical levels across the spectrum of operations.

Protecting the Population: WAS

Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect the population, forces, infrastructure and activities; deny the enemy positions of advantage; and consolidate tactical and operational gains. It builds on combined arms maneuver and focuses on the presence of Soldiers and their interaction with indigenous populations. Soldiers are trained and attuned to local culture and are tasked with building relationships and trust with local civil, military, and religious leaders. WAS recognizes the link between success in military operations and the security of the civilian population. It includes traditional actions to secure friendly forces, but emphasizes friendly-force actions to secure the local population, their activities, and their infrastructure. At the same time it denies the enemy the ability to threaten by disrupting the enemy’s social and economic progress. Forces conduct wide area security to support the larger goal of setting conditions for local and regional stability. Successful WAS sets the conditions for the transition of area control to local and regional government forces.

A New Approach to Training

The future operating environment will challenge the Army to develop adaptive and agile Soldiers and leaders imbued with the Warrior Ethos, capable of leading combined arms formations and of functioning effectively in the complex environment as integral members of a JIIM team. Units must conduct training in a realistic manner that replicates the uncertainty, stress and complexity of the various theaters of operations to speed the growth of adaptive leaders and Soldiers. Soldiers must be trained to engage with civil populations, nongovernmental organizations and host-nation organizations to build rapport and set the conditions for synergistic efforts toward common objectives. Leaders must be skilled in the art of mission command to lead operations successfully. To achieve this degree of realistic training, the Army must develop and utilize a blended training model of a fully networked structure of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training systems and approaches that are applicable to both mounted and dismounted Soldiers. This includes networked collective training capabilities embedded in Army systems.

Required Capabilities

More than nine years of war have reinforced the Army’s need...
to maintain its understanding of the complexity of the close fight and its proficiency in small-unit combat operations. Recent experience also clearly highlights the need to generate an adaptable force capable of conducting full spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and in the presence of an adaptable enemy. To prevail in the face of these operational realities, the Army must apply the lessons learned in the current conflict and adopt solutions that will increase its competency in future conflicts. The movement and maneuver concept proposes the following near-term required capabilities for maneuver forces:

• Develop a versatile mix of task-organized and networked combined arms organizations trained and ready to conduct combined arms maneuver and WAS in full spectrum operations.
• Preserve the capability to conduct continuous reconnaissance and security.
• Maintain the capability to fire, maneuver, and survive in close combat to close with and capture, kill, or neutralize the enemy.
• Develop units and leaders capable of conducting simultaneous, decentralized combined arms operations in noncontiguous areas.
• Improve unit and Soldier skills to enable Soldiers to work with and understand the culture of the people they are trying to protect through wide area security.
• Organize and equip maneuver forces to conduct joint entry operations, forcible or unopposed, from strategic distances.
• Update training simulations and systems to better replicate the future operating environment and to provide the best possible training experience for Soldiers and units.

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MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CONCEPT: A SCENARIO

Situation: A hybrid force from the country of Axima consisting of regular and irregular forces has crossed the border and is now in control of Dib City in the country of Ellis. They plan to annex the town and “reunite with their brothers.” They are systematically persecuting civilians loyal to the Ellis government, often marking them for execution as collaborators with the West. The enemy force is equipped and possesses some rocket artillery and mortars. The enemy is supported by local religious elders and disaffected tribesmen who act as guerrillas. Both receive some logistical support from other disaffected groups and weapons and ammunition from Axima. The enemy has an electronic and physical network that includes cell phones, satellite phones, the Internet and messengers.

The U.S. Response: Joint U.S. forces conduct forcible entry operations in Ellis to allow for the introduction of forces to defeat insurgents and set the conditions for the return of a friendly government to Dib City. Elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps seize airfields to establish multiple dispersed points of entry for follow-on early entry forces, while the U.S. Marine Corps seizes a port to facilitate long-term sustainment efforts. The 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and the 3rd Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigade (R&S BDE) soon land at the captured airfield in Dib City.

The 1st SBCT secures and expands the lodgment, while the 3rd R&S BDE multifunctional military intelligence teams conduct continuous reconnaissance operations to detect and intercept enemy electronic communications networks and quickly produce actionable intelligence for offensive and WAS operations. Their focus is on identifying enemy networks and conducting social network analysis. The 1st SBCT, with a tank battalion attached, develops the situation through action to defeat enemy forces and protect the lodgment. Using vital intelligence collected by the R&S BDE, task-organized teams of networked infantry, tanks, attack helicopters, unmanned aerial systems, engineers and sniper teams — supported by close-air support and artillery with counter-battery radar — overwhelm the enemy in the tactical close fight. They attack, while simultaneously protecting the civilian population and infrastructure by applying lethal and nonlethal systems with discipline and discrimination to minimize collateral damage.

The 3rd R&S BDE follows the 1st SBCT and deploys human intelligence operational management teams to establish a local presence to detect, infiltrate, subvert and destroy enemy networks, while civil-support teams establish humanitarian-aid sites throughout the area to provide assistance, clarify intentions and counter enemy disinformation. U.S. forces in Dib City make the transition to long-term stability operations and conduct WAS to consolidate gains and protect the local population and infrastructure. The 3rd R&S BDE continues building and refining the area’s network analysis through electronic monitoring and physical interaction with the population. This intelligence allows the joint task force to direct the 1st SBCT, supported by local forces and other joint and interagency partners, to seize weapons and ammunition stockpiles and interdict logistical support coming from outside of Ellis through combined arms maneuver operations. Intelligence combined with effective information operations helps influence local religious elders to publicly support coalition objectives. The R&S BDE, through its thorough understanding and interdiction of enemy and civil networks, has provided an unprecedented degree of understanding. The SBCT and other maneuver forces exploit this knowledge to defeat the enemy’s ability to operate in Dib City, to win the support of the civilian population and to promote local stability. The future operating environment will continue to present maneuver forces with complex and challenging conditions.

The movement and maneuver concept recognizes that we must adapt, even as an increasingly diverse threat environment continues to evolve; it suggests required capabilities to address the challenge.
The rapid advancement of precision targeting technology during the last decade has been remarkable. The capabilities and tools available to forward observers (FOs) and joint fires observers (JFOs) has evolved from compass and map to lightweight handheld laser range finders and advanced pocket-sized handheld devices with precision imagery. As a result of these advancements in technology, Soldier and leader training as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for employment of this technology also needs to evolve. The most important aspect of this precision targeting capability is providing the FO with enhanced ability to achieve the most difficult aspect of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire — accurate target location — thereby allowing the FO to achieve his primary mission — first round fire for effect.

Precision fires are necessary in today’s complex operating environment where collateral damage risks versus military necessity must be addressed. With the strategic risk associated with unnecessary injury and death of noncombatants, precision fires must be employed effectively. The accurate employment of ballistic and precision munitions allows us to reduce risk of collateral damage while achieving desired effects. Our precision munitions for mortar, cannon, and rocket systems offer tactical commanders the option of conducting lethal strikes while mitigating the risks to Soldiers, noncombatants and infrastructure. Precision munitions offer leaders on the battlefield a wide variety of choices on how to engage a target and a scalable capability to attack it.

As the Army continues to develop its coordinate-seeking munitions capability, consideration must be given to the requirements necessary to employ these munitions. One crucial aspect to the effective employment of coordinate-seeking munitions is target location. Accurately determining target location is required for effective employment of precision munitions and is achieved through a process called target coordinate mensuration (TCM). The U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCoE), as the Army designated functional manager for TCM, has established a joint recognized and accredited TCM training and certification program. The USAFCoE has a clear understanding of the requirements associated with precision fires and has collaborated with the Joint Staff, other services, combatant commands (COCOM), and combat support agencies (CSA) to develop a comprehensive training program for TCM, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation (CDE).

For the past two years, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), Fort Sill, Okla., has been the USAFCoE lead agent for the development of a Precision Fires Program (PFP). The PFP encompasses institutional training for TCM, weaponeering, and CDE. Precision fires training is designed for 13F (forward observers), 131A (targeting technicians), and 13A (fire support officers). Having trained operators enables tactical units conducting fire support to employ indirect fires accurately and effectively, achieving first round target effects while mitigating collateral damage.

Another critical aspect of employing accurate indirect fires is the FO hardware requirements. Currently, 13F FOs have the capability to conduct mensuration using the pocket-sized forward entry device (PFED) with precision fires image (PFI). Forward observers must understand the PFED is not primarily a digital communication device. It is a digitized computer that enables the FO to quickly determine a 10-digit grid and then mensurate that grid if the circumstances permit. When combined with a handheld laser such as the Mark VII or Vector 21, the PFED is by far the
fastest and most accurate means to determine an accurate target location. Once the accurate target location has been determined, the FO can send the call for fire voice or digital through the tactical radio. The PFED is standard issue for dismounted platoon FOs. Another FO system is the ruggedized handheld computer (RHC) with Forward Observer System (FOS) software and Precision Strike Suite – Special Operations Force (PSS-SOF) mensuration software. The RHC is a system used at the platoon/company level for fire support planning and execution that also facilitates digital calls for fire. With its embedded PSS-SOF capability, the trained and certified user can quickly mensurate coordinates. Both systems are highly effective and allow for timely and accurate calls for fire. However, these automated tools have not propagated to the fire support community due to a lack of capability understanding. Senior leader education and command emphasis must occur in order to fully integrate these capabilities into fire support operations. Once FOs are fully trained on the proper use of the PFED and RHC, they hold a very powerful weapon system that enables them to effectively support their maneuver formations with timely and accurate fires.

The following are a few basic questions that commanders should ask their fire support officers and fire support NCOs:

- Do we currently have certified operators for TCM so we can employ our coordinate seeking and ballistic munitions accurately and effectively? (APMI/Excalibur/GMLRS, etc...)
- Do we have the systems and software to conduct TCM? (PFED with PFI, RHCs with FOS/PSS-SOF)
- Are our JFOs and FOs current on their certification requirements?
- What proficiency or sustainment training do we currently conduct for our TCM-certified JFOs and FOs?
- Are our 13A lieutenants and captains trained and certified in the areas of precision fires?
- Where can we get our FOs trained?

By asking these questions, commanders will be able to determine their unit’s capability to employ fires effectively and make decisions accordingly. The Precision Fires Program provides three venues for instruction:

1. Primary Military Education for 13F — Advanced Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC); 131A — basic and advanced courses; and 13A — Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC) B and Field Artillery Captains Career Course (FACCC).

2. Functional course open to 13F FOs and 131A targeting technicians that did not receive this training during PME. It is also open to other services, partner nations, and individuals in targeting billets that require this training.

3. Precision Fires Mobile Training Team (MTT). The MTT will support Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), unit-level training program development and will supplement current COCOM training activities when requested. MTT support during FY12 is provided at no charge to the unit.

All venues provide training to joint standards and in all cases except BOLC B and FACCC, will lead to certification for TCM, CDE, or both. There is no certification requirement for weaponeering at this time.

Precision Fires Program POCs:

CW5 Robert P. Tisdale, JACI Precision Fires Program Manager, (580) 442-8629

CW4 Thomas M. Taccia, JACI Precision Fires Targeting Officer, (580) 442-3385

CW4 Thomas Taccia, 131A targeting technician, is a targeting officer with the Precision Fires Program at the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Okla. He has previously deployed as a fires brigade targeting officer and division Field Artillery intelligence officer in 2008/9, as a FA brigade targeting officer in 2004/5 and a Q37 radar section leader in 2003/4. He served as a 75th Fires Brigade targeting officer and developed a unit-level precision fires program consisting of TCM, Weaponeering, and CDE. He was assigned to JACI in 2009 and was a key architect along with CW5 Robert Tisdale in the development and implementation of the current joint Precision Fires Program.

A forward observer with the 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division uses a lightweight laser designator range finder to locate a target during a combined arms exercise in Iraq on 24 July 2010.

Photo by SSG Edward Reagan
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) proved to be invaluable to the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) during combat operations as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08. GEOINT is an intelligence discipline that includes imagery, imagery analysis, and advanced geospatial data. Although many organizations consume GEOINT, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is the lead agency for advocacy and analysis of both the intelligence community and the Department of Defense. For example, GEOINT was used during the planning and execution of operations in Sadr City, Iraq. At the time, Sadr City served as a safe haven for Shia extremists and offered almost unrestricted freedom of movement. GEOINT products provided knowledge of this complex urban area and greatly contributed to situational awareness. It also contributed in part to the subsequent 50 percent drop in significant activity reports (SIGACTS) and casualties. However, the time to take advantage of this intelligence is not after the battle has begun but long before — during the pre-deployment phase.

GEOINT in Pre-deployment Preparation

The proper use of GEOINT in pre-deployment preparation can pay dividends that will be realized throughout a combat tour. Training in the use of GEOINT can be scheduled through the S2/G2 or in the Army Training and Requirements Resource System (ATRRS). Much of the familiarization, overview, and analysis training is conducted through the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. However, GEOINT courses are also available through the NGA College and the Army Command and General Staff College.

Another aspect of the pre-deployment cycle is participation in mission rehearsal/warfighter exercises and rotations through the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La. Often, these are the most realistic training scenarios used to incorporate the use of GEOINT in combined arms and tactical operations. Leaders should make maximum use of the assets available to them by leveraging both internal and external sources for GEOINT products. If these products aren’t readily available, units and leaders should specifically ask what GEOINT support is available to the unit and if NGA representatives are on hand to assist. Some GEOINT best practices at this point include:

• Requesting and utilizing imagery of NTC and JRTC training areas prior to the unit’s rotation, particularly unclassified maps; and
• Using imagery in company/battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs) for situational awareness.

From the NGA perspective, the agency supports unit pre-deployment planning in three ways. First, the Office of Military Support-Army (OMSA) interacts with each deploying unit at the brigade level during counterinsurgency (COIN) seminars that are held prior to deployment. Second, through the Military Readiness Directorate, NGA has an active exercise support program and can be of assistance by:

• Conducting project management of exercises; and
• Coordinating support with NGA and
GEOINT support teams (These assets are described later in the paper.);
- Coordinating manning and collection requirements for GEOINT support; and
- Generating exercise products and collecting lessons learned.

Finally, units have access to NGA support teams that work with the supported units throughout the pre-deployment, deployment, and reintegration phases to provide the full spectrum of GEOINT support. Once deployed, GEOINT can play a crucial role in mission planning at the company, battalion, and brigade levels, especially when it is incorporated into the military decision-making process (MDMP) cycle and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

GEOINT in MDMP and IPB

Although GEOINT can play a critical role in all phases of MDMP, it is extremely useful in the mission analysis and courses of action analysis (war gaming) phases, as well as in all phases of IPB. Most commonly, it is used in the TOCs to depict movement on the battlefield. At the individual tactical unit level, GEOINT can:
- Augment road and topographical maps with imagery of key terrain and danger areas;
- Provide point positioning data and feature descriptions for targeting;
- Provide line of site graphics and analysis to assist in threat assessments, route assessments, and defensive analysis;
- Provide detailed elevation and slope data for identification of potential landing zones and drop zones; and
- Depict urban areas with accuracy that is not possible by other intelligence methods. The ability to visualize streets, key buildings, urban choke points, and key terrain is key during urban operations as well as civil relief efforts.

Of all tactical scenarios and missions, COIN poses some of the greatest challenges to tactical operations as a whole and to IPB specifically. The use and understanding of GEOINT is critical to mission success.

GEOINT in COIN

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides practical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for COIN operations and devotes several sections to GEOINT. The following is an excerpt from FM 3-24 that provides an excellent overview of GEOINT from a COIN perspective and describes some of the most relevant TTPs for tactical units:

**FM 3-24, 3-149** — Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery and geospatial information. GEOINT may have some benefit for identifying smuggling routes and safe havens. Imagery can be very beneficial to operations in urban areas as well. It can help identify structures of interest and aid urban terrain navigation.

**FM 3-24, Appendix B**

B-5. ...Geospatial information and services remains a core mission of the engineer branch and provides the foundation for GEOINT. Imagery intelligence remains a core mission of the military intelligence branch and provides the intelligence layers and analytic fusion for GEOINT. The result is digitally integrated intelligence products that support all-source analysis, planning, decision making and support to current operations.

**Geospatial Tools**

B-6. Geospatial products (tools) that can be provided by the geospatial information and services team include the following:
- Terrain databases
- Special terrain studies and products prepared by U.S. or (Host Nation) HN agencies, and special maps, charts, and geodetic studies
- Current photography
- Real-time terrain reconnaissance
- Terrain factor matrices

**Imagery**

B-7. Imagery products include both aerial photography and satellite imagery. In many cases, aerial reconnaissance platforms, such as unmanned aircraft systems, respond directly to commanders. This practice aids timely, focused data collection. Each (imagery) collection system has its own capabilities.

B-8. ...Intelligence staffs remain aware of the capabilities and limitations of these systems and the procedures for requesting this support.

B-9. ...These products have many applications. Presenting imagery in an oblique perspective by combining it with digital terrain elevation data provides a perspective view. ... Other uses include facility analysis, structural analysis, soil analysis, and damage assessment.

* Note that while FM 3-24 has some excellent examples of how to use GEOINT in COIN operations, it is not meant to be all encompassing.

**Obtaining GEOINT Support**

Army TTP 3-34.80, Geospatial Engineering, provides an excellent overview of GEOINT resources available to the warfighter that reside at both the national and the Army unit level.

**ATTP 3-34.80, Chapter 2**

**NATIONAL LEVEL**

2.2 The National System for Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG) is the combination of technology, policies, capabilities, doctrine, activities, people, data, and communities necessary to produce GEOINT in a variety of environments. NSG operates within policies and guidelines established by the Director of National Intelligence. The NSG community consists of members of the intelligence community, services,
and division levels, the majority of the workload is required to support geospatial database management, mission planning, and the IPB process. Below division level, geospatial engineering is increasingly focused on current operations and updating the enterprise geospatial database (database management).

2-5. Army geospatial engineer units, supporting each echelon down to the brigade level, provide terrain analysis, terrain visualization, digitized terrain products, tailored map products, map production, geospatial data management, and support to the integration of other GI requirements within the supported force. The organic or augmenting geospatial engineering units available to the commander operate within the command’s GEOINT cell. As discussed in chapter 1, the GEOINT cell is composed of imagery analysts and geospatial engineers that provide GEOINT capabilities (GI, imagery, and imagery intelligence [IMINT]). This cell ensures that GEOINT requirements are coordinated through appropriate channels as applicable and facilitates shared access of various domains. The composition of this cell varies based on the echelon and the availability of geospatial engineers and imagery analysts and it is located in the top secret sensitive compartmental information facility. The intelligence staff officer (S-2)/assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) has overall responsibility for leadership of the GEOINT cell.

A geospatial analyst with the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team shows Iraqi Ministry of Water and Ministry of Agriculture technicians features of a mapping program.

Photo by SGT Doug Roles
Cell members are supervised by the GEOINT cell officer in charge (OIC) but remain under the command of their parent unit. Within the BCT, the GI technician normally serves as the GEOINT cell OIC. At division and above, either the GI technician or the IMINT technician will serve as the GEOINT cell OIC based on seniority. The key to a successful process is collaboration across functional areas within the headquarters and among the GEOINT cell, higher headquarters, and the rest of the stakeholders.

2-6. The Army has two service centers that support GEOINT: the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) AGC (Army Geospatial Center). The first produces and disseminates all-source integrated intelligence on foreign ground forces and related military technologies. A major component of the NGIC is the 3rd Military Intelligence Center, the Army’s only GEOINT battalion. They produce and disseminate IMINT, GEOINT, advanced GEOINT, and GI products to the Army, joint, and multinational forces and national-level agencies in support of operational requirements.

The AGC has the mission to provide the operational commander with a superior knowledge of the physical environment and support the nation’s civil and environmental initiatives through research, development, and the application of expertise in the topographic and related sciences. They produce and disseminate standard and specialized geospatial products and provide technical support and advice to field units.

Since this ATTP was published, the GEOINT functions that were once performed by both Engineer and the Military Intelligence branches have been merged and several structural changes have resulted. The Army recently redesignated the operational imagery intelligence battalion from the 3rd Military Intelligence Center and renamed it the Army GEOINT Battalion. With this change came the addition of military geospatial engineers to the existing intelligence analyst manning structure. Other changes include standardizing how Army GEOINT cells are deployed and introducing opportunities for geospatial engineers and imagery analysts to train together at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center.

From a training and doctrine standpoint, the Army also published an initiative to train together at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center.

The key takeaway is that GEOINT is relevant, useful, and critical for all tactical leaders at all echelons on the battlefield. It is a significant asset for the tactical leader during pre-deployment, MDMP, and all tactical operations to include counterinsurgency.

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“Hot Action! Hot Action! Hot Action!” Six Soldiers sprang to their feet. “Go! Go! Go!” Everything in their paths was strewn across the hide in their exodus. This meant only one thing. It was code for a fire mission, and upon hearing this, the section sprinted to get to their launcher. The MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) track spun to life as SGT Marcoux screamed in the headset to take off, leaving a 20-foot-tall dust trail behind, obscuring everything in sight.

Marcoux looked out through the chief’s hatch over the earth-filled Hesco barriers at the never ending bone yard of rusted metal cars and remains of Iraqi Army equipment from the 2003 invasion. They were ready for this — excited. Marcoux heard a familiar sound through his headset. His gunner, CPL Hobbs, echoed back their call sign, “One-Two, fire mission.” The fire direction center (FDC) called over the radio “One-Two, you’re primary.” Marcoux couldn’t have asked for a better crew that day.

Soldiers launch a Multiple Launch Rocket System rocket during operations in Iraq in 2006. Photo by SSG James H. Christopher III
His three-man section had rehearsed this battle drill dozens of times in the month since they arrived at Camp Fallujah, Iraq. This mission was unlike those previous rehearsals — the grid and target data was different, unfamiliar. The launcher came to a sudden halt as the hydraulic pump kicked on and put the launcher module (LM) into its deliberate rotation. Forty-six seconds later the launcher was laid on the target. Six XM31 rockets pointed down range. Marcoux suddenly realized why everything seemed so different. The LM came to rest with a high quadrant elevation and pointed in an unfamiliar direction. “Wow, we are pointed at Baghdad,” he said over the headset.

It had taken less than three minutes to arrive at the fire point, lay the launcher, and verify the target data with the FDC. It was slow from there though, waiting for the air to be cleared. Usually after about 10 minutes of waiting, they wouldn’t fire. The crew waited. And waited. Finally, the command squawked over the radio “Air is cleared, waiting on the command.”

Excitement turned to focus as the alarm went off on the fire control panel. The launcher chief announced, “Received fire command.”

Marcoux took one last look at the LM, signaled to start the process to prepare the cab to fire, and slammed the hatch shut. SPC Schofell gave the signal that the cab was ready. Marcoux looked at Hobbs and announced, “Fire!”

The fire mission described above was part of Operation Tomahawk Strike 11 in Baghdad on 24 January 2007. U.S. Soldiers from the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division alongside Iraqi soldiers from the 6th Iraqi Army Division engaged insurgents from a high-rise in the Haifa Street area during security operations. Operation Tomahawk Strike 11 was one of a series of targeted raids to disrupt illegal militia activity.

In this particular operation, both U.S. and Iraqi forces were denied freedom of maneuver because of heavy machine gun fire. Apache helicopters were on station but could not get a clear shot because of the proximity of friendly forces. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) XM31 rockets were called in to provide the solution. For this mission, Charlie Battery, 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment fired one GMLRS-Unitary XM31 round, which neutralized the enemy and granted instant freedom of maneuver to the Soldiers and Iraqi forces participating in the operation.

The current version of the XM31 is the M31A1. The M31A1 GMLRS-U was specifically designed for urban warfare to minimize collateral damage. The M31A1 requires an M270A1 MLRS or an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launcher.

When a fire mission is received, individual aim points are assigned to each rocket by the launcher depending on which sheaf is requested by the Army Artillery Tactical Data System. GPS and mission critical data are also sent to the rocket. Once the programming has been received, the munition is able to calculate all parameters necessary to guide itself to the target with precision, including controlling its own impact angle for detonation on, below, or above the target surface. Upon launch, the programmed destination is refined by way of canards on the front end of the rocket housing. These fins move to adjust the flight path of the rocket while in flight, using the GPS data to ensure accurate impact. Upon reaching the target, the fuse setting determines how far from the aim point the warhead will detonate. Supported fuse settings are point detonate (surface), delay (below surface), and proximity (above surface).

Soldiers may have seen a video that has been circulating of an M31 GMLRS-Unitary rocket detonating through the roof of a building. A woman and a child were walking in the street no more than 75 meters away at the time. When the M31 impacts, they are startled and run a few paces and then continue walking. The design of the unitary warhead is designed to kill those in one room but minimize effects in the next. This design is what made it the problem solver on Haifa Street or in any urban environment where collateral damage or proximity to friendly troops is a consideration for risk mitigation.

Typically, the closer the target is the more predictable the accuracy. Typical tube artillery or mortar systems describe the change in accuracy at different ranges as probable error in range (PER). This could be compared to the beaten zone for small arms weapons. The bottom line is when GPS guidance is used, MLRS launchers firing GMLRS M31A1s are accurate within five meters at all ranges. That level of accuracy combined with the fuse options available with GMLRS gives any maneuver commander the ability to remove obstacles and regain or establish freedom of maneuver.

One of the challenges to enjoying the range, speed, and accuracy of M31A1 GMLRS munitions as part of your daily kinetic strike package is the fact that it is inorganic to the company-level maneuver unit. It is, in fact, a division-level asset. This presents a couple of other challenges that must be overcome — awareness and clearance of air.

Field Artillery officers attached or assigned to your unit can play a large part in awareness by learning as much as they can about MLRS capabilities. They can then grease the skids for fire missions to happen as smoothly and quickly as possible.

When considering the clearance of air, two courses of action exist for MLRS fire missions. The first course of action is for pre-planned targets, which become kinetic strike packages and are sent to the firing unit for execution. Clearance of air becomes part of that process. The liaison officer (LNO) is your quarterback for achieving clearance of air in an efficient and timely manner. Therefore, you must regularly interface with your LNO, if you know who they are. Once you’ve made the acquaintance, then your challenge is to feed them with the critical information they need to get the mission approved and cleared in a timely manner.

The second course of action is for troops in contact (TIC). These missions do not utilize the LNO path but are sent directly from the maneuver unit to the joint operations center that handles your area of operations (AO). Since the hand-off goes to a joint unit, they are already part of the clearance-of-air process for ground units. This is what expedites fire missions sent through this method.

MLRS units have great mobility in any terrain and are trained to execute missions in minutes with unmatched range and accuracy. They can be employed for pre-planned targets or targets of opportunity. For these simple reasons, MLRS should be part of any maneuver mission no matter the scope.

**1LT Brad Pemberton** is currently the First Fires MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) platoon leader for C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill, Okla.
Recent events at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., have revealed new trends in defining the roles and responsibilities of a brigade combat team’s (BCT) command group. BCT commanders who write and articulate a terms of reference for their command group and then use it to conduct battle command appear to have a more holistic approach to problem solving. The workload is spread more evenly across command group members, and the commander has a better opportunity to achieve desired outcomes than do BCT commanders who do not formerly address roles, responsibilities, and relationships within their command groups.

When new team members such as the deputy commanding officer (DCO) or O6-level stability and transition team (S-TT) leaders join the team at the Brigade Leader Training Program seminar just prior to or during the unit’s NTC rotation, some type of role definition is required to effectively bring the new members of the team on board and get them quickly integrated in a functional and meaningful way. BCT commanders who do not provide a level of definition of roles and responsibilities tend to create or allow an atmosphere within their command group where friction from overlapping tasks may occur or gaps in coverage may exist. A key ingredient to an effective terms of reference is a healthy and recurrent dialogue between command group members themselves as well as with the commander.

During a recent Operation New Dawn mission rehearsal exercise, a BCT commander came to NTC with a terms of reference for the DCO, executive officer (XO), and S3 based on headquarters functions and primacy or lead of the BCT’s efforts against its campaign plan (see Figure 1). The BCT commander gave his DCO, XO, and S3 the lead in headquarters functions as well as components of the campaign plan to provide direct oversight and leadership to the targeting process. This method — in combination with consistent and open dialogue within the command group — gave the commander some unity of effort within his command group to address BCT-level headquarters functions as well as establish and maintain a degree of momentum for the BCT’s targeting process across lines of effort for the BCT campaign plan. The framework on Figure 1 made the roles, responsibilities, and relationships clear to the members of the command group. In this scenario, the BCT commander was directly involved where friction arose to provide clarifying guidance or become directly involved as necessary.

In a recent mission rehearsal exercise for a BCT headed to Afghanistan, the BCT arrived with no formally defined roles and responsibilities for the command group. When interviewed, the DCO, XO, and S3 defined their roles as follows: DCO — “I fill leadership voids as directed by the BCT commander;” XO — “I am the chief of staff;” and S3 — “I am the operational planner.” When asked who had oversight of the BCT targeting process, the overwhelming response from the group was the BCT fire support officer because he “chaired” most of the working groups. As the rotation continued, BCT combat trainers noticed that the command group struggled with the execution of standard roles and responsibilities as the DCO, XO, and S3 overlapped heavily in some areas and did not cover down at all on some headquarters functions. The combat trainers used the model in Figure 1 to lay out what was being observed and to provide feedback to the command group as to what the DCO, XO, and S3 told us they did and what was actually observed. The result was Figure 2. The feedback to the BCT commander enabled the commander to engage with his command group and discuss how they could “divide and conquer” more efficiently.

**Figure 1— Key Leader Task Organization (A Way)**

![Key Leader Task Organization Diagram](image)
The definition of roles and responsibilities coupled with recurrent dialogue about the current challenges and opportunities within a BCT can enable a commander and his command team to be more efficient in the running of a complex and diverse organization like a brigade combat team. There are no cookie cutter solutions to command, but efficiencies can be made at any level of command when leaders understand their roles, responsibilities, and relationships as well as regularly and openly talk amongst each other about these roles and responsibilities and the challenges or opportunities available. Left without definition at a minimum, there is the potential for leaders to generate friction from overlap or leave important functions uncovered.

Taking the model in Figure 1 a step further, it needs to expand appropriately to all members of a command group. In the BCT’s case, the commander should look to include his command sergeant major as well as any O6-level S-TT leaders. The definition of roles and responsibilities also extends to efficiencies outside of the BCT’s command group (see Figure 3). With the entire command group integrated into the terms of reference, the BCT commander can look internally within his headquarters functions as well as externally to provide the guidance and dialogue required for a command group to be truly effective. At the end of the day, a BCT commander who has defined roles for his command group and then fosters effective dialogue within the command group will better enable his subordinate leaders to accomplish the mission.

Developing terms of reference not only increases the effectiveness of the BCT command group and staff but also assists subordinate commands. A clear articulation of roles and responsibilities within the BCT command group also directly benefits the BCT’s task force commanders (and their CSMs, XO’s, and S3s) with a common understanding of how BCT key personnel roles and responsibilities are assigned by the BCT commander. It enables TF-level leaders to effectively engage at the BCT level in order to provide bottom-up refinement or to seek clarity on issues when a commander’s decision is not involved or required. The definition of roles, responsibilities, and relationships within a command group or command team lined up against tasks can also be very useful at the battalion or troop/company/battery command level as well. Leaders at any level can articulate to their team what they want them to accomplish and then foster the necessary cross-talk to gain efficiencies in commanding their organization. The process starts with commander’s guidance, open and honest communication and is maintained with regular feedback and dialogue.

At the time this article was written, LTC Thomas Mackey was serving as a brigade senior combat trainer, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He has served in various leader and staff positions to include task force senior observer controller, Scorpion 07, NTC; commander of 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; executive officer of 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.; and S3 and XO of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Fort Lewis.
Many Soldiers and leaders still are not aware of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Warriors’ capabilities. Although PSYOP Soldiers have been around for years conducting operations around the globe, many don’t know that the Green Berets (Special Forces) were first called PSYOP Warriors, according to CSM (Retired) Joe Lupyak, chief of the Training Division, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. Additionally, the founding father of Special Forces, MG Robert Alexis McClure, was a PSYOP Warrior first before there were Special Forces or Green Berets. In September 1942, GEN Dwight Eisenhower appointed McClure to his Allied Forces headquarters as chief of intelligence for the European theater of operations while he was in Africa. In 1944, Eisenhower authorized establishment of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF) to support the European campaign against Nazi Germany. As the PWD/SHAEF director, McClure controlled and coordinated psychological warfare in Europe. On 15 January 1951, the Army formally recognized the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) — the first organization of its time with a mission to formulate and develop psychological warfare and special operations plans, according to the book Major General Robert McClure, Forgotten Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare by COL (Retired) Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.

While PSYOP is in the process of changing its name to Military Information Support Operations (MISO), other profound changes have been under way for some time. PSYOP is defined as the art and science of influencing diverse audiences with the purpose of achieving tactical, operational, and strategic goals. The branch dates back centuries, but even in the modern era of U.S. Army PSYOP (now MISO), changes to doctrine, equipment, and training have been constant. Today’s MISO Warriors continue to evolve and enhance their skills to successfully meet the challenges of the current operating environment. The very rapidity of the recent changes within MISO may have contributed to some misconceptions about the capabilities and the employment of one of the most effective non-kinetic weapons in our arsenal.

Many members of the armed forces, inside and outside the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, still identify MISO Warriors as those who carry a loudspeaker, perform leaflet drops, or distribute handbills in support of a Civil Affairs Medical Civilian Assistance Program (MEDCAP). Often they also have used the terms PSYOP and Information Operations (IO) interchangeably; hopefully MISO will not suffer the same fate. Although MISO Soldiers do sometimes engage in traditional tactical “loudspeaker and leaflet” types of activities, these are a small part of MISO capabilities. The range and sophistication of today’s MISO capabilities put MISO Warriors at a level of expertise that most people remain unaware of. Contrary to the stereotypes and misconceptions, MISO Warriors support a broad range of missions and force structure in environments ranging from austere to highly sophisticated; these operations are planned, coordinated, and executed before, during, and after conflicts, and must be integrated at all echelons to achieve full force-multiplier potential. MISO units may be employed to conduct missions in support of combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task forces (JTFs), theater special operations commands, component commanders, and U.S. embassies. MISO forces also support U.S. ambassadors, allies, alliance and coalition partners, and other government agencies (OGAs). MISO has the ability to support many types of missions across the range of military operations. MISO Warriors can operate in small autonomous teams or with other SOF, conventional or multinational units, or OGAs. MISOs are designed to meet the needs of conventional and other SOF commanders.

MISO Warriors are the best trained in influencing foreign target audiences and are a unique asset within the Department of Defense and the U.S. government. Such training goes beyond Army doctrine and the identified tactics, techniques, and procedures. Today’s MISO Warriors receive training in cultural awareness, media operations, public and mass communications, marketing, advertising, and public relations from some of the most competitive civilian organizations. They also utilize cutting-edge technology to research, communicate, design, produce, and disseminate MISO products.

Since 11 September 2001, MISO Soldiers have been heavily engaged in the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and other areas around the globe. Some tactical MISO units have supported ongoing operations in Afghanistan continuously since 2001, rotating forces without degrading capabilities. In addition, there are more than 30 MISO
teams providing defense support in various U.S. Embassies. The MISO Warrior works in a variety of environments supporting different entities: from support to a U.S. Marine platoon in an Iraqi desert, to engaging key tribal leaders in Afghanistan with an SF ODA, or in the Amazon jungle supporting a humanitarian mission with the U.S. Air Force. It is common for MISO Warriors, regardless of rank, to find themselves briefing a U.S. Ambassador, a U.S. commanding general, or a government minister of a partner nation, according to COL (Retired) Curtis D. Boyd.

Today, MISO Warriors influence neutral and hostile target audiences while engaged in supporting the U.S. goals of enforcing democracy, counterterrorism, human trafficking, and fighting drug trafficking. In addition, MISO Warriors are a force multiplier at the disposal of the combatant commander or a U.S. ambassador when analyzing and countering adversarial information. They constantly work in an interagency environment in order to create a favorable image of United States and coalition forces among the local populace of a foreign partner nation. The MISO Warrior receives valuable support from the strategic studies sections that are part of the regional battalions within the 4th MISO Group. These Ph.D.-level analysts are regional subject matter experts in political, cultural, and security affairs, providing an essential contribution to the success of the mission. One recent operational success story involving MISO Warriors was a rescue operation for captured defense contract employees in Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) held three defense contract employees captive for more than five years. The tip lines promoted by MISO Soldiers furnished actionable intelligence that facilitated the rescue. Once their ordeal was over, all three former hostages recounted how the leaflets and messages that MISO Soldiers produced kept their hopes up. MISO Warriors also played a significant role when a top FARC rebel commander, Jorge Briceno (better known as Mono Jojoy), was killed in a Colombian military raid in September 2010. This operation, supported by MISO, was a particularly severe blow to Latin America’s oldest and most formidable guerrilla insurgency.

MISO Warriors also have an important role in planning and supporting Noncombatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO). NEO are conducted to assist the U.S. Department of State in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, select host-nation citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. MISO Warriors provide information to evacuees, assist in crowd control, and greatly augment the success and speedy execution of the mission by providing necessary information to the evacuees. MISO Warriors provide similar support during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Recent examples include support following Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

In order to augment the capability and scope of MISO anywhere in the world, the Media Operations Center (MOC) at Fort Bragg provides reach-back support. The MOC facility, manned by 3rd MISO Battalion Soldiers, matches, and in some aspects, surpasses commercial civilian standards of production. The 3rd MISO Battalion is task-organized for print, audio/visual, and broadcast support, and it is able to provide organic maintenance for its equipment. The MISO Warriors in 3rd Battalion are effectively trained in the cutting-edge technology of media communications.

MISO Soldiers must be technically and tactically proficient in order to perform their mission. In addition, they must understand the supported unit’s mission to fully integrate MISO capabilities. This aspect is a well-defined characteristic of the tactical military information support team (T-MIST). These Soldiers currently support operational detachments-alpha (ODAs), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and U.S. Navy SEAL teams in Afghanistan and are an integral part of the village stability operations executed there. A T-MIST engages in face-to-face communication with key Afghan leaders, disseminates messages and information favorable to the Government of Afghanistan, and disrupts Taliban and al-Qaeda networks. These teams also fight alongside their supported units and react to the same enemy. A T-MIST is not only trained in MISO but also receives advanced marksmanship and medical training. MISO Warriors train with the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning, Ga., and also participate in the pre-deployment training of the supported unit, in which they are expected to understand urban operations, unconventional warfare, and foreign internal defense.

According to COL Reginald Bostick, who recently took command of the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne), MISO is not only experiencing fundamental changes in terms of doctrine as it adapts to today’s contingency operations, but also in the quality of Soldiers and training required to execute its unique mission. MISO Warriors are intellectual and physical fighters who constantly perform above their pay grade and bring innovation to the task at hand. In the near future, the MISO command will stand up with two groups in order to meet the ever-growing demand for MISO capabilities. The information realm continues to expand and must be taken into consideration in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Information dominance starts with the MISO Warrior.

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PSYOP Soldiers gather with tribal leaders in Afghanistan to enhance relations with coalition forces.
When deploying units understand some of the challenges they may face during partnered operations with the Afghan National Army (ANA), they are more likely to be successful in accomplishing their mission.

In this article, I want to detail some lessons I learned during my deployment to Afghanistan as the Task Force (TF) Mohawk liaison officer (LNO) to the ANA’s 6/4 Highway Kandak in the city of Gereshk. My mission was to help coordinate combined operations between the 6/4 Kandak and the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment in the TF Mohawk area of operations (AO). I believe that 4-23 Infantry was successful during its deployment to Afghanistan because of the effective partnership it established with the ANA.

The TF Mohawk AO included a long stretch of Highway 1 in Helmand Province. TF Mohawk’s AO ran to the intersection of Highway 1 and Highway 601 in the west and just past the Helmand River, incorporating the cities of Gereshk and Lashkar Gah to the east. TF Mohawk’s mission was to provide freedom of movement along Highways 1 and 601 to all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan units in the AO.

As the TF Mohawk LNO, I was stationed at the Operational Control Center District (OCCD) in Gereshk. I worked as a liaison not only to the ANA but also to the British and Danish forces who were also stationed at the OCCD and responsible for security within the cities of Gereshk and Lashkar Gah. When I first arrived, there was a small contingent of British and Danish soldiers assigned to the OCCD. There were four British soldiers who functioned as liaisons to the Afghan National Police (ANP) units in Gereshk, which provided security in the city. There were also Danish soldiers providing security for those British soldiers.

The OCCD in Gereshk served as the headquarters (HQ) for the 6/4 Kandak. We also had an ISAF command post (CP) set up, which was staffed 24 hours a day by at least one British soldier, one Danish Soldier acting as a runner and guard, one other American Soldier, an Afghan interpreter, and me.

The ANA unit was the primary battlespace owner and had checkpoints spread out along Hwy 1. ANA and U.S. platoons would stage their vehicles at these checkpoints and then dismount to patrol surrounding villages on foot. The checkpoints also acted as communications relay/retrans stations for the ANA. The OCCD in Gereshk acted as a relay station for our battalion to talk to our units in the AO; we set up a retrans antennae as well as a Stryker vehicle so TF Mohawk could better communicate with TF Mohawk units as they patrolled.

While U.S. forces had multiple means of communication, the ANA relied on old Vietnam-era issued radios which could not effectively communicate with our modern radios. Any messages coming into OCCD from the ANA would be relayed manually to myself and the interpreter. They would then be passed to the British and Danish units and then to TF Mohawk back at the forward operating base (FOB).

**Reporting Procedures**

Having a TF Mohawk LNO at the OCCD in Gereshk significantly improved our response times to any attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) incidents. It also gave the British and Danish ISAF forces a common operating picture of what was happening in our AO. As an attack was reported by the ANA, we were able to rapidly determine the type and location of the attack and relay that information to TF Mohawk, which could then respond by sending the nearest platoon to help the ANA or dispatch an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. A typical attack could be an ambush on a convoy, an attack on an ANA checkpoint, or an IED attack along Hwy 1. TF Mohawk was able to rapidly deploy troops as fast as we would relay to them 5Ws (who, what, where, when and why) of the attack. As the TF Mohawk LNO to the ANA, I would meet with the ANA battalion commander at least three times a day and relay any information he thought was important back to TF Mohawk. This enabled the TF Mohawk battalion chain of command insight into ANA actions and issues and gave them more freedom to conduct daily operations.

At the OCCD CP, it was important to constantly ask the ANA what was happening in our AO. With the ANA, small attacks on checkpoints were considered “business as usual” and were not considered important to report to the ANA chain of command. I had to emphasize that even sporadic enemy firing at an ANA checkpoint was important to report. We had to help them develop their reporting techniques and also help them to be able to accurately locate on a map where the incidents occurred. The main problem was that the ANA we worked with did not have handheld GPS and most of the ANA soldiers did not know how to read a map.

I taught the ANA personnel who worked in the CP basic map reading and also taught them to ask the reporting ANA units to
use landmarks near their checkpoints to identify where an attack occurred or where an IED was found. This gave the TF Mohawk units responding to the attack the ability to find the locations where the attacks occurred in a timely manner. We were also able to teach ANA soldiers IED-marking procedures and convince their chain of command it was not in their best interest to disarm the IEDs themselves.

We initially had a difficult time with the multiple names the ANA had for their checkpoints so we helped the ANA name and number their checkpoints along Hwy 1. Since the ANA chain of command knew all the different names for their checkpoints, it was not an issue for them to identify the checkpoint that was being discussed; however, until we numbered them and used the most common name for that checkpoint, it was a reporting issue for TF Mohawk.

Another important aspect of reporting was identifying that the ANA company commander in charge of their company’s checkpoints would not always report attacks or incidents in a timely manner to the ANA HQ. If an attack happened late at night, it would often not be reported until the next morning. If the attack happened early in the morning, the ANA company commander at the checkpoint where the attack took place would often wait until at least 9 a.m. to call the ANA battalion commander on his cell phone and report the attack. Through my face-to-face meetings with the ANA chain of command, I was able to emphasize the importance of timely reporting of attacks and incidents to not only the ANA battalion commander but also to the ANA HQ so that I could report the information to TF Mohawk and we could take action.

Checkpoints
The ANA had its companies arrayed along Hwy 1 in manned checkpoints/patrol bases 24 hours a day. The ANA company commanders were responsible for manning two to three checkpoints in their AO. Each ANA company commander would decide how many ANA soldiers would man each checkpoint.

For partnered patrols, it was important for TF Mohawk to know how many soldiers were at each checkpoint for planning purposes. This was essential because the ANA would not go out on patrol if they did not have enough soldiers to man a checkpoint and also go out on patrol. Due to injuries, illness and soldiers on leave or AWOL, the number of ANA at each checkpoint would change daily. It was important to coordinate two to three days in advance with the ANA company commanders so their units would be ready to go on partnered/combined patrols. There were still times when the ANA company commanders would tell the TF Mohawk platoon leaders that they did not have enough ANA personnel to go on patrol. I started going straight to the ANA battalion commander, S3, or executive officer (XO) and reminding them that a patrol was scheduled to leave a checkpoint that day and we needed a certain amount of ANA soldiers to accompany our units on patrol. As long as we had coordinated in advance with the ANA battalion chain of command, the ANA battalion commander, S3, or XO would radio or telephone that checkpoint and tell the company commander to accompany our Soldiers on patrol with the number of ANA soldiers we had requested. If the ANA company commander insisted he did not have enough people to go out on patrol, the ANA battalion commander or S3 would tell them to find enough personnel to go on patrol with us.

As the TF Mohawk LNO, I was also responsible for coordinating with the ANA in our AO along Hwy 1 to link up with engineer route clearance teams. The route clearance teams would contact me to give me their schedules, and I would plan with the ANA S3 as to where and what time the route clearance teams would link up with the ANA units, as all our patrols, including route clearance patrols, were partnered with the ANA. It quickly became apparent that it was necessary to meet with the ANA S3 every day to go over that particular day’s schedule. Since the ANA S3 kept his
schedule written in a book, I had to help him remember the location and times of the agreed upon patrols. I would meet with the ANA S3 and battalion commander every morning at 7 a.m., and we would review and discuss all patrols going out that day. I would then meet again with the ANA S3 in the early evening, which would give him time to contact the ANA company commander and remind him of the patrols for the next day.

**Patrols**

The ANA companies were arrayed in squads as similar to U.S. Army Infantry squads as their limited numbers would allow. The 6/4 Kandak was deployed from northern Afghanistan, near Kabul. I was told by the ANA battalion commander that the battalion was given one day to draw new U.S. issued weapons and deploy to Gereshk. Although the ANA unit we worked with had the same weapons systems that TF Mohawk had including the M16A2, M249, M240B, and M2 machine guns, they had virtually no training on how to use them and had no access to training manuals. The 6/4 Kandak also employed 82mm mortars and PKM machine guns as well as RPG-7s. Their heavy weapons — 240Bs, PKMs, or RPG-7s — were mostly kept at the checkpoints or left mounted on the vehicles.

The 6/4 Kandak used civilian four-wheel-drive pickup trucks, which had no armor or up-arming capability. They also employed older model 5-ton trucks and some high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The pickup trucks were fast and light, and a 240B or PKM machine gun could be mounted on the trucks. The ANA would conduct mounted patrols between checkpoints and in villages, and conduct dismounted patrols in and around the villages along Hwy 1. They would also assist the ANP in any emergency, respond to incidents, and patrol in and around the city of Gereshk, even though it was technically not their AO.

The 6/4 Kandak had no issues when patrolling with us, and depending on how well the U.S. platoons worked with specific ANA platoons, they were even put in the lead while on patrol. The ANA had man-pack radios that they would mount to their vehicles or carry on patrol to be able to communicate with their respective checkpoints. The radios were similar to the U.S. Army PRC-117s in size and communications range. Most of the ANA company commanders relied on their cell phones for communication and reporting, spending a good amount of their personal paycheck on their phone bill. The 6/4 Kandak were very reluctant to patrol further than the distances their radios could reach back to their checkpoints. It was also difficult to get the ANA company commanders to drive to key leader engagements (KLEs) and meet with locals from the villages. When I asked an ANA company commander why he was not interested in doing a KLE or meeting with locals from the villages, he answered “My checkpoint is right beside their village, and the villagers have never come to meet with me.” It was necessary for TF Mohawk to stress the importance of KLEs and meeting with villagers on a regular basis. Once we stressed the importance of KLEs to the ANA battalion leadership, they accepted the fact that KLEs needed to happen regularly and took ownership of that mission.

**Supply**

Sustainment was always a big issue for the 6/4 Kandak for several different reasons. Since the 6/4 Kandak was from Kabul and came from a different brigade than the one in the Helmand AO, resupply was difficult. The 6/4 Kandak was not a priority for the brigade it was attached to. Another important issue was its tashkiel (battalion property book). The ANA battalion commander was responsible for maintaining his battalion’s tashkiel. It became apparent that whoever was managing the tashkiel was not doing a very good job of monitoring and accounting for the property. The ANA could not accurately tell us how many weapons and equipment they had in the battalion at any one time. This was also the same for their personnel list. Depending on which ANA staff section you talked to, you could get several different answers as to how many personnel were present for duty, how many were AWOL, how many had been dropped from the rolls, and how many soldiers were on vacation or leave.

In order for the ANA to receive any supplies, they had to fill out two separate forms, one in English and one in Pashtu or Dari. The copy of the request for resupply in English was given to the British Official Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand; the other copy of the resupply request was given to the ANA brigade logistics of the resupply request in Dari and English, as the ANA logistics officer would most often not retain a copy. If the 6/4 Kandak did not get resupplied in a timely manner, I would notify the TF Mohawk battalion, which would notify the British OMLT at Camp

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A Soldier from the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment waits as a Danish explosive ordnance disposal unit clears the area on 16 January 2010.

Photo by TSgt. Efren Lopez, USAF
Leatherneck. We made multiple attempts to speed up this process.

Resupplying ammo and fuel was especially important, and the 6/4 Kandak seemed to be always in short supply. Several times during our deployment it was necessary for the 6/4 Kandak to receive emergency resupply for fuel and ammunition from the brigade at Camp Leatherneck. Oftentimes, the brigade logistics officer at Camp Leatherneck would tell the 6/4 Kandak logistics officer that certain items listed on the supply request were not available for resupply. The 6/4 Kandak logistics officer wouldn’t follow up with the brigade logistics officer or get a date or time when he could expect to receive the needed items. I had to constantly check with the 6/4 Kandak ANA logistics officer to see if they had received the needed supplies, as this directly affected the ANA combat readiness and our partnered missions. The 6/4 Kandak ANA company commanders would not hesitate telling TF Mohawk platoon leaders that they did not have enough fuel or ammo to leave their checkpoints to go on partnered patrols.

This brings up an important cultural aspect I observed in ANA leadership. The ANA battalion commander told me that ANA officers purchase their rank and commission with their own money. They must also purchase the next rank in order to be promoted and do so each time they are promoted. I was never able to substantiate this claim, however. Once an officer has been promoted, it is very hard for him to get fired or relieved of duty. An ANA officer is more likely to go to jail or prison for a specific period of time than he is to be relieved or fired. Because of this, I was able to observe two types of officers in the 6/4 Kandak. The first type of officer was very happy to do as little as his job required of him. The second type of officer wanted to do the best job he could possibly do because he loved his country and was proud to be an officer in the ANA. The officers who were concerned with doing the best job they could possibly do in the 6/4 Kandak were mostly older Soviet trained officers. The first type of officers who were happy to just collect a paycheck and only do the minimum amount of work required of them were mostly younger officers, just starting new families and were generally tired of their country being at war for so long. Most of the younger ANA officers were born during the Soviet occupation and have experienced war in some form their entire lives. It is important for deploying units to recognize that morale, or a lack of morale, may be a key motivation factor in the ANA Kandak that they are partnered with. It is also not uncommon for senior-ranking NCOs and officers to take vacations for months at a time, leaving the other soldiers to pick up the slack.

Another supply challenge for the 6/4 Kandak was Class IV supply material. The ANA units were in need of Class IV items like HESCO barriers, sandbags, concertina wire, and anything they could use to fortify or improve their checkpoints. Most checkpoints were in disrepair, and the supply system had very little in storage for helping them out. Since most checkpoints did not have access to a water well or electricity for refrigerators, food and water had to be delivered almost daily. Deploying units should be prepared to assist their partner units with obtaining Class IV supplies. These checkpoints were important not because the ANA lived in them but because they served two functions: overwatch and security. TF Mohawk used the checkpoints as staging points for our Stryker vehicles and as observation platforms for scouts to overwatch named areas of interest (NAIs). It not only benefited the ANA morale by improving security at checkpoints but aided TF Mohawk Soldiers in accomplishing their mission as well.

**Intelligence**

I was not prepared for the amount of information and intelligence that came through the OCCD in Gereshk on a daily basis. Because of the location of the OCCD, it was a hot bed for intelligence activity. In addition to ANP, the OCCD also housed several private contractors whose job it was to teach intelligence gathering and help develop informants in the ANA and ANP.

The ANA commander and staff were also important intelligence assets. Because most of the local Afghan people did not trust the ANP, the local Afghans would come to the ANA battalion commander with every kind of issue imaginable and ask him to settle disputes. They would then often provide the ANA battalion commander with intelligence about suspected Taliban and their activities.

It soon became evident that we needed an efficient way to collect intelligence and make sure it was shared with all of the ISAF partners in our AO. The OCCD started having intelligence meetings every evening to compare notes and make sure we were all on the same page and that nothing was missed during the day. A lot of intelligence that was gathered came from informants developed by the police. It was not uncommon for ANP officers to report on other ANP officers or government officials who...
At the time this article was written, CPT Derrick Boden was a student at the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He deployed to Afghanistan with the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division.

had illegal weapons. It is important for units to realize that a large amount of intelligence will be gathered on short notice and will require some type of immediate action for success. For example, a report of a weapons cache may require prioritization and allocation of resources for appropriate action. Units should develop ways to be able to act on this intelligence using their own forces or develop relationships with other units in the area that can act on the information rapidly. Nothing is more frustrating to nongovernmental organizations that obtain and share intelligence information gathered than a lack of action or perceived lack of action on that intelligence. It is also important that units realize that many civilian contractors who are hired to teach the ANA intelligence gathering, receive bonuses from their companies for the amount of intelligence they or their operatives are able to gather which results in operations where weapons or drugs are confiscated.

At the time of TF Mohawk’s deployment to Helmand, Afghanistan, the 6/4 Kandak’s only form of fire support came from the two 82mm mortars in their heavy weapons company. Due to a lack of mortar rounds, the 82mm mortars had not been used; one of the mortars also had a broken bipod. Despite several requests by the 6/4 Kandak’s logistic officer, no parts or ammunition were obtained for their mortars during our deployment. The 6/4 Kandak’s only source of fire support came from TF Mohawk’s mortars and an artillery section attached to us. Our primary mortar and artillery mission was terrain denial in the form of illumination fire missions, which were done almost nightly at different locations and NAIs.

Because the 6/4 Kandak lack in electronic warfare (EW) or protection assets, they are eager to travel in U.S. or coalition convoys and mounted patrols. Partnered patrols and convoys with the ANA allow them to receive EW protection and greatly improve the survivability of their vehicles. Partnered patrols and convoy operations also allow the ANA to benefit from the use of our unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance.

When conducting mounted patrols or convoys, communication with ANA vehicles is extremely important. One technique we used was to put an interpreter in an ANA vehicle with a radio, or give the interpreter and the ANA soldier in charge of the convoy a short range radio they could use during the convoy or patrol.

Combined partnered operations with the ANA can greatly improve a unit’s mission success. A training program for the ANA including basic weapons training, basic marksmanship, and fire and maneuver will greatly enhance the combat effectiveness of the ANA. It is also important to develop the ANA battalion staff so that the staff can take the lead in missions and plan and execute missions on their own.

In my experience with the ANA, all the training that we provided — from map reading to patrolling techniques to weapons training — was always received with great enthusiasm and heartfelt thanks.

At the time this article was written, CPT Derrick Boden was a student at the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He deployed to Afghanistan with the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division.
From March 2010 to February 2011, the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, also known as Task Force (TF) Iron Rakkasan, conducted counterinsurgency operations in Paktika and then Ghazni Provinces, Afghanistan. Throughout the deployment, the battalion operated across five lines of effort — governance, development, security, agriculture, and information engagement — to gain traction against a tough insurgency. The battalion had plenty of combat experience during its three previous deployments to Iraq, but the engagements in Afghanistan proved to be different.

Most of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) across the lines of effort — how to train foreign soldiers; how to meet with elders or sheiks; how to work with local governments; how to use money as an effective tool — seemed to translate easily between the two theaters. Tactically, however, the battalion had to make significant adaptations. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states, “In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly — the better learning organization — usually wins.” The Iraq veterans’ experiences with counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations and the Sons of Iraq organization were very different than what they faced in Afghanistan: engagements at 1,000 meters; frequent direct fire contacts; limited access to U.S. enablers; and an enemy who was willing to operate in the open on motorcycles.

As part of the surge, the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment relieved TF Iron in Paktika on 10 September 2010. Our battalion then moved to occupy two districts in eastern Ghazni Province until February 2011. The terrain there is similar to Paktika with many deep wadis that canalized movement to crossing points. Ethnically, the area is dominated by Pashtuns, but there is a small Tajik area in northern Deh Yak. In Ghazni, 3-187 Infantry manned five COPs and FOBs; mentored two district sub governors, trained
Afghan police and army personnel; worked with the NDS; and continued to use Afghan and western media to conduct information operations. In five months, the battalion made contact 398 times (an average of 2.5 times per day) against Taliban fighters with the most prevalent form of contact being direct fire.

In these two provinces, TF Iron adapted to the challenges of long range engagements, established cordons, expanded the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) footprint, and conducted maneuver warfare and targeting missions.

**Reacting to Long Range Engagements**

During the deployment, patrols typically made contact with the insurgents at ranges of 500 to 1,000 meters. This presented a tactical dilemma to TF Iron because the engagements were beyond the effective range of the platoon’s organic weapons. The Soldiers and leaders responded with a variety of innovative solutions that included using the 60mm mortar in handheld mode, incorporating the Javelin, and using plunging fire from the M240s to engage the enemy at long distances.

**Fires**

The M224 60mm mortar system in handheld mode proved to be the most effective weapon system at the company level, killing more insurgents than any other weapon. Every mounted and dismounted patrol was required to have a 60mm mortar when it left the wire. Companies found that a trained Infantryman could place quick, accurate fires out to 1,400 meters. More importantly, the ground force commander only had to visually clear the air space and visually confirm that the round would not impact close to a structure. The 60mm mortar consistently provided the maneuver commander with the best option for immediately available, responsive indirect fires to suppress, neutralize, and destroy.

During the pre-deployment training at Fort Campbell, Ky., the battalion heavy mortar platoon cross-trained 12-15 11Bs from each line company to use the 60mm mortar in handheld mode using a combination of the gunner’s exam, dry fire and adjustment drills, and maintenance techniques for the system. As a culmination exercise, each Infantryman fired five rounds in handheld mode at a live-fire range. The cross-training was not just beneficial but paramount to the success of each patrol in Afghanistan. During one engagement in Kushamond District, Paktika Province, while...
under intense enemy fire, SGT Ben Ward of B Company, 3-187 Infantry fired 18 rounds of 60mm mortar in handheld mode at three PKM machine gun teams, wounding several enemy fighters and forcing them to break contact. For his actions, Ward received an Army Commendation Medal with V device.

TF Iron used Javelins for both their optics and their ability to engage at ranges over a kilometer. One example occurred when a platoon was on a dismounted patrol west of a town in Andar District, Ghazni Province and had been in a series of engagements with an insurgent PKM team for several hours. When the enemy seemed to concentrate in the tower of a qalat (an Afghan family compound), a corporal used his Javelin to attack the tower from almost a kilometer away, scoring a direct hit. The insurgents broke contact.

Finally, TF Iron used M-240 and MK-48 machine guns to provide plunging fire and engage the insurgents at long ranges. The TF observed the enemy’s ability to utilize plunging fire to compensate for challenging terrain over great distances. During pre-deployment training, the TF did not train on using the M-240 machine gun to provide plunging fire — machine gun fire aimed so as to fall on an enemy from above. As the platoons realized the challenges of the extended distances of the engagements, they established hasty ranges around the FOBs to hone the machine gunners’ skills with this technique. Within a few weeks, the battalion could engage with plunging fire as well as the insurgents.

**Maneuver: Bounding Overwatch**

TF Iron Rakkasan faced a strong and determined enemy in Ghazni Province. In one three-week span, 2nd Platoon, B Company conducted seven patrols to Kok Village in Andar District and made direct fire contact seven times. Due to this level of contact, many leaders found it useful to use the bounding overwatch movement technique during the movement to and from an objective.

Many of the Soldiers and leaders who had extensive Iraq experience had never used the bounding overwatch technique. The battalion referred to FM 3-21.10, "The Infantry Rifle Company, and confirmed that “The purpose of bounding overwatch is to deploy prior to contact, giving the unit the ability to protect a bounding element by immediately suppressing an enemy force. In all types of bounding, the overwatch element is assigned sectors to scan while the bounding element uses terrain to achieve cover and concealment.”

After training and practical exercises in contact, all companies began using the bounding overwatch to move to and from an objective where contact was expected. All the companies employed bounding overwatch while mounted, dismounted, and when using a combination of vehicles and dismounts.

**Establishing the Cordon**

Another challenge TF Iron experienced early in the deployment was establishing a cordon around a village or qalat that prevented the Taliban from escaping the objective. Whether on foot or motorcycles, insurgents would routinely drop their weapons and move away from the area.

To combat this insurgent tactic, A Company employed Afghan uniformed police (AUP) on motorcycles in conjunction with both vehicular operations and air assaults. This enhanced the company’s tactical mobility and ability to establish a more effective cordon swiftly. TF Iron found that Afghan forces could move as quickly as the enemy, across all terrain, and could rapidly establish blocking positions or traffic control points along key avenues of escape. More importantly, the motorcycles could be used to chase down mounted and dismounted
people leaving the objective. A Company refined this technique over the course of yearlong operations in Afghanistan. First, the company marked the AUP and his motorcycle with reflective belts and VS-17 panels during the day and infrared (IR) chemlights at night. A Company also discovered the importance of ensuring that the AUP had a communications device so the platoon leader, his interpreter, and the AUP leader could maneuver the motorcycle. Simple rehearsals increased the AUP’s effectiveness. Terrain models proved especially helpful by providing the police with a sense of spatial awareness. For load planning purposes during an air assault, the motorcycle was assumed to weigh as much as one combat-loaded soldier (300 pounds), thereby decreasing the number of available seats by one. Another tactic that B Company favored for cordonning a village was the use of the aerial reaction force (ARF) during an air assault. Typically, the ARF was a squad from TF Iron, ANSF personnel, an interpreter, and other enablers mounted in two UH-60s. This asset would loiter near the village and would insert at a blocking position if possible insurgents fled the objective. During one air assault in Tsin Tsah Village on 31 May 2010, a B Company ARF captured two heavily armed insurgents exfiltrating on a motorcycle. C Company discovered another helpful tactic by conducting a dismounted infiltration into the village during the hours of darkness. This achieved surprise and enabled a company to isolate the objective before the early warning networks spoiled coalition forces’ initiative. Also, the enemy rarely attacked units moving at night where TF Iron’s night vision devices gave the unit a marked tactical advantage. Establishing a cordon with AUP on motorcycles, an ARF, or a night dismounted infiltration significantly increased the success of TF Iron’s cordon and search missions.

All-Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) During Patrols and Air Assaults

During the spring in Paktika Province, the melting snow and rain make it difficult to maneuver vehicles through the loose sand and wadis. For several weeks, the companies conducted dismounted patrols many kilometers away from their combat outposts. The dismounted patrols began using a Polaris ATV to carry extra ammunition and mortar rounds. This allowed the dismounted patrol to move a greater distance with less fatigue and haul additional ammunition and supplies. Additionally, the B Company Soldiers fabricated and tested a mount that would support a MK-19 on the back of the ATV. Soldiers also built ammo carriers for 60mm mortar rounds and 40mm ammunition as well as platform for medical evacuation purposes. The platoons quickly integrated the modified ATVs into nearly every dismounted patrol. The ATVs were also used for air assault operations by loading them on the ramp of a CH-47. For planning purposes, the battalion estimated the weight at 600 lbs, which reduced the amount of Soldiers on the aircraft by two. These adaptations and modifications increased the range and maneuverability of patrols and decreased the fatigue of the Soldiers. Much like the AUP using motorcycles, the ATVs enabled the company to rapidly isolate the objective and immediately provide an overwhelming amount of firepower in support of the company operation. The ease of integrating the MK-19 on the ATV patrols further enabled TF Iron to engage the enemy at extended distances. The ATVs provided B Company increased firepower and maneuverability with heavier loads.

Expanding the Afghan National Security Forces’ Footprint

Strong Points and Control

C Company constructed ANSF strong points to control the population and key terrain, a tactic that proved to be successful in both Paktika and Ghazni Provinces. Not to be confused with a traffic control point (a manned post used to preclude interruption of traffic flow or movement along designated routes), a strong point is a heavily fortified battle position “…used to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain” (FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics). C Company’s most effective strong points consisted of a HESCO perimeter, concertina wire, a couple of towers, and a living space. These strong points were placed on or near key terrain to deny the insurgents access to a village or an important route. The biggest challenge was getting buy-in from the ANSF to man the checkpoint after it was complete. Incorporating the Afghans into discussions about the long-term security strategy, pressure from provincial officials, and the strong local sentiment for increased security were all used to influence the ANSF to man the strong points. Over the course of the deployment, C Company built five strong
points using various methods of construction. In Paktika Province, the company contracted out the construction of two brick buildings and several observation posts (OPs) surrounded by HESCO walls. The company followed up with both U.S. and Afghan troop labor to fill sandbags and build fighting positions.

In Ghazni Province, the company constructed two strong points with support from the 92nd Engineer Battalion. These consisted of a HESCO perimeter, guard towers, and a concertina fence. The third strong point in Ghazni was built using a “Bobcat” along with Afghan and U.S. troop labor to fortify an abandoned qalat. In all five cases, construction was complete in less than 10 days. U.S. and Afghan forces helped to guard the construction site during the build, and C Company provided a quick reaction force (QRF) to the strong points whenever they were attacked.

The strong points effectively denied the insurgents access to key terrain such as bazaars and clinics, while preventing IED emplacement along key routes. Strong points enabled the TF Iron to expand the control of the government of Afghanistan and disrupted insurgent maneuver thereby decreasing the effectiveness of insurgent tactics. Lastly, the strong points were easily defensible and seldom attacked. This technique enabled the ANSF to expand their footprint, helped to control the population, and allowed TF Iron to dominate important terrain.

National Directorate of Security
The NDS is the domestic intelligence agency of the government of Afghanistan. In both Paktika and Ghazni Provinces, TF Iron worked closely with this organization to develop and share intelligence, detain and question prisoners, and confirm the death or capture of high-level insurgents.

In Paktika, TF Iron worked with the provincial director of the NDS and local agents at Yosef Khel, Kushamond, and Wazi Kwah district centers. Companies used NDS into the planning process and brought agents and their sources on operations. This collaboration measurably increased the success of operations for TF Iron.

Combined operations with the NDS resulted in the destruction of a Taliban IED factory and medical facility in the village of Shurkichah in the Mata Khan District and the capture of five 107mm rockets that were aimed at FOB Sharana. After the operation, close work between the TF Iron S2 shop and the TF Iron law enforcement professionals (LEPs) helped NDS develop and prosecute 31 cases against insurgents in Kabul. Many of these cases relied on evidence such as fingerprints taken off of IEDs.

In Ghazni, TF Iron convinced the provincial NDS chief to station two agents with the battalion — one at the battalion headquarters and one at Bande Sarde. The agent at Bande Sarde was able to help B Company capture 20 AK-47s and convince 27 elders to sign a pact pledging their support against the Taliban.

A close working relationship with the NDS helped TF Iron to keep the pressure on the insurgency, develop human intelligence, and get insurgents taken off the street using the Afghan system.

Conducting Maneuver Warfare
Mounted Maneuver, Observation, and Fires

The Brimzi area had been a sanctuary for insurgents for years. In fact, the area became well known to western nations in 2008 when a reporter from Rolling Stone magazine embedded with the Taliban there. Until November 2010, the insurgents felt comfortable enough to ride motorcycles with their weapons brandished openly. Single company operations during the preceding two months in this area were met with little success. With an extensive early warning network, insurgents would move away on their motorcycles before an effective cordon could be set. TF Iron needed to implement maneuver warfare to disrupt this enemy freedom of maneuver.

CPT Ed Peskie took command of A Company in October 2010, bringing with him four years of mounted maneuver experience from a Stryker brigade combat team. Shortly thereafter, FOB Andar obtained and launched the Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) or blimp. These events, combined with close air support and unmanned aerial systems like the Predator and Reaper, further enabled TF Iron to successfully maneuver on insurgents, push them into the open while under observation, and utilize bombs and Hellfire missiles to destroy them.

After the PTDS launch at FOB Andar, its cameras enabled the battalion headquarters to locate and observe insurgents 15-20 kilometers away. The tactical operations center (TOC) quickly developed the skills to locate and positively identify Taliban carrying weapons, even those hidden under loose clothing. TF Iron also found that it was important to establish named areas of interest (NAIs) at the villages a few kilometers away from the objectives. The battalion rarely spotted insurgents departing the objective but could locate them staging or conducting visual observation from the next village over. Soldiers with 3-187th Infantry also used profiling to identify the Taliban — two military-aged males on motorcycles riding aggressively across the AO; men loitering near mosques; and men stopping trucks along main supply routes (MSRs). The TOC discovered it helped to have two cameras watching the enemy — the PTDS plus an overhead platform made it much easier to follow insurgents on motorcycles as they moved in and out of towns.

On 28 November 2010, TF Iron launched Operation Iron Blade II, a three-company attack into the Brimzi area. As C Company attacked from the west and B Company from the south, A Company
moved in from the east. Using the combination of maneuver, a Predator, two F-16s and the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from the blimp, A Company was able to push two insurgents into the open and kill them with two 500-pound bombs from the F-16s. Later, they found an insurgent on a motorcycle, maneuvered him into the open, and killed him with a Hellfire.

The combination of PTDS and the fixed wing platforms enabled the unit to identify and kill these insurgents. Applying these lessons, on 04 December 2010 TF Iron launched Operation Iron Blade III, another three-company attack into the Brimzi area. Using the same combination of maneuver to push insurgents out of villages, ISR to locate their exfil, and a Reaper to finish them, TF Iron killed two insurgents on a motorcycle carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and IED material.

Once the temperature dropped below freezing, the insurgents covered their weapons better with heavier clothing, stopped driving around at night, and issued orders to not ride motorcycles. The battalion attempted several other maneuver operations in December without the same success. TF 3-187 Infantry’s maneuver warfare days were over — the enemy had adapted to our adaptation.

Combining maneuver, persistent ISR, well chosen NAIs and a Reaper, TF Iron was able to kill the enemy with a great deal of success for a several weeks.

Targeting in a counterinsurgency (COIN)

Drawing on FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, TF Iron used a two-week targeting cycle to focus operations and prioritize the use of limited assets and time. For 3-187 Infantry, the targeting process combined the four functions of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) with the military decision-making process (MDMP) to synchronize, prioritize, and coordinate efforts across all five lines of effort.

Every two weeks on Saturday, the battalion published the two-week targeting fragmentary order (FRAGO). During week one of the targeting cycle, the companies executed operations according to the FRAGO, while the battalion staff continued to request and synchronize assets to support these operations and resolve any schedule issues. In addition, the staff conducted an off-week MDMP on other major tasks such as the relief-in-place, redeployment, or major battalion operations.

During week two of the targeting cycle, the staff would conduct the targeting MDMP. On Monday nights, the staff and companies presented a mission analysis to the commander. The mission analysis process incorporated the traditional 17 steps and included assessments by LOE for the battalion and each company. Also, each company would recommend from five to 10 operations across all lines of effort for the upcoming targeting cycle. The battalion would then propose operations for the targeting cycle. On
Tuesdays and Wednesdays, the staff developed the courses of action (COA) as they analyzed the companies’ assessments, prioritized company and battalion operations, and requested and synchronized limited assets such as air weapons teams, close air support, ISR, route clearance patrols, and explosive ordnance detachments. On Thursday night, the staff presented the COAs for the next two weeks to the commander for his decision. On Fridays, the staff made changes, conducted final synchronization and coordination, and moved to orders production.

Another key tool that helped drive the targeting cycle was the post operations intelligence exploitation tracker (POIET). The POIET was a simple matrix that tracked the S2’s intelligence development to ensure that every step was followed after an operation from initial intelligence reports all the way through any operations conducted based on those initial reports. Each morning, the S2 would brief the progress on each of the events to the battalion commander and staff. Once the final report was complete, the S2 and S3 would sit down to discuss whether there was any actionable intelligence or tasks which needed follow up, such as delivering evidence to the NDS to help them prosecute a case. Once an intel-driven operation took place, the S2 took the event off the tracker.

The targeting FRAGO, the two-week targeting cycle, and the POIET were an efficient way for the battalion to prioritize and synchronize resources and actions across all five lines of effort throughout the year.

**Conclusion**

The 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry adapted quickly to the tactical situation during counterinsurgency operations in eastern Afghanistan in 2010-2011. At the tactical level, innovative use of 60mm mortars, Javelins, and plunging fire enabled patrols to place effective fire on insurgents at ranges of more than 1,000 meters; AUP on motorcycles established effective cordons; ATVs provided firepower and range to dismounted patrols; and ANSF strong points expanded the control of the Afghan government. A close relationship with NDS provided better human intelligence (HUMINT) to our maneuver commanders. Maneuver, observation, and fire gave the battalion tactical surprise and allowed it to eliminate insurgents for several weeks, while the use of bounding overwatch ensured patrols would have a base of fire when contact was expected.

At the battalion level, our NDS relationship provided HUMINT and the ability to prosecute insurgents in the Afghan system. A two-week targeting cycle focused operations and prioritized the use of limited assets and time. The POIET ensured that future operations were intelligence driven.

Collectively, these adaptations provided TF Iron with a variety of new TTPs. Hopefully units deploying to Afghanistan can utilize these adjustments and take the fight to the insurgency faster and more efficiently than TF Iron.

**Figure 3 — Example Post Operations Intelligence Exploitation Tracker**

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<td>Targeting MA Brief</td>
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<td>2200-2400</td>
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**Figure 4 — TF Iron’s Battle Rhythm During Targeting Week**

CPT Ed Peskie is an Infantry officer who has commanded A Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry since October 2010. He served in Iraq with 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker) during Operation Iraqi Freedom II and 06-08. He is currently assigned to Fort Campbell, Ky.

CPT Aaron T. Schwengler is an Infantry officer who commanded B Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry from April 2009 to May 2011. He served in Iraq with the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom V. He is currently assigned to the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison Fellowship Program in Washington, D.C.

CPT Justin Quisenberry is an Infantry officer who has commanded C Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry since February 2009 to June 2011. He served in Iraq with the 173rd Airborne Brigade during Operation Enduring Freedom 6 and 8-9. He is currently assigned to Fort Campbell.

LTC David G. Fivewcoat is an Infantry officer who commanded 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry from February 2009 to June 2011. He served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the 3rd Infantry Division during Operations Iraqi Freedom I, III, and V. He is currently attending the National War College in Washington, D.C.
“Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole. The U.S. Army has established specialized Advisory and Assistance Brigades — now the main forces in Iraq — and is adjusting its promotion and assignment procedures to account for the importance of this mission...”

— Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense

Security force assistance (SFA) is a broad framework that spans the full spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1) and is focused on assisting foreign security forces (FSF) in support of U.S. and coalition interests in a given operating environment (OE). In accordance with FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, it is defined as, “a unified action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community to generate, employ, sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” Brigade combat teams (BCTs) deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan with an emphasis on SFA are commonly referred to by a myriad of names such as a modular brigade augmented for security force assistance (MB-SFA), security force assistance brigade (SFAB), brigade combat team-augmented (BCT-A), or advise and assist brigade (AAB). For this article, we’ll refer to the BCT as a SFAB.

The SFA mission has very unique characteristics that impact not only the BCT but the battalions and companies as well. There’s the old saying “a BCT is a BCT,” but when deploying under the SFA umbrella, the mission focus is drastically different and the BCT — or the SFAB in this case — must change its task organization and structure accordingly in order to conduct SFA. A major development in the SFAB concept is the addition of approximately 48 personnel in the rank of sergeant first class to colonel to assist in the advising effort, which will be addressed in this article.

The findings in this article are based on interviews and discussions with 10 deployed or previously deployed SFABs, more than 60 stability and external transition teams, more than 20 Iraqi general of officers, two U.S. general of officers, select U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) staff, and a myriad of battalion and companies executing the SFAB concept. In addition, staff of both U.S. and Iraqi institutional training centers in Baghdad, were interviewed.

The first of September 2010 marked the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and signaled the start of the U.S. forces’ “new mission” to advise and assist Iraqi security forces — Operation New Dawn. While the date symbolically marked the change in mission, U.S. forces actually began restructuring its forces to advise and assist the Iraqi security forces during the 18 months prior to that transition. Beginning with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division’s deployment to Iraq as the “proof of principle” SFAB on 1 May 2009, a significant number of lessons have been learned by several SFABs since.
This article will present a consolidated list of considerations recommended by deployed SFAB commanders, staff officers, augmented advisors, stability transition teams (STTs), direct support company commanders, and host nation security forces (HNSF) staff and commanders.

For Afghanistan, BCTs began deploying with the additional augmented advisor packages from the U.S. Army Human Resource Command in the fall of 2010. The 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division could be seen as the SFAB “proof of principle” for Afghan-bound brigades, but as with the 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, the BCT deployed with little to no augmentation to assist with the advising effort. However, they did apply SFA principles and concepts to assist future deploying brigades with the lessons learned.

The Security Force Assistance Brigade

The dynamics of an SFAB and SFA can be quite intricate and complex. With provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Civil Affairs, State Department officials, and an additional 48 field grades (Iraq augmentation: four colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels, and 24 majors), the synchronization of unity of effort and unity of purpose can be extremely challenging. The same can be said about the Afghanistan advisor augmentation of two colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors, and 24 senior NCOs. Regardless of the augmentation package or theater of operation (TOO), the fundamental principles of advising and assisting are the same. In the application of those principles, here are some recommendations to consider:

First, when deploying as an SFAB, a brigade must understand that this deployment will not be like its last. It must have the proper mindset to be successful under the SFAB construct. Advising and assisting other nations’ military forces requires a set of unique attributes far different from the last time the brigade deployed as a BCT. It is imperative that SFAB leaders recognize the distinction between the two different sets of skills required and focus on instilling a patient, persistent, and flexible mindset.

Second, an SFAB needs to understand that its mission revolves around relationships. It is essential for the SFAB to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among its own elements. By its very nature the SFAB construct forces its members out of their traditional roles. The augmentation of additional advisors to the brigade can create some degree of confusion and distrust. An SFAB must purposefully look to build relationships between the advisors, commanders, and staffs.

Third, it is vital that an SFAB nest itself with its agency counterparts. It is understood that the SFAB is the force provider in the area of operations (AO) and proprietor of a plethora of assets. However, in order to be successful, it must understand that the mission gets accomplished with a unified effort among itself and its agency counterparts. Continuous communication with PRTs, Civil Affairs, and State Department officials in the battlespace will ensure a collectively synchronized approach in the building of civil capacity. In many cases the PRT and associated agents control the funding allocated for a given HNSF or a local government in the AAB’s respective AO. It’s beneficial for the SFAB to conduct coordination with its agency counterparts to see if a much-needed project is already funded by the PRT or like agency to prevent the duplication of effort.

Building Civil Capacity

Fourth, success begins with the immediate task organization and integration of augmented advisors into training. An SFAB should attempt to task organize advisors to the battalions they will fall under for command and control as soon as possible. It is extremely beneficial for an SFAB to do this prior to its combat training center (CTC) rotation. Early task organization allows augmented advisors and battalion staffs to build habitual rapport and exercise their systems and processes during the CTC rotation. Similarly, it is enormously beneficial to have advisors train alongside the direct support company that will support

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**The SFAB Mindset**

“Conducting successful security force assistance (SFA) requires a specific mindset. This mindset focuses on working by, with, and through foreign security forces (FSF) to support the host nation’s internal defense and development (which includes local security requirements) or regional organization’s charter. Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success. Those conducting SFA must understand that the military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive approach. The imperatives of SFA provide the foundation for proper mindset.”

— FM 3-07.1, Paragraph 2-1
them during their deployment. In addition to building a relationship, it provides the opportunity for both entities to develop a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

Fifth, an SFAB should require that all staffs participate in SFA training and utilize their expertise. Some ineffectiveness of the SFAB construct can be attributed to a staff’s lack of understanding of the augmented advisory mission and SFA. Participation in SFA training will provide a vital conceptual understanding of the advisory mission for brigade and battalion staffs. As the SFAB’s augmented advisors assist and assess the HNSF, they will look to secure SFAB assets to address HNSF deficiencies. Brigade and battalion staffs are more likely to allocate and assist with enablers if they have a workable knowledge of the advisor mission and its complexities. In addition, the SFAB stands to benefit greatly if it leverages the staff’s talents to assist in SFA/HNSF development. A reality for augmented advisors is that they often have to work with an untrained HNSF staff that lacks the knowledge and experience. Staff-on-staff training can be mutually beneficial. It educates the HNSF staff and subsequently provides an educated HNSF staff in which to work with.

Sixth, it is imperative that SFABs conduct an augmented advisor skills assessment. An SFAB should assess its 48 augmented advisors upon reception and expect a uniquely diverse set of advisors. The set of advisors that an SFAB will receive will come from all across the force. Some will have previously commanded Soldiers in combat and have difficulty understanding the diplomatic nature of the SFAB concept, while others will have a cognitive and in-depth understanding of advisement from their prior experience on a military transition team (MiTT). An SFAB should recognize that not all augmented advisors are fit for the mission and that some may adversely affect its efforts. The SFAB may need to revisit its task organization and adjust accordingly. The removal of an advisor for the betterment of the unit may be necessary.

Seventh, augmented advisors need to be educated in an assortment of supplementary skills. The contemporary operating environment (COE) compels advisors to be trained as diplomats, economists, civic planners, and social scientists in addition to SFA coaches and mentors. While the SFAB receives advisors with significant military education and experience, the SFAB mission will require unique skill sets outside of the normal military construct. In order to acquire these unique skills, an SFAB should consider sending its augmented advisors, and in some cases battalion and brigade staffs and leadership, to specific developmental courses to gain a basic understanding of how our systems work so during deployment the SFAB can assist the HNSF and HN government in developing their own functioning systems and processes. Examples of courses available to augmented advisors include:

* A five-day class with the Department of Homeland Security’s Border Patrol in El Paso, Texas, to assist with border and port of entry operations;
* A city manager’s course from the surrounding community of the SFAB’s post to gain a basic understanding of local governance;
* A civics course from a local university or college to assist

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**Figure 3 — Example STT Customized Training Program**

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<tr>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
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<td>Division PM &amp; SGM Briefs</td>
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<td>Travel</td>
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in understanding higher level government operations;

* A Civil Affairs course possibly from the 93rd Civil Affairs Detachment out of Fort Bragg to assist in understanding how to build civil capacity and stability; and

* A police trainer/mentor course from Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., in order to gain much needed police mentor training and basic policing functions skills.

Eighth, as an SFAB prepares to take on the enormous task of deployment, it needs to share its pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) with its augmented advisors or if possible, it should take select advisors. It is just as important for the advisors as it is for a battalion and brigade staff to collect important information on the day-to-day functions of the HNSF and the local HN government. Providing advisors the opportunity to acquire HNSF information such as assessments, reporting requirements, and battle rhythm will allow them to begin making general deductions and begin the task of framing a campaign plan focused on HNSF development.

Lastly, the SFAB must take into account all of its additional advisors when developing its rating scheme. This can be a point of contention if it is not done in an open and inclusive forum. The SFAB may receive field-grade advisors who have already commanded a battalion or who are command-select advisors. Based upon task organization, augmented advisors can be under dual supervision. In this case, the preferred method is to divide the rating chain positions between the two supervisory chains of command (AR 623-105, Officer Evaluations). The SFAB commander should discuss the rating scheme as soon as possible to dispel rumors that field-grade advisors will be “fodder” for a commander’s profile (see Figure 4).

The Augmented Advisor

There was a time when being selected as an augmented advisor meant being a member of a 10 to 16-man MiTT team which was significantly overburdened and grossly under resourced. The MiTT had a somewhat strained relationship with the battlespace owner, and command and control was not always clearly defined. But over the course of the last few years, the criticality of the advisory mission has been given just attention. The Army now recognizes and prioritizes the advisory mission as one of its foremost missions. In doing so, the Army specifically stood up the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk, La., to provide augmented advisors with training that is relevant, current, and applicable to the advisory effort, and focused on SFA. Additionally, the Army now codes certain advisor SFAB positions as command select, placing an emphasis on the importance of SFA. However, the principles of the advisor mission have remained constant through the years, and it is still geared toward the enormous and arduous tasks of teaching, coaching, and mentoring HNSF.

Relationships are an advisor’s currency. An advisor’s success is directly correlated to the relationship he has built with his HNSF counterpart and his SFAB team. A good relationship with his HNSF is necessary, but a great relationship with his own brigade, battalion, and supporting company is paramount. An advisor must spend just as much time nurturing and cultivating a relationship with his HNSF counterpart as with his own SFAB team.

Key leader engagements (KLEs) are crucial to the SFAB mission. As an advisor, it is necessary to develop engagement themes and prevent KLE fratricide. An advisor should attempt to not overly engage HNSF leaders with unnecessary meetings. When a HNSF leader is

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<th>SENIOR RATER</th>
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<tr>
<td>BDE CDR</td>
<td>STT COL (Chief)</td>
<td>DIV CDR/DEP CDR</td>
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Figure 4 — Example SFAB Advisor Rating Scheme

Augmented advisors to the 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, provide the commander of the 14th Iraqi Army with an intelligence update.
obligated to sit with a general officer followed by the brigade and battalion commanders and then the augmented advisor, there can be a mixture of messages. It is best to communicate predetermined themes and limit interaction with the key leader in order to prevent conflicting priorities and information.

The first five and the last five minutes of a KLE can be the most important. An advisor must build and improve his language skills. An advisor does not necessarily need to know how to order a drink or ask for directions to the grocery store in his host country’s language. Instead, he should attempt to perfect the fundamental greetings of the host nation. Initial contact in a KLE that is well-scripted and rehearsed can have a significant effect in building long-term trust and respect. Simply put, language takes practice. Although an advisor will improve his proficiency with his linguists and counterpart once he arrives in country, he should attempt to converse as often as possible before he deploys.

An augmented advisor must exercise patience and flexibility. His effectiveness as an advisor is based on gaining the trust and confidence of his counterpart. He should advise with the understanding that he is in “their home” and that decisions made will affect them long after the advisor’s one-year tour has expired. Additionally, the advisor must be flexible in his mentoring approach. HNSFs may adopt most U.S. SOPs; however, culture and traditions still play a major part in their processes. Some HNSFs will simply choose not to adopt U.S. doctrinal processes, and the advisor will need to be creative in how he coaches and develops his HNSF counterpart. Depending on when the advisor deploys, he may be the fifth or sixth rotational advisor to the HNSF commander. “Advisor burnout” may be prevalent among HNSFs who have “heard it all before” from previous advisors. In this case, creativity, patience, and flexibility by the advisor are absolutely necessary.

HNSFs are often more receptive to employing and refining HNSF tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) than U.S. TTPs, so an advisor should plan on “working their system.” Not all HNSF commanders and staffs will look to learn and implement U.S. methods, which could frustrate advisors. It is, therefore, imperative that an advisor learn HNSF systems and processes (logistics, maintenance, supply, etc.) before recommending changes. Often times, it is best to stick to the golden rule: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”

Patience and flexibility are also needed when attempting to acquire support. An augmented advisor must understand that their direct support company is dually tasked and that support may be significantly delayed at times. Succumbing to the realization that some systems and processes for requisitions in theater are fragmented and will take time will aid in preserving the support relationship. Unlike CONUS support, logistical needs and other support requests may take longer than normal to obtain in theater.

Success comes with the synchronization of battle rhythms. Establishing a time frame is critical to good planning. However, an augmented advisor must understand that his schedule is not always in sync with that of his HNSF counterpart. Some HNSFs take an afternoon “siesta,” where they retreat to their quarters for rest and recuperation and then come back in the evening to engage in operations and planning. This battle rhythm might not lend itself to the targeting cycle of his supported battalion. An advisor should communicate, coordinate, and synch his and his counterpart’s battle rhythms to achieve greater synergy in planning and execution.

An advisor should attempt to gain an understanding of HNSFs social, cultural, and political dynamics. His HNSF partners’ tribal, social, and political clout in some cases can be more important than his rank. An advisor should recognize that many times a HNSF member may have a title but little to no training in his particular field. Establishing governance can be difficult when HNSFs prioritize their tribes and religion before patriotism to their country. HNSFs can be very hospitable, but an advisor should not let their hospitality be a diversion from observing what is actually transpiring.

Last, an advisor should continue to be the leader he has been trained to be. The HNSF will test him early in his tour so he must hold the line. A monthly goals azimuth check should be done to see if original goals are still applicable and if the unit is still on track to achieving them. As leaders, we are always being watched, so everyone (on the team) must be professional at all times and lead by example. The advisory mission will be an enormously challenging one, so an advisor should cling tight to his sense of humor; he will need it every day.

The SFA Battalion
It is often said that relationships are pacing items. They are the pillar by which successful security force partnerships are held. While there is little doubt that relationships with HNSF are critical and fundamental to mission accomplishment, little is said of how important the relationship is between and among our own forces. If the battalion and augmented advisor relationship isn’t a pacing item, it’s at least a high priority. The relationship that a battalion builds and maintains with its respective augmented advisor team(s) is critical to achieving maximum results.

An SFA battalion must be proactive in the relationship it develops with its augmented advisors. The sooner a battalion begins to establish lines of communication and a command support relationship with its advisors, the better prepared it will be for the advising mission. It is simply not enough for a battalion to build and develop rapport with its HNSF counterpart; it must also embrace

### Necessary Qualities of an Advisor

Because advisors operate in very subjective environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include:

- Tolerance for ambiguity
- Motivation of self and others
- Open-mindedness
- Self-reliance
- Ability to withhold judgment
- Strong sense of self
- Empathy
- Tolerance for differences
- Communicativeness
- Perceptiveness
- Flexibility
- Ability to accept and learn from failure
- Curiosity
- Sense of humor

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its augmented advisors. Depending upon the advisory structure, the battalion will need to provide a direct support company or support element to support their advisors. Support usually comes in the form of, but is not limited to, logistics, communications, medical, intelligence through the use of a company intelligence support team (CoIST), and if a policing mission, possibly Military Police and a law enforcement professional (LEP). It is better for a battalion to develop a shared advisory vision with its augmented advisors prior to deployment than to wait until arrival in theater. Through coordination with the battalion commander and his staff, augmented advisors will count on leveraging the battalion’s assets to advise and assist HNSF.

**The Direct Support Company**

The direct support company under the SFAB construct demands an innovative, agile, and adaptive team. This company command team must understand its battalion commander’s vision and intent, while providing the necessary security and function area specialists (FAS) to support and assist its augmented advisors with their mission. The company-augmented advisor relationship is a critical one that needs to be purposefully developed.

A direct support company is the lifeline for an augmented advisor, so the advisor must communicate his needs, build rapport, and have professional restraint. An advisor should communicate his needs early on and provide some expectation of his requirements to the company commander. He should allow the company commander to command his company by not directing his support but allowing him to explain what he can provide. While a field-grade advisor has “abundant knowledge” from his time in command, he must harbor professional restraint and not engage in “company business.” He should limit his involvement in company operations; however, augmented advisors do have the unique opportunity to utilize their years of training and talents to advise and mentor a supporting company commander. Every company commander is at a different level of performance. While an advisor communicates his needs and vision of support, he should look for opportunities to teach and mentor. The supporting company commander may have the drive and motivation to assist a HNSF battalion commander or higher, but he does not have the needed experience or dedicated staff to mentor and advise.

This is a relatively new and different mission set for a maneuver company, so direct support company commanders should get with advisors up front regarding guidelines and requests. He should not wait for the field grades to track him down for a conference. A company commander will be working with his augmented advisors on a daily basis so establishing an early dialogue with them will provide him with an understanding of anticipated requirements. Figure 5 illustrates an example of a “contractual” agreement between an advisor team and its direct support company.

A company commander should explain how he will be able to support his augmented advisors and inform them of his A personal security detachment from a direct support company conducts a combat patrol brief prior to escorting augmented advisors to an Iraqi provincial joint coordination center.
major constraints. He shouldn’t be overly concerned about advisors interfering in company operations. If he does have concerns, he should present them early on so as to prevent any misunderstanding of the support relationship.

Building rapport with his augmented advisors is a necessity for a direct support company commander. Building rapport with HNSF in many cases is much easier than building it with advisors, usually due to the rank disparity. Ignoring or avoiding the field grades will cause friction in the long term. The company commander should choose to engage and discuss the mission with his augmented advisors as soon as possible. Early engagement will ensure that augmented advisors understand company constraints and competing requirements within the battalion.

Confidence and mission clarity under the SFAB construct comes from understanding the command and command support relationship. Under the SFAB architecture, a direct support company commander has two requirements. The first is that he will adhere to orders and guidance he receives from his battalion commander. The second is that he will also have mission essential directives from the augmented advisors he supports. Although this can be a precarious situation, he should seek to understand all requirements and be an active participant in determining what his priorities are. In gaining an understanding, this will likely result in a harmonious relationship between the advisors, the battalion, and the direct support company commander.

“Rapport is a relationship marked by cooperation, conformity, harmony, or affinity. When people discuss good rapport, they describe a relationship founded on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Relationships characterized by personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction often lack rapport. For the advisor, rapport describes the degree of effectiveness.”

— FM 3-07.1, Chapter 9

### Summary

The SFA considerations included in this article are not all encompassing or cover the entire spectrum of the SFAB mission but are an assembly of proven methods at the brigade, battalion, and company levels that have achieved significant effectiveness and resulted in great SFAB and advisory successes.

The key to maintaining SFA proficiency is the sharing of lessons learned and TTPs from those deployed to those who will deploy. The SFAB concept will continue to gain momentum and remain at the forefront of merging doctrine. As noted by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “the advisory mission will only continue to become a staple requirement of the general purpose forces.”

**Figure 5 — Example DS Company and STT Defined Responsibilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies Will ...</th>
<th>Advisors Will ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide functional area specialties (ops/logistics/intel) — Battalion also available upon request for skill sets that exceed company expertise</td>
<td>Provide planning time for companies to execute mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide security for movement</td>
<td>Attend unit order operation briefs when applicable to STT mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide training, oversight and supervision of dedicated platoon</td>
<td>Participate in patrol drills, rehearsals, backbriefs prior to and following movements IAW TAC SOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide STT supply, personnel, and other needs to battalion</td>
<td>Submit requests for supply and other needs through companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate growing a strong relationship with partnered ISF leaders</td>
<td>Manage EML internally — submit DA 31s through companies to battalion — primary and deputy deconflicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Co ISTs to inform STTs of current intel picture</td>
<td>Facilitate growing a strong relationship of companies partnered with ISF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep STTs abreast of ongoing and future battalion operations and events</td>
<td>Create opportunities for company and battalion to maximize partnerships — provide ideas for how CO/BN can help train partnered units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive STT ISF assessment of training needs to enable effective advising and training of ISF</td>
<td>Provide feedback and salient information to Co ISTs to ensure a holistic intel picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform STTs of any company changes that impact STT/CO relationship</td>
<td>Integrate advise and assist actions into BCT and BN-level operations and commander’s intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate with CO/BN before making a commitment of BN resources to ISF</td>
<td>Comply with BN reporting procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce required advisor reports (ORA assessments, logistics estimates, etc.) to higher headquarters for tracking ISF training, Manning, and equipment status</td>
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The helicopter flares but unlike the previous two times, this time it hovers just above ground level. Out jump six men: two steps and they are prone. The bird lifts off almost as if it never stopped. Silence ensues without a word, and the six men move to a position of cover. The team listens and adjusts to their new environment; they move out towards their objective. When they are one terrain feature away, they call up their insertion and say goodbye to the birds. They are now on their own. If contact is made, they will have to call for help, and the nearest friendly unit is 100 kilometers away on the other side of the enemy’s defensive line.

Long Range Surveillance Unit (LRSU)

The scenario described above was based on doctrine but doesn’t reflect current LRS missions. In the current operational environment (OE), how do we use this corps-level asset called a long range surveillance unit? The doctrinete is at a loss as the traditional forward line of troops (FLOT) does not exist. The glory seekers want to be used as a direct action (DA) unit. Others want them to perform only the most passive of the reconnaissance subtasks, which will not result in enemy contact. I propose a different tactic — that they be used as the conventional commander’s personal “Spec Ops” unit.

LRS missions are usually in the “hinterland” where other conventional forces are loath to go. Just like Special Forces units, LRS units have to be well rounded and able to take care of themselves. They often work in small teams with the quick reaction force (QRF) hours away. They have to be a mixture of several things — part field mechanic, part explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician, part off-road driving expert, part diplomat, and part guerrilla.

Where is today’s FLOT? One hint is when battlespace owners consider part of that battlespace to be “too far away.” Another way to look at it is to draw a line on a map from forward operating base (FOB) to FOB. You could include the smaller fire bases (FBs), but in a lot of cases these could be considered the same as a listening point (LP)/observation point (OP). It is the commander’s discretion. Either way you are left with large chunks of land without a U.S. presence. This trace could therefore be used to help define a FLOT. Shade in normal coalition force (CF) patrol routes, and the blank area is the LRS area of operations (AO). With that being said, a LRSU can be used to augment certain operations and units. There is no such thing as “no-go” terrain for a LRSU. For example, if a LRS platoon was staged at a FOB in Helmand Province, Afghanistan,
there would be no place they could not reach in the entire province, assisting with reconnaissance operations well in front of the frontline trace of other CF elements. The mountains on the Pakistan boarder are actually ideal LRS terrain.

A quick look at the basic make up of both a LRSU and an SF battalion shows that while the teams are different sizes, they both have similar positions authorized (military freefall, combat diver, and mountain warfare). The big differences are in human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT) assets and specified training in host nation interactions.

Where then could a LRSU make up the difference in intelligence-gathering capabilities? LRSUs are now a part of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons in the battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSB). This unique relationship has only one benefit— the BFSBs are full of intelligence assets such as HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) and multi-functional teams (MFTs). By augmenting the LRS with these assets, you now have a comparably capable unit that is directly under the conventional commander’s control. At that point, there is little in the role of intelligence gathering and direct action that can not be performed by a LRSU. Actually, the problem commanders must now resist is the pitfall of using the unit as their own personal DA element instead of having them gather intelligence.

How then do we get LRSUs to a level in which the commander has the confidence to use them fully? First, the discrepancies between the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) slots and the reality in schooling must be fixed. LRS units fight a two-front war: they fight the Military Intelligence brigades to get slots to schools, and then they fight to get into the schools controlled by Special Forces (i.e. Combat Diver Qualification Course and Military Freefall [MFF] Course). One possibility may be to conduct an MFF mobile training team (MTT) with a built-in challenge program for all the LRSUs to conduct at one time. After that, the school slots become a manning maintenance issue. Then there are the other schools (Mountaineer, Pathfinder, Airborne, Ranger, etc.). This is simply a matter of getting the proper slots and getting Soldiers there. Now some are going to argue that LRSU Soldiers just want the schools. Remember, the “Joes” didn’t write the MTOE; if “HIGHER” did not want them to have the schooling, they never should have been put into the paragraph line numbers.

In addition to fixing discrepancies in training, let’s look at mission requirements. In the past, host nation (HN) interaction was the hallmark of SF. Now, however, the Special Forces have all but handed over HN training to conventional forces. The army has stood up multiple acronym teams (military transition teams [MiTTs], border transition teams [BTTs], police transition teams [PTTs], etc), and battlespace owners from a variety of branches have taken charge of most interactions with the host nation. Working with foreign nationals is no longer a predominantly SF-centric task. Proper cultural training should be given to LRS officers and NCOs. In addition to training, newly commissioned former SF NCOs with their specialized training and qualifications could be assigned to LRSUs.

Intelligence gathering is a huge part of a LRSU’s mission. Traditionally, this was done through surveillance of targets. Having seen the fireworks after a LRS platoon leader accidentally wrote “Source says …” instead of “person x says …” in his situation report (SITREP), there is a need to validate the intelligence gathered by a LRSU. Attaching a small deployable intelligence support element (DISE), HCT, or MFT to the LRSU will help with the legal issue of saying “source” and allow the intelligence to be written in the correct formats. Some fusion cells have stated they enjoy reading the daily reports sent in by LRS elements. This is partially because it is a “no-garbage-this-is-what-I-saw-today” report from places other CF units do not go. It should also be transferred to official formats for digestion by higher echelon elements. The Army has a long proud history of ignoring reconnaissance assets that report contrary to the S2/G2 enemy situation templates (SITEMPS); this will aid in getting through that organizational friction. The intelligence gathered can then be used to refine the techniques to be used on targets to refine the intelligence, whether it is surveillance, “read on” techniques, or other ISR assets.

Surveillance missions are simply the LRS version of a special reconnaissance (SR) mission. Special operations units are supposed to be used in a deeper fight than the LRSU. However, since we theoretically control Iraq and Afghanistan, that becomes a moot point. If any authorization did come in for neighboring areas, the LRSU is doctrinally allowed 100 kilometers into “enemy” or in this case nonpermissive territory. The properly supported LRSU communications and photo capabilities are on par and in some cases superior to the SF capabilities. Both can send video and photos using a variety of capabilities.
By doctrine DA missions are performed by special operations units. On the conventional side, they are simply called raids. A LRSU is doctrinally allowed to conduct “emergency assaults.” No matter what you want to call it on your PowerPoint slide, we are talking about Soldiers attacking in some form an enemy element. Here is where most historical commanders have failed in the past — self-restraint.

As we have already discussed, at the core a LRS Soldier is an Infantryman. He craves the fight. But the value of the LRS Soldier is his ability to gather information in multiple forms from anywhere. The LRS Soldier should be used sparingly as an “assaulter.” He should, however, not be restricted from acting as such when the situation warrants it. For example, when 17 Scania trucks drive across the Syrian border and the battlespace owner (in this case a Cavalry unit) is unable to interdict due to an inability to drive at night, the LRS element on hand should be allowed to interdict that convoy. However, a LRS element should not be kept on strip alert for possible time sensitive targets within range of other CF units. Other units should be used for that mission, freeing the LRSU to gather intelligence for more targets.

“Read on” projects are a point of interest also. Due to the far reaching capabilities and area of operation of a LRSU, they should be read on and off of projects as the theater commander or C2 sees fit. For obvious reasons we will not delve into this area deeply except to point out they have a history of performing these tasks in multiple wars including Iraq.

A LRSU is an extremely versatile element that is capable of doing things no other conventional unit can. They are underutilized or sometimes worse — misused by commanders who do not understand them and their function on the battlefield. When treated as the corps asset they are, the corps commander can easily weigh his battle options with the amount of intelligence gathered. The corps commander can easily weigh his battle options with the amount of intelligence gathered.

The following is a historical account of a mission conducted by a predecessor of today’s long range surveillance units — the Alamo Scouts. “Faced with a need for specific, reliable information in the dense jungles of the (Pacific) theater, Sixth Army in November 1943 activated the Alamo Scouts to obtain strategic intelligence and to perform other covert operations within Sixth Army’s operational area” (U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan, Jr).

6 November 1944

Peering out into the darkness with its onboard radar, the boat made almost entirely of engine, wood, and aluminum glided through enemy waters. The darkness helped conceal the shape of the PT (patrol torpedo) boat and its special cargo. Suddenly the radar picked up a Japanese destroyer sitting directly in the boat’s path. The alarm was raised, and everyone moved to their battle stations. A map check solved the problem; it was a large rock well above the water line. Realizing their mistake, the skipper ordered the torpedo men to stand down but maintained battle stations as they continued on. The PT boat rounded the northern tip of Leyte Island and glided into Carigara Bay. The skipper muffled the exhaust on the three large Packard engines in order to reduce their noise signature. Finding the insertion area near Abijao, they turned toward the shoreline. Suddenly there was a blinking light from shore: dot dash dot, dot, dash dot dot (RED in Morse code), according to Larry Alexander in his book Shadows in the Jungle. Slowly and cautiously, the PT boat turned towards the light with all weapons at the ready, anticipating a possible Japanese ambush. As they pulled closer, they started to make out lights and then buildings and people. 1LT Robert S. Sumner, leader of the Sumner Team, turned to PFC Edward Renhols and said, “Flash scouts ashore,” according to Alexander. The longest Alamo Scout mission in World War II had begun.

The guerrillas realized the Americans had arrived and cheered; they then established a security perimeter. The scouts sprung into action. This was not their first amphibious infiltration in the middle of the night onto an enemy-controlled island. They inflated a rubber boat, but unlike previous times they had two tons of weapons and ammunition with them.

Sumner and part of his team rowed to shore where he was unceremoniously lifted out of the raft by the guerrillas and carried to shore. There, he met MAJ Jose Nazareno, commander of the 2/96 Infantry Regiment, a Philippine guerrilla unit. They discussed the equipment and how to get it to shore. Nazareno then ordered some of the guerrillas to assist with unloading the weapons and ammo using a type of local canoe called a barato. Then he presented a gift to Sumner: two captured Japanese soldiers to be brought back for interrogation.

In the process of moving the equipment, the PT boat came about beam to shore. This sudden move threw several people into the water including SGT Lawrence Coleman, whose hand was cut to the bone by one of the boat’s screws. After examining the wound, Sumner was forced to order him to stay with the PT boat and return to base, scrubbing him from the mission. This casualty brought the Sumner team down to six Alamo Scouts and a three-man Filipino radio team.

After 45 nervous minutes exposed in the water, the team and their guerilla allies moved to the village of Abijao, where the scouts were welcomed like royalty. Surprisingly, more than 600 people crowded the streets celebrating the return...
of Americans. An extremely noisy party ensued in the middle of a Japanese-controlled island. To maintain security, the guerrillas established an early warning (EW) system on all roads and trails leading to the village.

That night they slept in a local house whose owner told them how happy he was to see them after what the Japanese had done to them. Three hours later a sudden reveille was sounded using a cavalry bugle. After eating a large breakfast of local cuisine, the team issued out the weapons and ammo they had brought. Two companies of guerrillas were armed, but this did nothing for their lack of clothing and supplemental gear. On the march to Matag Ob Barrio, they were assisted by a company of guerrillas and a group of local militia called the Volunteer Guards (VG). The VG were a paramilitary-type organization drawn from the local villages; their size depended on the size of the village. They were the manual labor arm and casualty replacement for the main line guerrilla units. With the VG in place, they began the march to Matag Ob at 0800. Along the way, they were greeted by natives and showered with questions and gifts of chickens and eggs.

The Sumner team’s route passed by San Isidro. Sumner ordered CPL Robert Schermerhorn and PFC Paul Jones to establish a radio relay station to pass information to higher headquarter. The remaining four scouts continued the mission with the second radio. Upon reaching Matag Ob, the team was treated to another party. The guerrilla’s EW system was again emplaced to detect any Japanese threats. During the festivities, Sumner and Nazareno held a meeting and made a list of supplies to be air dropped to the guerrillas. A message was sent to request enough weapons, ammunition, web gear, and clothing to outfit 200 men. The supplies are to be dropped near the village of Mas-in.

The need for training and ammo was highlighted following several short but sharp skirmishes with Japanese patrols. “The guerrillas use as much ammo as a unit twice their size,” noted a representative of the Alamo Scouts Association. A large amount of ammunition was used, and the Japanese now knew the Americans were on the island.

Once at Mas-in, the guerrillas hacked out and marked a drop zone (DZ). Three C-47s arrived at 1400. The planes dropped 36 bundles loaded with weapons, ammunition, coffee, cigarettes, and even *Stars and Stripes* and *Life* magazines. They quickly cleared the DZ and moved to a more secure area. They then spent a couple days in the Mas-in area. Sumner established a human intelligence network to report on Japanese activity. The team then split again with CPL William Blaise left to man the radio and maintain contact with the first element.

Sumner and the others moved to an observation point at Puerto Bello. From there they observed enemy activity around Ormoc. There were some concerns about ‘Makapilis’ or Filipinos who collaborated with the Japanese. However, the guerrillas maintained a constant watch on those suspected of collaborating. The team spent a couple of weeks using a house on stilts as its command post (CP). As the naval and air battles ensued off Leyte Island, the guerrillas brought captured Japanese seaman and airmen to the team for questioning.

After a couple of weeks, the Japanese decided they had to eliminate that problem in their backyard. Using a combined amphibious and land pincer movement, they attempted to encircle the team and its guerrilla support. However, the guerrilla EW system warned Sumner that he had enemy units on two sides at about a mile away. The team packed up and started moving to Mount Naguang where there was a more defensible position. A radio signal was sent to Sixth Army telling them they would be out of contact for several days and that another air drop would be needed when they stop. Then the sight was broken down, and they escaped and evaded the Japanese trap.

By the time the team evaded the Japanese, they were critically low on ammo, only having enough for one more short firefight. On 18 November another air drop was conducted. Sumner also used this opportunity to help repay the locals. He requested items that threw the supply system into a clamor: sewing needles. The locals had been without sewing needles since 1943. They had sewing machines, but the ability to produce clothes had come to a standstill without the needles. The sewing needles were dutifully obtained by the scout’s unconventional supply system. Sumner made a gift of the needles and silk parachutes to the locals. Then, resupplied, the team and their guerrilla counterparts continued to evade Japanese patrols.

A near disaster struck when the team’s radio became inoperable, and they were unable to contact Sixth Army. They halted near Valencia as the team weighed their options. Then the answer, quite literally, fell into their laps. A disoriented fighter plane passed over and parachuted out a radio with extra tubes. Even stranger, it was a Japanese airplane and radio. To further add to the unpredictable fortunes of war, the radio was fixed a few days later with yet another mis-dropped radio.

As the guerrillas gathered intelligence, the Japanese were not the only ones found. The team also liberated five downed U.S. airman who were found living it up with the natives. They sent them with a guerrilla detachment back to San Isidro so they could continue their war efforts. Then the team set up a new CP on mount Naguang in a village called Cagdaat. The new CP had a separate radio room, a newly cleared DZ, and even a spring fed pool nearby.

As the team continued gathering intelligence and relaying it to Sixth Army HQ, reports started coming in about a camouflaged warehouse complex next to Ormoc. Air strikes were called in but
failed to hit the warehouses with their stores of ammunition and food. Then, the Alamo Scouts once again proved their direct action capabilities.

Sumner met with Nazareno and discussed planning for the raid. Another airdrop was necessary; this time explosives and equipment were needed to conduct a raid on the warehouses. They decided to bring in the best guerrillas to form a company-size force of men for the sensitive mission. The guerrilla force had a lot of former Philippine scouts in its ranks; these men formed the backbone of the raid force. The men were set up in a similar fashion to the U.S. units with a company consisting of three platoons with three squads each. Each squad consisted of nine men, one of which carried some form of automatic weapon. Due to a lack of heavy weapons, there was no weapons platoon. However, they did bring a captured Japanese 82mm mortar with parachute flares. The scouts conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the warehouse complex while the guerrillas gathered their men. By the time the guerrillas arrived, the scouts had a detailed layout of the complex and figured out the guard scheduling and manning. After a couple of days of training and rehearsals, they were ready.

The raid company arrived in its assault position in the evening, and at 2200 they began the raid. Members of 3rd Platoon set up a support-by-fire position roughly 200 yards from the front gate. Then, 1st and 2nd Platoons snuck in and killed the guards on duty by knife. One squad was set up in front of the guard shack but was ordered not to engage unless the Japanese soldiers tried to come out; any shooting meant the scouts would have to abort the mission. The rest of the force then snuck in and placed charges of TNT on five-minute fuses around the warehouses. Once completed, Sumner gave the order, and the initiators were pulled. Sumner then ordered the guerrillas to pull out. Once outside, a quick head count was conducted, and the entire force began to retreat. The total time on target was 15 minutes.

The company was about half a kilometer away when the explosions occurred. They stopped to admire their work. Huge fires erupted; that’s when they figured out all those bags of rice and boxes of ammo were piled on top of 55-gallon drums of fuel. Some of the explosions lit fires which started burning the camouflage netting. Realizing they were still too close, the group retreated. Other than some blind firing by the Japanese, there was no shooting. The guerrillas and scouts all made it back to base the next morning. Retaliation was swift; the Japanese tortured and killed civilians to get them to turn over the Americans. No one did.

Now that the ground work was laid, the 77th Infantry Division was ordered to attack the island of Leyte at Ormoc. Sumner received a heads up and moved to a position to watch the show. The scouts watched the landings and the encounter between the Japanese and American air and naval forces. The Japanese simultaneously tried to reinforce the garrison as the beach landings were occurring. A large air, land, and sea battle ensued. The Japanese received the worst of it but the Americans did not go unscathed. After a hard fought land battle, Ormoc fell to the Americans.

Sumner was then ordered to report to MG Andrew Bruce, commander of the 77th Division. Sumner brought some of the guerrilla intelligence personnel to the meeting. The scouts and guerrillas answered intelligence questions and had dinner with the general and his staff, who surprisingly did not eat as well as the scouts did on the economy. Sumner linked back up with his team. Having Americans on the island raised other problems. The Japanese were pushed into guerrilla areas, and the Japanese and American air and naval forces. The Japanese simultaneously tried to reinforce the garrison as the beach landings were occurring. A large air, land, and sea battle ensued. The Japanese received the worst of it but the Americans did not go unscathed. After a hard fought land battle, Ormoc fell to the Americans.

Sumner’s team moved to friendly lines and attempted to make contact but was shot at by Soldiers of 307th Infantry Regiment. The scouts pull back to a nearby town, and Sumner decided it was time to look more like Americans. He ordered the team to clean and polish their boots, press their uniforms, cut their hair, and shave. He told his team that they would cross the line after 41 days in the bush looking like they were walking off the parade ground. The next morning that is exactly what they did. With spit-shined boots on, they made contact with the American forces and walked across the line with their heads held high.

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Alamo Scouts Association; www.alamoscouts.org

CPT Thomas Doherty is currently serving as a observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La. He was commissioned from the Arkansas National Guard Officer Candidate School and is a graduate of Campbell University. His enlisted assignments include serving with the 3rd Ranger Battalion and 7th Special Forces Group where he deployed twice each to Colombia and Afghanistan. Upon receiving his commission, he served twice as platoon leader in F Company, 51st Long Range Surveillance, which included a deployment to Iraq during the surge.
When the Civil War broke out in April 1861, virtually all of the professional United States Army was spread out in company and small battalion-sized garrisons west of the Mississippi River. Of the 197 company-sized units, only 18 garrisoned installations east of that river. They served in the West to guard the frontier, escort and protect the convoys of emigrants crossing the Great Plains, and to fight Indians. Most garrisons were eerily similar to a modern forward operating base. Army authorities quickly realized that these troops would be needed to form a professionally trained reserve force and a cadre to train the multitudes of state volunteer troops rapidly being mustered into federal service. Most of these regulars would therefore be needed to redeploy to the Eastern Theater where the main combat operations were expected, according to George T. Ness Jr. in his book *The Regular Army on the Eve of the Civil War*.

One of these small units — Company C, 2nd U.S. Infantry — guarded the frontier and the nearby Indian reservations with its sister unit, Company K, at Fort Ripley, Minn., on the Mississippi River. The journey of Company C to Virginia and its participation at the battle of First Bull Run are the subjects of Part I of this article. The second part will provide statistics on the officers and enlisted men officially assigned to the company on 21 July 1861 during its first combat experience in the Civil War. Many of the aspects of combat and the organization of a typical Infantry unit of 1861 bear a striking resemblance to current practices.

**Part I**

By the end of 1860, the 2nd Infantry Regiment had 10 companies spread out in the Kansas Territory; at Fort Kearney, Nebraska Territory; Fort Abercrombie, Dakota Territory; and forts Ripley and Ridgeley, both in Minnesota. The regiment was commanded by 62-year-old COL Dixon S. Miles, who was appointed to that command on 19 January 1859 and stationed at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., outside St. Louis. Miles was later mortally wounded on 15 September 1862 during the siege of Harpers Ferry, (West) Va. The regimental lieutenant colonel, 62-year-old John J. Abercrombie, was in command of Companies C and K at Fort Ripley where he resided with his wife and nine children. Edgar S. Hawkins, the first major, was absent — sick at a private asylum for the insane in Flushing, Queens County, N.Y., since 2 July 1856. He was not formally discharged for disability until October 1861. Commanding at Fort Abercrombie, was the second major, Hannibal Day, since 4 August 1860. The two regimental staff officers, Lieutenants George D. Ruggles (U.S. Military Academy [USMA] class of 1855) and John P. Hawkins, adjutant and quartermaster respectively, served with COL Miles at Jefferson Barracks. In 1863, Hawkins (USMA class of 1852) had risen to the rank of brigadier general of volunteers. By the latter part of the Civil War, he commanded first a brigade and then a division of United States Colored Troops. This was a prime example of accelerated promotion in wartime.

Fort Ripley had been constructed in the spring of 1849, after the government consummated a treaty with the Winnebago Indians who were moved to Minnesota from Iowa. It was named for General Eleazer W. Ripley, a distinguished officer of the War of 1812. When the order to depart Fort Ripley arrived shortly after the fall of Fort Sumter, Company K departed the post on
18 April 1861, Company C did not leave Fort Ripley until 5 June. They arrived by train at Camp Brady, near Chambersburg, Pa., after ferrying down the Mississippi River and traveling by rail to the east. Arriving on 12 June, the Soldiers married up with their comrades in Company K and the regimental headquarters, staff, and band which had departed Fort Leavenworth on 23 May. Five companies of the 3rd U.S. Infantry (B, D, G, H and K), along with their own headquarters and band, had just arrived by sea from Texas and then by rail from Washington. The 3rd Infantry companies joined the two companies of the 2nd and Company G, 8th U.S. Infantry, newly organized of recruits at New York City, to form a regular battalion of eight companies, which was commanded by newly-promoted MAJ George Sykes, 14th U.S. Infantry. Sykes, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy in 1838, had rendered distinguished service in the Mexican War and on the Indian frontier in New Mexico and Texas. The regular battalion was temporarily attached to the force commanded by BG Robert Patterson; engaged in screening the activities of Confederate forces at Harpers Ferry and the Shenandoah Valley. The next leg took them across the Potomac River at Williamsport to Camp Hitchcock, (West) Virginia, on 16 June. Army headquarters now determined that the regulars were needed closer to Washington to oppose the Confederate force gathering under BG P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas. They wearily entrained at Hagerstown, Md., and arrived at Washington on 19 June. The entire regular battalion later left Washington on 5 July, moved across the Potomac River, and set up a bivouac at Camp Turnbull in Arlington Heights, Va. The headquarters, staff, and band of the 2nd Infantry left the latter camp on 13 July and arrived at a bivouac near Alexandria on the same day where Colonel Miles would soon assume command of the 5th Division during the Bull Run campaign.

The remainder of the 2nd Infantry remained beyond the Mississippi during July 1861 and would not reunite with the rest of the regiment until that autumn. It would reputedly prove the most difficult regiment to evacuate from the West, as their replacement by state volunteer units took additional time. Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan may recall all the difficulties in training and turning over operational duties to local national forces.

**First Bull Run**

Sykes’ battalion was assigned to COL Andrew Porter’s 1st Brigade of COL David Hunter’s 2nd Division. Despite serious
misgivings about the readiness and training of the force, BG Irvin McDowell’s Army of Northeastern Virginia left its camps on 16 July toward Manassas. Company C reported that enroute to Bull Run they lost one copy of Army regulations, three copies of Hardee’s 1855 Rifle & Light Infantry Tactics (the current tactical doctrine manual), and six copies of McClellan’s 1852 Bayonet Exercise for the Army from the unit library. Arriving at Centreville on the 18th, they awaited McDowell’s reconnaissance and plan of battle. Two days later, Hunter’s division led the 18th, they awaited McDowell’s reconnaissance and plan of battle. Two days later, Hunter’s division led the wide flanking march with the objective of turning the Confederate left flank. Awakened long before dawn on 21 July and held up by BG Daniel Tyler’s division on the Warrenton Turnpike, they began their march around 3:30 a.m. and finally crossed Bull Run at Sudley Springs ford amid choking clouds of dust and the gross indiscipline of the volunteer militia units. The regular battalion was detached from Porter’s brigade to assist the brigade commanded by COL Ambrose Burnside, which was heavily engaged on Matthew’s Hill. At an assembly area alongside the Sudley-Manassas road, Sykes made a short speech cautioning the Soldiers to remain composed and to fire low. He reminded them that they were regulars, and therefore were regarded as the mainstays of the Army. He finally admonished his officers to keep their companies well in hand, according to Timothy J. Reese in his book Sykes’ Regular Infantry Division, 1861-1864.

With Burnside’s brigade heavily engaged, the regulars marched behind the lines of two Rhode Island regiments and then formed line of battle on their left flank by the order, “On the right by file into line, march!” The regulars executed that order at double-quick time. The recruits of Company G, 8th Infantry began to fire wildly into the air, but the regulars soon settled down to their work. Most of the Federal and Confederate volunteer militia units on the field were still armed with smoothbore percussion muskets with a maximum effective range of only 100 yards, while the regulars’ Model 1855 Springfield rifle-musket were effective at 500-600 yards. They quickly gained fire superiority and, along with the Rhode Islanders, pushed three Confederate brigades back down the hill. For the rest of the day, the Confederates learned to keep their distance from the long-range regular rifles. One Federal participant described it as “a whirlwind of bullets.” Sykes’ battalion then moved to the right where his men assisted in manning a Rhode Island battery of 13-pounder James rifled cannons. A number of the regulars had served prior enlistments in artillery units, and thus brought up a battery on Chinn Ridge that soon opened up holes in the regulars’ ranks, but they mechanically closed ranks over their own casualties. Sykes realized that they were the only organized Federal Infantry left on the field, and he ordered a slow withdrawal. His action was assisted by small contingents of regular artillery and cavalry in a combined arms operation. Sykes’ role continued as the Army’s rearguard as they crossed the ford at Sudley Springs over Bull Run creek on their way back to Centreville.

The regulars reached their own camp at Centreville around 8 p.m. that evening; they had been on the move since 10 p.m. the previous night. The battalion’s casualties amounted to 83 men, 10 percent of the number engaged in the battle. They marched the next day for their old campground at Arlington where they were assigned to guard the capital’s approach against a Confederate advance that never came; the Confederates being as disorganized and weary as the Federals. Sykes reported that his men had marched without rest, many without food, footsore, and greatly exhausted, yet they bore the retreat cheerfully and set an example of tenacity and discipline worthy of older more experienced Soldiers.

A few days later, President Abraham Lincoln came to visit the troops. According to Timothy Reese in his article “Squared Away: The Regular Battalion at First Bull Run,” which appeared in the 2004 On Point: The Journal of Army History, General McDowell personally presented Lincoln to Sykes’ paraded command,
asserting, “Mr. President, these are the men that saved your Army at Bull Run.”

“I heard of them,” came the appreciative reply, followed by much praise and thanks. The regulars had established a standard that they would retain throughout the remainder of their service in the Civil War.

Part II — The Company

Company C, 2nd U.S. Infantry Regiment was representative of the eight companies in the regular battalion at First Bull Run. It was also fairly representative of the regular Army prior to the Civil War. Some statistics and demographics of the officers and enlisted men are certainly indicative of Infantry companies of the time. The following information was gathered after an extensive study of the relevant muster rolls and the individual service and pension records of members of Company C. Readers may note the similarities and the problems that modern Soldiers have to contend with.

Company strength on 30 June 1861 stood at two officers and 78 enlisted men — a good-sized complement considering all the movement and turbulence at this time. The company commander, CPT Nelson Henry Davis, had been in command since 1855. He graduated in the USMA class of 1846 along with other such luminaries as George McClellan and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Davis was awarded one brevet promotion for service in the Mexican War. After 1861, he received two brevets and ended his career as a brigadier general and the Inspector General of the Army in 1885. In the absence of a viable program of awards and decorations, honorary brevet promotions were awarded to officers for distinguished service. Under certain circumstances, officers were permitted to wear their brevet rank insignia.

LT Alfred Eugene Latimer (USMA class of 1853) had been with the company since 1859. Latimer was promoted to captain in May but had not yet been officially transferred to his new unit — the 11th U.S. Infantry. He later rose to command that regiment by 1864, receiving one brevet promotion to major. The company’s second lieutenant, Charles B. Watson, had been absent on detached service. In May 1861, he was promoted to first lieutenant and transferred to the new 14th Infantry. He left the company on 25 June.

Records indicate that at least four of the enlisted men could not have participated in the battle of Bull Run. SGT William Schmidt deserted on 9 July. PVT Robert McElroy “went over the hill” on 15 July but was apprehended after the battle on 25 July. PVT James Rainsford was on detached service from the company from October 1860 until his transfer to the 2nd U.S. Dragoons on 23 July. Finally, the pension file for PVT Thomas Connolly indicates he was sick in hospital in Annapolis, Md., from 5 July until his discharge for disability on 15 October 1861. The examining surgeon described Connolly as a “faithful Soldier,” but noted that Connolly’s illness was “supposed to have been contracted or aggravated by exposure while on duty on the Western prairies.” Additionally, there were another 11 men listed on the returns as sick. Many of these men may have been too ill to march out of Camp Turnbull on Arlington Heights for the battle.

Company C had a full complement of NCOs at 1st Bull Run: four sergeants and four corporals. All were immigrants, and four would later be commissioned as officers. SGTs Powers, Butler and Schmidt had been NCOs since at least 1859. CPLs Murray, Ford and Jackson had been corporals since the same year.

Oscar Hagen, the company’s first sergeant, was born in 1836 in Schmiedeburg, Prussia. First sergeants were also often addressed throughout the Army as orderly sergeants. Employed as a clerk before entering the Army, he enlisted in Baltimore in 1857. Hagen was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 11th U.S. Infantry on 22 November 1861 and brevetted a captain in March 1865 for gallantry and meritorious service in the field. He remained in the Army after the war, retiring on 4 April 1879 after 22 years of service. He died on 30 December 1880.

SGT James Butler was born in 1832 on the Isle of Man in England. His first enlistment was with Company B, 4th U.S. Infantry from 1846-51, with combat service in the war with Mexico. Until the middle of the Civil War, regular enlistments were for five years. Butler reenlisted in Company C, 2nd Infantry in 1854, and again in 1859. He became the company first sergeant after Hagen’s commissioning and remained in that position until his own commission in the 2nd Infantry on 26 November 1862. Butler stayed in the Army until he was honorably discharged at his own request on 20 November 1870. He received brevets to first lieutenant on 3 May 1863 for gallantry at the battle of Chancellorsville and to captain for gallantry at Gettysburg. Butler died on 11 December 1897.

SGT Patrick Ford was the third ranking sergeant. Born in 1831 in County Galway, Ireland, he enlisted in 1852 and served with Company K, 3rd Infantry until 1857 when he was discharged as a corporal at Fort Fillmore, New Mexico Territory. In 1858, he enlisted in Company C, 2nd Infantry. After surviving Bull Run, he
was wounded and taken prisoner at Gaines Mill on 27 June 1862. After his exchange in August 1862, he was placed on detached service in New York. Ford accepted his discharge after completing his enlistment on 9 January 1863. He reenlisted again in 1866 and was appointed a commissary sergeant in 1873. He served until he was discharged in the Arizona Territory in December 1879.

SGT Thomas Powers was appointed to the NCO ranks on 15 July 1861 — just days before the battle of Bull Run. He replaced SGT Schmidt who had deserted on 9 July. Born in 1828 in Waterford, Ireland, he first enlisted on 27 April 1848 in Company A, 3rd U.S. Artillery and reenlisted into Company C, 2nd Infantry in 1854. He reenlisted again in the company on 1 January 1859 at Fort Abercrombie. Powers would resign his position of sergeant on 22 January 1862 and returned to the ranks as a private. Wounded at Gaines Mill in June 1862, he was reported as missing in action but returned to duty and was promoted to corporal on 8 August 1862. In the final muster roll for 1862, Powers was sick at Washington, D.C., and would be discharged for disability on 2 February 1863 as a corporal.

CPL John Murray, born in 1831 in Antrim, Ireland, first enlisted in 1852 in Company H, 4th Infantry. He reenlisted into Company C, 2nd Infantry in 1858. Promoted to sergeant on 22 November 1861, he was wounded at Second Bull Run on 30 August 1862 but returned to duty by the end of that year. He was discharged on 27 March 1863 at Falmouth, Va., at the expiration of his five-year enlistment.

CPL John Jackson was born in Copenhagen, Denmark, about 1836. Jackson was on the third year of a five-year enlistment in 1861. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant on 31 October 1861 and transferred to the 7th U.S. Infantry. He appears to have been an excellent officer. He was promoted to captain in May 1864 and received a brevet to major in March 1865 for gallantry and meritorious service at Gettysburg. He resigned on 27 June 1866. What happened to Jackson after the war is a mystery. According to his wife’s application for a widow’s pension filed in April 1909, Jackson “disappeared” in 1885.

CPL George McGowan, born in Antrim, Ireland, about 1837, was an ornamental maker for headgear prior to enlisting. On 29 November 1861, he was commissioned a second lieutenant, and, like Jackson, was transferred to the 7th Infantry. A captain by late-1864, he received brevets to major and lieutenant colonel for his work in the mustering-out and disbanding of the volunteer forces after the war ended.

The last corporal was Patrick Farrelly. He was born in 1836 in Cavan, Ireland. An unskilled laborer when he enlisted on 5 June 1858, he was promoted sergeant on 22 January 1862, and then appointed company first sergeant on 2 December of that year. He was discharged by expiration of his term of service on 5 June 1863.

Desertion posed a perennial problem for the regular Army throughout the period. Prior to the war, posted to dreary service life in far-flung garrisons, Soldiers could count on low pay and dangerous conditions. When the war started, Company C lost four men in late June while still in Washington, D.C., but other than Schmidt and McElroy, there were no other desertions between 30 June and the day of the battle. After the battle, there were five desertions, all occurring on 22 July on the way back to Camp Turnbull on Arlington Heights. Four of the deserters — PVTs Thomas Griffin, John McManus, Thomas Miles and Dennis Roche — were new to the Army and had only enlisted in April of 1861 in the general rush to enlist at the outbreak of the war. These four new enlists obviously were unable to bear the stress of combat, combined with the iron discipline of the regulars. The fifth deserter, PVT James Morris, had been in the Army since June 1858.

The monthly regimental return for 31 July 1861 listed four men from Company C as missing in action after Bull Run and presumed captured. They were PVTs Daniel Clifford, William Seymour, Thomas Wynne and John Butler — Company C included two Butlers — no relation. The December 1861 Annual Return of Alterations and Casualties indicated that all four men were also wounded in action. This leads one to surmise that, in the heat of combat in the closing stages of the battle, the regulars were unable to remove their wounded as they marched off the battlefield and covered the retreat of the rest of the Army.

PVT John Butler returned to the unit from captivity after being exchanged on 28 October 1861. Subsequent muster rolls listed him as sick and recovering from wounds at the Circle Hospital in Washington City. He would be discharged for disability on 29 September 1862. Clifford and Seymour both returned to the company on 6 November 1862 and were listed as having been prisoners of war. Seymour would be promoted to corporal the following month and discharged at the end of his term of service on 12 June 1863, probably on the march to Gettysburg. Clifford served until discharged on 17 April 1864 by expiration of service. Both men would receive pensions for their wartime service. Clifford was granted an invalid’s pension in 1890 and died in Chicago in 1923. A clerk from Yorkshire, England, Seymour also filed for an invalid pension in 1890 but reported that his last name was an alias. His real name was William Clough, but unfortunately, pension records do not reveal why he enlisted under a false name.

When PVT Thomas Wynne returned to duty is not clear. He was listed as missing in action immediately after the battle, but his name does not appear in any subsequent muster rolls. This indicates that strength accountability has been a continuing problem. The enlistment register does indicate that he was discharged for disability on 27 May 1862 in Washington, D.C. However, Wynne reenlisted in November 1862 in the General Service as a messenger for the War Department and continued to serve there until he was finally discharged in August 1882. While he never rose in rank higher than a private, his character of service was repeatedly listed as “excellent.”

Of the 78 enlisted men in Company C, only 13 were born in America. As with its sister unit, Company K, the largest contingent came from New York with seven men claiming residence in the Excelsior state. Pennsylvania and Tennessee provided two men each, while Ohio and New Hampshire were homes of record for one man each.

PVT DeWitt C. Burke was typical of a native-born Soldier. Born in New York, he was on his second enlistment in Company
C in 1861, having first enlisted in 1853 as a field musician (fifer or drummer) at the age of 14. He reenlisted in Company C in 1858, trading music for a rifle-musket and the life of an Infantryman. Appointed a corporal on 1 November 1861, Burke became the senior corporal in the company by early 1862 but was demoted sometime by August 1862 for unspecified reasons. He was discharged on 1 July 1863 at Union Mills, Md., while his regiment marched to Gettysburg. In April 1865, Burke reenlisted at Washington City and rose to the rank of sergeant in his three-year enlistment in the Adjutant General’s Corps. With short breaks of service, he would stay in the Army until 1882, serving as a clerk with various units before ending his service back in the Adjutant General’s office.

Another Soldier, PVT William Mixon from Nashville, Tenn., was on his third enlistment with 12 years in the Army. Mixon served with Company C until he was discharged on a surgeon’s certificate of disability in November 1862 as a result of a gunshot wound that shattered his elbow during the battle of Gaines Mill in June 1862. He survived the war and married the widow of another Soldier in 1869. Mixon died in Ohio on 20 February 1902.

Highlighting the predominance of immigrants in the regular Army, Company C included 65 foreign-born Soldiers, mainly from Ireland (35) and Germany (19). Five men hailed from England, and one each from Belgium, Canada, Scotland, Denmark, Holland and Poland. The Soldier from Poland, Theophie Bhryd von Michalowski, was a 21-year old clerk when he enlisted at St. Louis on 16 April 1860. Transferred to the new 11th Infantry in August 1861 as the regimental sergeant major, he was later commissioned a second lieutenant in the 1st U.S. Artillery in October 1861. He received brevets to first lieutenant for gallantry and meritorious service at Antietam in September 1862, and to captain in 1864 for gallantry in action near St. Mary’s Church, Va. Michalowski resigned from the Army in August 1867. A study of immigrant Soldiers leads one to believe that once enlisted, most immigrants stayed on in the Army on a long-term basis, providing an additional measure of cohesion to the unit. However, generally the immigrants tended to band together politically. The Germans were solidly for the North, while the Irish tended to favor the South. This did not, however, affect their professionalism.

Company C included a large number of men on multiple enlistments. Sixteen men had completed at least one full enlistment by the time of the battle of Bull Run. PVT James Rainsford, although not present at the battle, was on his fifth enlistment. Rainsford, from Devonshire, England, first enlisted in 1840 with Company A, 6th U.S. Infantry. He would serve continuously for 31 years until his discharge in 1871 as a corporal. SGTs Butler and Powers, and PVTs Martin Kelly and William Mixon were on their third enlistments at the time of Bull Run.

Eleven men were on their second enlistments. That number included Patrick Breen from County Kerry, Ireland. Breen, another musician who later turned Infantryman, enlisted in 1855 at the age of 16 and would become a first sergeant by the end of the Civil War. He continued to serve until his discharge in December 1876 as an ordnance sergeant in New Orleans, La.

Company C’s enlisted men covered virtually the entire gamut of occupations for the mid-19th century. Given the demonstrated discipline of the company during the battle, a surprisingly high number (29) were unskilled laborers. Six men were farmers; six more were carpenters or woodworkers. Five listed their occupations as clerks, four were teamsters, and another four were shoe or boot makers. Other pre-war occupations included tailors, painters, butchers, cooks and bakers, and one soap maker. The shoemakers and tailors doubtless assisted in keeping the Soldiers’ uniforms and leather equipment in serviceable condition.

This is a remarkable human interest story. It is not only a tale of recent immigrants, attempting to make their way in a new country but also of native-born Americans who may have been down on their luck and decided to try the Army. While the casualties at Bull Run for this cohesive company were by no means heavy, the exigencies of army service contributed to ever-changing disruptions. Once the entire 2nd Infantry was reunited around Washington, D.C., the company and regiment would continue to render distinguished service throughout the Civil War. Much heavier casualties were sustained at Gaines Mill on 27 June 1862, in the Wheatfield at Gettysburg on 2 July 1863, and at the Wilderness on 5-6 May 1864. Decimated by heavy casualties and unable to compete for recruits with the liberal bounty systems enjoyed by the state volunteers, the remainder of the regiment was finally consolidated into Company C by 1864 for the balance of the war.

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Both authors are members of Sykes’ Regulars, a living history organization dedicated to studying and portraying the role of regular army Infantry regiments during the Civil War.

A complete list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry Magazine.
The Surge: A Military History.
By Kimberly Kagan. New York:
Encounter Books, 2009, 250 pages,
$25.95.
Reviewed by MAJ Sean M.
McClure.

Understanding the complex endeavor
of the Iraq War can be difficult for
the military professional, let alone the
civilian, to accomplish. However, with
that aim in mind, Kimberly Kagan
sets out to write a narrative of military
operations conducted as a part of 2007’s
surge of forces in Iraq. In this respect, she succeeds. Gleaning from
coalition forces press releases and access to major operational
commanders, Kagan tells the narrative of the surge from the
military’s perspective.

The Surge: A Military History provides the reader with a story of
military operations across Iraq in the summer of 2007. Beginning
with a description of the conditions on the ground that precipitated
the Bush Administration’s change in strategy, Kagan gives the
reader an operational perspective without straying too much into
the minutia of tactical actions. From this viewpoint, we see how
additional forces, equipped with new counterinsurgency doctrine,
were employed as a part of President Bush’s “new way forward.”
Kagan provides the reader with a detailed account of how LTG
Ray Odierno utilized the additional forces to increase security
in Baghdad and then goes on to chronicle the implementation of
Odierno’s campaign. The first step was to secure Baghdad itself.
Key to this was the dispersal of U.S. and Iraqi troops throughout
the city’s neighborhoods to protect the population from insurgent
attacks. Military operations then focused on clearing al-Qaeda and
other Sunni insurgents from their sanctuaries around the city where
they were able to launch attacks. Finally, as insurgents were forced
from their sanctuaries, operations focused on pursuing them as they
fled to other areas in the country.

Readers should be aware that The Surge is a military history, and
as such is told from the perspective of the military. The book places
most of its emphasis on those military actions which are considered
active combat or “kinetic” operations against the insurgency, and
spends little time talking about the “non-kinetic” activities that are
the hallmark of counterinsurgency — political-based actions which
contribute to defeating the cause of the insurgency.

Telling a convincing story in the midst of a war is difficult to
do as accurate information is poor in both quality and quantity.
As previously stated, much of Kagan’s information comes from
coalition forces press releases and first-person access to major
operational commanders; however, some information remains
classified. As such, Kagan’s book is a trade-off — it seeks to
provide some history now, rather than wait to portray the whole
story in the future after the declassification of military records.
Nevertheless, The Surge: A Military History fills an empty gap on
the ever-expanding bookshelf of the Iraq War. Publishers continue
to release books debating the political and strategic machinations
of the Iraq War along with many first-person accounts of the war. The
Surge speaks to the actions undertaken at the operational level
and would be a decent addition to the bookshelf of military and civilian
readers trying to decipher the puzzle of the Iraq War.

The Spectrum of Islamist Movements, Volume One. Edited
by Diaa Rashwan. First published
in Arabic by the Al-Ahram Center
for Political and Strategic Studies,
Cairo, Egypt in 2006. Translated
into English: Verlag Hans Schiler,
Berlin, Germany in 2007, 448
pages.
Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-
Enein, MSC, U.S. Navy.
The United States is entering its
first decade since 9-11 and combating
violent Islamist extremists. We must become more sagacious in
our understanding of radical Islamist movements, cultivating a
nuance that will open options in undermining the more violent
elements that pose an immediate threat, while keeping an eye on
those groups that mature into violent strains. Cultivating analysts
who comprehend these nuances takes time and a constant immersion
into the language, trends, and evolution of militant Islamist groups,
contrasting them with Islamist political groups. This is why it is an
event when direct Arabic books on militant Islamists are translated
into English. Egypt’s quasi-government think-tank, the Al-Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies, has published a multi-
volume set on Islamist movements from the violent al-Qaida to
the ideologically different Turkish Islamist political party AKP, which
is now in government in Ankara. In 2007, with the help of the German
publishing firm Verlag Hans Schiler, the first volume has been made
available to an English speaking audience.
The volume opens with a chapter on a more precise definition
of Islamist movements and settles upon defining it as those groups
that take some aspect of Islam or its interpretation as the frame
of reference for its existence or objectives. It goes on to highlight the
terms, symbols, and operational tactics that define the degree of
violence an Islamist movement possesses. The book also defines
peaceful extremist movements and violent jihadi movements
offering a taxonomy of Islamist groups. The section on al-Qaida
contains the usual historic narrative but with interesting additions,
such as details on Bin Laden’s role in destabilizing Marxist Yemen.
before their unification with the Republic of Yemen in 1990, and the continued assassination of Yemen’s secular and Marxist politicians afterward.

A section entitled, “What Remains of Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” traces the splintering of the group, and the external group led by Ayman al-Zawahiri losing its identity when it merged with al-Qaida formally in 1998. This controversial and arbitrary decision by Zawahiri further divided the group and was opposed by founder of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Pakistan Imam al-Sherief (aka Dr. Fadl). The end of the book contains a robust chapter on the writings of Dr. Fadl and how he has offered an ideological challenge to Zawahiri that has necessitated the al-Qaida deputy to issue a 300-page rebuttal to his former mentor.

The section on the evolution of Bin Laden’s discourse is excellent, and highlights Bin Laden’s lack of using the Quran (Islam’s Book of Divine Revelation), although he does use Quranic words in his speeches. The chapter contrasts Bin Laden’s oratory style with that of Zawahiri and the former al-Qaida spokesman the Kuwaiti Suleiman Abu Gheith. This is another nuance and helps in understanding what fragments of Islam these al-Qaida leaders utilize to accomplish their ultimate objective of gaining media attention and donations. These are objectives not highlighted in this book but in a recent publication by Dr. Fadl in January 2010 in the al-Sharq al-Awsat Arabic daily newspaper.

The book continues with Bin Laden’s rudimentary economic theories and the future of Islamist groups like Hamas and the Turkish Peace and Justice Party (AKP). There are also the Islamist radical theories of Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan, who advocates an Islamist version of equality between the sexes, yet was an associate of Usama Bin Laden from 1991 to 1995. This is required reading for those immersed in countering militant Islamist groups and offers insight into what Arab thinkers are writing about an adversary to Muslim and non-Muslim alike.


Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

The sheer mention of his name can quickly bring immediate discomfort and a general uneasiness to those who are familiar with the man. Ask that same person to begin reading his most referenced publication and paralysis could very well set in. What man and his work could possibly evoke such actions? As many of you have probably already surmised, only Carl von Clausewitz and his volume, On War, can generate such action.

It has been more than 178 years since the death of Clausewitz. Yet, today passionate debate continues regarding the man and the “book.” Perhaps, no other person or book associated with war has been as scrutinized or questioned as much as Clausewitz or On War. This in itself is highly intriguing since many who are vocal on these subjects have never completed the book in total. Clearly, no other volume related to war has instilled such varying degrees of emotion.

Throughout this debate, there have been numerous attempts to interpret Clausewitz and On War in print. Having read many of these efforts, I must admit that most left me more confused than before I had started. Despite their attempts to provide understanding, many of the books only muddied the waters more. Thus, when Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War was published, I was extremely hesitant to pick up the book.

Before I made the decision, I conducted some research. Certainly, in a book of this distinct subject area the credentials of the author are imperative. My investigation indicated Sumida was at least historically up to pursuing the challenge of tackling the topic. First, he has garnered an excellent reputation as a military historian. This standing was built primarily with his body of work in naval history and in the prestigious academic positions he has held in several institutions. Second, Sumida has studied Clausewitz for many years (since 1992) and written numerous articles on the man and On War. He is clearly not a novice in the subject area. Finally, having read some of his past material, I have found him to possess an engaging and effective writing style. Undoubtedly, this would be an asset in any attempt to articulate Clausewitz. In total, these credentials persuaded me to begin reading the book, a decision which would prove highly beneficial.

As I began reading Decoding Clausewitz, it was immediately evident this book would be unlike others based on Sumida’s purpose for the book. Unlike other authors’ motives in interpreting On War, which I felt were principally self-promoting, Sumida focused in another direction. In his preface he states, “…my intended objective is neither to produce an executive summary of a text nor to devise the definitive interpretation of that text, but to orient the learner perspective of a reader of On War in a matter that will enable that person to negotiate this book as its author intended …”

I believe readers will agree with me in assessing that Decoding Clausewitz not only strives for this objective but clearly achieves it. How does Sumida meet this obviously challenging objective? I believe there are three true keys that support him. To begin with, he undoubtedly grasps the difficulties readers have with On War. Further, he realizes how these difficulties affect a person’s ability to read let alone begin understanding the book. Next, Sumida does not attempt to tackle too much with his volume. He knows what he must accomplish in his book to obtain his purpose and focuses on that — nothing more. The final key is the author’s outstanding organization of the volume. Sumida has crafted a book that flows (spurred by Sumida’s engaging and easily understandable writing style) and contains chapters which build upon each other. Let me elaborate on each of these keys.

In order to make On War negotiable for readers, it is a necessity for you to understand what makes the book non-negotiable for so many. Although I have heard many opine on the problems with On War, no one has perhaps more clearly articulated them than Sumida. He states, “It is long, complicated, apparently inconsistent, in places seemingly obscure, and, to a large degree concerned with the military issues of the 19th century that appear to be of little
direct relevance to present concerns. In addition, many believe On War to be severely incomplete raising the possibility that the text is not a coherent statement.” Throughout Decoding Clausewitz, Sumida continually seeks opportunities to provide clarification on these points.

In past books “dissecting” On War, I felt most authors tried to take on too much. The result was a book far more complicated and in some cases longer than the book they were trying to interpret. This is not the case with Sumida. He understands his “limits” and focuses principally on answering the following three questions:

1) Is On War a completed work (and thus be analyzed for what it is versus what it might have been)?

2) What did Clausewitz mean when he said the defense was the stronger form of war?

3) Finally, does On War take the form of a theory of practice vice a theory of phenomenon? (If you are confused on this concept, Sumida breaks it down into simple terms).

Finally, Sumida has crafted a book which smartly and effectively takes the reader from his stated objectives to his conclusion. The author sets the conditions initially by examining and analyzing the thoughts of theorists (Antoine Henri Jomini, Julian Corbett, and Basil Liddell Hart) and scholars (Raymond Aron, Peter Paret, and W.B. Gaille) on Clausewitz and On War. This discussion provides all readers a solid background on the subject area. Sumida then capitalizes on this base as he focuses on the aforementioned questions and specific areas where most readers which trouble negotiating. It is a formula enabling Sumida to achieve his intentions and accomplish it in around 200 pages.

In summary, Decoding Clausewitz is an invaluable addition to our understanding of Clausewitz and On War. It is a book serving varying purposes depending on the readers’ “Clausewitzian” experience. For those who feel comfortable (if that is entirely possible) with their understanding of On War, it will provide critical insight and much needed clarification on key concepts. For those, who have attempted or could not muster the courage to read On War, it will provide the confidence needed to complete the volume. Truly, there is much to gain from Clausewitz and On War. Decoding Clausewitz greatly assists in opening the door to this knowledge.
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* Small Unit Development - A Paradigm Shift
* Trust and Balance: An Illinois Guardsman in Afghanistan with Polish Task Force White Eagle