**INFANTRY** (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. • Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to Infantry and Infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, **INFANTRY**, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail: usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@mail.mil. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Ga., and other mailing offices. • POSTMASTER: Send address changes to **INFANTRY** Magazine, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • USPS Publication No. 370630.

### FEATURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td><strong>WARRIOR CALLED HOME — A TRIBUTE TO CSM BASIL L. PLUMLEY</strong></td>
<td>MAJ Jim Crane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td><strong>THE FOUNDATION FOR SUCCESS IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
<td>MAJ Kevin McCormick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td><strong>ZEN AND THE ART OF COMMAND SUPPLY DISCIPLINE</strong></td>
<td>CPT Christopher L. Mercado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL ART AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL: A METHODOLOGY FOR CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFYING DECISIVE POINTS FOR BRIGADES AND BELOW</strong></td>
<td>MAJ Dave Park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DEPARTMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>COMMANDANT’S NOTE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>INFANTRY NEWS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>BRADLEY STRYKER CORNER — MASTER GUNNER TIP #1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>13-01 STABILIZED GUNNERY REVIEW</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>PROFESSIONAL FORUM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TEAM: SELECTING THE RIGHT SOLDIERS FOR THE JOB</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>DISPATCHES FROM A COMBAT ADVISOR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td><strong>LESSONS LEARNED AS AN OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td><strong>VIETNAM, IRAQ, AND THE LOSS OF INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td><strong>TRAINING NOTES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td><strong>ARMY SNIPER SCHOOL UPDATE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td><strong>SIMULATIONS: PICKING THE RIGHT TOOL FOR TRAINING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td><strong>BOOK REVIEWS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td><strong>SUBSCRIPTION AND UNIT DISTRIBUTION INFORMATION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Training the Infantry Squad

In the close quarters engagements in the urban and complex terrain of our current operating environment, our Infantry Soldiers can best fight effectively as dismounted squads, and we spare no effort in making sure that their training prepares them to deal with the elements of irregular warfare and asymmetric threats that we will continue to face. The Infantry squad will continue to fight as it always has, as part of a larger combined arms team employing fire and maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy. In order to accomplish this we need to ensure that the squad’s capabilities decisively overmatch those of our enemy in terms of lethality, mobility, leadership, force protection, and survivability, and these are all functions of how we train. We have long prepared Soldiers for war on the principle that we will fight as we have trained to fight, and that is even more critical today than in earlier conflicts. In this Commandant’s Note I want to highlight some of our current training initiatives that will help us remain the dominant force on today’s unique battlefield.

Our ability to dominate the battlefield rests on the diverse and lethal firepower which our combined arms maneuver units can unleash on an enemy. This is a key element of the overmatch we must achieve and is an integral part of the training we present. Combined arms training and education are fundamental to training at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) as Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry Soldiers and leaders validate their branch competencies while they prepare to carry the lessons they learn here out to share with the entire force. Our one overarching goal is improved combat effectiveness of the maneuver force, and we achieve that through our emphasis on outcome-based education; combined arms instruction; continued emphasis on the basics such as land navigation, first aid, physical fitness, battle drills, and marksmanship; and dissemination and validation of the lessons we have learned in our many deployments. In order to better assess the state of the Infantry squad, the MCoE has established a squad Integrated Capabilities Development team to examine where we stand in terms of squad proficiency and to recommend what we need to do to improve the squad’s overall ability to fight and win across the full range of military operations in present and future armed conflicts.

We have continually improved our existing training, but we have also developed new instructional concepts to present subject matter that addresses the confusion and unpredictability of war. Two of these are the Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT) and the Adaptive Soldier Leader Training Environment (ASLTE), which address our cognitive skills by emphasizing analysis and understanding of human behavior in different cultures. These initiatives train Soldiers to be more aware of their environment; to develop and sustain behavior profiling skills to better assess the more esoteric and often overlooked aspects of body language, voice inflection, and facial expressions; and to sense and interpret the rhythm of what otherwise passes for the ebb and flow of the marketplace or village.

Situational awareness training also helps us recognize anomalies that hitherto may have gone ignored or unnoticed. The American Soldier has long practiced sharing his observations, tips, and nuanced sensings of the battlefield with his team members, and that is how they have all survived prolonged combat. The MCoE has introduced the ASAT initiative and taken it far beyond the phenomenon observed by U.S. Military Assistance Command and Special Forces advisors in Vietnam. Because of their close proximity to the Vietnamese where they lived and trained, advisors often developed sensing and perception skills akin to what we are teaching at the MCoE, learning to recognize behavior patterns that could indicate an improvised explosive device (IED) — yes, the enemy used them back then — or suggest a potential ambush. More recently, the 82nd Airborne Division’s 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment trained on ASAT before deploying to Afghanistan and reported detecting 30 percent more IEDs than other units.

A further historic precedent for the ASAT concept lies in T.E. Lawrence’s “Twenty Seven Articles,” in which he outlined the principles he developed and successfully applied while he advised and led Arab Bedouin irregular troops against the Ottoman Turks, Germany’s allies in World War I. Just as Lawrence of Arabia placed proficiency in the indigenous language and cultural understanding high among his priorities, we too recognize the importance of language and cultural awareness instruction. Not all of these subjects need be only taught in the classroom environment; some can also be absorbed through independent reading, possibly with the guidance of subject matter mentors. The maneuver leader self-study program recently established at Fort Benning is ideally suited to subject matter best learned through reading and reflection and adds even more to the learning experience here at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. The training of tomorrow’s Soldiers is an exciting and dynamic process, and I invite you to join us in the effort to assure that the U.S. Infantry squad remains the dominant force on the battlefield.

One force, one fight! Follow me!
Army Refines Airburst Technology, XM25

Kris Osborn

The U.S. Army is preparing to conduct a second forward operational assessment of its XM25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement airburst weapon system.

Program managers are seeking to expedite development of the system, refine and improve the technology, and ultimately begin formal production by the fall of 2014, service officials said during a roundtable on 20 September at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE), Fort Benning, Ga.

The weapon fires a high-explosive airburst round capable of detonating at a specific, pre-determined point in space near an enemy target hidden or otherwise obscured by terrain or other obstacles.

“The XM25 brings a new capability to the Soldier for the counter-defilade fight, allowing him to be able to engage enemy combatants behind walls, behind trees or in buildings,” said COL Scott Armstrong, project manager, Soldier Weapons. “The weapon fires a programmable airburst 25mm smart round. It consists of the weapons system with a target-acquisition control system mounted on top.”

The XM25 is state of the art in terms of airburst technology, consisting of a programmable 25mm round, a sensor, and a fire-control system, said Dr. Scott Fish, Army chief scientist.

Using laser-rangefinder technology, the fire control system on the weapon uses computer technology to calculate the distance the round must travel in order to explode at a particular, pre-determined point in space, he explained.

“The laser rangefinder sends a pulse of light out to the target. This light pulse hits the target and is reflected back, allowing the fire-control system to calculate the distance based on the time it takes the light pulse to travel,” Fish said. “Since the speed of light is known, the exact distance to the target can then be determined. Once you determine how far the distance is to the target, a computer then calculates how long it will take the round to get there.”

The sensor and computer in the fire-control system calculate the time it will take the round to reach the target by factoring in the distance it needs to travel and the speed at which it travels, Fish added.

Earlier prototypes of the XM25 recently completed 14 months of forward operational assessments in Afghanistan, an effort designed to provide Soldiers in combat with the advantage of having airburst technology and harvest important feedback needed to improve and refine development of the weapon’s final design for production.

“The Army has learned many valuable lessons from these deployments regarding how the weapon can be deployed and how tactics can be changed to better refine the design of the weapon. Based on feedback from Soldiers and contractor testing, we have already incorporated more than 100 improvements to the systems related to ergonomics, performance and fire control,” Armstrong said.

During its initial forward operational assessment, the XM25 provided a decisive advantage to Soldiers in combat in Afghanistan. While on patrol in southern Afghanistan, Soldiers with the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division used the XM25 to engage and successfully defeat enemy forces hiding behind three-to-four foot walls used by Afghans to grow grapes, said CSM James Carabello, a combat veteran who recently led Infantry units in Afghanistan with the Army’s 10th Mountain Division.

“We defeated any enemy force that we deployed the weapon against. The XM25 is a devastating weapons system that changes the face of battle when we are in direct fire contact with the enemy,” he said.

In fact, the latest version of the XM25 slated to deploy with Soldiers in Afghanistan in January 2013 includes a range of key design improvements based on lessons learned from combat.

“The kids are calling it the ‘Punisher,’” BG Peter N. Fuller, who heads up the Program Executive Office Soldier, said in a 2011 interview referencing the Soldiers initially testing it in Afghanistan. “I don’t know what we’re going to title this product, but it seems to be game-changing. You no longer can shoot at American forces and then hide behind something. We’re going to reach out and touch you.”

(Kris Osborn writes for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.)
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. The recently published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90 are updates of the 2001 edition of FM 3-90, Tactics.

ADRP 3-90 is the introductory reference for all Army students of tactical art and science. ADRP 3-90 maintains the traditional tactical taxonomy upon which its two subordinate publications (FM 3-90, volume 1, Offense and Defense, and FM 3-90, volume 2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks) will be built. ADRP 3-90 is also the source document for almost a hundred offensive and defensive tactical terms from actions on contact to zone reconnaissance. ADRP 3-90 is an executive summary of the information contained in ADRP 3-90.

Most of the terminology changes in ADRP 3-90 reflect changes made in other manuals. The most important of these are:

- Calculated risk and military gamble are no longer approved military terms.
- ADRP 3-90 now mentions the other operational frameworks (deep-close-security and main and supporting efforts) mentioned in ADP 3-0.
- ADRP 3-90 changes the definition of the division echelon.
- ADRP 3-90 changes reconnaissance and surveillance where appropriate to information collection.
- ADRP 3-90 changes the discussion of protection tasks and other warfighting functions to reflect the list in ADP 3-0.
- ADRP 3-90 changes terminology from heavy to armored, motorized to Stryker, and light to Infantry for Army forces.

ADRP 3-90 has five chapters. The first chapter is titled “Tactical Fundamentals” and introduces the art and science of tactical operations. The key points contained within Chapter 1 can be summed up as:

- Your opponent is always thinking and wants to beat you.
- Mastering the art and science of tactics requires constant study and training.
- There are no checklists; doctrine merely provides a set of tools that the tactician must adapt to meet the needs and conditions associated with a specific situation.

Chapter 2 defines basic tactical concepts commonly associated with the conduct of both offensive and defensive tasks. It provides a figure that illustrates the doctrinal taxonomy established in ADRP 3-0. That doctrinal taxonomy is the basis for not only how Chapters 3-5 are organized but also how the soon-to-be-published FM 3-90 (volumes 1 and 2) will be organized. Chapter 2 also defines tactical echelons from the fire team to the division.

Chapter 3 provides the basics of the offense. It discusses the purposes and characteristics of the offense. It addresses common offensive control measures and defines the forms of maneuver. It then discusses common offensive planning considerations by warfighting function. The chapter then closes out with a discussion of the transition to an emphasis on the conduct of either defensive tasks or stability tasks. What Chapter 3 did for the offense, Chapter 4 does for the defense.

Chapter 5 addresses those tactical enabling tasks that are not the subject of their own manual. Tactical enabling tasks are tasks usually employed by commanders as shaping operations or supporting efforts during the conduct of decisive action but are not primary offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Thus, Chapter 5 does introduce reconnaissance, security operations, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, and encirclement operations, but it does not cover mobility operations which is the subject of its own manual. Since urban operations is not allocated its own field manual under Doctrine 2015, it is included in this chapter even though it is an environment and not a tactical enabling task.

For more information on ADP/ADRP 3-90, contact Douglas A. Darling at (913) 684-3903/DSN 552-3903, or via e-mail to douglas.a.darling2.civ@mail.mil.

Correspondence can also be mailed to: Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ADP/ADRP 3-90), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337.

(Douglas A. Darling is a military analyst (doctrine) with the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.)
What Should a Leader Expect to See on a Well-run Bradley or Abrams Range?

Leaders new to a combined arms battalion (CAB) will soon find themselves on a big bullet range. A good unit master gunner can greatly assist in the learning process. They have a special skill set, and a good master gunner is invaluable. However, they are not magicians. The foundation for most of what they do is described in doctrine. Company-level leaders especially should take the time to read what “the book” says about gunnery training, preliminary gunnery, as well as the live-fire tables and how they are scored. You do not need to be a master gunner, but doing your homework will allow you to assess your own training and not be completely dependent on the “special powers” of the master gunner. The following are some initial steps to prepare yourself to best influence training regardless of your level of experience with mechanized training.

First, review the doctrine.

FM 3-20-21, ABCT Gunnery — Some key chapters are: Chapter 12 (Gunnery Training Program), Chapter 13 (Range Operations), and Appendices A and B (Abrams and Bradley Live-Fire Preparation); these chapters will give you a big head start. (FM 3-20.21 can be found on the Army Publishing Directorate’s Web site at www.apd.army.mil.)

TC 3-20.21-1, Individual and Crew Live-Fire Prerequisite Testing — This short circular clearly describes the tasks and standards that all crew members must meet prior to executing a live fire. If time allows before your first range visit, get some hands-on training on these tasks.

Second, go to the range with a checklist in mind.

The checklist on the right lets you assess your unit’s current knowledge, experience, and discipline. Following a checklist, albeit discreetly, ensures that you do not forget anything. You might even surprise people with the quality of your questions!

Range Checklist (M1/M2)

Gate Guard:
• Should welcome you to the range, identify the unit training, what events are taking place, who is in charge, and direct you to their location.
• Should have a radio to keep NCOIC/OIC informed.

Tower/Bleacher Area:
• Should have sand table/diagram depicting range layout.
• NCOIC should be able to brief:
  ~ Conduct of the range, number of pax on the range, and what they are doing;
  ~ Current maintenance status (vehicle type/bumper #, commo, weapons); and
  ~ Range support locations (medics, commo, maintenance).
• After action review (AAR) location should have:
  ~ TV with recording device;
  ~ Tracking boards with crew current status;
  ~ Action, condition, and standards of current table;
  ~ Crew qualification rating criteria;
  ~ Crew’s strengths and weaknesses; and
  ~ FM 3-20.21.
• Tower/Control Node needs:
  ~ OIC, tower operator, two vehicle crew evaluators (VCEs);
  ~ Safety NCO (Inspects composite management worksheet (CRM) to ensure compliance); and
  ~ Three radio nets (admin, fire, jump) and recording system.

Ammo Pad:
• Should have completed pre-fire checklists for any vehicle that has drawn Class V.
• Should have ammunition broken down by vehicle load.
• Ammo NCO should:
  ~ Know the number of rounds issued by type, # of rounds fired by type; # of rounds remaining by type; and
  ~ Have residue barrels for casings and links and two charged fire extinguishers.

Concurrent Training:
• Action, conditions, and standards for each task as well as training aids needed for each task.
• If GST-focused, is evaluator using TC 3-20.21-1?

Vehicle/Crew Visit:
• Vehicle organization (Does it look like a leader is in charge?)
• Is there a dispatch book with 5988, TM (hull and turret), or PMCS extract on hand?
• Are hatch pins being used for any open hatches? (Exception: driver hatch has no pin.)
• Is there a current dispatch and 5988 of vehicle (supporting unit’s responsibility)?

E-mail your questions or comments to johnny.r.vanderhorst2.mil@mail.mil. Visit our Facebook site at https://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Bradley-Master-Gunner/47138976283073. Additional Bradley and Stryker resources can be found on the Master Gunner Course Web site at http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/197th/BCMC/ and the Bradley Stryker University at https://www.warrioruniversity.army.mil/training-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Bradley++Stryker+University.
As our armored brigade combat teams (ABCT) increase their focus on decisive action and core competency proficiency, the ability to effectively conduct stabilized platform gunnery training is reemerging as an important training topic for combined arms battalion (CAB) leaders. The basic individual, crew, and collective skills developed during a sound gunnery density enable our combat formations to progress to more complex combined arms training events. Executing gunnery training for a CAB is not complicated, but it is hard.1 Success requires engaged leaders to commit the appropriate time, resources, effort, and emphasis along with a strong, lead-by-example posture. As CABs relearn stabilized gunnery execution, a brief review of doctrine, techniques, and lessons learned will significantly reduce unit learning curves.

Unit Culture

The training culture with respect to platform-related requirements varies among CABs. Commanders, regardless of branch, usually play the central role in influencing these unit-specific cultural attitudes. Some units focus on the platform at the expense of the dismounted Infantry while others over-delegate crew training to focus on the dismounted Infantry. Both activities are critical, and CAB trainers should seek to strike the right balance. People generally tend to focus on their strengths, and Army leaders are no different. The diversity of experience that resides within a CAB provides leaders the opportunity to leverage traditional Infantry and Armor competencies to mitigate the risk of an unbalanced training emphasis. Leader training should address technical competencies from across the CAB’s mission sets. Leveraging branch-specific strengths will make the entire unit better and help prevent an out-of-balance culture.

Crew Management and Forecasting

Effective, capable crews must train together.2 Crew changes will occur for a variety of valid reasons from PCS actions to professional development needs. However, crew turbulence is most often a failure of unit planning and emphasis. Ongoing leader involvement and detailed planning at the company level can minimize these instances. Managing crews at the CAB level, with the commander retaining approval authority for all crew changes, is often an effective technique.

Master Gunner (MG) Comments —

Crew Management:
- Carefully considering individual professional development needs, anticipating PCS moves, and mixing experience among crews needs to happen before crews are assigned. Establishing a turbulence chart will greatly assist with this.
- Crews should be planned for and maintained prior to manning dismounted Infantry squads to maximize crew stabilization. This does not imply that crews should get an unfair share of the best talent.
- Cross training between dismounted/mounted elements reduces turbulence and the amount of time required to train new crews as new crew members are normally taken from dismounted Infantry squads. Additionally, this method builds friendship and trust among these personnel, a condition critical to mission success.
- In the event a crew member change is required, move the entire crew rather than just the gunner or vehicle commander (VC).

Bradley crews from the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, await their turn during a Gunnery Table V live-fire exercise at Fort Hood, Texas, on 15 October 2012.

Photos by SGT Quentin Johnson
Planning

Solid execution begins with planning. If your unit has not begun to plan for gunnery, start now. Six months out is not too early. Ongoing crew training is an excellent goal. Chapter 12 (Gunnery Training Program) of FM 3-20.21, ABCT Gunnery, provides guidelines for the development of a training program. Understanding the Army’s training doctrine (Army Doctrine Publication 7-0 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0) and the practical unit training management enablers available on the Army Training Network (ATN) will further assist planners in developing a logical, sequenced, and resourced plan. The CAB MG will play a critical role in assisting the commander in this process. The CAB MG’s continuous input is essential to the commander’s ability to assess his units during the plan, prepare, execute, and assess process. The MG must know each company MG’s strengths, weaknesses, and experience level including the number of MGs or experienced NCOs at the platoon level. Additionally, he must understand the company chain of command support that exists in each company. This detailed company and platoon-level knowledge and the CAB MG’s relationships with company MGs inform his eventual plan. By training individual and crew tasks continuously or as early as possible, a unit will be well prepared to execute live-fire crew and collective training.

MG Comments — Planning:

- CAB MGs need focused CAB commander/S3 guidance at the beginning of the planning process with respect to key collective tasks. This is especially relevant to desired training outcomes for the Gunnery Table (GT) XII or combined arms live-fire exercise.
- Vehicle crew evaluator (VCE) and instructor operator (I/O) training must be front-loaded in the run up to live fire.
- Properly forecast ammunition for both platforms and dismounted Infantry live-fire training.
- Master gunners should also be physically involved with the planning and execution of dismounted Infantry training.

Do not plan crew gunnery tables at the same time as dismounted Infantry collective training. The commander cannot be at two places at once. This also applies to planning for support requirements (gate guard, details, etc.). Incorporate enablers into collective training events. This allows young leadership the ability to work with assets like mortars and close air support.

Preliminary Gunnery

Recent deployments that required tailored, lighter formations have had a detrimental effect on our mechanized individual, crew, and combined arms team competencies. Both Infantry and Armor NCOs and Soldiers report to CABs with minimal platform experience. In some cases, platoons have only one or two NCOs capable of training others. Starting with the fundamentals is essential. Our success as an Army is underpinned by our NCOs’ ability to gain and sustain technical and tactical expertise, and currently our depth of expertise is challenged.

Our doctrine provides guidelines for a preliminary gunnery training strategy for individual through collective levels. Shortcuts in basic classroom individual instruction and hands-on crew training will doom subsequent collective live-fire training. Crews must gain competence in turret operations, gun theory, fire control, and the direct-fire engagement process before progressing to simulators. Proper I/O training will enable crews to maximize their learning in the simulator. Proper driver’s training is also an important safety consideration.

MG Comments — Preliminary Gunnery:

- Successful gunnery training will only happen if operator maintenance is routinely conducted and supervised by the platoon and company chain of command.
- Do not overlook training the direct fire engagement process (detect, identify, decide, engage, assess [DIDEA]).
- In addition to developing crew coordination skills and turret familiarization, the proper use of the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS)/Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) will allow crews to become familiar with gunnery and evaluation criteria.
- BATS and AGTS access levels should be controlled and assigned by the CAB MG. Senior instructor operator (SIO) privileges are powerful and should not be assigned below company MG. Retaining at CAB MG is a technique to better control crew movement and training parameters.
- Use simulator performance as another indicator of crew member performance. Substandard performance may drive a crew change. If so, make the change as early in the process as possible.
Gunnery Skills Test (GST)/GT I

The GST is absolutely critical to successful stabilized gunnery execution. It is a live-fire prerequisite and must be conducted within 90 days of the live fire. In addition to being a mandatory certification tool, it is also highly useful for identifying both individual and crew strengths and weaknesses. The conditions and standards for these tasks are found in TC 3-20.21-1, Individual and Crew Life-Fire Prerequisite Testing. Graders must have passed the GST within one month and been validated by the unit MG. Whether to conduct GST at the company or battalion level depends on several factors, and either technique can work effectively. The battalion MG should make this recommendation based upon the skill and experience of the company chains of command and MGs as well as unit culture. Regardless of what level the GST is conducted, full involvement of the chain of command is essential. At the completion of GST/GT I, the company MG should have conducted, full involvement of the chain of command is essential. The conditions and certification tool, it is also highly useful for identifying both

MG Comments – GST/GT I:

- Heavy emphasis on upload and download of ready boxes will greatly enhance range throughput.
- VC's should master the coax weapon system to ensure they can properly zero and clear their coax. This will aid range throughput as well as reduce the possibility of a negligent discharge.
- Certain tasks should be trained with combat gear to ensure the realism of task (Example: Evacuate an injured crewman and crew-fire drills).
- TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless-guided) missile tasks will be reintroduced to GST with the publication of TC 3-20.1, Direct Fire Gunnery (Ground).

Range Operations

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) will save time. If there is no current unit SOP, acquire an old one and amend it during execution for future use. At a minimum, establish expectations for the following range nodes: Control (tower), maintenance, ammunition, concurrent training, and medical. Ensure a parking bolt and track and coax are part of operator-level command maintenance. Bringing these items to command

MG Comments — Range Ops

- Tower (Control Node)
  - Use tracking boards (scores, maintenance status, firing order)
  - Minimize authorized pax in the tower (commander, first sergeant, MG, VCEs, and OIC)
- Ammunition Node
  - Ensure pre-fire checklist prior to execution. Do not issue ammo without a pre-fire checklist signed by VC and gunner.

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) will save time. If there is no current unit SOP, acquire an old one and amend it during execution for future use. At a minimum, establish expectations for the following range nodes: Control (tower), maintenance, ammunition, concurrent training, and medical.

- Ensure crews do not keep ammo for the next table; ammo NCO should have counts.
- Ensure all ammunition has been certified “serviceable” and properly inspected prior to uploading on vehicles.
- VC's
  - All must be platform and VCE certified to properly facilitate AARs.
  - TC 3-20.21-2, Vehicle Crew Evaluator Exportable Packet, can be helpful to certify VCEs.
  - Resource timing boards, electrical or manual.
  - In the best-case scenario, VCEs are not part of crews during gunnery. But if they are, front load them for each table so they are available to work the tower.
  - External VCEs for Table VI are highly recommended.
- Commo
  - All ranges should run three FM nets: admin, fire, and jump.
  - Crews should be trained to troubleshoot commo before gunnery execution. Be sure to include jump net operation.
  - Order jump cables well before execution.
  - Always have commo support on ranges.
- Crew AARs
  - Resource and maintain a solid AAR room; ensure playback equipment is on-hand and functional as well as training aids to display the engagement standards; leaders should be present for oversight of the AAR delivery.
  - Well-trained VCEs are critical to an effective AAR.
  - VCEs should follow training, review each engagement, solicit crew input, and review the video/audio to reinforce lessons.
  - Thru-sight video can be used as an alternate jump net/ VCE can evaluate fire commands and engagement techniques.
  - If available, a Digital Multi-Purpose Range Complex (DMPRC) includes jump net and the ability to record fire commands without the use of thru-sight video.
  - Ensure that you have enough CDs or tapes to record. Day and night fire should be recorded on the same CD or tape for each crew.
- Maintenance
  - Crews must have complete, current technical manuals for both preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and troubleshooting, etc.
  - A technique to make PMCS easier for crews is to make PMCS extracts for turret and hull using the current technical (-10) manual. This fits easily in a one-inch binder.
  - Proper 10- and 20-level PMCS done constantly.
  - Bolt and track and coax are part of operator-level command maintenance. Bringing these items to command
maintenance allows crews to dry-fire systems and will help identify issues. It is also a -10 check.

⇒ TOW verification is an annual requirement. Confirm tolerance early.

⇒ If possible, an on-site missile team is useful for Improved Bradley Acquisition System (IBAS)/Commander’s Independent Viewer (CIV) failures as well as missile issues.

⇒ Services on tank main gun/25mm need to have crew involvement.

⇒ Ensure that maintenance has extra gun parts on live-fire ranges.

⇒ Ensure the MG has a tool box on range.

■ Safety

⇒ Inexperience at all levels increases risk.

⇒ Do not assume what is common sense to seasoned mechanized Soldiers is common (walking between vehicles, ground guiding correctly, hatch pin use, ramp safety, etc.)

⇒ Ensure that every combat override switch is laced. This is a safety deadline and must be enforced to avoid serious injury.

⇒ Enforce hatch pin use. Soldiers new to the platform do not understand the danger of an unpinned hatch.

Additional resources can be found online:

⇒ Bradley Stryker University page: https://www.warrioruniversity.army.mil/training-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Bradley+Stryker+University

⇒ Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Warrior University page: https://www.warrioruniversity.army.mil/

⇒ Maneuver Center of Excellence Weapons and Gunnery Branch: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/628285

Stabilized gunnery training requires both solid preparation and hard work during execution to effectively train Soldiers and crews as well as efficiently use high-demand resources. Leader involvement at every level and strict adherence to our published doctrine will go a long way towards reducing friction and ensuring a successful outcome.

Notes

1 Following publication of TC 3-20.1 Direct Fire Gunnery (Ground), the term “direct fire training” will replace “gunnery training.” While this new manual will replace the current TC 3-20.21, HBCT Gunnery, the general principles discussed in this paper will remain relevant.

2 DA Pam 350-38, paragraph 5-24 defines a qualified crew as a track commander and gunner combination that has met Table VI standards. To maximize crew coordination, we recommend drivers be included and tracked with a specific crew.

3 See the sample six-month gunnery training plan from Chapter 12, page 12-7 of FM 3-20.21.

4 In accordance with AR 350-1 and DA Pam 350-38, sustainment crews should train at least four (4) hours per month in simulation (BATS/COFT, etc.).

5 The Army Training Network’s Web site is https://atn.army.mil/.

6 Figure 12-3, page 12-11 of FM 3-20.21 provides a good overview.

7 See Chapters 5-10 of FM 3-20.21 for a detailed DIDEA description.

8 FM 3-20.21, Chapter 14, Page 14-1.

9 Tasks 3B and 4B from Chapter 3 of TC 3-20.21.

10 See Chapter 13, FM 3-20.21.

This article was written by the Bradley Master Gunner Branch (SFC Johnny Vanderhorst [branch chief], SFC Lucas Aragon, SFC Christopher Cunningham, SSG Brian Okarma, SSG Jeff Turcotte, SSG Joseph Trolio, SSG William Goodman) and LTC Dan Kirk with input from MSG Joshua Whitmore, branch chief of the Armor Master Gunner School, as well as Team TRADOC Capability Manager - Armored Brigade Combat Team.
There were about five or six security force assistance teams (SFATs) packed tightly into a mobile classroom that day in famed TigerLand at Fort Polk, La. Many Soldiers have been there and while some are content to bide their time until the end of exercise (ENDEX), others are determined to gather any and all information they can possibly absorb before their fast-approaching deployment. Our classroom was filled with these minds and everything in between.

The topic of discussion that morning, led by a Marine lieutenant colonel, revolved around the SFAT mission and the simple question, “Is this mission accessible to all Soldiers?” I was sitting near the back of the classroom so I had an excellent vantage point to witness the ensuing dialogue. A seasoned sergeant first class with four deployments under his belt broke the silence. I will paraphrase his contribution: “Hell yeah it is. I believe the U.S. Army can take any Joe and train him to do anything necessary to complete any mission.” An Army lieutenant colonel, who had just finished a yearlong deployment as an advisor in southern Afghanistan, strongly disagreed. Based on his experience, he said that the mission of advising must not be an open door, accessible to all Soldiers. Moreover, he maintained that forcing the wrong personalities onto an SFAT would, in turn, actually impede the success of the mission. A fury of discourse followed, and a strong line of division was drawn down the middle of the classroom. A colonel, taken from brigade command to be an advisor, tried to resolve the argument. He aligned himself with the NCO, adamantly agreeing that what sets our military apart from all others is its practiced ability to train Soldiers — Soldiers able to adapt and overcome to complete any mission.

This vignette highlights the stark disparities that can arise from a simple question, escalating here into a heated debate. So, whether you have any experiential knowledge of an advisory mission or not, I hope to expose the common sense issues surrounding it. The military’s latest and greatest vehicle of success in Afghanistan has placed the SFAT in the role of the decisive operation, the main effort, the tip of the spear — all things we were told prior to and during our deployment. We even heard it from the Regional Command (RC) South commanding general during an operations and intelligence brief. The bottom line is that we had better learn the answer to this question before we begin shifting around billions of dollars trying to make it work. As a platoon leader in the Infantry, I never savored the idea of relinquishing my platoon to join an SFAT, but now five months into our deployment, I am thankful for the perspective it has given me. Our interactions with other SFATs are limited, but
altogether I believe my exposure thus far has lent me the ability to draw sensible conclusions to easily observable issues.

Selection Process

Plain and simple, the SFAT mission is not for every Soldier. But this is not to say that there is one specific qualification, military occupational speciality (MOS), or rank that "fits the mold," and there is not necessarily a specific team task organization that somehow guarantees success. Success for Soldiers on an SFAT depends on their level of maturity, confidence, patience, and that uncommon faculty that tells you when to take a back seat, come in second place, or be invisible. After five months in Afghanistan, it is becoming apparent who is tailored for this sort of mission and who is not. Though not fixed, these two groups often exhibit very distinctive traits, making categorization a realistic goal. As SFATs continue to gain prominence in this theater of war, we are, in effect, putting more weight and consequence on the backs of fewer Soldiers. Therefore, it is paramount that our Army’s leaders choose the right men and women to represent and protect our interests in Afghanistan.

I am a true believer in the Army’s ability to consistently output good Soldiers. Even so, some of our best and brightest Soldiers are not suited to be SFAT members. Why? Our Soldiers are incessantly trained and conditioned by Army doctrine, making them highly capable of thinking and executing within that specific doctrinal framework. An SFAT mission requires that a Soldier operate within a different, unfamiliar framework. For some, breaking away from doctrine and standard operating procedures is an impossible task and counterintuitive to everything they know — military sacrilege. I have seen many Soldiers like this who were assigned to or volunteered for SFATs in our area of operation. Five months in and they are still trying to force a square peg into a round hole. In other words, they have not learned to think and manage their expectations outside of doctrinal measures of effectiveness and performance. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) do not come close to the level at which the U.S. Army functions on a consistent basis. In the SFAT mission, terms like “success” are generally accorded lesser importance, whereas terms like “satisfactory,” “adequate,” or “tolerable” hold more intrinsic value. There is a reason that our Special Forces brethren spend an entire year of rigorous training, rewire their brains to conduct a mission very different from the SFAT assignment. Embedding with and training indigenous forces sounds eerily close to what we do day in and day out. The bottom line is if the SFAT mission is the decisive attempt to hand over Afghanistan to ANSF, hand selecting its members seems justified.

If you are wondering whether I am suggesting every SFAT member must be subjected to a personality test and a year of training, I am not. I believe there are those to whom this mission comes more naturally. If you look out at your Soldiers and peers, pinpoint the individuals that exhibit the following attributes:

An SFAT mission requires that a Soldier operate within a different, unfamiliar framework. For some, breaking away from doctrine and standard operating procedures is an impossible task and counterintuitive to everything they know — military sacrilege.

- a) Maintains control of emotions, especially when dealing with frustrating subordinates;
- b) Makes decisions and takes orders without incorporating his or her ego;
- c) Takes pride in training their Soldiers and genuinely, without pretense, wants to see them succeed; and
- d) Accepts having minimal to no authority in their assigned area of operations during deployment.

This is a short list, but I am sure in your minds you have significantly narrowed the playing field. SFATs are almost exclusively senior NCOs and officers, making the list of contenders even shorter. The problem arises from the moment the Secretary of Defense signs the order, tasking entire brigades with the responsibility to resource enough SFATs for a regional command, RC South in our case. The result of this order? Our brigade was stripped down to the platoon level of its core leadership. The sheer quantity of SFATs required from our brigade completely precluded any opportunity of being even remotely selective when fielding teams. After two frenetic months of requisite pre-deployment training, many teams were still unsure of where they were going or which ANSF entity they would be advising (i.e. police, border patrol, or military). With boots on the ground in Afghanistan, many teams were still being shuffled to any battlespace with an SFAT vacancy.

In part, because teams were not formed based on the qualifications listed above, a great deal of unwarranted time has been spent patching up negative relations between SFAT team chiefs and the battlespace owners (BSO). Of course, this is not to say the BSO is always above reproach; however, in this relationship, it is necessary that the SFAT capitulate to the BSO, regardless of personal vendettas against certain individuals no matter how justified they may be. The reason being, the SFAT scope of responsibility is limited to an advisory role that focuses on inconspicuously preparing their ANSF counterparts for both partnered and independent operations. Take a leader who formerly commanded or held responsibility over a brigade, battalion, or company and give them the job of being a shadow. Let’s just say quite a few have not taken the relegation of authority with grace. SFAT leadership must have Soldiers with enough self-confidence and humility to quickly forfeit small-scale BSO conflicts in support of the bigger goal of leaving Afghanistan.

One of the primary rationales behind carefully selecting individuals for specific advisory missions is safety. The number of “green on blue” attacks in Afghanistan has risen to new heights over the last two years, forcing us to seriously reassess our security posture at the frontlines. The majority of these attacks are due to enemy infiltration and impersonation, but some may be the result of ANSF soldiers retaliating against a coalition force Soldier’s deliberate cultural tactlessness or their inability to avoid senseless competitive feuds. SFATs interact with Afghan soldiers on a daily basis, leaving no room for a team member who puts themselves and their team in peril because of their immaturity and inability to avoid conflict.
Closing Thoughts

None of what I am saying implies those Soldiers who are unfit for an SFAT role are unfit for leadership elsewhere — far from it! I am merely drawing on lessons I have assembled while deployed; the fact is, there are Soldiers who have abundantly contributed and those who have needlessly hindered the SFAT mission in RC South. Yes, selecting specific leaders from our ranks presents many logistical and practical issues given the recent shift towards mass producing SFAT teams. Moreover, the qualities I have pitched as necessary components for an SFAT member are totally subject to the opinions of each selecting chain of command, which is why I suggest developing a broad, standardized selection process, wherein blatantly unqualified Soldiers can be refused a position on an SFAT.

Incorporating a more stringent selection during the formation of these teams is not a matter of pointless exclusivity; rather, it is a security measure and a way to avoid impracticable personality issues in a theater of operations that we, to a great extent, cannot afford any wasted time. Like it or not, the SFAT mission has been chosen as the primary culminating agent in Afghanistan. Before the next deployment, let us ensure that each SFAT team has the means to do their job, without preventable restraints.

1LT Andrew George is currently serving as an intelligence advisor for a security forces assistance team in Afghanistan. Prior to the deployment, he served as a platoon leader in B Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. 1LT George is a graduate of the Basic Airborne, Air Assault, and Mechanized Leader’s courses. He graduated from Clemson University with a bachelor’s degree in English.

DISPATCHES FROM A COMBAT ADVISOR

CPT CHRIS LAPINSKY

So, you’re going to become a combat advisor. Everyone has their own philosophy on mentorship, and there have been many documents published on how to effectively advise. In this article, however, I will attempt to convey the techniques and pitfalls I have experienced living the combat advisor role. I will focus on my perceptions of advising, the battlespace owner (BSO) and security force assistance team (SFAT) relationship, how to make the most out of your Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, tips to improve counterpart relations, and situations you should try to avoid.

If you haven’t already, you will likely hear that there is a fine line between advising and partnering. Many heated philosophical debates erupted on this very concept over the course of my rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La. Basically, I simplify advising down to giving suggestions to my counterparts on what parts of their job they fail at, how to improve those areas, and how to more efficiently perform those tasks that they are relatively proficient on. I would equate partnering to performing a task or mission side-by-side with my counterparts, with both elements conducting the same tasks towards the same end state. Go ahead and face it now, despite what self-professed experts say, you will perform the role of both a partner and an advisor (and probably at the same time on numerous occasions). Unless your counterparts are so experienced and effective at their jobs that they can perform without International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intervention, you will be required to partner with them, exemplify what right looks like, and ensure the mission is completed. You will likely find that by working alongside your partners you will gain their trust and respect, and your rapport will grow exponentially faster.

Traditionally, advisor teams have been coupled with a BSO unit that is understood to be the partnered force. This unit will spontaneously link-up with elements from your counterparts to conduct operations that, for all intents and purposes, benefit ISAF and may be nested with counterpart goals but are usually conducted without the wholehearted buy-in of the host nation. The obvious problem with these events is that you are not really enabling your counterparts to sustain themselves or exercise their operational machine. The situation becomes further complicated if the BSO and SFAT conduct operations with their counterparts independent of each other, and neither side knows how the counterparts performed or what was accomplished. My advice is to keep lines of communication open between the assigned partner force and your advisor team and make every effort to incorporate members of both elements for all operations. For instance, if the BSO is planning to conduct a clearance operation with your
counterparts, try to get a few advisors on the patrol so you can effectively evaluate your counterpart’s performance. Likewise, if you are fortunate enough to have your counterparts plan and conduct their own mission, make sure you take ample notes and pass the information along to your BSO. Above all else, do not develop the notion that all the advisor team does is “advise” and all the partnered unit does is conduct partnered operations.

You should, whenever feasible, get your hands dirty and work right along with your counterparts, both to strengthen your relationship and also to identify with how and why they do things. You may often find your team serving as a liaison between the BSO and your counterparts, but it is important to realize that what takes priority for the BSO is not always what is in the best interest of your counterparts. Despite what your mission statement says, your overall advising mission is to enable and improve your counterparts, so you are completely within your jurisdiction as an advisor to make suggestions to the BSO concerning tasks directed to your counterparts that you feel are counterproductive to your mission.

The problem with my JRTC rotation was that my team basically went through as test subjects to determine if the new SFAT-oriented regimen would work. We lived and operated in one of the small mock villages which served as our district center. The JRTC development group did a good job of basing our scenario around what we would potentially be facing in Afghanistan, even down to switching our role-play counterparts from Afghan Border Police (ABP) to Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) after we received a change of mission during our first week at JRTC. However, problems arose when we were placed in our fictional district center with another SFAT, and both teams had to use the same role-players. We had to deconflict when each team could utilize the district chief of police (DCOP) and deputy DCOP and allow time for the role-players to reset so they could attempt to keep each team’s progression separate and distinct. I mention this situation in hopes that these issues have been addressed and will change for your rotation, but if not, then you can possibly foresee circumstances you may have to overcome or simply ignore so you can sap all knowledge and experience possible out of the training center prior to really having to use it.

I suggest not using your rotation as a time to focus on small unit tactics and Infantry battle drills but rather work with the CTC cadre to create a scenario where your biggest issues are going to revolve around getting your role-playing counterparts to do their jobs, logistical issues, sharing of information between ISAF and counterparts, and cultural problems. More than likely, you will face counterparts that either genuinely want to do their jobs but for some reason cannot, or conversely, want to do as little as possible to make a paycheck. Your counterparts will probably not be as well funded as our military and may have a struggling supply system they do not know how to use in the first place. My team also found that there was a disconnect in the sharing of information between us and our counterparts. Often, we were restrained from passing along information due to classifications, and there were hurdles we had to jump to declassify. Other times, we caught our counterparts

![A member of the Afghan National Police pulls security next to an Infantryman assigned to a security forces assistance team during a patrol in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on 15 November 2012.](Photo by SGT Thomas Duval)
on their way out of the gate going on an operation that they did not tell us about, or we would find out about an operation weeks later with no one able to provide us with adequate details on what occurred. In order for your team to have a successful CTC rotation, you need to work with the CTC cadre and brainstorm these types of possible situations that could arise during your deployment so you can identify what works and what doesn’t work prior to being deployed.

No matter what you experience during your CTC rotation and any preconceived notions you have on your perspective counterparts, you must realize that they are human beings and will have a vast array of personalities just like us. You should strive to learn as much of the language and cultural characteristics as you can before you deploy. However, you should also treat your relationship with your counterparts much like you would act when you first arrive at a new unit. You may have a generalized idea of the personalities of key members of your counterpart chain of command from the team you will be replacing, but your counterparts know nothing about you and will likely base their opinions off of their American stereotypes and their experience with the previous units they came in contact with. You have to go in prepared to earn their trust and respect; start off with a lot of small talk before you actually get down to business because of their culture. You will gain respect by remaining levelheaded and proving that you know what you are doing and are there to help. You will gain trust by always being straightforward with your counterparts and not lying or giving half-truths. You will not always like your counterpart or be able to give them what they ask for or need, and your first step to building rapport with your counterpart is to know this and to work through it. Being selected to be an advisor usually means you have served in some leadership role, and you should focus on treating your counterparts as one of your subordinates or peers when necessary, all while remaining cognizant of cultural sensitivities and the differences in capabilities between American Soldiers and your counterparts.

When you first begin working with your counterparts, there may be assets they have come to expect from U.S. forces. Either they feel we are the only ones who can provide these assets to enable them to perform their jobs, or they are simply trying to take advantage of us. The AUP have come to depend on ISAF to provide fuel and believe themselves to be combat ineffective without ISAF supplementing their fuel supply. It has been a constant uphill battle to wean the Afghans off of U.S. logistical support and force them to rely on their own systems. Do not assume that because something has always been done a certain way that it is right and should continue. If you cannot train your counterparts in a way that makes them sustainable after ISAF leaves, then you are wasting your time. Be wary of your counterparts trying to manipulate your team by going to different team members to get what they want because your team is not in sync for how you will jointly respond to certain requests. It is also inadvisable to condition your counterparts into relying on you to provide all of their enablers and products to conduct their operations. If your counterparts will only do their jobs when ISAF provides aerial reconnaissance, intelligence, or communication and force protection assets, then you are in essence preventing your advisees from becoming a self-sufficient entity.

It is important to remember that even U.S. forces had to start somewhere. There is no reason why your counterparts cannot develop a baseline with what they have been issued while advisors help them build skills and processes to improve their situation. As coalition forces begin to pull out of battlespaces across the world, foreign forces are beginning to learn the harsh realities of what it means to rely on their own chains of command and procedures. No one expects you to turn your counterparts into the best of the best during the course of your deployment, but do everything you can to teach them how to operate on their own and to prepare for the inevitable day when they truly are on their own.

CPT Chris Lapinsky is currently serving as the S3 for a security forces assistance team in the Daman district of Afghanistan. He is assigned to B Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. He is a graduate of Ranger School, the Basic Airborne Course, and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He earned a bachelor’s degree in psychology from West Virginia University.
LESSONS LEARNED AS AN OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM JOHN E. BLUE

As I wrap up my first assignment as a sergeant major (SGM) with the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, I felt that this would be a good time to share some of my lessons learned with the rest of our Army’s senior NCOs. I know some SGMs already know and have experienced what I am about to share, but I feel it is my responsibility in an effort to spur discussion and hopefully influence other SGMs to do the same. Historically speaking, we do not do it enough.

My tour was only nine months long. The first four months were spent serving as the command sergeant major (CSM) (while wearing SGM rank) until one arrived, and the last five months I served as the operations sergeant (modern table of organization and equipment [MTOE] SGM position in the SBCT community). During those months, the battalion had spent a lot of time training and away from home. The battalion participated in combined training in Australia (Operation Talisman Saber 2011); combined training with the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) at the Yakima Training Center (YTC) (Operation Rising Thunder 2011) where we had conducted the first bilateral combined arms live fire (CALFEX) with JGSDF; squad and platoon situational training exercise lanes at YTC where we focused on fire and movement; and then platoon and company live-fire exercises again at YTC — all totaling 100 days of good, hard planning and training away from home station. I should also mention that the executive officer (XO), the operations officer (S3), the battalion commander, and I all arrived within a week or two of each other.

The roles I believe I was expected to fill are fairly simple. They were helping the commander understand and visualize the situation (define the problem); asking the right questions of the staff, higher headquarters, and the commander; assisting in staff management; helping determine the format and content of the briefings; and assisting in establishing and maintaining standards/expectations — especially deadlines.

Helping the commander understand and visualize the situation is probably the most important of all, as it is problem solving. Problem solving “is” mission analysis, which is the beginning of the military decision-making process (MDMP). During my short time at both the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) and 2-23 Infantry, I learned that a staff and its six warfighting functions must truly take the necessary time to conduct proper and thorough mission analysis. This will ensure that all the right questions are asked and that the staff provides the commander with the best recommendations possible. The successes of our current and future operations are based on it (and not just the tactical ones either).

Asking the right questions of the staff, higher headquarters, and the commander synchronizes efforts. It is ensuring that you, the staff, and the commander are well informed and able to make operational and tactical decisions in a timely manner. Asking these questions is how we develop operational assumptions (better known as our running estimates), which are a key responsibility of each staff section. My XO was essential in this process as most staff primaries (myself included) either did not know how to or that they are required to do it. This allowed us to have a better understanding of the current situation and helped us develop courses of action to employ against those threats or issues in support of the commander.

This was critical during the development of our long-range calendar in support of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and the battalion’s future deployment. A great example was when the unit was notified of the deployment and its mission. At this point, we had determined we would need a branch or sequel in our calendar that would allow us to respond to or change our training path in response to a contingency expeditionary force (CEF) mission or deployment expeditionary force (DEF) mission. At the time, our entire brigade was regionally aligned with the Pacific Command (PACOM), and we would have to change our focus to meet future pre-deployment training requirements in support of a DEF mission slate.

Assisting in managing the staff is broader than it sounds. First, we, as SGMs, have to work hand-in-hand with the CSM to address and help fill any shortages of key positions throughout the entire staff. This means providing the operations officer with the right staff by ensuring those key billets are filled with people with the right qualifications. I personally interviewed all prospective Soldiers. First sergeants are also key players in this process as it is imperative they understand its importance and provide us with great Soldiers to choose from.

This creates proficient warfighting function cells which allow you to properly perform all steps of the MDMP process. You can then help ensure the staff is working smoothly and efficiently by teaching, coaching, and mentoring so that the entire staff (including yourself) learns what “right” looks like, while also understanding how to work efficiently. This means working with the staff, not against them. It means understanding all aspects of operations and being up to date with current information to be an asset to the staff, CSM, and the commander.

Assisting in determining the format and content of the briefings
may also sound easy, but not all units operate the same. It is our responsibility to encourage our staff and those of our subordinate units to conduct business in accordance with Army and Joint doctrine. This will allow separate products to come together and will ease the extraction of that information in order to produce supporting future orders. It will also help newly arrived staff members because they will not have to learn an entirely new orders and planning process.

In our organization, there were a lot of concepts of operations (CONOPS) being developed in lieu of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), which took away from the formal aspect of orders production. Although CONOPS are a great tool, they have their place, normally as supporting documents to some type of order. A good rule of thumb is to staff everything through the S3 shop and produce an operation order (OPORD).

We used OPORDs for specific events and weekly tasking orders (WTO) for everything else. What I thought was unique was that we numbered our WTOs to sync them with training weeks and issued them on the first duty day of that week. We would then send out a FRAGO for that WTO if there was a short notice tasking from brigade that would fall in that week or the first day after the weekend. For example, training week 23 in FY12 would be WTO 12-23. The first FRAGO to that specific WTO would be WTO 12-23.1.

I, along with one of the assistant operations officers, read all daily tasking orders and OPORDs from brigade and worked with the tasking NCO in developing the next week’s WTO. The final draft would come back to me for approval, and then the tasking officer would send it out to all companies and primary staff members.

This did not eliminate the S3 from the WTO or OPORD production process. He also read all products coming from brigade, and we promoted open lines of communication between all staff members involved in an effort to flatten the organization. This ensured that both his and the commander’s intent was met and gave him more time to focus on other special taskings and products with other members of the staff, while still having situational awareness within the battalion and brigade.

Our desired outcome was to ensure everyone was involved and understood what was going on in the organization.

Finally, the easiest part of this duty is assisting in establishing and maintaining standards/expectations. We must ensure that planning teams meet deadlines given by the commander and the chief of staff (XO) with the best products possible. Meeting those deadlines allows us to give subordinate units maximum time to conduct their own planning in support of our overall missions and operations. Besides training and command and staff meetings, we should chair training resource meetings with the XO and weekly staff syncs with the S3. While sitting in on the resource meetings, I was able to help outline resourcing alternatives, analyze company training for flaws, and make recommendations. I did, however, fail to sit in on the staff syncs. It involved the primary staff members that were actually conducting mission analysis because our brigade used series operations orders to move through the ARFORGEN cycle.

During my outbrief with the S3, we discussed what we thought my role would have been and who else, if anyone, should attend the staff sync meetings. What we proposed to each other was that all staff primaries, to include the senior enlisted advisor, should attend the meeting. This would accomplish two things.

First, we would be providing the perfect opportunity to introduce a group of NCOs, most likely sergeants first class, to the MDMP processes (doctrinally) and how a battalion staff operates, and it would also give them a foundation to build on in preparation for attending the Battle Staff Course.

Secondly, it supported our desired outcome — a flatter organization that promotes asking the right questions so that you can go from the “what” to the “so what” and on through to the “therefore, which means…”

We also ensured that I was informed of all special products being produced by the staff. During my time, that included the battalion live-fire exercise standard operating procedure (SOP), battalion driver’s training SOP, the tactical operations center SOP, and the Tomahawk Battalion Maneuver Pamphlet. I tracked all the above items as they went through the staffing process and really had to ensure their timely compliance.

In closing, it is evident that as SGMS we have a big and important role during the planning processes and in staffs at all levels. Not only must we help the commander understand the situation; help the commander visualize the situation; ask the right questions of the staff, higher headquarters, and the commander; assist in managing the staff; assist in determining the format and content of the briefings; and assist in establishing and maintaining standards/expectations (especially deadlines), but we must also ensure that we are productive members of the staff and that we support our units, the officers and NCOs in them, and our commander. Bottom line — we must help supervise the work around the staff at all levels.

I hope I am been able to spur discussion within the SGM community and influence others to write about their experiences and lessons learned. We owe it to ourselves and our Soldiers to professionally share our ideas and our tactics, techniques, and procedures.

CSM John E. Blue is the command sergeant major of 2nd Battalion, 357th Infantry Regiment, 189th Infantry Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Wash. His previous assignments include serving as operations sergeant, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division (ID), JBLM; commandant, Warrior Training Academy, JBLM; first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd SBCT, 2nd ID, JBLM; and as a rifle company first sergeant and platoon sergeant with A Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd SBCT, 2nd ID, JBLM and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds an associate’s degree in general studies from Central Texas College and a bachelor’s degree in business and accounting from Saint Martin’s University.
Vietnam, Iraq, and the Loss of Institutional Knowledge

LTC CHARLES W. MORRISON

The operations conducted by the U.S. military in Vietnam have been rightfully described as foreign internal defense by past scholars, while the invasion and subsequent operations in Iraq have been more aptly described as “regime change” or “nation building.” Both conflicts contained elements of major combat operations but focused heavily on counterinsurgency operations. Even though there was no initial invasion of South Vietnam by U.S. forces, there was an effort at nation building (hereafter referred to as support to governance). This article will illustrate the similarities and differences between these two conflicts but will bring to light the most important lessons to be learned by today’s military professionals. Why did the civilian and military leaders in Vietnam forget the valuable lessons learned in World War II concerning support to governance after liberating areas of France and occupying Germany and Japan in 1945? Also, when U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2003, leaders ignored past lessons learned when it came to this important component of modern warfare. Though military and civilian leaders may disdain the thought of the U.S. military providing support to governance, those who ignore history may oftentimes be doomed to relearn hard-won lessons of previous conflicts.

Though our involvement in Vietnam was one in which we committed to supporting the South Vietnamese government, our initial focus and strategy was a purely military one at best. GEN William Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command-Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, focused on a strategy of attrition that centered on large battalion-, brigade-, and division-sized “search and destroy missions.” These missions significantly defeated North Vietnamese army units when they could be engaged but had little to no effect on the insurgency which was hampering the government of South Vietnam from establishing legitimacy. Westmoreland’s true interest was in large-unit maneuver, and pacification efforts headed by the U.S. ambassador “bored him.”1

1 A 1st Cavalry Division Soldier engages the enemy after coming under fire during a patrol in Buhriz, Iraq, on 15 February 2007. Photo by SSgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, USAF
a World War II veteran, was fighting the maneuver war of his youth — not a war that focused on population security, pacification, and support to the South Vietnamese government.

The code name for the invasion plan of Iraq in 2003 was Cobra II. LTG David McKiernan, commander of the U.S. Third Army, sought to emulate GEN George Patton’s breakout from Normandy, Operation Cobra, in his drive to Baghdad.3 This indicated that civilian and military leaders planning this invasion gave little thought about Iraq at the end of major combat operations. Eighteen months were spent planning the ground invasion of Iraq. However, planning for the occupation of Iraq began only a couple of months before the invasion.3 The end result was one of the most successful maneuver campaigns in military history. U.S. forces invaded Iraq and captured Baghdad in less than 30 days. It was a remarkable feat of fire and maneuver, but the real work was about to begin. No one had anticipated that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s militias, originally created to suppress internal rebellion, would turn into a ready insurgency. With no ready constabulary force to keep law and order or any other governmental agency ready to implement governmental control, lawlessness and disorder reigned for Iraqi civilians in the months after the initial invasion. The disjointed governmental control, lawlessness and disorder reigned for Iraqi civilians in the months after the initial invasion. The disjointed efforts of LTG Ricardo Sanchez’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7 and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by L. Paul Bremer only added to the mounting problems and growing insurgency. Bremer ordered the dissolution of the remaining army and police units, making the power vacuum within Iraq even worse. Due to pre-war planning troop restrictions, U.S. commanders found themselves with too few troops to secure the country and prevent growing unrest among not only the displaced Sunni governing minority but also the long-oppressed, majority Shia population.4 Much like America’s previous involvement in Vietnam, U.S. military professionals excelled at executing the fire and maneuver of the last war, Desert Storm, but seemed unable to respond effectively to what was becoming a troubling insurgency. The stark difference, however, from 1968 Vietnam was that in 2004 there was no host nation government to support. Ambassador Bremer and the CPA tried in vain to fulfill the role as a caretaker government but never seemed to look at past U.S. experiences to guide them in their efforts.

In June of 1968, GEN Creighton Abrams officially took over as the overall U.S. commander in Vietnam. Abrams, who was also a World War II veteran, understood that the object was not to necessarily see how many conventional North Vietnamese battalions he could destroy, but who could control the population of South Vietnam. Abrams believed in a one-war approach “that put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of RVANF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) and pacification — all of which are interrelated so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in the others.”5

Abrams developed an excellent personal and professional relationship with Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, as well. This relationship allowed Abrams and Bunker to create a true unity of effort between all the U.S. governmental agencies working in South Vietnam to include pacification efforts headed in the hamlets by the State Department. One key area of this work was the document entitled the “Program for the Pacification and Long Term Development of Vietnam” (PROVN). The directive behind PROVN focused on “the restoration of stability with the minimum of destruction so that society and lawful government may proceed in an atmosphere of justice and order.”6

Abrams further complemented the PROVN approach by changing the focus and size of U.S. military operations. He pushed his tactical commanders to operate at the company level, focusing on population security and interdiction rather than utilizing battalions and divisions to conduct large-scale search and destroy missions. As a result, U.S. forces began engaging the enemy on the ground of their choosing and disrupting the extensive logistics and shadow government networks North Vietnamese regulars had established in the villages and hamlets. This “one-war” approach with a focus on population security would not be lost on another commander who would assume command in Iraq in early 2007.

With the advent of a new Iraqi constitution and government in 2005, the focus of U.S. efforts had squarely been placed on training Iraqi security forces in order to allow U.S. military forces to draw down. This effort did not work. By 2006, Iraq was engulfed in a sectarian civil war that had raised violence levels to their highest since the coalition invasion in 2003. In 2006, President Bush named GEN David Petraeus to head military operations in Iraq and authorized a “surge” of 30,000 additional combat troops to implement the Army’s new counterinsurgency strategy that Petraeus had just overseen at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Petraeus was a student of the Vietnam War, and he set about to implement the positive lessons learned from that conflict. Just like Abrams before him, he developed a strong, personal, and professional relationship with the U.S. Ambassador, Ryan Crocker. The two even shared an office suite so their efforts could be more synchronized. Petraeus then ordered the combat units in Iraq to shift their focus from training Iraqi security forces to security of the local population. This led to the establishment of platoon-level combat outposts, manned jointly with Iraqi security forces, which greatly improved the security situation, especially in Baghdad Province, from 2007 to 2008. Additionally, Petraeus and Crocker were able to implement their own “one-war” effort by synchronizing U.S. military efforts with that of nongovernmental agencies working to provide support to the government of Iraq. It gave additional time as well to adequately train Iraqi forces with American advisors. This proved crucial to maintaining the stability of the Iraqi government as U.S. forces began to draw down in 2009 and 2010.

The efforts of Abrams in Vietnam proved to be too little too

With the closure of the American experience in Iraq, our Army will once again be tested on whether we can maintain that hard-won institutional knowledge or be forced to relearn what our forbearers have already provided us in the past. Modern military professionals who become leaders and planners for the next conflict would do well to search the past when conducting their mission analysis for the next mission.
late, and it is too early to tell if the current government now functioning in Iraq will continue to survive without the support of U.S. military forces. That, however, is not the key takeaway for current military professionals. Why did the U.S. Army forget its own institutional history when conducting the wars in Vietnam and Iraq when searching for answers to tactical problems?

In his 2009 book, *The Clausewitz Delusion*, Stephen L. Melton brings to life a little-remembered chapter in the history of the U.S. Army. The development of FM 27-5, *Basic Field Manual of Military Government*, in 1940 gave military professionals a ready guide to administer local government in occupied areas. World War II saw two revisions of this field manual and the training of thousands of military professionals dedicated to what is now called “civil-military operations” and support to local government. The end result of this effort would be successful occupations and the development of democratic governments in Germany and Japan.

Why was the institutional knowledge about unity of effort in combat and civil support operations lost just 20 years after World War II? Most likely, those who participated had been demobilized and were no longer in government or the military service. Both Westmoreland and Abrams served in combat units in World War II, not in civil affairs; however, Abrams was able to see the value of a “one-war” effort where civil support to government could be just as important as or more so than major combat operations. In Iraq, the specter of the American military experience in Vietnam kept the U.S. from looking to that conflict on how to address similar tactical problems in Iraq. Only students of that conflict, like GEN (Retired) David Petraeus and MG H.R. McMaster, seemed capable of creating that “reach back” to institutional knowledge to find potential answers to the tactical problems we faced in Iraq in 2004.

With the closure of the American experience in Iraq, our Army will once again be tested on whether we can maintain that hard-won institutional knowledge or be forced to relearn what our forbears have already provided us in the past. Modern military professionals who become leaders and planners for the next conflict would do well to search the past when conducting their mission analysis for the next mission.

**Notes**

3. Ibid, 503.

LTC Charles “Wes” Morrison currently serves as the commander of the 1st Battalion (Combined Arms), 120th Infantry, 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). He previously served as the executive officer for the Adjutant General of the North Carolina National Guard. In 2004, he commanded a Bradley rifle company in Iraq as a member of the 30th ABCT. In 2009, he served as the battalion executive officer for 1-120th Infantry, 30th ABCT, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mahmudiyah, Iraq. He holds a master’s degree in military studies from American Military University.

*Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, assemble on top of Hill 742, located five miles northeast of Dak To, Vietnam, in November 1967.*

U.S. Army photo
At the National Intelligence University, we conduct a one-year, graduate-level study program that develops expertise and in-depth knowledge in understanding and countering adversary denial and deception tactics, techniques, and procedures directed towards the U.S. Nothing is more important to countering foreign denial and deception than understanding the mind of our adversaries and even allies, who conduct deliberate attempts at deception. To penetrate the mind, one must cultivate empathy. To do this, one must read what our adversaries are reading and writing for their consumption. This requires careful examination of their narratives, histories, and perspectives from a non-Western point of view.

To this end, we are glad to count CDR Aboul-Enein as one of our speakers during the phase of our program that explores the Arab mind. He has been instrumental in teaching, speaking, and writing about the Middle East for years. His current project brings to life the memoirs of General Mohamed Fawzi to America’s military readers for the first time and is exactly what is needed to illicit thoughtful examination of non-Western viewpoints in order to cultivate the future generation of leaders. While this segment may not involve deliberate deception directly, it does explore General Fawzi’s mindset as he, and other senior Egyptian military leaders, dealt with the seemingly irrational decisions made by Field Marshal Abdel-Hakem Amer at a most critical point during the 1967 Six-Day War. However, beyond the devastating operational impacts the decisions had on the battlefield for the Egyptians, these events add perspective to how and foreshadow why the deep friendship between the president and strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Field Marshal Amer would lead others to betrayal, an attempted military coup, and ultimately, suicide. Infantry Magazine is to be commended for providing CDR Aboul-Enein a forum for his long-term project of bringing Arabic works of military significance to America’s military readership. I look forward to the discussion this series will generate, and more importantly, the learning that will take place in America’s military classrooms that choose to use this series to educate students on the Middle East generally and the Arab-Israeli Wars specifically.

— George Mitroka
Director of the Denial and Deception Advanced Studies Program, National Intelligence University

Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War was characterized on the battlefield by an inundation of disorganization and a lack of communication between the leadership and units in the field. Adding to the confusion was Field Marshal Abdel-Hakem Amer’s deteriorating mental state, which caused him to make questionable decisions, the most notable being the decision to rapidly withdraw from battle. The order to withdraw was given without clear parameters or instruction, causing scenes of chaos and uncertainty. However, what really stands out in reading General Mohamed Fawzi’s memoirs is the clash of two different types of military doctrine.

From the Egyptian perspective, the armed forces was designed primarily to preserve the 1952 Revolution, which meant that it focused more on internal dissension within the ranks and less on projecting military power. Since President Gamal Abdel Nasser attained power through a bloodless military coup, the Revolutionary Command Council would obsess about threats coming from within the military. The Israelis did not worry about military coups, and could therefore focus more clearly on defending Israel and projecting Israeli military power.

General Fawzi’s memoirs also reveal how a command structure collapses amidst an effective, modern, and rapid military onslaught. Readers of this segment will learn about Amer’s reaction and the crumbling of the Sinai front through lack of initiative and the inability to improvise without approval from higher authority. General Fawzi would carefully study the Six-Day War and use it as means to reconstruct the Egyptian armed forces for the next phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict — the War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

The Battles
Fawzi’s memoirs divulge conspiratorial narratives which need to be examined since he rose to command all of the Egyptian forces. His views should not be viewed as uncommon among Egypt’s officer corps. He writes that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informed Israel that Egypt had no offensive plans, or even counterstrike plans, which emboldened the Israelis to attack in 1967. Egyptian Vice President Zakariyah Mohheiddine’s planned visit to Washington, D.C., on 3 June 1967 at the invitation of President Johnson was a ruse that lulled Nasser into a false sense of security that the Israelis would not initiate hostilities.

At 1100 on 5 June 1967, five hours into the war, Fawzi was directed to call Syrian Chief of Staff Ahmed Suweidan to execute Plan Rasheed, an attack on Israel from Syria should Egypt be attacked first. The plan also reciprocated in case Syria was
attacked first. The Syrian general ignored Fawzi’s entreaties and placated him by saying, “We shall try, sir!” In Jordan, Egyptian General Abdel-Moneim Riad also requested Syrian intervention as part of the newly formed Arab Command, but he was ignored by Damascus as well.

One of the more descriptive aspects of Fawzi’s memoirs is the gradual decline in communications from the front. Field Marshal Amer and his war minister, Shams Badran, received panicked reports at their headquarters that steadily declined as Israeli air forces tore into Egyptian formations. Tuning into foreign broadcasts, Amer learned of the magnitude of losses, which triggered his nervous breakdown.

The battle began at 1450 on 5 June and ended at 2230 on 6 June. Although typically called the Six-Day War, the conflict was decided with the achievement of air dominance. First reports of an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) mechanized advance was at Khan Younis at 0900, with armor duels against the Egyptian 7th Infantry Division. At 1840 the IDF, using only 20 tanks and air support, isolated the 7th Division at Rafah. Umm Qatef was subdued by the Israelis in two days. The Egyptian 2nd Infantry Group repelled two Israeli attempts to take Quseimah. Fawzi wrote that Quseimah was only taken after Egyptians retreated from the town. He cited this and the Battle of Kunteila as examples of Egyptian arms holding their own despite a lack of air dominance. The Battle of Kunteila began at 0100 on 5 June with heavy Israeli saturation fire from mechanized artillery. The First Egyptian Artillery Division responded in kind and, according to Fawzi, the Egyptians gave chase to the Israeli harassing units. Fawzi admitted that this attack was a feint designed to occupy the First Egyptian Artillery Division while the main Israeli ground thrust attacked the main city of Arish. The Battle of Arish began at 1500 on 5 June and was met by the Egyptian 14th Armored Division reinforced with an infantry battalion. General Nasr al-Deeb was in command, and he attempted to close with the Israelis by using the Soviet-style tactic of hugging an enemy to negate superior air or artillery firepower. Al-Deeb radioed for Egyptian air support, which, unknown to him, was already wiped out. Fawzi noted that al-Deeb had briefed his sector prior to the start of the war and made an uncannily accurate prediction of how the Israelis would take Arish and Umm Qatef.

The Egyptian field headquarters in Sinai developed a plan involving the creation of a defensive line between Jebel Lebni and Bir Tamada, enabling the reinforcement of the defense of Kunteila. Simultaneously, a plan was developed to defend the Canal Zone by General Sadek Sharaf. The headquarters lacked reliable communications to transmit orders to the 1st Armored Division, the 113th Infantry Division, the 4th Armored Group, and the 6th Infantry Group. The 4th Armored Division received orders at 0740 on 7 June to defend the Giddi and Mitla Passes until an order to withdraw was issued. In the mind of General Salah Mohsen, the order meant there was no need to plan for a counterstrike and to limit his options to only defend or withdraw. As a result, the 2nd Armored Division fought Israeli units at the Giddi Pass, the 3rd Armored Division fought along the Ismailiyah Road, and the 6th Mechanized Division fought at the entrance to the Mitla Pass. Jordan and Syria finally began an air attack on Israel on 7 June, to which the Israelis responded with punishing attacks that decimated 80 percent of Jordan’s air force and 50 percent of Syria’s air force.

The Withdrawal
No issue is as controversial in modern Egyptian military history as to the details of how, when, and who gave the order to withdraw from the Sinai during the Six-Day War. Fawzi wrote that the first inkling to withdraw occurred at 0550 on 6 June. Amer sent a message from his command center in Cairo to the commander of combat forces in Sharm el-Sheikh to withdraw east of the Suez Canal. At noon on 6 June, he requested that Fawzi plan for a withdrawal and to do so in 20 minutes. Fawzi attempted to reason with Amer, but Amer’s mental state was not conducive to discussion or debate. Fawzi then summoned General Anwar al-Qadi, the operations
Chief, and General Tilhami, deputy of operations, to plan this impromptu order. They discussed the incredulity of the order; from their perspective, all forces — except for the Egyptian 7th Infantry Group — were holding their ground. Generals Fawzi, al-Qadi, and Tilhami attempted to brief Amer that a phased retreat to salvage as much men and equipment as possible would take four days. Amer cut off the briefier and in a raised voice said, “I’ve given the order already, four days and three nights, Fawzi!” Amer then went into his sleeping quarters and suffered a nervous breakdown in front of Fawzi and the two generals. After a few hours, Fawzi learned that Amer had ordered a withdrawal directly through Canal Command via Ismailiyah, ordering a retreat of forces from Arish with personal weapons only that was to be completed overnight. Fawzi and the general staff were stunned and silent, outraged at being cut out of such a significant order. More importantly, the order meant that the retreat would be a rout. The cascade effect of Amer’s order had only begun, and more Egyptians would die as a result of this uncoordinated and chaotic withdrawal.

The Arish commander abandoned his position based on Amer’s order without informing higher command in the Sinai. Fawzi wrote that Amer’s order defied every military convention and compromised the safety of soldiers in the field. Without orders, even in a withdrawal, pandemonium can set in, and in this case, thousands of tons of equipment were lost. Fawzi was concerned about friendly fire incidents with units stumbling on each other in retreat and firing on each other, or others thinking those retreating units were cowards and deserved to be shot, as not all units in the Sinai received Amer’s withdrawal order at the same time.

General Murtaji, Sinai front commander, was informed verbally of the order by a military policeman (MP). When Murtaji asked from where did such an order originate, the MP replied that it was from the field marshal. Astonishingly, Murtaji took this verbal order at face value and withdrew with his staff to Ismailiyah, instead of remaining at his post to command an orderly retreat. Murtaji did not bother to inform higher headquarters in Cairo, the general staff, or his field commanders in the Sinai of his withdrawal. General Salah Mohsen’s desire to create a shielding force for the retreating units was undermined by Amer’s order and the cascading effect that led to chaos on the battlefield. Fawzi detailed Amer’s erratic orders with this timeline:

- 1130 — Amer issues order to withdraw to a second defensive line in the Sinai.
- 1530 — Amer orders 4th Armored Division to counterstrike to lift the siege of Kuseimah.
- 1600 — Amer orders all forces to the west of the Suez Canal.
- 1630 — Amer orders Fawzi to layout a withdrawal plan in 20 minutes.

The erratic nature of his orders and his subversion of the chain of command in issuing his orders led field commanders to rely on MPs and military intelligence officers for orders. Rumor and confusion were the order of the day. Since commanders were not given a withdrawal point to muster, they relied on rumors, and thousands descended on barracks in Cairo, to Deservior on the canal, and even to the city of Ismailiyah. In one instance, an MP corporal was directing whole brigades and battalions along a road to Ismailiyah. A major arranged a flight for his unit’s administrative personnel from the Sinai to Cairo West Airbase, while the remainder of his unit scurried on the ground from the Sinai back towards the Suez Canal. A rumor to destroy airbases and equipment circulated, which Fawzi had to stop. In one evening, an estimated 120,000 troops stampeded towards the Suez Canal. Fawzi commented that it took one week — 7-14 June — for 100,000 Egyptian soldiers to make their way out of the Sinai, with thousands showing up at their homes and villages before reporting to their base.

While all of this pandemonium was taking place, Amer was in a state of nervous collapse. He was locked in his bedroom with his minister of war acting as his door guard, when these two men should have been giving orders. Shams Badran alternated between Amer’s bedroom and phone calls to Nasser, the Soviet ambassador, and the Soviet foreign minister. Amazingly, at this late stage and after issuing his chaotic order, he asked General al-Qadi, the operations chief, to take command of the 4th Armored Division and defend the Giddi and Mitla Passes. The Soviet military attaché was beside himself at Cairo headquarters because Egyptian units were ordered to retreat instead of standing and fighting. He finally yelled, “Why didn’t you just let the Egyptian combat units fight and demonstrate their valor!” Moscow could have replenished the air losses, and on 10 June, the fifth day of the war, 40 MiG fighters arrived via Algeria. They had been ready to be delivered to Cairo as early as 7 June.

Fawzi recounted how Nasser and Amer had an exchange early during the war, in which Nasser said, “you could’ve asked my opinion about a withdrawal, and now you ask my opinion about defending the passes??” Amer issued the withdrawal order on 6 June, which was followed by a formal message. On the morning of 7 June, Amer sent Fawzi on a fool’s errand to stop the withdrawal of the 4th Armored Division. He traveled from Cairo and arrived at the al-Gala’a military base in Ismailiyah only to find the entire Sinai field command there. Fawzi informed General Murtaji about Amer’s new orders regarding the 4th Armored Division, but Murtaji did not take these orders seriously and angrily said that with no air cover the entire Sinai would be lost. The war was lost in Murtaji’s mind even before it ended on 11 June. On his return back to Cairo, Fawzi wrote of seeing hundreds of new T-55 tanks being abandoned and their crews walking towards the canal. Fawzi came across General Emad Thabit, chief of armor administration, and pleaded with him to rescue the new tanks, but he was unsuccessful. Fawzi then attempted to get Egyptian artillery units to fire on and around the new tanks to keep them from falling intact into Israeli hands, but Egyptian crews were too afraid, telling Fawzi this would only attract Israeli air strikes.

To make matters worse, Egyptian combat engineers were given orders to destroy all canal crossings except one by 1300 hours on 7 June. When Fawzi returned to the operations center at Nasr City in Cairo, he found officers in a state of resignation, shock, and defeat. Amer’s order to withdraw all forces from the Sinai in one night deprived the Egyptian army of a chance to fight and defend the
It also led to chaos and the abandonment of thousands of tons of equipment. Under the watchful eye of Egyptian MPs and intelligence officers, engineers from Ismailiyah blew the last bridge over the canal on 8 June. They began to close the canal for international shipping by scuttling a dozen ships along the canal. It would not reopen for international shipping for another eight years. The closure of the canal would ultimately be devastating to Egypt’s economy and to global shipping in general, for ships now had to traverse around South Africa to reach European markets. Out of hundreds of tanks, Fawzi wrote that 47 reached the canal by diligent and disciplined crews but were left on the Sinai side of the canal because the bridges were being destroyed. Some tank crews bravely turned around and went back to use their tanks as transports for more troops. General Ahmed Ismail was assigned commander of the Eastern Zone on 11 June 1967, and, along with Fawzi, would have to pick up the pieces of the shattered Egyptian armed forces. Fawzi would now have to learn what went wrong and use these lessons to craft the rudiments of a massive offensive campaign that would become the seeds of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

Fawzi Assesses the Cost

Fawzi’s memoirs offer the first real calculus from an Egyptian perspective of the 1967 Six-Day War, and it is best to let his numbers speak for themselves:

**Personnel**
- Air Force: 4 percent
- Navy: No loss
- Army: 17 percent

**Equipment**
- Air Force: 85 percent
- Navy: No loss
- Army: 85 percent

**Breakdown of warplanes lost**
- Heavy bombers: 100 percent
- Light bombers: 100 percent
- Heavy and light jet fighters: 85 percent

Fawzi wrote that determining who was lost in the Sinai in 1967 was not easy, and some individuals designated missing were not determined as killed in action until 1971. Egypt worked via the Red Cross to attain Israeli cooperation in accounting for Egyptian war dead and missing. Fawzi estimated that 13,600 were killed and 3,799 taken prisoner, with 9,800 classified as missing in action until 1971 when they were designated killed in action. An armored group with 200 tanks had 12 tanks destroyed and 188 abandoned; only 6 percent stayed with their equipment and refused to give them up. Overall, the losses were devastating for Egyptian forces.

**Conclusion**

When assessing the causes leading up to Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, there are several regional, external, and internal issues, such as Field Marshal Amer’s erratic personality and quest for power. However, within the actual war itself, it is safe to say that a lack of communication and Amer’s sudden decision to withdraw troops within one day were significant factors in Egypt’s loss. Although Egypt was gravely unprepared to fight against Israel, the chance to defend itself was ultimately stripped by Amer’s abrupt withdrawal order, which led to even more destruction and chaos than the war itself. With all of the aforementioned factors leading up to the war and within the war, Egypt’s defeat seemed ordained.

CDR Yousef Aboul-Enein is author of Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat and Iraq in Turmoil: Historical Perspectives of Dr. Ali al-Wardi, from the Ottoman Empire to King Feisal, both with Naval Institute Press. CDR Aboul-Enein is adjunct Islamic studies chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and adjunct faculty for Middle East counter-terrorism analysis at the National Intelligence University. He wishes to thank the following libraries for assisting him and providing a quiet place to write this series: The National Defense University Library as well as the Army and Navy Club Library both in Washington, D.C., and the Blackwell Library at Salisbury University, Md. Finally, CDR Aboul-Enein thanks Dorothy Corley, who recently graduated with her bachelor’s degree in international relations from Boston University, for her edits and discussion that enhanced this work.
Undoubtedly like most history enthusiasts and Soldiers, I first heard of CSM Basil L. Plumley while reading the book We Were Soldiers…Once and Young, written by LTG (Retired) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway. Some may have first seen the movie starring Mel Gibson and Sam Elliot before exploring the book. While I was a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., LTG Moore visited the school and gave a briefing on his experience at Landing Zone (LZ) Xray in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam, the pivotal battle of 1965. The reputation of his briefing preceded it, and there was a tacit requirement to read the book before attending the briefing. While the briefing was typically reserved for upperclassmen about to choose their branch and post assignments, I was determined to attend as an underclassman. What I heard that evening made an enduring impression upon me. We Were Soldiers is undoubtedly a war story, but more so, it’s a human interest story. To the authors, the heroes are the Soldiers of modest backgrounds who served with courage and honor. LTG Moore’s briefing, to sum it in one word, was passionate. And his passion lay largely in sharing the story of what his troopers achieved in the juggernaut of the Vietnamese highlands in November 1965.

CSM Plumley was my single favorite character from the book. To a young cadet desiring to be an officer in the Infantry, he embodied the qualities of the ideal NCO: a sergeant who is experienced, tactically and technically skilled, candid, and absolutely tough as nails. There was no falter to his close-combat performance, no wavering of dedication to his troopers in the fight of their lives.

Though long-awaited, my first opportunity to meet CSM Plumley came entirely as a surprise. I was attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at the time filming of the movie “We Were Soldiers” was taking place at Fort Benning, Ga. Looking out the narrow prison-like window of my classroom one beautiful March day, I saw a great deal of commotion outside. My instructor informed us that MG John LeMoyne was hosting a ceremony for the movie cast and their real-life counterparts. I was less impressed in meeting Sam Elliot, Mel Gibson, and Barry Pepper as I was with meeting CSM Plumley.

To follow-up on this serendipitous event, I chose to take a bold course. At the conclusion of the ceremony, I rushed through the crowd to the VIP seating to meet CSM Plumley. Expecting to be dismissed by the veteran command sergeant major, I took a gamble to invite my living hero to dinner. To my delight, he freely accepted and wrote his phone number on the event bulletin. In short order, a friendship grew in which we shared many a dinner together. Each of my visits to Fort Benning and Columbus included a visit with the Plumleys. This typically centered on restaurant locations that included both a hearty steak (the CSM’s choice) and good sweet potatoes (the choice side dish of Mrs. Plumley). Dinner followed with dessert and coffee at the Plumley’s home. Now the Plumley home was a special abode; it included the plaques and mementos of a distinguished warrior. It was also the largest shrine to Elvis Presley outside of the gates of Graceland. Mrs. Plumley’s collection of Elvis plates, albums, magnets in the house, along with Elvis music on her iPhone were proof of this claim. The CSM was quite mum about the ever encroaching influence of Elvis in the home, but he seemed to counterbalance with an arsenal of guns and knives and gradually accepted his wife’s reverence for the man. After all, the King was once a fellow NCO who served honorably in the Army. Their choice of cars was also the source of some commotion and humor. The CSM kept Mrs. Plumley in stylish new Cadillac sedans, and the CSM had...
his distinctive pick-up truck. This truck was entirely unmistakable: its yellow paint was brighter than the sun, with a massive 1st Cavalry Division patch emblazoned upon the door panels. There was no mistaking when the Cavalry got there.

Mrs. Plumley’s passing in May of this year was a sorrowful loss. I have never known anyone more hospitable, kind, and entirely dedicated to the love and care of a spouse as Deurice Plumley. She also made the most delicious fruit cake and cream cheese pound cake known to mankind.

Throughout our gatherings, I reveled in CSM Plumley’s storytelling and was amazed by his impeccable memory for finite details of historic events. It surprised me at first that most of his stories were humorous anecdotes, rather than the “blood and guts” tales many listeners would expect to hear. One such story involved the death of a rival unit’s mascot. “Maggie the Mule” had made the arduous boat trip to Vietnam with her proud unit — the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Maggie’s wanderings around the Vietnam base camp got her caught outside the perimeter wire one night and shot by a trooper from the CSM’s own 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. When CSM Plumley asked the Soldier why he had shot Maggie, the trooper responded unwaveringly that Maggie failed to respond with the proper challenge and password! The CSM began each humorous story with his signature wry smile. Any story that told of a poor or self-serving leader usually included a hardened stare while he crossed his arms and told the tale. The malevolent actor of such a story would earn the title “sommab*tch” in West Virginia drawl, which was not a term of affection from the CSM.

He communicated no hostility to his former enemies of three wars and never failed to speak commendably of those who did their duty.

I was privileged to be a guest of the Plumleys at the 2011 LZ Xray 1-7 Cavalry reunion in Columbus. Both the CSM and Mrs. Plumley were so vibrant and boundless in energy. To their great credit, the Plumleys planned, organized, and executed the entire three-day reunion event for more than 175 participants. CSM Plumley went to great lengths to ensure rooms were reserved, signs were displayed, timelines were followed, dinners were arranged, and great quantities of beer were on hand. The feat of leading this carefully coordinated event would be impressive for any couple, yet alone one that had been married for 62 years. I spent most of the event seated between CSM and Mrs. Plumley. Mrs. Plumley graciously introduced me to the spouses and surviving family members of 1-7 Cavalry — wives, sons, daughters, and grandchildren who continue to honor the service of their beloved “Garry Owen” 1-7 Cavalry troopers. CSM Plumley shared stories of the men in the room. It was apparent that CSM Plumley was never a man who should be trifled with — he forgot nothing! He had tales of troopers losing their weapons, getting lost, or getting into other mischief. It was also evident by the warm handshakes, hugs, laughter and tearful individual gatherings between CSM Plumley and his aging troopers, that to these men, Basil Plumley was forever their command sergeant major. By the time the troopers of 1-7 Cavalry were acquainted with him prior to their Vietnam deployment, his personal bravery stemmed from an unquestionable trust in his own instincts, which guided him through the most harrowing combat engagements of World War II and Korea. LTG Moore and 1-7 Cavalry Soldiers in the crucible of the Ia Drang Valley was unparalleled. To an earlier generation, his service was akin to a Civil War veteran who fought with the bayonet at Gettysburg within the ranks of the famed 20th Maine Infantry under COL Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. He and LTG Moore were kindred spirits, the only boss he affectionately referred to as “The Old Man.” Although one was a ranking officer and the other a senior enlisted man, they viewed their roles as a partnership in the service of their Soldiers, coupled with a shared bond of trust, friendship, and GEN George S. Patton’s philosophy of “The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.”

CSM Plumley’s relationship with LTG Moore and 1-7 Cavalry was an impenetrable bond that held 1-7 Cavalry together when surrounded by the enemy in the Ia Drang Valley. CSM Plumley and his aging troopers, that CSIRO Chamberlain. He and LTG Moore were kindred spirits, the only boss he affectionately referred to as “The Old Man.” Although one was a ranking officer and the other a senior enlisted man, they viewed their roles as a partnership in the service of their Soldiers, coupled with a shared bond of trust, friendship, and GEN George S. Patton’s philosophy of “The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.” His kinship with LTG Moore was of epic proportions — two leaders who shared common values of selfless service and forged a visionary direction for their unit to follow. This direction blazed through testing the Army’s air assault doctrine in training and in combat operations, and continues to the enduring reverence 1-7 SGM Basil Plumley sits calmly behind the command post termite hill on 15 November 1965.
Cavalry la Drang veterans hold for this monumental command team. Any officer and senior enlisted Soldier team, from platoon leader and platoon sergeant on up, should examine the example of LTG Moore and CSM Plumley to shape their leadership style.

It was humbling to speak to someone who had not only lived through so much poignant American history, but to someone who made it. CSM Plumley’s heroism and exploits encompassed 32 years, from the fight for the liberation of Europe from the Nazi grip, to the frozen rice paddies of Korea, and the sweltering mountains and jungles of Vietnam. The timeless film “A Bridge Too Far,” depicts the story of the 1944 airborne Operation Market Garden into Holland … a young Sergeant Plumley was in that fight and was wounded in action. In a little known airborne operation, he jumped into combat in Munsan, Korea, in the winter of 1951 to surprise and repulse the overwhelming Chinese offensive. When a young African-American student named James Meredith fought for his right to attend college at Ole Miss in 1962, Plumley fought at his side to protect that right and was injured by a protestor’s brick in that effort.

As a mentor, CSM Plumley provided sage and timeless advice on the topics of combat leadership, tactical operations, leader training and development, and post-traumatic stress. He was giving of his time and freely shared the advice a new generation of Army leaders so desperately needed.

CSM Plumley was unquestionably devoted to the happiness of his wife and cherishing her memory. He was an especially loving father to his daughter Debra, grandfather to his late grandson Kenny, and to Carrie and Jeff, and great-grandfather to Carson and Jackson. Every Soldier throughout history struggles with his or her ability to balance the duties of Soldier with that of husband or wife, and parent. Despite long absences and sporadic communication from across the world, CSM Plumley’s love for his family has never been called to question.

In preparation for CSM Plumley’s funeral, my duty to the family was the preparation of his dress blue uniform for the visitation and funeral. It is a solemn honor that I hope I met with the impeccable standards of my distinguished mentor. There is a cherished story behind each medal, ribbon, badge and service stripe. They are interwoven with America’s story as a nation from a man cut from the same cloth as Old Glory. I have been proud to count CSM Basil Plumley and Mrs. Deurice Plumley as friends and am eternally grateful for knowing them. A plaque hanging in the Plumley’s dining room states, “CSM Basil L. Plumley: A Soldier’s Soldier: You turned a bunch of kids into men, made those men into great Soldiers, and marched them into the pages of history.” CSM Plumley is the man a Soldier should aspire to be, expect to be, and ought to be. Farewell and godspeed, command sergeant major. You have touched us with fire. We who have served and continue to serve in the armed forces are inspired by your example and hope that you count us worthy as brothers and sisters in arms.

---

MAJ Jim Crane is currently serving as a battalion S3 in the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Bastogne), Fort Campbell, Ky.
In 2011, the U.S. Army adopted a new doctrine — Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* — to ensure it is ready to defeat the contemporary threats faced by the United States in the 21st century. According to ADP 3-0, unified land operations describes how the “Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.” To achieve these end states, leaders must seek to achieve understanding of their operational environment.

While most leaders taking part in rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) believe they understand their operational environment, they typically are challenged in answering questions such as “why does the enemy have support in the area” or “why doesn’t the government operate here?” Operational environments are dynamic, resulting in unified land operations requiring leaders to conduct numerous missions simultaneously. Without a thorough understanding of their operating environment, units will continue to react to the enemy rather than identifying the factors which allow the enemy to operate in the area, limit government support, foster humanitarian disasters, etc.

While the doctrinal focus in unified land operations on the importance of understanding the operational environment is clear, what is not clear is how to gain and maintain an understanding. Although there are various tools which can help leaders understand their operational environment, JMRC has successfully used the interagency District Stability Framework (DSF) to train units to comprehend their operational environment.

*CPT Mark Crimaldi and 1LT Bryan Rodman of the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment discuss a mission while out on patrol during a Joint Multinational Readiness Center exercise on 15 October 2012.*

Photo by SSG Pablo N. Piedra
Doctrinal Focus

Unified land operations prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and/or create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. To accomplish these end states, leaders must understand the operational environment. As seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, simply killing or removing enemy combatants from the battlefield will not lead to success. Military units must understand their operational environment to identify and target the enemy’s support network. However, many commanders focus their training on gaining proficiency in core combat skills — shoot, move, and communicate — rather than training their formations to understand their operating environment. This is evident in rotational training objectives and execution by units at JMRC. Military units normally fill boxes in the operational and mission variable matrices (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information [PMESII] and civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [ASCOPE]), but fail to grasp the relevance to the population and operational environment. An effective understanding of the operational environment is based on a deep understanding of local conditions, grievances, norms, etc.

Understanding the local perspective comes from population surveys, key leader engagements, host country counterparts, and unified action partners and can help commanders understand “why” the enemy is in the area, “why” the government doesn’t have support, “why” locals aren’t solving their own problems, etc. Without investing time in collecting and analyzing this information, units tend to fall back on what they know best — taking the fight to the enemy. Taking the fight to the enemy without understanding the operational environment can destabilize the area or negate the activities of other unified action partners. A good example would be a unit partnering with local police who are corrupt and hated by the locals. In addition to lessening government support, this could increase support for malignant actors in the area. Only units that understand their operational environment and incorporate this understanding into their operations will be able to achieve mission end states.

Challenges to Understanding the Operational Environment

The conditions, circumstances, and influences which comprise the operational environment are dynamic and difficult to comprehend. This challenge is amplified by a lack of relevant education and training, inappropriate tools, and ineffective staff structures.

Lack of relevant education and training. According to the Correlates of War Project, only 17 percent of wars in the modern era have been conventional interstate conflicts. More importantly, the U.S. has been involved in a stability operation approximately every two years since 1990. These facts notwithstanding, professional military education at all levels continues to focus on the core combat skill of identifying, closing with, and defeating the enemy. The Army spends the majority of its time training in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle for conventional fights and applying conventional tools which omit key aspects of the operational environment.

The ramifications of this situation could be seen during a recent JMRC rotation. While the rotational unit (RTU) effectively defeated the conventional threat, it failed to negate the four other elements of the hybrid threat. The RTU did not invest the time and therefore struggled to understand its operational environment, which resulted in focusing combat power against the conventional threat and virtually ignoring other threats and, more importantly, the local population. Thus, while the RTU successfully defeated the conventional force, the host country government collapsed, the civil security decreased, infrastructure was destroyed, and insurgent elements were able to gain popular support and control of the provincial capital. In summary, the RTU had “tactical success,” but by not understanding the operational environment, the mission resulted in a strategic failure by not “creating the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”

Inappropriate tools. Most tools military units currently use to understand the operational environment are either enemy-centric, stove-piped, or focused on providing social services. The most common tools employed by units training at JMRC are intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), PMESII, ASCOPE, and SWEAT-MSO (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other) matrices. IPB primarily focuses on the enemy and physical terrain, minimizing the importance of the human terrain. The PMESII, ASCOPE, and SWEAT-MSO matrices not only look at variables from a U.S. point of view, they also lack an analytical section. In addition, these tools act as stovepipes, leading military units to focus on and prioritize irrelevant tasks. For example, units completing a SWEAT-MSO typically fill in the matrix without noting the relevance to the operational environment. Another problem with the matrices is they become measures of performance, and units focus their efforts on turning each box green by the end of their deployment. However, these projects can further destabilize an area as they might not increase support for the government or negate malignant actor influence. If a unit chooses to build schools to “turn the academic box green” in an area where schools aren’t needed or the population lacks the
capability and capacity to sustain them, the unit has not moved any closer to achieving its end states. These tools do not provide units a complete picture of the operational environment as seen at JMRC.

Figure 1 illustrates examples of products typically produced by rotational units training at JMRC. These products (area of operation [AO] overlay, pattern analysis, and high-value individual [HVI] target list) take information out of context and don’t give units an understanding of their operational environment and only focus on the enemy. In this example, the RTU focused on countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) rather than trying to find out why IEDs were emplaced there. Individually, these products don’t help units understand why the enemy has support and/or why the government does not. These traditional tools do not provide the local conditions, grievances, and norms required to understand the operational environment.

Ineffective staff structures. As David Kilcullen notes in his paper “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” a key to success is organizing for intelligence. Organizing for intelligence is critical to understanding the operational environment in order to conduct effective operations. At the tactical level, company intelligence support teams (CoIST) continue to be crucial for gathering intelligence to understand the operational environment. Squads and platoons have the most interaction with the local populace, which helps them understand the operational environment. Without the analysis of the CoIST, local perception data can overwhelm a unit as it tries to address local “wants.” In JMRC rotations, CoIST NCOICs often have a better understanding of the operational environment than the brigade commander. CoISTs are the crucial links and adjuncts to traditional staff structures in analyzing information and fostering a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. Their analysis helps commanders to better visualize the battlefield in order to decide where to allocate combat power and resources.

Understanding the Operational Environment

While doctrine emphasizes that understanding the operational environment is crucial to success, the process is not. Military units must have the appropriate tools, staff structures, and most importantly, the training to employ them effectively.

Appropriate Tools. Recognizing the need for a standardized, comprehensive methodology to foster effective civil-military integration, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Military Affairs, in collaboration with the Department of Defense, developed DSF. Combining USAID’s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) and incorporating military planning tools such as ASCOPE and PMEISII, the DSF provides a framework to help civilian and military personnel understand complex operating environments.

The DSF uses the following four “lenses” — operational, cultural, local perceptions, and the dynamics of stability and instability — to gain population-centric understanding of the operational environment.

The difference between the DSF and traditional tools is the latter focus either on identifying the “needs” of the population or on identifying the enemy. While these are elements of the operational environment, the tools are not focused on the operational environment in its entirety. The DSF gives practitioners an analytical process; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
Resiliencies | Events | Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions
---|---|---
What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined? | What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further reinforce stability? | Which individuals or institutions in the society are attempting to preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?

Grievances | Events | Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions
---|---|---
What issues or problems are the local populace concerned or upset about? Whom do they blame for these conditions, and how severe are they? | What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further reinforce stability? | Which individuals or institutions in the society are attempting to preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?

Figure 5 — Dynamics of Stability and Instability

Figure 6 — Company Staff Structure with a CoIST

McCollough, the battalion commander, noted, “This is something we had never thought about, as we considered phones to be a luxury. Without using DSF we would never have known about this concern, understood why it was a concern, or done anything about it.” DSF gives units the knowledge necessary to prioritize and target the end states outlined in unified land operations. However, to employ DSF or other methodological tools, units must be effectively structured.

Staff Structures. As previously noted, CoISTs are crucial components of an effective company headquarters. If companies are not provided personnel from their higher headquarters, they must staff the CoIST internally. CoIST members should be the best and brightest Soldiers in the company and be trained to collect and analyze operational environment information. To be effective, CoISTs must be properly resourced, trained to debrief patrols, and educated in analyzing information. The CoIST is “the brain” of the company, and CoIST Soldiers must possess the right skill sets, personality, and motivation to be effective in this position. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Figure 6 illustrates a way that a company can organize internally to staff a CoIST.

Education and Training. Previous JMRC rotations consisted of platoon and company situational training exercises (STX) that were firewallled from battalion and brigade operations. STX lanes amounted to 50 percent of the rotation and consisted of compartmented training that had no effect in changing the environment, which resulted in CoISTs and units failing to learn the importance of understanding their operational environment. To mitigate this, JMRC modified its rotational design to help RTUs understand their operational environment by removing the firewall between company STX and battalion and brigade command post exercise (CPX) operations. This fostered a dynamic environment by manipulating it based on RTU and
enemy actions. JMRC was able to accomplish this by conducting an internal program of instruction for observer/coach-trainers (O/C-Ts), which provided them with the knowledge and ability to manipulate and change the environment by working with role players to insert observables that the RTU could collect on and detect changes. O/C-Ts also received training on how to mentor and advise an RTU on understanding its operational environment through the application of effective and appropriate tools and staff structures. This was crucial.

As part of the leader training program, JMRC also conducted leader professional development seminars with the RTU on understanding the operational environment and provided CoIST training. During the first phase of the rotation, O/C-Ts replicating the outgoing unit provided the RTU an operations and intelligence brief as well as initial DSF products for the area of operations as part of a relief-in-place/transfer of authority. These products gave the RTU a baseline for understanding its operational environment and helped it successfully identify and prioritize targets in the area.

Compared to previous rotations, the RTU that conducted the modified rotational design produced products that fostered understanding of its operational environment (see Figure 7). The AO overlay, additional DSF products, and pattern analysis tools increased fidelity, which resulted in a comprehensive view of the operational environment. CoISTs were instrumental in collecting and analyzing the information from their area of operations. These products and tools move beyond identifying the “needs” of the population or identifying the enemy to understand the entire operational environment. The AO overlay includes key tribal information such as boundaries as well as important economic, religious, and government areas. The overlay helps increase units’ understanding by fostering questions such as “why” are there no IEDs emplaced in Tribe B’s land? Friendly pattern analysis, HVIs, and patterns of life are included as well as enemy pattern and HVI analysis. Focusing on friendly information helps units determine what is normal in their area and improves their understanding of the operational environment by increasing their ability to detect changes and determine “why” change is occurring. DSF provides a standardized, comprehensive methodology, and the four lenses provide the local perspective to understand complex operating environments. Once military units are appropriately structured and trained to employ effective tools, they will have the ability to truly understand the operational environment and thus be more effective in achieving mission end states.

**Summary**

Understanding the operational environment is the foundation for success in unified land operations. Military units must be able to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. To achieve these end states, understanding the operational environment is as important as mastery of the core combat skills. Without a thorough understanding of their operating environment, units will continue to react to the enemy rather than identifying the factors that allow the enemy to operate in the area. Using the process outlined above, JMRC successfully trained units to understand their operational environment. Units moved beyond reacting to the enemy by understanding their operational environment in identifying, prioritizing, and targeting factors giving the enemy support, resulting in fostering mission success and achieving mission end states.

**Notes**


---

**MAJ Kevin McCormick** is currently serving as the special troops battalion operations observer/coach-trainer (O/C-T), Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) Operations Group, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany. He previously served as the commander of the 509th Clearance Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. MAJ McCormick is a graduate of the Military Assistance Course, District Stability Framework Course, and NATO Counterinsurgency Train-the-Trainer. He has a bachelor’s degree in building construction management from Purdue University and a master’s degree in engineering management from Missouri University of Science and Technology.
LONG and loud beat the drums of war, but few ever hear the trumpets blare at the sound of an oncoming change of command inventory. There are no ribbons or glory to be found near an arms room inspection. Supply rooms are often reduced to “that place” you go to “get stuff.” Staff assistance visits and command inspection programs are dreaded, feared perhaps even more so than a particularly bad engagement against a hostile force. Excuses come in rapid-fire succession as it’s always some other person’s responsibility for property loss.

This article is, like its namesake (Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance), a short inquiry into the metaphysics of quality using the systems of combat readiness as its medium. This manifesto seeks to unpack the mechanics of command supply discipline and property accountability and eliminate the stigma many company commanders associate with these critical Army programs. Readiness lies at the heart of any company; standards in readiness must be enforced with quality controlled and assured by leaders, or the unit will need no enemy to bring it to its knees.

The Basics: Responsibility

In the Army, the property book is the basic record of assigning responsibility. According to Army Regulation (AR) 735-5, Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, there are five types of responsibility. They are:

- Command
- Supervisory
- Direct
- Custodial
- Personal

In short, AR 735-5 states that responsibility amounts to the “obligation of individuals to ensure that government property and funds entrusted to their possession, command, or supervision are properly used, cared for, and safeguarded.”

When you assume command, you are assuming responsibility for the unit, its personnel, weapons, vehicles, equipment, and in some cases, real property and facilities. By sub-hand receipting property to another, you are establishing a chain of responsibility, and this chain extends from you, the commander, through the platoon leader and all the way to the end user. The strength of this chain is determined by its weakest link — if you can’t spot the weakest link in your chain, it might just be you!

The Property Book

With its strange codes, acronyms, abbreviations, and landscaped format, a property book has left many a seasoned commander and his platoon leaders scratching their heads. What is a controlled inventory item code (CIIC)? Which items are sensitive and which are not? What’s the difference between a line item number (LIN) and a substitute line item number (SUBLIN)? Why do some identical end items appear on different LINs, some with SUBLINs, and others with different national stock numbers (NSNs) or different CIICs?

Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) is the non-classified Internet protocol (NIPR) property book management suite (https://pbuse.lee.army.mil). For the lay user, navigating the PBUSE site can be a bit tricky as it is quite technical and cumbersome in nature; still, the PBUSE manual can give anyone the ability to use the site with confidence — even in a single, rapid reading.

Appendix D of the PBUSE manual is an indispensable tool for commanders and platoon leaders as a primer to decipher the language of the property book and sub-hand receipts. Appendix D provides a quick reference guide to the codes, acronyms, and abbreviations found on your property book and sub-hand receipts.

Commanders will sign their property book prior to assuming command (after accounting for all property and ensuring all adjustments to their property book have been reconciled) and will validate it and its changes by signing it on a monthly basis. Reducing this to an annoying “check the block” exercise is a disservice to your sub-hand receipt holders and your

Types of Responsibility

Command Responsibility: The obligation of a commander to ensure that all government property within his command is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safeguarding of government property are provided.

Supervisory Responsibility: The obligation of a supervisor to ensure that all government property issued to or used by his subordinates is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safeguarding are provided.

Direct Responsibility: The obligation of a person to ensure that all government property for which he has receipted for, is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safeguarding are provided.

Custodial Responsibility: The obligation of an individual for property in storage awaiting issue or turn-in to exercise reasonable and prudent actions to properly care for, and ensure that proper custody and safeguarding of the property are provided.

Personal Responsibility: The obligation of a person to exercise reasonable and prudent actions to properly use, care for, and safeguard all government property in his physical possession with or without receipt.
End Items and Components

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines an end item (Class VII) as “a final combination of end products, component parts, and/or materials that is ready for its intended use, e.g., ship, tank, mobile machine shop, aircraft.”

End items are always nonexpendable and require accountability down to the user level, according to AR 710-2, Supply Policy below the National Level. You can use Appendix D of the PBUSE user’s manual to learn about accounting requirements codes (ARCs) so you know the difference between durable, expendable, and nonexpendable items.

For those unfamiliar with Army equipment, Army technical manuals (TMs/-10s) illuminate the components of end items (COEI) and basic initial issue (BII) using hand-drawn illustrations. In some cases, there may be an additional authorizations list (AAL) included as well. In most cases, the illustrations are not entirely helpful as they are vague, blurry, and imprecise. They will succeed at a minimum by providing a general idea of what you’re looking at or where you “might” find the component you’re looking for. In these cases, “good enough” is about as good as you’re going to get.

Even your car has components of end items and basic initial issue. Some items were meant to come with the vehicle and are required to put it into operation. Other items are unnecessary but considered part of the initial sale or transfer of the vehicle. You don’t necessarily need the vehicle jack to put the car into operation, but if you don’t have it, you’ll never be able to change a tire in the event of a blowout. Commanders must make decisions about which expendable components they are willing to carry as a shortage. Purchasing some equipment with taxpayer dollars is simply a waste of money. Commanders are not authorized nonexpendable shortages and don’t have the ability to order against nonexpendable shortages. This is a function of the property book officer (PBO). Commanders have a due obligation to report shortages of nonexpendable items. Do not conceal their loss for any reason whatsoever.

For property managers, it’s important to know that you’re signed for the end item and all of its associated components. The document of record is the component sub-hand receipt, where the end item itself is accounted along with all of its components on a single document. The sub-hand receipt itself does not include the components of the end item. If end items have serial numbered components, ensure that those serial numbers are annotated on the component sub-hand receipt.

As a best practice, treat all property as if it is nonexpendable, including its components and its basic initial issue.

Change of Command (CoC) Inventories

First, I will concede that a CoC amounts to much more than just inventories. The outgoing commander must ensure he effectively hands over responsibility for the company and all of its associated programs, missions, and responsibilities to the incoming commander as smoothly and seamlessly as possible. Broadly speaking, this means all aspects of unit readiness. For the purposes of this essay, however, I am focused only on that aspect of unit readiness that involves command supply discipline.

Long before you can ever find, fix, or finish your enemy, you will have to assume command of the company of Soldiers you plan on bringing to the fight. Before you assume command, there are a lot of tasks which need to occur to ensure continuity between commanders.

The CoC inventory is a forcing function and sets the tone for the remainder of your command. It is an incoming commander’s opportunity to yank the proverbial skeletons out of the closet and deal with the problems in a transparent, accountable manner. It is the outgoing commander’s opportunity to teach the incoming commander his lessons learned. The end of your time in command literally depends upon the beginning. A poor showing at the CoC inventory, and you will struggle throughout the remainder of your command. It is an incoming commander’s plan on bringing to the fight. Before you assume command, there are a lot of tasks which need to occur to ensure continuity between commanders.

The CoC inventory is a forcing function and sets the tone for the remainder of your command. It is an incoming commander’s opportunity to yank the proverbial skeletons out of the closet and deal with the problems in a transparent, accountable manner. It is the outgoing commander’s opportunity to teach the incoming commander his lessons learned. The end of your time in command literally depends upon the beginning. A poor showing at the CoC inventory, and you will struggle throughout the remainder of your command. It is an incoming commander’s plan on bringing to the fight. Before you assume command, there are a lot of tasks which need to occur to ensure continuity between commanders.

Your task is to inventory and account for all of your unit’s property. That includes end items and the end items’ associated BII, COEI, and in some cases AAL. You also need to validate that the equipment is functional. Despite being called an “inventory,” the CoC inventory is also an inspection of equipment serviceability and function. Further, you should use the CoC inventory to validate
that the equipment has been serviced in accordance with the prescribed maintenance schedule (-20 and -30 level services). This will require in-depth reviews of maintenance records and open job orders (O-26 report).

**Note:** Never rely upon your “knowledge” when conducting an inventory! Only inventory equipment with a TM and a component listing!

As a general rule, you must inventory all like items together at the same time. In practice, this is more efficient and prevents sub-hand receipt holders from pulling the wool over your eyes. This is much easier to accomplish in a garrison environment than in combat. Conflicting patrol schedules and competing demands for time and equipment often interfere with your ability to inventory like items together. Don’t accept these excuses; clearly establish your expectations and enforce the standard plainly and evenly. Any amount of equivocation will establish your reputation as inconsistent. With property there is no gray area. The equipment is either both present and serviceable or it is not, and someone must be held accountable for missing equipment. Damaged equipment needs to have a job order opened, or it is not, and someone must be held accountable for missing equipment. Damaged equipment needs to have a job order opened, and the CoC inventory is the perfect opportunity to accomplish this task.

The final result of your CoC inventory should give you a “zero balance” — that is to say that all your property should be properly accounted for, either with a financial liability investigation of property loss (FLIPL), statement of charges, or properly completed sub-hand receipts (with its associated components) down to the user level. Shortage annexes will be updated and initiated by the incoming commander, and your Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP) team should be prepared to start requisitioning to fill your required shortages.

To do this properly takes a skilled and dedicated team. The company executive officer (XO), supply sergeant, clerks, and both commanders must make this a top priority. It’s called “command supply discipline” for a reason — it only succeeds with emphasis from commanders and their respective teams.

**Taking the Next Steps in the CSDP Cycle**

The next step is to ensure that your CSDP team orders against your identified shortages and your unit starts receiving the ordered items. If this occurs correctly (orders received in the Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures [MILSTRIP] module of PBUSE), shortage annexes and component sub-hand receipts will be updated automatically. Once received, requisitioned items must be accounted for, secured, and maintained. Further received orders must be tracked, and the match rate (items ordered vs. items received) must be balanced. This monthly match-rate validation is more commonly called the “recon” and is a routine reconciliation between the supply support activity (SSA) and the unit to eliminate wanton pilfering of Army supplies and equipment.

Once items have been received to standard, they need to be issued correctly. Unit standard operating procedure (SOP) drives the issue process; however, it is fair to say that for Class II items a unit will simply use a ledger to account for issuance of typical office and cleaning supplies. With COEI and BII, however, the equipment must be issued on a DA Form 2062, Hand Receipt/Annex Number, for accountability and the associated end item’s component sub-hand receipt must be updated on the spot by the unit supply clerks.

Units need to routinely assess their performance. This assessment can be internal or external; internal assessments and evaluations involve the company commander, XO, and supply officer and amount to detailed inspections of the various steps of the CSDP cycle and unit SOP. These inspections serve as validation that the unit CSDP SOP actually performs as required and that all Army and higher commander intents are met.

This is where real “discipline” is required. It’s not easy to see this process through from inception to completion. If it were easy, anyone could do it. It all begins with your CoC inventory; enforce standards there, and every step thereafter will be considerably easier.

**Role of the Commodity Shop Officer (CSO)**

A second lieutenant, who in most cases has never been taught property accountability or command supply discipline, gets assigned the responsibility of being the officer-in-charge of the commodity shop. To excel, this lieutenant needs a clear, concise counseling from the company commander detailing specific duties, responsibilities, expectations, and standards. Who controls the commodity shop? What is the relationship between the CSO and the XO? How do you train and certify commodity shop officers? In practice, I have seen units employ a training checklist and certification program to train and certify all members of the CSDP team.

Put simply, when in charge, a CSO needs to take charge. No different than the platoon or section he is responsible for, a CSO must exercise responsibility for and authority over that activity he has been assigned to by their commander. A CSO liaises with agencies and activities outside of the organization on behalf of the unit supply sergeant when required; a commodity shop officer must also provide the benefit of leadership, analysis, quality control and assurance, and supervision to any activity.

**The Role of the XO**

During a meeting with company XOs, our battalion XO relayed a story of his time as a company executive officer. In his initial counseling, the company commander counseled him that his job as company XO was to “do everything that he (his commander) didn’t want to do, and all he (the commander) wanted to do was play video games.” While it was said tongue in cheek, it does foreshadow some of the responsibilities of the XO.

There are typically only a handful of XO positions within a given battalion. Given that there are more junior officers than “XO” positions, it is not possible for every officer to get an opportunity to learn the skills of the executive officer. This, in turn, leads to commanders who have never been responsible for anything more than a platoon’s worth of organizational equipment and have no
sense of perspective on the breadth and depth of responsibilities of an executive officer or a deployed company’s property book(s). I myself am guilty of never having served my time as an executive officer and can attest that I did not appreciate the position, having regarded it as akin to the bubonic plague. Having now been a commander of a few executive officers, I know that there is no other position that will better prepare you to be a commander and no more an indispensable position for a commander to fill with his absolute best junior officer. I would gladly go without a platoon leader as long as I had an XO worth their salt.

For want of experience, lack of confidence, or waning interest, too many commanders delegate complete responsibility for property management to their XOs, and these commanders do so at their own peril. Property management is a lesser of the myriad responsibilities of an XO. Providing oversight to the CSOs and to the NCOs and Soldiers performing these duties is another.

As second in command of the company, the executive officer is responsible for everything the commander is responsible for. This includes all aspects of unit readiness — maintenance, counseling, physical readiness training, and training management — all in addition to command supply discipline.

Commanders must resist the temptation to focus on the operational — whether that is training and training management or the actual planning and execution of combat operations — at the exclusion of their other command responsibilities. Absolving oneself from the responsibility of property management is akin to signing a blank check and walking away from it.

**Stewardship and Supply Economy**

Conservation of material, supplies, property, and resources is a shared responsibility of every member of a chain of command. While good stewardship should be the norm, considering the current state of the U.S. economy, it is that much more important for leaders to implement controls into their supply economy program. Translating this into practice is much easier than it sounds.

At the end of the day, your supply clerk can order up to 99 lines of expendable items (identified shortages or supplies) a day. Your platoons will order against their identified shortages by using the shortage annex (DA Form 2062) as their order form. The supply sergeant or clerk will order against these shortages in the MILSTRIP module in PBUSE. Leaders should identify those items (BII/C0E1/AAL) which simply are not required to put the end item into operation and amount to a waste of money. When identified by a sub-hand receipt holder, those items (BII/C0E1) not required to place an end item into operation should be placed onto a memorandum for record by the company commander and not ordered.

The process of identifying those items not to order should be accomplished during the CoC inventory. Should you be one of those poor souls who read this too late, well, don’t worry. As part of your CSDP, you can accomplish the same task simultaneously with your monthly 10-percent inventories. These inventories will also serve to validate the effort you put into your CoC inventories.

While I acknowledge that I risk coming across as condescending and insulting to my readers’ intelligence, I must address their discipline — you cannot have one without the other. Etiologically, leaders approach their duties with an almost romantic notion of their responsibilities. At the exclusion of other priorities, some leaders focus too heavily on only a few aspects of small unit leadership. They don’t give the full measure of their ability towards other equally important aspects of small unit readiness.

When problems with property arise, either because they are overwhelmed or intimidated by the systems and processes for maintaining, repairing, and ordering equipment, they are forced to rely on others to diagnose and resolve their problems. This inevitably results in serious and costly errors down the road.

By now, we have all heard the horror stories of a leader saddled with an enormous FLIPL or report of survey. In all likelihood, it will be a Soldier, NCO, or junior officer who is signed for and financially liable for the lost equipment. During the investigation, the first thing an investigating officer will likely hear is, “That’s the way I signed it for it” followed up closely with, “I didn’t know I had to account for the components.” “Nobody told me” are the worst words a leader can utter.

While I fear that I am likely coming across as patronizing, disdainful, or downright arrogant, what I am really trying to reinforce is that we, as leaders, must broaden our own horizons and step outside of our comfort zones to tackle these serious problems. I freely admit that as a platoon leader, I did not have any concept of, or appreciation for, command supply discipline. Regrettably, I was one of those maneuver platoon leaders who paid no mind to command supply discipline and frankly, I was downright lucky that I didn’t run into problems while I was in charge of that platoon. I am embarrassed to say that even to this day, I have no idea what kind of mess I left for my successors. I am glad to report that I did learn and made appropriate corrections as a company commander.

Tied inextricably to command supply discipline is the command maintenance program. While I won’t get into the details of command maintenance in this article, I will say that a large part of good stewardship and supply discipline is properly maintaining and servicing our equipment. Why go through all the effort to identify and order our shortages and then ensure they get distributed and accounted for only to let them fall into disrepair from a poor maintenance program? Simply put, maintenance (of all of our equipment) goes hand-in-hand with command supply discipline — you cannot have one without the other.

Navigating the myriad systems, programs, and cryptic codes of the supply and maintenance community isn’t easy. With some practice and study, anyone can learn the lingo and can then make well informed and timely decisions. Approach the “problem” with the mindset and minute attention to detail of an accountant and you’ll be just fine.

**All Units Will Lose and Break Equipment**

Given how frequently and how hard units train, eventually equipment will be lost or broken. My battalion commander would frequently remind his commanders that “all units lose and break equipment; good units know what they’ve lost or broken and then they do something about it.” With effective mechanisms in place, when equipment is
lost, a simple rational problem-solving approach will most often result in found equipment. Without mechanisms or systems in place, it will take enormous effort, luck, or an act of God to find the equipment.

What mechanisms am I referring to? Well, each month the commander is required to inspect and inventory (to the component level) 10 percent of his property book. Take this time to validate and update your maintenance service history, component listings, shortage annexes, and ensure that you have the most current TM. Additionally, each month the commander’s delegate (a sergeant first class or higher) will inventory 100 percent of the unit’s sensitive items (SII).

Another mechanism in support of command supply discipline is that sub-hand receipt holders should be inventorying 100 percent of their property each month to validate their component listing and to update and sign their sub-hand receipt and shortage annexes. Additionally, the commander should execute an arms room and supply room inspection at least once a month. I recommend doing this “at least once a month.” but in practice I found time to get into my arms room and supply room between two and three times a week each. You will be surprised what you learn in your commodity shops. Add to that the daily opening and closing “butt-count” conducted by your unit armorer and your twice daily “Green-2” report, and you will have an effective mechanism in place to rapidly identify lost equipment.

Immediately upon identification of lost equipment, a commander must initiate an informal inquiry into the nature of the loss. Notification to his battalion XO must occur immediately upon identification of lost equipment. If necessary, the commander can recall 100 percent of the company’s personnel to assist with the search for the lost equipment. Surging all the resources and manpower of his company to find a single piece of equipment sends a very clear message — lost equipment will simply not be tolerated.

When equipment is irretrievably lost or is negligently broken, leaders have to have that difficult discussion with the responsible individual(s). They are liable for the lost or broken equipment and must be held accountable. That means initiation of a statement of charges or a FLIPL. Leaders cannot selectively enforce the standards, particularly when it comes to financial liability. Otherwise, it will foment distrust, a culture of favoritism, and build expectations that negligence will simply be written off. That is irresponsible leadership. Of course, if the equipment was simply broken as a result of routine wear and tear or as a result of bona fide combat operations, then holding the individual financially liable is not the right avenue to pursue.

Earning your Evaluation

Twenty percent of an NCO’s evaluation is responsibility and accountability. For years I have seen this block “hand-waved” and filled with loads of unquantifiable, immaterial fluff — worthless words cluttering pristine white space. Your NCOs will be your sub-hand receipt holders. If a platoon leader properly sub-hand receipts the property to the user level, then NCOs become responsible for the property and its accountability and serviceability.

If a team leader or squad leader has Soldiers who habitually lose their equipment and the team leader doesn’t take any type of measures to prevent future loss, it should be reflected on that leader’s evaluation report. Of course, for the first or perhaps even second mistake, counseling and retraining are perhaps more useful tools. The squad leader who takes no action to counsel, mentor, or discipline that team leader should likewise see his inaction reflected in his report. This should continue up the chain of command to the company commander until all leaders in the unit know and routinely enforce the standard.

Naturally, this should be well documented and explained through the use of effective counseling, but frequently, I have seen junior leaders fail to maintain quality records of counseling on accountability problems and then inflate a responsibility and accountability evaluation because the leader failed to document routinely and maintain a quality records-keeping system.

The scope of their responsibility should no doubt be considered, but remember, their evaluation report is based not merely on the scope, but on their actions and contributions. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants bear the responsibility to counsel squad and team leaders on their responsibilities and how well (or poorly) they are executing those responsibilities. Remember — leaders are responsible for their unit’s actions as well as their own — good, bad, right, or wrong.

This applies to your junior officers as well. It will take the full measure of your chain of command AND your NCO support chain to effectively implement a CSDP. Again, they must be linked. If your junior officers do not, will not, or cannot meet these standards, they must be counseled. They must be trained and then they must be held accountable in the form of their evaluation report. Counseling is the “industry standard” for our profession...
in documenting performance. With rank comes responsibility. With responsibility comes the expectation that standards will be met.

**Even Our Enemies Practice Command Supply Discipline**

To think that our enemy is an ignorant belligerent is silly. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin are sophisticated, well-armed, and organized groups. They know, probably better than we do, that their lives, ideology, and their movement literally depend upon their equipment. Perusing through the Combating Terrorism Center’s many documents, one can find several references to unit readiness, including these:

* “Personal use of equipment that belongs to the cause of Jihad is strictly forbidden, and it is completely wrong.”
* “If a Mujahid is willing to transfer to another group for a good reason, he should then first get permission from his higher commander and return all Jihadi equipment assigned to him by his original team leader, and also return all those captured belongings from the enemy, since their ownership to the team was already established.”

Perhaps it’s not a fair comparison, but to some degree or another, our enemies are taking proactive measures to safeguard their equipment and ensure proper ownership. If AK47s and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) grew on trees, then this wouldn’t be an issue. It becomes a specified task (even for the Taliban) specifically because even they have encountered problems with property accountability!

**The Property Book Officer is NOT the Enemy!**

The property book officer (PBO) is a phenomenal resource available to commanders, XOs, and junior leaders. The PBO is a technical expert in property and property book management. He is an advocate for the commander and is a check on the commander and his XO. The PBO will ensure that the commander and his team are making sound decisions with regards to property. He provides quality assurance and quality control on administrative adjustment reports and assists with FLIPLs.

It has been my experience that PBOs know exactly what they are talking about. They know (very well) how to manage property and keep commanders out of trouble. They will also take the time to show you and teach you when you’re straying off the path. They’re not the enemy, so you shouldn’t treat them as such. I have seen a few of my peers fail to cultivate a positive working relationship with the PBO, and the adversarial nature of their interactions impeded quality management of their property.

**The Case Study**

As the then incoming commander of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, I had the opportunity to put all this rhetoric into practice. The outgoing commander and his team did a fantastic job building a solid foundation for unit readiness. The company XO had literally spent weeks preparing for the CoC, updating component listings, procuring TMVs, validating shortage annexes, identifying and ordering shortages, and resolving Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders alike were well prepared for the level of detail I inventoried (and inspected) because I had given them clear and concise expectations up front and provided them enough time to prepare themselves to meet that standard. The inventory wasn’t “flawless;” there were administrative adjustment reports (AARs) and found-on-installation (FOI) documents, but it was a necessary forcing function for the overall fitness of the unit.

B Company and its leaders did well throughout the next nine months at maintaining and accounting for its equipment. It wasn’t perfect or without its problems, but generally things progressed smoothly. At different times some equipment was lost and broken, but none of it irretrievably so. We always found what was lost, always repaired what was broken, and then took steps to learn from our mistakes and did our best to prevent it in the future.

Our deployed relief-in-place/transfer-of-authority (RIP/TOA) inventories in Afghanistan did not go as well. With the volume of sets, kits, and outfits (SKOs), commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, non-standard LINs, and rapid fielding equipment found in the theater-provided equipment (TPE), there was simply not a lot of literature (TMVs, operator manuals, etc.) available to complete the inventory to the standard I lay out in this article.

When I communicated my standards and expectations for layouts to the outgoing unit’s platoon leaders, inventories and inspections went exceptionally well. Because combat operations did not cease (nor should they have), I was not able to communicate this to the entire outgoing unit’s leaders in one single briefing. Thus, my standard was not well communicated, and leaders of the outgoing unit simply did not have enough time to prepare. This resulted in an inconsistent showing, but we remained patient and determined to press on. Eventually, the confusion was sorted out and expectations were met or surpassed. As another lesson to be learned, the unit we were replacing was well into their redeployment of Soldiers by the time my company arrived in theater, and many of their key leaders had already redeployed. In fact, their supply sergeant and supply clerk redeployed long before the property book was signed. This created other problems, as those that remained weren’t as familiar with the equipment or where it was located. Again, determination and patience from both units proved essential, and those frictions were sorted out.

**Remember — leaders are responsible for their unit’s actions as well as their own — good, bad, right, or wrong. This applies to your junior officers as well. It will take the full measure of your chain of command AND your NCO support chain to effectively implement a CSDP.**

Both units burned the candle at both ends to make up for lost time, researching each and every LIN and building individual folders those LINs in our TPE property book. (This was a task we had already completed in Baumholder — a planning mistake...
on our part found our hard work locked securely away in our sea movement container which didn’t arrive until months later!)

It should be mentioned for ANY leader who is to sign for property in theater that there is an increased risk for a deployed unit to “cross-contaminate” organizational and TPE. Take extra precautions to prevent any of your “ORG” equipment from being confused with TPE. That would be a painful mistake to have to fix.

As I prepared to leave command and move on to my battalion’s headquarters and headquarters company, I kept these hard-earned lessons close at hand and took every measure possible to set my successor up for a phenomenal command. Knowing how the end of one’s command depends upon the beginning, I spared no effort to ensure that the foundation provided to me was just as sound as the one I provided to my replacement. This standard was achieved and the credit due entirely to my company XO, arms, supply, and communications commodity shops, and the sub-hand receipt holders. In essence, it was a team effort which proved that with the proper emphasis, discipline, and diligence, a unit can both be combat ready and pass its inspections and inventories without problems.

We never once passed an inspection with flying colors, and we always found ourselves re-learning lessons we had learned earlier (never a good thing). Still, as a team, we ruthlessly pursued excellence and sought ways to enhance our systems and processes. At one point, we even painted Michigan “Go Blue” all over our arms room in a shameless attempt to score some brownie points with our battalion commander. Though it didn’t work, the Soldiers loved it, and it demonstrated the lengths we were willing to go to in attempting to build effective systems.

Most important, what I learned is that the unit’s CSDP is a commander’s program. If the commander is unfamiliar (or worse, unconcerned) with supply procedures, maintenance, and property accountability procedures, in all likelihood his organization is going to feed on that example and perpetuate it through the ranks.

The commander who makes informed decisions, consistently enforces standards, and conserves resources will likewise foster that mindset throughout the ranks. Command supply discipline and property accountability are the heartbeat of any company generally and an Infantry rifle company in particular. Without our weapons, we could not fight. Without our vehicles, we could not get to the fight. Without supplies, we could not survive the fight.

**Professional Military Education vs. On-the-Job Training**

One of the factors which contributes to a laissez-faire attitude towards command supply discipline and property accountability is the fact that our Army has completely failed to instill this in many of its NCO and officer education courses. Hand waves and pithy statements like, “you’ll learn this at your unit” need to be summarily dismissed. If we train leaders to blow over command supply discipline in our schools, then that’s exactly what we need to expect in the operational force. We need to maximize our available time and provide quality instruction at these schools. Anything less is worse than a waste of time and is a disservice to Soldiers and leaders who will end up paying for poor leadership and training down the road.

Most officers spend years in training before they become platoon leaders or company commanders. Command supply discipline needs to be taught pre-commissioning and reinforced at every step throughout an officer’s professional development. This can be accomplished at service academies and ROTC, Basic Officer Leadership Courses, and the Maneuver Captains Career Course.

Recalling the one-hour class I received at the career course, the silly online common core pilot program I had to take before going to the resident course did a better job teaching command supply discipline (though it still failed to accomplish its goals).

Having now bashed the efforts of professional military education (PME) to “teach” command supply discipline, I will offer a best practice technique which I personally observed and now recommend to units across the Army to adopt in lieu of any formal PME in CSD training program. Our battalion, recognizing that all of its experienced commanders and executive officers would be changing station shortly after our unit’s redeployment, made the prescient decision to resource a battalion leadership professional development (LPD) targeting the already identified future class of XO’s. Entitled “XO University,” this weeklong course put the future crop of XO’s through the supply, maintenance, and company readiness ringer. Subject matter was technical, theoretical, and practical and included courses in PBUSE, the Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW), Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA), command maintenance and preventive maintenance checks and services for vehicles, communication equipment, and weapons. It did not familiarize — it enriched.

On-the-job training (OJT) or experiential learning should serve only to reinforce the lessons learned in the classroom. It should be the application of theory and doctrine and the lessons learned on the job must be brought back to the classroom and distributed through our professional forums to infuse our organization with practical wisdom. The culture of “you’ll learn that at your unit” must be struck down immediately.

**Achieving Zen**

An age-old Army quip says that, “no combat ready unit ever passed inspection.” Perpetuating this myth is an Army culture which thinks that a unit at war doesn’t have time to practice command supply discipline. This is false and translates into poor performance in practice (in combat or in garrison) and it is this mindset (read excuse) which leaders cling to when they fail an inspection or lose accountability of their equipment. They rationalize their own failing by attributing it to someone else’s lack of appreciation for their “combat readiness” — as if combat fitness itself wasn’t inextricably tied to command supply discipline or other unit readiness programs. Worse, leaders find themselves footing
the bill for lost equipment at a CoC and truly have no idea how they wound up there.

As leaders, we must know and understand the mechanics of the programs we are responsible for. When it comes to command supply discipline, hope is not a strategy. Leaders must understand the inner workings of the systems they are stewards of. When leaders have a plan and have the discipline to build, maintain, and refine their systems, they will achieve peace of mind and the satisfaction of having built a unit that is actually combat ready.

When you can detach a platoon, section, squad, or team for a temporary or extended period of time and rest easy knowing that they can rapidly take with them the service and maintenance records of their equipment with all the documentation and records they need to immediately execute an inventory (TMs, component listings, shortage annexes) on arrival, you know you have an effective program.

Achieving “Zen” in command is much larger than having a smoothly functioning command supply discipline program. It transcends supply rooms, arms rooms, and rifle platoons. It is the product of a highly effective team, achieved only through the tireless efforts of everyone involved — some within your organization and some from without. Zen lies in not simply knowing the standard — it lies in understanding why the standard is in place, what mechanisms ensure the system works, and how these standards, processes, systems, and mechanisms enhance your unit’s readiness. To take the pulse of your CSDP, all you need to do is ask a Soldier if he has any confidence that he will receive the parts or equipment he needs if he puts them on order with supply. His simple answer will probably prove more insightful (and colorful) than anything found in this article.

While neither command supply discipline nor property accountability is the “I Ching” of counterinsurgency or conventional combat operations, understanding it will arm you with the knowledge you need to bring the full measure of your combat power to bear against those who would do us harm. If nothing else, it will frustrate you to no end, thereby arming you with a fighting heart!

Happy counting!

**End Notes**

1. Maintenance of equipment, weapons, and vehicles is a routine function of any company. Maintenance of equipment should not languish until a CoC inventory; however, this inventory offers an opportunity to identify any equipment NOT PREVIOUSLY identified for maintenance to be turned-in.

2. The Rules of Jihad established for Mujahideen by the Leadership of Afghanistan Islamic Emirates, Pushtu translation. Captured, translated document obtained from the Combatting Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program.

3. Ibid.

**CPT Christopher L. Mercado** is currently serving as the commander of D Company, 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga. He previously served as commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, in Baumholder, Germany. His other assignments include serving as commander of B Company, 2-18 Infantry (both in Baumholder and while deployed to Kunduz, Afghanistan); operations officer for the Panjshir Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan; a combat advisor for a military transition team in Baghdad; heavy weapons platoon leader and battalion mortar platoon leader with D Company and HHC, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colo.
At the brigade and battalion levels, our professional officers are often reluctant to invoke operational art, instead focusing mostly on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This is probably due to the term “operational art” containing the word “operational.” As battalions normally focus at the tactical level and brigades bridge the sometimes ill-defined demarcation between the tactical and operational levels of war, the tendency has been to err on the side of the tactical level of war. As such, a battalion or brigade-level planner tends to focus on “getting after the enemy” rather than persevering through the seemingly vague and conceptual elements of operational art based on obscure, centuries-old German texts. The result of this current paradigm is that our junior officers never learn or value operational art until late in their careers, by which time they have developed habits that are less analytical and more anecdotal in their analysis and application.

This article attempts to introduce our captains and majors to the application of the operational art at the battalion and brigade levels by providing a simplified approach to linking center-of-gravity (CoG) analysis and identification of decisive points. Traditionally, Army units did not value CoG analysis or decisive-point identification at the brigade or battalion levels. Such analyses were handled at the division level or higher. It is correct that the traditional CoG analysis model is not very useful at the brigade or battalion levels due to their tightly focused mission span.

However, with brigades and battalions occupying large areas of operation (AO) with multiple and hybrid threats in the same AO, it is now necessary for the commanders and staffs to confront the challenges of planning and execution at the operational level. In fact, our Army has been doing this for a decade during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our brigade and battalion commanders are now operating in AOs that are sometimes larger than division and corps areas of operation from both world wars. As brigade and division AOs are tightly delineated, division and corps commanders are no longer maneuvering units outside of their internal boundaries, focusing on wide area security instead. This leaves the battalion commander and to a lesser degree, the brigade commander, as the main echelon at which combined arms maneuverers are planned and executed. It is time that we embrace the elements of operational art at the battalion and brigade levels to elevate the degree of professional domain knowledge application in our military decision-making process (MDMP) in support of our combined arms maneuver. By using the following methodology, units at the brigade and battalion levels can identify an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and focus on the linkages between them as the decisive point of the operations, thus allowing them to defeat the enemy at its most critical juncture while maintaining economy of force.

Definitions
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, defines operational art as the “application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.” It is important to note that operational art applies across the levels of war, not just at the operational level.

The new Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, uses a clearer definition of operational art, as “the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose… The effective arrangement of military conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.”

For the military professional, operational art is what historians may refer to as the art of war. Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Don Starry are some of the authors of many elements of the operational art. It is the essence of our professional domain knowledge. As the only profession in the world that finds it necessary to proclaim its professionalism to the rest of the world in a periodic fashion, it behooves us to master operational art.

Elements of Operational Art
The operational art of war contains many elements. Over the last several decades, the list of the elements of operational art has evolved within the U.S. Army. The phrase, “operational art” was first coined in 1986 in Field Manual 100-5, Operations.1 However, the ‘86 version did not identify the elements of operational art. Instead, it listed six key concepts of operational art. This list was expanded to eight elements of operational design in 1993. In 2011, we had 17 elements of operational design at the joint level (JP 3-0) and 11 elements of operational art in the latest edition of FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, The Operations Process. The new ADRP 3-0 contains “elements for operational design” for joint headquarters and “elements of operational art” for Army headquarters.2 But as seen in the JP definition, these elements integrate ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. To do that, the ends must first be defined, which is why this constitutes the first element of operational art. Once the ends are defined, ways and means follow. CoG analysis assists in the refining of the ends by precisely identifying the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the threat, allowing for better integration of means and ways to service the threat. So much so that JP 3-0 states, “the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a CoG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…”

Center of Gravity
If the identification of the correct CoG drives the entire operational art, the definition of center of gravity is crucial. The
**Figure 1 — Redefining the Elements of Operational Art**

JP definition for CoG needs revision to align with Dr. Joe Strange’s CoG analysis, which is currently taught at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and in other professional military education (PME) courses, and is used across the echelon in various headquarters. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines CoG as “those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.” Dr. Strange defines CoGs as “dynamic and powerful physical or moral agents of action or influence that possess certain characteristics and capabilities, and benefit from a given location or terrain.” Dr. Strange further refined Clausewitz’s center of gravity by adding the elements of critical capability (CC), critical resources (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV) for the CoG. Change 1 to JP 3-0 integrates Dr. Strange’s definition somewhat. It uses the CC, CR, and CV, calling them critical factors (CFs). A detailed explanation and doctrinal debate can be found online. This article will not restate Dr. Strange’s thesis, as his work, along with COL Dale C. Eikmeier’s clarification, as his work, along with COL Dale C. Eikmeier’s clarification, do not require further elaboration. As most Army formations use Dr. Strange’s method for CoG analysis, this article will utilize his definition and methodology to build upon current best practices, instead of going back to the drawing board for a conceptual debate of limited value.

**Decisive Points**

JP 3-0 defines a decisive point as “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them.” The second sentence of the definition neatly aligns with Dr. Strange’s definition of CoG, while creating conflict with the JP definition of CoG. Identification of the correct decisive point allows the commander to gain a marked advantage over the enemy, thus enabling him to seize and exploit the initiative and attain the end state.

**Current OE**

In the recent conflicts in the Middle East, U.S. forces have had to deal with multiple threat actors in their areas of operation. Less culturally aware units grouped these different actors into a single monolithic entity called the “insurgents,” fighting it out for 12-18 months at a time and providing impetus for the divergent sects and groups to unite against a common enemy. Other more culturally aware units recognized...
these divergent groups as being disparate, and dealt with each of them in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner, leveraging their critical vulnerabilities to our gain. As the Joint forces pivots our orientation towards the Pacific and East Asia, we face potential threats that are just as diverse, complex, and interconnected. As we increase our understanding of our next theater, we must adapt our CoG analysis to account for complex, interconnected actors. This article will attempt to formulate such a method.

Traditional CoG Analysis and its Limitations for Brigade and Below

Figure 2 is a diagram of the traditional CoG analysis applied in a fictitious scenario. It is quite simple: by identifying a threat entity as the CoG, and identifying its capabilities vis-à-vis U.S. forces, our allies, the civilians, and the terrain, we identify its critical resources. By following his resources and capabilities, we further identify his critical vulnerability, which in turn translates into targets for lines of operation or lines of effort. A CoG has to pass the “does/uses” test formulated by COL Eikmeier. If a nominated CoG cannot perform the CCs and use CRs, it cannot be the CoG. These analyses are conducted at the division level or higher by School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)-educated planners and are passed down to brigades and battalions to service the targets. However, in many cases, the brigades and battalions have more situational awareness and understanding to conduct a true CoG analysis in their sector. What is missing is the ability to collate all of the CoGs together to identify high pay-off critical vulnerabilities.

Collation of CoGs and CVs Bring Out Decisive Points

Figure 3 shows an example of three divergent groups in a hypothetical area of operation and how one can identify a common thread among the critical vulnerabilities of the three disparate groups in an AO, allowing the coalition forces to maximize their combat effectiveness while using limited resources.

This method requires a unit to accurately and realistically analyze its AO. The use of the official storyboards sent up to higher, to bolster the party line that our proxy government in the AO is ever-increasing its area of influence and control against the nebulously defined “insurgency,” will not allow this type of analysis. We will have to more closely assess the nature of the threat in the AO to correctly identify the numerous disparate and competing groups in the AO. By collating the CoG analyses of these various groups, we may determine whether or not many of the groups share common critical vulnerabilities. These critical vulnerabilities common to multiple groups become our decisive points, and their interdiction or neutralization will give us a marked advantage against all of the diverse groups, disproportionate to the level of military resources applied.

Figure 3 — Combined Enemy Operational Vulnerabilities

* Fictitious entities: Any similarities to current or past entities are unintended and coincidental.
Linking CoGs to Decisive Points and Other Elements of Operational Art

Figure 4 highlights a method where you can actually align all of the threat groups, as well as neutral groups, and quickly visualize any common threads among their critical capabilities, resources, and vulnerabilities. In this specific example, one can see that in the Konar Province of Afghanistan, the foreign extremist organizations provided the resources needed by local militias to attack U.S. forces in their valleys. By occupying their valleys and preventing the locals from harvesting their timber, U.S. forces unwittingly galvanized the foreign groups and the local militia by providing the local tribes with a desire to fight the Americans, which the foreign fighter groups were delighted to resource.

This method collates the most important factors among the CCs, CRs, and CVs to accentuate the linkages among the various critical vulnerabilities. While abridging some of the critical factors, this presentation technique graphically illustrates the strong linkages between the diverse actors in a real-life area of operation. Significant to this analysis is that the threat lines of communication, rather than the local population, are identified as the decisive point.

Battalions and Brigades Must Practice Operational Art

Brigade and battalions do not create policy and strategy. Field grade officers are limited to trying to do the best in terms of operations and tactics within whatever strategic quandary they find their units in. By using this analysis, one can see that despite the unintended union between foreign groups and local militias, the critical vulnerabilities of these groups lay in the mountain passes used to supply ammunition, rockets, and weapons. Regardless of how effective these threat groups were in combat, none of the valley tribes in Konar possessed their own arms factory. Their weapons, parts, and ammunition were all brought on foot or carried by donkeys over several mountain passes, which are easily identifiable via overhead assets in the absence of perennial vegetation cover.

This methodology can be used to distill a potentially complex situation involving multiple threat groups in an area of operation to pinpoint a single or a group of several critical vulnerabilities for the enemy, further identifying them as decisive or key terrains during mission analysis of the MDMP. This ultimately allows U.S. forces to dominate the enemy with economy of force.

Conclusion

This article presents a TTP for brigades and battalion to use just two of the elements of operational art to help define the conditions at end state, operational approach, reach, simultaneity/depth, tempo, phasing, transition, and culmination. As CoG analysis helps define our threats and the strengths and weaknesses of our enemy, it actually drives the rest of the elements of the operational art. In effect, this TTP can assist a lower echelon commander and staff to integrate all of the elements of the operational art into his military decision-making process. By acknowledging and collating the reality of multiple hostile and neutral threats in the operational environment, a commander and his staff can identify the decisive points in the operation. This, in turn, will allow the unit to focus its limited resources in solving the right tactical problem sets instead of chasing after ultimately irrelevant accomplishments.

Notes

2 Doctrine 2015 separated our core field manuals into two separate documents, the Army doctrine publication, which only contains the broad summaries, and Army doctrine reference publications, which probably better replicate the original FMs.


MAJ Dave Park is a 1998 ROTC graduate of Georgetown University. A prior service infantryman, he has served in command and staff positions in the Infantry with the 2nd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division, with seven overseas tours (four combat tours). MAJ Park holds a bachelor’s degree in foreign service and master’s in national security studies from Georgetown University. He also earned a master’s in geopolitics from the Command and General Staff College. He has been previously published in Infantry Magazine and Military Review.
The U.S. Army Sniper School (USASS) is adapting to meet the needs of today’s force through the integration of new training methods, new technology, and a new weapons system, as well as the reintroduction of various fieldcraft subjects.

The sniper course has been five weeks long since the early 1990s. Since then, the Army adopted various weapons and technological solutions for snipers, but the course has remained the same length. Over time, various subjects fell by the wayside to make way for new weapons and technological solutions. In light of this, USASS will grow from five weeks to seven weeks in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. (See Figure 1 for the revised course calendar.)

The additional two weeks of instruction allow the school to bring back some of the topics that have been removed over the years, as well as implement training on all the weapons and equipment in the sniper’s arsenal. There are additional fieldcraft exercises to include tracking, counter-tracking, and SERE (survival, evasion, resistance, escape) skills, as well as an 80-hour field training exercise (FTX) involving multiple mission profiles and insertion methods. The FTX will be a culmination event that is graded using outcomes-based training and education concepts in order to ensure sniper graduates are ready to provide their units with the expected capabilities.

Until the school implements the seven-week program of instruction (POI) in FY 2014, the USASS cadre are on the forefront of implementing the 21st century Soldier competencies outlined in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2, Army Learning Methodology 2015. The changes to the sniper course address the larger needs of the Army to produce Soldiers that are agile, adaptive, and critical thinkers capable of rapid decision making under stressful conditions. Gone are the dogmatic, “lock step” record fires where the cadre dictate which engagement techniques the student must use. The students have the freedom to engage the target however they choose and are only graded on results. The target detection portion has been revamped to include more than just laying in the prone scanning for target indicators. It will include a moving patrol scenario.
and will eventually encompass many of the concepts taught in the Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT) course. ASAT is a battle-tested and scientifically validated training program that enhances Soldiers’ and leaders’ abilities to understand and interact in complex and dynamic human environments. ASAT focuses on the human behaviors present in all environments. It improves Soldiers’ observation and human behavior recognition and pattern analysis (HBPA) skills, thus enhancing their ability to identify at risk, dangerous persons and situations before a destructive event occurs (decision and sense making). ASAT teaches Soldiers to be skilled, deliberate observers of their surroundings; to be proactive, rather than reactive, to potential threats; and to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUNDAY</th>
<th>MONDAY</th>
<th>TUESDAY</th>
<th>WEDNESDAY</th>
<th>THURSDAY</th>
<th>FRIDAY</th>
<th>SATURDAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAY 0</td>
<td>DAY 1</td>
<td>DAY 2</td>
<td>DAY 3</td>
<td>DAY 4</td>
<td>DAY 5</td>
<td>DAY 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ATRRS formation</td>
<td>• ASAT</td>
<td>• ASAT</td>
<td>• ASAT</td>
<td>• PT</td>
<td>• PT</td>
<td>• PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Grouping exercise</td>
<td>• Fundamentals of recon</td>
<td>• Fundamentals of recon</td>
<td>• Fundamentals of recon</td>
<td>• Target detection/field sketch class</td>
<td>• Target detection/field sketch class</td>
<td>• Target detection/field sketch class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Welcome brief</td>
<td>• Select, construct, and occupy a rural hide</td>
<td>• Select, construct, and occupy a rural hide</td>
<td>• Select, construct, and occupy a rural hide</td>
<td>• Range estimation</td>
<td>• Range estimation</td>
<td>• Range estimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In-processing</td>
<td>• Basic map reading</td>
<td>• Basic map reading</td>
<td>• Basic map reading</td>
<td>• Target detection (PE1)</td>
<td>• Target detection (PE1)</td>
<td>• Target detection (PE1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equipment issue</td>
<td>• History of snipers</td>
<td>• History of snipers</td>
<td>• History of snipers</td>
<td>• Appearance of obj PE</td>
<td>• Appearance of obj PE</td>
<td>• Appearance of obj PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• History of snipers</td>
<td>• Ghillie suit const class</td>
<td>• Ghillie suit const class</td>
<td>• Ghillie suit const class</td>
<td>• Range estimation (PE1)</td>
<td>• Range estimation (PE1)</td>
<td>• Range estimation (PE1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ghillie suit maintenance</td>
<td>• Intro to M110 SWS</td>
<td>• Intro to M110 SWS</td>
<td>• Intro to M110 SWS</td>
<td>• Cadre-led stalk (PE1)</td>
<td>• Cadre-led stalk (PE1)</td>
<td>• Cadre-led stalk (PE1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intro to M110 SWS</td>
<td>• Camo and concealment class</td>
<td>• Camo and concealment class</td>
<td>• Camo and concealment class</td>
<td>• Ghillie wash</td>
<td>• Ghillie wash</td>
<td>• Ghillie wash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Camo and concealment class</td>
<td>• Snake class</td>
<td>• Snake class</td>
<td>• Snake class</td>
<td>• KIMS class (PE1)</td>
<td>• KIMS class (PE1)</td>
<td>• KIMS class (PE1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Snake class</td>
<td>• Stalk class</td>
<td>• Stalk class</td>
<td>• Stalk class</td>
<td>• Sniper seminar</td>
<td>• Sniper seminar</td>
<td>• Sniper seminar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1 — Sample Sniper School FY 14 POI Training Calendar Review**
use optics effectively to improve situational awareness and threat assessment.

Many of the course’s Powerpoint-heavy lectures have been replaced with hands-on practical exercises and cadre-to-student mentorship. The final shot exercise is much more comprehensive than ever before as well. During the new final shot exercise, students mount their optic, zero their optic, slip their rings, true their weapon system with the Advanced Ballistic Calculator (ABC), estimate range to the target, make a wind call, and engage the target.

All of these new course updates support the Soldier competencies in ALM 2015. In a learning environment that is founded on operationally relevant context, the cadre mentor and reinforce all of ALM’s competencies throughout the course, with the ultimate goal of producing innovative snipers capable of demonstrating critical-thinking skills and mission-focused initiative.

USASS has also considerably modernized its methods for both teaching ballistics and teaching sniper students how to arrive at a ballistic solution in combat. For years, snipers spent considerable time and resources gathering data on previous engagements or “DOPE” to account for minute differences in individual weapons, lots of ammunition, atmospheres, and shooter capabilities. Unless the sniper team had the opportunity to once again gather DOPE in the exact conditions they would engage the enemy, this DOPE card was just a best guess.

In today’s Sniper School, the ABC provides a very significant time- and resource-saving capability to arrive at an accurate DOPE card. Students receive their ABCs at the start of the course and begin using them as soon as they begin firing their weapons. The ABC uses a predictive algorithm that accounts for variables such as temperature, barometric pressure, altitude, etc. The sniper inputs all the variables into the ABC, and the ABC generates ballistic data for the sniper.

This first set of ballistic data, although very accurate, is still just a “best guess” as it does not account for minute differences in individual weapons or lots of ammunition. After inputting all the known variables into the ABC, the next step is to ensure that the ABC accounts for the differences in muzzle velocity for that particular rifle and lot of ammunition. This process is called “truing” and replaces hours of time spent in the prone gathering DOPE. When the sniper knows he will be operating under different conditions, he can use the ABC to create his field data cards vs. thumbing through pages and pages of paper data and applying outdated rules of thumb. It is important to note that at no time during Sniper School are students encouraged to pull out their ABC when the enemy appears. The ABC’s real value is in replacing precious range time and ammunition used to produce the sniper’s data card. The sniper team can now make their data card in one or two trips to the range and use their other ammunition and time to train on other skills.

There is an ABC authorized for every M110 semi-automatic sniper system (SASS) in the Army. (Units looking to determine the whereabouts of their authorized ABCs, should contact Marc Dalangin, the program director for the Advanced Sniper Accessory Kit at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.)

Sniper cadre also recently adopted more user-friendly and quick-to-use wind formulas than those taught for years, as well as methods of rapidly engaging multiple targets at multiple ranges using the graduations in the Sniper’s reticle on both the M110 and the XM2010. These methods are designed with the end user in mind, significantly cut down on complicated mathematics, and can be applied under conditions of stress very quickly.

Another major change affecting USASS and the force is the obsolescence of the M24 and its replacement with the M110. With the removal of the M24 from the sniper’s suite, USASS now trains the M110 as the primary sniper weapon system. The combination of increased training time on the M110, integration of the ABC, and higher quality instruction has resulted in the ending of some long-held assumptions about the M110, especially that it was only effective to 600 meters.

The XM2010 brings additional capabilities, such as increased range and terminal performance, through its .300 Winchester Magnum chambering, a detachable magazine, ability to be integrated with any accessories requiring Picatinny rail grabbers (night vision goggles and infrared devices), a collapsible chassis system that is adjustable to the sniper’s body size, a suppressor as a standard issue item, and a Leupold optic with H58 reticle.

The new day optic is a first focal plane design. This means that no matter what power the sniper has selected for a particular scenario, the reticle subtensions remain true. The current day optic on the M110 is a second focal plane design, which means the reticle subtensions change as the user zooms through the power range. Additionally, the windage and elevation controls on the XM2010 day optic are both calibrated in mils as opposed to the older day optics which had reticles calibrated in mils but knobs calibrated in minutes of
angle. The mil/mil design eliminates the requirement for a sniper to convert mils to minutes of angle in the middle of an engagement. The H-58 reticle found in the XM2010 day optic has a lot of advantages over the traditional reticles found on the M110. Although at first inspection many seasoned rifleman immediately say “that reticle is too complicated or too cluttered for me,” a bit of training will have most snipers see the utility in this reticle.

Through the integration of new training methodologies, new technology and new weapons systems, the U.S. Army Sniper School remains on the cutting edge of sniper training throughout the Department of Defense. For more information on the sniper course or any of the equipment discussed in this article, contact the USASS at (706) 544-6006.

CPT Daniel Wilcox is currently assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, Fort Benning, Ga. He previously served as commander of C Company, 2-29 Infantry. He is a 2005 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.

SFC (Retired) Joe Pisarcik is a former U.S. Army Sniper School senior instructor who is currently serving as a contracted POI instructional system specialist and part of the Army Learning Concept 2015 team, Course Management Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, states that curriculum, technology, and software must rapidly change to meet the needs of the modern learning environment. In an effort to adapt to the new learning model, the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Ga., was faced with the problems of changing its organizational behavior, fighting the iPhone culture, and getting the appropriate software to meet the course curriculum. Even with these major hurdles, MCCC sees value in implementing virtual and gaming simulations directly into the classroom to create decision exercises at the tactical level. Simulations provide students with another form of feedback on the outcomes of decisions in a fluid environment.

MCCC produces agile and adaptive leaders who are skilled in the art and science of mission command in the conduct of decisive action within current and anticipated operational environments. Students are prepared for the leadership, training, and administrative requirements needed for company command. Additionally, students receive training to execute the tactical planning responsibilities of battalion/brigade-level staff officers using the military decision-making process.

**Why Simulations Work: Exercising the Decision Framework**

Historically, students used paper maps and acetate to conduct the troop leading procedures (TLPs) for a company tactical problem. The student briefed a small group instructor (SGI) within a given amount of time, usually 60 minutes. The SGI then critiqued the student on the strengths and weaknesses of the operations order. By taking a student’s plan and placing him in charge of artificially intelligent units or other students, it forces the student commander to create and develop the situation. Instructors can observe and annotate the creation of favorable conditions on the battlefield in real time. Students then learn from analyzing each other and after action reviews (AARs). Were movement control and direct fire control graphics effective in the assault of the objective? Was the support-by-fire (SBF) element given enough maneuver space to affect the objective during the breach? These in-depth AAR conversations facilitate student visualization and learning in the small group setting.

In essence, simulation exercises create the environment where actions may be critiqued and lessons may be learned. The MCCC instructors now have the ability to critique how future company commanders capture, process, and ultimately act on data and information in real time. Additionally, the SGI can evaluate the
student’s ability to identify circumstances for actions to maintain momentum, conduct shaping actions that are proactive in influencing the battlefield outcomes, and what prudent actions should the student execute immediately.

Simulations provide an invaluable tool to instructors by allowing students to visualize complex terrain and tactical situations. The contemporary operating environment resulted in military units focusing on stability operations to ensure continued success in operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Proficiency in tasks such as the combined arms breach and a deliberate defense were regulated to a lower training priority. In an attempt to educate the next generation of Army leaders in these unpracticed tasks, MCCC instructors found simulations to be an irreplaceable tool to help students visualize the necessary synchronization and complexities of combined arms operations. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) linked to Fort Rucker’s Apache simulators allows students to conduct air mission briefs, TLPs, and engagement area development with actual AH-64 Apache pilots in aviation simulators. Programs such as Steel Beasts by eSim Games allow students to emplace obstacle plans, battle positions, and indirect fire plans within a short period of time after starting the scenario. The SGI and classmates can then watch their fellow students’ operations unfold and provide invaluable insight and tactical analysis.

**Challenges: Immersion vs. Ease of Use**

The largest challenge MCCC faces is the inconsistency when it comes to simulations in the classroom. Students will use Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) for their first module, followed by Steel Beasts or CCTT for the second and third, and VBS2 for the fourth. Students currently use Decisive Action for the first battalion module, followed by Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) for the second. For the stability module, students do a four-hour exercise in UrbanSim. The result is students spend an inordinate amount of time learning new systems instead of exercising decision making or critical thinking. On average, each student is given a 90-minute block of time to quickly familiarize himself with the software prior to execution. Although tutorials are assigned to students to learn controls, the students sacrifice study of them to spend time on academic assignments which count towards their grades. With the overwhelming majority of students exhibiting the instant technological mindset (i.e. short attention spans created by the iPhone culture), they quickly write off complex simulations with unintuitive interfaces and unresponsive artificial intelligence (AI).1 This decision hinders the spread of simulations as a training tool.

Another contributor to the student attitude towards any simulation is the atmosphere in which the simulation is conducted. All simulations exercises are followed up with a survey that analyzes the ease of use, interface, training value, and AI. Instructors and Sim Center staffs noted that student commanders who frame the simulation’s strengths and weaknesses, training objectives, and enforce standards and discipline have higher student ratings in the ease of use and training tool categories across the individual seminars. Student commanders must reinforce to fellow students that the simulation will be run in a professional manner similar to an actual field training exercise or combat operation. Positive comments and ratings on the survey were more likely to occur in individual seminars where the student commander, observed by the SGI, enforced a combat mentality. Examples include pre-combat inspections, communications check, readiness condition status, order of march, triggers, brevity on the radio, and reporting requirements.

The combat student mentality directly highlights the significant problem faced by the MCCC in introducing simulations. Any organization must select a simulation that fits the training objectives of the organization. When organizations attempt to make simulations go beyond the original scope, the result is often unstable simulations that reduce student learning flow and training value.2 The MCCC requires programs that are reliant upon AI to fill the roles of company level and below. This creates significant issues as the majority of simulations containing AI-driven platoons are in the constructive realm, such as JCATS and Decisive Action. In the case of CCTT, unmaneuverable AI units are tethered to human units. This is where the current programs of record at MCCC do not meet all of the training objectives of our course curriculum. Current programs have maneuver captains acting as fire team leaders or squad leaders. Running a company-level exercise requires a minimum of 17 to 18 students over command and control interfaces designed for platoon operations or below.

---

**Figure 1 — The Decision-Making Process**

*From Command and General Staff College, "Trident Valley PE, CGSC Term II - 2009/2010"*
Attempting to stretch VBS2 to the company command without Soldiers playing fire team leaders creates span of control, AI path-finding, and immersion difficulties. The result is students develop a lack of drive in continued training with the software. Student negative survey responses to VBS2 grouped strongly around the graphical user interface (GUI) and AI. Negative responses in AARs across a group of 600 students consistently stayed in the 66-70 percent for these two categories. Taking into account student abilities with simulations and SGI support, these responses indicate the functionality of VBS2 does not support company- to battalion-sized engagements where individual Soldiers are controlled by the software AI. Path-finding, react to contact, and general behavior of a squad controlled by one human in VBS2 results in flow breakdown and significant frustration for the user regardless of his ability to use the program.3

The ideal student runs a company-level operation. A student can enter his plan with an unlimited number of repetitions. This can be achieved with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software which is not yet certified for use on government computers.

Currently, the approval process for units to obtain COTS software to test against training objectives is cumbersome. Network Enterprise Command (NEC) is faced with the constant struggle of weighing security and training capabilities through simulations. Future leaders must assist unit training by efficiently streamlining the software development and approval process without sacrificing security.

Notes

CPT Edward R. Stoltenberg is a small group leader with the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. His previous assignments include serving as commander of C Troop and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and tank company executive officer and platoon leader with D Company, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Providence College and is working on a master’s degree in global business management from Georgia Tech.
Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Lester W. Grau.
Successful generals write military memoirs which deal with operations and strategy. Frontline Soldiers — sergeants and junior or field grade officers — rarely write memoirs, although they are the ones who bear the weight of tactical combat. There are some notable exceptions. Among the best are: Samuel Chamberlain, My Confession (U.S. dragoon, Mexican War); Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (German junior officer, World War I); Ernst Junger, Storm of Steel (German junior officer, World War I); Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier (German soldier, World War II); Gottlob Bittermann, In Deadly Combat, (German soldier, World War II); Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back, (U.S. Soldier, World War II); Dimitriy Loza, Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks (Soviet battalion commander, World War II); E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed (U.S. Marine, World War II); Charles B. MacDonald, Company Commander (junior officer, World War II); David Hartline, What a Soldier Gives, (U.S. Soldier, Vietnam); James R. McDonough, Platoon Leader (U.S. lieutenant, Vietnam); Avidgor Kahalani, The Heights of Courage (Israeli battalion commander, 1973 War); and David Bellavia, House to House (U.S. sergeant, Iraq). Antonio Salinas has just added his worthy contribution to this distinguished list.
As a lieutenant, Salinas led the 4th Platoon, D Company, 2nd of the 12th Infantry, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, in the Pech River Valley of Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in 2009-2010. He takes us through the metamorphosis of a young leader in combat in a heavily contested area. During his sojourn, he learns much about himself. He masters his fears and embraces the experience. He succumbs to the rush of combat. In the parlance, he becomes an adrenalin junkie. Men face direct combat danger differently. Some are never able to adapt and overcome their fears, experiencing withdrawal and breakdowns. Others accept it, but once it is past, it is past. Others draw strength, excitement, vigor, and meaning from the experience; they never forget it. They may not openly admit it, but it is a common occurrence that those who have not been in close combat do not understand. It is primal, but it is still very present despite all the efforts to socially redesign the modern man. Salinas takes a great deal of risk exposing his personal emotions and feelings on this topic. I thank him for his courage in stating an uncomfortable truth about our very nature.
This is a book about platoon combat in mountainous terrain and modern war fought in an ancient land by young Americans. It is a good look at leadership, the nature of small unit combat, relationships within units, and the hard, often unappreciated, work done by American Infantry Soldiers. Is it great literature? No. Very little published is. Is it important literature? You bet.

Reviewed by LTC Keith Everett.
The savage battle at the north-south gridline called 73 Easting is the location where American forces methodically, skillfully, and quickly destroyed the overwhelmed Iraqis in their defensive positions during Operation Desert Storm. Then-LTC Douglas Macgregor’s rage began to build as his Cougar squadron (the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment) was ordered to halt and break contact, a result of generals using only their conservative decision-making skills. The audacity lessons preached, praised, and taught at the combat schools of the U.S. Army since WWII and the success stories of generals like Patton were brushed aside, according to Macgregor’s analysis. It takes courage to take a bold stance and to exploit an apparent enemy weakness, as bold decisions can also backfire into defeat. Macgregor outlines some needed reforms to prepare America’s armed forces for future wars, which will require bold, audacious, and fiercely aggressive decisions to win.
Macgregor makes a strong, convincing argument that Operation Iraqi Freedom simply started where Desert Storm left off. He compares the ending of Desert Storm to the failure to completely close the Falaise Gap in WWII, allowing the Germans to survive to fight many more fights. Macgregor feels the failure to comprehensively defeat the Iraqi Republican Guard in Operation Desert Storm was the result of timid, non-visionary strategic leadership in that conflict. The embarrassing actions following Desert Storm included American abandonment of the Shiite Arabs and the Kurds resulting in the brutal massacre of scores of these people during an unsuccessful insurrection against Saddam. The failure to support the Kurds debacle is explored to a limited degree.
At the tactical level, Macgregor discusses the preference of maneuver formations in situations, and he also outlines other details such as making adjustments to carry three times the normal load of air filters to increase the capability of the Bradleys and tanks to sustain desert operations in the fine, thick dust and the use of a mess team radio net for communicating at the platoon leader level. Larger issues, such as a sloppy passage of lines by one of the brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, are chronicled with the division ignoring the marked lanes and guides, barreling through to
their advanced positions. Luckily, no one was killed although tank rounds were shot at a destroyed Bradley in the confusion. These details make this account of special value for combat commanders to read and understand, adding to their repertoire and reinforcing the old “keep-it-simple” idea.

Macgregor states that American forces suffered from “uninspired and timid leadership of American generals” because the Iraqi Republican Guard was not aggressively pursued and destroyed, resulting in survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime. History is the final judge of these things. The recent history of American forces going back into Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein is fairly convincing evidence that wrong decisions were made in stopping Operation Desert Storm too early. The Republican Guard, supplied with their Dunkirk by the slow-moving, timid GEN Frederick Franks and the decisions of Powell, Swartzkopf, and Bush to stop the war, allowed Saddam to keep killing and terrorizing his own people for more than a decade.

Macgregor finishes by talking of the failure of Army generals to create a joint command and control structure by the time Operation Anaconda began in Afghanistan. The fiasco of Anaconda was the result. Macgregor challenges all generals to “be serious students of their profession and of their enemies.” The continuing lack of an integrated joint system at the operational and tactical level is an indicator this is not done by many officers. Warrior’s Rage is a gift of guidance to the next generation of officers/students, helping prepare them to provide the bold, decisive leadership needed in combat. As such, it should be required reading at the tactical and operational levels of leadership at the very least.


Reviewed by Mark Thomas.

In a world of books in which the primary focus is tactics and strategy, Roger Reese gives us an in-depth look at the people who were actually fighting the war rather than purely focusing on the institutions that were involved. In Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II, Reese confronts the enigma of how the Soviet army still achieved victory against the German onslaught while having to deal with a plethora of factors that were working against them.

In the first two years of the war, not only did the Red Army take a high number of casualties and a massive number of captured/surrendered troops (approximately three million troops between June and December 1941), but they also had to deal with mass desertion, draft dodging, and self-inflicted wounds. The historical debate has to do with the amount of men that surrendered during the first six months of the war. Does this lead to a rejection of Stalinism and the Socialist state? Or does the fact that these people chose to fight in the first place show support of Stalinism? Reese’s work uses an immense amount of research, as well as convincing personal commentary from Russian veterans, to try and pinpoint the answer to the question that is in the title of the book: Why did Stalin’s soldiers fight?

Reese tries to break down all the factors that would motivate the Soldiers to fight. Many chose to fight in order to protect the rodina (Mother Russia), calling it the “great patriotic war;” some admitted that it was the fight for socialism against the ever-pressing capitalist Germany, while others just wanted to protect their families. There were also those who revealed that their motive was indeed to fight for Stalin. Reese evaluated each type of soldier by occupation, nationality (Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Caucasian soldiers also made up the Red Army), and overall status within Russian society and weighed accordingly how it translated into support or disdain for Stalin’s regime.

Reese also incorporates the Red Army’s brutal policies that were in practice on the home front and the battlefield in order to answer the question of why Stalin’s soldiers fought. This revolves primarily around the infamous Order No. 227, which is just one of many Soviet political blunders during the war. The regime was so oppressive on their troops that the order stated that any soldier who attempted to retreat would be shot and any officer who failed an objective would be tried in court and then ultimately executed. Battalions were formed and placed at the rear of the frontlines for the sole purpose of killing Russian troops attempting to retreat or desert. Back home, the families of Soldiers who were found guilty of cowardice were also punished with jail time. The order was an attempt to cease the mass desertions, retreats, and surrenders. While these numbers did decrease, it was not significant enough to say that the order made a difference.

While the Red Army was dealing with weak leadership, poorly trained and motivated soldiers, horrible planning and logistics, and mass political interference, Reese shows us how this leads to their overall military effectiveness in still finding victory. While he gives much insight and research on soldier’s motives throughout the conflict, he gives us many answers to his question that cannot be simply categorized as right or wrong. Surrender and desertion, as well as staying in the fight, cannot simply be summed up as either a show of support or an act of rejection for Stalin and his regime. Aside from his focus on motive, Reese also points out the mistakes made by leaders, both military and political, that can be learned through a study of history. This book contains a vast amount of information that still proves to be beneficial to this day.


Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

It has been decades since the conclusion of the Vietnam War. As the years have passed, the role of the U.S. Army junior officer (lieutenants and platoon leaders)
has come under increasing criticism. In fact, some would suggest it was the poor performance of the junior officer that was a major contributor to the ultimate outcome of the war. This opinion has been particularly swayed by two factors:

* The actions of LT William Calley on 16 March 1968 at My Lai; and
* The unflattering portrayal of junior officers throughout the media (including Hollywood).

One who has conducted significant study into the performance of the junior officer in the Vietnam War is Ron Milam. Milam has superbly packaged this research in his book, *Not a Gentlemen’s War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War*. Within its pages, readers will find a study meticulously researched, well-written, and filling an important void in the Vietnam War’s body of knowledge.

Milam is clearly well-equipped to dissect his subject matter. His credentials include firsthand knowledge of his subject and considerable academic experience tied to the area. He served as an advisor to Montagnard Forces in 1970-1971. Academically, he focused his doctoral dissertation on this topic. Additionally, he is currently an assistant professor of military history at Texas Tech University where he facilitates various classes on the Vietnam War.

As I began to read the volume, my initial concern was potential bias on Milam’s part. I thought perhaps that Milam’s political beliefs on the war (no matter where he stood) or his service in Vietnam could prejudice his study. As I progressed through the book, this concern quickly dissolved. I found the volume objectively written with no political overtones within its pages. There are instances where you sense the emotion in the words of Milam, but nothing that I would describe as influencing his findings.

Since this book originated from the aforementioned dissertation, it has an “academic” organizational feel to it. Many times, I find this transformation from dissertation to book does not work well for many authors and, consequently, readers. However, in the case of *Not a Gentlemen’s War*, I found this organization highly effective. Milam clearly establishes his thesis early on, focuses on this thesis throughout the volume, and lays out a structured approach to answering the thesis. This organizational structure makes the book extremely easy to follow and comprehend for any reader (no matter their previous experience with the particular subject or the Vietnam War in general).

One man and event infused throughout much of the book is William Calley and My Lai. Milam’s treatment of both is superb. The author’s purpose is not to go over the event in detail for his readers. He presumes readers have already established their thoughts and opinions on Calley and My Lai. What he does emphasize is the considerable influence the actions in My Lai had/have on people’s opinion on the junior officers serving in Vietnam.

I believe there is much value to *Not a Gentlemen’s War*. This worth lies in three key areas. First, it provides a perspective on the performance of junior officers many have not been exposed to. Second, Milam addresses many areas rarely found in books tied to the Vietnam War. These include the selection, training, and evaluation of junior officers and the training regimen for junior officers once they arrived in Vietnam. Finally, he adds an outstanding notes section and a historiographical essay (discussing prior books written on the Vietnam War) at the end of the volume. Both are superbly done and will provide readers with information they can utilize if they want to conduct further study on this subject or the Vietnam War.

Perhaps, the most appropriate way to conclude the review is to include a passage that highlights Milam’s writing style and summarizes his study’s conclusion. He states, “… the lieutenants who served in combat performed their duties with efficiency and aplomb, and the criticism afforded them after the war contrasted sharply with the reports and evaluations made during the war. The change in attitude coincides with the revelations of My Lai.”
INFANTRY Magazine Contact Information
E-mail — usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@mail.mil
Telephone — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951
Web site — https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine
(Will need common access card [CAC])

November-December 2012  INFANTRY  53
In the Next Issue:

* The TOW ITAS Collective Skills Trainer
* Delivering the Network to the Soldier
* Lessons from a Change of Command