COIN
Building on Success
INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY:  
THE WAY WE FIGHT TODAY

The United States Army has a long history on both sides of insurgency operations, having employed insurgent tactics and techniques in earning our own independence in the Revolutionary War. The actions of small bands of fighters skilled at woodland and mountain operations complemented the Continental Army’s newly gained proficiency. This forced British commanders to accept the realities of asymmetrical operations even as they were constrained by their own doctrine as they sought to defeat what was initially seen as little more than an uprising in the Colonies. Doing the unexpected is a basic tenet of asymmetric warfare, and the uncertainty it creates can enhance or impair the efforts of either adversary. Counterinsurgency (COIN) presents a multifaceted challenge and remains the focus of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this Commandant’s Note I want to highlight our lessons learned, describe how we are training for the COIN challenge, and highlight our initiatives and success in developing and sustaining this skill set.

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The difference today is that our COIN lessons have been superbly codified within our doctrine, first with the publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in December 2006 and later with the publication of FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, in 2008. FM 3-24 will continue to be a foundation for study before deployment and the basis for operations in theater for all battalion level and higher staffs. FM 3-24.2 will be the document that continues to tie the theory together with practical application at the tactical level. As our Army draws down in Iraq, continues COIN in Afghanistan, and begins to focus on core Infantry tasks, we must remember that COIN remains a graduate-level Infantry skill for our leaders. This is something to be learned over many years as our enemies adapt to our tactics, techniques, and procedures and confront us with ever-new surprises.

History only tends to repeat itself when we fail to recognize and learn the lessons inherent in the profession of arms, and as our enemies continue to seek asymmetries through COIN tactics, we can expect this flavor of warfare to continue, perhaps in new locations or even in areas with which we are already familiar. So as we balance our force and prepare for a full spectrum of operations, including once again combined arms maneuver, we must retain the experience and capabilities our Army Infantryman have gained. In this issue of Infantry you will find quality offerings ranging from reconnaissance in full spectrum operations to working as a combat advisor and the integration of foreign security forces in security force assistance. This range of topics take the COIN discussion from theoretical to practical through boots on the ground experience and should elicit thought and stimulate discussion based on your own experience.

Additionally, in Professional Forum articles such as “Lessons Learned from an Iraqi Strike Team” and “The Targeting Process Relearned,” the authors delve into topics that all Infantry Soldiers should read prior to their next deployment. Finally the Infantry Soldier can keep abreast of resident training courses and issues from reconnaissance to employing the Raven by paying close attention to our Training Notes section. These articles and others will allow our leaders to improve their skills as full spectrum leaders and allow them to continue to serve as quarterbacks, fully capable of calling the audible across seven difficult and complex lines of effort in COIN while still remaining completely proficient in those basic Infantry individual and collective skills historically associated with the higher end of the operational spectrum.

To meet this objective our institutional Army is rising to the occasion to give leaders more repetitions through blended learning by embracing old and proven techniques with the benefits of technology and simulations to meet the full spectrum challenge of the hybrid threat of the future. New ways to train, learn and — most importantly — to encourage our young leaders to move ahead with their own self development are essential to tackling this challenge. Today, just as in the many conflicts in which the U.S. Army has fought during the past 150 years, COIN will remain a critical task even as we continue to stress the fundamentals of branch expertise and sustain the effort to train, arm, and sustain the best Infantrymen America has ever sent forth in defense of this great Nation, her people, and our way of life. Follow me!
NEW HELMET TO BE FIELDED

C. TODD LOPEZ

The Army is looking at an improved combat helmet that surpasses the capabilities of what Soldiers are currently wearing in the field, and it may be available in the fall.

The new Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) doesn’t look much different than the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) it’s designed to replace, but the performance difference is huge, said COL William Cole, project manager, Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment.

“If you hold them in your hand, you’d have a tough time telling the difference, other than the relative thickness,” COL Cole said. “The ECH is a little bit thicker, also about an ounce to four ounces lighter depending on the size. But it’s really a huge leap ahead forward in terms of head protection capability.”

During testing, he said, the helmets did so well that a new test system will need to be developed to evaluate their effectiveness at protecting a Soldier’s head from fragments.

“The data we’re getting from the prototypes going into the milestone was even better than we hoped,” he said. “We had hoped for a 35 percent improvement over the ACH in terms of ballistic protection, and it’s way better than that.”

The Army wants 200,000 of the helmets, though Cole said, “I’d be surprised if we stop at that number.”

It’s expected fielding of the ECH will happen this fall and will align with the Army’s Force Generation Model, though Cole said he hopes to accelerate fielding. The Marine Corps is a partner in development of the ECH and will also purchase the helmets.

(C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.)

‘MA DEUCE’ M2A1 GETS UPGRADE

By spring 2011, all new .50 caliber M2 machine guns coming off the assembly lines will be manufactured to M2A1 specifications, a significant upgrade that enables warfighters to deliver increased volumes of fire at the enemy while enhancing Soldier safety in the operation of the system.

The M2A1’s fixed “headspace and timing” enhancement resolves the number one safety issue for Soldiers operating the weapon system. “Headspace” is the distance between the face of the bolt and the base of the cartridge case, fully seated in the chamber. “Timing” is the adjustment of the gun so that firing takes place when the recoiling parts are in the correct position for firing. The current M2 requires Soldiers to manually set headspace and timing before firing, after assembly, and after required barrel changes when the barrel becomes extremely hot from high volumes of fire. Improper adjustment can damage the weapon and cause serious injury to the user. Fixed headspace and timing reduces operator risk and eliminates the need for Soldiers to master and execute this time-consuming procedure.

“Soldiers love the M2; it’s their weapon of choice,” said Laura Battista, product director, M2/M2A1, Project Manager Soldier Weapons. “We didn’t want to change it. We wanted to enhance it by making it safer and easier to use. Soldiers will love the M2A1 even more.”

After the first unit is equipped with new M2A1s, M2s in the field will begin to be returned to Anniston Army Depot for retrofitting with the QCB kit, bringing the M2s up to the new M2A1 standard. Units will receive M2A1s in a one-for-one exchange for their M2s.

“Not only is this weapon safer, but faster to operate as well,” said Bob Sulzbach, lead engineer M2A1 weapons system, ARDEC. “In tests, Soldiers demonstrated they could perform the barrel change in just eight seconds, giving them near continuous firepower and increased lethality.”

The M2A1 incorporates the following improvements:

- Fixed headspace and timing
- Flash hider to reduce muzzle flash by 95 percent
- Quick change barrel (QCB) with removable carrying handle
- Modified bolt
- Trigger block
CHANGE 1 TO ARMY CAPSTONE

FM 3-0, OPERATIONS

Change 1 to FM 3-0 incorporates lessons from continued operations and maturing discussions on Army doctrine. Key changes include replacing command and control with mission command as both an activity and a warfighting function, and replacing the five Army information tasks with inform and influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.

Several other changes are also readily apparent:
• Hybrid threats are addressed
• Security force assistance is described within stability operations
• CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives) consequence management becomes an additional task within civil support
• Chapter 7 is updated to include design

Refer to the Combined Arms Center Web site for other changes and a more in-depth overview to the changes to U.S. Army operational doctrine.

The proponent for FM 3-0, Change 1 is the Combined Arms Center: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-0/index.asp.

FM 7-0, TRAINING FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

The new FM 7-0 is the Army's keystone doctrine for training units and developing leaders for full spectrum operations on a rotational cycle using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. It supports the concepts in FM 3-0, Operations.

The 2011 FM 7-0 is less than a third as long as the 2008 version and is best viewed on the Army Training Network (https://atn.army.mil). The online FM 7-0 links to videos, documents, best practices, examples, and other resources.

Other significant changes: FM 7-0 for the first time incorporates leader development as part of unit training; replaces core mission essential task list (METL) and directed METL with full spectrum operations (FSO) METL; focuses on a modular, brigade-centric force in the ARFORGEN process; introduces the importance of FSO training against complex hybrid threats; and makes training management an intellectual process rather than lockstep.

The proponent for FM 7-0 is the Combined Arms Center. FM 7-0 can be viewed at https://atn.army.mil
Culturally speaking, the United States and Saudi Arabia are two very different nations — our language, customs, religion, geography, and climate to name a few. Yet, over the years, we have managed to overcome those differences and build an alliance with the Middle Eastern nation.

Recently, Maneuver Center of Excellence Commanding General MG Robert Brown symbolized that bond when he received a memento from six Saudi soldiers who are students at the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), Fort Benning, Ga.

The exchange took place at a luncheon planned by the Saudi soldiers as a cultural awareness opportunity for their instructors and other senior Fort Benning leaders. It was the first of its type for the directorate that regularly hosts foreign students. The event featured authentic Saudi foods such as kabsa and traditional tea set to the backdrop of an informational slide show displaying images of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

MG Brown dined at the table with the Saudi soldiers, and expressed his thanks for our nation’s long-standing friendship. He presented each of them a commemorative coin, recalling when he too trained alongside Saudi officers nearly 30 years ago.

“What I learned, I carried with me years later,” MG Brown said. He acknowledged that some suggest the alternative of distance learning via the Internet for exchange educational programs but noted that “you can’t get these great relationships from technology.”

These opportunities to train together, he said, prepare us to better fight together.

The Saudis were grateful for their U.S. experience and the opportunity to share their culture. Several admitted that since being at Fort Benning they now have a new perception of our country.

“Before I came, I had heard something different than what I have seen here,” said Saudi CPT Al-Sahli Abdullah. “But I wanted to gain this experience because we build our relationships together.”

Like Abdullah, CPT Sattam Al-Otaibi said he found that everyone he came in contact with was friendly and kind.

“As a child, I heard of the U.S. as a freedom country, and when I came here, I got to see it with my own eyes,” Al-Otaibi said. “All the people here respect everyone, and they don’t look at skin or nationality. We are proud to work and study here.”

Al-Sahli, who was about a month away from his graduation at the time, said after studying here, he is confident about returning to command troops in Saudi Arabia.

MCoE Directorate of Training Director LTC Louis Zeisman said strengthening friendships by providing opportunities for understanding such as this will yield lasting results.
MCCC prepares recently promoted captains to serve as commanders and staff officers. At the time of the luncheon, one of the three classes, which average 170 students, had 20 students from 18 different countries. Each student is asked to present a cultural briefing for the other students at the beginning of his course.

“It’s important that we teach them here what to expect when they go to a different culture,” Zeisman said. “Every one of our officers that leaves here, in some sense, will be touched by these interactions.”

International students must apply to study in the United States and are chosen only after passing an exam displaying their proficiency in written and spoken English.

The visiting soldiers are allowed to bring their families for the six-month course and are assigned a volunteer sponsor from their class to assist with transportation and other transition issues. Outside of that, no special provisions are made. They are expected to perform physically and academically just as their American peers.

“They feel it’s important to come to this course, and they don’t want it any other way,” Zeisman said.

Those chosen for the program are considered among the most elite of their native armies, and Zeisman said he was honored by the Saudi soldiers’ effort.

“It was just amazing,” said DOT sergeant major Leslie Hart, himself a member of the Australian Army. Serving as the highest ranking enlisted soldier in the directorate, he noted that all foreign cooperative training arrangements are learning experiences that erase stereotypes.

“It’s easy for us to become comfortable doing things our way, but these international students bring in different points of view on military practices,” he said. But despite the many differences, he can say one constant prevails throughout the world. “At the end of the day, fundamentally, all soldiers are the same — they love their families, they love their armies, and they love their countries.”

‘VIRTUAL WORLD’ HELPS WITH POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS

CHERYL PELLERIN

The Defense Department is using virtual-world interactivity to educate and help warfighters and others who are reluctant to seek more direct care to deal with post-traumatic stress, said an official at the National Center for Telehealth and Technology, also known as “T2.”

During a recent telephone briefing from the center’s headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Tacoma, Wash., Greg Reger, a clinical psychologist and acting chief of the center’s innovative technology applications division, said the kinds of immersive experiences available in virtual worlds, such as the internationally-populated virtual world called Second Life, are designed to appeal to tech-savvy service members and their families.

“Far too many of our warriors come home and, despite difficulties they are having, are not going to come and see a psychologist, a social worker, a psychiatrist,” Reger said.

According to the center’s Web site, many researchers have declared traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress to be the “signature wounds” of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. About 19 percent of service members returning from combat screen positive for psychological health problems, and just more than half seek help, the Web site says, noting that barriers for those that don’t seek help include perceived stigma, physical access barriers, and limited resources.

“There’s a lot of great work going on at DoD to address stigma, but it is still an issue,” Reger said. “So we desperately need solutions to get resources into the hands of those who will not give us the opportunity to provide them basic care.”

Virtual worlds are computer-based simulated environments where users, as representations of themselves called avatars, can interact with each other and build and interact with objects and activities.

The T2 Virtual Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Experience, based in Second Life, is an immersive, interactive learning activity that is open to the public and educates visitors about combat-related post-traumatic stress. Users must download a copy of the Second Life world and then can access the world from any computer with a broadband connection. For more information, visit www.t2health.org/vwproj.

(Cheryl Pellerin writes for the American Forces Press Service.)

The T2 Virtual PTSD Experience is based in a internationally-populated virtual world.

Source: National Center for Telehealth and Technology
In a developed counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, specifically one that obligates U.S. forces (USF) to operate under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and within the host nation’s criminal justice system, the targeting methodology employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2004 to 2008 is no longer valid. As the host nation moves further away from a state of insurgency and closer to the rule of law, USF must embrace this less permissive targeting environment and be prepared to assist their Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) partners to shoulder the burden of proof.

Genesis of the Brigade Exploitation Task Force (ETF)

Shortly after the transfer of authority (TOA) to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, the enemy executed a series of assassinations utilizing small arms and improvised explosive devices in order to reestablish freedom of movement in its traditional support zones. It quickly became evident that we did not have the appropriate situational awareness needed to understand, analyze, and then combat this threat. The 30 June 2009 provision of the SOFA, which moved USF operations out of the major Iraqi cities, had the unintended effect of limiting the crucial daily interaction between USF and their ISF counterparts. The brigade worked with the ISF leadership in Baghdad to establish clear patrolling guidelines that allowed USF to move within the sector in order to better facilitate partnership building opportunities. This reinvigoration of the partnership with the ISF resulted in the restoration of a key element of situational awareness: access to the ISF’s daily operations. Once the brigade had regained operational access, it was able to flex combat power quickly to attack sites or “crime scenes.” However, USF on site routinely reported that the evidence was being contaminated and the opportunity to target the perpetrator using forensic evidence lost. This was mainly due to our ISF partners either being unaware of evidence preservation procedures or not practicing them for cultural reasons.

Recognizing a gap in capability within both USF and ISF, COL John Norris, the 4/2 SBCT commander, spearheaded the creation of an ETF and prosecution task force (PTF) pieced together from elements within the brigade staff including targeting, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), S3, Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO), Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Information Operations (IO), and law enforcement professionals (LEPs). The mission of the ETF was to rapidly respond to attack sites in order to secure, preserve, and exploit the scene. The key task of modeling effective site exploitation led to further intelligence gained, which helped stop future attacks; it also helped build the ISF’s capacity to enforce their own rule of law. An additional key task was to gain access to and exploit force protection sites such as explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), IEDs and indirect fire, which are not always embraced as a problem set by our ISF partners. The information gained from exploiting those attack sites was crucial to maintaining situational awareness of the battlefield and also served to protect USF during the responsible drawdown of forces (RDOF), a time of reduced security due to

Figure 1
Overcoming Judicial Prejudice Against Biometrics

One of the earliest and most critical missions of the ETF and PTF was to convince the Iraqi criminal court system that forensic and biometric evidence was a legitimate means of tying a suspect to the crime. As a result of nearly 30 years of isolation from the international intellectual and law-enforcement communities, the concept of forensic evidence was not widely understood or trusted by the Iraqi judges responsible for issuing the necessary warrants. The brigade’s strategy to overcome this hurdle was to identify key judges in each distinct operational environment and then take them on guided trips to the CEXC and JEFF labs. At the labs, they were given practical demonstrations on how forensic sciences work and how the evidence is handled to prevent tampering or contamination. The Iraqi judges came away from these tours with a newfound belief in the capabilities of forensic exploitation to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law.

Implementation at Battalion Level

Over the course of the deployment, the ETF concept morphed into a key line of effort within the brigade. Rather than isolating the skill set within a limited group of subject matter experts and thereby restricting how widely it could be employed, the methodology was pushed down to the tactical unit level. This was accomplished by brigade PTF staff officers conducting “traveling road shows” where they went to each battalion and briefed the leadership on the brigade’s overarching targeting methodology and the forensic labs’ capabilities that were available. However, the key to making this system successful was the decision to push contracted LEPs back down to the battalion level. The LEPs were retired U.S. law enforcement experts who had been pulled up to support brigade SJA teams with developing legal packets against several thousand so-called “high threat case” detainees being turned over from USF to Government of Iraq (GoI) custody. However, as the high threat case mission came to completion, they were again able to serve as instructors and advisors at the battalion level, giving both USF and select ISF leaders a crash course on developing cases against targets that would withstand the scrutiny of a judicial environment. They became a crucial staff enabler of the battalions while working side by side with the battalion S2s and targeting officers to build cases in order to obtain warrants for targets. USF at the company or “tactical” level would then work with their ISF partners to gather additional evidence or witness statements needed to obtain warrants and then conduct combined operations to detain lawful targets. They would also emphasize the importance of evidence preservation and crime scene exploitation. The emphasis on SSE and crime scene exploitation was required with our ISF partners at all leadership levels (brigade, battalion, and company) in order to have the needed effect on the ISF and build their capability and understanding.

Tactical Success

At the end of eight months, the concept had matured within the brigade to the point where it was yielding weekly tactical targeting successes at the battalion and company levels. Companies were able to work with their battalion S2 and LEP, who had direct access with the PTF, ETF, CEXC and JEFF labs, to turn in evidence acquired on the battlefield. The turnaround for forensic exploitation of evidence was reduced to seven to 10 days, making it a highly dynamic tool in a commander’s targeting kit bag. By the end of the tour, the brigade’s maneuver units had reached a number of key milestones ranging from the first ever use of DNA evidence to secure a warrant through the Iraqi judicial system, to an Iraqi Army (IA) division commander understanding and utilizing biometrics to identify the perpetrators of a drive-by attack on an IA checkpoint.

As in the case of 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment operating in Abu Ghraib, maneuver units were able to take the overarching methodology and customize it to their unique situation. The 1-38 IN had a unique partnership with the Abu Ghraib police and police detectives. The 1-38 IN was able to work with the Iraqi Police (IP) detectives to gather and present forensic/biometric evidence to
A member of the brigade exploitation task force teaches Iraqi Army company commanders advanced crime scene preservation and exploitation techniques.

A member of the brigade exploitation task force teaches Iraqi Army company commanders advanced crime scene preservation and exploitation techniques.

the local judge who would in turn issue a warrant for the targeted individual’s arrest, making the target actionable under Iraqi law. The 1-38 IN would then provide USF combat power and enablers to assist the IPs with the apprehension.

Units were also able to use ready access to biometric exploitation for purposes outside of traditional lethal targeting. In one instance a unit was able to use biometrics to completely discredit a Shia rejectionist cell attempting to instigate sectarian violence in its operating environment (OE). The Shia rejectionist cell was suspected of creating and distributing “night-letters” made to look like they were from Sunni violent extremists, bringing back memories of sectarian fighting in the area between 2006 and 2007. The unit obtained one of the night-letters, and sent it to the JEFF lab for exploitation. The JEFF lab confirmed the unit’s suspicions by showing that a bullet attached to the letter in a small plastic bag bore the fingerprints of two Shia rejectionists. Although not enough to secure a warrant, the unit was able to work with its IA partners and the local tribal leaders to discredit both the letters and the rejectionists who were distributing them.

Why the Methodology Works

What started out as a limited reaction to one of the brigade’s emerging problem sets became an opportunity to build ISF capacity and create the conditions for irreversible momentum towards sustained security. Ultimately, maneuver units were able to attain tactical success because the brigade’s methodology was not prescriptive in nature. Rather, it supported units with the staff manpower and resources when requested, and allowed each battalion to work toward the endstate of providing key developmental support to ISF partners. The 1-38 IN was able to work towards this goal by utilizing a “modular training” concept where training was planned and resourced at the platoon level and then taken directly to the ISF unit in the field. This approach allowed the unit to train a large number of ISF personnel who would not have otherwise been available due to continuing operational requirements.

This training strategy was symbiotic with the advanced training administered by the brigade ETF to select ISF leaders, as it provided a large pool of Soldiers and police at the lowest levels who understood the basic concepts of SSE and crime scene preservation and could then support their commander’s intent. By augmenting the brigade’s training strategy, 1-38 IN witnessed a rapid increase in its ISF partner’s ability and willingness to conduct SSE at a crime scene, resulting in several tactical successes.

Continuing Challenges

While the program has been a major success for the unit, there are still hurdles that must be cleared in order for the ISF and Iraqi judicial systems to sustain forward momentum in the face of continuing USF troop reductions. Perhaps first and foremost is the need for a culture change within the ISF about how to treat crime scenes. After a high-profile attack, the ISF and other GoI agencies receive enormous pressure to sterilize everything in an attempt to maintain normalcy. While this does limit al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ability to capitalize on the IO front, it also effectively destroys much of the forensic value. As the GoI and ISF continue to establish their security primacy, it is essential that they learn to employ tactical patience in developing the scene of the crime. In addition, the GoI continues to lean heavily on the CEXC and JEFF labs for personnel and equipment, which is likely to continue for some time due to a chronic shortage of properly trained Iraqi personnel. Finally, the enemy is quickly becoming savvy to forensic/biometric exploitation and is adapting his TTPs to prevent leaving a path back to his door.

Another challenge that USF will face in the future is a shortage of concentrated organic combat power. The advise and assist brigades (AABs) that have assumed our OE and the rest of Iraq will have less combat power to accomplish the task of providing security to the population of Iraq and protecting the force during RDOF. In order for the AABs to be successful at pursuing the enemy, they will need to maintain the partnerships with the ISF that allow them to continue to educate the ISF on crime scene preservation and evidence exploitation. Once ISF partners understand the capabilities the forensics labs have to offer, the AAB can act as a connector or a facilitator to overcome local obstacles from the ISF (obtaining the evidence) to the labs (producing the biometric matches), then from the ISF (armed with that information) to the Iraqi judicial system (which issues
warrants/prosecutes terrorists) This completes the process of prosecution-based targeting and reinforces Iraqi rule of law at all levels while giving USF access to intelligence on the enemy’s weapons that are being used to attack Iraqi and USF as well as Iraqi civilians.

Where to Go From Here

The stated long-term goal of the ETF concept was to enhance the primacy of the ISF and Iraqi judicial court systems and connect those entities together allowing USF to move further and further into the background. The brigade achieved measurable success towards this endstate, but a continuing culture clash between the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police will likely continue to hamper the ISF’s ability to achieve true fusion without some kind of U.S. intermediary. While maintaining capacity of forensics labs and technicians should be a consideration for either the Department of Defense or Department of State in the near term, a key task will be the necessary transition of these U.S.-funded facilities to the GOI. The drawdown of USF and resources will be a forcing factor in this process. However, until Iraqi programs come online, it is imperative that USF (AABs, EOD, LEPs) continue to provide the ISF with access to the CEXC and JEFF labs, and, in return, receive operational access to the Iraqi Security Forces, allowing for situational awareness of the battlefield.

CPT Corbett Baxter graduated from the University of Oregon and is the commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment. His previous assignments include serving as a platoon leader in the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment in OIF 05-06, and as a company mentor to 3/2/205th Kandak (Afghan National Army) in OEF 08-09.

CPT Reed Markham graduated from Northwestern State University and is a brigade assistant operations officer for the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. His previous assignments include serving as a platoon leader and company executive officer in 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment in OIF 06-07 and then as the battalion assistant operations officer.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM AN IRAQI STRIKE TEAM

1LT MATTHEW BUCHANAN

From November 2009 to July 2010, my platoon (2nd Platoon, B Company, 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment) served as the partner unit for the Iraqi Army’s Karkh Area Command (KAC) Strike Team. Our partnership with the team began as it was first standing up. Over the next nine months, we assisted in the planning, resourcing, and execution of two assessment and selection courses, combined air assault training, and joint combat operations. Finally, as the KAC Strike Team (KST) transitioned to unilateral operations, we helped them develop and implement a sustainment training management program. This unique 24-7 partnership yielded a number of insights into the dynamics of the Iraqi Army, as well as innovations to overcome roadblocks to a successful partnership.

The Strike Team Concept

In October 2009, the KAC commander expressed a desire for a direct-action force trained to conduct operations quickly and effectively anywhere in the Karkh Area Command (western Baghdad — our brigade’s operating environment [OE]). The KST was conceived as a company-size element with three platoons. Each platoon would have three 10-man squads. They would operate on a weekly “red, amber, green” cycle, with one platoon on leave; one on support cycle that could be tasked to augment various personnel security details (PSDs) or security operations; and one available to train and conduct operations.

When our platoon arrived at KAC headquarters in December 2009, the KST had assembled 70 experienced operators. Our first task was to grow their numbers to the desired 110 personnel.

Assessment and Selection Course

In order to craft an effective assessment and selection course, we needed to understand what the required baseline skill set for each strike team member needed to be. First, we met with the senior KST leadership and instructors to determine what they saw as the key individual and collective tasks for the KST and suggest some of our own. We then organized a five-week assessment and selection course that incorporated training on all of these tasks. The course covered battle drills (squad/platoon attack, react to contact, break contact, enter and clear a room/building) and key individual tasks such as marksmanship and first aid. Although many members of the KST were well polished on direct action tasks, we recognized a deficiency in the ability of the junior leadership to execute basic troop leading procedures (TLPs). We therefore included several days of situational training exercises (STX) — similar in complexity to the STX lanes at the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) or Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) advanced camp — with rotating leadership to give the new recruits some exposure to the
offending them, we worked closely with the Iraqi instructors/NCOs to tailor training to progress with the trainees’ abilities. By making each event difficult enough for the trainees to learn, while still retaining the opportunity for some noticeable success, we helped the KST see that while they had a lot to learn, proficiency was attainable.

As with any group trying out for an elite team, not all of the trainees had what it took for service on the KST. We noticed a steady decline in the quality of the recruits who arrived for the three assessment and selection classes. As previously mentioned, the first class included many Iraqi soldiers with years of operational and training experience. The second class had several recruits who had trouble mastering the required techniques, but few who couldn’t be brought completely up to speed by their squad leaders once assigned to a platoon. By the time the third class started, it seemed the KAC chain of command was more concerned with quantity rather than quality. On the first day of the course, there were no trainees available because the request for qualified recruits had not been disseminated to the KAC’s subordinate brigades on time. Rather than postpone the start of the course until enough quality recruits could be assembled, the KAC commander ordered the KAC command sergeant major to have 30 Soldiers in formation ready to start training by the end of the day. We arrived to find they had gone to the only place on their compound where Soldiers were available that day — the aid station. One “recruit” in the formation was literally on crutches.

We eventually received healthy students, but few of them were infantrymen, and many had trouble with even basic tasks such as assuming effective firing positions. The KAC senior leadership overlooked the fact that it takes much longer than five weeks to prepare an untrained Soldier for service in an elite direct-action unit. In order to ensure success at the assessment and selection course, the recruits should have arrived prepared for a challenge. We initially failed to avoid receiving sub-standard recruits by not ensuring that our partners had set a standard in the first place. The entrance criteria we established in coordination with our senior Iraqi instructors were simple but eliminated the problems we faced with the third selection class. When the KAC Strike Team seeks new recruits in the future, they will be required to complete a simplified version of the APFT (minimums: 40 push-ups in one minute, 50 sit-ups in one minute, run one mile in 10 minutes), and demonstrate proficiency on individual and crew-served weapons through a test similar to the weapons stations at Ranger Stakes or Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) testing.

**Combined Air Assault Course**

Once the KST was at full strength, we had the opportunity to conduct a combined air assault course with the 1st Battalion, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade and the Iraqi Air Force. The goal of the course was to teach the KST and their chain of command how to plan, resource, and execute air assault operations and to help jump-start a relationship between the KAC and local Iraqi Air Force rotary wing units. The course consisted of a planning phase, where students would learn about the planning and coordination requirements unique to air assault operations, and an execution phase, where they would plan and conduct training air assault missions STX-style. The course was highly successful at the platoon level. We used the necessity of communicating their ground tactical plan to the pilots as a vehicle to teach and enforce simplified TLPs. We developed a simplified mission brief format that included enemy situation,
mission statement, concept of the operation, a concept sketch, and a timeline. Though the format was much more simple than the standard five-paragraph operation order, it ensured that each Soldier on the KST thoroughly understood the mission and what was expected of him. More importantly, it provided a checklist that KST junior leaders could use to ensure their plan was well thought out.

The main obstacle to the complete success of the air assault course (and as we would later see, the KST as a whole) was the lack of officer involvement. The officers — from the platoon leaders to the general officers in the KAC command group — seemed interested in producing results from the KST, yet completely detached when it came time to plan and resource the training those results would require. Our original intent was to involve the KAC staff in the planning phase of the air assault training, so that they would be able to help plan and resource unilateral air assault operations. Unfortunately, no officer (platoon leaders included) could find the time to participate in training. However, feeding off the climate of NCO empowerment established during the assessment phase, the KST NCOs took charge and executed flawlessly in all phases of the course.

**Iraqi Officer/NCO Roles**

Throughout our partnership, the aloofness of the unit’s officers gave the KST NCOs a rare opportunity to shine. We emphasized to them at all times that it was their KST, and the Soldiers they were training would be the ones watching their backs during future operations. We listened to their input during nightly training meetings, and when their suggested course of action differed from ours, we discussed compromises until we reached a course of action the Iraqi NCO instructors would take ownership of that would still meet our goals. This prior planning allowed us to support them without reservation when the time came to train the soldiers.

Unfortunately, these same NCOs who were strong and independent in their officer’s absence were hesitant to provide input to them in person. This became a problem because although the KAC did not require their KST platoon leaders to participate in training, their presence was required on operations. Most officers in the KAC believed their Soldiers were so incapable of learning and progressing that participating in training would be a waste of their time, and that having an officer — any officer — present and micromanaging every step of operations was essential to avoid failure. In one case, the KST had to quickly react to human intelligence (HUMINT) and conduct a raid, but none of their platoon leaders were available. Instead of letting the platoon sergeant take charge, the KST platoon was forced to grab a lieutenant from the compound security unit before they could begin movement to the objective. Our challenge was to influence the KST platoon leaders to involve their NCOs in meaningful mission planning and incorporate them into an effective task organization, instead of showing up minutes before leaving the assembly area (AA) and micromanaging on the objective.

For the majority of the KST platoon leaders, all we had to do was get them to observe one or two days of STX training. Once they saw what their NCOs could do, they were more willing to take advice from their NCOs, stand back, and supervise. This technique failed to convince one of the particularly incorrigible platoon leaders. Even after seeing his NCOs successfully execute several STX lanes, he still insisted on micromanaging them during combined operations. Since his tactical knowledge was elementary at best, this produced less than desirable results. We found that a mixture...
of confronting and comforting his ego helped him adopt the right attitude. We conducted several officer professional development (OPD) courses where I gave him a “mini-Infantry Officer Basic Course” to help bring him up to speed on TLPs and tactics. Each OPD culminated with a STX lane, where he was tasked with leading Soldiers from my platoon to accomplish an objective. Though it was frustrating for my Soldiers at times, it provided an environment where he could make mistakes without embarrassing himself in front of his subordinates. This had the dual effect of making it obvious to him that he didn’t know everything, while not breaking him down to the point that he would stop listening to input and start making excuses. Then, while conducting joint operations, we would constantly remind him that he was “too important” to become bogged down in the details and to let his NCOs handle them.

**Joint Operations**

Joint operations provided an opportunity for us to see our partners in action, and it was also a chance for us to bring U.S. forces (USF) enablers to the fight. The KST was receptive to every enabler we integrated into their operations, but some integrated more effectively than others. Military working dog teams were easy to control and provided effective augmentation to the KST during cache search operations. The farther removed the enabler though, the less effective it was. Shadow UAV support was notoriously cumbersome in this respect. In order for the Shadow operator to relay information to the KST, it had to be passed through multiple positions before it reached the KST platoon leader through an interpreter. We never got to try it, but I believe having a One System Remote Video Terminal at the platoon level would have made the Shadow a much more effective enabler for combined operations.

**Unilateral Operations**

As the partnership progressed, the KST executed more and more unilateral missions. A primary reason for this was the difference in the amount of operational risk that the KST could assume than we could. The KST thought nothing of hopping in their vehicles and driving across Baghdad on the word of a “source” who would give them turn-by-turn directions to the objective, whereas our vetting and planning procedures were more stringent. While this inability to conduct joint operations was frustrating, it had the unintended effect of highlighting that the KST was highly effective on unilateral operations, and they proved to be masters of their “HUMINT-time sensitive target” mission set. We supported this by focusing our joint sustainment training around fundamentals they could apply regardless of the equipment and enablers that were available.

**Sustainment Training and Training Management**

As our operational role diminished, our focus moved to fostering a culture of training management within the officers and NCOs of the strike team. The first step was to work with the leadership to identify the team’s core mission essential task list (CMETL). After this, we planned the sustainment training in cycles where each platoon would train for a week on the individual and collective tasks for a particular CMETL task and then conduct a certification exercise in the form of a STX lane. This allowed us to lay the groundwork for a KST training management program they could sustain and track while conducting operations and fulfilling support detail requirements.

**The Way Forward**

On 22 July 2010, our partnership with the KST ended without backfill from another USF unit. However, we left the partnership secure in the knowledge that the KST had been given all of the tools they would need to continue achieving operational success. Unfortunately, the KAC senior leadership has shown a tendency to unwittingly hinder the KST’s progress. As our partnership drew to a close, it became routine for many members of KAC general staff to augment their PSDs with a KST squad or two, rendering the KST combat ineffective for days at a time. When we returned to KAC headquarters to distribute certificates to the KST, we learned that over half the strike team had been detached to man static checkpoints for an unknown amount of time. Perhaps as a result of this, the KST commander’s and platoon leaders’ interest in planning and resourcing training was limited at best. If their efforts continue to be swept aside by their chain of command, training will be grounded by apathy, and the KST will cease to be the extremely effective direct-action force they are today. Luckily, it is well within the AABs’ means to influence their partners to rectify this state of affairs. If senior leadership across the Iraqi Army can be convinced to use operational resources in their intended roles, the KAC Strike Team may be one of many highly competent Iraqi direct-action units to operate unilaterally in Iraq.

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As a warfighting technology that fosters new doctrine and organizations and requires specialized training, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is arguably the military’s newest example of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). From the strategic-level drone weapons platform to the tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection platforms, the UAV has become a driving force of change in modern warfare. The UAV’s versatility and utility will likely become an icon of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) era and a RMA of a generation of unmanned warfighting enablers.

For the “Spartan Brigade” — the 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3rd Infantry Division — the small UAV known as the Raven is a combat proven enabler of the HBCT’s full spectrum operations (FSO). Of the various types of UAVs employed in support of the 2nd HBCT, the Raven has had the least public attention but has led the way as the most accessible, responsive, and field expedient UAV and ISR instrument in the HBCT’s inventory. The Raven is portable, durable, and relatively simple to employ, requiring minimal training, effort, and coordination. This unprecedented capability at the tactical level has many advantages that enhance situational awareness for the maneuver commander and contribute to the development of his tactical situational understanding.

The Spartan Brigade arrived in northern Iraq in October 2009 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 09-10. Upon assuming responsibility of the Ninewa Province, the 2nd HBCT started a campaign to counter the enemy’s frequent indirect fire (IDF) threat targeting U.S. forces (USF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) operating bases. One such attack occurred on 10 November 2009, just prior to the 2nd HBCT’s transfer of authority of the mission and battlespace. This attack consisted of 20-25 80mm mortar rounds impacting the joint security site located in Tal Abtah. This attack illustrates the type of operational environment the 2nd HBCT assumed.

A component of the 2nd HBCT’s enduring counter-IDF effort was the aggressive employment of the Raven. Based on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the development of named areas of interest (NAIs), the staff developed a pattern analysis of locations and times that drove the employment schedule to counter the enemy’s activities against the facilities and bases. Nested in the battalion and squadron ISR plans, the Raven proved essential in bridging the void of operational-level enablers left in the wake of the USF drawdown.

Despite the constant reduction of forces, ISR, rotary-wing and other warfighting enablers, the 2nd HBCT effectively reduced enemy IDF activity by 44 percent in the first five months (from nine attacks monthly to four). As other tactical, operational and strategic level enablers were reduced, the Raven flight hours increased to compensate. Although the enemy IDF activity could have increased proportionally to the reduction in enablers, these attacks declined in relation to the increased Raven sorties and...
continuous observation of the NAIs. This development can best be attributed to the Raven’s audio signature.

Aside from the obvious benefits of having an organic ISR asset at the company level, one of the greatest capabilities of the Raven is its audio signature. When employed in certain flight profiles, the sound of the Raven is an effective tool that proved to disrupt the enemy’s activities. The distinct Raven buzzing noise alerts the enemy that USF are nearby watching their activities and can initiate lethal or non-lethal fires. This technique is most effective when properly coupled with successful “sensors-to-shooter” engagements. The Raven is the sensor, and attack helicopters are most commonly used as the shooter. It does not take long for the enemy to associate the audio signature of the Raven with the lethal effects of USF action. The end state is effective disruption of the enemy’s activities.

In January 2010, the 2nd HBCT received 10 separate IDF attacks in various locations that targeted USF bases. At the time, the brigade averaged 80 Raven flight hours per month. BCT units increased Raven sorties fourfold in the month of February 2010. This increase in sorties directly correlated to the reduction in enemy IDF attacks in the following seven months (see Figure 1).

The 2nd HBCT primarily employed the Raven in support of the local security and base defense architecture of the 13 static tripartite checkpoints, six joint service sites, and one contingency operations site. In one such area in the Tigris River Valley, the Raven operator for the 1-64 Armor Battalion identified two 107mm rockets aimed at the company’s logistical support area (LSA) while conducting a routine flight of the surrounding area. The unit successfully dispatched an element to disarm the rockets and to exploit the site. The Raven operator effectively prevented an imminent attack on the unit’s base. It is important to note that several months prior, in February 2010, 1-64 AR received a mortar attack consisting of several 82mm mortar rounds that injured two Soldiers, one of whom received life-threatening wounds to the face.

During its deployment, 2nd HBCT Soldiers flew more than 1,600 Raven sorties, and logged more than 2,000 flight hours in support of combat operations in Ninewa Province. The high operational tempo, coupled with the continuous use of the Raven, stressed the brigade’s Raven operational readiness rate (OR rate), estimated at 70 percent. The Raven is a “commercial, off-the-self” (COTS) fielding and is not managed nor tracked within the Army’s Property Book Unit Supply (PBUS) system. Managed and supplied by the field service representative (FSR) from a warehouse located in central Iraq, the resupply time for Raven durable components averages five days from the time of order. Durable components include wings, nose cones, and the rudder. Non-expendable components, such as the payload (camera) and aircraft fuselage, require a one-for-one trade at the FSR’s warehouse.

The designated proponent of the Raven, the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) and Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell, maintains a small bench stock of the Raven durable items to facilitate responsiveness to the subordinate unit’s demand for parts. Although the FSR is reluctant to support this initiative, it helps the overall effort to meet the supply and demand requirements by subordinate units and facilitates the FSR’s responsibility to provide timely and responsive support to the Soldiers. The BAE staff consolidates

Figure 1 — Raven/IDF Trends Analysis

![Raven to Rotor Wing Hrs](image)

![IDF Attacks](image)
the brigade’s Raven status on a daily basis and tallies the data for a weekly brief to provide the 2nd HBCT commander a snapshot of the brigade’s overall Raven OR rate and effective employment.

The 2nd HBCT deployed at 80 percent strength for Raven operators due to a shortage of available Raven operator training slots. This shortage was not fully addressed until midway through the deployment with the help of the Raven mobile training team (MTT) from Fort Benning, Ga. The MTT trained 25 Raven operators; this was essential in increasing the brigade’s depth in available Raven operators and capacity to fly the Raven. Additionally, the MTT created two brigade Raven master trainers drawn from within the ranks of the BAE and ADAM cell.

Establishing the Raven master trainers at the brigade level was critical to the overall success of the Raven program. Drawing from the aviation, airspace and Falcon View experience, the Aviation and ADA systems integration warrant officers proved to be ideal candidates for Raven master trainers. The Raven master trainers had three specified tasks and responsibilities:

1) Maintain the brigade’s Raven safety, standardization, and air training program (ATP);
2) Ensure unit Raven operators comply with Army, division, brigade, and unit level rules and regulations; and
3) Monitor and ensure unit members meet minimums and conduct recertification as required.

Loosely modeled after the Aviation brigade’s ATP, the next stage and way ahead for 2nd HBCT’s Raven program was to establish battalion-level Raven master trainers able to manage their own ATP. The brigade Raven master trainers will relinquish the ATP responsibility to the battalions and maintain an “advise and assist” role for the subordinate battalions’ master trainers and provide oversight of the brigades Raven safety and standardization program. Additionally, 2nd HBCT will incorporate Raven training in all available home station training to maintain operator currency and proficiency.

In summary, the Raven SUA V is an invaluable asset to small unit combat operations. Alone it is a relatively simple tool, but coupled with an efficient parts distribution systems, a safety and standardization program, and organic experienced subject matter experts, the Raven is an effective countermeasure to various enemy activities. In 2nd HBCT, the Raven is now a critical and permanent asset in battalion and squadron tactics, techniques and procedures. The Raven is a modern RMA in its infancy, which will continue to mature and pay dividends in saved lives with time, technology, and training.

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Fires Center of Excellence Establishes Fires Cell at Maneuver Center

Did you know that the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Fort Sill, Okla., has established a Fires Cell at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning, Ga.? The intent for the Fires Cell is to focus on maneuver leader fire support development, train maneuver personnel in fire support through the Officer Education System (OES) and the NCO Education System (NCOES), and integrate the FCoE and MCoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). The MCoE Fires Cell also has Electronic Warfare (EW) and Airspace Command and Control (AC2) subject matter experts along with Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT) operators/instructors. We want to make sure Fires and Maneuver are synchronized.

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The dynamic nature of 21st century warfare requires intellectually adept military professionals that can apply critical and creative thinking to solve problems. To best work out intricate scenarios, military professionals synthesize the analysis of modern conditions, then apply their findings against principles posed by prominent military theorists. One such theorist, Sunzi (often called Sun Tzu), and his classic compilation of military wisdom, *The Art of War*, have assisted military planners in the conduct of warfare for more than 2,500 years. Although the United States failed to apply many of Sunzi’s lessons early in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Sunzi’s insight eventually proved essential to success in Iraq because it emphasized the importance of changing our targeting methodology to effectively conduct counterinsurgency warfare.

America’s initial strategy to combat the Saddam Hussein regime was flawed because the chain of command violated Sunzi’s idea of understanding offensive strategy prior to invading Iraq in 2003. The following Sunzi quote succinctly captures the idea of developing a sound offensive strategy prior to the attack.

“Generally, in war it is better to take a state intact than it is to destroy it; it is better to take an army intact than it is to destroy it; it is better to take a regiment intact than it is to destroy it; it is better to take a company intact than it is to destroy it; and it is better to take a squad intact, than it is to destroy it. Because of this, winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the highest level of achievement. Subduing the enemy without battle, that is being the best of the best. Therefore, the best approach in war is to first attack the enemy’s strategy. The next best approach is to attack the enemy’s alliances. The next best approach to that is to attack his army. The worst thing to do is attack his cities.”

This quote advocates the opposite of what the coalition sought to achieve during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraq option for combating global terrorism surfaced as early as 15 September 2001 when President Bush met with his National Security Advisors at Camp David. During this planning conference, the President’s closest confidants met in secrecy to discuss options in fighting the looming war on terror. The conclusion of the meeting gave the intelligence community clear mission orders to find evidence of those involved in the attacks — Iraq included, according to the book *Bush at War* by Bob Woodward. From this early meeting, and then in a series of combined planning sessions, the President and his administration laid the groundwork for a “comprehensive strategy” to plan for war with Iraq.

“The military campaign supported the strategic goal that transcended removing Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athists from power. The strategic goal included establishing a stable, secure, prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Iraqi nation that is fully functioning member of the community of nations,” according to *On Point, The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom Through May 2003* by COL Gregory Fontenot, LTC E.J. Degen and LTC David Tohn. These objectives made it clear that the U.S. was not interested in preserving the state or leaving the army intact as Sunzi would have advised. The policy of removing the Ba’athists from power ensured that the Iraqi army and core of the Iraqi bureaucracy was dissolved.

As we later learned, removing key institutional leaders from the Iraqi government, i.e. the Ba’athists, damaged Iraq’s ability to resume critical governmental functions once major combat
through killing and capturing insurgents, the efforts yielded limited gains in building Government of Iraq capacity and winning local confidence. They learned to win engagements, commanders needed to focus on attacking xu force to compel the enemy away from where he is strong (shi force). Simply put, this means being proactive versus reactive by deciding where, when, and how to engage the enemy, not the other way around.

In COIN, the primary goal is the security and well-being of the people. Commanders in Iraq learned that they were targeting the wrong audience in the wrong places. The new approach focused commanders to leverage operations aimed at isolating insurgents from the people, rather than trying to pursue the enemy.

The first way U.S. Army leaders changed their approach to targeting involved utilizing Sunzi’s teachings of “emptiness and fullness” to decide where and on what to focus. Sunzi described this lesson in terms of xu force and shi force. Xu force is defined as identifying weakness or “where the enemy is not,” while shi force identified enemy strength, or “where the enemy is.”

Early in the insurgency, commanders focused operations in terms of finding and destroying the enemy (shi force). Even though U.S. forces achieved tactical success through killing and capturing insurgents, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the coalition failed to properly plan for the transition to stability operations. Within months of the initial invasion, Iraq was on the brink of chaos because of a coalition-induced power vacuum — and it was this vacuum that underpinned the expansion of a multi-dimensional insurgency. Despite these early miscalculations, the coalition eventually regained the initiative by properly identifying the complex nature of the Iraq insurgency and refocusing efforts in line with Sunzi’s teachings. U.S. Army leaders realized that in order to change the tide of the conflict, they would have to refocus their targeting practices to combat insurgent networks.

Therefore, experts at warfare move the enemy and are not moved by the enemy. That which is able to cause the enemy to come of his own accord is something of benefit to him. That which is able to cause the enemy not to come is something harmful to him. One can tire a rested enemy, starve a well-fed enemy, and cause a comfortably encamped enemy to move by attacking places that he must rush to defend.

In COIN, the primary goal is the security and well-being of the people. Commanders in Iraq learned that they were targeting the wrong audience in the wrong places. The new approach focused commanders on leveraging operations aimed at isolating insurgents from the people, rather than trying to pursue the enemy. This led to a paradigm shift in 2006-2007, when tactical units displaced from large forward operating bases to combat outposts in population centers.

This change in friendly disposition was essential for four reasons. First, it enabled U.S. forces to truly secure the people because of their continuous presence. Second, the immersion of forces among the people enabled far greater microanalysis of the military and civil aspects of terrain and provided key data about urban lifestyles. This synthesis of information clarified the nature of the counterinsurgency by correcting key intelligence deficiencies. Third, commanders were afforded greater access and frequency to local Iraqi civic and military leaders, and this cemented the bonds necessary for future growth. Lastly, and most critically, living among the people diminished insurgent influence.

This massive change in tactics, in essence, turned the table on the enemy because they were forced to leave their support zones and expose themselves if they intended to prevent U.S. control of population centers. Sunzi articulated the importance of this tactic: “If I wish to fight, even if the enemy is behind high walls and deep moats, he will have to come out and fight me if I attack something that he must save. If I do not wish to engage the enemy, my defenses need not be more than a line drawn on the ground. The enemy will be kept from engaging me because I will divert him elsewhere.”

The next critical change the U.S. Army made to the targeting process involved employing better methods to balance lethal and nonlethal actions in terms of properly “leveraging energy.” Sunzi described this

Soldiers with the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment mingle with residents during a patrol through a market in Nassir Wa Salaam, Iraq, on 12 November 2009.
energy dynamic by breaking down the balance of zheng and qi force. To translate these terms into current U.S. Army doctrine, zheng force is defined as conventional and/or lethal force with the qi force described as unconventional or nonlethal measures. Sunzi explained; “Generally, battles are a matter of using zheng force to fix the enemy and qi force to gain victory.” In other words, lethal operations are effective at limiting the enemy effects, but nonlethal operations bring about his ultimate defeat. The writings of counterinsurgency experts such as David Kilcullen, Sir Robert Thompson, and David Galula support this “Sunziesque” philosophy, and their contributions greatly shaped the way the U.S. Army adapted to the insurgency in Iraq. The common thread in all their works stressed applying techniques to win local populace support (qi force), while simultaneously using coalition and host nation forces to achieve security and control (zheng force). These conditions serve as the starting point to begin building host nation governmental and economic capacity.

Although the targeting process was well established in our doctrine prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, it took intellectual fusion to properly balance lethal and nonlethal actions into this practice. The 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, greatly enhanced this understanding. As stated in the manual, “the focus for targeting is on people, both insurgents and noncombatants... Nonlethal targets are usually more important than lethal targets in COIN; they are never less important.” Now, commanders possess current doctrine which ties the conventional targeting process to the contemporary problem. FM 3-24 “closed the loop” on how to decide on the target (i.e. xu or shi force); how to detect the target (named areas of interest tied to lethal and nonlethal priority intelligence reports); how to deliver the target (zheng or qi force); and how to assess (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance).

By applying Sunzi’s lessons to the Iraq counterinsurgency, commanders realized the window to decide when to shift focus from lethal to nonlethal was extremely small and often subjective rather than objective. If commanders focused on nonlethal actions too early in the fight, the enemy was able to reseed, which meant the unit would have to start over and have to go back and clear. If they continued to push lethal operations once an area was pacified, then they risked alienating the populace, which offered an opportunity for the enemy to return with renewed vigor. These efforts were streamlined due to the application of the framework developed by Sunzi and other notable military theorists.

Warfare is constantly evolving and to ensure future U.S. military dominance, we must design adaptive methodologies to facilitate intellectual growth. Part of this process involves reflection of prominent military theorists and their time-tested philosophies. During OIF, the U.S. military applied Sunzi’s principles of leveraging energy to restructure the targeting process to account for the complex nature of a counterinsurgency. This fundamental adaptation of doctrine enabled the U.S. military to regain the initiative, and as time will prove, accomplish the mission.

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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE TUNISIAN ARMED FORCES

CDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, U.S. NAVY

Tunisia is in the midst of a historic change in government. In January, the country’s president of 23 years, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was ousted following massive protests. The country’s army played a pivotal role in the revolution by refusing to fire upon demonstrators as ordered by the president. Tunisia’s interim government now prepares for the country’s first free elections this July.

Tunisia is one of the smaller nations of what Arabs call the Maghreb (literally the west), which also includes the nations of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania. American policy makers typically refer to the area as North Africa. Despite Tunisia’s size, it packs the potential to be among the most constructive allies in the war on terrorism as well as playing a role in peacekeeping operations. Yet, little has been written about Tunisia’s armed forces and how that nation views itself historically and militarily.

In 1996, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Tunisian armed forces, the Tunisian National Defense Ministry commissioned a large hardback edition titled Al-Jaysh Al-Tunisi (Tunisian Armed Forces — Dar-Alif Printers, Tunis City, author unknown). This 190-page book filled with colorful illustrations is not a critical self-analysis of the Tunisian military or even an in-depth discussion on regional security, which is sorely needed particularly after the dastardly attacks by militant Islamists in Casablanca, Morocco and the synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. The book, however, exposes interesting and little known facts about what the Tunisian armed forces has accomplished as well as where it hopes to see itself in the future. This article will discuss aspects of this book, which is published in both Arabic and English (side-by-side) and is not only recommended for students of the Middle East, but for members of the U.S. military who are looking for English and Arabic texts to compare and practice their intermediate or advanced Arabic language skills.

As a military officer with a passion for military history, this book was attractive because it covered the Punic Wars, Hannibal, Jugurtha, Kasserine Pass, and the Algerian war of independence in addition to recent peacekeeping operations. It is interesting to note that Tunisians are proud of not only their Arab roots but also their ancient heritage, which brought such military masterpieces as the Battle of Cannae.

The Ancient Period

The book begins with the foundation of the city of Carthage by the Phoenicians in 814 BC and its evolution into a major maritime trading city-state that competed with other city-states like Syracuse. This expansion continued until 264 BC when the Carthaginian Empire ruled what is now Spain. When the Carthaginian ships reached the British Isles and West Africa, they clashed with the emerging Roman Empire. The First Punic War was marked by the Roman use of sea power that gave them the ability to land a concentrated force of legions with 120 ships to gain a hold on Sicily. Although the Romans did not take the entire island from the Carthaginians, they did rebuild and refocus on expanding their fleet. The Roman Senate voted to fund 330 ships and strike not at Sicily but land directly in North Africa near Carthage, which allowed them to subdue the city-state temporarily. The Romans left 15,000 in Carthage, and the Carthaginians were able to evict this force using the skills of Spartan general Xanthippus, who reorganized the infantry and combined them with war elephants and Numidian cavalry.

During the Second Punic War (218-201 BC), Hannibal used a combination of cavalry and infantry formations to envelop the Roman legions at Cannae. The Roman phalanxes were useless as they could not maneuver their concentrated lances. Hannibal was later beaten in Zama by Scipio Africanus, who gained respect for his foe’s tactics and fought a war of attrition with Hannibal. My main criticism of the book is it does not go into such details on the tactics of the Punic Wars. The book continues with Carthaginian resistance to Romanization and little known revolts such as that of Tacfarinas (17-24 AD), who was a product of the Roman system of auxiliary warriors and, like Spartacus, led a slave revolt in North Africa.

Arab Conquest

In discussing the wars of Arab conquest (647-702 AD), the book assesses the new tactics of light mobile warfare that the Arabs excelled in. However, their takeover of Tunisia was not easy. First, they needed a logistics base, which they found in what is now Cairo. Arab cavalry was sent to scout and raid caravans, perform reconnaissance, and loot. Abdullah bin Saad led the first military expedition against the Byzantines, many of whom were evicted from power in Egypt. Byzantine lords wanting to establish
independent city-states broke with the empire, which made the conquest easy. The Arabs overran Sbeitla and used it as a base to extend their expansion westward. The book also highlights a warrior-priestess named Kahena, whose forces frustrated Arab advances. She was only defeated by a combination of offering land grants to her elders and outright war. It is simple for Bin Laden to credit Islamic success to blind faith, but in reality, it took innovative and adaptive tactics to achieve Arab dominance in North Africa. Bin Laden should also note that Arab chroniclers of the sixth century documented competent leaders, even women like Kahena who showed prowess in battle. The Arabs used a combination of force, bribery, alliances, and, above all, an appreciation of the methods different tribes fought. The Tunisians take pride in the fact their ancestors took part in Tariq Bin Ziyad’s conquest of Spain beginning in 702 AD which defeated the Visigoths.

Perhaps the most tactically interesting period after the initial Arab conquests is that of the Fatimids (909-973 AD), who used Tunisia’s strategic location to rediscover the importance of sea power in combination with infantry and cavalry. The Fatimids were a Shiite dynasty that capitalized on Sunni grievances which were economic and political in nature to evict the Sunni Aghlabids from North Africa. The Fatimid combination of tribal politics, sea power, infantry, and cavalry gave them the biggest prize — the conquest of Egypt. Using amphibious tactics, the Fatimids landed an army of 100,000. Their adversaries were used to raids from the desert and were ill-prepared for such concentration of forces.

The Hafsid State (1236-1535) is one of the more interesting periods of Tunisian military history. During this period, piracy was introduced along the Tunisian coast. It was initially used as a means of encouraging European states to enter into trade agreements, and over the centuries it evolved into a standard practice in which the rulers of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco partook. It would be easy to dismiss the Hafisids and their piratical predecessors as a rabble, but they evolved very interesting tactics using a combination of fortifications, reefs, sea-going galleons, and shallow attack boats to lure their prey or adversaries into traps.

The Ottomans occupied Tunisia in 1574, and they were preoccupied with maintaining their rule from competing forces. By 1591, a group of junior Turkish officers known as deys killed their superiors and forced the Ottoman representative to surrender power to them. Tunisia had its first military dictatorship, and piracy became an even more important source of income with one notable, Usta Murad, capturing 900 ships and 24,000 prisoners during his three-decade career. Local tribes from the Sahara also challenged the Ottoman warlords in Tunis. Unifying these tribes under one mission and flag was the key to breaking Turkish power over Tunis, and this was achieved by Murad Bey, who established his own dynasty from 1631-1702. This would be supplanted by the Husseinite State from 1705-1881. Ahmed Bey (1837-1855) is considered the father of the modern Tunisian army. He opened the Bardo military academy in 1840 and began a process of creating seven infantry regiments and an expeditionary force along European lines, with muskets, engineers, technical specialists, cavalry as well as artillery supporting infantry. Only real specialists in North African military affairs will discover that the Tunisians sent an expeditionary force to fight in the Crimean War (1855-1856). The evolution of reforms made by Ahmed Bey was not preserved by his successors, and by 1881, less than 2,700 officers and troops stood against a modern industrial age French fleet and army that landed in Tunisia and subdued it until 1956.

The French Period

French colonial authorities had to balance the need for securing Tunisia with empowering inhabitants with a security role. As a protectorate, the book discusses how the French created the Beylical Guard that was mainly ceremonial but retained security functions for French troops and legionaries. Resistance to French rule prior to 1881, centered on tribal leaders who had gathered in the Okba Bin Nafi Mosque (Okba bin Nafi brought the Arab armies into Tunisia and was instrumental in the spread of Islam there), giving their resistance a religious bent. They were no match for superior French firepower. Early in French rule, the colonial authorities tapped into the human resources of Tunisia, drafting locals in the Armee d’Afrique that gave Tunisians experience in French wars from Asia to Africa. This conscription became even more important as France’s birthrate could not cope with the Prussian, German, and Austro-Hungarian central powers that would start World War I in 1914. The book highlights that 80,000 Tunisians fought in World War I with a 20 percent casualty rate.

During World War II, Tunisians saw action with French units in the Battle of Monte Cassino in 1944 and the Battle of Belvedere in Italy, which exposed Tunisians to mountain warfare.
After the war, Tunisians — like their Moroccan and Algerian counterparts — saw action in the French Indo-Chinese wars that would evolve into the Vietnam conflict. They witnessed the defeat and withdrawal of French forces from Vietnam in 1954. From 1954 to 1956, Tunisians began a campaign of national resistance, which was stirred by Nasser’s pan-Arab rhetoric combined with the liberation movements in Algeria and Morocco that were designed to frustrate and evict the French from North Africa. Many of the veterans of French wars from World War I and World War II would take part in the wars for Tunisian independence. Although it did involve fighting, it is important to recognize that both Moroccan and Tunisian bids for independence were not as tenacious, bloody, or as long as the Algerian war for independence that lasted from 1954 to 1962. Tunisia’s independence war lasted four years and was settled relatively easily when compared to Algeria. Four battles are considered core conflicts that led to Tunisian independence in March 1956; they were the battles of Djebel Ichkeul, Djebel Arbat, Djebel Bargou, and Djebel Redayef.

When looking at these four battles in tandem, they all involved luring French forces into hilly terrain and the use of combined French land, air, and airborne tactics to subdue guerilla and insurgent movements. Although the Tunisians did not fare well in all four battles, the point of the assaults was to get Paris back into negotiating the eventual independence of Tunisia. France had committed to this for both Morocco and Tunisia but in both cases required a motivator to stimulate movement towards eventual independence. (The tactic of escalating guerilla attacks to stimulate negotiation would find its ultimate expression in Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lost tactically but gained politically in 1968.) Although the French agreed to Tunisian independence in 1956, French forces were slow to leave Tunisian bases, and this led to the quick baptism by fire of the infant Tunisian armed forces during battles that raged until 1963.

**Early Independence (1956-1961)**

The 20th of March 1956 is observed as Tunisia’s independence day. Less than eight weeks later in May 1956, a Ministry of National Defense was established. The ministry assembled 850 elite Beylical Guards (ceremonial force), the interior security and police, irregular Makhzan and Oujak forces, 1,300 Tunisians transferring to the new republic from French service, and 3,000 draft age men to form the Tunisian Armed Forces. An officer’s school was formed in October 1956. The parading of these forces for the first time as the Tunisian National Army on 24 June 1956 represents Tunisia’s Armed Forces Day.

Tunisia inherited many problems during its independence. First, there were remnants of armed French settlers who refused to accept a change in the status quo. The French army needed Tunisia for strategic depth in fighting the Algerian insurgency. The Algerians, in turn, were using the newly independent Tunisia as a means to evade and engage in cross-border attacks against the French. Tunisians were sympathetic and complacent with the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). French forces would then pursue the Algerians into Tunisia. Three important battles mark this, and it demonstrates an evolution in Tunisian tactics from pure guerilla warfare to a combination of guerilla, irregular, and regular forces much like the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The three battles were:

- **Village of Sakiet Siddi Youssef (1958)** — Algerian nationalists crossed into the village pursued by French ground and air forces. The French leveled the village, and this only drew Tunisian and Algerian nationalists closer together. The Tunisians, along with the Moroccans and Egyptians, worked to bolster the Algerians with equipment, basing, and propaganda.

- **The Battle of Remada (1958)** — Tunisian forces surrounded the Remada Garrison to evict French forces from it. With artillery, armor and infantry, the French used maneuver and aerial assaults from Remada to the village of Bir Ameur to break the siege; they also called in reinforcements from Dehibet in the north, which was ambushed by Tunisian irregulars. The French aerial bombardment caused the Tunisian regulars and irregulars to take refuge in the nearby mountains, making a tactical withdrawal to avoid French firepower. Although the Tunisians did not score an outright victory, the French began garrisoning villages and outposts in Tunisia and a new defensive mentality set in.

- **The Battle of Bizerite (1961)** — After the French refused to abandon a strategic base, the Tunisians laid siege to the barracks in Bizerite and bombarded the French airstrip making it useless for airborne or other reinforcements for the city. Urban street fighting occurred, which included the use of napalm, according to the Tunisians. Just as in previous battles, the objective was not outright defeat of the French army but to hold territory and make it costly for the French to maintain a hold on Tunisian territory.

Tunisian forces were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning in 1967, when Tunisia sent a contingent to fight in the 1967 Six Day War and in the 1973 Yom-Kippur War under Egyptian command. They also placed forces under Jordanian command in 1970 to observe cease-fire between Palestinians and Jordanians after Black September, when Yasser Arafat almost overthrew Jordan’s King Hussein. A main criticism of the book is the complete lack of information on real day-by-day description of Tunisian engagements, including tactics used against the French and details of how they were deployed in the Arab-Israeli wars.

**Tunisian Forces Modernize**

Until the recent uprising, there had only been two presidents of Tunisia in its 54 years of independence. Both presidents used their absolute power to modernize the nation both economically and socially, and in particular enhanced the quality of the country’s education system. The following will focus on the reforms undertaken that enhanced the ability of Tunisia’s military to potentially integrate itself into regional, NATO, United Nations, and U.S. military planning.

President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali took over as leader of Tunisia in 1987, and in the first decade of his presidency focused on the qualitative education of the national army. This included establishing Tunisia’s first higher military college and a concentration on academy preparatory courses for high school-aged children. A national center for remote sensing was
established as well as a program to bolster the Tunisian navy’s capability to conduct hydrographic surveys. The Tunisian military also understands the importance of cultivating higher technical skills to repair and operate ever increasing complex weapons and surveillance systems.

Two interesting large-scale programs undertaken by the Tunisian armed forces are the:

* National Food Security Project — a program to monitor erosion, crop rotation, and using science to aid farmers in making sound decisions about their soil and food production. The United States currently concerns itself with the protection of food sources from mad cow disease to outright terrorism.

* National Coastline Protection Project — updates geological data and aids in the environmental protection of Tunisia’s coastline. This merger of the coastal protection with the armed forces is pivotal as terrorists use cross-border operations to transfer funds, explosives, and personnel.

The Tunisian National Army is also utilized in domestic self-improvement projects, which are designed using armed forces assets to bring road construction, housing construction, harvest assistance, farming aid, and the restoration historic monuments. In the health-care field, the most notable program is the country’s blood bank, of which 80 percent of blood is provided by military donors. Tunisia has also created specialized clean-up crews (in case of oil spills) and attempted to enhance its ability to respond to maritime ships in distress off its coast. From 1960 to the present, Tunisia has had a robust peacekeeping tradition starting in the Congo’s Katanga uprising and ending with Tunisian peacekeepers still in the Congo and in the Balkans. Among the more notable peacekeeping operations are UN missions in:

* Cambodia — 1992-1993: Tunisian forces repaired bridges, water pumping stations, two schools, and a crematorium. They also treated an average of 30 patients daily and repaired vehicles used for the security mission.

* Somalia — 1993-1994: Forces provided security for warehouses at Mogadishu Airport; vaccinated Somali children as well as provided perimeter security for the UN headquarters at Mogadishu University.

* Rwanda — 1993-1995: Forces provided de-mining assistance as well as road security by patrolling demilitarized zones.

**Conclusion**

Tunisian armed forces also make an impact on global peacekeeping that should be developed further by the U.S. to enable Tunisia to take on missions while American forces are engaged in other theaters. Tunisia provided several tens of thousands of dollars to the United Nations and Indonesia during the 2005 tsunami. Investing in Tunisian lift and peacekeeping skills are an investment in global security. It is important for U.S. military planners to continue their exploration of Arab and North African forces to gain an understanding of the constructive role they can potentially play in enhancing U.S. objectives around the world. Having a Muslim peacekeeping force that works as part of a coalition will be important in the decades to come and lends legitimacy to stability efforts that militant Islamists are trying to discredit by arguing that only non-Muslim actors are taking a role in the Middle East. Books published by the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense, although not as objective as an independent assessment of Tunisian battles and military history, offer a glimpse into a little known force that we must become more familiar with. To demonstrate the lack of military studies on Tunisia, the book highlighted had only two dozen Arabic, English and French references; less than a dozen involved Tunisian military affairs. It is hoped that this article will encourage students in American war colleges and Tunisians studying in U.S. military institutions of higher learning to write papers on different aspects of the Tunisian armed forces.

The U.S. must begin to examine the writings, manuals, and viewpoints expressed by Arabic military authors and through formal Defense Ministry publications available to the public. This would enable American military planners to build on aspects of an Arab country’s history that have been constructive and share a commonality with America’s historical experience.

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Part I: Reconnaissance Squadron as the "Chief of Reconnaissance"

Reconnaissance missions are an essential part of any FSO endeavor. BCT reconnaissance efforts are intended to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) by employing varying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as an unblinking eye against specific named areas of interest (NAIs). The intelligence derived from answering those PIR provides the BCT commander with situational understanding and influences those key decisions that the commander anticipates having to make during the battle. The BCT reconnaissance effort involves multiple assets with varied command relationships to the brigade. The 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division found that centralizing all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron — designated as the “chief of reconnaissance” — was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the BCT’s reconnaissance operations and the BCT’s deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in ISR employment to better answer the commander’s information requirements. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was also able to provide reverse-targeting analysis to the non-maneuver battalions of the BCT, allowing those elements to better plan for the security of BCT high-value targets.

Synchronizing the Brigade’s ISR Effort

As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was allotted the lion’s share of the BCT’s NAIs to observe. Therefore, allocating organic, attached, and supporting ISR assets against the NAI set became the primary focus of the squadron’s targeting cycle. The ISR assets allocated to the squadron provided the capability to observe NAIs through a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).

During the first step of each targeting cycle, the S2 identified and counted the NAIs that the squadron was tasked to cover for the upcoming period. The S3 then calculated the number of ISR assets available to the squadron for that period. For long-term NAIs (defined as requiring 24-72 hours of coverage), each organic or attached dismounted scout squad (to include snipers) and each organic mounted scout section counted as an asset. Due to Army airspace command and control (A2C2) challenges that limit the flight time and range of Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), troop Ravens were not counted as assets. The number of organic assets was then augmented by attached and supporting ISR assets to include low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, HUMINT collection teams (HCTs), Shadow UAVs, Army aviation air weapons teams (AWTs), divisional UAVs, and occasional MQ-1 Predator and video-downlink (VDL)-capable close air support (CAS) sorties. The last step of the targeting process required the squadron fire support officer to align targets against the appropriate NAI (making target areas of interest [TAIs] of the NAIs that corresponded to known or suspected locations of enemy high-payoff targets [HPTs]).

By comparing NAI requirements against available assets and cross-
referencing that with the fire support officer’s target list, the squadron staff advised the commander on the capacity of the squadron to cover its NAI requirements with observation as well as fires. They also provided recommendations on those NAIs which may require pass-back due to an underlap in capacity, and/or which NAIs the squadron could apply multiple ISR assets to in order to achieve mixing, redundancy, and/or cueing effects of multiple “INTs.”

The final step of the squadron targeting process was to graphically overlay each of the tasked NAIs with the asset(s) assigned to observe them and the registered target locations in order to visually verify that the squadron was covering all of its requirements.

As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided a seat at the “head table” for BCT targeting workgroup meetings, joining the fires battalion commander in his role as BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). The squadron’s ISR allocation plan became its key input to the BCT targeting workgroup meetings. The ISR allocation plan was instrumental to the decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) process in that it identified the “sensor” portion of each sensor-to-shooter arrangement for those NAIs that corresponded to designated targets for lethal or non-lethal effects as determined by the FSCOORD. Once the BCT executive officer (XO) approved the ISR plan recommended by the squadron, the squadron proceeded with execution for the next time period.

One key consideration that became evident during execution was the requirement to ensure that the decisions on ISR allocation, made in the BCT targeting workgroup, were briefed to the BCT current operations (CUROPS) staff. This became a particularly important point of emphasis, as there remained some institutional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from COIN deployments that resulted in the brigade battle captain allocating ISR assets across the BCT in a “fair share” distribution system as the assets arrived on station. This particular tactic was not conducive to maintaining a focused ISR effort and produced some friction points between the squadron staff and the BCT’s CUROPS staff until all the various actors were educated on the newly created process.

**Task Organizing for Chief of Reconnaissance**

The BCT task organized several organic and supporting ISR assets under the reconnaissance squadron, essentially creating a reconnaissance task force. While this task organization technique was quite effective during the JRTC rotation, the attachment of Infantry scout platoons, in particular, required a great deal of coordination between the squadron and the Infantry battalions to ensure that the squadron understood the maneuver battalions’ PIR and to ensure that respective NAIs were included in the BCT ISR matrix.

For the forcible entry phase, the squadron was assigned to observe several brigade NAIs; since some of these were quite extensive, squadron staff refinement resulted in a total of twice as many. The scout platoons from both Infantry battalions, an LLVI team, and an HCT were task organized to the squadron; one supporting AH-64D AWT was placed in direct support of the squadron soon after the BCT executed its airborne assault. Since the two mounted troops of the squadron were allocated to the

*A Soldier with the 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment scans the area for enemy activity at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.*

Photos courtesy of JRTC Operations Group
B-echelon air-land package and unavailable for the first several hours of the operation, the additional assets — in conjunction with the squadron’s dismounted recon troop that arrived by airborne assault — provided the squadron with an array of organic or attached ISR assets and one reinforcing asset. This capacity enabled the squadron to observe all of the refined NAIs as part of an extensive screen line around the drop zone in order to eliminate enemy observers from calling for and correcting indirect fires against the airhead line.

As the mission evolved into a deliberate defense of the airhead line, the reconnaissance squadron was tasked to screen in two noncontiguous security zones. The northern security zone was extensive, while the southern security zone was more than five times as great and included three small population centers. The squadron was tasked to cover both divisional and brigade NAIs before adding additional NAIs created by the squadron based on its own micro intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the terrain and enemy — resulting in extensive NAI requirements. Clearly, this area and NAI density challenged the organic capacity of the squadron. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided with ISR attachments from the Infantry battalions and the brigade special troops battalion, which included battalion scout platoons, an LLVI team, an HCT, and M1200 Armored Knight fire support vehicles. The brigade’s Shadow UAV was placed in direct support of the squadron as were echelons above brigade (EAB) assets to include an AWT, a pair of VDL-capable F16s for use as non-traditional ISR (NTISR), and the Sky Warrior UAV (divisional asset). These supporting platforms added additional ISR assets to reinforce the squadron’s organic and attached capacity.

After the enemy’s counterattack was defeated, the squadron was tasked to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance in support of the BCT’s offensive operations to regain population centers seized during the enemy’s offensive. For the offensive phase, the squadron was tasked with numerous NAIs. To cover these NAIs, the squadron had its three organic troops and retained attachment of both Infantry battalion scout platoons (one was to be detached back to its parent battalion after that battalion crossed the line of departure/line of contact [LD/LC] and approached its objective). Supporting assets included an AWT, the Shadow UAV, a pair of NTISR F16s, the division’s Sky Warrior UAV, and an armed MQ-1 Predator (as with the defensive phase, not all of these supporting assets were airborne simultaneously throughout the offense).

**Mission Command Considerations for the Chief of Reconnaissance**

The role of chief of reconnaissance required the squadron to maintain a relatively closer relationship than most of the other battalions to the BCT commander and his staff, both in frequency of interaction and in geographic proximity. Recognizing that requirement, the squadron positioned its tactical operations center (TOC) close to the brigade headquarters’ main TOC — but outside of the templated bursting radius of the enemy’s indirect fire systems to ensure that two key brigade high-value targets would not experience effects from the same indirect fire event. The BCT fires battalion located its TOC in similar fashion. This geographic proximity allowed for daily face-to-face coordination between the squadron, fires battalion, and brigade primary staff representatives (specifically the S3, S2, and fire support officer). It also enabled better parallel planning. For example, it allowed the squadron staff to participate in the planning for the offensive phase such that the squadron leveraged the BCT’s ISR plan (from warning order [WARNO] #2 as its fragmentary order [FRAGO]), and the organic reconnaissance troops leveraged the BCT’s ISR fires rehearsal as their BCT-level rehearsal event. As a benefit of this parallel planning, all three organic troops had crossed the LD/LC and were in the process of gathering information to answer PIR when the BCT executed its combined arms rehearsal. (The technique of employing assets in advance of the BCT main body to answer PIR that validate the BCT’s tactical plan is commonly referred to as “recon push.”)

During the defensive phase of the operation, the BCT commander and squadron commander also identified the requirement to have an even more seamless interaction during critical events of the counter-reconnaissance fight. To achieve better synergy, the squadron relocated its tactical command post (TAC) — commander, S3, S2, fire support officer, and air liaison officer — inside the BCT’s TOC during the period of darkness in which enemy’s first echelon reconnaissance entered the BCT sector (particularly the security zone), and also the next period of darkness when the enemy main body entered the security zone and passed through to the BCT’s close area. This temporary collocation of C2 nodes allowed the squadron commander to interface in person with the BCT commander, S3, and CUROPS staff to ensure both the squadron and the BCT were seeing the same indicators and making the same assessments of the enemy’s actions and intentions. It also increased the effective synchronization of the various organic, attached, and supporting assets.

**Chief of Reconnaissance in the BCT “Deep Fight”**

The BCT commander structured his area of operations (AO) into three primary zones, as described in Chapter 3 of FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. The BCT rear area was essentially defined by the airhead line and included the brigade support area (BSA); the C2 nodes for the BCT headquarters, fires battalion, reconnaissance battalion, and brigade special troops battalion; and the area around the field landing strip (FLS) that the BCT used as a continual aerial port of debarkation/embarkation (APOD/APOE) for personnel, equipment, and logistics. During the defense, the close area included the terrain beyond the airhead line controlled by the Infantry battalions; during the offense, the Infantry battalions conducted battle hand-off of their objectives from the reconnaissance squadron to create their respective close areas. The deep area (synonymous with the BCT security area) included the terrain within the BCT AO that was beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) out to the BCT’s boundaries. For all phases, the reconnaissance squadron operated in the BCT deep area as a shaping operation, while the squadron’s field trains and TOC remained in the BCT rear area executing their doctrinal logistic and C2 functions.

The BCT commander also identified several “fights” that the BCT would closely synchronize in support of the maneuver battalions. The ISR/deep fires fight became the purview of the reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion (chief of recon and FSCOORD, respectively) to prosecute. As the BCT quickly discovered, the presence of supporting ISR and fires assets — such
as CAS sorties, armed Predator sorties, and the M777 platoon provided by the 18th Fires Brigade — provided the BCT with the capability to identify targets and apply lethal effects far beyond the limits of the brigade’s organic MTOE assets. (Unlike the heavy and Stryker BCTs, the IBCT has no organize 155mm cannon assets with which to employ precision artillery munitions.) In fact, the brigade was able to employ lethal precision munitions against enemy HPTs located in and around the main offensive objective. The destruction of key enemy forces as part of the deep fight had a resultant shaping effect in support of the BCT’s Infantry battalions in that it prevented the enemy from using those assets against the Infantry battalions’ latter assaults.

The prosecution of the BCT deep fight was formulated in BCT targeting...
workgroup meetings in coordination between the chief of recon, FSCOORD, and the BCT XO. In doing so, the ISR plan was synchronized to the BCT’s HPT list and attack guidance matrix (AGM). The result was an integrated and centralized system-of-systems approach to the D3A process that enabled the chief of recon to locate and destroy enemy high-payoff targets simultaneous to the conduct of reconnaissance operations focused on ground line-of-communication conditions and enemy dispositions in and around the Infantry battalions’ objectives. This combination of ground reconnaissance by organic and attached assets, in conjunction with squadron-controlled enablers operating one phase line to the front of their forward trace to target enemy HPTs, created a capability and lethality far beyond the squadron’s MTOE design. In essence, it applied the precepts of the pre-rotational troop-level joint fires integration live fire at a squadron level — with similarly devastating effects.

The benefit of the enablers became painfully evident around midnight of the first period of darkness for the offensive phase. Around that time, for various reasons, the squadron’s supporting air assets were all grounded or off station. Almost immediately, the squadron’s ground reconnaissance elements began to take substantially heavier contact and increased casualties as the enemy regained freedom to maneuver due to the suddenly one-dimensional nature of the reconnaissance and targeting effort.

By contrast, the enemy commander admitted after the offensive phase that one of his essential tasks communicated in his intent to his forces had been to destroy the BCT’s ground reconnaissance forces in his security zone in order to prevent them from identifying his high-value targets and providing information on the assault objectives to the BCT and the Infantry battalions. In the BCT’s final after action review (AAR), the enemy commander specified that the combination of enablers in echelon forward of the ground reconnaissance elements was not only unforeseen but had significant effects on his combat power. This caused him to constantly reposition his high-value targets to replace his losses in his security zone and to avoid their detection and destruction prior to eventual engagement with the BCT’s Infantry companies.

As a final note on the prosecution of the BCT’s deep fight, the synergy achieved by synchronizing ISR assets with lethal fires into a process under the control of a single battalion-level commander, operating within the intent of the brigade commander, could not have been achieved under the habitual COIN method of equal distribution of assets. Even with all of the assets under the squadron’s control, the process remained extremely dynamic and required frequent retasking of assets from their originally apportioned set of NAIs in
Chief of Reconnaissance in Reverse-Targeting

In addition to its role in the BCT deep fight, the reconnaissance squadron was able to provide valuable advice and information pertaining to the force protection of BCT high-value targets located within the rear area. Specifically, the squadron applied a “reverse-targeting” process to the BSA and the FLS. By analyzing each of those targets and determining how the squadron would execute reconnaissance and target acquisition activities against them, the squadron staff was able to develop a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and recommended NAI overlay for each. Those products were provided to the brigade support battalion and brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) staffs, respectively, to assist in their security and counter-reconnaissance plans.

The 3rd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division not only employed its reconnaissance squadron in the manner prescribed in FM 3-20.96, it also developed TTPs for utilizing the squadron command and staff as the BCT’s chief of recon. In this role, the squadron contributed to the BCT’s successful execution of combat operations against a hybrid threat by synchronizing the BCT commander’s ISR assets to achieve ISR unity of effort; coordinating (in conjunction with the fires battalion) the BCT’s deep fight against enemy reconnaissance forces and high-payoff targets; and conducting counter-reconnaissance assessments of the BCT’s high-value targets. These functions are beyond the scope of current recon squadron doctrine but speak to the vast untapped potential of these organizations as the Army explores the employment of modular BCTs in full spectrum operations.

Doctrinal Overview

The deactivation of the armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons leaves the reconnaissance squadrons in the Army’s three BCT designs as the highest-echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on performing reconnaissance and security operations for a higher headquarters. (Although the battlefield surveillance brigades are intended to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in support of a corps headquarters, their current design doesn’t not lend itself to label them as “maneuver” units.) As explained in FM 3-20.96, the reconnaissance squadrons of modular BCTs provide a significant dismounted and mounted reconnaissance force; provide timely, accurate, and relevant combat information; and enable the [BCT] commander to decisively employ his maneuver battalions and joint fires at the time and place of his choosing.

This is particularly essential during the conduct of full spectrum operations in which commanders are expected to perform offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously.

Fundamentals of Reconnaissance

FM 3-20.96 lists seven fundamentals of reconnaissance that must be adhered to during reconnaissance operations:

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance;
- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve;
- Orient on the reconnaissance (or security) objective;
- Report all information rapidly and accurately;
- Retain freedom of maneuver;
- Gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible; and
- Develop the situation.

FM 3-20.96 also lists five fundamentals of security operations. However, since those fundamentals parallel and are essentially inclusive to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, the latter framework will be used for discussion purposes in relating the experiences of 5-73 Cavalry at JRTC and in providing proposed solutions to the situations it encountered.

Ensure continuous reconnaissance.

By comparing the NAI requirements for the defensive and offensive phases of the JRTC experience — assuming that the size and scope of the squadron’s NAI responsibilities were typical for full spectrum operations — it is clear that the squadron’s organic (e.g. MTOE) assets are not sufficient to provide continuous reconnaissance given the size of the defensive security zones and the extensive area in which the squadron conducts offensive operations.

To further complicate matters, each NAI is not best observed with ground reconnaissance personnel. The solution to this dilemma is a combination of internal task organization (for the defense, each organic troop was task organized with both mounted and dismounted platoons), and the employment of significant ISR attachments to include scout platoons from the Infantry battalions, LLVI teams, HCTs, AWTs, brigade’s Shadow UAV, and non-traditional ISR in the form of VDL-equipped CAS sorties. This combination of assets provides for different means to observe NAI and lends itself to more effective mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets as explained in FM 2-01, ISR Synchronization, and FM 3-20.96.

Another way to ensure continual reconnaissance is to vary the means by which reconnaissance assets are inserted or infiltrated into the area of operations. If mounted or dismounted ground insertion from the vicinity of the LD/LC is the only technique used, the enemy can easily focus and mass his counter-reconnaissance assets forward; this is analogous to “putting eight men in the box” in football parlance. However, air insertion of...
dismounted assets — either from the dismounted troop, attached Infantry scout platoons, or even dismounted sections from the mounted troops — forces the enemy commander to disperse his counter-reconnaissance forces and provides for a better chance of successful insertion (and thus observation of the assigned NAIs) by ground reconnaissance elements.

The employment of supporting aerial ISR assets is also a consideration for achieving and maintaining continual reconnaissance. Each air asset has different capabilities that must be understood by the squadron staff in order to optimize its usage. The squadron considered three key questions to help in optimizing the employment of ISR assets during this operation:

* Does the asset have VDL capability so that the squadron can observe its feed and adjust its observation area if necessary?
* What type of optics (day, IR, thermal) does the asset have?
* Does the asset have the capability to engage targets (within the proper engagement criteria and in accordance with the HPT list and AGM), or is it best used as a “hunter” for a second armed asset?

These considerations come into play during the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance mission and may require dynamic retasking of aerial assets to take advantage of each platform’s particular capabilities. For instance, if an unarmed UAV observes a stationary enemy reconnaissance vehicle, it can act as the “hunter” for lethal artillery fires delivered by the fires battalion — to include GPS-guided precision munitions from supporting 155mm howitzer units. However, if an unarmed UAV observes a moving enemy vehicle, it will likely require the squadron to retask an aerial asset armed with laser-guided precision munitions to which the target can then be handed off for lethal targeting and post-strike battle damage assessment. Once that hand-off occurs, the unarmed asset can then assume overwatch of the NAI that the armed asset was previously observing. This rapid D3A process can and did occur several times over a single period of darkness during the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fights.

**Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.** Idle reconnaissance assets represent a poor employment plan, given the likely volume of NAIs tasked to the squadron. The only exception to this is the likelihood for the squadron to maintain a reserve or quick reaction force — most likely in the form of a mounted reconnaissance platoon — in order to reinforce reconnaissance efforts or to provide a “killer” asset to reconnaissance elements that must remain otherwise static with strict direct fire engagement criteria. The S2 and S3 must continually compare NAI requirements and available reconnaissance assets to ensure that the squadron is optimizing its capacity. Any “excess” reconnaissance assets beyond a 1:1 ratio (and the QRF requirement) should be employed to provide mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets of various types.

**Orient on the reconnaissance objective.** The primary means to ensure that organic and attached reconnaissance elements remain focused on the reconnaissance objective is for the squadron commander to provide clear reconnaissance or security guidance during the planning phase for a mission. Reconnaissance guidance should include the focus of reconnaissance, tempo of reconnaissance (stealthy vs. forceful, deliberate vs. rapid), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria. Security operation (e.g. screen line) guidance is similar and should include focus of security operations, tempo (time duration of the observations posts), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria.

Detailed terrain analysis performed at all levels of reconnaissance unit leadership is another imperative for reconnaissance and security operation planning. Reconnaissance element leaders must analyze the terrain to determine where the enemy is most likely to try to acquire and destroy friendly units. Terrain analysis requires the identification of natural or man-made obstacles that will create chokepoints for the reconnaissance force — and will likely require a deliberate process to clear or bypass. In the force-on-force scenario at JRTC, the enemy elected to strong-arm a series of natural chokepoints along the long route that the squadron was tasked to recon. That route reconnaissance effort evolved into a series of intense engagements between enemy mechanized forces and friendly HMMWV-mounted elements — an intuitively obvious combat power mismatch that resulted in significant friendly casualties and a slower than expected reconnaissance tempo on that particular route. Had the squadron and troop leadership performed a better terrain analysis, a good deal of the direct fire contacts between friendly and enemy ground elements may have been avoided.

The habitual COIN method of diverting ISR or AWT assets to emerging events (mortar points of origin or troops-in-contact situations) creates friction with the fundamental requirement to orient on the reconnaissance objective and should therefore
be carefully considered during full spectrum operations. Since air assets often perform zone reconnaissance or screening operations in advance of ground elements, the reconnaissance or security effort tends to lose focus and tempo when those aerial assets are dynamically retasked away from the squadron. As a second-order effect, the tempo of reconnaissance slows as ground elements become more cautious in their technique, particularly when facing an enemy that has combat power overmatch against organic vehicles and weapon systems. The current operations cells at the BCT and squadron levels need to make a deliberate assessment of each indirect fire event or troops-in-contact situation in order to determine if the threat presented requires a retasking of a high demand/low density asset such as a UAV or AWT away from the predetermined reconnaissance focus of that platform. One potential solution to this challenge is to specify which assets are in direct support to the squadron, and which are in general support, with the latter being the primary assets to consider for re-allocation in support of events that occur outside of the security area.

Report all information rapidly and accurately. In order to develop the BCT commander’s situational understanding, the squadron must ensure that all information from the deep area is reported in a timely and accurate fashion. Early in the defensive phase of the operation, the squadron recognized that there was a gap in situational understanding by the BCT commander. Essentially, the common operating picture (COP), both friendly and enemy, of the security zone (e.g. deep area) as depicted by the brigade and squadron staff’s in their respective TOCs did not match. This gap in knowledge also existed between the squadron (which was operating on digital systems such as command post of the future [CPOF]) and its organic ground reconnaissance troops (which were operating primarily on Blue Force Tracker [BFT]). The largest friction point was not the reporting from the troops to the squadron TOC. Instead, the friction point was the translation of the troops’ reports, which primarily came across FM nets along with some BFT reports, from analog reports to digital (CPOF) reports, and the subsequent tracking of those digital reports by the BCT TOC. The squadron TOC created CPOF events for the reports that the troops rendered. Those CPOF events did not, however, auto-populate the CPOF COP maintained by the BCT TOC; instead, it required a dedicated individual in the BCT TOC to manually “drag” the squadron’s CPOF events into the BCT’s master CPOF COP. Therefore, the BCT commander and his key staff did not “see” the same enemy disposition as the squadron. Likewise, not all CPOF events translated into BFT reports (note: the two systems do not auto-populate one another). Thus, if the squadron TOC did not create BFT reports from the CPOF events of other battalions, the troop commanders were unable to gain a full situational understanding by monitoring their BFT systems.

A three-part solution solves this reporting deficiency created by a multitude of analog and digital systems at varied levels of command. First, the ground troops must report all contact and observations reports over FM communications and digitally through BFT (if they have BFT; the dismounted troop may not, depending on its tactical configuration for a specific mission). This will ensure that the digital COPs of higher headquarters immediately reflect the situation on the ground. Second, the squadron TOC must ensure that all monitored CPOF or FM-reported events from units other than the ground troops (or from organic elements without BFT) populate BFT; this may require the BFT operator in the TOC to manually create BFT events. Lastly, the squadron must continually synchronize its CPOF COP with the BCT COP. This is a duty suited for the squadron liaison officer to brigade.

Additionally, as a means of fratricide prevention, the squadron must continually track, both digitally and analog, all friendly
positions — particularly those in the deep area. The squadron experienced two fratricide incidents during the operation. The first involved an AH-64 engagement against a friendly gun truck and M1200 vehicle; the second involved a mounted platoon engagement against a dismounted element that was infiltrating into zone. Both incidents could have been averted by a combination of passive and active control measures. First, the squadron (and all BCT elements) must ensure that a common air-ground integration (AGI) vehicle marking system is in place; the markings must be visible by aircraft using day, IR, or thermal optics. Second, all mounted elements must be equipped with BFT systems. For those that are not and for dismounted elements, the troop command post must continually update their position on BFT by manually entering an icon. Lastly, graphic control measures (controlled fire lines, infiltration lines, no fire areas) must be disseminated to all elements over BFT to ensure proper synchronization and a clear COP.

**Retain freedom of maneuver.** Ground troop command posts and troop trains must be able to self-secure during FSO. A ground troop cannot maximize its reconnaissance assets forward and maintain its freedom of maneuver if it “bleeds off” gun trucks to secure the troop C2 and/or logistical elements. To solve this dilemma, the troop collocated its troop C2 element, 120mm mortar section, and trains (to include attached medical and/or maintenance assets) for mutual force protection. However, this method reinforced the requirement of the troop command team to properly position and camouflage key (and vulnerable) friendly positions to prevent their compromise by the enemy.

Ground troops require assistance for the evacuation of casualties and/or damaged vehicles from the deep area back to the rear area. As with security of the C2 and logistical assets, the troop loses momentum of reconnaissance if it must generate sufficient combat power to evacuate casualties and vehicles a significant distance rearward from the troop casualty collection point or unit maintenance collection point. To assist the troops, the squadron employed an armed escort element from the distribution platoon to link up with troop first sergeants at predetermined logistical resupply points to retrieve casualties and damaged vehicles for transport back to the rear area. This method (and all logistical resupply missions) required the distribution platoon element to conduct forward and rearward passage of lines with the Infantry battalions as they progressed from the rear area, through the close area, to the fringes of the deep area, and back. This also required the squadron to resource the distribution platoon with gun trucks — a method that is common in the current COIN theaters, but one that is not enabled by the squadron’s organic MTOE.

At the squadron level, sustainment of organic and attached elements forward in the security zone or beyond the LD/LC in offensive operations, quickly overwhelmed organic capability and capacity. The squadron lacks the ability to rapidly and efficiently perform casualty evacuation, back-haul of damaged vehicles, and resupply of vital logistics (particularly Class I, III, and V). A great deal of planning and assistance from the BCT staff and supporting units (the brigade support battalion and potentially the supporting Army aviation unit) is necessary to allow the squadron’s troops to operate at extended distances from the Infantry battalions or brigade rear area without losing momentum. This planning and coordination must be solidly in place before the BCT publishes WARNO #2 and executes the ISR/fires rehearsal — which often serve as the squadron’s FRAGO and combined arms rehearsal, respectively.

**Gain and maintain contact with the smallest element possible.** Despite previous doctrinal suggestions that reconnaissance elements can gain valuable information without making direct contact with the enemy, this is not often the case when facing a determined hybrid threat such as the one encountered at JRTC. Ground reconnaissance elements, particularly those of the mounted troops, must expect that they will make direct contact — and tactically array themselves to do so with the smallest element possible. This often requires moving in multiple echelons, with UAV, AWT, or other assets conducting a zone reconnaissance ahead of ground reconnaissance assets who, in turn, move either with dismounts to the front of the mounted formation (if stealthy, deliberate reconnaissance is required) or, at a minimum, with an overwatch formation if a more aggressive tempo is demanded by the mission timeline.

This same concept of echeloned reconnaissance applies to security (screen line) operations. Where feasible (by METT-TC), array reconnaissance forces so that air assets are screening forward to provide early warning and detection of approaching enemy forces. Air assets then hand off approaching enemy forces to static and concealed dismounted teams. The dismounted elements in turn maintain contact until mounted reconnaissance forces can either observe or, if engagement criteria dictate, destroy the enemy.

**Develop the situation.** Each reconnaissance element must continue to develop the situation upon contact (visual or direct fire) with the enemy. Troop commanders must be knowledgeable in the planning and employment of joint fires — so that CAS, AWT, and indirect fire assets (from the brigade’s fires battalion or from the troop organic mortars) can be brought to bear. Troop commanders must also be versed on the tactics to apply when the unit encounters linear danger areas or man-made obstacles that cannot be bypassed (e.g. defile drills and obstacle breaching procedures). Lastly, troop commanders must continually update their reports as they gain more information about a particular NAI or objective.

**The Reconnaissance Squadron in Stability Operations**

In Iraq and Afghanistan today, reconnaissance squadrons are employed in much the same fashion as Infantry battalions; they are designated as “landowners” for the purposes of conducting COIN activities within a defined area of operations. In contrast, the 3rd BCT conceptually developed several other potential mission sets for the reconnaissance squadron in stability operations that better utilize its capabilities to shape conditions in the BCT area of operations and to improve the BCT commander’s situational awareness.

**Route security.** With its two mounted troops and a habitual relationship with several forms of aerial ISR platforms, the reconnaissance squadron is ideally suited to perform continual route reconnaissance (and route clearance if enabled with attached
The reconnaissance squadrons in the modular BCT designs have become the highest-echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on, and proponency for, reconnaissance and security operations.

Operations within unassigned areas. As the brigade’s dedicated reconnaissance and security element, the squadron is capable of conducting shaping operations within otherwise unassigned battlespace in order to provide the BCT commander with information about the enemy, terrain, or population or to achieve specific desired effects. If the BCT owns a substantially sized area of operations and elects to assign noncontiguous areas of operation to its Infantry battalions, there remains a potentially large unassigned area that, by doctrine, is the responsibility of the brigade headquarters. As part of the targeting process, the squadron could be assigned the mission to perform reconnaissance of a specific NAI or set of NAIs within the unassigned area. If provided with supporting assets, the squadron could then achieve lethal or non-lethal effects against a specified target within the unassigned area in support of the BCT’s concept of operations and campaign plan.

Civil infrastructure reconnaissance and assessment. Properly trained reconnaissance elements are capable of conducting enemy, terrain, and populace-focused reconnaissance operations. If enabled with the appropriate civil affairs and engineer assets, the squadron is capable of ranging the BCT area of operations and conducting reconnaissance and assessments of critical civil infrastructure in order to inform future improvement projects that will improve the quality of life for host nation civilians.

Host nation security force assistance. As a reconnaissance and security-focused organization, the squadron is capable of partnering with host nation forces — particularly reconnaissance and security forces (e.g. cavalry or border guards) — to conduct security force assistance. This role also takes advantage of the squadron’s relatively smaller subordinate elements, which also have a lower soldier-to-leader ratio than most other maneuver units, to act as self-mobile advise-and-assist teams to host nation units.

Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief zone reconnaissance. Reconnaissance units are particularly valuable during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. These missions often occur in an environment that has been ravaged by forces of nature and require careful consideration of where to focus the BCT’s forces to have the greatest effect on assisting the joint task force (JTF) commander, the lead federal agency, and the local or host-nation authorities. Recent examples of this include the disaster relief efforts conducted by 82nd Airborne Division units and other elements in New Orleans (2005) and Haiti (2009). The squadron can assist the BCT and JTF headquarters by performing its basic mission essential tasks to answer PIR pertaining to the operational environment. Potential missions during humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations include route reconnaissance from the APOE/SPOE to the most affected locations, area reconnaissance of potential basing or staging areas for relief forces, zone reconnaissance to locate displaced persons, and area security to assist local authorities in preventing looting by criminal elements.

Summary

The reconnaissance squadrons in the modular BCT designs have become the highest-echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on, and proponency for, reconnaissance and security operations. Understanding and adherence to the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security operations are absolutely essential to success during full spectrum reconnaissance and security operations. The lessons learned by leaders and paratroopers of Panther Recon during its recent JRTC rotation mandate that reconnaissance squadrons — particularly those in the CEF — incorporate and reinforce these fundamentals during tough, realistic home station training.

Editor’s Note: The next issue of Infantry will feature part III in the IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron series — “Organizing, Manning, and Equipping the IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron for Full Spectrum Operations.”

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Mentoring and advising a foreign officer that is at least one rank higher than your own and has been fighting since he was a teenager can seem like a daunting task. In addition, a combat advisor (CA) may attend several weeks of training to be an advisor and still may not have a clear vision of what he will actually be doing once he is in theater. This article will attempt to give simple and direct advice on what a CA can expect in the relationship with his counterpart based on actual CA experiences, with a focus on key leader engagements (KLEs) in Afghanistan.

Relationships Will Make You or Break You
The most important measure of success as a CA is your professional relationship with your Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) counterpart and with your coalition counterpart. Your relationship with your Afghan counterpart will be the determining factor on how much progress you will make during your deployment; however, do not take for granted your relationship with other coalition leaders. You will certainly have your own U.S. chain of command for reporting, but you may have a dual reporting requirement to another coalition military. Your CA team may be responsible for an Afghan brigade commander, but the division-level CA team may be from a coalition nation. For example, the CA organization in western Afghanistan in 2009 included U.S. Army battalion-level CAs and an Italian Army brigade-level CA team. Those responsible for Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion commanders and staff had a dual reporting chain. They reported to their U.S. chain of command as well as to the Italian CAs at the Afghan brigade. If a coalition CA team is responsible for a higher or adjacent Afghan unit, you must make sure your chain of command understands the goals and operations of that coalition team.

Build Rapport to Get the Best Results
To teach, coach, and mentor your counterpart, you must be able to influence his decision-making process. The best way to do this is to build a solid rapport with him. There will be vast cultural differences between you and your counterpart. You may have nothing in common with him, but you must first build rapport to start developing your professional relationship.

Get to know your counterpart personally. He will definitely invite you to lunch, so have lunch with him and do it often. Talk with him about subjects not related to work. Don’t be afraid to socialize.

Another great and often overlooked technique used to get to know your counterpart better is to debrief your interpreter after each KLE. Your interpreter will tell you if your counterpart liked what you said, got upset, what he said to his staff during the KLE, or even what kind of Dari accent he has.

Once you get to know your counterpart on a personal level, the process of building a professional relationship becomes much easier. When you have a good professional relationship, advising will be much more effective. It all starts with building rapport.

There Will Be No Short Meetings with Your Counterpart
There are rarely “quick meetings” or engagements, either at home station or while deployed. As Army leaders, we are all experienced in attending meetings. The KLE is the crux of what a combat advisor does, and your KLEs with your Afghan counterparts may take twice as long as a meeting with your American peers. The reason for this is obvious and simple — the language barrier. All of the discussion in a KLE is literally said twice — sometimes several times. Everything you want to say to your Afghan counterpart must first be understood then translated by your interpreter. Your counterpart’s response must also be understood and translated by your interpreter. Some words simply don’t translate from English into Dari (or whatever language your counterpart speaks) and vice versa.

Besides single words not translating, oftentimes entire phrases, the nuances of different languages, and the complex intent behind what we want to say to our counterpart don’t translate well. Just trying to convey one idea to your counterpart can bring the KLE to a standstill. Another example of the cumbersome translation process is trying to get a simple piece of information from your counterpart.
and having to ask multiple times to get a simple answer.

Another reason a KLE will take longer than originally anticipated is that your counterpart will agree on a topic of discussion but have an ulterior motive and will direct the conversation in an entirely different direction. For example, you may go into a routine KLE with the agreement that the topic will be mundane details about a weapons and personnel inventory, and your counterpart will talk about his fuel needs for most of the meeting.

He may talk for extended periods of time while you sit patiently and quietly and listen. This is simply a cultural difference — your counterpart is not intentionally being rude. Afghan officers can, and will, go into an extended monologue during a KLE, talking about not only the issue that prompted the KLE, but every other issue he may have at the time. Usual topics of discussion include: ammunition, food, transportation, and the Afghan resupply system. He may not expect you to provide realistic solutions for him on the spot, but he is usually venting his frustration about his challenges.

Don’t Assume Your Counterpart Knows or Cares What You’re Talking About

What is important to you isn’t necessarily important to your counterpart. American staff officers spend countless hours building and refining ingenious slide presentations and various other correspondence. Conversely, Afghan officers can request aviation support with a three-sentence, hand-written memorandum on a plain white piece of scrap paper with no letterhead. The ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) do not use the same staff processes and products as U.S. Soldiers. The lesson here is when you tell your counterpart in a KLE that one of you has to prepare slides for an upcoming briefing or operation, he will not necessarily know or care about what a professionally built presentation looks like.

Another example of the cultural difference in priorities is the importance of formal sensitive items accountability. In the U.S. military, accounting for weapons and sensitive items is a no-fail, command-directed activity. If a sensitive item isn’t accounted for, everything stops and it’s a unified effort to search for the item until it is found. The ANA and ANP don’t necessarily have the same systems and emphasis on this.

This doesn’t imply that they negligently lose weapons and equipment, but they are satisfied if their soldiers and police have enough weapons and equipment on hand to accomplish the mission. This will affect your KLE in how much command emphasis your counterpart should place on the inventories that he must conduct, and the timeliness and accuracy of the inventory.

Don’t Hold Your Counterparts to a U.S. Standard

Some combat advisors try to make their counterparts and their Afghan units perform at the same level as an American unit. No matter how hard you try, this will not happen. The cultural and social differences and priorities are enormous, and Afghan units simply will not conduct operations the way we do. An example of this is the staff process. For U.S. Army units, an operation order (OPORD) for a battalion mission can be a major document to include multiple annexes. An OPORD for an Afghan infantry battalion (kandak) can be a two-page hand written document with no annexes, if the kandak staff produces an order at all. For example, the embedded training team (ETT) in Farah Province, Afghanistan, has mentored the kandak on the military decision-making process (MDMP) and OPORD production several times over the years. For security operations during the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan, the kandak staff produced a two-page, hand-written OPORD. The kandak would not have produced one at all if the ETT had not coached them to do so.

In addition to the differences in staff processes, general soldier and military conduct is vastly different from the American military. A striking example of this is the general appearance and cleanliness of Afghan unit areas and buildings. To put it simply — there is trash everywhere. There is trash inside the offices, conference rooms, outside the buildings, and in the parking areas. A unit in the U.S. Army would never have an area like this. However, this is commonplace in Afghanistan. As a CA, you may want to address this with your counterpart, but don’t be disappointed if no progress is made. Afghans simply do not place the same emphasis as we do on area beautification and cleanliness. It is yet another example of different priorities in their culture.

Don’t Try to Be Your Counterpart’s Boss

As a CA, you give advice and mentor your Afghan counterpart. You are not in a supervisory position in relation to your counterpart. A potential pitfall in the CA relationship with a counterpart is attempting to dictate tasks. Your counterpart does not work for you. You are there simply to advise, relay information, mentor, coordinate, support, and whatever else may be needed. If your counterpart does not prioritize a mission or tasking that you as a CA need him to, then you will certainly think you are not accomplishing your mission. In this case, you may want to “order” him to do the mission or else! This absolutely will not work. A CA may try to emphasize the importance of a task to his counterpart,
but the counterpart simply does not plan to accomplish the task in the time frame or manner the CA wants or expects.

A great example of this is the ANP weapons and personnel inventory. This is a routine and recurring tasking that the ANP must complete and have completed for the past several years. The CAs report the results through their chain of command to measure ANP development.

In the spring of 2009, there was a KLE between the Herat Regional Police Mentor Team and the ANP commander for western Afghanistan. The topic of discussion was the upcoming weapons and personnel inventory. The ANP commander was not in the mood to discuss the inventory and was making excuses about why it would not be completed. The discussion went back and forth for a few minutes between the senior CA and the Afghan commander with no agreement. Finally, the CA gave the Afghan commander an absolutely brilliant response just because of its honesty and simplicity. He said, “General, this is not my inventory; this is your inventory. I really don’t care if you do it or not. I can only report that you didn’t to my chain of command which will report to the Ministry of the Interior. That’s all I can do.”

The CA remained calm and professional throughout the entire meeting even though his counterpart was not agreeing to their terms. The CA told his counterpart his role as a CA and why it’s important for the inventory to be completed. This method will work much more effectively than attempting to bully or coerce your counterpart. The response should be one of the guiding principles for a CA: “This is your mission, your unit, your country. Not mine. I’m just here to help.”

Don’t Assume Your Counterpart Needs Your Advice for Anything

As a CA, you’ll most certainly be providing advice and mentoring to a counterpart that outranks you and possibly has been fighting since he was a teenager. The Afghans are not naïve, they realize that they outrank you and probably have at least as much combat experience as you, if not more. However, they will always be polite, friendly, and gracious. They will listen to everything you have to say. Whether or not they take that advice is up to them, but they will at least listen.

Afghan leaders are not necessarily incompetent. They have their own methods and visions on how they lead their companies, battalions, brigades, and corps. The advice your Afghan counterpart wants to hear from you during combat is where you are placing your crew-served weapons and that close air support (CAS) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) are available. During garrison operations, your Afghan counterpart will almost certainly want you to help with his supply and logistics problems, primarily by personally delivering the supplies and equipment he wants and needs. This is rarely, if ever, possible, but you can facilitate the process for him. More often than not, this will be perfectly acceptable.

You Can’t Solve All Your Counterpart’s Problems, but You Can Facilitate

A common negotiation pitfall among salesmen and customer service representatives in the civilian world is telling a client that “it’s not possible” or “that’s against policy” or simply, “I can’t do that.” An effective technique to use when dealing with a difficult client in this situation is “don’t tell people what you can’t do; tell
them what you can do." This will apply to you as a CA more often than you think and will make your life much easier.

Your counterpart will almost certainly tell you that he needs ammunition, building materials, fuel, computers, printers, or any number of items or equipment. He will expect you to deliver these items because his supply system isn’t working well, and more importantly, that you are an American.

Do not tell your counterpart that you will make sure he gets his supplies and equipment as soon as possible. He will expect you to personally deliver everything he requested to his headquarters within the week, which almost certainly will not happen. When you fail to deliver on an obvious promise to your counterpart, you will lose credibility and your working relationship will suffer.

A good method to use in this situation is to honestly tell your counterpart what you can do, not what you can’t do. You can’t deliver his requested supplies within a week, but what you can do for him is to facilitate the process. You can report to your CA chain of command that your counterpart has ordered supplies and to have your higher level CAs check into the supply request with their counterparts. You can arrange a meeting with your counterpart’s logistics officer and the next higher level logistics officer. You can deliver the supply request forms to the next higher level logistics officer, or his CA, and make sure he understands the order and what he must do to fulfill it. As a CA, you are an advisor and a facilitator. Your job is to make your counterpart’s system work for him, not to do the work yourself.

Check, Recheck, and Double Check Everything with Your Counterpart

As previously mentioned, cultural differences between you and your counterpart can be vast. They can and will have different priorities than you and your CA team. For example, you and your counterpart’s focus for the week is planning for the security of an upcoming event. Your focus may be on creating a slide show for a briefing, and you desperately need input from your counterpart on how his unit will accomplish the mission. Your counterpart may be focused on the troops to task for the plan and making sure his soldiers have food and water while they are on the mission; he could care less about your PowerPoint slides. No amount of badgering from you will convey to your counterpart the importance of a slide show, even though to you it is critically important. To appease you, your counterpart may eventually give you a simplified concept of the operation, a troops to task analysis and anything else you may need, but you must make him understand that the information he provided will be brief to your boss, his boss, and up several levels of the chain of command. You must absolutely verify that the information and the plan he provided is what his unit will actually do for the operation because that is what will be presented.

Don’t Assume Your Counterpart Doesn’t Speak English

As a CA in Afghanistan, you may be pleasantly surprised by how many ANP and ANA officers speak English. Some Afghan officers speak fluent English. Other Afghan officers, even enlisted, will have a working knowledge of English but will not speak it to you. It is very important to know this because you will need to be aware of what you and your team members say while among your counterparts and their soldiers. The language barrier won’t mean that you can have a private conversation with your team members during a KLE. Make absolutely sure that you, or anybody else with you, don’t say something in English to insult your counterparts during the meeting; it’s highly likely they will know what was said. Also make sure you don’t have semi-private sidebar discussions with your team members during a KLE. What you say will probably be heard and understood by your counterparts.

Don’t Think That a CA Assignment is a Non-combat Job

Although your primary mission as a CA is to teach, coach, and mentor your counterpart, this is not necessarily a combat or lethal mission in all cases. A lot of your time will indeed be spent creating slides, gathering information for higher headquarters, conducting various inventories, planning training, and other administrative functions. However, it is highly likely that you will eventually be in a combat situation with your counterpart or his subordinate units. As previously mentioned, the enablers (CAS, MEDEVAC, crew-served weapons, etc.) you bring to the fight are highly valued by your counterparts. Don’t underestimate how much value your counterpart will place on your enablers — they can and will be a determining factor in your counterpart’s mission accomplishment. For example, an entire Afghan kandak will postpone or cancel a mission if the American CA team can’t join them. In many instances, your counterpart will insist that your CA team accompany them on missions. If your counterpart’s unit conducts a mission without you, chances are high that your counterpart will contact you during the mission requesting quick reaction force (QRF) support from you. You may be answering e-mail in the morning and providing support by fire by lunch.

Conclusion

Being a combat advisor is certainly one of the most challenging, frustrating, and rewarding assignments an Army leader can have. As a CA, you are the face of the American military and the American people and part of the long-term exit strategy. You are responsible for teaching, coaching, and mentoring a foreign military. The rapport you build with your counterpart will pay big dividends in building relations between the two militaries and in defeating the insurgency.

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Taking a Unified Approach:

The Integration of Foreign Security Forces in Security Forces Assistance

CPT DANIEL R. LEARD

After spending a year in Afghanistan training and advising an Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) brigade, I was very curious to see what the latest field manuals had to offer regarding the military advisor mission and related operations. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, were of particular interest. Both manuals appeared to be articulate and thorough, each providing numerous insights. As a company commander, I would absolutely make both manuals required reading for my platoon-level leaders. However, I cannot help but notice a propensity in recent doctrine to expound upon ethereal concepts and philosophies rather than to delineate clear practices, procedures, and processes.

The integration of foreign security forces (FSF) into combined operations is paramount to achieving our desired endstate in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Doctrine offers the combat leader many considerations, but it yields remarkably few answers in how to achieve that integration. The purpose of this article is twofold:

• To propose a group of principles that govern combined operations with host nation forces, and
• To present a step-by-step method for integrating conventional ground forces, transition teams, and host nation forces into the planning and execution of combat missions.

The goal is to provide advisor team leaders and commanders at the company and task force level a functional, systematic approach to combined operations with FSF.

To combat the insurgent counteroffensive that engulfed the southern region of Afghanistan in violence in the spring and summer of 2008, coalition ground forces saw increasing utility in conducting combined operations with Afghan forces. Infantry and Armor elements entered the scene, turning basic patrolling into high-intensity offensive operations. Coalition commanders at all levels fought for command and control against a hardened Afghan psyche that refused to submit, and mentor teams were in the middle of the ensuing power struggle trying to pick up the pieces. Although the problems that we encountered and witnessed in combined operations with Afghan forces are endemic, they are easily remedied.

The conflicting practices and thought processes apparent among the variety of coalition commanders that we encountered in Kandahar Province are products of two dynamics: the inherent complexity of the current mission in Afghanistan and the common, institutional identity propagated among conventional combat units. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment and our drive to transition to solvent host nation governance have produced a hybrid state of warfare, encompassing high intensity, security, and stability operations. Our current operational efforts combine elements of direct action and targeting in COIN, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Security Force Assistance (SFA). In fact, we are at a point in both Iraq and Afghanistan that to speak of COIN, FID, or SFA unequivocally implies the others. Even more problematic is that conventional forces, largely untrained in these types of operations, conduct the vast majority of FID and SFA missions traditionally reserved for Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Although FID and SFA have previously existed almost exclusively as SOF missions, emerging doctrine has captured the truth that the need for FID and SFA efforts in current conflicts far exceeds the capabilities of existing SOF elements. Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, introduces the expectation that conventional forces will now participate in the majority of operations related to internal defense and development, of which FID and SFA are an integral part. In his foreword to FM 3-07.1, GEN Martin E. Dempsey, commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, goes a step further and declares SFA to be a “core competency for our Army.”

The major issue that I witnessed in Afghanistan is that conventional maneuver units do not receive focused training or doctrinal instruction that adequately prepares them to accomplish the SFA mission. The three months of advisor training that my team received prior to deployment left us with very little knowledge concerning practical execution of our mission. In essence, we have not yet bridged the gap between SOF and conventional capabilities in the realm of SFA operations. The expectation that junior leaders can read a manual on the conceptual nature of SFA and walk away prepared to deploy and execute the mission without a practical guide or first-hand experience is unrealistic. If SFA is to be a core competency, establishing practical guidelines for its execution is essential.

The need for flexible leaders who exhibit an adaptive mindset and unwavering discipline and focus is greater than ever. Commanders will ultimately need to apply tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from across the operational spectrum to accomplish our missions in Southwest Asia.
Afghan National Army soldiers and Soldiers with the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry walk across a bridge during Operation Mountain Highway II in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 27 April 2008.

Photo by SSG Brandon Aird
need to refine and standardize certain practices to ensure unity of effort in our operations. These practices include the adoption of a functional framework and method for conducting combined operations with FSF.

**Understanding the Principles**

In early 2008, my mentor team participated in a combined operation between a reconnaissance (recce) troop of the Canadian 12th Armored Regiment and two battalions of the 3rd Zone Afghan Border Patrol (ABP). Our mission was to kill or capture the members of an improvised explosive device (IED) cell responsible for more than two dozen IED attacks against coalition and Afghan forces. Twelve hours into the operation, the Canadian commander and I nearly called off the mission because, from our perspective, the mission appeared to be chaotic, and our frustrations with the ABP commander grew to a boiling point. Moments later, a small group of Afghan patrolmen captured both members of the IED cell in the act. Even more to our amazement, the previously unidentified leader of that cell turned out to be a regional high-value target. We slowly realized that our perception that the mission was going badly was a function of miscommunication and a difference in tactics between the Canadian-American element and Afghan forces. Twelve hours into the operation, the Canadian commander's decisive operation. By the Afghan commander’s...
design, not ours, his unit’s task organization and tactics mirrored the enemy and were, therefore, successful. At the time, we did not appreciate this initiative for what it was and became easily frustrated with what seemed to be disorganization. In retrospect, we should have encouraged this commander’s thought process because he was right where he needed to be — inside the enemy’s decision cycle. In this case, all elements had unity of effort on the ground, but the Canadian commander and I did not realize it initially because we viewed the operation from a conventional perspective while our Afghan counterpart did not. Although SFA has recently become a mission for conventional forces, it requires a great deal of unconventional thought to accomplish correctly. Our solutions and approaches — as well as those of our host nation counterparts — may be as unconventional as we can imagine, but as long as we preserve unity of effort at all echelons, we will be successful.

**Interdependence** provides the means by which we assist without leading and assess without impeding. Once we ensure unity of effort, the next crucial step in planning and executing combined operations in SFA is to establish an interdependent relationship between the assistance force and the FSF throughout the duration of the operation. As I have already alluded, FSF integration bears much resemblance to our own joint operations: separate forces marked by disparate capabilities, tactics, identities, and operating languages but united by a common purpose. FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that “joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one service’s forces on another service’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both.” This definition adequately describes the interdependence concept as it applies to the integration of foreign services as well. Essentially, from the line of departure to the end of mission, both forces must remain independently controlled but in some way dependent on each other to accomplish the mission tasks.

This interdependent relationship, though similar to the joint relationships among our own services, stands in contrast to our practical application of combined arms theory. Among U.S. services, interdependence occurs innocuously behind the lines. Once bullets fly, however, the ground commander seizes control and directs the action. Conversely, in SFA, the ground commander must ensure that the interdependent relationship with the FSF unit endures throughout all phases of operations. The key to creating this interdependence is identifying a potential weakness that each element possesses and task organizing such that the elements are mutually supporting and at a significant disadvantage if one element abandons the unity of effort. The goal is to achieve two conditions:

1) The FSF unit is dependent enough to give the assistance force some small measure of control and input, and
2) The assistance force is dependent in some obvious and critical way that demonstrates its trust in the FSF unit.

During the 2008 mission, all units depended on the Canadians to deliver firepower and air support coordination. My advisor team provided the vital communication link between the Canadians and the Afghans, and the Afghans controlled all the intelligence sources and the bulk of ground forces. Our organization mirrored a three-legged stool that would topple should one leg disappear. Since our advisor team had an inordinately large area of operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border, it was relatively easy to create this interdependent relationship on long-range missions. In the deep frontier, our heavy weapons and the ability to call in close air support (CAS) and medical evacuation made the Afghans very dependent on us. Conversely, our ability to sustain ourselves, particularly with fuel, was negligible. We made it standard practice to have the bulk of our fuel carried by FSF trucks to demonstrate our need for and trust in them. Interdependence is vital to establishing proper roles between elements, maintaining unity of effort during the execution of operations, and building trust between forces.

**Continued collaboration** is the only path to competence. My primary counterpart in Afghanistan once said to me, “Because we are allies we will work with each other. Because we are friends we will listen to each other. Because we are brothers we will bleed for each other.” His statement is a simple and powerful illustration of the levels of FSF responsiveness to an assistance force advisor based on perceived personal relationship. “Allies” have very little influence. “Friends” influence the way one thinks. “Brothers” influence the way
one acts. An assistance force will have very little effect at all if it
cannot, at a minimum, reach friend status.

Much like the process of gaining cultural understanding, the
spirits of friendship and brotherhood can only be achieved through
regular, intensive collaboration. Units must establish long-term
relationships with counterpart FSF units if we hope to affect their
thoughts and actions. Ground force commanders must not slough
off the responsibility to bond with Afghan counterparts and expect
an advisor team to fill the gap. The advisor team will naturally deal
more closely with the Afghan unit and leaders; however, fostering a
healthy and productive combined relationship is the responsibility
of the ground commander. There are three very important
products of this continued collaboration: a mutual appreciation
for the counterpart unit’s capabilities; an observed, historical
framework for SFA operations assessment and modification; and
a set of combined standard operating procedures. Perhaps most
importantly, these are all durable products that pass to follow-on
units for continuity.

As related to our case-study mission in 2008, this particular
Canadian troop had never attempted a full-scale, combined
operation with an FSF unit. The new relationship between the
mentored Afghan leadership and the Canadian commander was
tenuous. The successful completion of that particular mission
seemed to be the foot-in-the-door that the Canadians wanted.
Unfortunately, a series of rather unfortunate and uncontrollable
events over the subsequent weeks caused a rift between the
local ABP leadership and the Canadian partner unit. Eventually,
the higher headquarters in Kandahar City gave up on repairing
the relationship and moved the Canadian troop elsewhere. The
Canadian unit’s performance was superb, and their commander
was supremely talented. I am not sure, in that specific case,
whether the relationship ever could have progressed beyond ally
status; however, because there was no continued collaboration, the
Canadian forces severed their chance to gain influence indefinitely.

**Exploitation** determines actual success. In COIN operations,
establishing the legitimacy of the ordered government and
dismantling the legitimacy of the insurgency are equally important.
We can define exploitation in two ways:

1) “Taking full advantage of success in military operations,
following up initial gains, and making permanent the temporary
effects already achieved,” and

2) “Taking full advantage of any information that has come to
hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes” (FM 1-02,
*Operational Terms and Graphics*).

This principle ties directly into the management of information
and expectations as a contemporary COIN imperative. Information
operations allow us to attack the legitimacy of an insurgency
without ever firing a shot. We must publicize every success (and
every enemy failure) to promulgate a sense of security and support
for local governance.

In our case study mission, we achieved overwhelming tactical
success. However, weeks later, we discovered that the mission,
by then a memory, had somehow become a complete failure.
The FSF commander had announced publicly that his forces
had apprehended the bomb maker. The IED cell in question had
inadvertently killed more than a dozen civilians, and the general
public consensus regarding their capture was positive. Unknown to
us at the time, however, the international military police
at Kandahar Air Field misplaced the incriminating
evidence required for the captives to stand trial. After
three days, the military magistrate released them. The
fallout when the captives returned was horrific. The
IED emplacement resumed, and the FSF and
the coalition appeared emasculated in the eyes
of the populace. It was a humiliating time.

![Afghan National Army soldiers walk through a village during a joint patrol with the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment in the Andar District of Afghanistan on 6 January 2011.](image)

Photo by SSgt Joseph Swafford, USAF

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Any failure on our part to exploit fully a favorable situation will open our efforts to potentially crippling physical or psychological attacks by the insurgency. In our case study, we — the ground commander and I, through no direct fault of our own — had failed to remove the threat from the populace. We were unable to exploit our tactical success. With further study of subsequent missions along with some focused research, I have compiled a model for successful mission exploitation in SFA operations. In the next section, I will fully discuss that model’s imperatives.

Building a Methodology

From our AAR following the 2008 mission in southern Afghanistan, we identified a set of basic steps that had directly contributed to our success. Over time, I have slightly expanded and refined the list to include a more thorough analysis of our failures in exploitation. The product is a seven-step model for the military advisor team or commander at the company/task force level. This methodology incorporates the troop leading procedures (TLPs) and the military decision-making process (MDMP) into a framework for conducting combined operations with foreign security forces. Although I built this model based on COIN experiences and some aspects of its execution, as described in this article, are specific to a COIN environment, the seven steps apply across the full spectrum of operations.

Step #1 — Identify Capabilities of the FSF Unit. This is a group effort between the ground commander and local advisor team if one exists. The doctrinal elements of combat power found in FM 3-0 are an excellent framework for this analysis. The most important area of focus is the quality of leadership in the participating FSF unit. The level of leadership competence will be the most critical factor when beginning to determine the FSF unit’s role in the operation. Additionally, the ground commander and his subordinate leaders must understand FSF unit tactics, particularly those that are different from our own practices. The most potent gauge of FSF unit capabilities is personal observations from previously conducted operations. The ongoing assessment of security force development remains the responsibility of the military advisor team. However, both commanders and advisors should capture these assessments through continued collaboration and analyze them according to established measures of performance and effectiveness.

Step #2 — Determine Appropriate Role for FSF Unit. This is the responsibility of the ground commander with the input of the advisors. Combined operations with FSF elements occur across the operational spectrum. I will use offensive operations, specifically the model for an attack, as an example, but with a little creativity, commanders can appropriately apply the concept to a variety of mission types. Army doctrinal task organization for a small unit attack designates four types of forces: assault, support, breach, and reserve.

An Infantry leader’s initial tendency will be to nominate the FSF for the reserve element (with no intention to use them at all) since their inferior capabilities indicate that U.S. or coalition forces can better accomplish the mission. This thought process is a fallacy. A unique set of operational conditions manifest in a variety of developing nations and are observable in nearly all COIN efforts undertaken by Western powers in the last century. Regardless of our tactical effectiveness or nobility of action, local populations will very often exhibit a “social version of an immune response in which the body rejects the intrusion of a foreign object, even one that serves an ultimately beneficial purpose,” according to Kilcullen in The Accidental Guerrilla. To avoid or limit this rejection, it is crucial that in all combat operations we ensure an active role for FSF that imparts upon that force a clear sense of purpose, ownership, and accountability. Additionally, as noted in the earlier discussion on legitimacy, a foreign security force that hangs steadily on the coattails of the assistance force, watching the action from afar, will lose its identity and purpose.

The assault, support, and breach forces that remain all require some skills. I would argue the rightful place, initially, for FSF elements is the assault. The assault force requires the most basic and easily taught skills, and they are the ones most personally engaged with both the threat and the surrounding population. The support element requires a level of skill and discipline — accuracy of fires and intimate knowledge of control measures — which a fledgling FSF unit will struggle to achieve. The breach element exhibits an even higher level of technical complexity requiring significant training and rehearsal to master. The use of FSF in the assault is imperative, and advisors must implement small-unit training geared toward progressive FSF assumption of support and breaching activity. As the FSF increase their capability to succeed in complex operational components, the burden is on the ground commander to trust the FSF unit and ensure their roles change accordingly.

Step #3 — Cooperatively Plan the Mission (TLPs/MDMP). This step brings the SFA ground commander, the military advisor, and the FSF commander(s) to the planning table. Initially, based on the role identification from Step #2, the U.S. company or task force will conduct the planning process. The commander will commit the selected course of action (COA) to memory and carry it to the cooperative planning session. Commanders must hide written orders or products at this point as they convey to the FSF leaders that the planning is complete without their input. Once together, the three leaders begin “planning negotiations.” Keep in mind that SFA operations will rarely pair commanders of equal rank. In my case, I was a young captain charged with mentoring a brigadier general and a colonel. This was an unusually large disparity; however, we must expect that the counterpart FSF commander will be at least one rank superior to the advisor and ground commander.

After dozens of leader engagements and cooperative planning sessions, my approach to dealing with this situation remains very similar to that of T.E. Lawrence nearly a century earlier. First, present the operational picture — situation, enemy, etc. — to the FSF commander for his consideration. Second, establish objectives and a mutual endstate. Third, ask the FSF commander

### Seven-Step Method for FSF Integration at the Tactical Level

1. Identify Capabilities of the FSF Unit
2. Determine Appropriate Role for FSF Unit
3. Cooperatively Plan the Mission
4. Share Resources
5. Collectively Rehearse the Mission
6. Execute/Supervise the Mission
7. Exploit the Three Bases
Step #4 — Share Resources. Once a combined COA emerges, the commanders must divide resources. The ground commander will most likely own the preponderance of assets. From my observations in Afghanistan, the commander’s desire will be to hold assets close, reserving them for his needs, but the FSF commander’s sole interest in conducting combined operations is to gain those assets for his effort. There has to be some give. The ground commander must share resources between forces. This may mean giving priority of fires to the FSF unit, giving control of CAS to the advisor team working close to the foreign force, or sending specialty teams such as snipers or mortars to support the FSF effort. The FSF commander may need to provide escorts in unfamiliar territory or provide security elements for isolated U.S. elements. This two-way sharing of resources is the means for achieving essential interdependence.

Step #5 — Collectively Rehearse the Mission. This step brings elements that will work in close concert together to refine tactics and procedures. Platoons, squads, or teams integrated with FSF elements must have adequate time to rehearse actions and maneuvers they will perform during the operation. For the commanders, the goal is to facilitate a rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill. As an example, if the participating FSF unit is a battalion, the FSF battalion commander (coached by the advisor) leads the ROC drill with all company commanders, including the U.S. commander, talking their respective actions and responsibilities. This combined ROC drill simultaneously builds the confidence and prestige of the FSF commander and ensures continuity among maneuver elements.

Step #6 — Execute/Supervise the Mission. The components of this step are obvious. The critical tasks for the ground commander and advisor are to:

* Keep the FSF element focused on the mission;
* Ensure the FSF element interfaces with the populace;
* Provide support as necessary; and

for a recommended COA, subsequently approving and praising his initial planning ideas. Fourth, introduce subtle modifications “causing the suggestions to come from him until they are in accord with your own opinion” (Twenty-seven Articles, T.E. Lawrence). Fifth, turn the group’s attention to fine details, holding the FSF commander to the selected COA.

Step #7 — Exploit the Three Bases. Exploitation is more of an ongoing process rather than a discrete step. Before we begin to plan a combat operation, we must consider how to exploit the tactical victory. In SFA operations, particularly in a COIN environment, there are three “targets” for post-mission exploitation: the enemy, the local population, and the local FSF unit. I call these targets “bases” as the process of engaging them is analogous to scoring in a baseball game. The idea is that if you want to get home, you have to hit all the bases, and it is best practice to hit them in the right order. While engaging these bases, the ground commander and advisor must address nine imperatives (See chart).

Concerning exploitation of the enemy, the exhaustive collection of intelligence is paramount. Intelligence provides a realistic perspective of enemy actions and intentions. Following site exploitation, removal of threat individuals from the population is the most enduring and powerful statement of success. This is where our team failed in 2008. Ground commanders and advisors must take a keen interest in the routine processing of detainees. If the coalition takes responsibility for the legal processing of a detainee, the lowest levels (or capturing level) must actively follow the legal process to ensure that the threat individuals receive full punishment under the law. As this can be very time-consuming, it is best to have the FSF handle detainees through the host nation legal system whenever possible. Lastly, with updated intelligence and target lists, the commanders must adjust combined operations to counter the enemy’s latest tactics. Concerning exploitation of the local population, we must ideologically separate the insurgent from the population. As the insurgent most likely has more in common with the locals than does the assistance force, this is no easy task. The best technique to alienate opposition forces is to paint them as an enemy to general public interest. We accomplish this through a planned, focused series of community engagements, information operations campaigns, infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance, and population security measures. Just as the population must see...
the insurgent as the enemy, it must see the FSF as the protector. A critical component of our community engagements must be a constant attempt to strengthen the security force’s prestige among the people. By endearing the FSF element — the arm of the host nation government — to the populace, we more firmly establish the legitimacy of the government itself. Finally, we must incorporate local leadership as the third element in a people-government-security force paradigm. Local leadership may include tribal entities as well as formal government representation. Using this connection with the leadership, we prepare the population for both the next cycle of direct action against the enemy and the ensuing economic and development programs.

The ongoing assessment of the FSF element and the provision of feedback are the primary means by which we promote growth and learning. Field Manual 3-24.2 offers a solid AAR plan incorporating a combined AAR with the FSF unit, a commander’s one-on-one discussion, and an internal AAR conducted by the advisor team and partner unit. This format provides honest feedback to all units while taking into account the possible need for face-saving on the part of the FSF leadership. With our observations and assessments in hand, the next step is to refine the organization and its capabilities by subtly altering FSF training and advisory assistance to promote improvement in identified weak areas. Lastly, but most importantly, we must avoid patterns of failure at all costs. Errors in judgment and tactical losses will occur. When they do, we must immediately follow up with a series of successes. An FSF unit that experiences sequential tactical losses or performance blunders will consequently suffer diminished self-confidence and legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Avoiding the Undesirable Partnership

Most of the negative relationships that I witnessed in Afghanistan were easily avoidable. In these cases, the partner units or advisor teams fell into dangerous pitfalls, or more accurately, adopted those traps as plans. I generalize these in two major categories. The first type of pitfall is a relationship built on mutual distrust or disrespect. One U.S. company commander in Paktika Province in 2008 avoided contact with adjacent Afghan elements and routinely referred to Afghan security forces as “host nation mine rollers.” This cultural arrogance and disregard for the lives of the FSF members created a sense of apathy on both sides. The second type of pitfall is a relationship built on unilateral action. This type of relationship occurs when the assistance force exhibits a proclivity to either undertake the FSF mission in their stead or fails to assist the FSF in their time of need. The approach is hallmarked by prevailing attitudes that range from “we can do it better” to “it is their country, let them take care of it.” I have already discussed the dangerous effects of these extreme perspectives.

In conclusion, the principles and methodology described in this article are applicable across the full range of FSF organizations. Advisory and partnered assistance occur simultaneously across competencies. In his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula notes that counterinsurgency police organizations, if properly trained and supported, supersede armed forces as the most potent COIN force. Before adopting any standard practice in SFA operations, we must consider if the practice pays positive dividends across all lines of effort. I derive the integration steps from my experiences dealing primarily with the Afghan Border Patrol, an organization that exhibited a broad mission set, ranging from local policing to multi-echelon offensive operations. My advisor team successfully applied the seven steps to combined operations with Afghan National Police elements in both city and highway operations as well. When comparing this seven-step method against popular historical examples, it appears very similar to the orchestrations of T.E. Lawrence in the latter phases of the Arab-British march to Damascus in 1918. The process is timely, flexible, and, most importantly, it allows advisor teams and partner units to integrate FSF elements with a common approach that will promote continuity.

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A list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry.
The recently modified Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) is a unique 26-day course that provides maneuver commanders with Soldiers trained in detailed mission planning, coordination, and the technical skill sets required to conduct persistent reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the contemporary operating environment. An extremely physically and mentally demanding course, RSLC integrates a variety of training highlighted by advanced planning techniques and specific technical training. This training includes: advanced collection and product development, beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications, close target reconnaissance (CTR), multiple insertion/extraction methods (special purpose insertion and extraction system [SPIES], fast rope insertion and extraction system [FRIES], and airborne insertion), and small unit tactics. Upon successful completion of RSLC, graduates are capable of executing squad and team level reconnaissance and surveillance missions in any environment and are awarded the 6B additional skill identifier (ASI).

A common myth about RSLC is that the target audience is specifically long range surveillance (LRS) units. While LRS Soldiers do attend the course, RSLC training is structured to provide the shared training requirements of different Soldiers and MOSs throughout the Army — from RSTA squadrons, Infantry scout platoons, LRS teams, to Special Operations Forces (SOF). Furthermore, RSLC trains elements across the services to include the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. While RSLC is a part of the Ranger Training Brigade, being Ranger or Airborne qualified is not a prerequisite for attendance.

RSLC provides a variety of different training options to support specific unit operational mission requirements. The primary option is the “Open ATTRs” course that is conducted approximately eight to nine times per fiscal year. However, RSLC offers the opportunity to conduct rotational unit training (RUT). This option is unique because units can acquire the majority of course slots for their Soldiers. Furthermore, this affords units the opportunity to train as organic teams for the duration of the course. Additionally, RSLC does offer the opportunity to conduct the full program of instruction (POI) through mobile training teams (MTTs). These MTTs mirror the resident course, and graduates are awarded the ASI-6B upon successful completion. Understanding today’s constraints based on the current operational tempo, RSLC does offer a menu-based option in which units can select specific material to best support their training needs and time constraints. A menu-based POI can be accomplished either as an MTT to the unit’s location or at Fort Benning, Ga.

To highlight the above flexibility of RSLC, here is a list of RUTs, MTTs, and menu-based POIs RSLC has conducted over the past year as well as future events planned for this fiscal year:

- MTT in support of Texas Army National Guard annual training
- COURSE TRAINS SCOUTS FOR INFANTRY, RSTA FORMATIONS

MAJ DAN CASTORO AND 1SG JOE FRYE

A Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course instructor observes as students use communications equipment.

January-March 2011 INFANTRY 45
MAJ Dan Castoro is currently serving as commander of D Company, 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Fort Benning, Ga.

1SG Joe Frye is currently serving as first sergeant of D Company, 4th Ranger Training Battalion.

- Mission planning and SPIES/FRIES certification for RRC
- MTT, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division
- Joint Readiness Training Center observer/controller support for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
- RUTs for 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division and 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division
- MTT to the Algerian Special Forces Application School, Algeria
- HF Communications Training for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division and 147th Air Support Operations Squadron, Texas Army National Guard
- MTT, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
- Advanced collection/reporting, reconnaissance techniques for 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups

More information regarding RSLC and future attendance can be found at the following Web site: https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/RTB/.

If there are any additional questions about the course, contact the authors:

1SG Joe Frye: (706) 544-6196 or joe.frye@conus.army.mil

MAJ Dan Castoro: (706) 544-6100 or daniel.l.castoro@conus.army.mil

Rangers Lead the Way!

Have you checked out the Ranger Training Brigade’s Web site lately?

The site was recently updated and includes information such as packing lists and reporting information as well as suggested preparation for Ranger School. The site also includes information on the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, Ranger Hall of Fame, and Best Ranger Competition.

Visit https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/RTB/

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SNIPER SCHOOL GETS URBAN TRAINING VENUE

DENNIS TERRY

In recent years urban training has become an Army priority. Several training ranges, such as combined arms collective training facilities (CACTF), urban assault courses (UAC), live-fire exercise shoot houses, and air/ground integration (AGI) villages, have been constructed or are in construction to ensure this critical training is enabled for all Army units. The U.S. Army Sniper School at Fort Benning, Ga., has moved forward to ensure Army snipers are trained in relevant urban environments at the institutional level.

In the past, sniper training has focused on proper key sniper fundamentals such as selecting sniper team routes and positions, using sniper movement techniques, reaction to enemy contact while moving, enemy identification, range estimation, fundamentals of marksmanship, land navigation, call for fire, and other sniper training tasks. For the most part these training events have been accomplished while operating in rural environments at the Army Sniper School and unit sustainment training at home station. However, there are recent efforts at the MCoE Sniper School and TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM)-Live to provide sniper training venues in the urban environment. This type of sniper training is also becoming more prevalent at home station with numerous mission commanders requesting towers for their sniper team sustainment training.

The U.S. Army Sniper School recently added urban structures on one of their main training ranges and adjusted their program of instruction (POI) to ensure urban training is a priority training event versus a secondary training event as in years past. Prior to the October 2010 upgrade of the training range, the U.S. Army Sniper School was unable to train current and future snipers on engagements from an urban area into an urban area. With the simple addition of the container tower along the left side of the firing line and the two-story container building down the left side of the range, they are now able to train on these critical tasks. Additionally, they are able to transform the inside of these containers to replicate multiple environments that a sniper may face in combat situations.

For example, the Sniper School will have one section of the urban complex dedicated to engagements from a standard U.S./European urban structure with another section dedicated to Middle Eastern structures. The acoustics and ballistics from these urban environments vary, and it is extremely important for sniper teams to train in these various conditions to adequately prepare for current combat situations.

The center section of the structure will be modified to replicate firing from the eves of a roof at different angles and from a smaller enclosed area as seen in typical West Asia urban rooftops. They will also utilize the surrounding area of the tower by adding rubble from construction areas and gravel so that sniper teams can engage from these austere positions, also common in contemporary theaters of operation.

This addition to the U.S. Army Sniper School significantly enhances training of current and future snipers as well as sniper instructor training for future combat operations and allows the school to work with home station units such as the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and the 3rd Infantry Division to ensure their snipers are optimally trained for combat in today’s urban environments.

This is a great example of what can be accomplished by TCM-Live Range Development and Range Modernization working with the proponent to define the training requirement and modernize the training range to meet the requirement. This teaming effort will allow the end user the ability to train and incorporate current combat tactics, techniques, and procedures into their sustainment training scenarios.

For more information on TCM-Live range development and modernization, visit the Sustainable Range Program Web site at https://srp.army.mil.

The U.S. Army Sniper School recently added urban structures and adjusted their POI to ensure urban training is a priority training event.

MAJ (Retired) Dennis Terry retired from the U.S. Army after 26 years of service. During his career, he served in every type of Infantry unit to include air assault, airborne, mechanized, motorized, and light units. He began his career as an enlisted Soldier and reached the rank of sergeant first class before being commissioned. Terry is currently serving in a support contractor position as a combat developer/senior training analyst with the Sustainable Range Program Range Development Team at Fort Eustis, Va.
At first glance, the small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) looks as harmless as a remote-control airplane buzzing around a city park. But the “Raven” is a real heavyweight on the battlefield, instructors said.

Fort Benning’s Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) School — operated by E Company, 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment — conducts the Raven Operators Course, a 10-day period of instruction that provides an introduction to the UAV system, complete with a how-to manual for Soldiers on basic flight capabilities.

“We give them basic operating skills,” said SSG Corey Burkman, a senior instructor with the company. “We teach them how to use it so they can employ it when they get back to their units.”

Soldiers come to Fort Benning from all over the world to learn about the “Raven,” he said. The unit also dispatches mobile training teams to locales such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Alaska, and Germany — and it teaches foreign armies on occasion.

The course’s first two days involve classroom presentations, but the “meat of the class is out here on site,” Burkman said.

The 4.2-pound Raven can be strapped to a rucksack and launched with one hand from the mountains of Afghanistan or streets of Baghdad. The UAV has its own set of batteries and doesn’t require an external power source. The system comes with spare parts and a repair kit.

Burkman said the vehicle’s general range is 5 to 7 kilometers but it can go out 10 kilometers with a “unidirectional” flight plan. It operates at altitudes up to 10,000 feet.

“It provides real-time imagery as it’s flying — there’s not really a delay at all,” he said. “What’s happening is what you’re seeing.”

The Raven’s “Falcon View” tracks everything on the ground and in the air. Its computer generates maps. The entire system is run by GPS.

The UAV needs two people to fly, Burkman said. The vehicle operator is out front, while the mission operator monitors telemetry, wind direction, aircraft warnings and other signals from behind a computer. Both Soldiers are looking at flight video.

The instructor said target acquisition, convoy security, and battle damage assessment are among the Raven’s primary surveillance uses in battle.

“Not many people know that much about the Raven, but it’s proven itself in combat,” he said. “It’s shown itself to be a reliable piece of equipment.”

A dozen Soldiers attended this Raven Operators Course. Most came from Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Lewis, Wash., but one traveled from Germany. Several from Fort Bragg were gearing up for an Iraq deployment.

“It’s a good system and it’s going to help overseas when we deploy,” said PVT Jason Brill of C Troop, 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment. “It could help pick up people planting IEDs or planning ambushes. We’ll be able to see outside the wire, so we can plan our mission better and know what we’re going into before we actually get there.”

PFC Jeremiah Graham of Fort Bragg’s 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, said his unit will operate the Raven during mounted patrols.

“We can hook it up to our Humvee, so we’ll be able to fly it around ahead of us and check out areas we’re moving into,” he said.

SPC Adam Stauss, also of 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, praised the instruction he got at Fort Benning.

“I’ve seen the Raven around before, but to get my hands on it and see some of the capabilities has been amazing,” he said.

Two training sessions featured night operations, Burkman said. In the final exam, students must map out a flight plan and mission from scratch, fill out all the necessary paperwork and conduct crew briefings — just like they’d do in theater.

In addition to the operator’s course, the school also offers the Raven Master Trainer Course, a five-day course that focuses on a student’s ability to evaluate other operators.

Vince Little writes for The Bayonet, Fort Benning’s post newspaper.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT SECURITY

ED DEVOS

For many years, our Army has used established principles which form the foundation of all military operations. A discussion of these principles of war is found in Appendix A of FM 3-0, Operations. These principles are objective, offensive, security, unity of command, mass, maneuver, economy of force, surprise, and simplicity.

This article will focus on the principle of security. Doctrinally, security means we should never permit the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. We should keep scouts out looking for the enemy. We should constantly seek information about the enemy. We keep a reserve ready to exploit enemy weakness. And, we should keep all lines of communication secure. These are easy words to write and easy words to read, but what is reality?

For you on the front lines of the global war on terrorism, here are a few other thoughts to consider about security. First, there should be no argument about the items listed above. These are common sense things to do. But what else should you consider about your personal or unit security?

The intent of this article is point out some of our frailties as human beings which may give one combatant an advantage over another. The comments are not new. These basics have been around since “Caesar was a corporal.” So, what are some of these human frailties we should consider?

1. Assume nothing. Don’t assume that just because you have scouts and security out the enemy can’t get to you. Don’t assume that because you told others to keep something “close hold” that they will. Don’t assume the enemy is stupid and will not use anything he has in his arsenal to get information about you. Don’t assume your “secure” lines of communication are secure. As the old sergeants say, “Don’t assume nothing!”

2. Trust someone entirely or not at all. Trust is earned as you work more and more with those of other nationalities. If someone doesn’t have a need to know, don’t tell them anything. No hints, no hidden winks, nothing! Are you willing to share information to someone you just met if you knew your error in judgment would cost you your life? Alexander Hamilton once said, “Our great error is that we suppose mankind is more honest than they are.” In other words, always think operations security (OPSEC).

3. In this day of instant communications, are you innocently communicating facts and information to your loved ones back home? Could they in turn innocently say something at the wrong time or wrong place to people who have absolutely no need to know? When have you crossed the line of giving out to too much information? A phrase used during World War II to remind our nation about the importance of security is still true today: loose lips sink ships.

4. In World War II, the Japanese assumed their coded communications were secure. They weren’t. The German High Command thought their communications were secure. They weren’t. Therefore, don’t assume your “secure” communications are secure. If one smart man can make a secure system, another smart man can break it. Always, always follow proper radio-telephone operator (RTO) procedures.

5. Reporters and TV personalities are generally nice folks. They are easy to talk to and very good at asking questions. But what is their job? Obviously, it is to report. Therefore, why tell them anything about ongoing or future operations? Again, just remember OPSEC.

6. We all love to brag. We brag about what we did, what we’re going to do, and what we think we’re going to do. Remember, the enemy is always listening, piecing together small bits of information to understand what you may be up to or what you have done successfully in the past. What happened when our national leaders told the world that we were tracking Osama by cell phone? He stopped using his phone. Dah! Just because some of our national leaders can’t understand the harm they cause by some of their factual statements, doesn’t mean you have to fall into the same trap. The bottom line here is to save the bragging for your reunions 20 years from now. Your stories will be much better over a lot of cold beer when you can look back at your successes through the perspective of time.

7. Finally, your enemy is not stupid. He is a thinking human being driven by his passion to kill you. He will use every deceit known to mankind: coercion, intimidation, bribery, theft, lies, spies, double agents, and terrorism in all its forms to get any information he can use against you. Assume he is always actively trying to accomplish his goal. Always be on your guard. If something doesn’t look right, it probably isn’t. Keep your situational awareness at high levels at all times and in all places. Keep your eyes and ears always looking, hearing, searching, sensing. Constantly be aware of your surroundings.

Always be on your guard. If something doesn’t look right, it probably isn’t. Keep your situational awareness at high levels at all times and in all places. Keep your eyes and ears always looking, hearing, searching, sensing. Constantly be aware of your surroundings.”

The name of the game regarding security is to get him before he gets you. Make the enemy earn every bit of information about you the hard way. Don’t make it easy for him! Good hunting!

Ed DeVos retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel in 1989 after commanding the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division. He received a master’s degree in military history while attending the Command and General Staff College. His awards and decorations include two Silver Stars, a Legion of Merit, the Combat Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab, and German and American Parachutist Badges.

Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

For a man who had his share of controversy and who was an integral part of the military for so many years, it would seem the shelves would contain numerous books focused on the life and military career of Curtis LeMay. Yet, in a market seemingly flooded with biographies, there is minimal coverage of LeMay. That is why Warren Kozak’s superb volume, LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay is such an important contribution to military history. It is a book that not only highlights the impact of LeMay but provides a fair portrayal of a very complex and oftentimes misunderstood man.

For many, the name Curtis LeMay will draw little recognition. In fact, those who are familiar with the man will associate him with events occurring after his retirement from the U.S. Air Force. As the years have passed, the military career of LeMay has all but been forgotten. Apparently it has been overshadowed by decisions LeMay made or comments he allegedly said after his retirement.

Kozak focuses much of his attention on reversing this trend. In particular, he keys on the major role he played in the planning and execution of the strategic air campaigns during World War II. Additionally, he provides readers with details on positions LeMay held following the war. These include: heading the Berlin Airlift, leading the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) for nearly a decade, and serving as the Air Force Chief of Staff from 1961-1965. Clearly, LeMay’s resume is impressive, yet it is one that has not been read by many today.

Even more obscure to the public than the subject will be the treatment was only cursory. During this time, LeMay was a figure in the military world. In fact, LeMay is his first true undertaking into this genre. Prior to this volume, he had a long career as an accomplished television news writer and crafted the acclaimed biography of Manhattan Rabbi Haskel Besser, entitled The Rabbi of 84th Street. Yet, despite being a relative newcomer to this field, readers will quickly conclude that Kozak and military history are an excellent match.

Unquestionably and deservedly, this book revolves around LeMay’s military career. However, Kozak also discusses the aforementioned events following his retirement that have eclipsed his military service. In particular, he highlights LeMay’s venture into the political arena. LeMay decided to become George Wallace’s running mate in the 1968 presidential election. The decision to enter the ticket brought much controversy to LeMay at the time. Kozak describes the thought process utilized by LeMay in making this decision. He also outlines the opinions of family members and friends. This discussion is the most detailed I have read regarding this subject. It was during this time on the campaign trail that LeMay is alleged to have made the comment that “Vietnam should be bombed back into the Stone Age.” There has been debate on whether LeMay made the comment or not. To the detriment of LeMay’s military legacy, this comment has now become synonymous with any present discussion of the man. In the book, Kozak strives to set the record straight on the comment and end the debate. Obviously, his motive is for future discussion on LeMay to shift back to his military career and not his ill-fated jaunt into politics.

A good biography must portray its subject in total. No matter the author’s personal views of the subject, it must be essentially objective. If this means sharing some of the subject’s “warts,” so be it. I believe Kozak has indeed shared LeMay’s imperfections with his readers. He depicts a man who most found aloof and socially uncomfortable. Kozak’s decision to share the “good” with the “not so good” clearly gives the volume credibility. Most of us have read biographies that quickly turn to “love fests.” Without question, this book does not fit into this category.

It is a rare book that does not leave you wanting something more. In this case, it was the amount of attention Kozak spent in discussing some periods of his career. Specifically, I would have liked more detail of LeMay’s time spent leading the SAC (1948-1957). Although Kozak does not dismiss this period, I felt the treatment was only cursory. During this time, LeMay was a central figure in firmly establishing a service which was in direct competition with the other services for resources. More discussion of this work would have been beneficial.

A LeMay biography of this depth, substance, and quality has been long overdue. So the key question is, was the wait worth it? The answer is unequivocally – yes! All readers from the uninitiated to the knowledgeable will find this an invaluable biography. It is a volume that educates readers on LeMay’s military service and provides a well-rounded depiction of the man. Additionally, it establishes Warren Kozak as an important new contributor to the field of military history.


Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN.

Geoffrey Wawro taught strategy at the
BOOK REVIEWS

U.S. Naval War College and currently teaches at the University of North Texas. He has written several books on military history, and his latest book is a broad look at America’s engagement in the Middle East from World War I to the present. This book is recommended for those wanting a total immersion in modern Middle Eastern political history. The 18-chapter book begins with Zionism and the creation of Israel. It then dives into the importance of oil and ends with Operation Iraqi Freedom. The advocacy for an Israeli state in World War I and the impact of the holocaust in World War II led to a Palestinian and Arab reaction of drifting towards the Axis. Nazi and Italian propagandist seized upon anti-colonialism and Arab nationalist sentiment to undermine the British presence in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan. The chapter on oil traces the gradual dependency the United States would have on Persian Gulf oil. As late as the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, there would be deliberate policies to shift European energy consumption to the Middle East.

The chapter on Operation Ajax discusses the 1953 staged overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq by the CIA. Other important events that would change the Middle East were the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and the rise of Egyptian strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Five of the book’s chapters are preoccupied directly or indirectly with Nasser including discussion of the 1956 Suez War, the Eisenhower Doctrine which addressed Nasser’s erosion of traditional Arab monarchies, and the 1967 Six-Day War that so discredited pan-Arabism and Nasser that ideological room was made for Islamist radicalism. Five chapters discuss various aspects of Iraq from the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein to a discussion on the handling of Saddam by various American administrations.

Wawro derived the title of this massive study from British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933) who said, “The Arab Question is a regular quicksand.” It ends with a pessimistic view of Middle East policy, arguing it is prone to quagmires. However, in the final analysis, the combination of oil, lanes of communication, demographics, balance of power, and the religio-historic attachments of the region make American involvement in the Middle East both inevitable and constant.


Reviewed by LTC Keith Everett, USAR.

The guide is organized in the order the battles took place in Europe on the Western Front, followed by battles on the Eastern Front, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and key sea battles. The brief narrative on each of the major battles gives a general idea of what the situation was at the time for both sides and what happened during the battle. Pictures taken at the time and pictures of the battlefield today are added to many of the narratives to add perspective and a little spice. The maps add understanding to the ebb and flow of the attacks and advances/retreats of the trench warfare of WWI. The maps could have better supported the narratives they were assigned to by including all of the towns mentioned in each write-up. One map of the African continent desperately tries to cover the Boer Revolt, the East African Campaign, and battles in West Africa with little detail to aid in understanding any of those events.

Reading the Vital Guide is a good way to cram for an overall view of WWI battle history in just a few nights of reading. Anyone on a WWI battlefield tour would probably want more in-depth coverage of the key battles and more information on how and why
the battles started and what were the strategic implications for each in the overall scheme. The uninitiated to WWI can get a general idea of the entire war, but this whirlwind tour can also leave a reader far behind if the book is read by sections out of order. The transitions from battle to battle could have been stronger, tying the entire narrative together in a comprehensive overview, rather than a more disjointed look at battle to battle to battle. The bibliography of battlefield guides to specific battlefields such as Ypres, Somme, Gallipoli and the Italian front are useful. The bibliography includes a couple of atlases of WWI, some general histories, and books on the battles covered in the guide.

Some of the innovative artillery tactics by German COL Georg Bruchmuller (the artillery innovator) are detailed in various battles. Some of the tactical details of using tanks in groups of three in a unified attack to break the German defenses and cross the trenches in the battle of Cambrai are also discussed.

This guidebook is a good starter for a casual overview of WWI (if you do not mind the small print), but for a serious battlefield visitor or student, a more detailed and complete guide would be more desirable.

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Soldiers with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment provide overwatch during a mission in Afghanistan on 29 April 2010.
I am an American Soldier.
I am a warrior and a member of a team.
I serve the people of the United States, and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy, the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.
IN THE NEXT ISSUE:

* Operation Lion Leader Forge: 2-7 Cavalry’s Leader Trainer Model for the 2nd IA Division

* Where There Is Water, There is Life: Water Complexities in a COIN Environment