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The Dismounted Infantry Squad:
Situational Awareness in the Information Age
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The Dismounted Infantry Squad

Situational Awareness in the Information Age

The Army is Soldiers. The American Soldier has been our Army’s greatest asset and the foundation of the nation’s defense since 14 June 1775. Today’s dismounted Infantry squad Soldiers dominate the small-unit fight and have earned their reputation as the dominant force in the contingency operations that characterize the global war on terrorism. As we recognize that there is still room for improvement in how we disseminate information, enhance situational awareness, and network the dismounts to capitalize on the technological advantages available to them, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the most resilient and battle-proven tool at the Soldier’s disposal is his brain and that the greatest value in today’s digital technology lies in its ability to complement the Soldier’s own skills. Our current initiatives toward building cohesive, lethal, and survivable teams will strengthen tomorrow’s Army every bit as much as they strengthen the resilience of today’s Soldiers who are deployed or facing deployment, and I want to talk about some of these initiatives in this Commandant’s Note.

Today’s Soldiers have access to far more information than their counterparts of the generation that fought from Vietnam through Operation Desert Storm and can receive, assimilate, and share data at rates that were unimaginable two decades ago. This means that the Infantry squad leader and his Soldiers will enjoy levels of situational awareness far exceeding those of their predecessors. The current capability to transmit real-time intelligence, targeting data, and situational updates carries with it the challenge of how to receive, process, and act upon information without succumbing to information overload. Today’s Soldier is already well equipped to deal with that eventuality because he has grown up in the digital world. Soldiers enlisting today already bring to the fight their own skill sets and familiarity with social media, video games, smart phones and tablets, instant messaging, and all the other applications readily at hand. For Soldiers already serving, the realistic blended training model available today complements their easy familiarity with social connectivity as it prepares them to receive and process real-time incoming data without disruption. Simply put, this means that we have the means to share our enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance products to enable the squad leader to seize and retain the initiative and initiate contact on his own terms rather than having to react to an ambush, a suicide bombing, or an attack initiated by detonation of an improvised explosive device. The vast array of acoustic, thermal, and motion sensors available today can give the squad leader degrees of situational awareness unheard of even a decade ago. We must continue to develop, evolve, and procure the training tools that will ensure we can sustain the squad’s proficiency in the sensors’ employment, and we need to pursue this training as aggressively in simulations and in an immersive training environment as we will the actual employment of the sensors in combat.

As we expand our foothold in the digital environment, we cannot afford to overlook the core factors that have enabled the Infantry to dominate the battlefield. We must continue to resource the Infantry squad with the requisite levels of support to ensure it remains the linchpin of the maneuver force through its lethality, survivability, and mobility. Any discussion of mobility will appropriately include a discussion of Soldier’s load and we need to explore any and all options that will enable the Infantryman to arrive at the fight fully capable of locating, fixing, and decisively engaging the enemy. Today’s technical enhancements and the increased sophistication of training now available within the human domain equip the Soldier with a skill set in his head and at his fingertips, and facilitate enhancements to our environmental and situational awareness and how he receives and interprets data. We are likewise deduating assets to addressing the cultural, societal, political, and environmental implications of the human domain as we build our squad teams. I invite your attention to an article in this issue which describes a new perspective on human intelligence collection in a counterinsurgency, yet another milestone in enhancing the situational awareness for the small unit commander. Our next issue will offer articles on the Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT), a pilot program of the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and warfighter load dynamics. These and other initiatives will remain in our range fan as we continue to field the best-trained and best-supported Infantrymen our nation can send forth in defense of her global interests.

Follow me! One force, one fight!
With the need for Soldiers in Afghanistan to engage the enemy at longer distances, Picatinny Arsenal has completed an initial training and fielding of a weapon previously used only by special operations commands for traditional Army units.

The Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS), also known as the M3 Carl Gustaf, has been in the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) inventory since 1991.

However, the unique capabilities of both the system and its ammunition led to a forward operational assessment (FOA).

The MAAWS has similarities to the AT4 shoulder-fired, anti-tank system, but it is unique in that the system itself is not disposable, which means it can be used more than once.


“After firing, the assistant gunner reloads it, and it can be fired again,” Thoguluva explained. “On a disposable weapon you will find a maximum effective range of approximately 300 meters, whereas with the Gustaf you are talking about possibly up to 1,700 meters. That’s a huge difference.”

An operational need for the MAAWS system occurred in May, when troops reported that they were having a difficult time in reaching the enemy at those distances. The purpose of the MAAWS is to engage lightly armored targets at ranges up to 700 meters and soft targets at up to 1,000 meters.

Previously used only by special operations commands — beginning with the Army Rangers in 1989, the Navy SEALS in 1997, and later the rest of the U.S. Special Operations Forces — the need for the system has become more apparent among traditional Army units.

“This fielding really could not have been done without the help from SOCOM,” Thoguluva said. SOCOM allowed the transfer of these systems and its ammunition to the Army for this fielding.

The quantities for this initial fielding were 58 Carl Gustaf rifles and 1,500 rounds of high explosive (HE) and high explosive dual purpose (HEDP) ammunition. Also, 114 Soldiers and 21 armorer maintainers were trained in its use.

Although there are eight varieties of combat rounds and two training rounds for the system, the HE and HEDP rounds are the only two included in the assessment. The other rounds can provide users with heat, illumination, anti-structure, multi-target and smoke capabilities. As the need for additional capabilities increases with Army users, other rounds could be fielded to the Army troops in the future.

The gun is breech-loaded and can be fired from the standing, kneeling, sitting, or prone positions. A built-in detachable bipod helps the shooter raise the weapon off the ground while shooting from the prone position.

The propellant gas escapes through the rear of the weapon, which equalizes the force of recoil. In the AT4 Confined Space (AT4-CS) system, a salt-water solution is ejected rather than exhaust, which is one reason why the AT4-CS does not have the range of the MAAWS.

“Remarkably, there is actually more recoil from firing a 7.62mm round than this...
84mm round,” Thoguluva said.

“It’s a balancing act,” he added. “When shooting a 7.62 there is no exhaust gas, so the shooter’s shoulder takes the majority of the recoil.” This balancing act puts less stress on the shooter.

The current MAAWS system weighs approximately 22 pounds with each round of ammunition weighing less than 10 pounds. Material developers are working to lighten the load of the rifle.

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“The blast radius stemming from an HE round is anywhere from 50 to 75 meters. The user sets the firing distance on the MAAWS by simply rotating a labeled meter at the top of the round.

The HEDP round can detonate in two ways — upon impact of the intended target or in a delay mode where it will penetrate a target, then detonate at a pre-determined time.

Since fielding the system, feedback from the field has been very positive.

“It’s safe to say it’s doing its job,” Thoguluva said.

The current fielding is being used by Soldiers in the 3rd and 25th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 10th Mountain Division. Representatives from the Army Test and Evaluation Center FOA Team conducted assessments of the training event.

Additionally, Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division are training on the system at Fort Bragg, N.C.

The Carl Gustaf gets its name from the Swedish weapons production factory known as Carl Gustaf’s Stads Gevärsvärk (”Rifle Factory of Carl Gustaf’s town”). The name Carl Gustaf’s town was a name used intermittently for the town Eskilstuna after King Karl X Gustav gave the town city privileges. The weapon was first introduced into Swedish service in 1948.

(ERIC KOWAL writes for the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command.)

STUDIES VALIDATE MASTER RESILIENCE TRAINING

DAVID VERGUN

The Master Resilience Training (MRT) aspect of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) is working well — that’s the conclusion of an Army report that was released in December 2011 and covered a 15-month period of statistical evaluation.

CSF was launched in 2009 to teach Soldiers how to be psychologically strong in the face of adversity, such as combat. The program, also available to family members and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians, was designed at the University of Pennsylvania by a behavioral specialists using proven research-based methodologies.

Within CSF, all Soldiers — active and reserve component — are required annually to take the Global Assessment Tool (GAT), an online questionnaire which measures a Soldier’s psychological health. The GAT scores give Soldiers an indicator of where they are strong and where they can improve. Those needing improvement could take Comprehensive Resilience Modules, which are online help tutorials, or seek professional counseling.

GAT scores are confidential, but the results are aggregated for statistical purposes, such as for use in the recently released report “Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Master Resilience Training on Self-Reported Resilience and Psychological Health Data.”

MRT is the second aspect of CSF. Master resilience trainers are Soldiers and DA Civilians who graduate the 10-day MRT course taught at University of Pennsylvania, Victory University, or by the mobile training team. They teach leaders to instill resilience in subordinates — meaning they help fellow Soldiers learn to bounce back from adversity.

The study evaluated GAT scores of eight randomly selected brigade combat teams (BCTs). Four received MRT and four did not. Over the 15-month period, scores of the four BCTs receiving the training were significantly higher than the others, irrespective of other variables, such as unit leadership and cohesion.

“This report represents a significant milestone with respect to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program and the Army’s broader efforts to develop a more resilient and capable force,” wrote Army Vice Chief of Staff GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, in the report’s forward. “It is my hope that this report will spark fruitful discussions; leading to new and improved ways, we may help our Soldiers, Army Civilians, and family members to improve their overall psychological health.”

The study has demonstrated that the program is successful, concluded BG Jim Pasquarette, the CSF program director.

“I believe this is something we’re going to have forever, similar to physical training,” Pasquarette said. “I think in the future, even under this budget, we’re going to fund it. We believe this will save us money through prevention (because) it helps our Soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army Civilians deal with adversity in their life and more importantly — thrive in their lives.”

(David Vergun is the managing editor of Soldiers Magazine.)
Two changes made to a set of programs will make participation easier for officers wanting to expand their military careers with opportunities such as fellowships and scholarships.

Under the officer Broadening Opportunity Program (BOP), officers can apply to all programs they qualify for, instead of just one. Additionally, notification for acceptance into one of the programs will now come much earlier.

The BOP includes the Strategic Education and Development Program; the Army Regional Fellowships; the Olmsted Scholar Program; the Joint Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Department of the Army (DA) Staff Internship Program; the Cyber Command Scholarship Program; the Downing Scholarship Program; the Congressional Fellowship Program; and the Arroyo Center Fellowship Program.

“These programs educate and mature the officer for the next battle,” said Joel Strout, manager for the programs included in the BOP.

With current budget concerns, Strout said, officers who know how Congress works and who have had experience on Capitol Hill will be valuable to the Army.

“The Army Congressional Fellowship Program can allow the officer that experience,” Strout explained.

One of the changes under BOP allows officers to apply for all programs for which they are qualified — though they will be accepted to only one. Under the previous non-military education level (non-MEL) program, officers could apply to only one. The change, Strout said, gives interested officers “a better chance of being selected for a program.” Officers can apply for all of the BOP programs for which they are qualified, and then rank their preference. Acceptance into one of the programs eliminates them from consideration for the other programs.

The second change that comes with BOP is that officers will learn by as early as mid-July if they have been accepted into one of the programs. In past years, under the non-MEL program, they might have had to wait until as late as December to find out if they were accepted.

“Notification is sent out much, much earlier to all the candidates and all the career managers, of who was selected and who wasn’t,” Strout said. “In previous years, selection boards were scattered.”

The deadline for applying for the next series of BOP fellowships and scholarships is 30 March 2012. The selection boards for all those programs will meet during a two-week window in late June. Results will be available to applicants by mid-July. The earlier notification aligns better with the onset of the officer assignment cycle, Strout said. “The earlier that we can tell the candidates they’ve made it or not, the earlier they can put their name in the hat for an assignment.”

Strout said the changes come as a result of Human Resources Command listening to officers who have in the past participated in the fellowships and scholarships that are now part of BOP.

“The HRC is listening,” Strout said. “They said let’s do it this year; let’s do the pilot program. This is the very first time that we are allowing multiple programs at one time that a service member can apply for.”

Six of the eight programs in the BOP are graduate degree programs, Strout said. Two of the eight programs provide Intermediate Level Education/Advanced Operations Course credit — the Army Congressional Fellowship Program and the Joint Chief of Staff, OSD, and DA Staff Internship Program.

Programs that are part of the BOP include:

* The fiscal year 2013/2014 Arroyo Center Fellowship: The 12-month program, open to majors or lieutenant colonels, is a research and study fellowship established at the Army’s research and development center, the Rand Arroyo Center.

* The 2014 Army Congressional Fellowship Program: The 43-month program educates selected Army officers, senior NCOs, and civilians on the importance of the strategic relationship between the Army and Congress.

* The fiscal year 2013 GEN Wayne A. Downing Scholarship Program: The 24-month program — open to active-duty captains and majors in the maneuver, fires, and effects branches — provides participants the opportunity to study terrorism and counterterrorism at top-tier graduate schools.

* The fiscal year 2012/2013 U.S. Army Cyber Command Scholarship Program: The two-year program, followed by a three-year utilization assignment, is open to active-duty captains and majors in the maneuver, fires, and effects; operations support; and force sustainment branches.

* The fiscal year 2013 Joint Chief of Staff, OSD, and the DA Staff Internship Program: The three-year program includes a Georgetown University master of policy management degree, an internship on the Joint Staff or with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and an internship within the Headquarters Department of the Army staff.

* The fiscal year 2013 Olmsted Scholar Program: The program, open to active-duty officers, provides participants the opportunity to achieve fluency in a foreign language while studying at the Defense Language Institute and then pursue graduate study at an overseas university.

* The academic year 2013/2014 Army Regional Fellowships — LTC level: Three separate programs provide an approximately yearlong fellowship to participants at the Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii; the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany; or the Department of State in Washington, D.C.

* The academic year 2013/2014 HQDA G-3/5 Strategic Education and Development Program: This one-year program, open to active-duty and Army Reserve captains and majors, provides participants with a master’s degree in public administration at Harvard University followed by a utilization tour within the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army G-3/5 and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (for Reserve officers only).

For more information call 888-ARMYHRC (276-9472).

(C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.)
RANGERS TEST NEW RIFLEMAN RADIO

KRIS OSBORN

The U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment in Afghanistan recently completed an operational assessment of the software-programmable Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) Rifleman Radio. The assessment highlighted the radio’s ability to share combat-relevant information, voice, and data across small units in real time.

“We have just entered the era of the networked Soldier,” said COL John Zavarelli, program manager (PM), Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) JTRS, Handheld Manpack Small. “The individual rifleman now has a game-changing capability.”

The operational assessment marked the first formal combat use of the single-channel, software-defined Rifleman Radio, which uses Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), a high bandwidth waveform which draws upon a larger part of the available spectrum compared to legacy radios to share information and “network” forces.

The Rifleman Radio is part of a family of software-programmable JTRS radios, which make use of National Security Agency (NSA)-certified encryption to safeguard and transmit information. The radios are built to send packets of data, voice, video, and images via multiple waveforms between static command centers, vehicles on-the-move, and even dismounted individual Soldiers on patrol.

The operational assessment of Rifleman Radio is part of an overall acquisition strategy aimed at rapidly and effectively harnessing Soldier feedback as a vital element of procurement and technology development efforts, said BG Michael Williamson, JPEO JTRS.

“This is a near perfect example of how early engagement by the warfighter working closely with the PM and the acquisition community can deliver capability smarter and faster,” said Williamson. “There was a tremendous amount of work done by the program manager, the Rangers, and the acquisition leadership within the DoD (Department of Defense) and the Army to achieve this milestone.”

The general said the Rangers spent a lot of time using the radios and “clearly had a significant level of confidence” in the system. Rangers liked the size, weight, and power of the Rifleman Radio, which provided a battery life of up to 10 hours and increased the units’ ability to communicate despite obstacles such as buildings and nearby terrain.

The elite Ranger unit, which outfitted multiple platoons with the Rifleman Radio while conducting various tactical missions in Afghanistan, indicated that the systems greatly assisted their unit’s ability to exchange key information such as position location information faster, further, and more efficiently across the force, Zavarelli said.

“Communications were effective and reliable,” Zavarelli said. “Team leaders and squad leaders benefited from the position location information because of the information carried by the SRW waveform.”

Rifleman Radio and SRW allowed the Ranger units to establish a mobile, ad-hoc network. Using that network, squad leaders, commanders and dismounted Infantrymen shared and viewed mission essential information using small, hand-held, end-user devices with display screens. The devices displayed digital maps that allowed users to view surrounding terrain and to also locate nearby friendly forces, Zavarelli explained.

“The Rangers felt the radio was very effective for conducting Infantry operations, especially at the small unit level,” Zavarelli said. “Rifleman Radio allowed them to execute missions very rapidly because they had an improved awareness of where they were in relation to surrounding troops. Mission Command decisions were achieved faster.”

Using the software programmable Rifleman Radio and SRW, the Rangers were able to “network” voice, data, and information across deploying units in austere environments, without needing to rely upon a “fixed” infrastructure or GPS system to communicate across the unit while on the move.

Overall, incorporating feedback from the Rangers is consistent with the aims of the Army’s ongoing biannual network integration evaluations, which are geared toward identifying, integrating and assessing capabilities, systems, and technologies for Soldiers before they are sent to theater, Williamson explained.

Placing a premium upon Soldier feedback is a key element of the Army’s “agile process” approach to acquisition, which seeks to expedite development and delivery of emerging technologies by evaluating them in tactically-relevant, combat-like scenarios such as the NIE.

Ultimately, the Army plans to broadly deploy the JTRS Rifleman Radio across the entire force.

(Kris Osborn writes for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.)
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It weighs 3.5 pounds, has a barrel length of 7.75 inches, fires 12-gauge shells and can be mounted on the M4 carbine or act as a standalone firearm. The M26 Modular Accessory Shotgun System (MASS) is the latest combat enhancer in one brigade’s arsenal.

The 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team was the first unit in the Army selected to be issued this new weapons system.

“This is a new capability that is now in your hands for you to conduct your mission downrange,” said COL Scott C. Armstrong, with Project Manager Soldier Weapons (PMSW) during a presentation ceremony held at Fort Campbell’s Strike Academy on 7 February.

“This is a big day, not just for the 2nd Brigade, but for the Army,” he said.

Picatinny Arsenal-based PMSW is a group that supports Soldiers through the development, production, fielding, and sustainment of current and future weapons systems. PMSW fielded the M26 MASS to the 2nd BCT, also known as the Strike Brigade, due to the unit’s profile and future deployment schedule.

“We’re glad to be the first unit to put this weapon to work and there is an appreciation for all that goes into this,” said COL Dan Walrath, the Strike commander.

After the “hand-over” ceremony, the weapons were issued to Strike’s engineer company — Company A, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) — and Strike’s military police with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd BSTB. For three days, under the guidance of PMSW, the Strike Soldiers learned how to assemble, maintain, repair, and effectively fire their new weapons.

“From the classroom instruction to employing the techniques taught at the M26 live-fire range, I was very impressed with the professionalism, motivation, and skill of the Soldiers present,” said MAJ Vinson Morris, assistant product manager.

“I have no doubt the 2nd Brigade Soldiers will seamlessly incorporate this new weapon into their current missions while benefiting from the weapon’s light weight and exceptional reliability.”

The Strike Soldiers who received and shot the weapons welcomed the new firearm into their arsenal and saw how its capabilities will help their missions.

“I can see this being very effective with the engineers for breaching and with the military police, especially since you can shoot ammunition that is non-lethal,” said SGT Rhys McMahon, a combat engineer with Company A. “So far this is an amazing weapon. I’ve shot about 75 rounds and it works magnificently. This would have helped us out quite a few times when we were in Afghanistan.”

The Strike MP’s first sergeant, 1SG David Ward, is honored to have his teams use the new weapon system and attributes it partly to their accomplishments achieved in Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11.

“Since I have the brigade MP platoon in my company, I feel the initial deployment of these weapons to Strike is a testament to the service the Strike Soldiers have always exemplified, but most specifically in our last deployment into Afghanistan,” said Ward, talking about the brigade’s engineers and MPs. “Both of these elements of the brigade did some outstanding work in Afghanistan and it is nice to see them be the first to field the latest and greatest systems.”

(SGT Joe Padula is assigned to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs Office.)
While partnering, mentoring, and advising are nothing new for the U.S. Army, as troop reductions begin, successfully developing effective, efficient, legitimate, and independent Afghan and Iraqi army and police forces is assuming an increasing level of importance. The Army has developed doctrine or at least tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for brigades with security force assistance missions and a variety of teams designed, trained, and manned to develop local national (LN) security forces — military transition teams, police transition teams, embedded training teams, security force assistance teams (SFATs), etc. These efforts have succeeded in some instances and not in others. But throughout current and past conflicts, another entity has borne a large portion of the burden: Soldiers at the company level and below. Moreover, as we transition from Iraq and Afghanistan-focused operations to a full spectrum operation (FSO) mission essential task list (METL), we will work with militaries across the globe. While transition teams come and go, companies remain.

A company working with LN security forces is not very interesting, until the scope of a company’s mission grows from conducting partnered patrols to developing a LN battalion or higher into an independent force. Companies are not designed, trained, equipped, or manned to perform this mission, but they will be called to perform it more and more as the number of LN units grows.

While it makes sense to give SFATs the security force development mission under a brigade commander’s control, there are not enough SFATs to work with all LN battalions or higher. Companies will have to develop LN battalions and higher. Using companies for this poses many problems. However, if organized and enabled properly, companies can successfully develop LN security forces concurrent with other traditional Infantry missions. In fact, due to their organic ability to shoot, move and communicate, companies can develop LN forces in ways that SFATs cannot. Though difficult, company partner/mentor missions are critical to meeting the security force development demands created by the growing number of LN forces and decreasing number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops.

**Partnership vs Mentorship**

At this point, it is helpful to clarify some terms. According to the latest Army training paradigm (NATO Training Mission-...
Afghanistan brief “Conducting Partnered Operations”), the development model is teach-coach-advise. Guidance for brigades tasked with developing local national forces divides the security force development mission into phases: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability, according to FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. While the vocabulary changes, the idea remains the same: as LN units develop, they require less help at the LN soldier/police level doing the basics and more help developing higher commanders, staffs, combat support, and combat service support. U.S. units train LN leaders and soldiers at multiple echelons simultaneously, but the basic progression holds true.

For ease, this article uses the terms partner and mentor. On a spectrum, partnership comes before mentorship. In this article, partnership means a coalition unit’s leaders and Soldiers executing their mission with a LN unit. If the task for the day is to conduct a reconnaissance, then the partnered unit does it with LN forces. If the LN unit has to isolate and search a village, then the U.S. unit isolates and searches with it. In this article, mentorship means developing a LN force’s leadership and staff at the LN battalion or higher level, usually executed by a specially trained team such as an SFAT.

Vocabulary can be confusing because a U.S. unit’s overall mission might be to partner with a LN unit. That is not a doctrinal task, but it happens all the time. In theory, this lack of clarity reveals a need to revise the Army’s vocabulary to include tasks typical to counterinsurgency (COIN) or stability and support operations. But in practice, it does not matter because on any given day, a platoon or company will still execute a tactical task, like seizing an objective, through a partnered patrol.

The linguistic distinction between partnership and mentorship matters at the level at which the relationship occurs, both for the U.S. and the LN unit. Partnership typically occurs at the U.S. company level or below. Mentorship usually occurs between a small team of senior officers and NCOs and a LN battalion or higher staff.

Partnership implies an inability of the LN unit to operate independently at the small unit level. Mentorship implies that the LN unit can probably operate independently at the small unit level on its own (squad or platoon), but that it has trouble planning operations, linking operations to intelligence, communicating, commanding and controlling, vertically and horizontally integrating its staff, and especially performing logistical and maintenance functions. For context, many Afghan National Army (ANA) units operate at the platoon level but have difficulty conducting company or higher operations, conducting combat support, and conducting combat service support. Therefore, they require mentorship rather than partnership. Many Afghan National Police (ANP) still need help doing the basics and require partners and mentors, although the Afghan National Civil Order Police are highly trained.

Companies are well suited to partner with LN companies—commanders can plan with LN commanders; platoon leaders can conduct troop leading procedures (TLPs) with LN platoon leaders; squads work with squads, teams with teams, Soldiers with Soldiers. As long as the U.S. forces act respectfully towards their less-educated, less-trained, less-equipped partners, both sides will benefit greatly. Companies, however, are not designed, trained, equipped, or manned to mentor LN battalions or higher. It takes a conscious effort to reorganize and enable a company to succeed at this task, but the rewards are worth the effort.

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**Limitations of Companies**

When my company took over the ANP mentorship and partnership mission, we had to reorganize our company headquarters, re-task platoons, reallocate equipment, and ask for enablers from our battalion in order to succeed. We also had to overcome a lack of training for the mentorship mission.

Company intelligence support teams (COISTs) have been in vogue in maneuver units for years. Our battalion turned a traditional COIST into a company operations and intelligence support team that almost comprised a company staff. Our S2 liaison was joined by our command post radio telephone operators (RTOs), our day and night battle captains and NCOs, and a line of effort (LOE) owner for each of the battalion’s LOEs: counter threat, partnership, governance and development, and Information Operations (IO). Eventually we added a Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS) NCOIC. The COIST helped platoons execute COIN operations and worked with their battalion counterparts to better support the company.

When we assumed our mentorship and partnership mission, we had to reorganize. For context, when we assumed our new mission, we had one platoon on a combat outpost (COP) 50 kilometers from the rest of the company and another platoon under our tactical control (TACON) on a COP 100 kilometers from the company. We had just transitioned another COP to Afghan control and had our headquarters, two rifle platoons, and mobile gun system (MGS) platoon on the battalion forward operating base (FOB).

Mentoring the ANP provincial chief and his staff meant having another FOB at the police headquarters, but more importantly, it meant forming a mentorship staff. Forming a COIST from within the company was hard, but forming a staff was nearly impossible and detracted from the COIST. Along with the mentorship mission came a mission to partner with the ANP across the province and to assume battlespace ownership of the province’s capital. Finally, I was directed to move my command post to the ANP headquarters, which required splitting my headquarters.

The troops-to-task was difficult but critical. One option was to task the mentor mission to one platoon, but I decided against that because I did not want to lose the combat power and did not think that a second lieutenant, a sergeant first class, and some other NCOs could effectively mentor a brigade staff. The company needed help from the battalion. Per my battalion commander’s guidance, I framed the question in terms of cost and underwriting...
risk: “Where were we willing to accept risk?”

Infantrymen can figure out how to mentor an ANP S3 and possibly S2. However, we were not trained or equipped to mentor the S1, S4, or S6. Our battalion staff was located on a different FOB, and they were already conducting an ANA mentorship mission. Assistant staff officers are a good option to mentor LN forces, but they were unavailable to mentor the ANP.

My battalion commander sent a human intelligence (HUMINT) team and two assistant S3s (senior lieutenants) to augment my company. The HUMINT team leader doubled as the S2 mentor. One staff lieutenant mentored the S1 and the other mentored the S3. The former partnership LOE owner in the COIST became the S4 mentor; luckily, he had civilian business experience that translated well to logistics mentoring. We used a smart sergeant, who was a former RTO, to mentor the S6. I mentored the police chief and the chief of security. We also had two law enforcement professionals (LEPs) from the brigade, who mentored the S2, counter narcotics, counterterrorism, and criminal investigation division. The battalion also augmented us with more interpreters, although we never reached our goal of one per mentor.

The mentorship team did not come without sacrifices. Our COIST lost one of its key personnel. More importantly, we were forced to split our headquarters. The advisor team, my tactical command post (TAC), and the MGS platoon moved to the ANP headquarters. I chose the small MGS platoon due to space constraints at the ANP headquarters. That left two rifle platoons and my commodity shops on the battalion FOB. My executive officer (XO) stayed at the battalion FOB where he could push logistics to the platoon FOBs. He could also cover down at any meetings I could not attend in person or via phone. The first sergeant (1SG) moved around but spent more time with the majority of the Soldiers on the battalion FOB. We did not have enough Blue Force Tracker (BFT) tactical operations center (TOC) kits or tactical satellites (TACSA Ts) to run multiple command posts (CPs), so we ran a CP at my new headquarters and a “Zulu” CP at the battalion FOB with just a phone and two radios. We also signed for computers from the outgoing mentor team and from our battalion, giving us two for the mentor team, one for the CP, and one for me.

But as painful as moving the CP was, it was critical. I had to live with the police chief to effectively mentor him. We met at all hours and shared most meals. Living together was critical. The advisors also had to live with their staff counterparts to ensure both sides had quick access to each other. We needed to have a presence 24/7 to encourage good behavior on the part of the ANP, just in case the temptation to release a captured high-value individual became too strong, for example.

Finally, we had to overcome our lack of training for the mentorship mission. We had been trained on tactical tasks, COIN fundamentals, and to partner with the ANA. We had not been trained to mentor LN forces, particularly the ANP. The LEPs were essential to our success; they were able to teach us about community policing so we could better mentor and partner with the ANP. I included them in all of my long-range mentorship planning. They helped me conceive how an Afghan police force should organize and operate. For example, I divided the area of operations (AO) into small “precincts” of a couple of blocks. Here, the same ANP could “walk their beat” and really get to know their area. There are also open-source resources and higher unit mentors available, but nothing can replace the expertise of actual police if a company is called to mentor LN police forces instead of the LN army. As the commander learns how to mentor, he needs to conduct professional development with his subordinate leaders and mentor teams to increase their effectiveness.

Our company succeeded in its mentorship mission despite limitations because we were enabled by the battalion and because we accepted risk by splitting our headquarters, mitigated by placing the XO and 1SG where they could best affect the fight.

Unity of Command and Effort

Much can be said about the difficulty of different units with different chains of command operating in the same battlespace. This occurs often with mentorship missions. A company falls under a battalion, brigade, division (regional command or multinational division), and so on. Ideally, the company’s higher headquarters would be partnered with the LN unit’s higher headquarters, and so on up the chain of command. That would go a long way to ensuring synchronization of operations, logistics, enablers, and the like.

However, that is rarely the case. The LN unit’s higher headquarters is probably mentored by an advisor team outside of
the company’s chain of command. The operational and mentorship chains of command may link up somewhere echelons above the company, but in practice that is little help to the company commander in trying to effectively mentor the LN security force and simultaneously conduct operations within his battalion commander’s intent.

My company had to deal with several coalition and Afghan chains of command. The ANP higher headquarters, 404 Maiwand, was mentored by a coalition team that answered to Regional Command (RC) South. When I took over the police mentorship, the outgoing mentor team had no contact with the 404 Maiwand mentor team. I immediately contacted the 404 Maiwand senior mentor and asked if my mentors could contact his team. My battalion commander granted us DIRLAUTH (direct liaison authorized) with the 404 Maiwand mentors for situational awareness and understanding. They could not task me and I could not ask them for resources, but we developed a relationship that allowed us to track what was going on at the LN higher level and allowed them to track the ANP in our province.

Much good arose from this practical, if not doctrinal, relationship. For example, Zabul ANP requests for logistical support to 404 Maiwand usually went unanswered. This was partly because our provincial ANP did not know how to use their own system effectively, but it was also due to lack of supervision in 404 Maiwand. When our S4 mentor formed a relationship with the 404 Maiwand G4 mentor, we could send a copy of the ANP logistics request to the 404 Maiwand mentor team as well as the ANP G4. The G4 mentor knew what Zabul requested and could effectively follow up on the request. He did not necessarily advocate for us or pull strings, he just mentored the G4 to do his job, and part of that job was supplying our ANP in Zabul. The working relationship facilitated coordination and vertical staff integration for the ANP and for us. It also helped improve the ANP chief’s relationship with the 404 Maiwand commander, as the higher headquarters became more responsive to his staff.

**Mentorship Fratricide**

If company commanders mentor battalion, brigade, or higher LN commanders, they should expect the U.S. battalion or brigade commander to have a relationship with the mentored LN commander. This three- or four-way relationship is delicate and difficult to manage. No matter how tactful the U.S. higher commander is, the LN commander knows our chain of command and rank structure and knows who the boss is. If the U.S. higher commander meets separately with the LN commander, that undercuts the company commander. If the U.S. higher commander contradicts the company commander, that undercuts him more.

The company commander can accidentally undercut himself as well. The first time the U.S. company commander tells the LN commander that he needs his battalion commander’s approval, he loses most of his credibility. If I ever needed higher-level approval, I would simply say that I had to check on resources or had to do some research. Ideally, I tried to anticipate what the ANP commander was going to ask and find out the answer beforehand. No matter what, I never said that I needed to get someone else’s permission or approval, even if I did.

Once a week, my battalion commander met with our mentor team. They briefed him on their major accomplishments, current priorities, and any help they needed from the battalion or higher. He then gave the team guidance. In turn, I met with the mentor team daily. They updated me on progress, issues, and requests. This huddle allowed me to help them, integrate our efforts, and give guidance. These two meetings were critical to our success and ensured that we maintained our independence within our commander’s intent.

The company commander’s mentorship role can be anything from an information conduit (passes messages from the U.S. battalion commander or answers his requests for information [RFIs]) to a full-on mentor. That depends on his other responsibilities (he will still have platoons to maneuver, battlespace ownership, etc.) and the role that his battalion and brigade commanders want to play. The best thing a company commander can do is to feed information to his battalion commander early and often. Assuming that there is a trusting relationship between battalion and company commanders, the battalion commander will probably give the company commander much leeway in his mentorship role.

**What Companies Provide that SFATs Cannot**

Though limited in some ways, companies can outperform SFATs and other mentorship teams because of the organic combat power and ability to conduct partnered patrols. SFATs can probably muster a patrol. They can sign for a small number of vehicles and can get out on a patrol or battlefield circulation with their mentored commander. But when they do that, the team members are not mentoring — they are driving, manning weapons, and pulling security. Aside from the opportunity cost to mentorship, this group is not the best suited or trained to patrol. A company can provide...
either a TAC platoon for the commander or a maneuver platoon to escort the commander on patrols and battlefield circulation while his mentor team is concurrently mentoring the LN staff. That is a key benefit of companies over mentor teams — companies can mentor and still conduct other missions at the same time, like owning battlespace and patrolling villages.

But even better is the nesting of mentorship, partnership, and operations. If an SFAT advises a LN commander and staff, its team members cannot supervise the implementation of their recommendations. They cannot see if information is being disseminated from ANP leaders to ANP subordinates. They cannot work with the lower-level forces to support the mentored commander’s intent. But, a company can do all of these things. A company commander can mentor the LN commander and staff and execute his tactical tasks. He can execute these tasks through partnered patrols at the platoon level. These patrols also further his mentorship mission, because they help the LN forces accomplish their commander’s intent. All three — mentorship, partnership, and operations — are nested.

The nesting of mentorship, partnership, and operations also facilitates information flow, which is critical to quickly identifying and resolving issues. A company commander will know before an SFAT commander if the LN police/soldiers are not patrolling, if their vehicles are deadlined, or if they say they have no fuel. Then, the company commander can turn to his S4 mentor and ask if the vehicles are broken or if the fuel is low. The S4 mentor can figure that out, give a fuller picture to the commander, and then take steps to fix it. All this can happen in one day in a company, but it would take days or weeks if the SFAT had to submit an RFI to the battlespace owner (presumably the brigade), which would then issue the RFI in a fragmentary order (FRAGO) or targeting order, which would then have to be filtered from brigade to battalion to company and back up.

We saw this firsthand with our commander’s unit assessment tool (CUAT). We used this tool to rate our partnered and mentored units and relay the assessment to RC South. My platoons partnered with several ANP units in the province, and I could easily task them to complete the CUATs. Platoons from other companies in our battalion and other battalions in the brigade were partnered with the rest of the province’s ANP units. It was easiest to collect accurate information from the platoons in my company, second easiest from units in my battalion, and fairly difficult to get information from units outside my battalion.

It was evident that the more removed a platoon was from my company, the more difficult it was to get a clear assessment of the partnership or to task the unit. The centralized command and streamlined flow of information provided by a single company as mentor and partner proved far more effective than a collection of units from different commands. Even putting SFATs under brigade control could not accomplish what a mentoring and partnering company can do, at least not as efficiently.

TTPs for Company Partnership-Mentorship Missions

The following are some lessons learned from our experiences partnering with and mentoring the ANP. While not universal, they should provide some practical TTPs for companies tasked with mentoring or partnering with LN forces.

An Infantry company is versatile. With 163 Soldiers plus attachments, you can find people with the right skill set to do almost anything. Given a little training (even on the job), a little guidance and a commander willing to give them top cover and freedom to err, our Soldiers can do almost anything.

When requesting assistance from the battalion, frame the argument in terms of opportunity cost and acceptable risk. I told my battalion commander that I could form a mentor team that lived at the police headquarters, but I would have to disband the COIST and use a sergeant to mentor three needy staff sections. This gave the battalion commander the ability to decide where to underwrite the risk, and he chose to augment our team with more mentors.

Capabilities relie®es-in-place (RIPs) are acceptable if you cannot do a one-for-one personnel RIP. One of our mentors worked with the S1 and S6 at the same time while our S6 mentor was on leave. He met with the S1 in the morning and the S6 in the afternoon. It hurt our effectiveness, but it was better than nothing.

If at first you don’t succeed, try again, but not at the risk of sacrificing effectiveness for perfection. We went back to the drawing board twice in the first month of mentorship, trying different people in different roles and trying to assess the ANP at the same time as we learned our new jobs. But since mentorship requires relationships, we had to draw a line and accept the team we had.

Partner one-on-one. On every patrol, pair Soldiers one-on-one with LN soldiers/police. This gives Soldiers a stake in every patrol. Each Soldier makes sure that his partner is doing the right thing. Each feels like he actually contributed something to the patrol. One-on-one partnership also helps the patrol leader control his patrol, which is probably half LN, and therefore twice as big as he usually leads. The patrol is more effective because the LN unit is doing the right thing more often. The LN force receives better training with on-the-spot corrections and constant examples.

Most LN units struggle with logistics, maintenance, communications, and personnel. They struggle at the staff level to synch intel and operations — the “so what” of an intel report. They have difficulty communicating. Their equipment is sometimes lacking, but mostly they do not have trained RTOs to operate and/or maintain the equipment.

LN units need help with vertical and horizontal staff

It was evident that the more removed a platoon was from my company, the more difficult it was to get a clear assessment of the partnership or to task the unit. The centralized command and streamlined flow of information provided by a single company as mentor and partner proved far more effective than a collection of units from different commands. Even putting SFATs under brigade control could not accomplish what a mentoring and partnering company can do, at least not as efficiently.
integration. LN companies do not know how to request things from their battalions, and battalions are not vertically integrated with their brigade staff counterparts (and so on up the chain). Staffs are not horizontally integrated either — the S4 might know that a unit needs fuel, and the S3 might know that a patrol is going to that unit’s AO. However, the two will not talk to get the fuel into that patrol.

Thankfully, there are some easy fixes to the integration problem.

First, the mentoring unit needs to learn the LN system and encourage the LN staff officer to do the same. Once the LNknow their system, force them to use it instead of taking the easy route and using U.S. money.

Second, the LN unit needs meetings. We encouraged the ANP chief to hold a weekly command and staff. We worked with each staff section to come up with a briefing agenda, basically a running staff estimate. The meetings force horizontal integration and provide a forum for the LN commander to task and track.

Use the briefing agenda/running staff estimate in all mentor engagements. Show the LNunit the benefits of using that staff estimate, and they will want to use it. For example, the ANP S4 gained great confidence when he could tell his commander how many trucks he had at which checkpoints, how much ammo he had distributed, and how many weapons were in his arms room. He became a more effective advocate to his higher headquarters because he had the data to back up his requests. Finally, he could answer the ANP companies’ requests for logistics.

Use seating charts. The ANP would brief in the order they sat, and they all wanted to sit close to the commander, so it was important to print name placards and set the table prior to their arrival so that they sat mostly where we wanted and briefed mostly in that order.

Do not give them money. We rarely used our money for Afghan problems. We even let them go without fuel for a few days until they figured out how to get it from their higher headquarters. It was difficult and it meant fewer patrols for a while, but in the end they got their own fuel and realized that we were serious about using their system.

Keep a document registry and encourage the LN unit to do the same. Just as the U.S. Army uses the DA Form 200 when documents change hands, LN units need the same when they send documents higher, lower, or to other staff.

Conduct leader professional development with the LN commander if he is willing to learn.

Find effective leaders and staff officers and support them. It is hard to fire or move LN leaders, but you can try to remove them or at least work around them.

Use LEPs for police mentorship. They know law enforcement and are a great enabler.

Use as many interpreters as possible. We strove for one interpreter for each mentor, so the interpreter could learn the specialized vocabulary of his staff section and develop a relationship with the mentor and LN staff.

Conclusion

The end state of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is debatable. Maybe it is an effective, legitimate, (relatively) honest LN security force. Or maybe it is leaving these theaters better than we found them, where LN governments can reasonably maintain the gains they have made. If so, legitimate LN security forces are the guarantors of that end state. That is why partnership and mentorship are so important; whatever our end state, they are the mechanism by which we can leave these theaters. Developing LN security forces is a hard mission. Typically, there is no better unit than an Infantry company to do the hard, important missions. Properly enabled and resourced, companies can mentor LN battalions and higher, partner with LN units, and conduct operations at the same time. The Infantry company can fill the security force development gap created by the increasing number of LN units coupled with the limited number of transition teams and help these LN units operate on their own. Difficult though it may be, our success in these theaters depends on it.

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In October 2011, U.S. military forces in Iraq began to hand over bases and missions to the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I), an organization reporting to the U.S. Department of State (DoS) Embassy in Baghdad — the largest U.S. Embassy in the world.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (1-5 Cav), while simultaneously executing its role in the largest military withdrawal effort in decades, successfully conducted the transition of the first U.S. contingency operating base (COB) to OSC-I. The battalion, with assistance from the United States Division - North (USD-N) and 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, turned over the U.S. mission in Tikrit at COB Speicher to OSC-I Tikrit. These transitions from Department of Defense (DoD) forces to other U.S. agencies are likely to occur again in Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere in the near future. Our lessons learned and perspective could be of assistance to company and battalion-level leaders facing this challenge.

While initially tasked to only provide a small force of combat Soldiers for the force protection of OSC-I Tikrit trainers, we determined quickly that if the transition were to be successful, we had to create a true partnership with OSC-I to form one team of U.S. government agencies committed to achieving the goals of the post-Operation New Dawn U.S. mission. We assisted OSC-I in reaching operational capability by partnering with OSC-I staff along several dimensions. This required an effort that extended far beyond simply “guys with guns.” Soldiers from 1-5 Cav assisted OSC-I with security, battle-tracking, medical planning, contractor support, and building relationships with key Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) leaders before we were relieved of the mission by United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I), to which we reported as a strategic reserve element.

**Situation**

COB Speicher is located just north of Tikrit in Salah ad Din Province. The post hosts the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) Academy, as well as initial pilot, air traffic control, and aircraft maintenance training. Until the end of October 2011, the post also served as the headquarters for USD-N, a garrison command, an air advisor team, two stability transition teams, several support units, and a combined arms battalion.

Prior to DoD departure, IAF training and operations occurred on the combined U.S.-Iraqi installation. With the departure of U.S. forces (USF), securing the entire post perimeter was no longer practical. Therefore, OSC-I planned to transition the outer perimeter of COB Speicher to ISF and began construction of a smaller compound within the Iraqi base. This inner perimeter was referred to as a green zone and was secured by U.S. contracted security. This area initially housed and supported 1,400 trainers, security contractors, and administrative support personnel. All of these activities would be managed and overseen by an eight-person OSC-I staff.

Security assistance teams (SATs), composed of contracted civilian trainers, completed the most important component of the mission. SATs trained and oversaw the IAF’s initial and subsequent upgraded pilot training. To accomplish this task, the SATs needed to be escorted from the green zone to an area between the inner perimeter and outer perimeter, which was guarded by ISF and referred to as the amber zone. Security escort teams (SETs), contracted security personnel, would secure the SATs during training and provide security of all movements out of the green zone. The SETs had arrived but were not operational because of weapon issues with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Baghdad.

*Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment pose for a team photo in October 2011 at COB Speicher, Iraq.*

Photos courtesy of authors.
Operation Homestead

Ninety-six hours prior to our scheduled departure, our battalion received its initial warning order to leave 50 personnel on COB Speicher to augment OSC-I security. The battalion staff began analyzing and planning for this contingency. The final decision was to be made by the USF-I deputy commanding general, but 1-5 Cav had to begin planning and making necessary movements immediately. The battalion commander was concerned about leaving 50 Soldiers without an organic headquarters behind in Iraq while the rest of the battalion moved down into Kuwait. Based on the concerns of the battalion commander and the recommendations of the staff, the battalion requested to leave an entire company team, augmented with elements of the forward support company and specific elements of the battalion tactical command post (TAC). In all, the battalion recommended to USD-N and USF-I that it leave 100 Soldiers behind at COB Speicher.

The battalion and the selected company — A Company, 1-5 Cav — began preparing for two contingencies. First, as initially planned, the company and TAC would move by ground to Kuwait if the decision was made that they were not needed at COB Speicher. Second, if USF-I decided that a bridging force was needed until OSC-I was operationally capable, those remaining forces would break their vehicles down and prepare all but the most essential equipment for shipment out ahead of the battalion main body’s departure. The aim of option two was to keep the 100-Soldier stay-behind element transportable by rotary wing and with less than six aircraft pallets of equipment and baggage.

Forty-eight hours prior to the planned departure, OSC-I still had not received authorization for the SETs’ weapons from the Iraqi MoI. Thus, USF-I ordered option two, and the battalion worked into the night reconfiguring serials and preparing vehicles and equipment for shipment.

The following morning, the TAC and A/1-5 began preparing to execute this contingency mission. The TAC met with OSC-I personnel, and the A/1-5 commander met with the security contractor supervisor. At both levels, we began assessing the specific problem set and developing a way forward. We chose to collocate our TAC and company command post within the OSC-I headquarters.

Twenty-four hours prior to our battalion’s departure, the outer perimeter security would transition from USF to Iraqi Army (IA). This transition was complicated by the fact that the IAF ran and owned the base and entry control point (ECP), but the actual perimeter would be secured by an IA battalion brought in from elsewhere in the province.

Our battalion’s stability transition team chief took on this challenge and personally worked to ensure occupation of the outer perimeter and then to ease friction between the IA ground force and IAF base commanders. Maintenance of the perimeter was vital as it prevented looting and destruction of the IAF equipment and infrastructure that had reportedly occurred on other installations at the departure of USF. Additionally, it created the amber zone, which was contractually required in order for the SATs to continue training and advising the IAF.

We task organized the company with one platoon serving as the quick reaction force (QRF) and security escort from the inner perimeter to the Iraqi ECP. Another platoon executed security escort of a contractor’s trucks from the green zone to a pond seven times daily. Another platoon escorted and secured the SAT of instructor pilots, aircraft maintainers, and air traffic control advisors from the
green zone to three separate locations within the amber zone. Our company headquarters manned our company command post (CP) where we battle-tracked unit movements and personnel locations. Our maintenance personnel worked to make and keep the fleet of OSC-I up-armored SUVs (UASs) operational.

As the majority of our battalion departed COB Speicher for Kuwait, the security contractor raised new concerns over the acceptability of the UASs. As we discovered, the contract between the U.S. government and the security contractor had specific requirements for the vehicles the government was contracted to provide. There were some obvious requirements like serviceable ballistic armor, but some requirements were a bit of a surprise. For example, the vehicles had to be a 2007 or newer model and had to be diesel powered.

Word that the security contractors were refusing the vehicles spread to the SATs, culminating in their refusal to depart the green zone, thus stopping all training for IAF pilots. This uneasiness on the part of the SATs peaked with the departure of our battalion the day before, along with all of their vehicles and equipment. It could have delayed training considerably, but the 1-5 Cav commander, A/1-5 commander, and OSC-I officer in charge (OIC) briefed the SATs on the concept for security the following day. The SATs found this concept agreeable, and we began our first set of security escort missions the next day.

Over the next several days, 1-5 Cav Soldiers secured the SATs, escorted basic life support personnel, and manned the QRF. At the battalion level, the TAC continued to work with OSC-I to build capacity with mission command systems, introduce OSC-I personnel to a few key local Iraqi leaders, and arbitrate between the IA and IAF in order to preserve the amber zone.

After seven days of executing this mission set, the security contractor’s weapons and weapons cards arrived. The only point of contention remaining was the acceptability of the vehicles. During this time, the U.S. government contracting agency at Rock Island, Ill., negotiated with the corporate office of the security contracting firm in London and worked towards resolution. Concessions were ultimately made on both sides.

The only remaining issue was the mechanical state of the UASs. The entire fleet was in fair condition upon receipt at COB Speicher. However, without a maintenance contract in place to fix issues like brakes needing adjustments and doors that would not open, we reached another impasse. To fill this gap, our company’s combat recovery team mechanics went to work making repairs and controlled substitutions bringing 11 UASs to mission capable status. Together with the five UASs the contractors initially accepted, they could now assume their role as security escort teams.

With the final hurdle behind us, we began a deliberate relief in place (RIP). At the company level, we transitioned our equipment as well as the standing operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) we had developed over the 10-day period. The company headquarters and battalion TAC continued to coach and mentor OSC-I operations center personnel.

We conducted one day of operations where we led with their key leaders riding along in our patrols. Then, we conducted one day with them in the lead and our key leaders riding along. On the third and final day, we remained in tactical overwatch from the operations center for a full day prior to beginning preparation for movement. We conducted nightly after action reviews with OSC-I and the security contractors and addressed shortfalls like training on some of the communications equipment we transferred to OSC-I.

With the mission complete, we closed out our living areas and command posts, boarded two sets of CH-47s, flew to Baghdad, and eventually to Kuwait where we rejoined our battalion main body.

Role of TAC
After our initial analysis, it became apparent that this mission would grow beyond “guys with guns.” The battalion staff conducted detailed mission analysis to best determine in what other areas or efforts OSC-I may need assistance. We decided it would be best for the company commander to focus solely on securing the various contractors on COB Speicher. We decided to develop a task-organized TAC, complete with the battalion commander and a stability transition team (STT) commander. This approach provided much needed organizational capacity as the problem set evolved.

The TAC interfaced directly with OSC-I headquarters, relieving the company of reporting requirements and direct interaction with

![Figure 2 — 1-5 Cav TAC Task Organization](image)
OSC-I, allowing the unit to focus solely on the security mission. The TAC also assisted OSC-I with the development of mission command systems and SOPs. For example, TAC personnel trained the OSC-I base defense operations cell personnel on patrol tracking and battle drills. Additionally, we decided to include the battalion physician’s assistant in the TAC to assist in developing the OSC-I medical evacuation SOP and mass casualty plan.

OSC-I required this assistance from 1-5 Cav because they were manned for an enduring mission and not properly staffed with the additional personnel it would take to make the site operational. Eight staff members essentially replaced a garrison headquarters with its administrative, life support, and base defense functions. They also replaced a maneuver battalion headquarters, with two attached STTs that operated in the area and maintained key relationships. The enormous daily requirements of simply operating the OSC-I footprint for 1,400 personnel overwhelmed the OSC-I staff and prevented the development and implementation of enduring solutions. They were, in essence, stuck in the close fight and could not focus on the mid to deep fight.

Two significant shortcomings hamstrung the OSC-I team’s efforts from inception. First, the entire OSC-I team was not assembled in time to develop cohesion prior to the COB Speicher transition. In fact, the entire team was not in place until after 1-5 Cav had left for Kuwait. Obviously having this team in place well in advance of the transition, perhaps even allowing them to go through initial training together, would have helped immensely.

Secondly, the OSC-I staff had no U.S. Army personnel. While this would not be an enduring requirement, inclusion of U.S. Army staff during the period leading up to and through the transition would have greatly facilitated the relief of 1-5 Cav. The few team members on hand were either U.S. Air Force officers or civilian contractors. Consequently, communication was difficult as we often did not even know what were the right questions to ask of each other, let alone the answers to those questions.

A Deliberate Transition

Having lived and operated from COB Speicher for the previous six months, it would have been easy to understate how different the new mission and operating environment would be with the departure of all other maneuver forces. To limit potential oversights, we conducted a white board session at the company level to discuss the ways our mission and the operating environment had changed as well as how our different set of vehicles and equipment would affect the way forward.

From a mission perspective, our role changed from a full spectrum force to one focused solely on the security of the SATs and immediate security threats to the green zone... In contrast, our new mission set was to secure the SATs and nothing more.

Obviously having this team in place well in advance of the transition, perhaps even allowing them to go through initial training together, would have helped immensely. In contrast, our new mission set was to secure the SATs and nothing more. No further action to gain ground, to protect property, or other personnel could jeopardize the security of the SATs. Given the limitation of our new vehicle platforms and almost nonexistence of enablers, we needed to rework our battle drills to ensure we did not overcommit our forces and jeopardize the safety of those in our charge.

While the platoons worked to develop SOPs and TTPs to fight, survive, and recover from the turretless UASs, the company and TAC worked to develop criteria for our eventual release to Kuwait.

We realized we needed to define the exact composition of a patrol to accomplish the mission in this new operating environment. This gave us a way to communicate capacity to OSC-I and served as a control measure to ensure each element outside of the green zone had an acceptable baseline of capability. We settled on eight personnel with two UASs. We required each patrol to have redundant communications, a mix of squad organic weapons, and a minimum medical and recovery capability. Then we defined some organizational conditions that had to be in place prior to a patrol departing the green zone. First, we dedicated a 15-man, three-UAS quick reaction force, with a 10-minute response requirement. We established a redundant communications network utilizing OSC-I’s very high frequency (VHF) radios that were backed up with our tactical line of sight and satellite-based communications. For emergencies, we outfitted each patrol with red star clusters and briefed the tower guards on this emergency signal.
To battle-track our forces, we reverted to analog means and developed overlays complete with routes and checkpoints that each patrol reported while in the amber zone.

Finally, we developed a set of return-to-base criteria including contingencies like committal of the QRF, contact in the amber zone, loss of communications, and others.

**Key Relationships**

The relationships we built with key OSC-I and contractor leads allowed for candid discussion of issues and mediation between parties critical to getting the site operational. As in most instances, the relationships we build and maintain can be instrumental to our success. This is particularly true where one organization has no formal authority over another. Once leaders acknowledge the importance of relationships, the next step is to determine the relationships on which to focus effort, time, and resources. The key personnel we identified were OSC-I’s contracting officer representative (COR), the security contractor lead, and the force protection officer.

The importance of the COR cannot be overstated. With the sheer number of contracts a mission like this requires, it is important a unit gauges the level of involvement of the person and provide assistance if needed. Developing a relationship with this person to allow candid discussion is key. If this person is a new COR, it is important to impress upon them how powerful intimate familiarity of the contracts can be. We needed the COR to know all the details of the contracts.

If the COR conducts a detailed review of their contracts, he can identify shortfalls and make early moves to amend, which can reduce or prevent negative mission impact. In our case, the COR was overwhelmed and had limited understanding of the scores of contracts he oversaw. This created delays and obstacles as well as induced false assumptions. The details of the security contract requiring OSC-I to provide UASs to the security contractor with specific capabilities were unknown until identified by the SETs themselves. Had the COR known the vehicle fleet did not meet the specifics of the contracts, he could have worked a remedy and avoided a delay of the mission.

The force protection officer served a broader role encompassing the duties of an operations officer. This person worked the day-to-day requirements of our patrols and eventually the patrols for the security contractor in accordance with the OSC-I OIC’s priorities. This person was also integral in the installation of all the force protection enablers at the ECPs and on and around the perimeter.

Another key personality was the security contractor lead. Our security contract lead was a retired British army captain working his first private security contract job. We found him to be knowledgeable and professional. He had the most experience with security issues within the OSC-I organization and had more than 300 personnel under his supervision. This person was ultimately with whom the company headquarters coordinated most closely and eventually conducted their RIP. Developing a relationship allowed for candid conversation to determine points of friction between the security contractor and OSC-I. With this relationship established, we were also able to provide assessments of the security contractor’s scheme of maneuver to secure the SATs and contingency plans in both the green and amber zones.

Through this relationship and candor, we developed an understanding of contractor issues like their unwillingness to accept the UAS as delivered. We initially thought they were just being picky until they explained how the types of vehicles were also specified in their insurance policy which protected their firm. Unlike the U.S. government, security contractors are not protected under sovereign domain and can be sued by their employees or protectees for negligence.

**Key Lessons Learned**

The transition from U.S. military forces to OSC-I and DoS was ultimately successful. However, as a result of this challenging nonstandard mission, many lessons learned emerged that could assist similar transitions in the future. The following are some of these lessons.

**Focus on what needs to be done as part of the transition and then task organize accordingly.** Any battalion tasked to conduct or support a transition of this kind should be prepared to conduct detailed mission analysis to determine exact requirements for success. Only then can the commander decide which capabilities he will require. The inclusion of a TAC in an operation such as this builds additional capacity and enables security elements to focus solely on their task at hand.

An important part of the transition is learning about partner organizations. **Units need to be prepared to educate the relieving agency on Army systems and methodologies to help them ask**
the right questions of the right people. This is a two-way street. The military unit should also spend some time learning how the non-DoD agency is organized. Some coaching and mentoring may be required to help the agency design and manage systems as the organization forms and undergoes the daunting tasks of establishing SOPs. Military planners must understand there will be no one-for-one personnel RIP with a non-DoD agency, and thus the RIP will not follow traditional models. Instead, the planners should focus on the endstate of what a person or system does and attempt to best determine how it will apply to the new agency.

Be deliberate in assistance to reduce the disruption upon eventual departure. We deliberately decided how to assist OSC-I Tikrit with one-time tasks as opposed to enduring tasks. We chose to assume and complete one-time tasks like cataloguing and consolidating the vast non-tactical vehicle fleet they inherited in an effort to allow them to focus on developing their long-term systems. This got them out of the knife fight. In the short term, it would have been easier for us to have kept our mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles and utilized our systems and equipment. However, it would have made the eventual transition for OSC-I more difficult. In our case, we went to painstaking lengths to utilize as much of OSC-I’s equipment and as many systems as possible. This proved beneficial to the enduring success of their organization as it proofed their equipment and exercised their systems. This provided an opportunity for unbiased feedback and joint problem solving as needed. An example of this was our identification of their lack of redundant communications. To remedy this issue, we transferred several line-of-sight and satellite-based systems to OSC-I and provided OSC-I and the security contractors training on the systems.

Deliberately forecast and constantly reassess the changing mission and operating environment before, during, and after the transition. A unit preparing for this type of mission set needs to conduct their own assessment of the mission and operating environment, validate their systems, SOPs, and redlines. Determining and projecting these changes allows the unit to be proactive and agile.

Identify the key personnel within the other organization. With the key role the COR plays in the success of the mission, it is important a competent person is assigned and ideally dedicated to this task. This should be one of the first people brought onto a team and brought forward to the site well in advance of the transition. A unit should do as much as possible to enable this person’s success and allow them to focus on their job.

Build and maintain relationships with key personnel. We learned most of the contracts had explicit and implicit freedom of maneuver built in for both parties. For example, the security contractor agreed to escort the contractor’s trucks in lieu of one capability by assisting in the development of several systems, conducting a deliberate transition to a nontraditional mission, and building relationships with OSC-I staff, contractors, and Iraqis alike. The scope of the original mission was to simply provide “guys with guns” who would secure the OSC-I trainers as they conducted their mission in the amber zone. However, it became clear, even before the departure of the USD-N headquarters, that an element of battalion-level leadership, in the form of a TAC specifically designed to provide certain capabilities, would be required to complete the transition. In the end, we assisted OSC-I with tactical patrol planning and tracking, medical evacuation and treatment planning, contractor support, key Iraqi leader engagements, and even intel collection.

While this transition was ultimately successful, it came at a cost in organizational energy, manpower commitment, and money. By applying these lessons learned, our hope is that units at the tactical level that must transition a mission to a non-DoD agency will be better prepared for success. If the “whole of government” approach is one to which the U.S. will truly subscribe, we must improve our interagency cooperation at the national agency level. Until then, the people on the ground, from all agencies, must solve any challenges that arise in an effort to accomplish our national goals.

**Key Lessons Learned**

- Focus on what needs to be done as part of the transition and then task organize accordingly.
- Units need to be prepared to educate the relieving agency on Army systems and methodologies to help them ask the right questions of the right people.
- Be deliberate in assistance to reduce the disruption upon eventual departure.
- Deliberately forecast and constantly reassess the changing mission and operating environment before, during, and after the transition.
- Identify the key personnel within the other organization.
- Build and maintain relationships with key personnel.

**Conclusion**

Nearly two weeks after the mission began, 1-5 Cav had conducted more than 100 security escort patrols into the newly designated amber zone and successfully assisted OSC-I Tikrit to achieve an initial operational capability by assisting in the development of several systems, conducting a deliberate transition to a nontraditional mission, and building relationships with OSC-I staff, contractors, and Iraqis alike. The scope of the original mission was to simply provide “guys with guns” who would secure the OSC-I trainers as they conducted their mission in the amber zone. However, it became clear, even before the departure of the USD-N headquarters, that an element of battalion-level leadership, in the form of a TAC specifically designed to provide certain capabilities, would be required to complete the transition. In the end, we assisted OSC-I with tactical patrol planning and tracking, medical evacuation and treatment planning, contractor support, key Iraqi leader engagements, and even intel collection.

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**LTC Chip Daniels** commands the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas. His previous assignments include serving as aide de camp to the III Corps commanding general; operations officer and executive officer (XO) in 1-5 Cav; operations officer in the 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion; assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy; headquarters and headquarters company and tank company commander in 1st Battalion, 66th Armor; and troop XO, and scout and tank platoon leader in the 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. He holds a bachelor’s degree in management from Virginia Tech and a master’s in business administration from Duke University.

**CPT James R. Vance** commands A Company, 1-5 Cav. His previous assignments include serving as C Company commander, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment (One Station Unit Training); and as a rifle and weapons platoon leader with the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment. He holds bachelor degrees in finance and economics from Texas Tech University and is a graduate of the Maneuver Captains Career Course.
P
rior to deploying to Afghanistan, I questioned the role of the heavy weapons platoon in a counterinsurgency environment. The limited number of personnel assigned to individual platoons by the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) was a seemingly glaring disadvantage as was the heavy emphasis on mounted movement and use of, what I initially thought, was an archaic missile system.

My perceptions were proven to be completely invalid within the first week that 1st Platoon, D Company, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, deployed to Kunar Province. The successful targeting of well-emplaced insurgents provided small tactical victories, but the integration of one tactic involving the TOW (Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided)/Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) created an unmatched lethality. (An unabridged version of this article, which further discusses this tactic, can be found on the Infantry Magazine Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine.)

Given the effectiveness of the TOW/ITAS, units should place a heavy emphasis on developing competent teams to employ once they begin combat operations. This will specifically require a need to task organize prior to deploying to theater. Task Force No Slack attached two of its weapons platoons to line companies and detached a rifle platoon to augment the heavy weapons company during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) XI. However, training and integration prior to deployment was limited as all platoons remained with their companies until the battalion was boots on ground, slowing the ability to maximize the available combat power. Should a light Infantry battalion decide to task organize itself in a similar manner, heavy weapons platoons should be attached to rifle companies several months prior to any major pre-deployment exercises. This will allow adequate familiarization with company standing operating procedures as well as its organic platoons.

Training with rifle platoons prior to deployment will garner a deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the system and how the TOW/ITAS is able to support combat operations. Practice with this system during daily training as well as Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations facilitates immediate implementation once troops initiate combat operations.

Despite the system’s tremendous success, limitations exist that challenge general applicability in the Afghan theater and primarily revolve around the TOW/ITAS. The weight and size of the TOW/ITAS make it best suited for use in a mounted role as moving its components through the rugged terrain of the Kunar Province is an extremely taxing, although not impossible task. Additional TOW/ITAS-capable vehicles are also needed. Our heavy weapons platoons relied on retrofitted MaxxPro mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. If vehicles were to go down for any reason, it could decrease a company’s combat power.

The largest inhibiting factor is the lack of adequately trained TOW/ITAS gunners throughout a light Infantry battalion. In garrison, training simulators were readily available for platoons to use, but nothing can simulate the sound and feel of a live round leaving the tube. The jolt from flight motor ignition and initial viewer whiteout are the roots of most misses as they can hinder an inexperienced gunner’s ability to track his target. Because of the scarcity of training ammunition made available prior to deployment, platoons were able to train only two gunners each, and their experience was limited to no more than six rounds. During deployment, a gunner’s absence for any reason is a critical loss and forces on-the-job training for inexperienced gunners.

A competent TOW/ITAS team possesses tremendous potential for lethal and precise targeting of insurgents. Battalion and company commanders should aggressively pursue pre-deployment proficiency in its use. This will require a dedication of sometimes scarce assets in garrison to build a competency. While this certainly is one more hurdle to overcome prior to deployment, the tangible and intangible results it yields on the battlefield are worth the effort.

At the time this article was written, 1LT Nicholas Orzechowski was serving in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, as the executive officer of Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment. He previously led 1st Platoon, Delta Company, 2-327th IN for 17 months, six of which were in combat. He is a 2008 graduate of Virginia Military Institute. Questions concerning this article can be directed to nick.orzechowski@us.army.mil.

Visit the Infantry Magazine Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine to view the complete article.
Egyptian General Mohamed Fawzi

PART I: REFLECTIONS ON DEEP STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR DEFEAT

CDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, U.S. NAVY

Professional military education is a hallmark of the armed forces of the United States. From the time I entered the Marine Corps as a second lieutenant until I retired 37 years later as a lieutenant general, education was a continuous process. During my career I had the opportunity to learn from my predecessors by walking their battlefields in the Pacific, Europe, Africa, North America, and the Middle East. This experience was invaluable during my combat tours. Understanding terrain is an important aspect of a military education; another is the ability to get inside the mind of fellow commanders and their decision-making process. CDR Aboul-Enein has provided our current and future leaders with a treasure trove of information that educates and highlights Arabic works of military significance. This particular series takes an intimate look into GEN Mohamed Fawzi, who offers a candid assessment of Egypt’s failure in the 1967 Six-Day War and his interactions with President Nasser during the reconstruction of the Egyptian military after its crushing defeat. Readers will get a ringside seat in decisions that would shape military history in the Middle East. I applaud the U.S. Army’s INFANTRY Magazine for providing CDR Aboul-Enein a multi-series forum to educate our military leadership on Arab strategic, operational, and tactical thinking. This series offers us all insight into the human terrain of the Middle East.

— USMC LTG (Retired) Richard F. Natonski
Former Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Command

In 2000, former Egyptian GEN Mohamed Fawzi died in Cairo at the age of 85. During his life he held the titles of armed forces chief of staff and war minister under President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. His military career ended with President Sadat relieving him for being part of a conspiracy to remove the new Egyptian leader in 1971. He is best remembered within modern Arab military history as the lead architect of rebuilding the Egyptian armed forces after the demoralizing defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War. One word in Arabic summarizes this war: al-Naksah (the setback), which is closely tied to another Arab-Israeli War — al-Nakbah (the catastrophe), a singular word that describes the creation of Israel and the displacement of Palestinians in 1948. In 1984, Fawzi left an extensive military memoir. This series will introduce this important Arabic work of military significance to America’s military leaders, as a means of immersing a new generation of American leaders into direct Arabic sources. The United States will continue to be engaged in the complexities of the Middle East for the foreseeable future, and educating America’s military officers and decision makers in the memoirs of Arab military leaders is vital to cultivating a more comprehensive understanding of the Middle East.

Fawzi’s memoirs were published as Harb Thalathah Sanawat, 1967-1970: Mazakirat al-Fareeq al-Awal Mohamed Fawzi, Wazeer al-Harbiyah al-Asbaq, translated as The Three Years War, 1967-1970: The Memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi, the Former War Minister. The book used for this series is the 1990 fifth edition by Dar al-Mustaqbal Printing in Cairo. This edition contains a chapter on the outcomes and lessons of the War of Attrition (1967-1970). It is crucial for America’s future military generation to immerse themselves in memoirs written by Arab generals as a means of understanding the language, rationale, and thinking of warfare from the Arab perspective.

Nasser and His Top Military Officer Abdel-Hakim Amer: Triumph and Tragedy

Among the challenges Fawzi identified in assessing the defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War was the removal and forced retirement of officers from 1952 to 1967. In addition, the Six-Day War was shaped by Egyptian forces mired in the Yemen War (1962-1967), which framed Egyptian military thinking, immersing them in guerilla warfare and letting conventional warfare skills atrophy. Another problem from Egypt’s geo-strategic perspective was the single-minded focus of attempting to merge the general commands of Syria and Egypt into a Unified Arab Command, which meant that military training was neglected within Egypt. Although the previous challenges were important, perhaps one of the most debilitating internal weaknesses was the unconstrutive and nepotistic relationship between Nasser and his war minister, Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer.

The Amer-Nasser relationship impacted the quality of planning, analysis, and preparations for the 1967 Six-Day War. Through Fawzi, we discover that Amer had an inability to accept countervailing views and developed a cult of personality with loyalty to himself and not to the nation. This cult of personality would prove fatal for Egypt. Over time Nasser, at Amer’s urging, concentrated most elements of Egypt’s security institutions into Amer’s hands. Distanced from defending against external threats, the Egyptian military assumed responsibility for civil security and put more priority toward internal threats and counter-coups. The Egyptian army’s popular image among the people after the 1952 Revolution began to erode, as the military evolved into a state within a state, a condition that still exists today within the Egyptian armed forces.

Fawzi wrote that the relationship...
between Nasser and Amer began to deteriorate in 1962. It is important to digress and understand that Fawzi assumed that the reader is familiar with the Nasser/Amer relationship, which is part of modern Egyptian political lore. It is a political tragedy of two officers who rose through the ranks together, planned the 1952 Revolution, named each other’s sons after one another, and led Egypt, with Amer rising from the rank of major to field marshal in a matter of a few years. Amassing power, Amer came into conflict with Nasser, leading to a series of strategic blunders on Amer’s part. However, Nasser overlooked them due to their close friendship. The Six-Day War was the final straw, and Amer attempted a counter-coup against Nasser that ended with Amer’s suicide under suspicious circumstances. Fawzi’s memoirs discuss that there was no effects-based planning on a military-political level when Nasser, at the urging of Amer, made the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Amer then deployed massive formations into the Sinai on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War. Fawzi wrote that there were no objectives outlined for these deployed forces or any operational instructions, leading to an improvisation of military plans. This improvisation led to a change of military plans no less than four times. A positive result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was that the crisis of power between Amer and Nasser was resolved once and for all. Amer was discredited by the dismal performance of Egyptian arms, and a serious reconstruction of the Egyptian military could begin under the guidance of Fawzi, who concentrated on linking the armed forces to civilian support, unifying civil and military authority, and developing Egypt’s first coordinated national strategy. Fawzi advocated the integration of Egypt’s defense establishment within the cabinet. The first chapters of Fawzi’s memoirs emit a sense that Egypt was attempting to re-attach an element of power (the military) to other elements of national power. After the 1967 war, the Egyptian High Command developed the buzzwords of consolidation, confrontation, and combat that would shape the thinking for the evolution of operational and strategic planning for the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

**Amer Uses Presidential Decrees to Enhance His Power and Undermine Civilian Oversight**

To merely assess Amer as using street protests to get his way would be a grave mistake; Fawzi’s memoirs provide the deeper strategies Amer used to consolidate power into his hands. He used his influence, charm, and friendship with Nasser to get him to sign Presidential Decree 2878/1962, which made the deputy supreme commander of the armed forces responsible to the president and presidential council for all affairs of the armed forces, both military and administrative. By linking the president and presidential council, Amer marginalized the presidential council, as he felt he could directly appeal to Nasser. This meant Amer retained in effect the status quo where he continued to be solely responsible for promotions, personnel assignments, and military equipage.

In 1964, Presidential Decree 117/1964 concentrated the powers of war minister in the hands of the deputy supreme commander. This decree allowed Amer to have control of the army budget, in which he created a funding site for the military administration of Gaza. In 1966, Presidential Decree 1956/1966 neutralized the independence of the war minister position, separate from Amer’s deputy supreme commander position, by appointing Amer’s protégé Shams Badran. This enabled Amer to ignore the 1964 Constitution and make the war minister subordinate to him. In addition to all three previous decrees, Fawzi considers Presidential Decree 367/1966 as the most dangerous, because it gave the war minister (Badran):

- The Portfolio for Military Secrecy
- Administration of military courts (In 1966 Military Decree 25 stipulated that if a civilian got into a dispute with a military member, it would be resolved by military tribunal.)
- Administration of military intelligence
- Morale and welfare of the armed forces
- Oversight of budgetary affairs
- Customs and coastal defense
- Military industries
- Oversight of the procurement offices in Moscow and Cologne, Germany
- Census for the draft
- Linkage between the office of the war minister and the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS)
- Oversight of military districts (Egypt was divided into military districts, and can be described as a state within a state)

Using this decree, Amer and his war minister used the pretext of the nation benefiting from military leadership expertise to take over key industries. It appointed military officers to key ambassadorships, usurping the job of the foreign ministry, and began maintaining a presence in Egyptian high schools and universities to oversee the political indoctrination of the youth. Amer distanced Nasser from the military apparatus and began eroding his authority. It is unclear why Nasser signed these decrees knowing that his power would be eroded, but one explanation is that he could never say no to his best friend. Amer used Nasser to boost morale by conducting a 1964 visit of combat forces in Yemen.
Fawzi wrote that Nasser attempted to have Fawzi remove his cronies and cited a 1960 incident where Nasser decided to travel to an Arab summit meeting in Casablanca aboard the presidential yacht Hurriyah (Freedom). The yacht was to be escorted by two Egyptian naval destroyers, but, to Nasser’s embarrassment, both destroyers could not complete the mission due to malfunctions and had to be taken into Algiers for repairs. Nasser called for the relief of his naval chief, but Amer ignored these calls.

As more of Egypt’s civil life was placed under military oversight such as census, customs and fixing public transportation, less attention was paid to offensive and defensive combat competencies. Adding to this was Amer’s program of providing military officers priority housing and giving away automobiles and pay raises, despite knowing the economic strains these were placing on Egypt. Fawzi commented that this new sub-strata of society — the military — had a detrimental impact on placing the entire nation on a war footing. In addition, military leaders became inward looking and therefore were not looking to plan and train for projecting offensive power outside of Egypt’s borders. It also made no difference that Egypt was providing the latest Soviet combat weaponry, because its leaders under Amer were not interested in combat effectiveness, but instead they were making the most of opportunities to personally enrich themselves.

After the 1967 war, Fawzi was provided access to Amer’s papers and classified safes, in which he came across a classified Egyptian military headquarters document. The document was a plan by Badran to create a secret cabal comprised entirely of Badran’s military cadet class of 1948. This secret cell was designed to be informants on the loyalty of fellow officers to Badran himself and to Amer. This revelation by Fawzi shows the extent of division within the Egyptian army on the eve of the Six-Day War.

**Regional and Internal Challenges**

Fawzi wrote that the symptoms for the crippling defeat of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War began not with the mass retreat of the Egyptian army or the decimation of the Egyptian air force within an hour, but began years before. According to Fawzi, regional, external, and internal dynamics brought about the conditions for Egypt’s defeat.

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orbit, yet wanted to retain independence from the superpowers. He became a major architect of the Non-Aligned Movement with India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and worked to destabilize President Eisenhower’s creation of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).

Nasser viewed the United States as entering the colonial void left by Britain and France. The United States failed to appreciate how MEDO collected all Arab traditional monarchies, such as Jordan and Iraq, against newly formed Arab nationalist governments in Egypt and Syria. Egyptian leaders failed to comprehend Washington’s desire to seek stability in the region while rolling back Soviet influence. Despite the open debates that would lead to the long-standing American policy of Soviet containment, there is no indication Nasser ever discussed the work of George Kennan and his policy of Soviet containment by the United States and its allies or how Egypt would fit in this emerging Cold War. The United States cut funding for the Aswan High Dam in response to Egyptians signing a massive arms deal in 1955 with Czechoslovakia. This led Nasser to increase his ties with the Soviets, who took up funding the dam. With this increased economic and military assistance, Nasser had difficulty maintaining policy independence from Moscow.

America’s popularity was at its height in Egypt as the United States was seen as causing the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from the Sinai in the aftermath of the Suez War. America’s popularity would be eroded among Arabs, generally, and Egyptians, specifically, due to increasing American support for Israel as well as Washington’s support of Arab monarchies. While Israel and Arab monarchies both were hostile to one another, they both saw the danger Nasser was posing with Arab progressive regimes. Fawzi saw himself and Egypt as locked in a struggle to preserve and spread pan-Arabism against forces who wanted to roll back this ideology.

The failure to understand Nasser’s need to balance Egyptian national independence with Soviet encroachment and his inability to appreciate that pan-Arabism was only judged by American
policymakers in the wider context of containing communism led the Egyptian leader ever closer to Moscow, declaring a new subset of pan-Arabist ideology — Arab Socialism — with the addition that Nasser supported national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

**Africa, the Arab League, and National Liberation Movements: Egypt Pulled In Differing Directions**

In 1962, Fawzi was commandant of Egypt’s war college and was tasked with representing Egypt in what Nasser’s generals called the Combined African High Command. It was an attempt to operationalize Nasser’s ideas of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism that are prominent in Nasser’s book *Philosophy of Revolution*. Although published in English and Arabic, there is no indication that the Pentagon of the Eisenhower or Kennedy administrations read, assessed, or analyzed this work. Fawzi wrote that Egypt provided expertise, training, and coordination for this joint African force. Military officers in many African states, many newly independent, would train in Egyptian war colleges and military academies. Nasser wanted to capitalize on this wave of independence sweeping Africa and ordered an Egyptian paratroop division to deploy to the Congo to bolster the president of its newly independent but highly unstable government. Egyptian military leaders, bolstered by Nasser’s anti-imperial and anti-colonial rhetoric, deployed a tank regiment to Iraq to aid in its confrontation with British forces over Kuwait in 1961. Egypt aided Soviet military advisors by facilitating the disbursement of aid, training, and logistics to Algeria, Sudan, and Somalia, much like the United States utilized Pakistan as a conduit for several Afghan mujahideen groups fighting the Soviets. The Soviets used Egypt as a conduit for supporting national liberation movements in Africa and the Middle East. The Cold War between the superpowers would harden into a competition between the so-called progressive Arab countries — Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen — against traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Jordan, Iran, and Morocco. The United States and the United Kingdom stood behind traditional monarchies, and the Soviets stood behind progressive Arab states.

The Arab League, created in 1945, underwent socio-political engineering by Nasser, which Fawzi discussed as the creation of a Unified Arab Command. While this may have seemed menacing to American policymakers of the time, they failed to understand the mechanics and problems this command created. Fawzi revealed that attempts at creating an Arab Defense Collective caused Egypt’s leaders to neglect defining any national security policies for Egypt. There were no questions on how Egypt’s security fit within the collective security of differing Arab states. Fawzi criticized Nasser and Amer, as well as Egypt’s general staff, of failing to tie together the economic, political, and military aspects of a unified Arab security pact. Instead, the general staff focused on operations, tactics, and formations, and completely lost sight of a military designed to advance national geo-political objectives. According to Fawzi, there was no Arab comprehension of national security that drove or even kept together any Arab collective defense arrangement.

**Seminal Events Leading to Egyptian Strategic Disadvantage in the 1967 War**

Before the 1967 Six-Day War, Fawzi said there were several seminal events that shaped the regional strategic landscape to Egypt’s disadvantage. They were:

* The union between Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) was a euphoric moment for Arab nationalists and Nasser, but after the euphoria there were massive disruptions in the merging of Egyptian and Syrian ministries in Cairo and Damascus. These disruptions were unwieldy in the coordination and execution of policy. The UAR saw Amer as deputy leader of Syria, leading him to devote less time to military affairs while retaining his defense portfolio. Other problems became apparent months into the union, when Syrian Abdel-Rahim Sirraj became UAR interior minister. Sirraj and Amer clashed continuously, and Syrians objected to Egypt’s moves to dominate Syria’s defense and security institutions and impose Egyptian military and police methods on Syria. Economically, Egypt poured tens of millions of pounds in loans and aid into Syria.

* Combining and bureaucratizing the military was a contentious affair, as Egypt attempted to combine Egyptian and Syrian combat formations into one. Aside from the imbalance of forces between Egypt and Syria, no thought was given to morale or unit cohesion. Egyptians were heavy-handed in implementing control over Syrian military personnel, and Fawzi spent three months out of the year as chief of staff for the military academy, inspecting and overseeing the academy in Damascus. Fawzi commented...
that Egypt was ahead in air defense, naval systems, and technical units compared to Syria. Another contentious aspect of merging the two armed forces was the imposition of Egyptian military intelligence personnel instilling revolutionary discipline on the Syrian troops.

* Amer began assuming more powers, and his cronies began marginalizing the Syrians in their own country. The Syrian Military Intelligence (2nd Bureaux) and Egyptian Military Intelligence (DMI) conspired and conducted counter-plots against one another. Political cells that resented Egyptian dominance in the union began forming within the Syrian army. Communists, Socialists, and Baathists coalesced and plotted around anti-Egyptian feeling. Fawzi wrote that Egyptian officers abused their positions in Syria, putting personal enrichment above efforts to make unification with Egypt and Syria work. Critics of the UAR scored propaganda points and dominated the airwaves to talk of a separation between Egypt and Syria. The date of the inifaal (separation) came on 28 September 1961. A small clique of Syrian colonels who ran Amer’s office in Damascus successfully completed the coup, which took less than two hours. With the threat of violence, Egyptian top officers on Amer’s staff and their families were surrounded. Nasser, fearing his close friend would be captured or killed, ordered an Egyptian paratroop regiment and naval assets to land in the Syrian port of Latakia. Egypt had received faulty intelligence that the Latakia Barracks was pro-union, and the Egyptian contingent was taken into custody upon disembarking into the port. During the following weeks, Egyptian military personnel and their families in Syria were exchanged for Syrian military personnel and their families in Egypt. Nasser’s humiliation caused by Amer’s mismanagement of Syria culminated at the Shatura Conference in Lebanon that formally dissolved the UAR. Events of the UAR would have a direct bearing on Nasser’s strategic thinking when it came to providing military aid to Yemeni Colonel Abdullah Sallal in September 1962, a decision that would escalate into a five-year quagmire for Egypt known as the Yemen War.

Conclusion
Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War began long before the war even began. Regional, internal, and external challenges all played a significant role in Israel’s victory over Egypt. Included in those dynamics was the deteriorating relationship between Nasser and Amer, as Amer gradually extracted more and more power from Nasser. Amer’s hunger for power led him to catastrophically mismanage Egypt’s relationship with Syria, causing the eventual split of the UAR. The dissolution of the UAR would prove to be detrimental for Egypt by the time the 1967 war began. External complications from the Cold War superpowers — the United States and the Soviet Union — caused Egypt’s leadership to focus efforts toward defending itself from outside disruptions rather than toward handling internal affairs. These external and internal aspects culminated in Egypt entering the 1962 Yemen War, which will be highlighted in the next issue of INFANTRY.

The United States will continue to be engaged in the complexities of the Middle East for the foreseeable future, and educating America’s military officers and decision makers in the memoirs of Arab military leaders is vital to cultivating a more comprehensive military strategic understanding of the Middle East.

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Our military has learned many lessons over the last 10 years in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our institutional challenge now is how to effectively integrate those lessons into our training while preparing for future conflicts that may require us to conduct major combat operations against a near-peer competitor, conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in support of an allied partner’s government, support disaster relief in a neighboring country, or a combination of all three in a single theater of operation.

The complexity of recent operations in theater and our assessment of potential future conflicts demand that our Army be prepared for operations across the spectrum of conflict — from traditional offensive-defensive to stability and support operations — that may have to be executed in a time-compressed response. As such, the Army has renewed its emphasis on training “conventional” core skill sets, tasks, and operations that have eroded over the last decade because of our required focus on conducting COIN operations. At the same time, our military leadership understands the need to avoid repeating past mistakes, which include applying the fatal “if we’re good at one, we will be good at the other” mind-set. This is where military leaders believe if a unit was good at major combat operations, they would be good at low spectrum operations.

Equally dangerous is the “either-or” philosophy, where training either focuses on conducting major combat operations against an adversarial conventional force or COIN operations against an irregular force. To this regard, the Army’s leaders have directed in the latest doctrine, highlighted in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, that our formations must be prepared to fight using a construct of combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) against a continuum of threat actors, called a hybrid threat, that range from formidable conventional army units to terrorists and criminal elements. To that point, the combat training centers (CTCs), in conjunction with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), have built and are improving the next CTC training model designed to build on the past lessons as we prepare our Soldiers, leaders, and units for an unforeseen future.

In October 2011, the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) executed the Army’s first iteration of TRISA’s Full Spectrum Training Environment (FSTE) exercise, which centered on the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The exercise was designed to keep our Army’s training both relevant and realistic by providing a common training scenario for use during all the CTC rotations, built upon a Georgia-Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey (GAAT) scenario. This scenario’s environment gives each of the four CTCs designated battlespace to build their training upon. Perhaps more significant is that the rotational units’ actions are mutually interlinked with one another. For example, what occurs during a rotation at JMTC in Grafenwoehr, Germany, will have an operational environment (OE) impact on a unit executing a rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif.
This article will not focus on the 173rd ABCT’s conduct of the rotation (as additional articles are forthcoming that will go into detail about the unit’s tactical execution). It will, however, discuss overcoming the desire to exclusively apply the Afghanistan and Iraqi experience as the guide to handrail future training, while not divesting those critical lessons learned to the point the Army goes back to a pre-9/11 conventional war training mentality. The article will also discuss the purpose of this new training model, the joint and multinational collaboration used by JMTC to execute this FSTE training model, and a proposed way ahead.

There’s a common reference being made by leaders in their discourse that the Army needs to “get back to the basics” while at home station and specifically during CTC rotations. The FSTE training model, utilizing the TRISA’s FSTE scenario, was designed to capture those lessons learned during the last 10 years of war while fully preparing our Soldiers, leaders, and formations for the wide range of future threats they may likely face. This scenario’s hybrid threat — a combination of adversaries from regular, irregular, and criminal groups — is an accurate reflection of the global challenges our formations will face in future conflicts. The likelihood of such a threat can be seen in the recent conflict in Libya where the rebel National Transitional Army — backed by NATO — faced not only Muammar Gaddifi’s conventional military but his paramilitary forces, pro-Gaddafi tribal militias, foreign fighters, and local criminal elements.

Based on this assessment of future conflicts, the FSTE training model is designed to force a rotational unit to conduct simultaneous operations along the various points of the spectrum of conflict (from stable peace to insurgency to general war and back) as the operational environment dictates within the span of their monthlong CTC experience. Up to this point, a U.S. commander who faces a near-peer enemy with almost the same military capacity cannot ignore a terrorist or criminal element within an urban center in his area of operation (AO), as they may hypothetically attack his lines of supply and communication. Scenarios such as these are extremely realistic and strain a unit’s ability to properly synchronize all its warfighting functions, something that was observed during the 173rd ABCT rotation. Additionally, the FSTE model compels a unit to implement the Army’s doctrine of CAM and WAS throughout the entire training process (as was the case
Soldiers with the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team return fire during a Full Spectrum Training Environment exercise on 23 October 2011 in Hohenfels, Germany.

Photo by SSG Joel Salgado
One of the major advantages the JMTC offers the Army is its location in central Europe, which supports U.S. Army in Europe’s (USAREUR) mission to train with our multinational partners. The geographical proximity enables our coalition partners to participate in these important exercises. As a one-of-a-kind CTC, this provides our nation a strategic value and sets JMTC apart from other CTCs in the U.S.

This collaborative effort greatly added to the richness of the rotation and provided an unmatched realism for U.S. Soldiers who had to work with and through foreign militaries during the exercise. During the 173rd ABCT’s rotation, JMTC was fortunate to have a Slovenian infantry battle group serve as the host-nation security force, a motorized Slovakian infantry battle group serve as the conventional opposing forces, and a Bulgarian special operations team serve as the special purpose opposing force. Ultimately, this exercise not only trained participating U.S. units and coalition armies, but it continued to effectively build onto the existing strategic partnerships between our nations.

For the planning and execution of this exercise, JMTC involved a multitude of allied partners, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and the other CTCs. This collaborative effort greatly added to the richness of the rotation and provided an unmatched realism for U.S. Soldiers who had to work with and through foreign militaries during the exercise. During the 173rd ABCT’s rotation, JMTC was fortunate to have a Slovenian infantry battle group serve as the host-nation security force, a motorized Slovakian infantry battle group serve as the conventional opposing forces, and a Bulgarian special operations team serve as the special purpose opposing force. Ultimately, this exercise not only trained participating U.S. units and coalition armies, but it continued to effectively build onto the existing strategic partnerships between our nations.

The JMTC’s flexibility in rotational design allowed the command to modify the traditional CTC training cycle — a unit conducts its deployment operations, then situational training lanes and command post exercises, followed by a challenging week or longer force-on-force phase — to account for the unique capability the 173rd ABCT possesses. A core competency of airborne units is its ability to conduct forcible entry operations; however, the 173rd ABCT had not realistically trained for that mission-essential task or conducted this operation in more than eight years because of its high operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Prior to the exercise, the 173rd ABCT had a limited number of aircraft available to conduct airborne operations training above the company level. This lack of aviation assets caused USAREUR to coordinate with USAFE and U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) staffs to receive enough airlift support to conduct a brigade (minus) airborne assault. The end result of hundreds of staff hours of planning was approximately 1,000 paratroopers (including soldiers from a Polish airborne company attached to the 173rd ABCT) exiting C-130J and C-17 aircraft in a mass attack. It was the combined efforts and coordination between the sister services’ staffs that enabled this airborne assault to occur, which allowed the 173rd ABCT to gain increased proficiency of this critical skill at the brigade level. A key lesson...
learned from this rotation is the increased need for service component commands (SCC) to work together in a manner to support not only CTC but all other major brigade-level and above exercises, to realistically train our collective forces in a cooperative manner that echoes the military axiom of “train as you fight.” The benefits of such a joint exercise for all participants cannot be undervalued as all units, regardless of service component, improved their proficiency in warfighting and increased their readiness to execute their wartime mission.

Another major highlight of this rotation was as the 173rd ABCT and supporting 12th Combat Aviation Brigade conducted their portion as the CTC rotation in the live-training domain, the 30th Medical Command (MEDCOM) executed theirs in the live-virtual-constructive training domains. The ability to train functional and multifunctional brigades is another unique service that JMTC offers the Army. As such, the 30th MEDCOM served as the primary training audience for JMTC’s Joint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC). While the 30th MEDCOM set up its headquarters and physically collocated with the 212th Combat Surgical Hospital (CSH) to execute casualty play in the live-training domain, the JMSC created a “wrap-around” virtual and constructive feed that replicated 30th MEDCOM’s Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) events that were virtually occurring in the larger FSTE exercise beyond the boundaries of the 173rd ABCT’s areas of operation in the scenario. The end result was all the training audiences were able to achieve their agreed upon training objectives. The training value of all units’ cooperatively exercising their wartime missions simultaneously in one scenario at the same time was exponential.

This rotation set the foundation for future training that capitalizes on adding additional secondary training audiences that train virtually and/or constructively while another unit conducts live training. Hypothetically speaking, a maneuver enhancement brigade at Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Wash., and a battlefield surveillance brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, can participate virtually from their locations, while at the same time a 1st Infantry Division BCT executes a CTC rotation at Fort Irwin and the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., provides mission command for the entire exercise. The richness of such a geographically dispersed exercise provides a realistic flavor to the rotation that would train a multitude of units in a way that saves precious training dollars while increasing readiness across a series of commands. This effort aligns nicely with the training philosophy GEN Martin E. Dempsey proposed in his February 2011 ARMY Magazine article “Leader Development.” He wrote, “The Training Brain is helping us to evolve massive multiplayer online role-playing games that will allow Soldiers and leaders to interact and collaborate using common scenarios in a virtual environment with other Soldiers within their units and across the Army.” This rotation was a major step forward in validating this effort. The FSTE training model offers a mechanism to accomplish our senior leaderships’ vision to achieve institutional adaptation through learning, inculcated with mission command as a warfighting function, and to develop adaptive leaders and formations through collaborative efforts across the Army.

As our military continues to seek ways to capture the lessons learned during the past decade from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must delicately balance those lessons in a manner with a realistic projection of how to train to cover the gamut of potential contingencies that may occur across the spectrum of conflict. In his article “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” historian and political scientist Sir Michael Howard states that in times of peace military leaders will be wrong in their assessment of what future wars will be, however, the key is not to be too wrong. With that in mind, we find that the JMTC’s rotation in October serves as a solid proof-of-principle that the FSTE model is the right training model to implement in both CTC and home-station training to prepare units for current and future conflicts. Additionally, the model offers the ability for increased integration and collaboration within and across the military services in an effort to get an added comprehensive synergistic training value, while potentially reducing training costs during nationally economic strenuous times. When it comes to improving on this model and training, only our imagination can constrain us.

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“This is a game of wits and will. You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.”
— GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 2004

As a result of the United States’ overwhelming military superiority, its recent adversaries have chosen to apply both unconventional and asymmetric tactics aimed at undermining popular support and confidence in a nation’s ruling body. In response, the United States and its allies attempt to use “all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government,” according to FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. In short, warfare has become a contest of political influence centered on the population. Success in this environment relies upon the collection, aggregation, and analysis of human intelligence. Networks of human sources enhance the military’s ability to understand the perceptions of the population and enrich its decision-making processes aimed at neutralizing the insurgency and shaping public opinion around the legitimacy of its operations.

Unfortunately, the U.S. military is in danger of losing the battle of public influence. The proliferation and ubiquity of mobile (cell phone and Internet) technology has changed the rules of the game. Insurgents are capitalizing on the nearly nonexistent transaction costs of establishing groups and distributing information using technology. Insurgent operations aimed at developing networks, gathering intelligence, and distributing information are outpacing the antiquated, inflexible, and unresponsive system employed by our military.

In light of this recent trend, the U.S. military should seek to strengthen its human intelligence-gathering apparatus through crowdsourcing. Leveraging the latest technology, it could create large, interconnected networks capable of instantaneous and inexpensive communication. This would allow for unprecedented intelligence collection as well as widespread and immediate distribution of information critical in shaping public opinion — a cornerstone of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

A Soldier with the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, talks to an Afghan villager during a patrol in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

Photo by SGT Jeffrey Alexander
The Current System

The importance of intelligence collection in effective COIN operations is underscored in FM 3-24, which states that COIN “is an intelligence-driven endeavor. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host nation, and insurgents.” And in counterinsurgencies the preponderance of intelligence must be procured through human sources — human intelligence.

FM 3-24 defines human intelligence as “the collection of information by a trained human intelligence collector from people and their associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities.” Anyone can receive unsolicited information from a “walk-up” or anonymous source, but Army doctrine mandates that only trained collectors may gather intelligence from designated human sources. Development of a source requires a specially trained Soldier to cultivate a trusting, personal relationship that is tedious, cumbersome, and often quite dangerous for both parties. Careless handling of a source by an untrained Soldier increases the chances of reprisal against the source, significantly reducing their willingness to participate. Although intelligence collectors are trained in source protection procedures, this process is not free of risk. In many cases, personal meetings are required between the source and collector to share information. Great care is taken to select a proper site for the meeting, but most must take place in enemy territory or on a coalition forward operating base. Neither offers a safe haven or refuge from the watchful eyes of an enemy insurgent or his allies. In his 28 November 2001 The New York Times article “Militants Turn to Death Squads in Afghanistan,” Ray Rivera noted that in Afghanistan alone, the United Nations observed “…462 assassinations [in 2010 in reprisal for cooperating with the coalition] according to their records, double the number from the previous year. The figures may not include many killings in remote areas, like the mass beheading, because fearful villagers never reported them.” Direct and personal relationships with sources can also be dangerous for the intelligence collector. In December of 2009, seven intelligence collectors were killed in Afghanistan by a source serving as a double agent who detonated a suicide vest after being granted special access to a coalition base by his handlers.

Additionally, the number and capability of trained intelligence collectors is a limiting factor to the size and scope of a human source network. On average, trained collectors represent less than five percent of the total organization conducting COIN operations, and their capacity to develop sources and collect intelligence is finite. Communication between a collector and a source is often limited due to security considerations and the timeliness of a source’s response to specific intelligence requirements is unpredictable.

Currently organizations conducting COIN operations are limited in their abilities to gather intelligence from or directly communicate with the entire general populace of the host nation. FM 3-24 acknowledges that all Soldiers are potential collectors and organizations should incorporate systems to capture intelligence informally collected during routine patrolling. Similarly, it highlights the importance of establishing a security environment that encourages the population to provide unsolicited information (walk-up sources). And, it implores commanders to consider other sources of community-collected, intelligence-written surveys or information gathered by the media, non-government organizations, or contractors as amplifying data for use in analysis and trend identification. However, all of these methods of intelligence collection are contingent upon the security of the population, offer little anonymity, and place anyone who cooperates with the counterinsurgent force in danger of reprisal. Moreover, none of these techniques afford the counterinsurgent force the opportunity to widely disseminate information or receive immediate feedback from the population. Conversely, many insurgent networks are interconnected with technology (social media) and have the ability to immediately and inexpensively broadcast information to the population in their own language. Their message often reaches the population first and is effective in shaping public opinion.

Finally, current military organizations conducting COIN operations lack the technological infrastructure to respond quickly to the “demonstrated ability of extremists to respond quickly with information and misinformation,” according to Sheldon Himelfarb in his United States Institute of Peace brief “Media and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” Successful COIN operations demand the immediate broadcasting of event-driven news. Distributing good news or mitigating the effects of a crisis is critical to a strategy aimed at influencing public opinion. The Army’s current system lacks the complexity to counteract the insurgent’s media dominance. Personal contact with a finite number of human sources, limited engagement of the population at large, distribution of leaflets, radio broadcasts from military outposts, and reluctant use of social media do little to target an increasingly technologically savvy populace interconnected with a social network.

The Power of the Network

“Groups of people are complex, in ways that make those groups hard to form and hard to sustain; much of the shape of traditional institutions is a response to those difficulties. New social tools relieve some of those burdens, allowing for new kinds of group-forming…”

— Clay Shirky
Here Comes Everybody, 2008, Penguin Books

Historically, humans have gained strength from reliance upon each other. Hunting in groups increased efficiency; consolidated workforces and the creation of the assembly line increased production; and nations bound together by some form
of representative government tended to flourish. The contributions of many surpassed those of the individual. The advent of social media-based technology has lowered the transaction costs of organization even further. Now, an organization enabled with today’s technology can form quickly, establish an informal hierarchy, and communicate cheaply and instantaneously.

The size and capability of these organizations can be explained using Metcalf’s law which states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system (n^2). One can simply illustrate this law with the introduction of a cell phone into a community. One cell phone is useless, but the value of every cell phone increases with the addition of more cell phones into the network because of the number of people with whom each user can send and receive phone calls (See Figure 1).

Technology that creates small world networks (social networks) further increases its power. This phenomenon can be explained using Reed’s law which states that utility of large networks, especially social networks, can scale exponentially with the size of the network. In his February 2001 Harvard Business Review article “The Law of the Pack,” David Reed wrote, “[E]ven Metcalfe’s law understates the value created by a group-forming network (GFN) as it grows. Let’s say you have a GFN with n members. If you add up all the potential two-person groups, three-person groups, and so on that those members could form, the number of possible groups equals 2n. So the value of a GFN increases exponentially, in proportion to 2n. I call that Reed’s law. And its implications are profound.”

Simply stated, technology that creates small world networks establishes structure within a large organization by creating multiple, densely connected small groups making large groups seem smaller and more personal. In essence, this technology has eliminated the transaction cost for humans to fulfill their basic instinct of participating in a group that shares, participates or acts in concert, according to Shirky.

The world-wide proliferation of cell phone technology creates tremendous opportunity for a counterinsurgent force to create a large social network within the population for human intelligence collection. Similar to wireless Internet, mobile phone coverage is prolific, inclusive, and growing. Currently there are 5.3 billion mobile subscribers in the world (77 percent of the world’s population) with over 3.8 billion subscriptions (68 percent of the population) in the developing world alone. Also, almost a third in the U.S. — as well as 28 percent of consumers globally — report ownership of multiple cell phones, noted Survey Sampling International [SSI] in its press release “Cell Phones Approach Total Penetration Globally, With Smartphones Moving Toward Market Dominance.” Mobile phones are multi-faceted devices with clocks, cameras, and calculators and possess extraordinary latent potential for intelligence collection. Globally, 86 percent of owners have clocks on their phones; 84 percent have still cameras, calendars, and calculators; 81 percent have text messaging; and 75 percent have Internet capabilities, according to SSI.

SSI also noted that phone users find value in text messaging, and it is regarded as the king of mobile messaging, with 37 percent saying they use this feature almost all the time and 41 percent reporting they use it very or quite often. In 2011, mobile subscribers are estimated to send eight trillion text messages, and application-to-person (A2P) messaging (e.g. bank alerts and mobile advertising), is set to overtake person-to-person messaging in 2016, according to mobiThinking’s 2011 global mobile statistics. Internet capability is the third most popular feature (after clocks and text messaging) used almost all the time by 27 percent of respondents and very or quite often by 31 percent, according to SSI. In 2009 over one-half of a billion people accessed the web via the cell phone and usage is expected to double in the next five years, overtaking web access by PCs. And, by 2011 mobiThinking projected that nearly 85 percent of handsets sold will allow access to the Internet.

The growth of the mobile phone market is not isolated to the largest, most-developed countries in the world. For example, nearly 12 million of Afghanistan’s 22 million people (54 percent of the population) are reported to have cell phones, wrote Spencer Ackerman in his October 2010 Wired Magazine article “Can Cell Phones Bring Justice to Afghanistan?” Additionally, 80 percent of all Africans and almost 68 percent of Asian countries own some type of cellular device.

The global population’s participation in social media is prolific across multiple demographics and access through their mobile device seems to be quite commonplace. It appears that it would require little effort by a counterinsurgent force to create a large network using some type of social media. Twitter has grown more than 500 percent in the last few years, and Facebook reaches over 56 percent of active American Internet users and is the third most visited site for users 65 and older, according to the Nielsen Company’s 2010 Media Industry Fact Sheet. Worldwide, mobiThinking estimated that “there are more than 350 million active users [44 percent] currently accessing Facebook
through their mobile devices. People that use Facebook on their mobile devices are twice as active on Facebook as non-mobile users.”

Finally, data indicates that cell phone users are quite responsive to calls-to-action sent to their handset via short message service (SMS). In June 2009, the Shedd Aquarium in Chicago used advertising on four network television stations to create awareness and drive visitors to a new aquatic show. Each commercial was the same except one of the four stations asked viewers to text instead of navigating to a Web site. After a viewer texted in, they received a message asking them to respond with their e-mail address and zip code. As reported in a Mobile Commons case study, the ad with the SMS call-to-action generated 325 percent more contest entries and comprised nearly 52 percent of total contest entries despite only running 25 percent of the ads.

Practically speaking, members of an ad-hoc human intelligence community would be quite responsive to direction from the counterinsurgent force. Commanders could instantly broadcast messages to the community directing them to be on the lookout for a certain individual or vehicle or solicit input from the community on the effects of recent operations, and they should expect widespread community compliance.

Participation within these large group-formed networks can be modeled using the power law or long-tailed distribution, according to Shirky. What is unusual about a long-tailed distribution is that the “most frequently occurring 20 percent of items represents less than 50 percent of occurrences; or in other words, the least frequently occurring 80 percent of items are more important as a proportion of the total population” (Wikipedia - Long Tail). Simply stated, a large number of single human intelligence reports collected from a large population size exceeds the value of a large number of reports collected from a few sources. In the past, it was neither possible nor efficient to collect human intelligence reports from everyone in the community; time and resources had to be aligned with a few, reliable sources. Now, it is possible to quickly and inexpensively create a large, inclusive network to take advantage of data collected from sources that were once inaccessible, including those who will only have one significant contribution, ever.

Crowdsourcing

In his June 2006 Wired Magazine article “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,” Jeff Howe defined crowdsourcing as “the act of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call.” The advantage of crowdsourcing, rather than performing operations internally, is an organization can gain access to a very large community of potential workers who have a diverse set of skills and expertise who are willing to participate on a limited basis and at a much lower cost, according to Paul Whitla is his paper “Crowdsourcing’ and its Applications in Marketing Activities.”

A recent example of crowdsourcing comes from the London bombings that occurred on 7 July 2005. Before any of the mainstream media could respond to the scene, eyewitnesses began to photograph and report the tragedy via their blogs, providing the public with thorough and instantaneous media coverage. Having an amateur photographer at the scene with cell phone cameras was better than a professional photojournalist who had to travel.

Shirky pointed out that not only did these photos document the destruction of the bombing, but they served as means of immediate communication between survivors and their families, messages of defiance, and means of official notice to the community (a photograph of a sign that said all services are suspended).

Crowdsourcing creates tremendous opportunities to enhance our Army’s human intelligence-gathering apparatus. No longer will the population be passive observers of COIN operations, they will become active participants and stakeholders in the struggle to defeat an insurgency. Additionally, human intelligence gathering will become less dependent upon the security situation of the region. Sources can find security in anonymity, decreasing the likelihood of reprisal for their actions. Also, treating each member of the population as a stakeholder could increase their willingness to participate. As the population begins to see the success and positive outcomes of their reporting, it is safe to assume that the probability of further contributions will increase: success begets success.

A New Model for Human Intelligence Collection

The following could serve as a model for enhanced human intelligence collection. Upon arrival to an area of conflict, the commander on the ground broadcasts a call-to-action via conventional means: media advertisement, leaflet distribution, cell-phone distribution, or word of mouth to solicit text message responses from the populace within the area of operations. As members of the community respond via SMS, the counterinsurgent force will capture their information (phone number and e-mail), establish a social network, and initiate an ongoing, two-way conversation with the public through their mobile devices. Not only can the commander pass on requests for information to the community, he can use the medium to engage them consistently in an attempt to outpace or delegitimize the message broadcast by the insurgents.

As the human intelligence reports begin to arrive from the community, a commander can use a relatively inexpensive software package to aggregate, map, and analyze the reporting, similar to the software analysts currently use to evaluate traditional all-source intelligence. Using the large amounts of data collected, the commander should be able to analyze trends and develop further priority information requirements to push back to the community. A commander can expect the distribution of the population’s participation in this social network to follow the power law distribution. Using this information, the 20 percent who provide the most frequent reporting could be further evaluated as potential formal, human intelligence sources. Developing a more intimate...
relationship with these sources will allow a commander to answer additional requirements that may be too sensitive, dangerous, or complex to present to the community at large.

As the network becomes more robust, the complexity of both the intelligence requirements and human source reporting could evolve to the point where both could lead to real-time responses to crises. For example, a human source could report the location of an insurgent safe haven via SMS. Upon receipt of this report, the commander could query the particular source or the community for additional information including pictures of the building(s) or the person(s) inside, which would provide a ground force with enough information for an immediate response. Finally, after the ground force responded to the reporting, the commander could broadcast the results of the operation to the entire community providing them with immediate, positive feedback for their contributions.

Haiti Disaster Relief — A Model of Success

Recently, the concept of crowdsourced intelligence in support of military-assisted disaster relief has proven to be quite successful. In the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) special report titled “Crowdsourcing — Crisis Information in Disaster Affected Haiti,” authors Jessica Heinzelman and Carol Waters examined the role of the crisis-mapping software Ushahidi during relief efforts following the January 2010 earthquake. In the report, Craig Clarke, an open-source intelligence analyst in the U.S. Marine Corps, noted, “In this postmodern age, open-source intelligence outperforms traditional intel... The notion of crisis mapping demonstrates the intense power of open-source intelligence... [W]hen compared side by side, Ushahidi reporting and other open sources vastly outperformed ‘traditional intel’ [after the Haiti earthquake].”

When the 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, most of the infrastructure (including 70 percent of its cell phone towers) was destroyed in the country’s most populous areas and more than 230,000 people were killed. Multiple organizations from the international community, including the U.S. military, responded immediately to provide assistance. Despite the widespread devastation, workers were able to quickly restore mobile service providing a lifeline to nearly 85 percent of Haitian households, according to Heinzelman and Waters. They also noted that although traditional disaster-relief mechanisms allowed for communication and information sharing between the many international organizations, relief efforts lacked the ability to “aggregate and prioritize data that came from outside sources, making it difficult to benefit from valuable information coming from the Haitian community.” With Ushahidi, relief agencies were able to collect, aggregate, and share information they received directly from Haitians quicker and more efficiently than they could through traditional intelligence gathering means.

Using social media (blogs, Twitter, Facebook) and text messages sent from mobile phones, relief workers were able to capture real-time reports, identify immediate needs for medical assistance, food or water, and plot them on an interactive web-based map available to anyone with an Internet connection. This data significantly aided relief agencies in the prioritization of their resources. In one example, two women and a young girl were rescued from the rubble of a supermarket a few hours after sending a text for help.

Crowdsourcing harnessed innovation from the community, further enhancing the quality of the data and the effectiveness of the relief efforts. With the help of hundreds of volunteers
and the Haitian diaspora, relief workers assisted in the collection and translation of thousands of text messages that decreased on-call response times and responses to Haitian community requests for additional resources. Additionally, the thousands of data points received from the community enabled responders to create accurate maps — which were nonexistent before the earthquake — depicting the change in the landscape as a result of the natural disaster and the progress of the disaster relief. In the report, Jacob Quintanilla, the coordinator for Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities in Haiti, noted in 2009 that the crowdsourcing intelligence model “opens the gates of information to anyone interested, allows citizens in crisis to seek help, and helps to foster dialogue between affected communities and services providers.”

Additionally, this technology-enabled dialogue created between the populace and the relief workers allowed for the early detection and prevention of violence. On two occasions, the U.S. Marine Corps responded to Ushahidi reports of the formation of angry mobs near food distribution sites. In both cases, security forces dispersed crowds before the situations became violent. The report also states, “Ushahidi security reports provided not only information on individual incidents but also insight on the contextual factors that were triggering violence,” a critical aspect in any type of intelligence-driven operation.

Despite many successes of disaster relief in Haiti, the use of crowdsourcing did highlight areas that need to be considered to improve future implementation. First, using crowdsourcing to identify and respond to violence requires the establishment of trust through assured confidentiality and confidence in the system. Between February and August of 2010, only 100 of the 12,286 reports received by the disaster relief workers were security-related information, according to the report. Surveys of the population indicated that initially respondents were reluctant to report in fear of reprisal, but a public education program that introduces the “SMS reporting system in which they [the population] see the computer where the reports come in and are introduced to the staff that receive, respond to, and follow up on messages” will alleviate the public’s fear and instill trust in the system, reported Heinzelman and Waters. In short, developing an effective crowd-sourced, human intelligence network will require effective communication, community education, and conditioning of the populace.

Second, verification of crowdsourced information is difficult. “In order for crowdsourced reports to be permanently integrated as legitimate and actionable sources of information, a system must be created to rapidly identify inaccurate information, whether intentional, exaggerated, or accidental,” wrote Heinzelman and Waters. Commanders of counterinsurgent forces must be wary of attempts by the insurgents to use the system to their advantage. Limiting reporting to only verified participants or using multiple similar incident reports as a form of corroboration are two techniques that could be used to usurp the efforts of those attempting to game the system. And, continued engagement and ongoing public education will be necessary to improve the quality of community reporting.

Conclusions
Harnessing the latent potential of the populace with the use of technology will increase the effectiveness of both human intelligence collection and COIN operations. Moreover, using the power of a GFN increases our military’s ability to widely and effectively distribute its message. In the 3 April 2010 Boston Globe article “U.S. Effort in Afghanistan Focuses on Cell Phone Use,” Rear Admiral Greg Smith said, “We found that Afghans in the most troubled, insurgent-held areas lived in information wastelands dominated by militant propaganda [and]... we are fighting back with a revamped strategy that puts the people and their ability to communicate at the forefront of our effort.” An ever expanding mobile network is enabling societies throughout the world to become increasingly connected and the United States military should seek to capitalize on this unique opportunity that will permanently change the face of public influence and human intelligence collection.

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Have you ever had one of those days when you shake your head in disbelief because nothing is going right? Typically it is on a Monday, and it is raining. I’ve had plenty of these days, but one sticks out in my mind the most. It was during a deployment to Afghanistan right before the first election for the Afghan people. Tensions were high; elevated security was a must; and rumors that insurgents were planning to disrupt the elections swarmed. There was a lot that needed to be accomplished and placed into action before the election.

During operation planning, you can extensively “take into consideration” and “contingency plan,” but you’ll never be able to account for everything, much less the unexpected. During military professional development, you build operation orders and run through the military decision-making process (MDMP) in order to hone and perfect your planning and decision skills. This training is vital as maturing officers and NCOs advance in rank, and it is definitely important in combat mission planning. It helps to alleviate the level of stress in combat based on preparation and rehearsals. This allows Soldiers to react to the unexpected and adjust more rapidly. However, you can never plan for the insanely unexpected — ever. You can guess what the enemy might do, you can predict the weather, but you can never prepare for blocked routes, vehicles breaking down, friendlies in your AO, or when you may be attacked by the enemy — hence my somewhat humorous story.

SSG Jerry Redmon and I were on a one-year deployment as combat advisors — embedded tactical trainers (ETTs). We were part of Task Force (TF) Phoenix’s third iteration. The TF’s mission, which was inherited from the Special Forces, was to stand up an entire Army to replace the irregular force used to kick the Taliban out of power. This task was too large for the SF contingent and would take them away from conducting “other” missions.

In preparation for the Afghan elections, Weapons Company, 2nd Battalion (Kandak), 3rd Brigade (Lawa) of the Afghan National Army (ANA) had been tasked to cover three large districts. Because of this and the fact that SSG Redmon and I could not be in three locations at one time, we divided Weapons Company into three teams — sharing the heavy weapons platoon, mortar platoon, and scout platoon. Weapons Company was attached to Task Force No Fear — the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds), 25th Infantry Division — and was subsequently divided to cover the three districts. One team would cover Gamal down south with a platoon from A Company, 2-27, and one team would go up to Gayan with 2-27’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The ANA company commander and I would be with the remaining team, which would cover Sarobi and Charboron.

On this particular day, the two teams covering Gayan, Sarobi, and Charboron were tasked to move to Ambush Alley and...
clear the route so that the Gayan team along with HHC(-) from 2-27 could pass through and stage themselves for the elections. With the recommendation from the HHC commander, we would leave at “o’dark-thirty.” I am usually opposed to early SPs due to their predictability and the possibility of being ambushed. I always varied my SPs and routes to confuse the watchful eyes of the unknown. But due to time constraints, it was best to start early. The mission was mine, but I welcomed the mutual planning from the HHC commander as he had been on the ground longer and had more resources to pull from, i.e. close air support (CAS).

Before the crack of dawn, we began moving to the western side of Ambush Alley — coffees in hand. As we moved south of Shaykahn, we planned to come to a short halt and remain there for approximately 30 minutes. We were ahead of schedule, and the Marine AH-1s were not scheduled to arrive until 1000 local time. I felt it better to wait there as to not reveal our intent; I did not want to wait for CAS at the staging area west of Ambush Alley. So we did the usual and conducted a patrol and set up a traffic control point (TCP). We were comfortable yet alert as the day’s plan began to unfold.

As we were waiting, comfortably, the first of many “unexpected” events occurred. One of the locals started a commotion, throwing his hands up and creating what always appeared to be an argument. My interpreter (“terp”) informed me that the local was telling us that the bridge so often used en route to Ambush Alley was damaged and was not passable. Now, don’t imagine a normal bridge. This bridge is roughly 15 feet long and built using irregular logs from trees tied together. Apparently the ties or wrappings had come loose, and the logs had separated — a task too lengthy in time to try and fix. Realizing that we were not going to be able to cross the bridge, we were now in a time crunch because we had to travel back to a crossroad and take an alternative route to our staging area.

So we collected everyone, backtracked to the intersection, bypassed the impassable bridge, and arrived at the staging area. The ANA commander and I then went over the plan one more time. Keeping it as simple as possible allowed for greater success when using the ANA. If it were too complex, the plan would be lost in translation — literally. In short, we planned to place 20 soldiers on the northern ridgeline and occupy the high ground with observation post (OP) positions — dropping off a couple soldiers at each identified OP. Additional ANA soldiers would also move along the southern ridgeline and secure the high ground by dropping off soldiers at each OP. A few ANA soldiers would walk the route to ensure no land mines or tripwires were in place, and others would walk the left and right side, at varying distances looking for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and disrupting ambush points. I leveraged every single ANA soldier, and all of these teams would move out on line. Command and control was handled by the commander in the vehicle 50 meters behind those clearing the route, and the ANA occupying the .50 cal would act as overwatch. If one side began to lag, the commander would instruct the other to hold until they caught up. It is a slow but very effective process, and it allows you to control the terrain. If you plan for it, you minimize or eliminate the threat.

As we finalized our execution plan, the Marine AH-1s arrived and began clearing the route from an aerial standpoint. As the ANA soldiers began to move out, we received a report from the Cobra pilot that the main route was blocked by a burning fuel

During operation planning, you can extensively “take into consideration” and “contingency plan,” but you’ll never be able to account for everything, much less the unexpected.

An Afghan National Army soldier looks out from an observation post.

Photos courtesy of author
truck. Later, we would find out that the fuel truck, which was supporting a special operations unit, was ambushed as it passed through Ambush Alley unescorted. The operations unit was ambushed as it passed a fuel truck, which was supporting a special multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Apparently the truck tipped over, spilling fuel in the road and was now an obstacle to our mission. The only option was to shift the ANA soldiers to the south and continue the clearing process on the alternate route. The alternate route had its own problems — hence alternate. The route had a steep climb in some areas, a negative cant which isn’t favorable for large trucks, and was just wide enough for a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The alternate route was also known for its fair share of ambushes and IEDs.

During our rotation in the Paktika Province, the ANA’s 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade lost six soldiers when an IED exploded next to their 2.5-ton truck. Another six Afghans were killed as they followed the 1/3 ANA through the alternate route and were hit by another IED. Both missions resulted in casualties because they refused to dismount and clear the route. That is why we always dismounted and cleared — no matter what.

As we were shifting the soldiers who had already moved out, a Marine pilot came over the net and said, “...oh, and by the way, the alternate route is partially blocked by a ‘jingle’ truck carrying bricks.” Apparently the truck tipped over spilling bricks on the route, partially blocking it. However, the Cobra pilot felt the route was passable so we continued with our first of many alternate plans.

Once the soldiers had secured the first OPs, they reported in and we began moving the next team. As we began moving, the OP to the southern side reported that they secured three RPGs located on a hilltop that were overlooking the alternate route. Three RPGs on the ridgeline can only mean that someone was waiting at some point to ambush a convoy on that route — another advantage to clearing and securing the high ground. One of two things had happened. Either the helicopter pilots flying CAS had witnessed the insurgents and they fled, or as we staged, the insurgents were informed that we were dismounting and had begun clearing the route. Either way, we disrupted their plan and forced them to quickly leave the area before they were killed.

As we made it to the top of the summit, we placed two more OPs and continued clearing the route. As we cleared the route, we came across the destroyed 2.5-ton truck once owned by ANA’s 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade. The twisted wreck was a grim reminder of the soldiers who had lost their lives because they refused to dismount. They chose to run the gambit and lost. Interestingly enough, the Marine ETTs were not with the ANA unit on both missions where men lost their lives.

We moved through Ambush Alley and set up security on the far side (east). During the clearing operation, a Marine pilot reported a number of Afghans at the gas station on the eastern side of Ambush Alley. In the past, anti-government fighters (AGFs) sometimes gathered there; when convoys passed through Ambush Alley, they collected their weapons, moved to an ambush point, and attacked them on their way back. Ambush Alley is an east-to-west corridor. There is only one way to travel through this area. If you pass through, you have to come back and the AGFs knew this. I felt it necessary to move to the gas station and conduct a quick search of the AGFs and the gas station.

As we were searching the gas station, members of the Afghan Special Forces (ASF) approached en route through Ambush Alley with three jingle fuel trucks. Apparently they were going to try and move through Ambush Alley again — this time with a military escort. Before we had left Orgun-E forward operating base (FOB), we coordinated with TF No Fear, and they told us that no friendly forces would be passing through our AO. Needless to say, we were surprised to see them. The ASF leader also informed us that he had personnel walking the high ground; they had AK-47s and were not in uniform. Perfect, just what we needed — the potential for a green-on-green encounter.

The ANA commander radioed the soldier at the first OP to let him know what to expect. That ANA soldier then identified the ASF walking in his direction. Once we finished the search and confiscated four AK-47s, the HHC element and the Weapons Company platoon moved through and on to Gayan. Once through, we gave a slight sigh of relief, looked up towards the sun and its location, checked our watches, then began closing Ambush Alley. We gave the ASF element the option to fall in behind us as we closed the route with the caveat that they would not pass through until we reached the other side. They accepted and probably were appreciative that we were there and were holding the high ground — based on their prior failed attempt resulting in a burning fuel truck.

A couple of hours later, back at the summit (near the overturned brick truck), we allowed the ASF to move on as we waited for the ANA OP soldiers to consolidate on our location. Once the OPs were accounted for, we began our move down the west side of the summit. As we were moving, we came upon one of the ASF’s jingle fuel trucks which had become lodged in the side of the mountain and was stuck. The Afghan drivers and ASF were huddled around, throwing up their hands, and were engaged in their normal “argument-like” style of resolving issues. The truck was stuck with
no signs of being “unstuck” in the foreseeable future. About 50 feet behind our HMMWV, there was an even more narrow dirt path navigating down the mountain. We questioned whether a HMMWV would even fit. After walking the route and measuring its width, we determined it could and we backed up our convoy and headed down the path. Thinking back on this incident that I’m about to describe, I believe this was the preamble to a later event. While navigating down the path, I was ground guiding SSG Redmon. Ensuring he was not going to run off the low side and tumble down the mountain, he was hugging the high side. At one point, the HMMWV hit a large rock, which jammed the steering all the way to the right. SSG Redmon backed up, and we continued down the mountain. With no further incidents and at the bottom of the mountain, we rallied at the staging area and started our move back to the firebase.

Since we did not have the convoy with us, there was another shorter route we could take through the village of Shaykahn — remembering that the bridge was out from earlier this morning. On this route, there is a random 10-inch pipe that crosses the route about 12 feet above the road, so anything larger than a HMMWV would not be able to pass under it. We took this route instead and made it back to the riverbed and continued the trip to the firebase. Ten minutes into the riverbed, an ANA soldier began yelling into the radio; my terp informed me that one of the ANA trucks had two flat tires. So we dismounted, set out security, set up a TCP, and they began working on the truck. This took approximately 50 minutes, and then we were able to move again. They radioed they were ready and had collected everyone, so we cranked up and started moving out. Remember that incident while coming down the mountain? Well, just as we started to move, the steering rod on the uparmored HMMWV broke, leaving the HMMWV completely unsteerable. We tried pulling the HMMWV with a Ford Ranger, but because the uparmored HMMWV was three times as heavy and in a riverbed with torso-size rocks, pulling it proved impossible.

Now, recall the fuel trucks we bypassed back in Ambush Alley. Apparently they had rectified their own situation and were passing by our location. Our ANA first sergeant stopped one of the trucks and told the driver to pull our HMMWV back to the firebase. Once again and as usual, there was a lot of arguing and the typical throwing up of arms, and the issue was resolved. The end result was that our HMMWV would be towed by the jingle fuel truck.

In past missions when we travelled beyond a few kilometers from the firebase, we lost communication with TF No Fear due to the mountainous terrain. We could sometimes monitor the radio traffic but not transmit. So, as usual, we monitored the radio until we were in range and could call in with a situation report (SITREP). This day was no different and as we started monitoring the net, A Company, 2-27 started reporting they were under attack. SSG Redmon and I both sat up in our seats and listened intently as the radio chatter picked up. We were well within communication range with TF No Fear, but there was no way I would break in during the exchange of radio traffic. As we continued to monitor the radio, A-25 and No Fear-26 continued to develop the situation over the net. As we listened to the reports, we learned that A-25 was not being attacked. During a patrol, they had come across a timed launch site and had witnessed the launching of three rockets towards the firebase. They were instructed to secure the point of origin (POO) site and neutralize those responsible. As the chatter subsided and I felt there was a break on the net, I called in to No Fear and told them we were en route and that our HMMWV was disabled and being towed in by a jingle truck. No Fear-26 instructed me to stop and secure the area, set up a TCP, and then wait for a follow-on mission. While we were setting up our TCP, three billowing smoke signatures rose to the west of my location about 200 meters. It was surreal at first to see these three white billowing clouds arise from the ground and then hear the muffled sound of the explosions. We then realized what we had just witnessed — three rockets impacting near our location. Those in combat can attest that when engagements go down, your adrenaline starts pumping and you enter into a surreal state of mind. You are very attuned to what is happening but it just doesn’t seem real — especially when it is sustained and/or there is a casualty.

I reported in to No Fear that we had observed three rocket attacks and provided them an estimated grid. No Fear-26 instructed us to move the company into the Orgun-E village and secure the village with help from the local police. They also asked that I conduct a
I thought to myself, “How the hell am I going to find three holes in the ground?” Plus, we had left on this mission more than 16 hours ago and were now trying to get back to the firebase.

We “limped” into the village behind a fuel truck and instructed the ANA commander to coordinate with the local police and secure the village. We attempted to find the POI — in the dark. The crater was about two meters in diameter and about half that in depth. The one odd fact of the POI was that in the dark of night, residue from the crater was giving off a luminous green glow — similar to that of a green “chem light.” Using my GPS, I was able to give a more accurate location and I took some pictures for the S2. I still have no clue as to what was causing the “green glow,” but I did make sure it was noted on my end-of-tour medical report.

We moved to their location and conducted crater analysis of the point of impact (POI). At this time, it was starting to get dark and I thought to myself, “How the hell am I going to find three holes in the ground?” Plus, we had left on this mission more than 16 hours ago and were now trying to get back to the firebase.

At the Orgun-E firebase that a coordinated rocket attack like this had occurred. The first three rockets that we had listened to over the net had come from the eastern mountain side less than two kilometers from the firebase. The second set of three had come from the northwest about seven kilometers from the base and the third set had come from the southwest, again about seven kilometers away. The first set hit the firebase, the second set was short, and the third set was over but hit the village.

About two hours had passed since we secured the village. We were doing our patrols, the roads were blocked, and the village was blacker than the firebase. Everything was perfectly quiet — less from the south and impacted in the village. The Orgun-E village was lit up like a carnival in the isolated part of the province. Recognizing that the lights from the village might be allowing the enemy to adjust their fires, I instructed the police chief to turn off every light in the village. With a lot of yelling and screaming and flailing of arms and hands, his policemen ran off into the night to turn off all the lights. The comical side to this task was watching these policemen “black out” the village.

If there was no switch to turn off a light or if one could not be found, the police went around swinging big sticks and breaking all the incandescent lights. With a few laughs coming from SSG Redmon, the commander and those around us, the village was soon “black out.”

We reported the rocket attack to No Fear, and they once again asked for a crater analysis. Really? We obliged and set out to find it. This time it was a little easier as the police reported that two rockets had impacted the customs office. They located two impact craters but were unable to find the third. SSG Redmon and I moved to their location and conducted the analysis.

This was the first time since I had been at the Orgun-E firebase that a coordinated rocket attack like this had occurred. The first three rockets that we had listened to over the net had come from the eastern mountain side less than two kilometers from the firebase. The second set of three had come from the northwest about seven kilometers from the base and the third set had come from the southwest, again about seven kilometers away. The first set hit the firebase, the second set was short, and the third set was over but hit the village.

When we returned to the firebase, we found out that the original rocket attack had made its way into the firebase and destroyed two HMMWVs. The impact was very close to the dining facility, which, at the time, was serving evening chow. There were no injuries though some of the Soldiers exiting the chow hall were knocked to the ground due to the blast.

We had embarked on a mission that should have only taken eight hours. Twenty hours later, we unhooked our HMMWV from the fuel truck — which had damaged the driver’s rear bumper — paid him $100 for his troubles, dropped off our ANA counterparts, coordinated a truck to drag our HMMWV to the maintenance area, reported in to No Fear, and called it a day/night — a very long day/night!
numerous articles have been printed about the U.S. Army Ranger School over the years, but most have merely provided in-depth descriptions of the three phases of the school. There has never been an article that lays out specific areas where students fail, and more importantly, how to prepare students to avoid these pitfalls. This article is part one of a three-part series that will highlight the challenges students face during each phase of Ranger School and how to physically and mentally prepare for the Army’s most demanding course. Ranger School is the Army’s premier leadership and small unit tactics school designed to produce physically tough and mentally agile leaders that are the foundation of our fighting force. Ranger School requires Soldiers to challenge themselves while they function in an ad-hoc squad and platoon with members from different backgrounds, units, and experience levels. In addition, Ranger School graduates learn that they can push themselves further and faster even when their bodies and minds say “stop.” Most Soldiers and civilians fail to maximize their “human potential” and limit themselves to an individual comfort range of approximately 40- to 50-percent exertion during normal activities and only for short periods of time. Ranger School helps students understand and break through their self-imposed limitations and reach a higher level of human potential that equates to more than 80-percent exertion during high intensity and long duration periods. Unfortunately, half of all Ranger students cannot mentally or physically break out of their comfort range and realize their true potential.

It is imperative that the unit selection process for determining who should attend Ranger School, at a minimum, be a battalion responsibility. The years when each line company had 10 to 15 Ranger graduates are over. The level of Ranger School experience, which translates into what the Ranger standard looks like, is currently lacking at the company level. The workout programs, pre-PT test, and layout inspections get pushed down to a squad leader or team leader who has not attended the course and does not know the standard, or even worse, they do not hold the student to the same standard that will be expected by the Ranger instructor.

The Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) would also like to dispel the myth that there exists a limited quota to fill during the PT test. Too often we talk to students who have heard that they better get in the first two lines during the PT test because once RTB hits their quota everyone else will get a “no-go.” This is completely false. RTB is required to bring in 286 students per class by the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATTRs), and we routinely accept 40-50 additional walk-ons. If you follow our instructions and perform to standard, you will get into the course.

Ranger Assessment Phase

The low percentage of Ranger School graduates originates during the three-day Ranger Assessment Phase (RAP). Approximately 60 percent of the total Ranger School failures occur during RAP. RAP is comprised of numerous events including but not limited to: push-ups, sit-ups, five-mile run, pull-ups, water confidence course, land navigation, two-mile buddy run, Malvesti obstacle course, and 12-mile foot march. No single event is too difficult to complete; however, students are tired, hungry, and stressed during each event. It is the accumulative effect of executing all these events back-to-back that breaks the student either physically or mentally.

One of the major contributors to RAP failures is push-ups. The Ranger standard is 49 push-ups in two minutes. Students must break the plane in accordance with FM 3-22.20, Army Physical Readiness Training, in order for each repetition to be counted. This relates back to our previous comment about the Soldiers’
leadership at home station not enforcing the same standard during the student unit’s pre-test. In general, Soldiers should begin to train at least 90 days before entering Ranger School. During preparation, Soldiers should conduct push-ups on dumbbells or other equipment that allows them to go down farther than the ground would normally allow. Future Ranger students should also prepare by elevating their feet or adding a weight belt during the push-up training. Ranger students need to show up on Day Zero prepared to complete 80 “chest-to-ground” push-ups in two minutes in order to guarantee success on the first event at Ranger School.

The next event many fail is the five-mile run. If a Soldier can run five miles in 38 minutes on flat terrain, that Soldier will have a difficult time running the event in under 40 minutes on the Ranger five-mile course. Soldiers need to prepare on a course with intermittent hills. Like the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), the running event is the third event on the Ranger Physical Fitness Test (RPFT). Ranger students will not be fresh when it’s time to tackle their five miles. In order to understand the difficulty of the RPFT, Soldiers should practice the entire RPFT at least five times during the 90-day train-up period. The fourth and final event on the RPFT requires the student to complete six pull-ups. Students should show up able to complete 12 “dead hang” pull-ups at the end of a rigorous workout. Those Soldiers who train prior and execute correctly during the RPFT will be able to progress to the next events without issue.

Additionally, individual land navigation skills are critical for success in Ranger School, and the student’s abilities will be put to the test on Day 2 of Ranger School. The average distance traveled during the land navigation test is six kilometers. Students are given a compass, protractor, map, score sheet, verification of their pace count, and a quick refresher class on basic land navigation. Lack of confidence is the number one reason for failures during land navigation. This confidence deficit can stem from many sources — unsure pace count, lack of experience in plotting points, inability to read a map with a red lens flashlight, or unfamiliarity in moving throughout a woodland environment, especially at night. The best way to prepare for the Ranger School land navigation test is to PRACTICE. Most Army posts have land navigation courses open for reservation that are perfect locations to refresh land navigation skills. This is why the battalions should take ownership of their Ranger pre-training programs. It will take the battalion to coordinate, man, and resource the running of the navigation course. The land navigation test is a four-hour course and consists of two hours of limited visibility and two hours of daylight. Plotting points are within the four-hour time limit. Students are allowed to plot their points with white light but can only use a red lens flashlight for map checks on the course. Regular practice of basic map reading and point plotting skills as well as understanding how to use attack points will boost confidence in every Soldier before they arrive at Ranger School. Practicing and memorizing a running and walking pace count will also improve a student’s chances of finding points on the Ranger land navigation course. Land navigation is a perishable skill. Soldiers must hone it before they arrive at Camp Rogers.

The final event that causes a significant amount of attrition during the RAP is the foot march. The 12-mile foot march is conducted on paved roads surrounding Camp Rogers and must be completed in three hours. Students will carry their personal weapon, eight quarts of water, and a 45-pound ruck sack. Prospective students should visit the RTB Web site (https://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/RTB) for examples of fitness regimens that will help them prepare for the RAP foot march. Following the foot march is a packing list layout. This and all other layouts during Ranger School are strict and non-waiverable. If a student is missing an item at any equipment layout, that student will be subject to a major minus. Three major minuses lead to a board case and a probable recycle. In order to ensure a Soldier has all items on the packing list, RTB suggests that future Ranger students be pre-inspected at the battalion level from their home unit. An updated version of the packing list can always be found at the RTB Web site along with other keys to success.

Pre-Ranger/Train-up

The Ranger Training Brigade has made significant improvements to their Web site with the sole purpose of assisting future
students prepare for the physical and mental rigors of Ranger School. There are 30-, 60-, and 90-day work out programs on the site that ensure the students arrive in shape and not already fatigued. Aside from the normal physical conditioning (cardio and strength training, foot marching, and swimming), prospective students should also study basic small unit tactics from publications such as the Ranger Handbook and FM 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, especially if prospective students are non-combat arms. The RTB Web site has another great resource available — Virtual Battlespace 2 videos. These videos explain in detail how to conduct basic and intermediate battle drills used every day in Ranger School. The Web site also provides a section detailing how to prepare mentally for Ranger School and what to expect during the course.

Additionally, prospective students should take advantage of home station pre-Ranger courses or the two-week Ranger Training Assessment Course (RTAC) taught by the Warrior Training Center at Fort Benning. RTAC is not a physical fitness smoke-fest; it gives students a concentrated look at what they can expect from Ranger School in respect to physical conditioning, small unit leadership, and tactics. The RTAC instructors are certified by RTB, and graduation rates show that pre-Ranger/RTAC students are much more prepared for Ranger School than those students that did not attend a pre-Ranger course or RTAC. For example, students who attend RTAC have a 62 percent chance of graduating Ranger School compared to the approximately 50 percent chance for those who don’t take a pre-Ranger course. RTAC Students are taught by certified instructors on how to succeed in Ranger School.

Students and unit commanders should know that 75 percent of Ranger students who pass RAP and Benning Phase proceed to the Mountain Phase. About 94 percent of Ranger students starting Mountain Phase progress to the Florida phase. Once in Florida, the Ranger student graduation rate reaches 98 percent. Successful completion of RAP week sets favorable conditions for continued success throughout Ranger School.

Upon graduation, these young and dynamic leaders are ready to lead the fire teams, squads, and platoons that are the Army’s foundation for its decisive force. For more information on Ranger School and how to prepare for the course, visit: http://www.benning.army.mil/Infantry/RTB/Student Information.html.

**INFANTRY NEEDS ARTICLES**

INFANTRY Magazine is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, and experiences while deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. We can also use relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past.

If you’re unsure whether a topic is suitable, please contact us. We can let you know whether we would be interested in the article and can also give further guidance.

Our fully developed feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 3,500 words, but these are not rigid guidelines. Shorter articles can be used in our Professional Forum and Training Notes sections. We prefer clear, correct, concise, and consistent wording expressed in the active voice. Also, please spell out all acronyms and abbreviations the first time you use them.

Sketches, photographs, maps, and line drawings that support your article are encouraged. When you submit your article, please include the original electronic file of all graphics (jpeg, tiff, Powerpoint, etc.). Please also include the origin of all artwork and, if necessary, written permission for any copyrighted items to be reprinted.

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A BATTLE IN EVERY CLASSROOM:

USING LOW-OVERHEAD SIMULATIONS TO PRODUCE EXPERIENCED CAPTAINS AND MAJORS

LTC CHUCK ALLEN AND DR. JAMES STERRETT

For more than 10 years the Digital Leader Development Center’s Functional Area (FA) 57 officers and Career Program (CP) 36 civilians have been providing low-overhead simulation support to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., — creating experiential learning environments for our Army by putting a battle in every classroom. Today, CGSC is branching out from Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to provide these experiential learning environments to the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics’ (SALT) Captains Career Course (CCC) Common Core at Fort Leavenworth; the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Ga.; the Signal Captains Career Course (SCCC) at Fort Gordon, Ga.; and Engineer, Chemical, and Military Police Captains Career Courses at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. These courses are moving away from planning-centric operation order (OPORD)-based learning and evaluation, embracing the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015’s educational methods by using focused, low-overhead simulations. In this article we will explain the value of experiential learning; the nature of the classroom environment and why collective simulations do not work in it because of the high-overhead requirements; review several successful uses of these simulations; and, finally, discuss how to identify low-overhead simulations for classroom use.

Experiential Learning

“Tell me and I will forget; show me and I may remember; involve me and I will understand.”

— Confucius

Experiential learning — doing the activity — frequently involves learning from one’s mistakes. The challenge to our Army’s educational systems is to allow our students to make those mistakes in the classroom instead of the battlefield. Low-overhead simulation tools are uniquely suited to provide this opportunity. Because these simulations can be tightly focused on certain learning outcomes and allow for much repetition, students can experiment with various courses of action and gain needed experience with tactical problems. CGSC’s goal is to provide multiple opportunities for each student to practice decision-making tasks through experiential learning.

Institutional Learning Environments

In a classroom, all students are working through the same program of instruction (POI), and the purpose of classroom exercises is to train individuals on the capabilities being learned. Ideally, every student would hold the exact same role in each exercise; at the very least, every student should engage in important decisions directly relevant to the POI in every exercise. The number of relevant roles in any given exercise is small. As a result, we must run numerous exercises to provide the experience to all students, but to keep to curriculum time lines, these exercises must be run simultaneously. Moreover, the exercise must not only fit within the space, time and hardware available in the classroom, it must also require very low overhead in terms of student time, instructor time, and support personnel in order to ensure it is affordable. The simulation must be simple enough to use that students and faculty can learn it quickly and utilize it in the classroom with only a small cadre of support personnel acting in a general support role.

Collective training simulations do not serve this environment. Classroom requirements differ from collective training.
requirements because the two serve different purposes. The purpose of collective training is to improve collective capabilities, with each person in the training audience having a particular and distinct role to practice as part of the larger organization. In order to provide operational units with realistic experiences, collective simulations must provide enough raw data that the staff and all mission command systems can function properly as if the event were live, driving the unit’s decision process and permitting all of the varied individual positions to be usefully exercised. By contrast, student educational events have a small number of curriculum-relevant roles. Filling other subordinate or parallel roles with students, instructors, or support personnel rapidly becomes prohibitively expensive and requires significant equipment overheads as well. A classroom simulation should provide data to the students as if the supporting functions were engaged and respond to the student inputs as if the organization’s other personnel were present, but it must perform these tasks without creating the overheads of having those functions in place.

Success Story — CGSC’s ILE

In the 1990s, CGSC’s capstone exercise, Prairie Warrior, was a corps-level command post exercise (CPX) using Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), an Army collective training simulation. The exercise cost more than $3 million (10 years ago) for contractor support and required enormous student overhead as role players (of the 1,200 CGSC students in a given exercise, roughly 100 students had a role in the training audience). The other 1,100 students filled support roles to make the exercise successful, many of them distant from the training audience and receiving little to no educational benefit.

Today’s Prairie Warrior is a division-level CPX using a low-overhead simulation called Decisive Action. Each ILE section (64 students) runs its own division CPX. For example, for the August 2010 ILE class, we ran 17 division CPXs simultaneously, with each exercise running independently according to the desires of the instructors. The exercises were conducted on classroom computers and backstopped by a support staff of five Army Civilians. This ILE capstone event has 900 students in the training audience, and the rest of the students are in support roles adjacent to the training audience’s echelon. The new Prairie Warrior exercise is much more beneficial to the student body as a whole and frequently earns student praise as the highlight of the ILE course. Additionally, the Decisive Action simulation can interface with the Mission Command Workstation (Command Post of the Future [CPoF]), bringing additional relevance to the learning environment.

UrbanSim was developed for CGSC’s School of Command Preparation, where it has been a steady success for several years. UrbanSim also found success in ILE’s S3/executive officer elective courses. In addition, CGSC has developed several “bite-sized games,” which are very tightly focused drivers for classroom concrete experiences that are extremely easy to learn and rapid to play. One of these games, Future Force, leads off the ILE classes on force management, significantly increasing student understanding and interest in what had been the most reviled block of instruction in the school. Another game, Forward into Battle, serves the same role for the equally unpopular classes on reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Success Story — SALT

The School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics focuses on instructing captains on leadership and tactics, providing a common baseline prior to their branch-specific captains career.

Figure 1 — Screen Shot from Future Force Bite-sized Game

Figure 2 — Screen shot from Crucible of Command Simulation During MCCC’s Bush Hill Exercise
courses. SALT’s proof of principle (PoP) in 2011 at Fort Bliss, Texas, proved a rousing success in part due to the use of the low-overhead simulations Crucible of Command (CRUCOM) and Decisive Action Brigade Level (DABL). Both CRUCOM and DABL provide SALT the ability to reach targeted training objectives at brigade through company levels with very little overhead in time and personnel. Compared to traditional planning-only practical exercises, executing student plans in the simulation creates cause and effect feedback, greatly enhancing students’ engagement and learning. Student journals showed that support for DABL and CRUCOM was nearly unanimous, and the single facet most spoken of by students proved to be seeing the outcome of their planning and fighting through the consequences: ALM 2015’s experiential education in action.

Success Story — Fort Benning’s MCCC
Fort Benning’s MCCC also piloted DABL and CRUCOM. Over the course of 2011, MCCC students executed several tactical decision exercises (TDEs), testing both simulations’ viability for incorporation into the MCCC POI. Today MCCC is loading all student laptops with these simulations and plans to use them to support their TDEs and other educational events. For example, the students executing the “Bush Hill” light attack exercise, which most graduates of Infantry CCC remember, now do more than just write and brief their plan; MCCC students now fight their plan in a simulation, practicing before they get into the field exercise and ensuring each student has the opportunity to execute their own plan.

Success Story — Fort Gordon’s Signal CCC
Fort Gordon’s SCCC uses CRUCOM to support their capstone combination arms exercise. CRUCOM allows SCCC students to conduct near real-time mission command using a student-developed battalion plan. The students fight their plan, issuing movement orders and attack orders as well as coordinating various combat multipliers. Students belonging to SCCC Class 3-11 found CRUCOM to be engaging and valuable as a learning tool. SCCC plans to implement DABL in their full spectrum operations (FSO) and military decision-making process lessons to illustrate key learning objectives.

Identifying Low-Overhead Simulations for Experiential Education
At CGSC we define low-overhead simulations as those that operate on classroom computers and can be learned by students in under four hours (and ideally less than 15 minutes) with no requirement for external adjudication. The simulation must provide all necessary data (battle results) in a user-friendly format and do so flexibly enough for the instructor to allow the educational event to rapidly get to the learning objective. The simulation must not have unnecessary detail and capabilities as these add to overhead. All these aspects allow the simulation to complement the classroom environment, not impede it.

We use the framework of purpose-decisions-interactions to select simulations for classroom use. Educational objectives define the purpose of the exercise, which in turn defines the decisions that the students must face. Those decisions frame the necessary interactions the simulation must provide: the data creating the situation for the decision, the inputs the students must be able to make in order to execute their decision, and the models that create a new situation based on the students’ input. Details and models that do not support the decisions which students must face in order to reach the educational objectives are overhead and should be trimmed if possible. This framework enables us to define and design simulations to meet given educational objectives with the least overhead.

Considerations for Selecting Simulations to Support Educational Environments
What do I need from a simulation? What major decisions do the students need to face in order to achieve the learning objectives?
1) What information must be presented to the student in order to convey the situation requiring the decision?
2) What orders must the students be able to issue in order to implement their decision?
3) What processes must be modeled in order to create a new situation that provides feedback and presents a new opportunity for students’ decisions?

In all three cases, concentrate on that which is absolutely necessary — this identifies the minimum requirement for interactions with the simulation: its information display, modeling, and the orders it can receive. Armed with this information, you can seek the simplest, easiest-to-use simulation that meets your requirements.

Other considerations that should be worked through are listed in Figure 3.

Summary

Over the past 10 years, CGSC has developed seven educational simulations tailored for classroom use, spending less than $1 million total of year-end operations and maintenance funds. CGSC’s efforts have resulted in every ILE section (64 students) running their own division CPX with no additional hardware or contractors. In addition, CGSC is assisting other schools in getting experiential learning into their classrooms with simulations, as evident by five CCCs now integrating these same types of low-overhead simulations into their classrooms. By enabling experiential education in the classroom and continually improving its suite of simulations, CGSC is meeting the desired outcome of Army Learning Model 2015.

UrbanSim is one of the Army Low Overhead Training Toolkit (ALOTT) Program of Record simulations. All other simulations in this article are interim solutions until successfully replaced by ALOTT simulations.

To learn more, visit our milBook site at http://frago.us/edu-sims.

**Figure 3 — Other Considerations When Choosing Simulations**

| Echelon | Compare the users’ echelon of interaction (at which commands must be entered) with the simulation to the student’s intended echelon of decision in the exercise. Example: A company commander gives orders to platoons: echelon of decision. A simulation may require orders to be entered for squads or individual Soldiers. Someone has to fill the roles between the company commander generating commands to platoons, down to the squad leader generating inputs for the simulation’s entities. Ideally, the echelons are the same! |
|———|———|
| Artificial Intelligence (AI) and/or Abstraction | Do subordinates fight to standard, or must they be micromanaged to achieve correct results? Subordinate units fighting to standard makes it possible to close the gap between the echelon of decision and the echelon of interaction. |
| Adjudication | Are all necessary warfighting functions replicated? How much white cell overhead is required to create important results? |
| Mode of Play | Does the simulation support single player and multiplayer as necessary? |
| User Training Required | How long will it take to train a student enough to use the simulation effectively? |
| Hardware | Will it work on classroom computers? (What are the software’s requirements of computer speed, RAM, video card? Will it work on the classroom computer’s operating system?) |
| Software Administration | Is there a Certificate of Networthiness (CoN) for Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) and for multiplayer? If not, is the vendor willing to assist in gaining one? |
The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment recently concluded its second Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) testing at Fort Irwin, Calif., within the past year. With the regiment supporting 10 rotations each year at the National Training Center (NTC), a three-week period exists to conduct EIB testing annually. The first was conducted in September 2010, with only 15 percent of the Soldiers earning the badge. During the second and most recent test, conducted in July 2011, more than 40 percent of the Soldiers earned the EIB. After the first testing, several changes were implemented based on after action reviews (AARs) and other lessons learned from the regiment and other units from across the Army. This article will explore those changes in training strategy between the two tests that resulted in a much higher success rate.

Events and Numbers

The Army recently changed the way EIB testing is conducted in accordance with U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) Pamphlet 350-6, with the September 2010 testing being the regiment’s first time conducting the test according to the new standards. The regiment began the 2010 event by conducting one week of training site set up and validation prior to the testing phase to ensure that 100 percent of the EIB trainers were able to train the tasks to standard. The candidates participated in five days of train-up that included splitting them up into 27 squads and conducting round robin training on all 30 tasks they would be evaluated on during the test week. Upon completion of training, the regiment proceeded with the five-day testing period. Of the 227 eligible Soldiers that began the first event, the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), 113 passed the APFT by achieving 75 points or greater in each event. The second event was day and night land navigation, which only 58 of the remaining 113 candidates passed. The next three days included lane testing on 30 EIB tasks — 10 tasks each on the urban lane, the patrol lane, and the traffic control point (TCP) lane. The remaining squads were split evenly on these three lanes to maximize throughput. After testing the 10 tasks on that lane for the day, the squads rotated to the next lane the following day. In total, 43 of the 58 Soldiers passed the three-day lane training portion of the testing. Finally, 34 of the 43 Soldiers remaining passed the 12-mile road march and were awarded the coveted EIB. Overall, 34 of the 227 Soldiers who began testing in September 2010 earned the EIB.

Implementing Change

During the AAR a few critical improvements were identified by the EIB committee. With the 51-percent pass rate of land navigation, the first was the need for the regiment to incorporate land navigation as part of the EIB train-up time frame. The second recommendation was to adjust the schedule in order for leaders to conduct physical training with their Soldiers on a daily basis, both to ensure the candidate has the best chance of passing the APFT and to improve his fitness in general. The third and final point was the recommendation to conduct two road marches as part of the EIB train-up. The committee decided to run both a six- and eight-mile road march as part of the train-up to ensure the Soldier’s endurance level and foot conditioning was adequate for the 12-mile route.

An EIB candidate prepares to load an M2 machine gun during EIB testing conducted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in August 2011. Photos by SGT Giancarlo Casem
During the planning process for the second EIB, the regiment’s EIB committee studied the results from the year prior and made changes to the training plan to ensure the training deficiencies were corrected. The NTC rotational calendar allowed for a two-week train up, twice as long as the previous 2010 train-up session. During that period, the candidates completed a six-mile road march the first week and an eight-mile road march the second week. The rigorous land navigation training included four total iterations for each Soldier — two days and two nights — on a course similar to the one they would be tested on. The committee moved the start time for round robin training from 0800 to 0900 daily in order to allow time for physical training and the road marches. The Soldiers were separated into 36 squads versus 27 to reduce the squad size and increase the trainer-to-candidate ratio.

The adjusted training strategy improved the success rate for every EIB event, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of Soldiers earning the EIB. The regiment started with 28 fewer eligible Soldiers than the previous year, yet 48 more Soldiers earned the EIB. The APFT pass rate increased from 50 percent to 70 percent due to the focus on daily physical training. Additionally, due to the mandatory land navigation train-up, that pass rate increased by 15 percent from the previous year. For the lane testing, decreasing the trainer-to-candidate ratio by creating smaller squads increased the pass rate by 15 percent. For the final event, the 12-mile road march, 81 out of 82 passed in 2011 versus 34 out of 43 from the previous year. Again, this was due to the addition of daily physical training as well as the forced six and eight mile road marches the weeks prior.

Every unit and every post has different challenges when preparing to execute EIB training and testing. The 11th ACR supports at least 10 NTC rotations per year and must be vigilant on training individual tasks prior to EIB. This plan should be outlined using the eight step training model, and each unit must designate individual training as a priority. If EIB committee members closely examine their unit’s strengths and weaknesses, they can help commanders and leaders focus to prioritize their training plans. Additionally, opportunity training and sergeant’s time training should be nested within this training plan to enable leaders to prepare their Soldiers and give them the best opportunity to earn the coveted badge.

SGM Louis Barnum has served 23 years in the U.S. Army. He has served in all leadership positions from team leader through operations sergeant major and from platoon master gunner through division master gunner. He was awarded his EIB in 1992 and has participated in six additional EIBs as cadre. SGM Barnum has served on the EIB committee twice for the 11th ACR. He has been deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and twice to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Figure 1 —11th Armored Cavalry Regiment EIB Testing
probable the single most important technical challenge facing the future of live-fire target systems is associated with the operations within a wireless environment, whether as the primary infrastructure or as ad hoc add-on devices to an existing range. The restrictions in bandwidth, loss of very high frequency (VHF), and the desire for better real-time management has resulted in an incompatibility of requirements.

The Army has made significant strides in standardizing to the Future Army System of Integrated Targets (FASIT). While this will result in saving opportunities, the challenges associated with the inclusion of low bandwidth radio frequency (RF) targets within the FASIT standards has remained elusive.

This article will discuss the past and future solutions for operating FASIT protocols within a restricted low bandwidth RF environment.

**Background**

How can a range manager provide new and interesting live-fire training opportunities to our Soldiers using existing ranges and target standards?

As battle tactics evolve, so must the training that prepares the Soldiers. Finding ways to utilize existing training areas for new types of training becomes important during this evolution. It is often necessary to change certain aspects of an existing training range in order to make it suitable for use in these new training scenarios. This becomes a challenge for range managers who must make do with their existing range facilities and limited budgets. Large-scale construction projects involving trenching and laying cable for new target positions are often too costly and time consuming.

Historically, range managers have turned to RF-controlled target systems and battery power in order to provide additional/new target positions to augment their existing facilities. Due to the difficulties inherent in obtaining frequency spectrum approval, the RF target systems must often operate at frequencies that offer only extremely low bit-rates. This condition severely limits the number of RF targets that can be used and the amount of information that can be exchanged.

**FASIT**

The FASIT standard is based on the use of modern computer networks and standard IP-based (Internet protocol) communications, specifically the transport control protocol (TCP). The FASIT standard is also supported by the targetry range automated control and recording (TRACR) range control software currently in use at more than 100 U.S. Army live-fire ranges around the world. Due to the higher data rates required by FASIT and TCP/IP, especially when the target count increases, the low bit-rates provided by data radios operating in the lower VHF/UHF frequency bands become insufficient.

**Low Bandwidth Challenge**

In order to reap the benefits that RF target systems provide, Program Executive Officer for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STR) has embarked on the design and development of a new communications interface standard. There are a few usage scenarios that come immediately to mind when considering how to best utilize this new communications interface standard.

**FASIT RF targets** — In this scenario, target vendors would provide native support for the communication standard in the targets that they build. There are some difficulties with this case, as it requires significant investment by the target vendors to implement. It will also likely require that a specific brand of radio be chosen.

**Interface modules** — This would involve the development of hardware to be located at each target pit which would communicate with current FASIT targets and translate between the existing FASIT TCP network interface and the new FASIT low bit-rate interface transmitting over RF. This option is attractive in that it leverages existing FASIT target assets while not requiring additional research and development efforts by target vendors.

**Handheld target control** — The streamlined FASIT messages used in conjunction with multicast (one sender, many receivers) network communications, allows status data for large numbers of targets to be sent from the central control system over standard wireless networks using only a small portion of the available bandwidth. Target and scenario commanding can then be achieved using standard web interfaces, resulting in a highly decoupled system capable of being implemented on a wide variety of handhelds, including tablet-based devices. Prototyping efforts in this area have yielded encouraging results.

Overall, the new FASIT low bit-rate communications standard that is being developed will open up a number of exciting possibilities for live-fire ranges. It will allow for greater flexibility in expanding the capabilities of existing ranges, while keeping costs down and leveraging existing range assets.

Reviewed by CSM (Retired) James Clifford.

It is a given that the victor usually writes the history of the war. Such did not apply after the American Civil War. For reasons too complex to explain in this short review, the victorious North left a self-serving version of the war virtually unchallenged for more than 100 years after the war. This version became the accepted story of the war taught to generations of Americans. This literary and intellectual view became known as the “Lost Cause” theory; the basic premise being that the Confederate defeat by overwhelming economic, industrial, transportation, and human capital did not diminish its moral legitimacy. An essential element of the theory is that the victorious general, Ulysses S. Grant, rather being militarily superior to his opponents, was an uninspired leader who repeatedly attacked in the face of a determined, often dug-in, enemy without concern for the resulting massive casualties. Adherents to the Lost Cause theory cast Grant in the role of butcher in a bloody martial play who only won through attrition, devoid of any plan other than to continually pound his opponent to submission. Edward H. Bonekemper III is the latest historian to take on this theory with his unbiased treatment of Grant, the man he calls a military genius.

Bonekemper presents an analysis of Grant, the Soldier. In doing so he looks at the totality of Grant and determines that Grant was a strategic, tactical, and political master. Bonekemper’s Grant is invested with an unshakable determination in the face of a committed enemy to his front and a large number of self-serving critics to his rear. Through it all, Grant showed no fear of the enemy or allowed doubt to enter his mind. With unassailable evidence, he shaped the future rather than allow it to shape him.

The author takes on the idea of Grant as a butcher by showing how in every engagement, although losing Soldiers in great numbers, his losses were relatively lower than those of his opponents. In each case, the analysis reveals that Confederate forces lost a larger percentage of its troops engaged than did those under Grant’s command. The imagery of Grant the butcher was a political manifestation designed to support the Lost Cause theory of the Civil War. This idea, along with the Lost Cause theory itself, has been reexamined in recent decades and generally comes up wanting. Bonekemper provides a comprehensive appendix, which illustrates the numbers.

Readers wedded to the Lost Cause theory of the Civil War may be put off by this book. After a lifetime of being fed a slanted viewpoint of the Civil War, it may be difficult to consider alternative points of view. However, readers are urged to approach this book with an open mind, prepared to consider the possibility that a more balanced picture of Ulysses S. Grant will bring one closer to the truth.


Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

I had read the superlative reviews and had seen the many awards that The Forever War had garnered since it was published in late 2008. Yet, a year and half later, I still had not picked up the book. I’m not entirely sure why I waited so long. Perhaps I was afraid of the book not reaching my lofty expectations. I quickly found The Forever War not only reached these expectations but clearly surpassed them.

Perhaps the best way to discuss this book is to describe what it is and what it is not. Within the pages of The Forever War, readers will principally find the experiences of journalist Dexter Filkens while he covered the Middle East from 1998 to the summer of 2006. Although the focus of the book is clearly on the Iraq War, Filkens includes smaller sections of his time spent in Afghanistan and while he was in New York City on 9/11.

Filkens utilizes dozens of vignettes or short stories to expertly convey the human dimension of war. What is truly unique about The Forever War is the varied groups of people readers will be exposed to. In one moment, the author will describe his experience moving with Marines in combat operations in Fallujah. The next moment he is in Sadr City observing prayer at the Mohsin Mosque. Along the way, you may read about Filkens spending time with an Iraqi mother, or with a possible insurgent, or with an American CIA agent. This broad prospective enables readers to better understand how the war touches all those it interacts with.

Among the numerous vignettes, there were several that stood out for me. First, was his time spent and his discussions with Ahmed Chalabi. This provided me a more personnel view of a man I read and heard so much of during the early period of the Iraq War. Second, was his discussion on his efforts to find the then-kidnapped journalist Jill Carroll in January 2006. Filken’s interaction with sources, spies, government agents, etc., in his attempt to uncover information regarding Carroll is fascinating stuff. Finally was the
author’s aforementioned period spent with the Marines during the second battle for Fallujah. Filkens depicts the emotions of combat as well as anyone has done during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

What makes each of Filken’s short stories so powerful is the ability of the author to enable the reader to visualize each situation and environment. Although this is a bit cliché-ish, you do actually feel like you are there. This is the true test of any print journalist, and Filkens achieves this as well as anyone. He clearly possesses the ability to bring words to life.

Certainly, it is critical for potential readers to know what a book is all about. Just as important, is knowing beforehand what a book is not. This is especially true in the case of The Forever War. For those seeking a book filled with analysis on the decisions made militarily or politically in Iraq, The Forever War is not for you. Filkens leaves the commentary for others. In fact, the book is nearly void of personal opinion. Obviously, those who desire a book of this genre have numerous other options.

One characteristic of the book that may not appeal to some is its organization. For those who want their books organized chronologically, The Forever War is not for you. There are many places in the book where Filkens makes significant jumps in time. For instance, he may move in time by months and even years in his stories. Some may find this a bit confusing and a detriment to their reading of the book. I personally found these skips quite appropriate for the book and its subject matter.

As a sidelight to the book, most readers will be struck by the risks Filkens took in “getting the story” and by his desire to go for runs in clearly some of the most dangerous locations in the world. In fact, some may very well question his intelligence in some of the decisions he made. Obviously, these decisions enabled Filkens to gain access to people and environments that many journalists would never consider.

In summary, The Forever War is an incredible book. It is an important addition today to our understanding of the human dimension of the Iraq War. More importantly, it is one of those rare volumes that will grow in importance through the years. With this book, Dexter Filkens has solidified his position as one of today’s best war journalists.


Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O’Sullivan.

Every Soldier worth his salt as a decent human being is aware of and concerned about the moral issues inherent in our profession — even when not directly responsible for decisions on such. We learn about some of these as part of the values of American society. Those of us in the armed forces soon find that the military is a profession about the nature of professional ethics, and more specifically, about the professional military ethic. This goes into human rights, the “Just War” tradition, and the moral character of the rules of war. Military decisions and actions are based on these.

All civilized societies regulate the use of armed force, killing, and other forms of intentional violence and maltreatment. Irregular warfare, as we’re now involved in, poses special problems such as the identification of the enemy, humane treatment of detainees, torture, and denial of due process. Hartle covers these as well as such things as the Lieber Code, the various Geneva Conventions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Of particular value are the 14 case studies that show the practical application of the principles and rules described here. This is a very effective method and should be used more, when practicable. One issue that is discussed too little is military disagreement with civil authority, as shown in the cases of McClellan, MacArthur, and Powell. The author has one study on this, but it warrants more.

There is another more widespread dilemma which is not addressed here. Combat leaders at every level are faced with the bitter choice of who shall live and who shall die because of their orders. The commander who cares for his troops and takes seriously his responsibilities for leading them judiciously must make tough decisions. This can outweigh care for the fate of strangers.

This work is not only for military professionals but for the public who should have a better understanding of decision making in a variety of scenarios.


Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN.

As the United States ponders its mission in Afghanistan, strategists and theorists will tend toward comparisons to the Vietnam conflict. Although there are some similarities, the two conflicts are very different strategically, ideologically, and even in terms of terrain. While other books focus on tactical similarities and differences in the prosecution of aerial combat, Stephen Randolph’s book also explores the complexity of calibrating presidential objectives with military power. It looks at President Richard Nixon’s decision-making process in escalating and even widening the conflict in Vietnam, despite running on a platform of downsizing American troop presence in the country.

Randolph, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, teaches at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He offers many lessons on balancing domestic promises to attain peace with honor, interacting with a resistant South Vietnamese political leadership, and addressing the reactions of North Vietnam to both domestic...
Randolph goes on to dissect the problem with these aerial strikes in terms of their design to disrupt North Vietnam’s use of these nations to resupply and infiltrate into South Vietnam, given that Cambodia was a neutral nation and Nixon failed to inform Congress of his widening of the conflict into that nation. He also discusses Operation Pocket Money, the aerial bombing of Haiphong Harbor conducted during negotiations with the Soviets for strategic arms limitations, as Nixon’s political gamble against Moscow’s casual but politically significant potential for withdrawal from the negotiations.

It was during this bombing, an attack that incidentally was in stark contradiction to previous President Lyndon Johnson’s policy of avoiding the SA-7 anti-air missiles as a target, that the U.S. mistakenly sunk a Soviet ship, risking Nixon’s planned summit scheduled in Moscow. This incident also happened to coincide with the North Vietnamese request for a Soviet naval presence in Indochina to counter the presence of the U.S. Navy. The Soviets denied this request based on their lack of trust of the North Vietnamese and Moscow’s frustration at North Vietnamese secretiveness about their military operations. This is just one incident that Randolph uses to demonstrate that communism was not a monolithic ideology connecting the Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese. Among other interesting discussions in the book is the impact of American military technology in aerial combat. Readers will be surprised at the testimony of the effectiveness of the AC-130 gunship on North Vietnamese columns and military operations described by Randolph. It is too bad the Taliban didn’t have this book to allay their fears of this weapon system over three decades later in Operation Enduring Freedom.

Randolph takes the reader through an analysis of North Vietnamese misinterpretations of the influence by South Vietnam, as a strategic ally, on President Nixon. This analysis paints a Nixon more concerned with America’s credibility in the world, and America’s image in Vietnam as the unraveling of his overtures to China and Russia. Randolph’s analysis culminates in a lesson on presidential power unrestrained by Congress, and a presidency plagued by a dismissal of the advice of the Cabinet.

Randolph’s book is not for the novice, though. For those with little understanding in the overall history of how we got into Vietnam, I recommend Stanley Karnow’s book, *Vietnam: A History*, before delving into *Powerful and Brutal Weapons*. For the true student of the Vietnam conflict, this book is not only an interesting read but fascinatingly relevant during these times of America’s challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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