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The dismounted Infantry squad continues to be the keystone of the tactical fight. It is the success of our squads in taking the fight to the enemy that ultimately determines the success of the platoon and company fight. We need to overmatch our adversary at every level, and that begins with the squad engagements, where the enemy gets his first taste of what it means to face our Soldiers in combat. Early in both the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts these first contacts have been costly ones for the enemy, forcing him to modify his tactics to avoid directly engaging our dismounted Infantry. The enemy has proven to be highly adaptable in his response to our tactics in an effort to offset our tactical advantages. Success in the contemporary operating environment (COE) means staying giant steps ahead of the enemy. As we constantly seek ways to enhance the squad’s lethality, protection, mobility and our ability to sustain it, we must also examine how we train the squad to seize and maintain the initiative.

The COE demands that we train to meet both the current and any anticipated evolved challenges the enemy is capable of presenting. Today’s battlefield is characterized by its asymmetry and ambiguity; asymmetry born of the resourcefulness of the enemy and ambiguity as to which form the threat will assume. These hybrid threats have made the mission of Soldiers and leaders more complex, but at the same time they have made us more adaptable and innovative in responding to the enemy’s kinetic and anticipated courses of action. The uncertainties and complexities of the COE are what we must replicate in our institutional schoolhouses, at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), and to the greatest extent possible in home station training. We can accomplish this through the right mix of live training and simulations, through simulations in various forms of blended training environments, and by making sure that weapons proficiency remains a key element of readiness.

During the past decade of conflict our junior combat leaders have demonstrated that they more than possess the initiative, knowledge, skills, and attributes to take advantage of enablers that provide the overmatch required to win the first contact with a diverse enemy.

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment survey the ridgeline after taking sniper fire in Afghanistan on 29 July 2011.
They excel at quickly understanding the complex environment, which has been proven through their superb abilities to react to the enemy. Unfortunately, far too often it is our forces reacting to the enemy; we must evolve our training and capabilities to where the enemy reacts to us. Future training must enable our small unit leaders to see first, decide first, and act first against a potential threat. Allowing the small unit leaders to draw from existing information, to employ enablers (both lethal and non-lethal), and to provide critical information to the next higher level of command to maintain the degree of situational awareness which allows for increased support will aid in decreasing the enemy’s current tactical edge.

In order to more fully empower our junior leaders, small unit enhancements must include training on the capabilities, employment, and vulnerabilities of their supporting weapons systems; enhanced opportunities for Soldier and leader development; participation in the squad’s training management. By investing our small unit leaders with the skills, knowledge, and abilities to more effectively employ their units’ capabilities, we will have empowered them to execute the commander’s intent within their given situation with multiple or specific capabilities.

We have traditionally trained our squads in the fundamentals of shoot, move, and communicate; we will not lose sight of these mission-essential tasks, but we must reach beyond the skills that they imply. During his Fort Benning tenure as assistant commandant from 1927-1932, George Catlett Marshall insisted that our leaders be taught not what to think, but how to think, and that tradition continues today. We are on the cutting edge of a revolution in the training of the leaders who will direct our Army for decades to come. That is an imposing challenge, and we accept the changes it will demand. Much of the doctrine we possess is still valid, but some is dated. We will retain those approaches that have worked and modify or simply replace those that are no longer relevant in the present or anticipated operating environments.

In this issue of Infantry, MG Robert B. Brown has addressed the paradigm shift that will characterize how we envision small unit leader development. He has made a case for the changes needed, discussed revisions to the NCO Education System, and outlined how we can develop agile and adaptive leaders using outcomes-based training. He concludes by addressing the matter of training management for small unit leaders in the context of a lifetime learning concept. MG Brown’s proposals are thought-provoking and demand our consideration and input. I welcome your thoughts and recommendations as to how we can join this massive collaborative effort to best prepare the leaders who will defend our nation, her citizens, and our way of life in the decades to come.

Follow me!
An Army Ranger who lost his right hand and suffered shrapnel wounds after throwing an armed grenade away from his fellow Soldiers is the second living Medal of Honor recipient from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On 12 July, President Barack Obama awarded SFC Leroy Arthur Petry the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions during combat operations against an armed enemy in Paktya, Afghanistan, on 26 May 2008.

At the time of his actions in Afghanistan, Petry was assigned to Company D, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. Petry’s actions came as part of a rare daylight raid to capture a high-value target.

Then-SSG Petry was to locate himself with the platoon headquarters in the target building once it was secured. Once there, he was to serve as the senior NCO at the site for the remainder of the operation. Recognizing one of the assault squads needed assistance clearing their assigned building, Petry relayed to the platoon leader that he was moving to that squad to provide additional supervision and guidance during the clearance of the building.

Once the residential portion of the building had been cleared, Petry took a fellow member of the assault squad, PFC Lucas Robinson, to clear the outer courtyard. Petry knew that area had not been cleared during the initial clearance. Petry and Robinson moved into an area of the compound that contained at least three enemy fighters who were prepared to engage friendly forces from opposite ends of the outer courtyard.

The two Soldiers entered the courtyard. To their front was an opening followed by a chicken coop. As the two crossed the open area, an enemy insurgent fired on them. Petry was wounded by one round, which went through both of his legs. Robinson was also hit in his side plate by a separate round.

While wounded and under enemy fire, Petry led Robinson to the cover of the chicken coop. The enemy continued to deliver fire at the two Soldiers. As the senior Soldier, Petry assessed the situation and reported that contact was made and that there were two wounded Rangers in the courtyard of the primary target building.

Upon hearing the report of two wounded Rangers, SGT Daniel Higgins, a team leader, moved to the outer courtyard. As Higgins was moving to Petry and Robinson’s position, Petry threw a thermobaric grenade in the vicinity of the enemy position. Shortly after that grenade exploded — which created a lull in the enemy fire — Higgins arrived at the chicken coop and assessed the wounds of the two Soldiers.

While Higgins evaluated the wounded, an insurgent threw a grenade over the chicken coop at the three Rangers. The grenade landed about 10 meters from the three Rangers, knocked them to the ground, and wounded Higgins and Robinson. Shortly after the grenade exploded, SSG James Roberts and SPC Christopher Gathercole entered the courtyard and moved toward the chicken coop.

With three Soldiers taking cover in the chicken coop, an enemy fighter threw another grenade at them. This time, the grenade landed just a few feet from Higgins and Robinson.

Recognizing the threat that the enemy grenade posed to his fellow Rangers, Petry — despite his own wounds and with complete disregard for his personal safety — consciously and deliberately risked his life to move to and secure the live enemy grenade and consciously throw the grenade away from his fellow Rangers, according to battlefield reports.

As Petry released the grenade in the direction of the enemy, preventing the serious injury or death of Higgins and Robinson, it detonated and catastrophically amputated his right hand. With a clear mind, Petry assessed his wound and placed a tourniquet on his right arm. Once this was complete, he reported that he was still in contact with the enemy and that he had been wounded again.

After the blast that amputated Petry’s hand, Roberts began to engage the enemy behind the chicken coop with small arms fire and a grenade. His actions suppressed the insurgents behind the chicken coop. Shortly after, another enemy on the east end of the courtyard began firing, fatally wounding Gathercole. Higgins and Robinson returned fire and killed the enemy.

Moments later, SFC Jerod Staidle, the platoon sergeant, and SPC Gary Depriest, the platoon medic, arrived in the outer courtyard. After directing Depriest to treat Gathercole, Staidle moved to Petry’s position. Staidle and Higgins then assisted Petry as he moved to the casualty collection point.

Higgins later wrote in a statement, “if not for Staff Sergeant Petry’s actions, we would have been seriously wounded or killed.”

Petry is the ninth service member to have been named a recipient of the Medal of Honor for actions in Afghanistan or Iraq. Petry currently serves as a liaison officer for the United States Special Operations Command Care Coalition-Northwest Region and provides oversight to wounded warriors, ill and injured service members, and their families.
In May 2010 I said goodbye to a high-performing airborne brigade combat team at Fort Bragg, N.C., as its executive officer. I was privileged to lead that staff including more than 15 majors and a support staff of more than 100 officers, senior NCOs, and Soldiers. All were fantastic leaders and Soldiers. They worked very hard and could accomplish just about anything with little supervision. The team also included two civilians, both of whom were in specialized fields and very easy to manage.

In June, I said hello to a new staff at Fort Benning, Ga. Although a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) brigade headquarters, the mission was diverse and challenging. The staff consisted of 13 Department of the Army (DA) Civilians (three of which were primary staff officers), nine Soldiers (one major, one operations sergeant major, six NCOs and one lower enlisted Soldier), and three contractors. This group was vastly different than any other team of which I had ever been a member. I was completely out of my element.

I had little to no training working with DA Civilians. Up to that point, I had heard all the warnings. I had heard that “little old ladies in tennis shoes” really run the Army. I had been told that civilians would get up and leave at 4 p.m., regardless of remaining work. I had heard that poor performers were impossible to separate. One humorous anecdote compared DA Civilians to ticks — even if you pull them out, the head remains. I hesitantly assumed my duties, not sure of where to start. We began assessments immediately, and over the next several weeks, we assessed every DA Civilian and military member of the small, diverse brigade staff. Disaster struck early on though when I received a “night letter,” an anonymous letter threatening to go to the installation leadership if something wasn’t done about the “fraud” that was occurring with two employees’ time cards. Worse, up to this point, my perception of these two employees was that they were among the best on the team — hard-working, dedicated, and competent. After an investigation, the accusations were declared unfounded, but the real problem, however, was two-fold. First, there was a perception of wrongdoing, and second, relationships among some on the staff had become toxic.

We clearly had some challenges. Cohesion amongst the staff sections was abysmal. Some members would deliberately avoid other members of the staff because they hated each other so much. In some cases, interactions became hostile when perceived “rice bowls” and informal authorities were challenged. In addition to the toxic environment, our civilian employees were very “stove-piped,” and the work was not clearly integrated amongst the staff sections. Teamwork was prevalent with some of the members, especially intra-section, but most did their jobs and had little interest in the overall mission of the organization. Finally, after some additional research, we realized that the uniformed members of the staff were not doing anything to rectify the tension that existed. A straw poll revealed none were counseled regularly and to standard. Additionally, after implementing our plan of action, comments like, “No one has ever been interested in us (DA Civilians) at all,” and “I hardly ever talked to the last green-suiter” were clear evidence that the uniformed members were a part of the problem. We had to take measures immediately to change the direction of the organization. Reflecting on our struggles, we
realized much could be learned from our mistakes. As a result, we developed seven steps to help supervisors who are leading DA civilians for the first time.

1) Treat your civilian employees like you would treat a military member in the same job, except follow the rules.

The first part of this step you have likely done your whole career. The difference here is a matter of perspective. From the DA Civilian’s perspective, you are another “green-suiter” that comes and goes. The DA Civilian knows that you will be hard-charging in the beginning and then disengage as you get closer to the end of your tour. After dealing with the churn of a couple of different supervisors, one can understand that a certain amount of indifference can develop among civilians to the revolving door of “green-suit” leadership. Now, couple this with our preconceived notions of civilians, our lack of knowledge of their systems, and our sometimes very short tenure, and you create a “wait it out” mentality between both military and civilian employees. What we found was surprising. When we started acting like a regular unit and held our civilians to the same standards as military members (within the rules, of course), they rose to the occasion. In fact, we had some civilians who were better than the equivalents in our last assignments. Expecting success and treating people with respect were key. Slowly, the environment began to improve.

The second part of this step involves your education. You will need help understanding the rules. There are lots of resources. The Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), specifically Management and Employee Relations, is an excellent resource to start learning the rules. There are courses for military members who supervise DA Civilians on most installations. If you are at the brigade or higher level, you may have a civilian liaison as an interface. Talk to other more senior officers who have supervised civilians. Above all, educate yourself. Don’t look at the rules as restrictions. Look at them as the “terrain” on which you must maneuver. Understand it and its effect on you and your mission, and you will succeed. Most of my mistakes resulted from lack of education or information. Once you understand the civilian “terrain,” you will find that you have a lot of flexibility to accomplish your mission. For example, with notice and a little planning, you can work nights, weekends, overtime, etc. Moreover, your civilians embrace this, because they like flexible hours versus “standard hours,” but more importantly, they like doing meaningful work.

Most employees want flexible hours, but let me caution you. I made a mistake. I was not informing other members of the team that I approved modifications to the work schedule. For example, when employees see someone leaving every day at a certain time that is not the traditional time, they sometimes question whether that employee is really working the properly prescribed hours. The opposite can happen. When an employee constantly works late, others may get the impression that they are being paid for that time. A little education and discussion up front can help you to avoid this.

Finally, include them. This will reap two benefits. First, you may find out the best way to do business based on sometimes years of experience regarding that problem on that installation. Second, they are people too. They have an innate desire to feel valued. By including them in decisions and asking their opinions, you embrace the idea that solutions can come from anywhere! When you do this, you get buy-in and make them feel important because they are important!

One additional caution — don’t rely on any one employee too much. You may be inadvertently creating “rank” among your civilians. You may have an employee who is particularly competent. However, relying on this one member of the staff can create tension. I made this mistake in the beginning. It created a sort of power position. Others came to resent that one member who was the “go-to guy” that got all the attention. Worse, the “go-to guy” began to use his new influence and abuse it.

2) Counsel them in writing often.

Let’s face it. We are not counseling our military subordinates to standard. If that is occurring, how well do you think we counsel our civilians? Yes, there is the “backstop” of having to provide counseling when annual evaluations are due, but it tends to be an afterthought just like in the military culture. This can be even more damaging when the individuals you are counseling never leave an organization like civilians. What I observed in our “small civilian leadership laboratory” was that individuals were being counseled but only as a function of the requirements: twice annually, short bullets, focused on duty description. We had been meeting only the bare minimum standards. That level of effort rarely led the employee to any self-discovery of a weakness or what he or she could do better. It rarely discussed goals or any long-term aspirations. It rarely informed the employee of any behaviors that needed modification. A DA Civilian could go five to 10 years and never receive any feedback at all. Behaviors never got modified. The uniformed member’s perception is reinforced by poor performance/behaviors that the civilian doesn’t even know he or she is doing.

Additionally, you can’t “build a case” like you can with Soldiers when you are trying to remove a difficult employee. The timelines associated with removal of a DA Civilian can be much longer than Soldiers. You also risk a complaint if you start an aggressive counseling campaign that was not there before. You have to follow the rules, identify EXACTLY what behaviors you want modified, develop a plan to improve those behaviors, and allow ample time to pass to see if the employee improves. The difference with Soldiers is that they likely want to leave, so they won’t complain about crappy counseling. With civilians, they don’t want to go anywhere. This is their livelihood. They will fight back aggressively if they perceive a threat to their jobs.

We received one great second-order effect from counseling we weren’t expecting. The DA civilians now had an outlet to be heard. This allowed them to talk through the friction they were facing in their jobs or with other employees. Over time this improved the working environment because the employees knew management was listening and responding to the things they felt were important.”
environment because the employees knew management was listening and responding to the things they felt were important. We built on this with some “open-mike” time at the end of training.

We used counseling and evaluations to overcome our lack of integration amongst the staff sections. Each section had become “stove-piped” with little or poor integration among the other sections. However, when integration across sections was required, friction sometimes led to conflict. To counter this, in addition to forcing interaction at routine staff meetings, we invoked use of the senior rater portion of the civilian evaluation. This portion, not required in the evaluation, was rarely used in our organization. Because I was interested in integration and cooperation, I used it to drive this. I pulled every civilian into my senior rater profile. This allowed me as the brigade’s chief of staff to evaluate individuals based on their ability to function across staff lines. This proved valuable.

I recommend you counsel at least quarterly. This depends on the number of employees you directly supervise, but quarterly counseling allows just enough time to see if the employee is making efforts to modify behavior or improve performance. For those you senior rate, if you choose to do that, I recommend counseling them at least semi-annually. This allows you to get a sense of how your raters are developing their subordinates.

3) Train them regularly.

As a result of the “night letter” we received, the course of action we chose was to put the civilian employees together as often as possible. We developed some simple training designed to be quick and to force the civilian employees to interact with one another in a manner outside their normal duty description. We made an effort to choose discussion topics that didn’t have a “right” answer, so no matter how poor an answer, it would be accepted by all the employees. I moderated most of these in the beginning, using a Socratic method of leading questions. Some of the topics included a discussion on the Civilian Creed, goal setting, conflict management, and simple team-building exercises you can get for free online. We used outside experts where required but primarily did the training ourselves because we had mostly relationship and respect problems. Participation was mandatory. The moderator asked questions and then managed the discussions that followed. When we did exercises, we split the groups into non-typical lines. Our training plan culminated in a civilian-led team-building exercise that was planned, prepared, and executed by civilians from multiple staff sections doing simple problem-solving exercises.

What we discovered was that the topics of training were less important than the interaction that occurred in the training itself. Quickly, the tensions surrounding some employees were faced. The discussions helped employees discover their negative actions and the impact those actions had on the rest of the team. In fact, during our conflict management training, we discovered that more than 87 percent of our employees had a physical response (stress-related sickness, loss of sleep, anxiety, etc.) as a result of conflict in our organization. Although we didn’t fix all our problems, many employees’ relationships were strengthened as a result of our monthly training. Additionally, the civilians themselves asked to bring in the military members to improve daily interactions with them.

4) Don’t threaten them.

Many of your civilians have likely been around the military longer than you have. They understand the Civilian Personnel System better than you do. Therefore, any directives you deliver must follow the rules associated with civilian employees. This doesn’t mean you should tolerate poor performance. It just means that it is likely the individual believes he or she is performing well. Counsel them. Develop Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs) and find out all the tools at your disposal that are required before considering dismissal.

5) Don’t have unrealistic expectations.

Remember, as a field grade officer, you have had an immense education — college, the basic course, the advanced course, Intermediate Level Education, several deployments, and countless hours of experience dealing with a wide range of problems. You have been trained to be a multifunctional problem solver. Your DA Civilians may have been prior service and may have very rich experiences, but they were hired to do a specific job with defined duties. When you have expectations beyond that, they may not be trained to respond. Some civilians may have worked in those roles for some time. Therefore, assigning them projects outside their duty description might not yield the
results you want. Conversely, they will be experts in their field. They will have likely seen all types of challenges that you will face and know the answer to most issues.

6) Don’t expect them to work as long as you work.

There are rules that preclude them from working beyond their established hours. Your rhythms will be different than theirs. They do not have physical training (PT), 1.5-hour lunches, or typical time at the end of the day for closeout with your boss. If they “volunteer” to stay and work “off the clock,” this creates its own set of challenges. Additionally, they are likely not paid for those extra hours. Because they don’t wear rank, it is sometimes hard for Soldiers to understand the level of responsibility with each GS level. Finally, understand they are not in an “up or out” field. Several of our employees have no desire to be promoted. For each person, that may be completely OK. Evaluate them against their duty description, not against your own performance or expectation of performance.

7) Don’t try to force them to fit your way of doing business.

Take some time to realize why over years and years things are done “the way it always has been done.” There is likely a very good reason why that civilian is doing it the way he or she always has. Spend some time finding out why. By doing that, you will gain your civilians’ respect because you took the time to talk to them. This doesn’t mean to accept everything “as is.” After you develop a relationship, you will find it easier to challenge assumptions and try new approaches.

Conclusion

Remember, our goal as leaders is to employ our subordinates to their fullest potential. DA Civilians sometimes become troubled by things military members don’t realize. We have to remember that these employees don’t come and go like we do. Tensions that are created don’t dissipate by the natural ebb and flow of military permanent change of station (PCS) moves. Therefore, something seemingly insignificant can have a profound effect on productivity for long periods of time. I recommend you face any problems head on. Allowing the status quo will prevent you and your organization from meeting its fullest potential. Engage your civilians with the same rigor you developed leaders in your “regular” commands. Develop them like you were developed as a junior leader. Train them. Send them to school (yes, they have schooling, too). Train yourself. Get to a CPAC supervisor’s course as soon as practical. This will help you navigate the sometimes challenging Civilian Personnel System and make you a better supervisor. Above all, treat your DA Civilians with dignity and respect. These individuals are essential members of our profession and deserve the same leadership our military members receive. Lead them well and they will excel!

LTC Michael Dane Acord is currently serving as the commander of the 6th Ranger Training Battalion at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. He previously served as the deputy commanding officer of the 199th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Ga. He has served in various command and staff positions to include serving as a small group instructor for the Maneuver Captains Career Course; a campaign planner for XVIII Airborne Corps/Multi-National Corps-Iraq; executive officer (XO) for the 1st Battalion 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, and XO for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.

CPT CAMERON E. HOSMER

Many changes will accompany the impending troop drawdown and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the management of contracts is one area that needs to be addressed. The system by which American military forces contract Afghan nationals for military and infrastructure construction requires reform in order to stem charges of corruption and prepare the Afghan government to assume a greater degree of control over future foreign aid.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has sought to deflect criticism of the rampant corruption plaguing his administration by countering that the American contracting effort in Afghanistan fuels corruption by awarding an elite, unaccountable few access to millions in American aid. The Afghan president has called on the United States to direct contracting efforts through Afghan ministries, implausibly arguing that direct control of contracting funds will make it less likely that ministers siphon funds for personal gain. While President Karzai’s proposed solution is flawed, his diagnosis of the contracting system as plagued by misappropriations and poor management deserves further scrutiny. Attempts to reform, however, may be unsustainable and fleeting as international leaders poise to begin withdrawing the Soldiers and resources required to ensure that contracting funds are properly utilized. However, the institution of a partnered contracting system that gives the Afghan government a stake in the contracting process and imparts the standards of contractual adherence used by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) could help to ensure that future foreign aid is properly allocated despite a reduced international presence.

The American military currently spends approximately $14 billion per year, or nearly 12.5 percent of annual war spending, on contracting work to provide a wide array of services such as forward operating base (FOB) construction, operations and maintenance services, and civil engineering projects. These efforts are immensely important in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Publication 1-06, Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A), states, “Commanders employ many resources in pursuit of mission accomplishment. In this theater, money is often used to generate nonlethal effects that can be equally, and in many cases, even more important than lethal effects.” These non-lethal effects have the potential to have a profound impact on the face of Afghanistan —
legitimate employment for military-aged males, an improved infrastructure, and facilities from which Afghan Army and Police can successfully fight an insurgency. Used properly, contracting efforts have the potential to set Afghanistan on the path to self-sufficiency as much as air strikes or raids on insurgent forces.

President Karzai has argued that the impact of contracting on Afghanistan is instead detrimental and spawns corruption. In a November 2010 interview with *The Washington Post*, President Karzai claimed that government corruption is fueled by American dollars funding contractors who are not accountable to the Afghan government. He countered accusations of corruption asking, “Why is the U.S. government giving contracts to the sons and relatives of officials of the Afghan government? We don’t do those contracts. I don’t have authority over a penny of those contracts…” President Karzai contrasted the current situation with the Soviet occupation in another news article. “The Soviets were here, and they were spending all their money through the Afghan government,” he said in *The Washington Post* article “Karzai Wants U.S. to Reduce Military Operations in Afghanistan,” by Joshua Partlow (14 November 2010). The conclusion to this line of logic is that by filtering American money through Afghan ministries to contractors, the Afghan government will be able to ensure that friends and relatives of those working within the Afghan government are not unfairly awarded lucrative contracts. Direct access to contracting funds and the power to disburse them would alleviate rather than empower corruption.

Even if one is able to overlook President Karzai’s statement that he has no control over his ministers, his proposed solution is meritless. Appropriating contracting funds directly through Afghan ministries would facilitate the corruption. For example, an Infantry company wanted to build a school for Afghan children in a rural district within Zabul Province and sought to involve the local district government in the process of soliciting bids from the population. The initial effort seemed promising as multiple bids were submitted within a week of the announcement. A few days later, however, a U.S. observation post witnessed the local chief of police travel to the home of one of the potential contractors. While this is not suspicious in and of itself, the fact that all the other construction companies withdrew their bids in the subsequent 48 hours screams of collusion and conspiracy.

At higher echelons of government, according to other news articles, President Karzai has members of his family that have been plausibly charged with corruption and his senior aide, Mohammed Zia Salehi, was arrested on charges of corruption in the summer of 2010. According to November 2010 Associated Press article “AP Interview: Ex-minister Facing Indictment” by Deb Riechmann and Rahim Faiez, Afghan Deputy Attorney General Rahmatullah Nazari was investigating or had closed 20 cases involving former or government officials. Investigations range from an unnamed cabinet of officer, officials in Uruzgan and Zabul provinces, and an Afghan diplomat to Canada. Given the evidence exposing rampant corruption on the micro and macro levels, one cannot reasonably believe that funneling American dollars through the Afghan government will reduce nepotism.

Although President Karzai’s proposed mechanism for reforming the system is flawed, his assessment that the current system has failed to optimally appropriate American funds is not entirely inaccurate. When traveling through southern Afghanistan, it does not take long to comprehend that the Afghan public has earned a rather dismal return on the billions of international aid dollars invested in development. Indeed, GEN David Petraeus acknowledged failures in the system and sought to mitigate many of these issues by announcing new guidelines in September 2010 designed to enlarge the pool of contractors and eliminate corrupt power-broking. Still, other problems persist in the contracting process as the potential for theft remains high at the operational level. For example, a contract that requires a contractor to electrically wire a building would stipulate that National Electric Code (NEC) standards are followed. A contractor operating in a country devoid of quality assurance laws and an effective legal system may yield to the temptation to scrimp on the labor and equipment required to comply with the NEC. Similarly, it is not uncommon for contractors to disregard the required completion date and pay an understaffed labor force. Recognizing the potential for abuse, Regional Contracting Command (RCC) assigns a contracting officer representative (COR) responsible for oversight of the contract.

The COR is empowered to direct the contractor to correct
deviations from the terms of the contract or even recommend the assessment of financial penalties against the contractor for failure to adhere to contract specifications. Proper oversight necessitates routine inspections in order to ensure that work is being conducted to the standard contained within the contract and in compliance with applicable labor laws and regulations (e.g. human trafficking). While the COR should be present within a short distance of the job site (i.e. drivable) or at the site itself, this is not always feasible due to mission constraints. Currently, work sites that should be routinely inspected are unsupervised and allow the contractor to deviate from the contract specifications. Moreover, a COR is often just one of a myriad of additional duties that a junior officer/NCO with little or no knowledge of construction, engineering, plumbing, etc. is delegated. The language contained within contracts can be extremely specific and technical thus forcing the COR to attempt to find scarce subject matter experts such as personnel from the Army Corps of Engineers to provide technical expertise for evaluations. Returning to the example above, a COR can tell if a building is wired for electricity by simply flipping a light switch, but determining whether the building is wired in accordance with the NEC requires an electrician. This distinction is vital as it can result in the prevention of injury or death from electrocution. In sum, the corruption within the contracting system and bemoaned by President Karzai exists at both the institutional and operational levels.

The rampant corruption within the Karzai administration as well as the corruption identified within the current contracting systems yields an important question: With ISAF’s presence poised to diminish substantially over the course of the next four years and beyond, who will assume the responsibility of awarding and oversight of contracting efforts? International leaders, while posturing to withdraw troops, have made no mention of decreasing aid. In an interview with Sky News Television regarding the future of British involvement in Afghanistan, Prime Minister David Cameron reported, “We may be helping to train their army; we may still be delivering a lot of aid, in effect, because we don’t want this country to go back to being a lawless space where the terrorists can have bases.” Barring a decrease in contracting funds proportional to the reduction of forces, a radical change of the military situation that allows for unhindered movement on the nation’s roads, and a precipitous drop in the general level of violence, the military will have little choice but to turn over a degree of contracting to Afghan ministries. Oversight cannot take place from an office in Bagram or Kandahar without a ready supply of helicopters and vehicles for transport and Soldiers to provide security for the individuals responsible for oversight. The current system will become unsustainable in the near future as the military resources required to facilitate contractual adherence over the violent, severely restricted terrain of Afghanistan are reduced. While granting Afghan officials a degree of control over $14 billion of recession-era tax dollars has a certain unsavory political flavor, an accommodation of some sort will become a military necessity in the near future. The U.S. military should implement reforms now designed to wean Afghanistan off the current resource-intensive oversight procedures to a system that will allow future inspectors general from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State to assume oversight in the same manner that other Southwest Asian countries are currently monitored.

Partnering the U.S. CORs with Afghan counterparts in the same fashion that Afghan units are partnered with American Infantry platoons is one possible solution that could yield both short and long-term benefits.”  

MSgt. Demetrius Lester, USAF

An Afghan man asks U.S. service members assigned to the Regional Contracting Center a question during a vendor fair in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, on 3 April 2010.
was initiated when the ANA logistics officer contacted his ISAF counterparts and complained about the living conditions at the installation. After conducting an inspection of the facility and questioning the ANA stationed there as to what their desired end-state for the project was, the ISAF representative requested they submit a MOD-14 (the Afghan equivalent of the U.S. DA Form 3953, Purchase Request and Commitment), in order to exercise the Afghan supply system. This was the extent of Afghan involvement. Operating unilaterally, ISAF subsequently solicited bids from multiple Afghan contractors, wrote a scope of work to detail the duties and obligations of the contractor, and processed the required paperwork to execute the project. The endeavor continued to be devoid of Afghan government or military involvement as the contracting officer in Kandahar awarded the contract to a construction company completely untenable to the personnel for which it was performing the renovations. While conducting an inspection of the worksite, the ANA complained that the contractor was not replacing their generators despite the fact that generator repairs/replacements were not part of the original contract. The installation commander became upset when he learned that ISAF would not force the contractor to repair the generators by simply withholding payment. His words conveyed a complete ignorance of the most basic concepts of contract law, and despite attempts to explain the process, the commander walked away with the impression that ISAF was deliberately withholding electricity from him and his men. While incidents of this sort are neither uncommon nor unavoidable, involving an Afghan partner COR in the process could mitigate the fallout.

Additionally, assigning partnered Afghan CORs would enable U.S. CORs to jointly write contracts (in English and Dari), solicit contractors, and inspect the progress of contractors. In addition to the positive result of the Afghan government and military assuming responsibility and ownership for their installation improvements, there are several derivative advantages. Simply learning the method by which CORs hold contractors to the standard prescribed within a signed contract would be extremely beneficial for a culture in which vague, verbal agreements are the norm. While the exacting military standards used to evaluate contracted work and the principles of contract law would be difficult to impart to a culture in which business is largely conducted through personal relationships and the hawala banking system, involving Afghans in the contracting oversight process now is the international community’s best hope for seeing their future aid disbursements properly utilized. Ideally, such an arrangement would also have the tangential benefit of fostering healthy, professional relationships between Afghan military/government personnel and the private sector. One can hope that the relationships forged while constructing barracks for ANA Soldiers are able to translate into civil engineering projects such as roads and schools that contribute to the development of the Afghan infrastructure.

Furthermore, a government versed and practiced in contract law would significantly increase the probability of receiving the foreign investment needed to develop and participate in the regional and global economy. In the near term, a partnered effort would additionally provide Afghan government and military officials a forum in which they are able to voice their input regarding contracts. Just as American platoons are currently investing their blood and sweat by partnering with an Afghan army that will one day be able to sustain itself, a partnered contracting system would contribute to a bureaucracy able to manage future aid while minimizing corruption.

American contract expenditures in Afghanistan are a positive force for Afghanistan, but this “weapon system” in the COIN fight is inefficiently waged. Despite the best intentions and strictest of guidelines, America will be unable to ensure its aid is properly used without Afghan government involvement. Extrapolating the current partnership model used by combat units to encompass the contracting process is the international community’s best chance of ensuring efficient and proper use of future aid.

At the time this article was submitted, CPT Cameron Hosmer was serving as the contracting officer for the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, which was deployed to Afghanistan. He previously served as a rifle platoon leader. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Boston College.
Cross-Cultural Competency (3C) is a critical combat multiplier for commanders at all levels that enables successful mission accomplishment. Possessing cultural understanding is one of the critical components for Soldiers who interface with the local population. At a minimum, Infantry Soldiers must possess cultural awareness; select Infantrymen must demonstrate cultural understanding with the proficiency to apply cultural knowledge effectively to achieve mission objectives. The TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) can help Infantrymen gain this mission essential proficiency. Lessons learned from 10 years of operational deployments clearly indicate that 3C is a huge and indispensable combat multiplier.

The TCC supports Soldiers and leaders throughout the Army and other services in numerous ways. It conducts Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)/pre-deployment training for any contingency; trains culture trainers; and produces professional military education (more than 160,000 military personnel trained since 2004). The TCC will create or tailor any products deploying units require. The TCC produces cargo pocket-sized training products to include smart books and smart cards, as well as digital downloads for smart devices. Areas covered include Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, and more. For a complete list of materials, see: https://ikn.army.mil/apps/tccv2.

The TCC has also developed several distance learning products available for facilitated instruction or individual student use. As an example, the TCC produced two seasons of “Army 360,” which contain 19 episodes. “Army 360” is an interactive media instruction (IMI) training product which meets the Army Learning Concept 2015 learner-centric requirements. The TCC is in the process of turning the “Army 360” IMI into digital apps which will be easily accessible for all Soldiers. The TCC produced an Initial Military Trainee (IMT) training product for the initial entry level Soldier called “IMT-BCT What is Culture?” We are also producing a Basic Officer Leadership Course IMI product. Both products are or will be available via the TCC Web site. The TCC is expanding other products into the apps arena as well as developing additional distance learning products to provide new 3C training and sustainment.

Units can request training from the TCC at https://ikn.army.mil/apps/G3MTT.
Editor’s note: This feature is the third installment in Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier’s “Dual Path” series. The Dual Path is PEO Soldier’s strategy to provide Soldiers with a service rifle that is even more effective, accurate, and reliable than the current family of M16/M4 individual weapons. The strategy pursues a rigorous M4 improvement program while simultaneously challenging the industry in a carbine competition to deliver an entirely new weapon system that can outperform the combat-proven M4.

Battlefield Effectiveness

The Army uses a simple framework to outline the complex discussion of Soldier effectiveness on the battlefield:

Soldier + Weapon + Ammo + Optic + Training = Battlefield Effectiveness

This framework reflects that no one thing accounts for how effective a Soldier is in engaging the enemy. Unfortunately, many discussions on the topic narrowly focus on the weapon platform and its corresponding ammunition. While these elements are important, they still represent just pieces to the overall puzzle. According to COL Doug Tamilio, project manager for Soldier Weapons, Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., the components of battlefield effectiveness in order of increasing importance are: weapon, ammunition, optics, training, and the Soldier.

“While the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, every component here plays an invaluable role,” said COL Tamilio. “If you pulled any one aspect out of the equation, the effectiveness of the Soldier is greatly reduced, which is why the Army takes a holistic approach when it comes to Soldier lethality.”

Clearly, the Soldier is key to the story. What is his mindset? Is his morale high or low? Is he tired, cold, wet and hungry, or is he fired up? Does he feel like an accepted member of a tight unit or is he isolated? Most importantly, is he confident? The variables are nearly endless and they all contribute in one way or another to how a Soldier will perform on the battlefield. To contain the scope of this article, therefore, we will set aside a discussion of the Soldier to focus instead on weapon, ammunition, optics, and training, in that order. The intent is to give the reader a greater understanding of the complex nature of a Soldier’s battlefield effectiveness.
Weapons
The individual weapon is the primary system utilized by the Infantryman for carrying out his mission to destroy the enemy. The effectiveness and performance of this one system is integral to success, which is often the difference between life or death. To be effective, weapons must be reliable, accurate, ergonomic, and able to leverage all the enablers that can impact performance.

In post-combat surveys conducted by the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Benning, Ga., more than 90 percent of Soldiers interviewed rated the M4 as an effective weapon system, a mark that reflects well upon the performance of the system overall in light of the many demands placed upon it.

Reliability — For the Soldier, reliability is simply, “when I pull the trigger, it fires.” A rifle’s range and lethality matter little if the rifle will not fire when a Soldier needs it to. For the M4’s part, engineers have worked hard to ensure the system meets the Soldier’s standard. Through a continuous improvement program, the Army has incorporated more than 60 engineering refinements to the M4 since it was first fielded. The system is now rated at 3,600 “mean rounds between stoppages” (MRBS), which is 500 percent more than its stated reliability requirement of 600 MRBS. Any future carbine must be able to at least match or exceed the M4’s reliability performance on this point. However, with any small arms weapon system, stoppages are bound to occur, which is why Soldiers are trained to work through these situations.

For the Army’s upcoming carbine competition, the weapon reliability testing will be extensive. Hundreds of thousands of rounds will be fired in a multitude of scenarios with both laboratory precision and “Soldier in the Loop” user evaluations. Reliability testing also includes a wide range of extreme environments from -60 to 160 degrees Fahrenheit, solar radiation, drop tests, shock tests, vibration, fouling, dust, mud, ice, water, submersion, salt fog, humidity, sustained rate of fire, lubrication, toxic fumes, chemicals, and even fungus growth tests and more.

Accuracy and Dispersion — Many factors contribute to the accuracy of an engagement with no one factor affecting it more than the human element (e.g., Soldier and training). However, there are a multitude of factors that affect accuracy beyond shooter performance to include: sight adjustment, weapon condition, barrel temperature, ammunition, and environmental factors such as heat and wind. The weapon itself controls the repeatable delivery of a round, which is referred to as dispersion.

One measure of dispersion is “minute of angle” (MOA), which is the measurement (in fractions of degrees) of a ballistic round’s deviation from its initial heading. Technically, one MOA is equal to about 1.05 inches at 100 yards (~91.4 meters) of distance. To simplify, let’s work with one inch at 100 meters. Since MOA is a linear function, at 300 meters, the spread would be equivalent to about three inches. So for a sub 1-MOA system like the M110 sniper rifle firing at a target 600 meters away, the rounds would be expected to strike within a circle with a six-inch diameter if no other factors affected the dispersion of the weapon. Other weapon systems are not necessarily as precise. For example, the M107 .50 Caliber Long Range Sniper Rifle (LRSR) is a 2.5 MOA system. At 1,000 meters, the rounds would fall within a 25-inch circle, which is why the system is intended for targeting large equipment at greater ranges rather than personnel.

A weapon’s dispersion is dependent on the weapon’s design. Generous internal tolerances may result in a weapon performing under extreme environmental conditions but at the sacrifice of accuracy. Tight tolerances may deliver greater accuracy but reduced performance under extreme conditions.

Range — The maximum effective range of a weapon system is also a key element as it represents the potential for how far out a Soldier can effectively engage the enemy. This is also critical as it affects a Soldier’s ability to leverage an overmatch advantage. Doctrinally, this means that a Soldier will look to engage the enemy at a range that is greater than the range at which they can be engaged by enemy fire (typically 20 percent). According to FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16/M4 Series, there are three ranges of concern. First, there is the detection range, which must be well beyond the effective range of the weapon system. This provides the Soldier time to prepare to engage the enemy at the farthest possible ranges. The next band is the range overmatch distance, whereby friendly Soldiers can engage the enemy, but the enemy cannot engage the Soldiers. The final band is the threat engagement range where enemy personnel can target friendly forces.

Optimally, friendly forces will engage as the enemy enters the range overmatch area. This advantage is short-lived, however, since a quickly approaching enemy can move through this area in seconds. For example, according to The Encyclopedia of Land Warfare in the 20th Century, the effective range for AK-47 fired on semi-automatic is 400 meters. The effective range for an M4 Carbine is 500 meters. The 100-meter difference provides a decisive range overmatch capability so long as Soldiers are proficient at hitting targets at the 400-500 meter range, which is why extensive marksmanship training is so critical.

The range of a weapon system relies heavily on the ammunition the weapon fires and the length of the barrel. Systems that utilize 5.56mm ammunition typically cite ranges of 500-550 meters for point targets while U.S. weapon systems that fire 7.62x51mm typically cite ranges closer to 800 meters for point targets. The rounds actually travel further but tend to destabilize after they slow to subsonic speeds and therefore lose accuracy. Longer barrels allow more of the propellant’s energy to be transferred to the projectile, resulting in greater range. The spiral grooves inside a rifled barrel impart spin to the round. The spin stabilizes the round which provides accuracy, though it doesn’t necessarily increase the average range of the system.

Regardless of the range potential for certain weapon platforms, the human
factor must be considered. Studies have shown that Soldiers can only consistently hit a human-size target more than 300 meters away 50 percent of the time or less on a qualification range. The numbers are significantly lower when a Soldier is operating in high-stress environments. Therefore, whether a Soldier is firing a 5.56mm system with an effective range of 500 meters or a 7.62mm platform with an effective range of 800 meters, what really matters is whether he has the skill to hit the target to begin with. Taking the human factor into account, one could argue that the “real world” effective range of a 5.56mm system is similar to a 7.62mm weapon platform because the range potential of both platforms significantly exceeds the average Soldier’s marksmanship ability. This is not to say that exceptional Soldiers such as U.S. Army snipers and squad designated marksmen with specialized training are not fully capable of firing small arms to their maximum potential.

The value of having a system capable of increased range not only depends upon the skill of the operator, but it also depends upon the operating environment. In urban or restrictive terrain, for example, most line-of-sight ranges are significantly less than a weapon’s range potential. In more open terrain, the engagement range increases. For example, in operating environments like Iraq, 80 percent of engagements are within 200 meters, according to LTC Thomas Henthorn, the chief of the MCoE Small Arms Division. While in more distributed environments like Afghanistan, only 50 percent of engagements are less than 300 meters.

“A Soldier must be able to engage the threat he’s faced with — whether it’s at eight meters or 800,” said LTC Henthorn. “Squads need a diverse capability that allows them to maximize their effectiveness in any operating environment.”

Ergonomics and Design Features — Beyond reliability, accuracy and range, there are a host of attributes that contribute to how a Soldier effectively employs a weapon. Overall size will make a big difference in terms of handling and mobility.

Typically, a heavier weapon is more reliable as a result of its ability to withstand the physical stressors and heating of the barrel by the explosive forces of the rounds. However, the Soldier also needs to be able to easily maneuver the weapon while moving through buildings, confined spaces, and in and out of vehicles. Often, the weight differences can be substantial. For example, a loaded 5.56mm M4 Carbine weighs in at just over 8 lbs. Meanwhile, the 7.62mm M14 Enhanced Battle Rifle (EBR) weighs 16.6 lbs loaded — more than double the M4’s weight.

How the Soldier reacts to the weapon when it is fired is also paramount. If a weapon’s recoil is too intense for the operator (which can be the case at times with heavier weapons), he may not be able to keep the weapon on target, resulting in missed shots and wasted ammunition. Larger recoil also tends to foster an anticipatory flinch in the shooter that can be difficult to control. Rate of fire and capacity will also affect the Soldier’s sense of the weapon. Burst and automatic modes enable the Soldier to send more rounds down range but at the sacrifice of precision accuracy.

Simplicity is also an important feature on many different levels. Simpler systems are easier for Soldiers to train on, clean, and maintain in the field. Simpler systems also have fewer parts that can break and have lower logistical support requirements.

A Series of Trade-offs for General Purpose Needs — Ultimately, Army service rifles must be general purpose in nature and embody a series of trade-offs that balance optimum performance for a wide range of possible missions in a range of operating environments. With global missions taking Soldiers from islands to mountains and jungles to deserts, the Army can’t buy 1.1 million new service rifles every time it’s called upon to operate in a different environment. Inherent in a system’s ergonomics are the significant design trade-offs of caliber and barrel length.

“Larger 7.62mm systems deliver higher energy rounds at longer ranges, but are heavier, use heavier ammunition, and have greater recoil, which makes putting subsequent rounds on target difficult in the close fight,” said COL Tamilio. “Smaller 5.56mm systems are lighter, have less recoil, improved controllability, and lighter ammunition, but deliver lower energy rounds at range. Actually, weapons that are too light can have significant recoil that makes it difficult to maintain on target.”

Shorter barrels reduce a weapon system’s weight and make them much more maneuverable in everyday use and close combat situations. However, short barrels tend to deliver decreased accuracy and range, as well as lower muzzle velocities that can reduce the effects of ammunition on its target.

Rather than trading off characteristics, some may suggest simply increasing the variety of platforms in a squad. While it’s beneficial to have a mix of capabilities, too much system diversity reduces a unit’s ability to cross level magazines and ammunition in a firefight. On a much larger scale, standardization between units and among allies facilitates logistical support.

Ultimately, the “best” weapon for an operator with a unique...
target set will not be the same as the best weapon for a large Army facing a wide range of targets.

**Ammunition**

“When all the factors of marksmanship do come together, it is ammunition that ultimately comes in contact with the enemy,” said LTC Jeffrey Woods, product manager for Small Caliber Ammunition, PEO Ammo. “Of significance is ammunition’s ability to engage a wide range of targets effectively.”

Considering the global mission demands it faces, the Army requires a staggering amount of ammunition. The Joint Munitions Command manages plants that produce more than 1.6 billion rounds of ammunition annually for training and combat. The Army currently employs a 5.56mm round for its 1.1 million M16/M4 weapon systems, as well as for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon. Larger caliber 7.62mm rounds are used in the M240 series of medium machine guns, the snipers’ M24 and M110 systems, as well as the M14 EBR. The M2 machine gun and the M107 LRSR make use of .50 caliber rounds.

Despite the fact that studies have long concluded that shot placement is the most critical factor in stopping a subject, some firearms writers continue to argue for a system that can deliver a “one-shot stop.” However, according to LTC Henthorn, the reality is that Soldiers never fire one bullet anyway.

“In the close fight, Soldiers don’t pull the trigger once and then evaluate and then pull the trigger again,” said Henthorn. “Instead, Soldiers in combat pull the trigger two, three, or four times and then reevaluate. The single bullet mantra just does not apply in real world combat because Soldiers know that you rarely get a second chance in a firefight to come out on top of an engagement.”

**General Purpose Rounds** — During the course of a Soldier’s patrol, he may face a variety of threat situations. He could be working a checkpoint that is approached by enemy combatants in a vehicle. He could be engaging in a firefight with insurgents clad only in soft garments. Or he could be facing an enemy taking cover behind walls or doors. To be effective in all scenarios, a Soldier needs to have true “general purpose” rounds that are accurate and effective against a wide range of targets.

“Naturally, some ammunition types will perform better than others against specific targets,” said LTC Woods. “Armor-piercing rounds will do well against hard targets whereas other rounds may give up hard-target performance for soft-target effectiveness. Yet, after testing and measuring combat performance, the Army concluded that only one general purpose round was more effective than the current 5.56mm M855 to defeat the wide range of targets faced by Soldiers, and that’s the new the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round.”

In summer 2010, the Army began fielding stocks of the M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round (EPR) to units in Afghanistan. The new round is the result of years of Army research and testing. The M855A1 is identical in weight to its predecessor but different in construction and materials. The new round exposes a harder and sharper steel “arrowhead” penetrator that extends beyond a copper jacket. The jacket is now “reverse drawn” and formed from the back of the bullet up to the penetrator. The lead slug inside the jacket has been replaced by a copper slug, and a new flash reduced propellant provides higher velocity. In effect, the M855A1 delivers match grade performance in a general purpose round.

“The M855A1’s performance is dramatic,” said LTC Woods. “Compared to the older M855 round, the new round delivers improved hard-target penetration, more consistent performance against soft targets and a significantly extended range of these desired effects along its trajectory. With the lead portion eliminated, the round also has a reduced environmental impact.”

From a performance perspective, the M855A1 can penetrate 3/8 inch mild steel at ranges exceeding 350 meters, compared to just 160 meters for the M855. In fact, Army Research Laboratory tests demonstrated that the M855A1 even outperformed the 7.62mm M80 ball round, which does not have a steel penetrator, against hard targets within the effective range of the M4/M16 weapon systems. The M855A1 provides consistent expected performance against soft targets, too.

A significant difference between the older M855 round and the new round is that the M855A1 does not rely upon yaw for its effects. As a bullet travels along its trajectory, it does not fly perfectly straight. It actually wobbles slightly as it spins resulting in variable changes in both pitch (up and down) and yaw (left to right). The yaw of the M855 round can cause it to turn as it enters soft tissue, break into discrete components of penetrator and slug, and transfer its energy to the target. Yaw-dependent rounds achieve different effects on the target depending upon the angle of yaw of the round when it hits the target. There is the possibility that if the round happens to hit a soft target “straight on” at the instant of impact, the round could pass through and fail to transfer its full energy to the target. As the M855A1 is not yaw dependent, it provides the same consistent performance against soft targets every time, regardless of yaw angle or whether in close quarters.
or longer-range engagements. Essentially, the new M855A1 EPR delivers the best potential soft-target performance of the older M855 every time it’s fired.

Caliber — Much has been written about the “bigger bullet” debate. Before the 5.56mm M16 was introduced in the 60s, Army Soldiers were armed with the 7.62mm M14 rifle. Earlier service rifles such as the M1 Carbine and M1 Garand also fired larger rounds. One of the primary benefits of a larger round is greater range. It’s not necessarily a faster round, but once the propellant accelerates the mass, the laws of physics allow for the object in motion to remain in motion longer; therefore, the 7.62mm round can travel farther than a round with less mass. The round’s accuracy over distance is also less affected by environmental factors such as wind.

Larger rounds do come with trade-offs, however. Bigger rounds result in larger recoil profiles, more weight for Soldiers to carry, and a potential reduction in lifelong reliability and durability of the weapon platform. Larger caliber ammunition requires that you build a stronger system, which often equates to increased weight. Weapons with greater recoil and more weight also demand a higher performance from Soldiers who need to control the weapon and keep it on target. After all, a miss with a bigger bullet is still a miss.

The performance of a 5.56mm round to a 7.62mm is somewhat comparable, especially when reviewing the performance metrics of 7.62mm M80 ball with the 5.56mm M855A1. To say that the one round is better than the other depends ultimately on the target set and the range. For example, a talented squad designated marksman firing 7.62mm M80 ball ammunition through a M14 EBR has the potential of incapacitating an enemy combatant without body armor at 700 meters. However, using that same weapon and ammunition, the marksman couldn’t match a rifleman’s ability to incapacitate a combatant taking cover behind intermediate barriers such as a car door at 300 meters with M855A1 ammunition. The reason is simply that M80 ball ammunition doesn’t have a steel penetrator, and it suffers from the same performance inconsistencies due to yaw angle as the M855 but to a larger degree.

“All things being equal, bigger is better,” said LTC Henthorn, “However, things are never equal, and technology advances are virtually erasing the performance differences of the 5.56mm vs. the 7.62mm ball round. In the near future, once the EPR updates get incorporated into the 7.62mm round, there will be another significant jump in performance that we will be able to put into the Soldier’s hands.”

Optics, Sensors, and Lasers

Though their significance is often overlooked, optics, sensors, and lasers are true combat multipliers in that they allow for quicker engagements, increased probability of a first-round hit, and better accuracy to make a force more lethal. After all, if you can’t see what you are shooting at, it doesn’t matter what size weapon or ammunition you are shooting — you will not be effective.

“Sensors, lasers, and optics are not only tools for better shooting, they are also tools for knowing when not to shoot by providing positive identification,” said LTC Christopher D. Schneider, product manager for Soldier Maneuver Sensors. “Minimizing collateral damage begins with knowing what you are shooting at.”

Optics have been standard on U.S. Army service rifles since shortly after 11 September 2001. In fact, the Army recently passed a milestone having purchased its millionth M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) in 2010. Allocations for the various types of optics differ depending on unit make up. About 85 percent of M4 Carbines are issued with a CCO. The remaining weapons are issued with the four-power M150 Rifle Combat Optic (RCO), while M240 machine guns are issued with the M145 Machine Gun Optic. If for any reason the primary optical sight becomes inoperative, all M4s and M16s have an integrated back-up iron sight that provides an immediately available capability adjustable to 600 meters.

The CCO provides the Soldier armed with an M16 series rifle or M4 Carbine with an optical red dot sight. The sight enhances target acquisition speed, allowing Soldiers to engage targets up to 300 meters with both eyes open to maintain situational awareness. The sight has no magnification and can be used with all current night vision devices.

The CCO presents only a single red dot aiming point for the Soldier to consider, rather than the two points presented by iron sites, which was the standard sighting mechanism for centuries. In post combat surveys, 85 percent of Soldiers rate the CCO as an effective optic and regularly comment on the sight’s effectiveness for close quarters combat.

“The red dot system eliminates the need for a Soldier to align the front and rear sights and switch focus between the two,” said John Heinsohn, product director for sights, Product Manager Individual Weapons. “The CCO requires less training than iron sites and eliminates uncertainty and a potential point of failure. Once the system is properly zeroed, using it is as simple as putting the red dot on center mass and pulling the trigger.”

At ranges beyond 300 meters, a valuable tool in the optics arsenal is the M150 RCO. The sight is a battery-free 4x magnified optic for use on M4/M16/M249 weapon systems. The RCO provides greatly enhanced target identification over non-magnified views and is typically assigned to small unit leaders as well as squad designated marksmen. In the Marine Corps, all Infantry personnel use the RCO. The sight increases the probability of a first-round hit and can be utilized for reflexive fire in close quarter battle to long-range engagements. Enhanced capabilities provided by the RCO include range estimation, which along with the bullet drop compensated reticle, provides accurate target engagements out to 800 meters. In post combat surveys, 98 percent of Soldiers rate the RCO as an effective optic and regularly comment on the sight’s ruggedness.

Proper Employment — Proper utilization
of optics is just as vital to a Soldier’s performance on the battlefield as the four fundamentals are to firing a rifle. CCO training is incorporated into Army basic training while RCO training is provided by new equipment training (NET) teams using a train-the-trainer method.

Mounting and zeroing optics are critical first steps. Zeroing means the sight is aligned with the weapon system so that the point of aim matches the point of impact to the best extent possible. Any error in the zeroing exacerbates itself as range increases. Conditions such as temperature, altitude, and angle of fire will also affect point of impact. For example, Soldiers who zeroed their weapons at sea level would benefit from re-zeroing their weapons if they are operating at 5,000 feet.

Zeroing errors do not begin to take into consideration other factors such as human error, ammunition, or weapon inaccuracies. A Soldier must also train on correct eye relief and sight alignment to ensure proper shot placement. More often than not, an enemy will not remain fixed in place and will be on the move. Therefore, a Soldier must also know how to lead a target by adjusting for slow and fast movements. Wind will also affect the trajectory of a round and must be taken into account.

While target movement is a key factor, so is the movement of the projectile itself as it travels through space. Bullets do not travel in a straight line like a ray of light, rather they fly along an arching trajectory due to gravity, which pulls down on the projectile throughout its flight. When M4/M16 sights are zeroed, they are typically set for 25 meters and 300 meters as the projectile’s path is a match at those distances. This is especially true for iron sights and the M68 CCO. In this scenario, at 200 meters, the projectile is actually traveling higher than any straight line path. To incorporate the physics of the bullet’s flight into a Soldier’s marksmanship requires training and close attention to range estimation, especially at longer distances. At the squad level, laser range finders are issued to grenadiers carrying the M320 grenade launcher, but a properly trained Soldier can use his RCO to determine a range estimate as well.

Sensors and Lasers Extend Human Capability — “Technology accessories have greatly extended a Soldier’s capability to engage the enemy regardless of environmental conditions,” said LTC Schneider. “For years, Infantry Soldiers have used image intensification technology to see at night, then came thermal sights. Now we layer the two technologies together for unprecedented capability.”

The current image intensification platform is the Monocular Night Vision Device (MNVD) AN/PVS-14, which is issued to nearly every Soldier. The MNVD amplifies ambient light and very near infrared energy to enable night operations out to a range of 150 meters. The system is designed for use in conjunction with rifle-mounted aiming lights. The device mounts on the head or helmet and incorporates an infrared (IR) illuminator.

Moving beyond image intensification are thermal weapon sights that reveal IR signatures undetectable to the naked eye. The AN/PAS-13 Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) family enables the Soldier to detect and engage targets, day or night, in all weather and in most low visibility conditions. These devices can be mounted onto a weapon rail and operate to the maximum effective range of the weapon. The TWS family comprises three variants: light, medium, and heavy. There are typically six TWS systems issued to each light Infantry platoon.

Merging image intensification with thermal vision technology, engineers have developed the Enhanced Night Vision Goggle (ENVG) AN/PSQ-20 as a single, helmet-mounted passive device. The pairing of the technologies complement one another and balance out the limitations of each. The ENVG combines the visual detail in low light conditions that is provided by image intensification with the thermal sensor’s ability to see through a significant amount of smoke, fog, and dust, as well as a certain degree of foliage cover.

“The thermal capability makes the ENVG useful during the day as well,” said LTC Schneider. “For example, if an insurgent approaches a checkpoint with a suicide vest or a hot weapon under his garments, a Soldier looking at him through the ENVG could pick up indicators that something is ‘wrong’ with the picture, giving the Soldier a whole new level of situational awareness.”

Having been equipped with the ability to see in many scenarios, Soldiers are also provided technology to target in multiple scenarios as well with the use of laser pointers that can be set to work in both day and night conditions. The Army began pushing out “multifunctional aiming lights (MFALs)” in large numbers in 2007. The
The Next Step for Optics: Fire Control — From a systems growth perspective, sensors and lasers have significant potential. As an example of what will soon become available in the near term, the developmental XM25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System employs a target acquisition/fire control (TA/FC) that can turn an average shooter into a marksman. The TA/FC allows the individual Soldier to quickly and accurately engage targets by producing an adjusted aimpoint based on range, environmental factors, and user inputs. The TA/FC integrates thermal capability with direct-view optics, laser rangefinder, compass, fuze setter, ballistic computer, laser pointer and illuminator, and an internal display.

Looking even further out, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is leading an initiative for improved optics through its Dynamic Image Gunsight Optic (DInGO) program. The goal of the DInGO program is to develop a rifle scope that will turn every Soldier into a marksman over the full lethal range of the combat rifle, allowing accurate engagement of targets by automatically making all of the ballistic adjustments needed to hit the target. The government’s solicitation asks industry to overcome the limitations of current scopes that are optimized for a single target range and introduce a reticle error at long range limits. The new DInGO scope will allow for a wide field of view at close quarters as well as sufficient magnification to hit moving targets farther than a quarter mile away. Scope designers will also compensate for bullet drop and moderate winds.

The future of sensor technology lies also in its fusion with accessories that transmit the data back to common platforms and higher units where the information can be shared in real time with team members and commanders to improve situational awareness on the battlefield. Soon, Soldiers won’t necessarily need to look through the scope to see what the gun sees. They will be able to view it through an eyepiece hanging from their helmet. Also in the works is “Liquid Lens” technology, which takes advantage of polymer lenses to add an eight-power magnification for the CCO at the flick of a switch.

Training
Of the multiple factors relevant to Soldier effectiveness on the battlefield, Soldier marksmanship represents the greatest variable. The weapon, the ammunition, and the optic are all manufactured devices with stable attributes and performance parameters, whereas a Soldier’s ability to control those devices with precision is entirely dependent on the operator. Training is the only way to reduce the variability so that Soldier performance becomes more effective and more consistent over time. The more training, the less variability, the better the marksmanship.

Shooting a weapon accurately is difficult. It takes a lot of physical dexterity to hold a weapon still, take proper aim, and squeeze the trigger without drawing the weapon off its intended mark. Service members know firsthand how tough it is to shoot while clad in full military gear. An even smaller set of individuals, combat veterans, know that performing the same task in the face of enemy fire is extremely difficult.

Large aiming errors are expected in combat considering extreme stress, unknown target locations, short target exposures, and multiple targets. To complicate matters, just because a hit is recorded, doesn’t necessarily mean it was an incapacitating hit either.

Unfortunately, training is not a “one and done” endeavor. Marksmanship is a perishable skill. As with any motor skill, it is important to frequently exercise the muscle memory that is critical for accurate reflexive fires. Frequent live-fire training is required for developing and maintaining expertise, whether the targets are at close quarters battle (CQB) ranges or at 200 meters and beyond.

Overhauling Marksmanship Training — In March of 2010, the Army instituted new guidance for its Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) and its Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM) programs that represent a complete revision of the marksmanship program. Army Research Institute studies in both 2008 and 2010 validated the new approach that increases both the amount of ammunition fired in training as well as the variety of firing positions and battlefield scenarios faced by the Soldier.

“Essentially, the entire emphasis of training has changed,” said MAJ Aaron Crafton, the battalion S3 for the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry, 197th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, whose office is the proponent for the Army’s rifle marksmanship field manual, FM 3-22.9. “The goal of our new program is to teach Soldiers how to ‘fight with a rifle’ rather than to just ‘shoot a rifle.’”

MAJ Crafton explained that the new program integrates lessons learned from years of warfare. The Army is moving away from the foxhole firing methods of old. Training is now based upon what Soldiers are seeing in the field — Soldiers shoot from the kneeling, shoot from the standing, and shoot from barricades. Gone also is the “1-shot-1-kill” mantra of legacy training whereby Soldiers were presented with 40 rounds to strike 40 targets. In recognition of battlefield realities, the new marksmanship program requires that...
some targets receive multiple hits for a “kill,” which is why “controlled pairs” are being taught in the program. Another real-world aspect of the testing incorporates malfunction clearance, which is something that Soldiers need to be prepared for. In the old qualification procedures, “alibis” were allowed for Soldiers whose weapons experienced a misfire. Of course, the Army is still teaching center mass aiming, and the four fundamentals of shooting remain the same: steady position, correct aiming, breath control, and proper trigger squeeze.

**Training Regimen** — Training begins with an introduction to the rifle. Soldiers learn all about its components and how to disassemble and reassemble the weapon, load, unload, clean, and everything else that comes into play when being introduced to a weapon for the first time. Afterwards, Soldiers are introduced to the four fundamentals of marksmanship.

“The biggest myth is that a Soldier can add the best optic and best accessories in the world to a weapon and be a great shot, but if you don’t know the basics on how you fire your weapon, you’re never going to hit the target,” said SSG Juan Vega, a marksmanship instructor with 2-29 IN. “The four fundamentals have held true for a long time. If something is going wrong with your shooting, it’s going to be a problem with one of the fundamentals.”

The hands-on introduction is followed by training with the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000, which is a large scale simulator the size of a large room. The EST 2000 is essentially a sophisticated video game with full-scale replica weapons that give Soldiers a better understanding of the fundamentals. In use since 2006, more than 900 of the simulators are utilized by Army, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers.

The simulator saves significant time and ammunition resources and can run hundreds of scenarios, from basic range zeroing and shot grouping drills all the way to shoot/don’t shoot modules. The value of virtual marksmanship is that it allows a Soldier to conduct repetitive and reparative training leading to increased weapons proficiency, combat effectiveness, and ultimately, survivability on the battlefield.

Infantry trainees at Fort Benning also spend time on a special “location of miss and hit” (LOMAH) range for their field fire training. LOMAH is a projectile detection targetry system for small arms marksmanship training. The system detects the passage of supersonic projectiles passing through or by the target surface, presents multiple targets at the same time, and provides downrange feedback. The system tells the Soldier exactly where his rounds are going, thereby providing more information for the Soldier that will assist him in adjusting his marksmanship.

LOMAH is followed by the final BRM qualification test in positions learned so far: the prone supported, prone unsupported, and the kneeling. In all, Soldiers spend about 15 days on basic rifle marksmanship. Lasting between seven to 10 days, the ARM program held during Advanced Individual Training is shorter than BRM, but more robust in terms of rounds fired. The most significant difference with the new ARM program is the training conducted around combat field fires. In this portion, Soldiers learn to shoot in the kneeling unsupported, barricade supported, and prone. In the testing portion, numerous targets require multiple hits to qualify for a “kill.”

**Underlying Complexity is Confidence**

At the start of this exploration of Soldier battlefield effectiveness, we opened with the following framework: Soldier + Weapon + Ammo + Optic + Training = Battlefield Effectiveness.

A review of each topic area reveals significant complexity with each factor playing a major role in a Soldier’s overall performance:

1) **Weapons are the base platform for Soldier lethality.**

2) **Ammunition incapacitates when it hits its mark.**

3) **Optics, sensors and lasers are combat multipliers.**

4) **Training represents the greatest variable in the Soldier effectiveness equation.**

Considering these elements in context reveals the truly complex composition of a Soldier’s battlefield effectiveness. In light of how effective the U.S. Army Soldier is, it is evident that Army’s holistic approach to outfitting and training Soldiers produces results, though there is always room for improvement.

Doubtless, the Army will continue to pursue every advantage in its quest to make the Soldier the most effective he can be on the battlefield. This pursuit will result in the evolution of weapon systems, accessories, and tactics — anything and everything to ensure that U.S. Soldiers never find themselves in a “fair fight.” The net effect of all the Army’s efforts must be a well-equipped, well-trained Soldier who has faith in his gear, training, unit, and Army. In the end, it is always the exceptional confidence of the U.S. Soldier that carries the fight.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy Marksmanship</th>
<th>New Marksmanship</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Shoot a Rifle</em></td>
<td><em>Fight with a Rifle</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Soldiers taught to fear a rifle</em></td>
<td><em>Soldiers taught to be comfortable with a rifle</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>“Up &amp; Downrange” on ranges</em></td>
<td><em>360 degree low-ready on ranges</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>1 Shot -1 Kill as part of qualification</em></td>
<td><em>Some targets require multiple hits for a kill</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Antiquated firing positions</em></td>
<td><em>Combat-relevant firing positions</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>M68 CCO introduced in ARM 2</em></td>
<td><em>M68 CCO introduced in BRM 2</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Malfunction = Alibi</em></td>
<td><em>Malfunction clearance is a part of the qualification</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Magazine changes are an administrative function</em></td>
<td><em>Magazine changes are part of the qualification</em></td>
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| *Endstate: A Soldier who could successfully engage 23 of 40 targets.* | *Endstate: A confident Soldier who continually assesses the situation he is presented with and acts decisively to not only engage targets but keep his weapon operational.*

Figure 3 — Comparison Between Old and the New Marksmanship Training

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### Percent Increase:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRM vs. New ARM</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM)</td>
<td>8.5 percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>341 rounds fired vs. 370 rounds</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM) vs. New ARM</td>
<td>66.6 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216 rounds fired vs. 360 rounds</td>
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While the strategic and operational levels of the Mexican cartel war have gained much prominence in analytical assessments, the tactical level has received less attention. This article is an attempt at tactical assessment of the drug war. It will provide a brief sketch of evolving tactical missions in the cartel war and the challenges faced by Mexican police and military forces. Cartel tactics have undergone a disturbing evolution over the past few years. The resulting trend includes greater proficiency, lethality, and barbarism as the conflict matures.

Organizations at War

Violence in cartel operations is multifaceted and exists on a multitude of levels. Tactics employed in the conflict include armed assaults, targeted assassinations, ambushes, raids, blockades (narcobloqueos), combined arms assaults (active shooters with grenades), and the use of crude car bombs. These are frequently amplified with brutal hangings from bridges, beheadings and dismemberment, often accompanied by narcomensajes (or statements) affixed to corpses (corpse-messaging) to give strategic amplification to tactical incidents.

The result is “high-intensity” violence increasingly culminating in small-unit operations with heavy infantry weaponry. These include both carefully targeted assassination missions and indiscriminate outbreaks of violence. The low end involves drive-by shootings and individual assassinations — savage violence directed at rival gangsters, police, journalists, and, increasingly, ordinary Mexicans. Such violence has little “tactical” logic unless one wants to analyze the tactics of the Charles Manson family as well. The “medium” range of operations involves concerted turf contests or campaigns with instrumental goals. The “high” end includes mass executions, social cleansing, and complex infantry assaults on armed rivals — cartels or security forces. This article looks at the spectrum of violence to assess evolving potentials.

First, it is important to discuss something of the nature of the organizational direction and command and control of cartel units. It is common to see news reports estimating cartel numbers as if these organizations have fixed tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es) akin to a conventional armed formation. This is not necessarily true.

Cartel violence also does not involve the entire potential strength of a Mexican criminal organization — only the lowest foot soldiers and operational commanders. The primary purpose of cartels is to compete economically and politically for both illicit and licit state public goods. This differentiates them organizationally from conventional formations — which are built exclusively for supporting maximum military effectiveness in attrition and the more segmented Cold War insurgent model of fighters and human logistical “infrastructure.” Tactical operators (sicarios or hitmen) and assault teams play an important part in grinding attrition warfare but are only one segment of the criminal competition.

Enforcer organizations — such as La Linea and Los Zetas before they morphed into a full-fledged cartel — are the “poor bloody infantry” of the Mexican cartel wars. They employ a mix of both hierarchal and networked organizational forms. For example, La Linea is a hybrid network encompassing elements of the Juárez cartel, the Barrio Azteca prison/street gang, and co-opted police with links to the Zetas.

To use an admittedly imperfect historical analogy, most pre-professional armed forces were little better than mobs led by individual lords and nobles that served clear strategic missions but were difficult to control and lead in real time. There is a similarity in that cartel operational mission sets are decentralized fights over lucrative plazas (drug control routes). This, in its own way, forces a different kind of operational and tactical command and control scheme. Additionally, arrests and losses mean their organization is constantly in flux.

Ultimately, the increasing lethality of cartel warfare and the growing sophistication of typical major criminal combatants have a Darwinian effect stimulating adaptation, driving innovation and greater sophistication of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Combined Arms: From SUVs to “Narco-Tanks”

Cartel forces have two basic functions: encounter battles and carefully planned “coups de main” involving assassination and/ or raid missions. Encounter battles occur as a matter of chance, but assassinations and raids are carefully designed missions. Both, however, have some important similarities.

Weapons and terrain, in part, dictate tactical form. Until the recent trend of cartels producing what news outlets have popularly identified as “tanks” (infantry fighting vehicles would be more accurate), armored sport utility vehicles (SUVs) remained the primary cartel transport. Mexican authorities have discovered more than 100 homemade narco-tanks (narcotanques) in recent months. These rude armored infantry fighting vehicles, dubbed “Los Monstruos” (the Monsters) by the Mexican media, have armor plating, air conditioning, and gun ports. A Gulf cartel factory assembling more than 25 of these “Mad Max” or “Rhino truck” vehicles was reconfiguring tractors to include protection with one inch (2.5 cm) thick steel plates.

Although the lethality of cartel weapons has increased, there are structural limits. Cartels are unlikely to acquire most modern heavy weapons (such as artillery) and anything more than the most
Cartels have access to a wide range of infantry weapons. Pictured above are some of the weapons and drugs seized during a 44-month multi-agency investigation that targeted a Mexican drug cartel.

rudimentary armored vehicles. These crude “narcotanques” do confer a decisive tactical advantage when employed against civil police and dismounted adversaries. Even if they do incrementally develop more sophisticated armor, it would be extremely unlikely that they could in the short term master the discipline, doctrine, organization, and logistics necessary to optimally employ them.

That being said, cartels have access to a wide range of infantry weapons that go beyond the typical assemblage of basic small arms weapons often seen in typical criminal conflicts. Enforcer gangs are either known or suspected to utilize assault rifles, crew-served weapons, military explosives, grenades, .50 caliber rifles, anti-tank weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and grenade launchers, and a variety of other lethal weapons. This includes the limited use of crude car bombs.

Additionally, cartels have a makeshift command and control arrangement centered on communications ranging from handheld equipment (cell phones with instant messaging) to global positioning systems (GPS). Cartels have access to military equipment such as night-vision goggles, and the presence of military defectors gives them familiarity with basic infantry TTPs. Lastly, access to an extensive human intelligence network (halcones) as well as radio and telephone intercept means gives them a fearsome tactical advantage.

For a while, the basic element of cartel tactics centered around the usage of convoys of armored SUVs. These vehicles granted a great amount of tactical flexibility — they could easily serve as firing platforms, enable ambushes and chases, and “swarm” and overwhelm opponents without similar motorization. The latter is a rather important element of cartel tactics — it is common to see engagements in which the adversary is suddenly and quickly overwhelmed by a swarm of armored SUVs. In this way, armored SUVs are an improvised tactical solution akin to the “technicals” and other main combatants in “Toyota” wars. When combined with blockades (narcobloqueos) in urban settings, cartels can quickly assert an advantage over civil police or lightly armed adversaries.

As cartels lack heavy artillery and aircraft, victory in encounter clashes depends on “combined arms” coordination of infantry and supporting vehicles. Without vehicles, cartel gunmen would be limited to mobility of foot. While the latter is certainly important in urban warfare, the ability to marshal overwhelming force for tactical and psychological advantage is crucial.

With the introduction of the “narcotanque” or “narco-tank,” this is changing. SUVs are no longer survivable enough for encounter battles, the ferocity of which requires more fire suppression, armor, and carrying capacity. The heavily armored trucks increasingly deployed by cartels are essentially infantry fighting vehicles with firing ports and turrets that allow better utilization as firing platforms and transports for infantry dismounts.

Additionally, the armored trucks themselves might eventually, like the Soviet usage of armored vehicles in the Afghan war, serve as mobile fire support platforms that maneuver to deliver suppression in support of dismounted troops and cut off lines of retreat. The narco-trucks (aka “Rhino trucks”) are evidence of a growing arms race in order to procure heavier weapons systems to pierce the armored veil.

**Direct Action in Cartel Warfare: The Convoy Ambush**

A large portion of cartel tactics, however, are better judged not necessarily as encounter battles but “direct actions” such as raids, ambushes, and assassinations. Although not necessarily special operations in that they are basic tactical missions in both conventional and irregular warfare, they share many similarities to the “direct action” functions of special operations forces.

The powerful actors are always well-protected, and in countries where security is largely privatized, this factor is amplified. Both cartel bosses and high-ranking government officials shroud themselves in increasingly dense security enclaves that are difficult to directly attack without prohibitive expense. Hence, the main opportunities to strike are always when the target is mobile or in a position where the protective security detail is distracted or lacks tactical mobility or terrain advantage. Since men are not machines, they cannot sustain perpetual readiness. This provides the “criminal soldiers” with opportunities to leverage “relative advantage” to quickly gain superiority over a target.

As William McRaven outlined in his pioneering case studies in special warfare, special operations direct action missions are dependent on “relative advantage” — the creation of an overwhelming superiority early in the engagement that is sustained until completion. In cartel warfare, relative advantage is the product of careful intelligence preparation and heavy armament.

The process of moving from a “march” formation of a vehicle...
convoy into firing positions, especially when the attacker has the advantage, is always fraught with danger, especially when combined with improvised explosive devices. Swarming operations are also crucial, with the use of mobility to encircle, trap, and then attack targets from all sides.

As Scott Stewart and others have detailed, the size and armoring of the convoy itself is no protection from anti-vehicle weaponry. Ambush operations against army convoys are no longer a theoretical issue, as cartels are increasingly found doing so.

**Heavy Concentration and Special Operations: Tools of State Power**

The Mexican police and armed services have two main methods of countering the cartels: concentration and special operations. While both of these have had limited successes, the evolving special operations capabilities have achieved greater success. Indeed, despite the poor popular reputation of the Mexican security services, the Mexican military and, increasingly, the federal police are uniquely suited to perform these operations.

Many Latin American armed forces were shaped by the challenge of internal security, known informally as the “Internal Enemy” doctrine. Although, like in many states, Latin American states shaped armed services acquisition for prestige, power balancing, and defense needs, Cold War-era internal warfare necessitated the creation of counter-revolutionary warfare capabilities for both pitched conventional warfare and guerrilla operations.

Cartel operations are seen through the lens of this experience. “Search and destroy” operations are used to flood an area with troops on patrol in an attempt to drain an area of guerrillas. The conventional explanation for why this doesn’t work is that such a clumsy approach alienates locals, is foiled by corruption, and cannot catch nimble cartel members hiding among the people. However, this explanation is incomplete.

A far simpler explanation is the issue of power and infrastructure — familiar to many who produced RAND studies on Cold War insurgencies. Infrastructure is the source of military power for irregular movements because it generates logistics, combat support, and other functions that are the backbone of military operations. Military forces often take elaborate infrastructures for granted. For private forces or insurgents, infrastructure is often generated through improvised rather than formal means.

Cartels have built up a large infrastructure that can sustain them in both urban centers and dispersed urban environments. This infrastructure could be destroyed as the Vietnam-era destruction of the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) bloodily demonstrated, but the military strength at present is insufficient to do so. The political will to put Mexico on a war footing sufficient to mass enough power to destroy cartel infrastructure does not exist — and present military strength is sufficient to temporarily focus power on a certain region or city that cannot be politically or logistically extended to all regions or even generate a permanent presence in the region of operation.

Rather than having the opportunity and capacity of massing simultaneous power against cartels, military forces can only do so sequentially. Only the full employment of state power can either completely destroy an irregular force or induce it to the negotiating table. Military effectiveness is further degraded by corruption within the ranks, political use of military strength to take sides in cartel battles, and the lack of interagency and interregional governmental coherence that is necessary to actually exercise power.

One solution has been the employment of special operations forces for direct action missions. The Mexican Navy (and Marines) remain one of the most politically reliable forces capable of serving as an effective instrument of the state. They have increasingly proven to be an effective tool for generating (or exploiting) intelligence to target both kingpins and middle managers. Network targeting of cartel infrastructure, however, is another kind of sequential campaign. Expansion of such counternetwar initiatives would bear fruit and should be considered a priority.

**Cross-Border Tactics: Contrasts**

Cartels have yet to operate with the murderous impunity they display in Mexico when they operate in the United States. U.S. police and law enforcement are respected members of the community with greater firepower, organization, and doctrine than most domestic gangsters (sicarios). Nevertheless, cartel tactical actions have occurred across the U.S.

One prominent example of a cartel tactical mission was the 2008 Phoenix raid, now semi-legendary among cartel watchers. Gunmen, dressed in police tactical uniforms and carrying AR-15 long guns, carried out what first appeared to be a typical “breach and clear” tactical entry in a private home. In reality, the raid was a targeted killing directed against a local man. The gunmen attempted to ambush responding police tactical units and were caught in the attempt.

The attack illustrated some dynamics of stateside cartel tactics. It is discrete, highly professionalized, and largely takes place exclusively within the private world of drugs, thugs, and guns. However, should police intrude upon that world or prove an obstacle to cartel missions, enforcers or surrogates will use force. Rarely does this mean anything more than opportunistic fights with police officers. To some extent, this might change with time. Far more common is local opportunistic violence by low-level recruited hands that carry out cartel business.

It is unclear whether or not this reflects a conscious policy or simple convenience. The structure of illicit business in the United States is demand-size: the large money to be made is in the selling of products. In Mexico, control of drug trafficking routes generates power and thus is an object of contestation.

**Future Tactical Trends**

Cartel tactics are becoming more professional and proficient. Cartel gunmen increasingly display the characteristics of small
mercenary armies. Uniforms and standardized gear are now commonplace, and mechanisms — including training camps in Mexico and Guatemala — have been put in place to impart the tactical skills of the original Zetas (military defectors) to new recruits in Mexico and beyond.

As the cartel war matures, cartels and gangs are learning to employ new weapons in pursuit of profit, plunder, and power. The less proficient gangsters die; the proficient innovate. Raids, ambushes, and direct assaults are being waged with increased intensity in both rural and urban battle space. The use of armored maneuver vehicles (essentially infantry fighting vehicles) is clear evidence of the proliferation and pursuit of incrementally more sophisticated arms. When combined with experience, increased barbarism and intense profit potential, the cartels and affiliated gangs can be expected to refine their tactics and embrace increasingly combat effective mechanisms to sustain their quest for narcopower.

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"A squad is an organizational idea jointly held by its members. It does not exist physically — you can’t see a squad — you can only see the individuals who man it.”

— COL William E. DePuy
Army Magazine, March 1958

Framing the Environment

The current and future operational environment in which the Army will fight continues to deal with an asymmetric and ambiguous battlefield against an intelligent and adaptive enemy. We face what GEN Martin Dempsey has described as “…hybrid threats of regular, irregular, terrorist and criminal groups with capabilities that rival those of nation states; an exponential pace of technological change; and greater complexity.” Leaders at all levels must be prepared to face those enemies across the spectrum of operations by all lethal and non-lethal means, and GEN Dempsey recognizes that: “The development of adaptive leaders who are comfortable operating in ambiguity and complexity will increasingly be our competitive advantage against future threats to our nation.”

Overmatch is essential to achieving success on the battlefield. The mission of the Infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. Overmatch is the ability to successfully execute critical tasks against projected threat forces across the operational spectrum, concluding with decisive operations that defeat the adversary and achieve the operational objective while retaining our own capability to plan, execute, and support further missions. As long we have overmatch — we win. We enjoy overmatch in the air, sea, and ground at higher echelons.

A platoon sergeant with D Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, briefs his squad leaders on upcoming patrols in Andar District, Afghanistan.

Photo by SSG Andrew Guffey
GEN Dempsey has noted that: “We don’t want to send a Soldier into harm’s way who doesn’t overmatch his potential enemies. It’s at the squad level where it becomes too much of a fair fight.” It is at this small unit level, on the ground, where it becomes too fair a fight. The enemy has adapted his methods in an effort to offset this overmatch. Those who wish to do us harm avoid our strengths and look to bleed us by a thousand cuts at the small unit level. We don’t have a crystal ball to determine the future, but we can be certain that the future will remain one full of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. There will be those who look to attack our strengths, but the cost of this may be more than they are willing to accept. We can be certain, however, that our enemies will continue to attempt to exploit our weaknesses.

Taking a bottom-up approach, we must thoroughly assess our gaps and weaknesses at the squad level and then fix them. We must work to achieve and sustain overmatch at the tip of the spear — where we need it the most. We must analyze gaps across the formation, both materiel requirements and the human dimension, and then close them across the entire spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). We can gain overmatch at the squad level from an effective combination of some new capabilities (network, load, mobility, power) and most importantly from a thorough review of small unit leader development, training, education, and empowerment. We will achieve overmatch by looking at the measures of effectiveness for the squad formation. Those areas that offer the greatest impact on the formation will become the highest priorities for corrective action.

The result will be overmatch at the lowest level — where it matters the most. This will only be effective if we train our small unit leaders to take advantage of the overmatch and empower them to make decisions in an environment of trust through mission command. Given the incredible performance of our junior leaders over the past 10 years of conflict, how could we not provide overmatch and enable our squads to be dominant on the battlefield?

**Human Dimension**

The human dimension is one of our highest priorities because we know that there are significant training and leader development challenges ahead of us. Our small unit leaders must become more familiar with the full range of resources that deployed units will have available to them. Our squad leaders must have a greater understanding of supporting weapon system capabilities, vulnerabilities, and employment considerations. They will have to make the most efficient and effective usage of training time and facilities, and they must become familiar with cognitive, physical, social-cultural, and moral-ethical 21st century Soldier competencies.

**A Case for Change**

At the forefront of our nation’s forces is the Infantry squad. The basics of shoot, move, and communicate continue to provide the necessary foundation of the squad, but due to the contemporary operating environment we must move away from the rote, repetitive approach to settling an engagement and focus on the unit’s ability to integrate all capabilities within the squad’s fight, again ensuring overmatch. To ensure this happens prior to deployment, we must institute a method to develop cognitive skills, values, critical thinking, and decision-making skills across all levels of command, including the squad. These additional leader skills will prepare leaders at all levels to support the squad to enable it operate in any environment across the full spectrum of operations. The squad is the cornerstone of the combat formation and must rely upon the internal knowledge, skills, and attributes (KSAs) of its leaders and Soldiers in order for it to remain dominant on the battlefield. At leadership levels above the squad, leaders must have the right means to understand the situation, evaluate quickly, and accurately introduce those enablers needed to provide that overmatch capability needed in the squad’s fight. Leader development is a critical component in developing cognitive skills and decision-making ability in the identification of threats, collecting intelligence, evidence collection through effective sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and the psychological effects of trust, cohesion, teamwork, and empowerment under mission command.

As the environment in which we as a nation and Army operate, adapt, and evolve, so too must our response as a profession continue to include changes in how we develop leaders. A culture of adaptation and chaos management must emerge as we shift the paradigm to a model of decentralization and empowerment for Soldier and leader development across our force. Not since Vietnam has our Army had such a rich, operationally experienced force from which to draw knowledge and grow and adapt leadership development.

The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), partnering the Armor and Infantry Schools, is developing a series of three articles which will appear in our branch journals. We are doing this in order to open a dialogue to promote change which will enhance small unit leader development. This article addresses the challenges we face in leader selection and developmental changes for team leader and squad leaders, agile and adaptive leader training, and training management for the small unit leader. The next two articles will address developing mission command and trust through immersive training, team building, and cognitive skills development through the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness-Performance and Resilience Enhancement Program (CSF-PREP). These subsequent articles will detail examples from the experimental force and operational force which have worked in improving leader development in both the institutional and operational force environments. As always, feedback from the force will create a dialogue for future changes and ensuring the operational force is receiving a quality product from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) force and that we partner as we re-energize home station training and leader development to complement the professional military education (PME) the Soldier receives. We share a common goal through home station training, structured self-development (SSD), and PME to develop the best leaders possible for the growing and intense demands of future conflicts.
Leader Selection and Developmental Changes for the Team Leader and Squad Leader — NCO Education System (NCOES) Revision

Over the last 10 years we have seen reductions in the time allocated to training and leader development, yet the requirements and responsibilities for our NCOs have increased. Pre-9/11, the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)/Warrior Leader Course (WLC) was 30 days in length; post-9/11, the course was reduced to 17 days. Pre-9/11, the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC)/Advanced Leader Course (ALC) was eight weeks in length, and post-9/11 the course was reduced to five weeks. Pre-9/11, the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC)/Senior Leader Course (SLC) was 11 weeks in length, and post-9/11 it was reduced to seven weeks. The changes in the course length reflect the operational needs and tempo, especially during the surges of Iraq and Afghanistan. Although these changes don’t necessarily represent a decline in quality, it is time for the Army to take a look at the courses’ structures.

As dwell time increases across the force, we have a unique opportunity to re-look the courses and professional development holistically in order to buy back what we have sacrificed over the last 10 years. It also allows the Army to review the KSAs required at all levels of leadership and identify where they are taught and reducing redundancies across the institutional, operational, and structured self-development domains. Operational requirements to train leaders in a timely manner for the operational force also created a shift in the domains to put the onus on the institutional Army for leader development. Now is the opportune time to equally weight all three domains and capitalize on technological advances and allow for the SSD and operational development to increase in the development of our Army’s junior leaders.
Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, conduct a patrol through an open poppy field during Operation Mountain Cougar in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, on 21 April 2011.

Photo by PFC Justin A. Young
We will need relevant, carefully structured programs of instruction (POIs) to make this model work. This must be a collaborative effort between the Department of the Army (DA), TRADOC, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). These POIs will operate as the impetus to formalize the training across the force and to help operational units focus on leader development as opposed to only course development. The POIs provided will allow the operational units to provide a structure to their leader courses and NCO development programs. The POIs will also include a model that provides the operational Army with the selection of building block events that lead to capstone training, and when a squad leader or platoon sergeant elects to attend the training, the rest — resources, terrain needed, training ammunition, and lesson plans — are available to support him. The goal is to provide the requisite training and development at the appropriate time during the career of the NCOs to better enable them to meet the demands of the current and future operating environments and maximize 21st century training capabilities. For example, it would include training on the 360-degree assessment; instruction on how to teach, coach, and mentor; focus on how to properly counsel and build teams; prepare leaders to lead from the front; and ensure that leaders have the requisite technical and tactical skills to lead. Junior leaders will learn the most in their units from their leadership, as they follow the “two-down” model with first sergeants developing squad leaders and platoon sergeants developing team leaders. This will also allow for unit leaders to adjust POIs and implement unit-specific training requirements, post requirements, and specialty skills required in light, airborne, Stryker, and mechanized units. The institutional Army will assist by providing tools — such as apps, bite-size digital leader training, and immersive squad trainers — and creating assessments to measure programs and implement feedback as those courses develop.

Additionally, an individual training avatar will be developed during initial military training (IMT), possibly earlier during the accessions process, to help Soldiers better recognize their personal strengths and weaknesses and then provide them with instructional and training tools that will help facilitate self-improvement. It will also serve as the critical link between virtual and live. As the Soldier performs, the avatar will follow in simulations. The simulations/virtual link will allow for more repetitions and hence a greater learning and trust-building environment for the Soldier and leader. It will allow unit leaders to access their digital leader books upon arrival to the unit. The avatar will be accessible at NCOES as well, allowing for an immersive experience focusing on leadership fundamentals at the team through company levels. The avatar will provide the digital link to the Digital Training Management System (DTMS), allowing that Soldier to carry successfully completed development in the SSD and operational domains to new units and NCOES.

**Agile and Adaptive Leader Training — Outcomes-Based Training**

In training for full spectrum operations (FSO) with the intent of developing the moral-ethical, cognitive and physical components of the human dimension, leaders may find it helpful to consider developing values-based standards derived from concepts such as the Army Learning Concept, Warrior Ethos, and Army Values. These concepts explicitly state what is important to our Army; however, the desired attributes and competencies are less easily measured than specific tasks or actions. Consequently, training and education often focus on menus of specific individual and collective tasks that somehow will develop the desired attributes. This task-focused approach to training may not be the best solution in developing attributes such as adaptability, confidence, initiative, judgment, or accountability.

While task accomplishment is important and Army standards must be met, an outcomes-focused approach to training may provide commanders with a better solution for developing the attributes associated with the 21st century Soldier competencies, Warrior Ethos, and Army Values. One of the eight leader development imperatives stated in the Army Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army is to “Prepare leaders for hybrid threats and full spectrum operations through outcomes-based training and education.” With an outcomes focus, leaders have the flexibility to adapt training to meet the developmental needs of subordinate leaders and Soldiers. FM 7-0 tells us that “using the principle of ‘train as you will fight,’ commanders...
employ mission command in training as well as actual operations. They tell subordinates their intent, and the subordinates determine how to achieve that intent.” When the commander includes developmental outcomes within his intent, Soldier development becomes a dynamic and integral aspect of training. In the context of training, commanders should consider that the outcome includes not only the training objective — which describes the intended outcome (task, condition, standard) — but the total impact of the training on the Soldier or unit, whether intended or unintended.

With respect to the strategic squad, the squad leader would necessarily be empowered to execute the commander’s intent. He would likely be responsible and accountable for developing and conducting training to achieve his commander’s intent; however, he would need resources, especially time, in order to accomplish his task. To develop the necessary attributes such as initiative, discipline, accountability, adaptability, etc. associated with decentralized operations, the training should demand and develop those very same attributes. Mission command requires trust and we trust the squad leader in combat; why can’t we trust him to train his squad? The NCOs at the squad level, both squad and team leaders, are relying on past experience and baptism by those very same attributes. Mission command requires trust and we trust the squad leader in combat; why can’t we trust him to train his squad? The NCOs at the squad level, both squad and team leaders, are relying on past experience and baptism by fire in combat to develop and refine cognitive skills. It is time that we elevate their training to the level required for a truly decisive force.

Training Management for the Small Unit Leader

Leader development is now taking on a lifelong learning concept with structured self-development and PME combined to continually develop the leader at the squad level. Home station unit commanders also share in that responsibility to maximize assets to narrow training and education scope during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle to focus on specific regions/areas of responsibility, languages, cultures, etc. Commanders can also leverage technological assets so that training support packages and hip-pocket training can be taken to the next level by using interactive modules, which can increase cognitive skills through repetition during tactical decision exercises at the squad, platoon, and company levels.

Additionally, the squad leader must have the cognitive skills to assist his commander in developing lethal and non-lethal targets, answering the commander’s priority information requirements, collecting those requirements through reconnaissance. Training needs to be added for personality targeting, tactical questioning, negotiation techniques, SSE, and both non-lethal and lethal targeting techniques. An example of a resource currently available is Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT). In the U.S. Marine Corps, ASAT is known as Combat Hunter. The training stresses the value of combat observation techniques, combat tracking, as well as human profiling and behavior pattern analysis techniques. The goal of the course is HOW to train Soldiers to be true sensors, and subsequently to apply predictive analysis to all situations.

Once the squad leader has mastered these skills, he is ready to be an active participant in collaborative training management of his squad nested with the platoon training goals and company and battalion FSO mission essential task list (METL). The individual and collective task training management is essential in not only developing cognitive fusion and teamwork across the squad, but it will also inherently build trust, teamwork, cohesion, and empowerment to psychologically prepare the squad for the rigors of combat in any environment against any enemy.

Conclusion

In almost all of our Army’s past conflicts, the squad has always operated as part of a larger force: platoons and companies in Vietnam, battalions and regiments in Korea, and in division level and larger attacks during World War II. But today, and for the foreseeable future, the operating environment has changed. The squad continues to operate as part of a larger force; however, the environment has demanded that these forces assume risk and spread out across the battlefield, which in some cases prevents quick reaction, mutually supporting efforts, and clear knowledge of where all forces are at in times of crisis. This has proven to be even more difficult when these forces are operating along rugged terrain in a dismounted role — where we have the least connectivity to our supporting assets and situational awareness and understanding.

In accordance with Army Learning Concept 2015, it is time to take a serious look across our leadership development courses for junior leaders and determine what material is outdated and where the training focus needs to be for the future fight and adapt new, emerging technologies through virtual, constructive, and gaming to enhance team and squad leader development prior to moving to live training in order to build trust and thus enhance mission command across the force. Empowerment across the force will allow timely feedback, tapping into our most valuable resource — combat tested and proven junior leaders. By drawing upon their skills and experience, we can adapt the courses to their needs, enhance their strengths, and structure the courses to reach the current knowledge gaps in training management and home station unit training.

In this article we have laid the groundwork and made our case for change, addressing the challenges we face in leader selection and developmental changes for team leader and squad leaders; agile and adaptive leader training; and training management for the small unit leader. Subsequent articles will address developing mission command and trust through immersive training, team building, and cognitive skills development through CSF-PREP. We look to detail examples from the experimental force and operational force which have worked in improving leader development in both the institutional and operational force. Feedback from the operational force will facilitate both a bottom-up and collaborative effort, driving timely changes in our courses and cross-pollinate effective practices across curious units as we continue to better ourselves as an Army.

One force, one fight!

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As an Illinois National Guardsman, my experience in the profession of arms has been a life-changing adventure — sometimes hazardous and uncertain, but always exciting and personally fulfilling. I enlisted in 1996 and was commissioned in 2002. I have served two combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and was mobilized for one state active-duty humanitarian mission. My experience in war zones and homeland defense has taught me that success is not measured in body counts but rather by how well we balanced the aspects of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multicultural (JIIM) environments. A key component in finding this critical balance — and achieving success — lies in building trust not only with the host nation that we assist but within the coalition forces as well. It is within this framework of balance and trust that I will describe my involvement in Afghanistan with Polish Task Force White Eagle from November 2009 to May 2010.

The Big Picture

In late October 2009, I was assigned to the Illinois National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ-IL). I deployed with the fourth rotation of the Bilateral Embedded Support Team (BEST-A4) as a part of the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan one month later. The 18-member team was comprised of 10 officers and eight NCOs with various military backgrounds and skills. Our mission was to stand side-by-side with Polish Task Force White Eagle (TF-WE) at the brigade (BDE), battalion (BN), and company (CO) levels to effectively coordinate, mentor, and advise the Polish staff on U.S. Army capabilities and doctrine. This included everything from logistical support, to tactical planning, to participating in combat missions. For this rotation, TF-WE was comprised of the 21st Mountain Brigade (Podhale Rifles), commanded by BG Janusz Bronowicz. TF-WE’s higher command, Regional Command-East (Combined Joint Task Force [CJTF]-82), was commanded by MG Curtis Scaparrotti (82nd Airborne Division commanding general). BEST-A4 was commanded by COL Paul Fanning from Illinois Army National Guard (ILARNG).

A year prior to our arrival, the Polish Land Forces (PLF) assumed responsibility for the security of Ghazni Province in Afghanistan. I deployed with the sixth rotation of Polish troops to Afghanistan. The BDE totaled approximately 2,000 troops, which included two Infantry battalions, a brigade-level headquarters, and support units. Prior to October 2008, Polish involvement was restricted to operations around the village of Sharana in Paktika Province, east of Ghazni — and limited to a battalion-sized force.

The Illinois National Guard’s involvement in the NATO/ISAF mission was based on its State Partnership Program (SPP) and the relationship we shared with Poland. Under the Illinois SPP program, we were placed throughout the Polish brigade at various echelons based on our individual talents and strengths. One important focus of this program is to emphasize the importance and trust the U.S. forces place on the NCO Corps, so it was important for the BEST-A4 commander to balance our team between officers and enlisted. This allowed the BEST-A4 commander to place senior NCOs in key leadership positions, showcasing the strengths and necessity of the rank they held.
At the brigade level, COL Fanning was the senior American officer on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ghazni and BG Bronowicz’s lead advisor and facilitator of American capabilities within the province. The BEST-A4 commander was also the American link to the NATO/ISAF coalition higher headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force 82. The S3 and S3-Air worked side-by-side with the Polish S3 and his staff to plan and track operations. BEST-A4 provided the Polish BDE operations cell with an operations sergeant major, three battle captains, and an intelligence officer — all Illinois Guardsmen. This group worked in the BDE tactical operations center (TOC) directly with their Polish counterparts tracking and reporting operations in real time. Logistical and communications support for the BDE was handled by the support cell — we provided an S4, two NCOs, and an S6 to assist that cell.

The BDE had two battalions, referred to as battle groups (BGs), located in different locations. BG Alpha was collocated with the BDE at FOB Ghazni. BG Bravo was located in the southern district of Gelan at FOB Warrior. One BEST-A4 officer and two NCOs were assigned to each BG.

My BG’s area of responsibility (AOR) was the northern portion of the province and consisted of approximately 5,000 square miles, 11 districts, and 800,000 people from multiple ethnic groups. Highway 1 passes through the AOR from Ghazni through Gelan districts. The primary mission of TF-WE was to maintain freedom of movement along this highway to ensure it remained trafficable for both coalition forces and the Afghan populace.

My Responsibilities

I was assigned to BG Alpha to serve as the personal advisor to the Polish BG commander and his staff on U.S. capabilities and doctrine, and to act as battle captain within the BG TOC. I was responsible for the coordination and planning assistance between the BG and the various multi-national forces located in northern Ghazni. My role was to facilitate, coordinate, and assist in acquiring U.S. resources in support of TF-WE’s mission. The available resources were diverse: Texas agribusiness development team (ADT), Navy provincial reconstruction team (PRT), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team, route clearance package (RCP), Special Forces, aviation assets, and medical assets to name a few. My two NCOs were located at FOB Four Corners in Andar District and provided the Polish company located there with logistical and tactical support. I was also used in other ways across the BDE. On multiple occasions, I was sent on missions with BG Bravo to assist with command and control of U.S. air assets. I served as an American point of contact for the battlespace handovers (BHO) between U.S. Special Forces operations and the Polish battlespace owner (BSO). I was also involved in the planning and coordination of operations between Polish operational mentorship and liaison teams (OMLTs), U.S. assets, and the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

In a joint environment, various complicating rules and restrictions were placed on both U.S. and Polish personnel regarding contracts and funding as the monies involved came from multiple agencies, depending on the intended purpose and use of the funds. One of the many tasks for BEST-A4 was to assist the Polish support cell in the process of procuring needed support from higher levels. All construction — current and future — FOB expansions, troop increases, and everyday supply needs in the province — both American and Polish — were handled by the support cell. It was a major undertaking. While I was not involved directly with the major supply chain, I did have a role ensuring FOB Four Corners’ supply issues were dealt with accordingly. Civilian contractor maintenance support, food and water requests, and building material requests were channeled through the contracting officer’s representative (COR) on the FOB. One of my NCOs was assigned this additional duty. His role was an essential component of maintaining the operational status and readiness of the FOB.

Building Trust

When I deployed, I was unsure what my role was going to be and what to expect when I arrived. I had no prior knowledge of the SPP or the Illinois-Poland relationship in Afghanistan. We arrived in Afghanistan with no knowledge of the people with whom we were to serve. This mission would take me out of my comfort zone, challenge my perceptions of the Polish forces, and teach me many lessons about teamwork, trust, leadership, and relationship building.

I would describe our BEST-A4 mission as 90 percent relationship building and 10 percent tactical knowledge. As NATO/ISAF Soldiers and coalition partners, we had no direct authority over the Polish — or even U.S. forces on the FOB for that matter. Building trust was our weapon of choice. Unfortunately, this was sometimes hindered by external forces — and sometimes those external forces were our own internal prejudice. On several occasions, I witnessed what I describe as the “ugly American syndrome.” I saw this as a tendency for American forces outside of foreign commands, with little to no direct experience with them, to disregard or belittle the efforts of the other coalition partners. I have been guilty of this prejudice in the past, but my work with the Polish while in Afghanistan taught me to be less judgmental, more tolerant of cultural differences, and certainly more aware and sensitive to the complexities of operating in a multinational environment.

When talking to my American peers while deployed in Afghanistan and later back in the States, the perception of the Polish force was less than stellar. This was not my experience. I participated in multiple combat missions with the Polish — never once did I have a reason to question their desire, willingness, or ability to fight the fight. In fact I would — and I did — trust them with my life. One mission stands in testimony to the many I witnessed when the Polish soldiers displayed their competence.

On 21 December 2009 — two months into my tour — I was participating in Operation Sharp Talon and traveling with elements of BG Bravo, conducting presence patrols in Gelan District. I was assigned to assist the Polish joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) with fixed wing close air support (CAS) and rotary wing close combat attack (CCA) command and control. While conducting patrols on the south side of Latif village, a Polish Rosomak (an eight-wheeled, armored infantry fighting vehicle) struck an improvised explosive device (IED). I was traveling behind the Rosomak in a mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle,
and the concussion rocked my vehicle back and forth.

My vehicle moved away from the immediate danger zone, allowing the Polish soldiers on board to dismount and establish ground security. The JTAC and I immediately contacted the two Apache attack helicopters on station to provide overwatch on our position and scan for possible insurgent activity or mortar firing positions — a common insurgent technique. One of the soldiers transmitted a 9-line air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) request to pickup the vehicle’s driver who had been seriously injured. The Polish ground commander radioed FOB Warrior, and the ground quick reaction force (QRF) was dispatched to assist us in recovering the disabled vehicle and to provide additional security.

Two hours into the recovery operation, we received mortar fire. The rounds landed 100 meters from my location. The CCA was off station at that time; however, we were supported by Air Force CAS. The JTAC and I once again contacted the fighter pilot to provide overwatch and scan for the point of origin. No other rounds were fired at our position. We successfully recovered the damaged Rosomak and moved back to FOB Warrior without further incident.

The Polish ground commander had total situational awareness and was in constant contact with base throughout the entire operation. The JTAC performed his duties flawlessly, ensuring we received air coverage when needed. The Polish QRF and MEDEVAC both responded quickly. The dismounted Polish infantrymen were always in a defensive position, providing security. I was the only American embedded with the Polish on this mission. At no point did I feel my life was in any more danger being with the Polish forces than had I been with American forces.

I witnessed the Poles in action flawlessly, ensuring translation from both sides. His command style was “old-school Soviet” — direct and authoritative in nature. He was a loud and boisterous man, and it was a challenge to perform my role and inject myself into his command structure without feeling underappreciated or even ignored.

Rank in the Polish force is very important and strictly followed. It was rare for me to see Polish subordinates interject opinions or offer dissenting points of view to superiors. This is in contrast to the U.S. military philosophy where opinions are welcomed and encouraged. Our command philosophy requires a free flow of ideas from our subordinates, and doctrine dictates commanders at all echelons foster an environment that allows juniors leaders to take initiative on observed opportunities.

As I was a captain and he was a lieutenant colonel, I always got the feeling my input was not always welcome because of the disparity in rank.

Engaging the BG Alpha staff, on the other hand, was a completely different experience. They trusted me and my abilities. For whatever reason, the communication barriers that were evident between me and the BG commander did not exist between me and his staff. The TOC was staffed with 15 Polish officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers. I dealt directly with the chief of staff (a major), the battle captains (captains and warrant officers), and the various other staff elements within the TOC. Working with these individuals on a daily basis, I was able to build relationships with them that enhanced our productivity and effectiveness.

It was easier to make friendships in this working environment. In the lulls between operations, we discussed our lives at home. We talked about politics, our families, sports, and hobbies. I formed real friendships with these men. The general feeling amongst the BG staff was that we were peers. Because of these personal and professional bonds, I know that the level of communication and sharing of information developed between us was key to our overall effectiveness.

The ability of the BG to communicate effectively under fire was tested many times, no more so than during a high-risk mission to retrieve a disabled vehicle from an outlying FOB. The convoy’s route was through an area known to have multiple IEDs and insurgents — a very dangerous route. One of the assets available to the mission was an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capable of broadcasting live, full-motion video back to the command post. One of my responsibilities was to assist with the employment of this asset. While I did not have direct physical control of the UAV, I was the direct line of communication to its operators via Internet relay chat (IRC). During the mission, the TOC had a live video feed of the UAV, communication to the UAV operator via me, and communication with the Polish ground commander via their communication systems.

During the 22-hour mission, the convoy struck several IEDs resulting in some injuries before it finally reached its destination. Because of the level of cooperation and trust developed between me and the staff, information flowed freely and efficiently from the unit on the ground, to the TOC, to the UAV operators, creating synergy within the mission. Because of this synergy, we were able to provide the Polish ground force commander with a high level of situational awareness otherwise unavailable, allowing him to

![A Polish helicopter completes a medical evacuation during Operation Sharp Talon in the Gelan District of Afghanistan on 21 December 2009.](image-url)

**Overcoming Differences**

In the beginning, I found it difficult to engage with my Polish counterpart at the BG level. I now believe the problem was due to a combination of personality differences, language and cultural barriers, rank structure, and the uncertainty of how to use each other. The language barrier was very hard to overcome. His English was broken, and my Polish was limited to greetings and salutations. Sometimes meaning and intent were simply lost in translation from both sides. His command style was “old-school Soviet” — direct and authoritative in nature. He was a loud and boisterous man, and it was a challenge to perform my role and inject myself into his command structure without feeling underappreciated or even ignored.

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During the 22-hour mission, the convoy struck several IEDs resulting in some injuries before it finally reached its destination. Because of the level of cooperation and trust developed between me and the staff, information flowed freely and efficiently from the unit on the ground, to the TOC, to the UAV operators, creating synergy within the mission. Because of this synergy, we were able to provide the Polish ground force commander with a high level of situational awareness otherwise unavailable, allowing him to
conduct recovery operations and ultimately reach his destination.

On reflection, this was my first experience functioning as a liaison to a foreign military, and as such I was very unsure of my role and how I was to interface with the BG commander. Engaging him proved difficult — until a confrontation actually brought us together. It was four months into the deployment before I was able to effectively connect with him and directly assert myself and offer assistance.

The turning point came in March of 2010 after Operation Edelweiss. On 3 March, a large cordon and search operation was conducted near FOB Four Corners in an area of Andar District known to sympathize with the insurgency. The operation was conducted by the Polish company located on the FOB along with the BEST-A4 NCOs and other U.S. units. A shura (a meeting with the village elders) was planned after the operation took place. The tactical portion of the operation went well. However, during the shura, miscommunication and a lack of trust between BEST-A4 NCOs and the Polish company commander resulted in an escalation of tensions between them. Specifically, the commander refused to join the shura. Knowing this was bad protocol and potentially insulting to the local villagers, my NCOs took exception to this tactic and voiced their concern at the time — but their input was not well received by the commander.

Because of the importance of this mission, the TF-WE commander requested an after action review (AAR) to be submitted to BDE at the conclusion of the operation. My two NCOs submitted to me some rather pointed comments about the mission that were directed specifically towards the Polish company commander. (The NCOs had previous run-ins with the company commander. In fact, over the course of the deployment, they became a sounding board for the Polish soldiers at Four Corners who would often air grievances and a general dislike for their leader.)

In support of my NCOs and having had made the same observations myself on earlier missions, I backed their critical comments and sent them forward. The AAR was conducted at the BDE level involving the TF-WE general, the BG commanders and staff, and members from BEST-A4. Needless to say, when the comments were made public, the BG Alpha commander — my direct counterpart — was less than enthused. To the credit of the TF-WE commander, instead of escalating the issue and possibly further complicating the situation, he stressed the need for open dialogue, trust, and cooperation between the BG Alpha commander and me.

I didn’t make the decision lightly to publicly criticize the company commander and, indirectly, my own BG Alpha commander. In fact, I had sought guidance and consulted my own chain of command before moving forward with my decision. The initial fallout seemed scandalous in the eyes of the Polish BG and company commanders; however, as a result of the AAR, the BG Alpha commander and I developed a more forthcoming rapport for the remainder of the deployment. This was proven when he invited me to participate in weekly staff meetings — the first time I had been asked to be involved.

In hindsight, a better course of action might have been to address the matter with him before submitting the comments. This might have set the ground work for an even stronger relationship between us, but as it was, the AAR was the stepping stone to our finally being able to engage in open and free dialogue.

**Polish Tragedy**

On 10 April 2010, Poland suffered a great tragedy. Polish Air Force flight Tu-154 crashed near the Russian city of Smolensk while en route to the 70th anniversary memorial of the Katyn massacre. The accident killed all 96 passengers on the flight. The deceased included Polish President Lech Kaczynski and his wife. Also killed in the crash were the chief of the Polish General Staff, senior Polish military officers (including Polish officers directly involved in the SPP and BEST program), Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister, President of the National Bank of Poland, members of the Polish parliament, Polish clergy, other Polish government officials, and relatives of victims of the massacre. This event had a profound effect, not just on the nation of Poland, but the Polish and U.S. military serving in Ghazni as well.

From the moment the tragedy occurred, serious questions arose regarding how Poland’s role in Afghanistan would be affected. The president and other military officials were instrumental in supporting Poland’s involvement in the war. Poland’s opposition party, however, was not. The opposition would now have a controlling interest in foreign policy. Speculation began immediately about whether or not Poland’s military involvement in Afghanistan would come to an abrupt end. Not only were the Polish soldiers in Ghazni deeply mourning the loss of their president and chief of staff, but they were faced with the uncertainty of their future involvement in the war effort. It was a very dark day for the Polish people, and all we could do from our perspective was console our
been in a difficult situation. Ghazni Province was the only aspect of Operation Enduring Freedom that Warsaw was responsible for — and all eyes in Poland were watching the actions of TF-WE. This created a precarious environment for the Polish ground commanders in Ghazni to operate in because every move was scrutinized by their homeland — the Polish media, political and military officials, and fellow countrymen.

In my opinion, in many ways, this scrutiny at home limited the amount of risk they were willing to take in Ghazni. I believe that fear of reprisals from the leadership in Warsaw was a complicating factor in many of the decisions the TF-WE commander made. An incident that occurred at FOB Four Corners is one such example. One night in late February, the Polish company reported to the BG headquarters on FOB Ghazni that it was observing what appeared to be two suspected insurgents emplacing an IED near a village within visual range of the FOB, in a location known to have IEDs. The Polish company commander deployed two snipers, established positive identification, and requested permission to engage from the BG.

The request was escalated to the Polish BDE level and denied. The reason given was the FOB was not in immediate danger from the emplacing team. As opposed to engaging the targets, BDE decided to send a U.S. EOD team at first light to neutralize and destroy the IED. However, the incident was not reported accurately, and EOD was not notified until well into the next day. The IED site was eventually exploited and rendered safe but much later than it could have been.

While I do not know the exact reason why the Polish general denied the request, I do know U.S. forces would not have needed that level of approval. The influence of the Polish higher command made for a more risk-adverse climate on the ground than needed, potentially putting coalition lives at risk. I never got the feeling that this attitude was inherent to the Polish soldiers but rather a product of political and social pressures placed on the ground force commanders. Many of the challenges BEST-A4 encountered were of this nature, and it was our task to minimize these occurrences. Yet, despite our best efforts, many on the outside looking in only saw the end result of these situations and not the root cause, thus inaccurately surmising the Polish were unwilling to fight.

**Political Pressure**

Even before the tragedy, the Polish Land Force (PLF) had been in a difficult situation. Ghazni Province was the only aspect of Operation Enduring Freedom that Warsaw was responsible for — and all eyes in Poland were watching the actions of TF-WE. This created a precarious environment for the Polish ground commanders in Ghazni to operate in because every move was scrutinized by their homeland — the Polish media, political and military officials, and fellow countrymen.

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**Battlespace Conflict**

Balancing the interests of both the CJTF-82 commander and Polish battlespace owner in this environment was a challenge as those interests sometimes conflicted. This balance, and BEST-A4’s effectiveness and ability to influence our Polish partners, was put to test one day in April 2010.

Our deployment was coming to an end, and BEST-A4 was seven days from leaving Ghazni. Our team was in the process of conducting relief-in-place (RIP) operations with the incoming team, BEST-A5. Meanwhile, TF-WE had already sent a large bulk of soldiers back to Poland, receiving replacements as they rotated out. As part of the RIP process, the outgoing unit would train the new unit over a two-week period and share the various lessons learned in preparation for the transfer of authority (Phase I: we teach them what we know; Phase II: they take the seat and run the operations with us watching.) The Polish used a similar process. This was a very chaotic period of time for everyone as the amount of personnel essentially doubled. Overall, operations turned inward, focusing on knowledge sharing and teaching the specific tasks and processes of each staff element as opposed to continuing offensive goals. In contrast, CJTF-82 was mid-tour and still very much focused on the fight.

In the early hours, members of a U.S. Special Forces task force conducted an air assault operation in the Qarabagh District of Ghazni Province. Various intelligence sources suggested an insurgent stronghold and an arms cache would be located in the village. Upon arriving at the objective, the SF team encountered resistance from a force much larger than anticipated. It found itself pinned down, out-gunned, and with wounded comrades. An exfiltration order was given, and the team was pulled from the objective. (The BSOs are briefed ahead of time, so TF-WE knew the operation was going to take place.)

The CJTF-82 commander ordered TF-WE to secure the village of Bagi Kheyl and conduct a cordon and search. He wanted to own that space and own it quickly. As the battalion-level U.S. liaison officer, I observed reluctance to this idea from my Polish counterparts. The Polish general and his staff hesitated; they believed the time needed to effectively plan and execute the mission was too short and the operation too risky. The mindset of most of the Polish at this point in the deployment had noticeably shifted from conducting aggressive offensive operations to redeployment.

The challenge for the BEST-A4 commander was to overcome this mentality and convince the Polish command of the urgency and importance of this mission. The more time that was lost, the greater likelihood the cache would be moved and the insurgents would relocate. COL Fanning pressed the issue that not supporting CJTF-82 would reflect poorly on TF-WE and negatively affect future relationships, not only for the current BG but for the incoming BG as well. The Polish had an opportunity to show CJTF-82 they could be trusted when called upon. By focusing in on the idea of “one team, one fight,” COL Fanning was able to persuade the TF-WE commander that it was in his best interest to oblige.

In that moment, Operation Sudden Storm was born. The BG Bravo commander was tasked as the ground commander for the operation. A combination of approximately 200 soldiers from BG Bravo and U.S. elements from FOB Ghazni were organized for the mission. ANP and ANA soldiers were used to ensure combined action and to reinforce the troops on the ground. The Polish headquarters element, to which I was attached, was airlifted one kilometer away from the objective on top of a hill for command and control.

As the U.S. ground liaison officer for the operation, I was the information hub for the BG Bravo commander. I filtered U.S. attack air information as well as direct communication with the SF team. Both ground and air operations were conducted simultaneously. U.S. AH-64 and Polish MI-24 attack helicopters provided CCA support; U.S. fighter jets provided close air support; and area surveillance was provided by a tactical blimp and an unmanned aerial vehicle. Soldiers from BG Bravo established an outer cordon, while U.S. and Polish Special Forces, civil affairs, and Afghan National Police searched the village. As a result of the search, a substantial cache of IEDs, ammunition, stolen ANP uniforms, and a stolen ANP vehicle were discovered. Local villagers told the civil affairs team that the insurgents were caught off guard by the massive force that converged on the village and had no choice but...
to retreat. At least four mid-level Taliban insurgents were killed, and four individuals were detained for questioning during the resulting operation.

The 14-hour operation was a considerable achievement for TF-WE and BEST-A4. The task force proved its ability, commitment, and dedication to the war effort; the members of BEST-A4 were able to successfully balance the interests of both commands; and both elements capitalized on the operation and used it as an example for the incoming teams as a baseline on how to conduct operations. Through trust, respect, and the combined effort of multiple organizations, conditions were set for the Polish forces to succeed that day. Not only did we successfully conduct one of the largest missions in Ghazni Province, we did it under adverse conditions in a time-sensitive setting.

**Conclusion**

Through these opportunities as a NATO/ISAF officer in Ghazni and as an ILARNG SPP participant, I was able to see, experience, and learn from the multi-faceted and complex nature of the environment in which I found myself. These experiences, for me, quantified and humanized the act of balancing those elements. Most importantly, these experiences fostered my personal growth as a leader — and I attribute much of that growth to working with the Polish in war zone in Afghanistan as a BEST-A4 team member.

I did not have any preconceived notions about the Polish Army, but my willingness to step across the international boundary and engage in team building and cooperation, at least initially, was inhibited by my lack of trust in our coalition partner. American Soldiers all possess a certain bit of arrogance, and I certainly am no different. I believe this attitude is a natural reaction to being the superpower we are, but if not kept in check, arrogance can negatively affect how we interact with our allies.

Once I stepped out of my comfort zone and engaged in dialogue with my Polish brethren, in particular the battle staff, a level of trust was formed that transcended nationality. By the end of my time in Afghanistan, I truly believed in the “one team, one fight” mantra. I respected their work ethic enough to submit two of my counterparts for the Army Achievement Medal. They respected our contributions enough to award five members of my team with the Polish Army Medal (awarded to foreign personnel for distinguished service to the Polish Army). I was one of those five and was incredibly honored to receive it.

Upon returning from Afghanistan, I joined select members of BEST-A4 to participate in the Bagram VIII exercise in Poland in the fall of 2010. We were able pass the knowledge gained from our time in Ghazni to the next BEST and Polish rotation to Afghanistan.

The Polish Army has earned my respect as leaders and soldiers. I learned firsthand that the Polish are a polished fighting force, deeply-committed to the NATO cause, and a proud and patriotic people. Further, despite the difficulty of the environment and the external political, social, and cultural pressures that impacted the Polish Army in Ghazni, my eyewitness opinion is that TF-WE managed to make remarkable strides in furthering the NATO/ISAF mission to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multicultural environment.

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On the morning of 12 July 2009, the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Task Force Chosin) air assaulted into Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, to secure the village of Barg-e Matal as part of Operation Mountain Fire. The operation was planned to last 96 hours but did not conclude until 19 September 2009 — 69 days later.

I didn’t join the fight in Barg-e Matal until 16 July 2009, four days after the initial air assault. Attack Company of TF Chosin had seized the remote village of Barg-e Matal and was fend[ing off counterattacks as the insurgents attempted to reoccupy the village. Early on, it had become clear that securing the village and transitioning security operations to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) within the planned 96-hour window would be impossible, largely because the ANSF categorically refused to remain and fight if the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) left. Hence, U.S. forces were embroiled in a daily, highly kinetic fight while still trying to generate options to be able to eventually hand off local security of the village of Barg-e Matal to the local national forces. In this way, Operation Mountain Fire was a small-scale parallel to the situation we face now in Afghanistan on all levels — from an individual village, to district, province, region, and nation. Specifically, Barg-e Matal made clear that the most significant link to establishing effective, locally led security lies at the district level, where effective governance needs to meet vested interest and involvement from the local populace.

Background
The province of Nuristan, renamed from Kafiristan in the 1890s, has perhaps the most fascinating and diverse history of any Afghan province. The name itself is interesting. Kafiristan is literally “the land of infidels,” as the populace of Nuristan has been polytheist for the majority of their millennia-long history. Alexander the Great sowed his army’s seed when he crossed the Hindu Kush into Nuristan in 327 B.C. Korrengalis in the neighboring Konar Province claim that Alexander the Great was defeated there and diverted to what was then India. Nuristanis dispute this claim — the myth is that five of Alexander’s soldiers stayed behind in Nuristan and sired the distinctly different-looking “Red Kafirs.” The typical Nuristani looks more European than Asian. Many have fair or red hair and a different build from a typical Afghan, who’s darker-skinned with Asiatic features. This polytheistic progeny of Alexander’s army continued to populate the isolated province up until the 1890s, when then-Emir of Afghanistan, Abdur Amir Abdurrahham, and his army invaded and forcibly converted the populace to Islam. Kafiristan, the “land of infidels,” hence became
known as Nuristan, or “land of light,” after the Muslim enlightenment. Becoming the most devout Muslims, Nuristanis were the first to rise against the newly-installed Communist government in May 1978. The same dynamic continued during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Nuristan is the only province where the Taliban rules openly, virtually unopposed, and with the legitimate support from the populace. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GiRoA) officials installed there are essentially figureheads. It was these fleeing officials who abandoned their posts when the anti-Afghan forces (AAF) took over the village of Barg-e Matal and who prompted the government in Kabul to petition ISAF for help, generating the Mountain Fire concept of operation (CONOP).

Nuristan isn’t only historically significant, it has some strategic importance as well despite being the most remote and rugged Afghan province. Nuristan is one of the most impassable regions of Afghanistan, with only 1 percent of its 10,000 square kilometers classified as flat. A road network is nearly nonexistent — there’s only one road leading in and out of Nuristan, and it’s barely passable by pickup truck. It is also one of the main smuggling routes used by the AAF to transit men, weapons, and equipment into Afghanistan. Controlling this route is vital for the insurgents to retain the ability to sustain a fighting force, and the village of Barg-e Matal is a key point along it, both in terms of population and geography.

Operation Mountain Fire

The initial Mountain Fire CONOP task-organized Attack Company(+) under the command of CPT Mike Harrison, along with a battalion tactical command post (TAC) element, which took care of fire support de-confliction, landing zone and preparation zone (LZ/PZ) operations, and administrative reporting requirements. I relieved our chemical officer, LT Randy Bielski, as the battle captain for the Barg-e Matal TAC on day four of Operation Mountain Fire. At this point, we were still in daily direct contact with the enemy, often for two to three hours at a time, as AAF maneuvered to retake the village of Barg-e Matal. As a task force, we were still focused on retaining Barg-e Matal proper and neutralizing the AAF and had not yet taken steps to set the conditions for our exfiltration. Maintaining full-on combat operations in Nuristan and in our own area of operations (AO) in Konar Province — two distinct AOs separated by almost 90 kilometers — for an extended period of time was already becoming very taxing, and we couldn’t sustain it for much longer.

During the rare lulls in fire, COL Mark O’Donnell, TF commander, attended shuras with the village and provincial leaders to hammer out a solution that would allow the local populace, along with ANSF, to retain control of Barg-e Matal; appease the skittish ANSF commanders; and allow TF Chosin to resume combat operations in our own AO in Konar Province. The lynchpin to this solution would be to train what would later be called community-based security (CBS). This would become the TF’s primary focus — a daunting task, considering that we had to turn local volunteers into a semblance of a fighting unit under less than pleasant conditions. There were no weapons to be had, no communication equipment, no uniforms, and no way to pay the force, which was nearly impossible to resupply in an air-only AO. Finally, all training would have to take place on a two-way range inside a typical Afghan “fishbowl” (commanding high ground on all sides, with narrow exits to the north and south). Along with CPT Charles Schaefer, another TF assistant operations officer, I would plan, attempt to resource, and implement this plan, with guidance from COL O’Donnell and MAJ Scott Horrigan, TF S3.

Community-Based Security

The CBS concept isn’t new — it’s been practiced in the Pashtun Belt (predominantly Pashtun areas in eastern Afghanistan) for centuries. Most Pashtun communities are situated in mountainous, remote areas and are governed by the local village and tribal elders. Hence, CBS forces, or Arbakai as they’re traditionally known in Afghanistan, are stood up by each individual hamlet and aren’t sponsored by the central government. The first known centrally-sponsored Arbakai was stood up in Konar Province by the provincial governor, Fazlullah Wahidi. Traditional decentralized Arbakai and the government-sponsored organizations operate on the same basic precepts: they’re charged with implementing the jirga’s (a decision-making body) decisions; maintaining law and order; and protecting the borders of the tribe or community. COLO’Donnell used the Anbar tribal engagement strategy model as a base system of precepts for Barg-e Matal CBS to provide a lasting solution to the security problem. Though many precedents exist for this type of strategy, it was really the only viable option that was available and was
generated as a result of COL O’Donnell, CSM Jimmy Carabello, MAJ Horrigan, CPT Schaefer, and me simply sitting down in the courtyard of the girl’s school in Barg-e Matal and discussing the matter.

The immediate challenge to standing up any kind of fighting force was the lack of security. Despite the fact that the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division — our operational control (OPCON) brigade headquarters — was somehow able to secure funding, weapons and uniforms, actually putting these resources to some sort of training schedule was a challenge.

CPT Schaefer and I formalized the training in a memorandum of instruction, accompanied by a sketch of the training sites and ranges, a resource list, and a rough timeline. COL O’Donnell and MAJ Horrigan reviewed and approved the document and called a shura where the local elders and ANSF commanders inducted the new volunteers into the force and issued uniforms. After the induction ceremony, CPT Schaefer began training the CBS force, while I rotated back to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Joyce in Konar Province to continue operations there.

CPT Schaefer, along with two squads of 4-4’s MP platoon, began with simple drill and ceremony training to instill discipline in the brand-new force. With help from the local elders, CPT Schaefer chose platoon and squad leaders. The new recruits did not have issued weapons yet, but a few brought their own AKs to the induction. The next hurdle was to issue weapons and ammo to the force and establish a tracking system for personnel management, to include pay. The Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) assisted us with payroll issues by handling all of the required paperwork to procure cash for payday.

At this point, I rotated from FOB Joyce back to Barg-e Matal, and after a relief-in-place (RIP) with CPT Schaefer, picked up where he left off. I began by entering the individual recruits into the biometric automated toolset/handheld interagency identity Detection Equipment (BAT/HIDE) and issued them ID cards. The CBS force then transitioned to flat range instruction, establishing the baseline for their AK-47 marksmanship. The first series of flat ranges went without incident and were uncomplicated by contact with AAF. As the CBS activity became more apparent though, AAF countered our training regimen by placing a sniper team on the high ground surrounding Barg-e Matal. Any movement through the village would draw contact from the AAF positions on the surrounding high ground, inevitably turning our training into a live-fire exercise and making it difficult to get a good grasp on the basics. Our solution was to do our crawl and walk phase, as well as any dry-fire training and instruction, in an alley and courtyard that was mostly covered and concealed from likely AAF positions. Transitioning from the basics to crew-served weapon operations and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) ranges, the CBS force gained proficiency with more casualty-producing weapons but would also draw more AAF fire. The AAF fighters were especially determined to prevent RPG training, engaging individual CBS members from more than 800 meters away before they even had a chance to move from their houses to the training site.

Continued pressure from AAF in the form of multiple coordinated attacks daily drove home the urgency of standing up an effective, trained CBS force. The intensity of these attacks varied, as AAF needed two to three days to resupply after each major attack. The AAF realized that they needed to step up the intensity of their attacks to levels equal or exceeding those of the first 96 hours of Operation Mountain Fire to dislodge ANSF and ISAF and seize Barg-e Matal.

On 26 August 2009, AAF dressed in burkas were able to infiltrate the town of Barg-e Matal during daytime hours and occupy fighting positions in buildings within the town. Additional AAF massed on the high ground. All told, more than 100 AAF fighters participated in this attack.

In the early morning hours of 27 August 2009, AAF initiated direct fires on the A Company command post (CP), the district center, and the TF tactical operations center (TOC). As ANSF, with one A Company platoon, led by CPT Micah Chapman, began a deliberate clearance of the western side of the river, close air support (CAS) and close combat attack (CCA) sorties destroyed AAF concentrations on the high ground around Barg-e Matal and placed precision fires into buildings in town. The ANSF and A Company became decisively engaged after clearing the high school on the west side of the river and were fixed in their current positions. The CAS had already broken station, and CCA was about to come off. It was painfully clear that one company, split in two by a river running through the middle of Barg-e Matal, had a hard fight to retain Barg-e Matal proper. The Afghan troops partnered with A Company had become ineffective in the first moments of the fight, leaving the single A Company platoon to continue the house-to-house fight. The

The village of Barg-e Matal in Nuristan Province is a key point along a smuggling route that anti-Afghan forces use to transmit men, weapons, and equipment into Afghanistan.
CBS force that we were still training could have been that additional combat power that we needed. Unfortunately, the CBS was not yet ready to muster for this fight. To allow A Company to continue its clearance, and unable to set the conditions with external enablers, we engaged AAF positions in two buildings with an AT-4, a shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-disposable (SMAW-D), and a thermobaric light antitank weapon (LAW). The effective destruction of the building allowed A Company, without ANSF at this point, to continue to move forward and clear the remaining buildings on the west side of the river, removing AAF resistance from Barg-e Matal proper. The fighting continued into the afternoon, lasting more than eight hours. We engaged the remnants of AAF positions on the high ground with additional CAS sorties and were able to remove that day’s sniper threat. Several buildings in the village were destroyed, with no known civilian casualties.

Fights like the one on 27 August 2009 continued, on a somewhat smaller scale, as AAF didn’t have the resolve or the manpower to infiltrate Barg-e Matal again and resorted mostly to occupying positions on the high ground and placing precision fires on ISAF and ANSF forces within Barg-e Matal. In overcoming the kinetic fight, TF Chosin had to look forward to our endstate and how to achieve it. As set forth on the initial infil, our endstate was to hand over local security to ANSF and return to steady-state operations in our own AO. However, this became more of a challenge than expected for multiple reasons.

First, conditions had to be set and approved by our higher headquarters, from brigade all the way to the joint task force, with ISAF oversight. TF Chosin maintained good lines of communication with our brigade headquarters, but that was a double-edged sword. While it was easy to request assets and communicate our needs and effects of our operations to higher headquarters, the abundance of information produced a set of unrealistic requirements that we needed to fill to be able to hand off responsibility to CBS and ANSF and execute our exfil. TF Chosin sent daily updates to higher headquarters, with increasing fidelity as increased communications capabilities were fielded in Barg-e Matal and became available. Whether we painted too sunny a picture, maybe downplaying the negative aspects of our situation, or if our updates were seen in a different light on the other end at higher headquarters, the net result was that we needed to accomplish ever greater feats to meet our endstate. A prime example would be the last requirement imposed on TF Chosin a day prior to our exfil — train Afghan joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) so that CBS had the ability to request and employ CAS to help them project combat power and retain Barg-e Matal after coalition forces’ departure. The average training cycle for American JTACs is five years, from enlistment to being operational. The Afghans we were to train couldn’t read a book, a map, or a compass and didn’t know how to work a radio any more complex than a walkie-talkie but were supposed to be able to send a CAS 9-line after a day’s training. Nonetheless, we were able to get a couple of senior Afghan leaders in Barg-e Matal to send a target reference point tied to a point on the ground over their high-frequency radio to an Afghan TOC in Naray, so they, in turn, could pass that to an ISAF TOC and the JTAC there.

By 18 September, TF Chosin had finally met all external requirements for exfil from Barg-e Matal, and on the morning of 19 September, the remainder of the coalition forces moved back to FOB Bostick and then on to FOB Joyce. One question remained, though: would the CBS force be able to secure and retain Barg-e Matal with almost no ANSF support?

The CBS force was formed as a force that would have a vested interest in securing Barg-e Matal — they would be securing their own families. We can’t blame the ANSF for not wanting to stick around Barg-e Matal. Some of them hadn’t been paid in more than seven months, and they weren’t local to the area, violating any Afghan’s chain of allegiance — family, village, clan. What we’ve learned in Barg-e Matal is that a properly resourced and motivated indigenous, in the full sense of the word, force would be able to provide security in their village. However, after ISAF’s exit from Barg-e Matal, the ISAF’s interest in maintaining the difficult supply and communication chain to Barg-e Matal waned, as other areas of Regional Command East became the focus for the brigade and division. Barg-e Matal didn’t really fit into ISAF and ANSF joint strategy, mostly because we didn’t really have one beyond a general “go forth and engage and secure the population” mandate. As noted earlier, ISAF involvement with retaining Barg-e Matal was triggered by several influential elders who used their direct connections to the Kabul administration. Thus, TF Chosin’s presence in Barg-e Matal wasn’t tied to any tangible ISAF objective. A lack of a definable strategy in Barg-e Matal negated any success at the tactical level.

The concept of establishing a CBS-type force has evolved and currently exists as the “Village Stability Platform” concept in use by Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan. The Village Stability Platform is a concept legislated and legitimized by the Karzai administration, akin to the Tribal Engagement Teams proposed by MAJ Jim Gant in his paper “One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan.” The key to a successful strategic victory in Afghanistan is connecting the Afghan government influence from the national level down to district level and mating the current Afghan government structure to the traditional Afghan way of life at family, village, tribe. What we’ve learned in Barg-e Matal is that a properly resourced and motivated indigenous, in the full sense of the word, force would be able to provide security in their village. However, after ISAF’s exit from Barg-e Matal, the ISAF’s interest in maintaining the difficult supply and communication chain to Barg-e Matal waned, as other areas of Regional Command East became the focus for the brigade and division. Barg-e Matal didn’t really fit into ISAF and ANSF joint strategy, mostly because we didn’t really have one beyond a general “go forth and engage and secure the population” mandate. As noted earlier, ISAF involvement with retaining Barg-e Matal was triggered by several influential elders who used their direct connections to the Kabul administration. Thus, TF Chosin’s presence in Barg-e Matal wasn’t tied to any tangible ISAF objective. A lack of a definable strategy in Barg-e Matal negated any success at the tactical level.

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Before we get into the weeds of this thing and start arguing over such vital details as, say, the perfect number of socks to carry during Mountain Phase or the most efficient method for eating a Beef Patty MRE (Meal, Ready-To-Eat), I figure that I should lay out both this article’s purpose, structure, etc., as well as my own personal qualifications. After all, who has either the time or desire to sit around listening to some schmuck blather on and on, only to find out that his opinions and advice are either outdated or otherwise defunct? Not many people that I know. That said, if you trust that what I have to say might be beneficial and/or don’t care about the mechanics behind this article, feel free to skip on down to the next heading for the actual meat and potatoes. For the rest of you with less inherent faith or actual curiosity, continue reading. Either way, let’s get to it.

My purpose is simple — to share my thoughts on how best to prepare for your Ranger School experience (be it 61 days or otherwise) during and after the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC). The information contained in this article is compiled from my own experiences, thoughts, and observations, as well as those of my peers and Ranger buddies alike. The document’s structure is simplistic, breaking the scope of preparation down into four categories: military, physical, mental, and miscellaneous. I have endeavored to do my best to keep items organized in the most appropriate category; however, many bits and pieces could fit under two or more of the sectional headings. As you no doubt have noticed, my tone is conversational. This article is neither formal nor academic; hopefully, it is straightforward and practical. The point of using a casual voice is twofold: one, to keep you awake, and two, to convey information as clearly as possible. At times, my style may come across as pompous or arrogant, but that is not my intent. I am merely being candid and frank. I am not the authority on all things Ranger, but as you shall see below, I do have some experience with the school. Leveraging all that is explained above, it is my intent to give a reasonably comprehensive look at how to prepare yourself, without going into a day-by-day breakdown of every hurdle you must clear. For that, I suggest picking up a copy of So This Is Ranger School, available at most military supply stores on or around Fort Benning.

Now, regarding my own résumé, brief though it is. I commissioned out of the U.S. Military Academy in May of 2010, having attended the Army’s Mountain Warfare School (summer phase) while a cadet. Arriving at Benning in July, I attended both Stryker Leader and Air Assault courses while on wait status for IBOLC. I was a member of Delta Company, 2nd Battalion,
11th Infantry from October to early February 2011. My Ranger School experience began at Camp Rogers on 28 February with Class 05-11 and lasted a grand total of 118 days. I was privileged with an extended stay in Dahlonega where I recycled over a period of five weeks (Best Ranger Competition break) prior to beginning Mountain Phase a second time. I graduated with Class 06-11 on 24 June 2011. Now you know the experience of your author and can more readily gauge the worth of his advice. Once again, I am no subject matter expert. Take my advice at your own risk.

**Military**

“Task, condition, standard, and time hack.”

One of the most common things that you hear Ranger instructors (RIs) say (and say and say again) is that, despite what you may think, Ranger School is not a course on small unit tactics. That is why all of your class days prior to graded patrols in each phase are designated as techniques training, not tactics training. There are simply too many perfectly acceptable ways to, say, clear a room for the Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) to definitively rule that one way is superior. Every unit in the Army trains a certain way, and they all get the job done when it’s go-time. Hell, practically every RI has his own method for clearing a room. Yes, Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) exist, and they teach specific methods with specific points of execution. But as you know from your commissioning source and IBOLC experiences, those TTPs are more of a base foundation, a guideline for what right looks like. As a result, RTB neither hopes nor wants to grade students on tactics. Rather, RIs expose students to numerous techniques which have proven successful in the past and then evaluate based on a Ranger’s demonstrated leadership. Of course, mission accomplishment and acting in accordance with the five principles of patrolling (*cough cough* common sense *cough cough*) is also a priority. The point is that it is important to remember at all times that Ranger School is the U.S. Army’s premier leadership course. Leadership, not tactics.

With the above discussion behind us, we can now move on to identifying a number of actual military skills/tasks that are necessary for success while in Ranger School:

1. **The Ranger Common Task Certification List (aka Commander’s Validation Letter) —** This is a list of 36 basic military/physical tasks that your commander must sign off on stating that you are trained and proficient in everything from basic weapons operations to the Ranger Physical Fitness Test (RPFT). Between the training you received at your commissioning source and IBOLC, you have probably demonstrated at some point your ability to handle each of the tasks. Still, it is a good idea to know just what those tasks are, as you will see them all again at Ranger School. The list can be found on the RTB Web site (https://www.benning.army.mil/rtb).

2. **Terrain Models** — Multiple times, whether at IBOLC or RTB, I have heard my instructors say that the building of terrain models is a dying art. Don’t be a part of that supposed trend! Do not go to Ranger School without both a comprehensive terrain model kit of your own and an understanding of how to build clear, effective, and detailed models. What is meant by detailed can be found in your Ranger Handbook. In my Ranger experience, few things did more to clarify (or, conversely, completely muddle) a mission than the quality of the terrain model. That said, you can have the best model ever made, but it won’t matter if you don’t or can’t incorporate it into your order. Take seriously the opportunities for practice that IBOLC affords you!

3. **Casualty Evaluation (CASEVAL), Buddy Aid, Etc** — Medical training is important for Ranger School and beyond. I don’t think I need to say much more than that!

4. **Platoon Sergeant (PSG) Duties and Responsibilities** — Just because you are a second lieutenant doesn’t mean that you won’t be graded as a platoon sergeant. Understand what the job entails — accountability (status cards), supply requests/distribution, all things casualty-related (mass-casualty plan), patrol base activities/security. Use your team leaders (TLs)! When the platoon leader (PL) and squad leaders (SLs) are worried with planning and execution, TLs enable you to monitor the platoon and its condition. And if one of them isn’t worth a damn, fire him!

5. **Forward Observer (FO)/ radio-telephone operator (RTO) Duties and Responsibilities** — What do these entail? Planning fires, calling up reports, preparing the 9-line, contributing to mission/route development via de-confliction with adjacent units and coordination with higher, calling for fire, maintaining communications, etc… Both the FO and RTO, while ungraded positions, are force multipliers on patrol. Know how to use the multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR), the advanced system improvement program (ASIP), and the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR). Your ruck is going to be heavy as hell. You might as well be able to use what you’re carrying.

6. **The Orders Production Process** — Warning orders (WARNOs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), operation orders (OPORDs), etc… This is one area in which you, an IBOLC graduate, should have a leg up on the rest of your squad/platoon. The troop leading procedures (TLPs), the five-paragraph format, METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, etc…) is very beneficial on patrol.
time available, and civil considerations), OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment), etc. — you should have a working knowledge of all that, thereby allowing you not only to produce orders but also teach your fellow Rangers to do the same. Believe me, your ability to both spin everyone up on orders production as well as delegate and supervise will greatly increase your squad/platoon’s efficiency. And increased efficiency often leads to more sleep.

Physical
“Not for the weak…”

It goes without saying that you should report to Camp Rogers as physically fit as possible. But, no matter your level of fitness, do not allow adrenaline, excitement, nervousness, or whatever to cause you to overdo it. The course is 61 days — that’s a marathon if I’ve ever seen one. Treat it like one. Below are a few physical areas that I’ve singled out:

1. Climbing a Rope — If you made it through your commissioning source without learning to climb a rope, you are unfortunate. If you make it through IBOLC without doing so, you are wrong. Not only is this a valuable skill, it is something that you are guaranteed to run into at Ranger School, courtesy of the Malvesti and Darby Queen obstacle courses. There are ropes on Taylor Field. Grab a buddy and get him to teach you!

2. Rucking — If you’ve recently graduated from IBOLC, you should have no real issue in this department. That said, you can expect to carry a heavier weight than you ever have: in the winter at “Mountains” the heaviest rucks (FO/RTO) top out at around 120 pounds. Be prepared to handle that type of load over multiple kilometers and still be able to assault the objective.

3. Field Hygiene — Lack of sleep and malnutrition are going to be doing a number on your immune system to begin with. Don’t weaken yourself further through poor hygiene. Wash your hands when given the chance. Use showers/laundry facilities when made available. Keep your canteens clean and use iodine tablets appropriately. Brush your teeth as usual, even when in the field. Foot care? Use powder, change boots/socks when possible, and let them air-out at night. At a bare minimum, wipe down your face, groin, knees, and elbows every night. Tell the medics if anything is wrong so it can be addressed before it becomes serious enough to require your removal from training.

4. Eye Protection — Ranger School is a valuable experience and is worth a hell of a lot, but it isn’t worth your sight! Multiple times on patrol I had limbs almost gouge me in the eye, and that was with eye-pro on. Yes, your lenses will get scratched and fogged and all that. Deal with it. Don’t be short-sighted or you might end up blind... and still be tab-less!

Mental
“Not for the faint-hearted…”

When it comes to mental preparation, most of it must be left to the individual. People can (and will) give you advice all day long on techniques and tricks they used to get through to graduation, but in the end it comes down to Y-O-U. Everyone is different, with different outlooks and different perspectives. It is on you to make the decision that you just aren’t going to leave without that tab, whether that means “61 and done” or doing multiple tours in each phase. What I can say is that state of mind is important. Equally important is finding out what it is that motivates you so that you can motivate yourself on the bad days — and you’ll have them. For me, it was pride. Upon recycling Mountain Phase, knowing that I was facing a full five weeks before the next class arrived, I wanted out. For those counting, that would mean a total of 11 weeks spent on Camp Frank D. Merrill in Dahlonega, Ga. To heck with that! But then I thought of how I would feel, trying to explain to my family, my friends, and my peers that my ability to lead my future platoon just wasn’t worth the extra time. My pride just wouldn’t allow that. And that did it for me; I signed on the dotted line, accepted my recycle, and now am extremely thankful that I did so. So, my point is that you have to find that thing that drives you, that keeps you going at it. Now, as I said before, people will offer advice all day long, whether you want it or not. And I’m no different. Assuming from the fact that you’re still reading that you’re willing to take it, I’ll go ahead and offer a piece of my own: use it or lose it, your choice...

Over my mountain recycle, I decided on three words to embody my mental approach to what remained of my training. This personal mantra, as it were, was: positivity, proactivity, and perseverance.

1. Positivity — Optimism and pessimism are both contagious, the latter more so than the former. That said, they are also both the result of a conscious choice regarding how you decide to view your world each day. When you wake up each morning, you have to choose what mood you’re going to be in. It is easy to complain and it takes no leadership ability at all to do so. Exert some self-control — don’t just react to external stimuli. While at Ranger School, keep the positive in mind — “Hey, it’s not raining today! Okay, so it’s raining now...but it’s not hailing! Oh yeah, we’re getting hot breakfast tomorrow. Bring on those blueberry pancakes!” Or, perhaps, all you’ve got is the fact that you’ve successfully completed one more day and are a step closer to graduation. Well, make a pocket calendar and keep track of those days as they pass. Small victories — that is the key. Stay positive, both internally and externally, and you will see benefits both in your own morale as well as in the motivation and willingness to cooperate displayed by your fellow students. And it won’t hurt your peer evaluations either.

2. Proactivity — In Ranger School, there is always a lot to do and not enough time to do it in. So why wait around to be given a task or, worse yet, bicker about whose turn it is to complete said task? Be proactive! Volunteer! Whether in leadership or not, you should always look ahead to what tasks are next and help facilitate their completion however you can. Why?
   * It saves time, your most valuable resource;
   * It will get you off the line, keep you awake, and keep you informed as to what’s happening;
   * It preserves and inspires teamwork and selflessness; and
* It’s what leaders do! And Ranger School is the Army’s premier school for what?

3. **Perseverance** — Simply put, don’t quit. Ever. Just keep going. Whether in terms of looking for ways to contribute or while trying to plan a mission in 15 minutes at 0300 in wind and freezing rain on the side of a mountain — do not quit! Remember, surrender is not a Ranger word! Enough said.

**Miscellaneous**

“...set the example for others to follow.”

What follows are those items that either I couldn’t place elsewhere or those that I felt deserving of special mention:

1. **The Ranger Creed** — falling within the first few pages of your Ranger Handbook, this creed is something you know you need to know. So know it and be prepared to lead in reciting it from day one. Think about its message and use it to motivate yourself and to help you motivate others. It’s what you’ve volunteered for.

2. **Boot/Socks** — Your feet are your most crucial asset in terms of making it physically. Therefore, take care of them by wearing the right boots and socks. Use your 16 weeks in IBOLC as a period of trial and error. Talk to your peers and instructors, but ultimately do what is right for you. If that means dropping a few hundred dollars on special moisture-wicking socks, so be it. Just make sure that your footwear is approved by RTB. Points of consideration should include: boot durability, weight, ankle support, ability to drain/dry, etc…

3. **Ruck Packing/Wear** — How you pack your ruck will have a large influence on how enjoyable your Ranger rucking experiences are. Though there are a myriad of opinions on how to do it, your packing method should be that which works best for you. And you should pack the same every time. That way, when it is 0-dark thirty and you have lost your headlamp, you will be able to quickly locate articles from your packing list without searching every pouch. Once again, use your time at IBOLC to develop your own technique. If you need help, find a buddy with more experience who can show you how to raise and lower the frame, readjust the straps, etc. Personally, I would suggest two things: one, find some way of tying down your two-quart canteens. I’ve done it with the transport tightening system (of one-rope-bridge fame) and can tell you that not having roughly eight and a half pounds flopping around makes a difference; two, attach your butt-pack to the outside-center of your ruck. Not only will this provide you a good amount of extra space, it will also be your easiest-to-access compartment, allowing you to preserve the organization of the main pouches.

**Parting Shots**

Below are a few last tidbits that I felt like including, though with significantly less explanation than those above.

- Have a good terrain model kit with laminated graphics. Some office supply stores around Columbus sell Ranger School terrain model kits that you can supplement as desired (suggestions include colored yarn, plastic Army men, colored chalk).
- Sew name-tapes onto your ACU tops, bottoms, and covers to prevent their disappearance.
- Stash a cache at home for you to use while on your Darby eight-hour pass. Include items that you will need to resupply (zip-locks, 100-mp tape, 550, batteries, etc.) to reduce time spent in Ranger Joe’s/Commando’s/Post Exchange. Also, pack your own care package for Mountain Phase.
- Watch cap (aka “snookie”) – Report with no less than four, even during the summer. Don’t argue, just do it.
- Be sure to take some cash (small bills) for the dog-x after each phase.

One of my Ranger buddies, an SF medic/combat diver/HALO jumper, loves to say that success in the Army relies on your adherence to three simple rules:

1. Look good;
2. Know where you are;
3. And if you don’t know where you are, look good.

While I can’t say that I place the most faith in that career plan, I do wholeheartedly agree with another of his claims — that all you need to do in Ranger School is never quit and always be a “good dude.” It might take you more than 61 days, but those two rules won’t steer you wrong.

As I mentioned at the start, it is my intent that this document provide light-hearted yet practical advice for the aspiring Ranger student. Hopefully, that intent was realized and I’ve got you thinking. No composition, no matter how long, can hope to fully enlighten you as to what expect from your Ranger School experience — certainly not one of such brevity as this. But is that not at least partially the point of the course — forcing you to face the unknown, to make decisions under pressure and without all the information?

Sounds like a pretty good test of leadership to me.

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As the nation, and thus the Army, continues involvement in asymmetric conflicts, we find, as in all wars, there has been a rapid advancement in the use of technology. The past few decades have differed from previous generations in that civilian technological advancements spurred military technology improvements whereas previous generations relied upon military technological discoveries to advance civilian designs. Primary among these advances has been utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).

Those who have served downrange may have some basic familiarity with electronic warfare (EW) in terms of Counter Radio-Controlled IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Electronic Warfare (CREW aka “Warlock”) systems. Virtually all U.S. Army formations had Navy or Air Force personnel attached to the unit serving as the electronic warfare officer (EWO). In the past few years, Soldiers may have noticed Army personnel taking over these roles. However, many do not realize that EW is much, much more than CREW.

For more than a century, the radio waves that comprise a portion of the EMS have been critical to military operations, and today we see ever-increasing competition for spectrum utilization driven by both civilian and military users. Today’s young Soldiers (and many of the old ones) cannot fathom life without a Blackberry or Wi-Fi. The U.S. Army’s reliance on GPS has become such that it has seen fit to remove land navigation from the Warrior Leadership Course. But what happens when the use of the EMS is taken away from us? Army operations would come to a standstill without tools such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Army Battle Command System (ABCS), Command Post of the Future (CPOF), or even the use of the ubiquitous single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS).

**Return of the Army EWO**

After decades of neglect, the U.S. Army resurrected its electronic warfare capability. The Army realization that its EW discipline was woefully lacking was driven primarily by initiatives to protect our troops from IEDs. However, as the operating environment evolves, the more the Army understands the wider implications of EW in operations. In order to...
correct this shortfall, the 29 Series Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was established: Functional Area 29 for officers and MOS 290A and 29E for warrant officers and enlisted personnel, respectively. Additionally, many Soldiers were awarded either the 1J (Operational Electronic Warfare) or the 1K (CREW Master Gunner) additional skill identifier (ASI) after receiving training. These personnel are trained at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Okla., with ASI 1K training being conducted at the Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. These EW professionals are beginning to appear at units throughout the Army. So what does this mean to the maneuver Soldier? There is a new asset available in the toolbox.

The Electromagnetic Spectrum as Terrain

In maneuver warfare, one of our primary considerations is terrain. It impacts every operation that we conduct. The EMS is no different. In fact, if the maneuver Soldier considers the EMS as key terrain, the importance of EW becomes much more evident. The 29 Series Electronic Warrior enables the maneuver Soldier to control that terrain. To take that concept a bit further, the maneuver Soldier needs significant amounts of information to conduct operations but rarely considers the implications of how that information gets to them.

LTC Greg Griffin, 1st Armored Division EWO, noted, “Numerous warfighting functions are interested primarily in the information, and possess little concern for the medium of its employment. In contrast, the Electronic warfare cell is not focused on information, but on the medium, specifically the spectrum.”

By controlling the spectrum, the maneuver Soldier controls the terrain in which both he and the adversary operate, from the strategic level down to the tactical. This includes space, land, sea, air, and cyberspace.

Three Pillars of Electronic Warfare

Many readers are thinking to themselves, “But isn’t EW a function of Signal or Military Intelligence (MI)?” The answer is “yes”… and “no.” EW utilizes some functions of both disciplines, as well as those of Fires and Information Operations (IO). This multi-faceted field consists of three subdivisions: Electronic Attack, Electronic Support, and Electronic Protect.

Electronic Attack (EA) can be further broken down into two categories: destructive and non-destructive (you may also hear these referred to as kinetic/non-kinetic or lethal/non-lethal). Jamming, exemplified by CREW systems, falls into the non-destructive side, whereas directed energy weapons and High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) belong to the destructive side. Here EW touches on Fires and IO by targeting adversary assets such as communications systems, radars, cellular phones, and civilian broadcasting facilities.

Electronic Support (ES) consists of activities such as direction-finding, electronic collection, and threat warning. Here EW merges MI functions with Fires by providing a targeting ability along with intelligence products.

Electronic Protect (EP) also contains two subsets, as it considers protection from both friendly and adversary electronic effects. Frequency deconfliction, in coordination with Signal, ensures that the multitude of emitters fouling the spectrum do not adversely affect our usage. In shielding friendly devices from enemy actions, EP seeks to mitigate changes in adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) through such means as reprogramming equipment with updated loadsets and by masking friendly systems.

What It Means To An 11B (or 19K)

- EW protects Soldiers from Radio-Controlled IEDs (CREW systems) Vehicle-mounted systems like DUKE V3 Man-portable systems like THOR III
- EW aids in finding the enemy and their equipment and facilities
- EW aids in predicting what the enemy is thinking, planning, and doing
- EW protects friendly systems from being jammed by adversaries
- Communications, GPS, Blue Force Tracker, Army Battle Command System, etc. stay up and running
- EW takes away the enemy’s ability to communicate and “see”
- Jamming or otherwise denying adversary communications, radars, and networks
- EW provides scalable options for engaging the enemy
- Can be used as an escalation of force measure and for shaping operations
- New technologies such as directed energy weapons can be used for non-lethal area denial

Having an Electronic Warrior on your modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) brings these abilities to the fight. Survivability and effectiveness on the battlefield are exponentially increased, allowing the maneuver Soldier to more efficiently close with and destroy the enemy. Own the electromagnetic spectrum, and you will find owning the fight much easier.

Lou West served six years in the U.S. Navy as an electronic warfare technician. Upon leaving the Navy, he first joined the California National Guard and later the Tennessee National Guard, serving in various MOS’s, including as an 11B. West served with the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment as an electronic warfare officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom X and is now employed by FSCX, Inc as the EW analyst and instructor at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Ga.
MWDs: A Cost Effective, Low-Tech Answer to a Persistent and Deadly Threat

War Dogs, or as they are known today, Military Working Dogs (MWDs) have been in man’s arsenal for thousands of years. MWDs are a cost effective, low-tech answer to a persistent and deadly threat. This article will present a brief history of MWDs, an overview of the history of the U.S. Army’s MWD Program, and the MWD program in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in particular. Our goal is to provide Infantry leaders at all levels with the basic information necessary to understand the program by covering the different categories of MWDs as well as their capabilities and limitations. We ultimately hope to provide the reader with information and references that will help effectively plan, implement, and safely utilize MWDs in all aspects of a unit’s operations in support of OEF.

History
Since the beginning of recorded history, dogs have been used to support combat operations. They have been used to attack enemy personnel and animals and to destroy a unit’s cohesion and formation. There are Egyptian murals commemorating the fighting spirit of the Egyptian war dogs. The murals show vicious animals being unleashed by the Soldier-handlers and leaping upon the enemy. The Emperor Hammurabi of Babylon equipped his Soldiers with huge war dogs; and in ancient Greece, the Corinthians used dogs as shoreline sentries as a defense against an Athenian amphibious assault. According to legend, 50 war dogs leaped, with open jaws, at the Athenians as they crept ashore during a surprise night attack. The legend says the dogs fought ferociously but were all slain, except for one who awoke the Corinthian troops in a nearby town by barking. The Corinthians rallied and defeated the Athenians. A war dog was immortalized in a mural depicting the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. when the Athenians defeated the Persians.

The Romans had veterinarians and war dog handlers. The Romans classified their dogs as watchdogs, sheepdogs, and hunting dogs. The hunting dogs were further classified into attackers, trackers, and chasers. Attila the Hun used packs of large dogs to stand as sentries around his camps to prevent a surprise attack. During the medieval period, large war dogs, such as mastiffs, were clothed in chain mail and released to attack enemy horses, negating the effect of the mounted men-at-arms. Napoleon used war dogs during his campaigns in the early 19th century by deploying fighting dogs in front of his reserves. During World War I, the Germans used 30,000 war dogs, while the French used 20,000 and the Italians used 3,000. The French employed large sheep dogs for sentry duty; the Belgians used dogs to tow machine gun carriages; and the Italians used large numbers of dogs on the
Alpine front. Pound for pound, a dog can pull a greater weight than a horse.

In the United States, the first recorded use of war dogs by the U.S. Army was during the Second Seminole War. The Army bought 33 Cuban-bred bloodhounds, and these dogs and their five handlers were used by the Army to track the Seminole Indians and the runaway slaves the Indians were harboring. During the Spanish-American War, war dogs were used as scouts, most famously by patrols of Teddy Roosevelt’s “Rough Rider” regiment. The dogs were trained as “point scouts,” and patrols accompanied by dogs were almost impossible to ambush. The U.S. armed forces received and trained more than 20,000 dogs for use as scout, tracker, mine detector, attack, and sentry dogs during World War II. The dogs were procured through a “Dogs for Defense” program that accepted family pets donated to the war effort. The majority of the surviving dogs were reunited with their families at the end of the war. It was found, due to terrain, that the dogs were much more effective in the Pacific theater than they were in Europe.

The 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was the only scout dog platoon in the Army at the start of the Korean War. Members of the platoon were awarded three Silver Stars, six Bronze Stars for Valor, and 35 Bronze Stars for meritorious service. On 27 February 1953, the Department of the Army recognized the accomplishments of the platoon in General Order Number 21. The platoon was so effective that the Army authorized one scout dog platoon for every Infantry division in Korea. The war ended before those additional platoons could be trained and shipped to the combat zone.

A total of 4,900 MWDs served in Vietnam. The U.S. Army organized 26 scout dog platoons and 22 combat tracker teams (platoon-size elements) for combat operations. The Scout Dog School was established at Fort Benning, Ga., under the auspices of the Infantry School. The Scout Dog School trained both dogs and handlers, which were then rotated to Vietnam as individual replacements. The Army also established a Combat Tracker School at Fort Gordon, Ga., which trained both the tracker dogs and handlers, and the “visual” trackers who complemented the dog’s skills on the combat tracker teams. The dogs were used for scouting, tracking (both enemy personnel and lost/wounded U.S. service members), sentry, attack, mine/booby trap, and tunnel detection. This number does not include the U.S. Army MP sentry dog and U.S. Air Force guard dog units. Only about 200 of the MWDs that deployed to Vietnam were redeployed to the United States. It was the Army’s policy at the time that the dogs were too dangerous to attempt to be reintegrated into civilian life. Also, it was thought that the dogs may carry diseases that would be hazardous if introduced into the continental United States. After the Vietnam War, as after all wars, the MWD Program was radically scaled down.

During Operations Desert Shield/Storm the U.S. utilized 118 MWD teams in the Gulf region. By contrast, the French employed 1,177 MWD teams during Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

**Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF)**

More than 600 MWD teams have been deployed by the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps during OIF/OEF. This number does not include NATO/Coalition MWD teams currently assigned to support OEF. The current inventory of MWDs have, in some cases, very specific capabilities while others are multipurpose MWDs.

**The general capabilities of MWDs are:**
- Enhanced sense of smell and hearing
- Sight is superior for detecting movement
- Can work seven days a week (within limitations)
- Can work day or night
- Can work off-leash
- Passive response
- Can ID target odors in situations/environments that defeat other sensors
- Can clear a larger area faster than other sensors
- Can be multipurpose
- Can be used to apprehend fleeing/evading suspects
- Less lethal use of force

**Limitations:**
- Do not share cover/concealment well
- May bark at inappropriate times
- May become protective of the handler
- May fight or attack other animals when working off-leash
- Vehicle traffic may be a hazard to the MWD when working off-leash

There are currently 14 categories of MWDs employed in OEF. All categories of MWDs have military handlers with the exception of the Contractor Working Dog (CWD). Each category is discussed below.

**Explosive Detector Dogs (EDDs)** are single-purpose, on-leash explosive detector dogs. EDDs are authorized in lieu of dual-purpose MWDs and Specialized Search Dogs (SSDs), which will be discussed later.

**Patrol Explosive Detector Dogs (PEDDs)** are dual-purpose, on-leash MWDs that can perform both patrol and explosive detection functions in an
offensive or defensive detection environment.

Patrol Narcotics Detector Dogs (PNDDs) are dual-purpose, on-leash MWDs that can perform both patrol and narcotics detection functions in an offensive or defensive detection environment.

Specialized Search Dogs are single-purpose, off-leash MWDs. SSDs conduct extended long-range searches for weapons and explosives.

Combat Tracker Dogs (CTDs) are single-purpose scent trackers capable of detecting scents at an improvised explosive device (IED) post-blast site. They detect human scents and can track those scents back to their source; this is an expanding capability with the Department of Defense (DoD). CTDs are military assets currently sourced via contract lease or DoD trained/owned.

Patrol Dogs (PDs) are single-purpose, law enforcement dogs used to support law enforcement and detention operations and to apprehend suspects.

Mine Detector Dogs (MDDs) are single-purpose, explosive detector dogs that are best utilized for “ground lane searches” to detect buried mines.

Human Remains Dogs (HRDs) detect the scent of human remains located in water, sub-surface, structures, rubble, and elevated surfaces. They can detect remains of all ages, sexes, and stages of decomposition.

Force Protection Dogs (FPs) are local indigenous dogs not considered to be DoD owned. These are local, host-nation dogs vetted by forward operating base (FOB) commanders in coordination with the local provost marshall and division/task force MWD operations NCO and servicing veterinarians. FP dogs will receive health certificates from the responsible veterinary corps officers. FP dogs will only perform at the FOB where they are vetted. FP dogs will not be redeployed to other FOBs. The number of FP dogs will be limited, based on the operational needs and veterinary support capabilities.

Therapy Dogs are dogs that work with medical combat stress teams or forward deployed military hospitals to assist with the recuperation of wounded warriors.

IED Detector Dogs (IDDs) are specially-trained detection dogs that find IEDs in a multi-weather environment. IDDs are a Marine Corps-specific asset utilized in OEF.

Contract Working Dogs are those dogs provided by a contractor which have a contract handler. CWDs perform internal and perimeter security searches in a defensive posture on FOBs/installations for explosives, narcotics detection, and limited patrol work based on statement of work/performance work standards. CWDs are prohibited from being utilized in combat operations or outside an established FOB exclusionary zone unless granted a waiver by the Army Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG).

Multipurpose Canines (MPCs) are special operations assets, contractor owned, coupled with a military SOF Handler. MPCs are used extensively to provide tracking, explosives detection, attack capability, sensitive site exploitation, neutralization, off-leash operations, and vehicle and building searches.

Tactical Explosives Detector Dogs (TEDDs) are off-leash, single-purpose IED detector dogs that are contractor provided but coupled with an Infantry handler. TEDD is an Army exclusive program.

As with any system, they can be utilized outside of their capabilities and limitations. These have been referred to as “fatal” errors. Some of these errors are:

- Poor handler selection
- Inadequate rest cycles
- Disregarding the handler’s input
- Failure to recognize/treat heat injuries in the MWD
- Improper utilization of the MWD
- Overreliance on the MWD

As we have seen, the MWD has been a part of armies almost as long as armies have been in existence. We hope this article has provided the basis of information that the Infantry leader will need to effectively utilize this asset in combat.

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While attending the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course at Fort Belvoir, Va., there were 16 Army majors in my staff group from a variety of career fields. We had a doctor, a lawyer, a public affairs officer, Special Forces officer, an engineer, etc. There was one career field, however, that no one seemed to know anything about — my field, Functional Area 49 - Operations Research Systems Analyst (ORSA). I received quite a few perplexed looks after introducing myself during the first day of class. The first question was, “What the hell is an ORSA? I have never heard of that before.” My answer was, “Well … we do math and stuff to help the commander make better decisions.” As soon as I said math, the eyes of my cohorts rolled back in their heads, and the focus shifted to another subject. However, after completion of the course, I am better able to articulate the jobs ORSAs perform at an operational and strategic level. My hope is that this article will better inform those who will be working with ORSAs and need to know what capabilities we bring to the staff.

According to DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, the ORSA functional area encompasses the application of analytic methods to the solution of varied and complex strategic, operational, and managerial defense issues. The ORSA is able to perform the following:

1. Formulate problems and design research and study methods.
2. Conduct and supervise qualitative and quantitative analyses of complex military and related problems.
3. Apply objective, analytical, and orderly thinking to the analysis of complex operational and management problems and support this analysis, when appropriate, with the use of ORSA tools and techniques such as statistical inference, analysis, models, mathematical programming, and simulations.

(4) Summarize and synthesize complex analyses into simplified terms and present results to decision makers.

5. Plan, evaluate, coordinate, and integrate ORSA actions with other staff elements and functions.

So what does all that mean? Simply stated, we take complex problems, provide data analysis, and assist the commander and staff in developing solutions. Or we find bad answers to problems which would otherwise have a worse one. You can think of an ORSA as an internal Army consultant. We help the commander make well-informed decisions by assisting the staff in its development of quantifiable data analysis and presentations.

All Army ORSAs have operational backgrounds and understand the challenges that confront operational staff officers. Assisting the operational force is the keystone to our career field. During deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, many of you may have interacted with an ORSA. Many were surprised that we did not wear thick glasses or sport pocket protectors, although we do carry a lot of pens. My experience as a deployed analyst gave me the opportunity to interact with every staff section at multiple levels in the command.

Data is everywhere, and a great many Soldiers and officers lack the experience to efficiently manage data. ORSAs are trained to make data come alive! With the use of simple software like Microsoft Excel’s pivot tool, complex data becomes more manageable. We can turn data into information. Whether it’s analyzing the number of attacks and trying to find a correlation, making projections to see if the host nation will achieve its personnel goals, or simply keeping track of critical equipment, ORSAs have the knowledge and expertise to make a staff officer’s life easier. When the commander has questions on polling data or concerns about the trends in violence, the ORSA can provide quantitative answers. We also have the support of great reach-back organizations to help assist in data gathering and analysis.

The Army ORSA also brings additional resources and expertise to the strategic and operational level staff sections. According to FM 5-0, The Operations Process, ORSAs are a dedicated core group of analysts that assists in creating formal assessment plans and various other assessment products. The senior ORSA on the staff may also serve as the lead for the commander’s assessment working group. The ORSA has the skill set to present quantitative assessments in a manner which supports the commander’s decision-making cycle. The ORSA must be involved during the entire planning process; otherwise, the assessment plan may not be in conjunction with the operational plan.

ORSAs are a force multiplier to any organization. When you have a complex problem, call the ORSA and we will help develop the solution. The ORSA can be compared to Spock from Star Trek — we bring logic to the decision-making table.

MAJ Sang Min “Sam” Sok is currently serving as an Operations Research Systems Analyst at the Center for Army Analysis. He deployed to Afghanistan as an ORSA in 2009 and has previously served as an Infantry company senior observer controller (OC) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La. He has also commanded Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, Korea.

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Reviewed by LTC William K. Everett, USAR.

This is the first book of a two-volume work on the development and performance of the Joint Command in Vietnam. This volume contains a wealth of information and proven ideas on developing, organizing, and running a combined staff. Told from the perspective of the theater joint commander, the decisions that developed the organization of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) are analyzed in the context of the time period. Extensive primary sources were used for this work including memos, papers, and briefings of many of the key generals, leaders, and staff members from all the branches of the military as well as many civilians. Readers will get a better understanding of what a theater commander can do and how he can create an effective strategy to reach goals set by Washington.

The lack of a formal, unified chain of command for the military and civilian forces working in Saigon created two separate ways of combating the Vietcong instead of a unified effort. The key mistake was not designating a single directing authority for all U.S. activities in Vietnam. LTG Paul Harkins identified a key issue of having two commands — the MACV, which commanded units and assisted the South Vietnamese forces with American operational planning and intelligence, and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which ran advisory and training missions and indirectly financed and equipped allied forces. Harkins saw this as needless duplication of effort as the commands overlapped functions, but it took more than a year to merge the two commands.

The expansion of the J2 focused on the collection of intelligence by increasing the American effort and training South Vietnamese. One of the key controversial issues never resolved by the MACV J2 was developing what the most meaningful indicators of progress were in the counterinsurgency efforts. The same issue is struggled with today in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

After GEN William Westmoreland took command of MACV, many officers from other services were gradually replaced with Army officers. The first two years of MACV also saw unresolved disputes between the separate subordinate commands for Army and Air Force aviation. Interservice rivalries were intense throughout the Vietnam War, and each service fought intensely for a larger piece of daily operations and control over their forces. Westmoreland struggled with these rivalries and worked through his corps commanders to guide and supervise operations. Westmoreland issued yearly and six-month campaign plans and formal letters of instruction as some of the methods of control and held periodic conferences, bringing together his commanders, service component leaders, allied force leaders, and other agency leaders. Westmoreland partially corrected the handicap of lacking a truly joint, unified command by these and other efforts.

Westmoreland’s hard earned lessons in counterinsurgency operations should be studied today by officers leading efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. MACV: The Joint Command should be required reading for anyone taking a joint staff position or organizing a command staff. If the goal is just to learn why certain decisions were made during the Vietnam War, this book puts you into the situational circumstances the President and Westmoreland faced. Cosmas has produced a well-researched, well written, and interesting history of the development and problems of the command and control system used in guiding military and civilian efforts during the Vietnam War.


Reviewed by MAJ Paul Grant.

What if American leaders were more historically literate, particularly about the realm of conflict? Perhaps American foreign policy would not be as mired as it is today in far-flung conflicts, with domestic leaders unable to clearly frame the problem for the American citizenry and provide efficient and effective solutions. Instead of watering down history at every echelon in the civilian education and officer development system in an attempt to avoid the often repulsive and bloody reality of the world today, Americans would learn from history. In Endless War, LTC (Retired) Ralph Peters, who is also a New York Post columnist and Fox News strategic analyst, forwards the notion that Americans have consistently failed to learn from history and therefore risk making the same mistakes again and again. From the start, his intent is to force the reader to take a critical look at events in history and learn everything from them — the good, bad, and ugly — and not selectively pick the lessons according to personal preferences. More than merely providing history lessons, Peters challenges the reader to question previously accepted conventions and seek and develop a higher understanding of the context of today’s conflicts.

Endless War is a collection of 35 of Peters’ columns written about a myriad of topics ranging from medieval conflict, early (and continuing) Christian and Muslim violence, terrorism, Prime Minister Putin in Russia, illegal immigration, to professional officer education. Peters originally published these articles in various professional forums including Armchair General, USA Today,
National Review, New York Post, Joint Forces Quarterly, and Armed Forces Journal. In each column, Peters begins by setting the context of the upcoming discussion. He then poses a question or two to stimulate thought as he begins his analysis of the situation. The reader is at first lulled into the feeling that this will be simply a benign history lesson. At that point, Peters throws his first bomb, shattering (or at least sharply challenging) the approved solution of understanding for the situation in question. This is the instructive nature of the book at its best. Peters proceeds to provide a framing of the problem and his solution. Sometimes, both his analysis and solution are initially inflammatory and controversial. However, Peters consistently provides a fluid and logical analysis replete with historical examples that is both convincing and learned. Herein lies the secret weapon of his lessons: Peters doesn’t insist that the reader accept his explanation and solution as the only valid option. Instead, he offers his views — often scathing and frustrating — as a potential starting point for the reader to disagree and develop his own views and solution. This is his objective — for the reader to take a more critical look at events and truly learn their lessons. Peters leads the reader to the edge, and at that point when he jumps off, the reader is left with the choice to follow him, choose a different direction, or remain on the edge with the other tired clichés and catchphrases.

Peters presents underlying themes and uses the articles to highlight deficiencies in thinking displayed by today’s leaders and policymakers. Among his more salient themes are that:

* Americans display a lack of appreciation for cultural context and knowledge of history. Peters opens with a chapter of stories that, at first glance, appear to be instructive in tactical command. Emperor Romanus IV’s failed punitive expedition against the Seljuk Turks in 1071 as well as King Guy of Jerusalem’s doomed battle against Saladin in 1187 both hint at failure spawned from poor tactics. However, taking a step back reveals that both leaders failed to appreciate both the environment in which they were fighting as well as the historical actions of their opponents. The chapter concludes with more historical anecdotes of leaders failing to appreciate the historical context of their fights and always arriving at the same conclusion — death.

* Westerners — American in particular — often fail to understand their enemy. Peters’ inclusion of historical Christian/Muslim combat anecdotes and Crusader references is more than historical food for thought; he illustrates America’s penchant today for continually being duped by and drawn into battle on unfavorable terms by historical Middle Eastern tactics and techniques such as use of atrocities, baited ambush, surprise, deceit, and fanaticism from centuries before. Part I of Endless War ends with Peter’s highlighting of modern terrorist and insurgent strengths that hearken back to historical Muslim army strengths such as unity of command, non-reliance on, but great appreciation for logistics, and surprise. Peters closes the first part of the book with a warning: unless the West adapts itself to the Muslim way of war, it will suffer the same permanent decline that the Ottoman Empire suffered by refusing to adapt to new battlefield conventions.

The one seeming inconsistency in Endless War is between Peters’ assertion on one hand that too few Americans know enough about history and apply critical reasoning and his highly critical article about military professionals pursuing Ph.D.s and extensive advanced education. According to Peters, “You should never let any full-time university professor near any form of practical responsibility, and you should never let a rising officer near a professor.” Peters describes Americans as being historically illiterate, yet he assails higher education. One would have to sit up and take issue with this. Some of the foremost leaders in the military establishment today — GEN David Petraeus, ADM James Stravidas, BG H.R. McMaster, and COL Peter Mansoor — all hold numerous advanced degrees including Ph.D.s. In this current age of warfare that straddles the line between major combat operations and cultural and political engagement, wouldn’t the nation be better served by leaders armed with the necessary tools to be both warrior-diplomats and warfighters? The other focus of this article is the obsolescence of the education given to today’s leaders and deluge of pointless theory forced upon officers. Perhaps though, this inconsistency is really in line with Peters’ true intent: reminding us that we need to continue to educate ourselves, but not at the expense of our core warrior attributes.

Endless War is an insightful and evocative book for every military leader, politician, and policy-maker who wants to be more informed about the security environment in which they live. Even civilians, tired of the pundits and desiring a deeper understanding of global security issues, would benefit from the thought-provoking discussions Peters initiates. Peters’ intent in Endless War isn’t simply to complain about the current state of affairs. It is to challenge Americans now to discard the worn out and ineffective solutions they’ve overused to date and to innovate new approaches to solve problems. Else, the end of America as a superpower may become just another chapter in a future historian’s chronicle of failures.


Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillargeon.

In the world of military history, I personally find that there are basically two types of authors. First, there is the writer who is focused on describing the “what” for his reader. His objective is to provide an understanding of “what” happened during a particular time period in the past. The second type of author also answers the “what,” but their focus is to detail the “why” and “how” for the reader. His objective is to provide readers with an understanding of “why” this period was important and “how” we can utilize its lessons learned today.

One author who clearly resides in the second category is Andrew Roe. In Waging War in Waziristan, Roe (an Infantry officer in the British Army) has crafted a volume that truly answers the “what,” “why,” and “how” for his readers. It is a book which concisely discusses the past. More importantly, it addresses how the past can
provide some answers to dealing with the present and the future. Before discussing the book in earnest, it is important to highlight Roe’s credentials. First, Roe has spent two tours in Afghanistan (or as he dubs, “where the wild things are”) while serving in the British Army. Second, he has researched and written two master’s theses and one doctoral thesis on subjects related to the region. It is a combination making Roe well-equipped to engage in this subject matter.

In discussing the past, Roe focuses on the British dealings (and colony rule) with Waziristan (a region of northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan) from 1849 to 1947. During that period, the British had significant challenges in controlling the tribes that inhabited the country. To meet these challenges, the British implemented various political and military measures and strategies. Some of these met with success, while others were of little value.

Roe begins his treatment of the past by providing readers a mini study of the area. Readers not familiar with the area will receive a primer on terrain, weather, population, culture, etc... This is critical because a basic understanding of the region is required to grasp the complexities of initiating any strategy in the region. In summarizing the region he states, “Waziristan is a complex, outwardly dysfunctional, and seemingly anarchic environment. Western logic and rules of behavior do not apply to the Pathan tribesmen.” This initial section of the book certainly sets the conditions for the author’s subsequent discussions of the past, present, and future.

In addressing the past, Roe provides a nearly century-old history of the British association in Waziristan (the final year of British rule was 1947). Within this history, he emphasizes the relationship between the Brits and the tribes of the region. There will be many who will be surprised at the various aspects of full spectrum operations the British conducted in the region. Roe details the conduct of these operations and their effect in the region.

With the “what” answered, the author offers his analysis on “why” the British/Waziristan history is so critical today. For some of his audience, this examination will not be particularly enlightening. However, for those not as well-versed in the region, this will be far more informative. As Roe states, “Waziristan is once again the storm center of the frontier. Currently, the Taliban and al-Qaeda use the remote region both as a sanctuary and as an impregnable base from which to launch attacks against targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, the region may also be sheltering Osama bin Laden and many of his key lieutenants. With Pakistan and the international community short of ideas on how best to deal with this troubled region, investigating the success and failures of British political and military structures employed in Waziristan may produce some useful and relevant parallels that could have application to contemporary challenges.”

The clear strength of Waging War in Waziristan is the final chapters of the book. These entitled “The Hard-Earned Lessons and Realities of the British Experience in Waziristan, Part 1 and 2” and “Contemporary Parallels and Prognostications” unquestionably answer the “how” for readers. Drawing from his earlier discussion, Roe offers a number of recommendations on how to deal politically, militarily, and culturally not only in Waziristan, but in the entire region. They include among others: the requirement for cultural understanding, the availability of medical facilities and treatment for the indigenous population, the understanding that perception is reality within the area of the world, the value of a mixed political and military force structure (that works with each other), and the importance of leadership. In total, I found them perceptive and thought-provoking.

In Roe’s concluding remarks he states, “History may not repeat itself exactly, but the past provides a useful blueprint for adaptation, and Waziristan provides proof of this.” Within his volume, he has succinctly captured this past for readers. More importantly, Roe has taken this past and articulately presented powerful recommendations to utilize today and in the upcoming years. The ability of Andrew Roe to skillfully weave the past, present, and future makes Waging War in Waziristan an extremely valuable book.

**BOOK REVIEWS**

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