Rally Point for Leaders: Building an Organization’s Mission Command Culture
(Page 20)

CATS Provides Training Assistance
(Page 36)
20 RALLY POINT FOR LEADERS: BUILDING AN ORGANIZATION’S MISSION COMMAND CULTURE
LTC Scott A. Shaw

26 AN AMBUSH IN SHIGAL DISTRICT: TACTICS AND TRIBAL DYNAMICS IN KUNAR PROVINCE
CPT Michael Kolton

1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE
2 INFANTRY NEWS
4 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
4 CAPSTONE: STRATEGIC LANDPOWER FOR THE COMPANY COMMANDER
GEN Robert W. Cone
CPT Jon D. Mohundro

7 HINDSIGHT: BROADENING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGING YOUR CAREER
MAJ Eric B. Alexander

9 COMMUNICATING AT HOME: THE RELEVANCY OF INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE GARRISON OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
MAJ James Pradke

12 AMERICA’S FIRST COMPANY COMMANDERS
LtCol (Retired) Patrick H. Hannum, USMC

36 TRAINING NOTES
36 CATS PROVIDES TRAINING ASSISTANCE
SGM Charles Covington

41 BRADLEY TRAINING AMMUNITION
SGM (Retired) Derek D. McCrea

42 A SUCCESS STORY: ENGINEER MASTER GUNNER INITIATIVE
SGM (Retired) Derek D. McCrea

43 JUNGLE RECONNAISSANCE AND THE PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC
1LT Matthew E. Miller

46 GFP ACCOUNTABILITY: THE UNKNOWN GORILLA—PART I
COL James Kennedy

49 TRAINING FOR THE NEXT CONFLICT
CPT Dan Krueger

52 BOOK REVIEWS

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INFANTRY TRAINING FOR TOMORROW’S CHALLENGES

We are a nation at war, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Our enemies have shown themselves to be innovative, totally committed, and implacable in their intent to target our interests at home and abroad. We cannot afford to lose the initiative in this fight, and that means we must build upon what we have learned even as we prepare to encounter an enemy with advanced weapons systems, technological upgrades, and changes to his tactics, techniques, and procedures that he hopes will reduce the advantages we can now claim. The Commandant’s Note in this issue, the last to appear in the print version of Infantry, will outline a few of those fundamental strengths that have long sustained our Army and which will remain relevant even as we exploit our future capabilities.

The enemy we faced in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations may have lacked the industrial base to develop and field his own advanced weapons and materiel, but he has been able to receive enough support from outside entities, covert state actors, and powerful non-state actors to present at least localized credible threats in the current operating environment. We can expect these sources of support to remain accessible to him as he struggles to execute the asymmetric warfare that characterizes the current conflict. He is an adaptive and determined enemy, and our most effective countermeasures to his acts of aggression are the close combat, fire, and maneuver that only a dismounted U.S. Infantry squad can deliver. The squad is the tip of the bayonet in the war on terrorism, for it is the squad that takes the fight to the enemy and grapples with him on his own turf, whether it is within diverse urban settings or on other complex terrain of the current operating environment. As our enemy seeks to further extend the battlefield into sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, or the Pacific Rim, we must be ready to meet his actions with credible, decisive force.

We recall Mao’s dictum alluding to the civilian population as the water in which the guerilla must swim to survive. Our current enemy has long regarded indigenous populations as an environment to be cultivated, exploited, and — where necessary — sacrificed in the pursuance of his objectives. His willingness to exercise the latter option has cost him the willing support of populations he once dominated. Over the past decade our Army has become increasingly adept at intercultural operations that have elicited the support of the people we are striving to liberate. Situational and cultural awareness training and a diverse array of cultural awareness initiatives from language instruction to crowd sourcing techniques have enabled our Soldiers to better read the environments in which they work and gain useful intelligence on likely enemy courses of action. These efforts have also enabled us to enhance the effectiveness of advisors and the training teams we deploy to train host nation forces who will one day assume responsibility for their own security. Successful advisors from T.E. Lawrence in Arabia during World War I to Special Forces and mobile advisory training units in Vietnam, as well as British, Australian, and other allies’ teams in African and Asian trouble spots have demonstrated how threatened nations’ own forces can be transformed to counter a communist or other localized threat to their stability.

Battles are fought and won by dismounted Infantry squads of technically and tactically proficient Soldiers, and the strength of our Army rests upon leaders who possess the initiative, skills, and vision to build those cohesive teams. The linchpin of this effort is clearly leader development. At the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) we are implementing an array of initiatives to train leaders, one of which is the consolidation of professional military education into the 199th Infantry Brigade. This brigade has become the Leader Development Brigade of three battalions and 13 companies. The brigade will offer a collaborative, interactive program with increased skill sets and leadership strategies. NCO, lieutenant, and captain professional military education will be combined under one brigade with exercises involving students from all three disciplines, and collaboration with other Centers of Excellence will encourage interaction that will yield even greater opportunity to share combat experience.

The inclusion of the decisive action training environment into our Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC) scenarios will aid the development of adaptive critical thinkers, and this initiative will be augmented by training links to language, regional expertise, and cultural understanding. Even as we implement these improvements, we will continue to increase the rigor in our courses by focusing on tough, realistic, relevant threats. Earlier instruction has relied on PowerPoint presentations, and the Advanced Soldier and Leader Training and Education methodology will replace those with the seminar environment of the adult learning model which increases dialogue between the student and instructor. Finally, integration of the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program will focus on strengthening the resilience of our leaders and family members. These proposed and ongoing initiatives will yield a quantum improvement in the readiness of the Infantry squad and the Army team that comprises Soldiers, their leaders, and our family members.

One force, one fight! Follow me!
SOLDIERS SHAPE NEXT GENERATION OF ARMY MC SYSTEM

NANCY JONES-BONBREST

While deployed to Iraq, SSG Scott Harrison relied on the Army’s chief situational awareness system to plot enemy holdouts, mark known improvised explosive devices, and exchange command and control messages with fellow Soldiers.

Now, his experience is helping shape the next generation of that system — the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P).

“I think it’s brilliant that they’re using Soldier feedback to develop JBC-P,” said Harrison, who is now assigned to the task analysis branch of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTH). “I like the idea of getting guys [who] have just deployed and experienced the previous system, and then picking their brains about what changes need to be made.”

Harrison provided feedback on JBC-P during a user jury held earlier this year by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager (TCM) for Brigade Combat Team Mission Command (BCT MC) at Fort Benning, Ga. The user jury was part of a series of similar events designed to ensure that the evolving capability builds on lessons learned from theater and meets the needs of a digital generation of Soldiers.

“You need the people who are actually going to be using the new capability to verify it,” said SSG Charles Marvel, who is assigned to the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. “We’re the ones with our feet on the ground and who see it every day and use it every day.”

Almost 90 Soldiers were polled throughout the three-day user jury. Soldiers used JBC-P in realistic scenarios to send text messages, place calls for medics, and plot enemy strongholds. They then provided feedback on aspects of the system, including user interface, screen size, and graphics.

“We stress quality feedback over quantity,” said Dan Dwyer, senior program integrator for TCM BCT MC. “By putting the systems in front of the warfighter before the capabilities are fielded, it allows us to make the necessary corrections so we ultimately deliver the very best product possible.”

By actively incorporating Soldier feedback, JBC-P, which is assigned to Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T), has evolved to include touch-to-zoom maps, a Google Earth-like interface, and drag-and-drop icons. JBC-P is the Army’s tool for brigade and below mobile mission command, situational awareness, and friendly force tracking, which gives Soldiers a complete picture of the battlefield so units can synchronize operations and reduce fratricide.

JBC-P is the Army’s next-generation upgrade to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking system, (FBCB2/BFT). Fielding now is Joint Capabilities Release (JCR), which provides a “bridge” between FBCB2 and JBC-P.

“Receiving feedback on JCR and now JBC-P has been a vital tool in ensuring it is easy for Soldiers to use,” said LTC Michael Olmstead, product manager for JBC-P. “Hearing from Soldiers who have used this capability on the battlefield has been invaluable in improving JBC-P and making it more intuitive.”

Slated for fielding later this fiscal year, JBC-P will continue to incorporate feedback from the user juries as well as from operational evaluations at the Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs).

“Because we have to strategically conduct these user juries in between NIEs, it allows us to get two different flavors of feedback on a frequent basis,” Dwyer said. “We work collectively to ensure that evolving systems such as JBC-P meet the warfighters’ needs by delivering integrated solutions toward the most critical gaps and then validating these capabilities and requirements with the user.”

(Nancy Jones-Bonbrest writes for PEO C3T)
On 16 October 2013, Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Raymond T. Odierno published his strategic priorities, which expressed his desire to "educate and develop all Soldiers and Civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment."

The Maneuver Leader Development Strategy supports this priority by reinforcing the synthesis of training, education, and experience in order to develop leaders with the skills, abilities, and attributes necessary to expand their capacities to learn. To support these priorities, the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) initiated efforts to provide Soldiers with college credit for successful completion of certain Army courses by beginning the American Council on Education (ACE) accreditation process. The following attempts to answer some of the questions Soldiers may have about ACE-accredited courses.

**Which courses are being examined for accreditation?**

College credit is only considered if the course taken meets the extensive requirements necessary to achieve accreditation. Some of the courses being examined for ACE accreditation include:

- 11B10-OSUT; Infantryman
- 11B10-OSUT (ST), Phase 1; Infantryman
- 11B10-OSUT (ST), Phase 2; Infantryman
- 11C10-OSUT; Indirect Fire Infantryman
- 11C10-OSUT (ST), Phase 1; Indirect Fire Infantryman
- 11C10-OSUT (ST), Phase 2; Indirect Fire Infantryman
- 010-11B30-C45; Infantryman Advanced Leader
  - 2E-S15W/011-ASISW; Jumpmaster
  - 2E-F201/010-F25; Mechanized Leader (M2A3)
  - 010-F24; Bradley Fighting Vehicle Master Gunner (M2A3)
  - 9E-F12/950-F8; Basic Army Combatives Instructor (Level III)
- 0-11/19-C46, Phase 1; Maneuver Senior Leader
- 0-11/19-C46 (11B), Phase 2; Maneuver Senior Leader (Infantryman)
- 0-11/19-C46 (11C), Phase 2; Maneuver Senior Leader (Indirect Fire Infantryman)
- 0-11/19-C46, Phase 1; Infantryman
- 0-11/19-C46, Phase 2; Infantryman
- 010-11B10 (R); Infantryman
- 010-11C10 (R); Indirect Fire Infantryman
- 010-11C30-C45; Indirect Fire Infantryman Advanced Leader
- 071-11C30-C45, Phase 2; Indirect Fire Infantryman Advanced Leader
- 071-11C30-C45, Phase 3; Indirect Fire Infantryman Advanced Leader
- 9E-F59/950-F38; Dismounted Counter-IED Tactics Master Trainer
- 9E-F57/920-F48; Advanced Situational Awareness-Basic (ASA-B)
- 9E-F56/920-F47; Advanced Situational Awareness-Advanced (ASA-A)
- 2E-S13X/010-F25; M2 BIFV/M3 CFV/M7 BFIST Leader
- 2E-F206/010/ASIB8; Heavy Weapons Leaders

**What does ACE accreditation mean to Soldiers?** ACE accreditation enables college students to earn credit for courses completed at higher education organizations, such as the USAIS. This means that Soldiers who are currently enrolled in a college or university could receive college credit when they successfully complete ACE-accredited Army courses.

**Which colleges and universities support the inclusion of ACE-accredited courses in their degree programs?** A list of these organizations can be found at: http://www2.acenet.edu/CREDITCollegeNetwork/Default.aspx?s=

**How will I know when the course has received ACE accreditation?**

Once a course receives ACE accreditation, it is listed online at http://www2.acenet.edu/credit?Fuseaction=browse.main.

**How many credit hours can I receive for each course?**

The number of credit hours awarded for successful completion of each course varies based upon the course itself and upon the procedures for transferring credits to your college or university. ACE provides credit recommendations for each course; however, institutions in the College and University Network are not required to accept the credit recommendations.

The Army is now issuing the more robust, more streamlined “Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK II)” as replacement for the older kit which was built inside an ammunition pouch for a Squad Automatic Weapon.

The IFAK II contains all the supplies of the old kit with the addition of a second tourniquet, a tactical combat casualty card to annotate what kind of first aid was applied to a wounded Soldier, a marker, an eye shield, a rubber seal with a valve for sucking chest wounds, and a strap cutter.

The kit fits inside a custom pouch that can be mounted out-of-the-way on the back of a Soldier’s Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV).

While the new first aid kit can be mounted on a Soldier’s back, it is designed to be easily accessible when needed for both right-handed and left-handed Soldiers.

The IFAK II can be removed from its container pouch from either side by pulling on one of two tabs and slipping it out of its case. The kit also comes with two removable tourniquet pouches that can be mounted to the kit, or to other parts of a Soldier’s gear.

Read more about the IFAK II at www.army.mil/article/116565/New_first_aid_kit_includes_eye_protection__strap_cutter/.

(C. Todd Lopez writes for the Army News Service.)
In Iraq and Afghanistan, a generation of officers grew up solving strategic dilemmas at the company and platoon levels. Well-versed in the requirements and responsibilities of an Army at war, this generation must guide the Army into an ever-evolving and uncertain future. In order to navigate through the complexities in front of us, the Army needs capable, adaptable leaders now more than ever who champion the Army’s strategic purpose and goals. With that, one of the most important discussions over the next few years will be how company commanders understand and implement the Army’s central role in strategic landpower.

Over the last two years, the Army has put a lot of great people to work examining every facet of our training, doctrine, and warfighting capability. We did not do this to examine where we stand today. Rather, all of this effort was aimed at figuring out two things: what kind of Army we will need to meet future challenges, and what we have to do to build that Army even as we continue fighting in Afghanistan and remain engaged throughout the world. Much of what we concluded is available in a single brief document — U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/wp525-3-0.pdf. If you have not read it yet, please do so.

We won’t summarize an already brief document in this article. Instead, we will discuss how the newest and most vital ideas relate to the execution level — the company. While things have been written about strategic maneuver, nothing has been written about its application at the tactical level. Although some ideas may be new, much of what must be done remains the same — training, standards, and understanding the human environment. This is a result of the unchanging character of the Army’s basic strategic problem and mission. As in prior eras, as part of the joint force, our Army must retain its ability to protect U.S. national interests, execute any mission assigned to us, and win on any battlefield around the world.

Given our national strategy, we are required to field an Army capable of waging war decisively. Fielding a ready and responsive
force with sufficient depth and resilience to wage sustained land combat is central to our mission, and that force must be able to conduct both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. A ready, robust, responsive force deters adversaries, reassures allies, and, when necessary, compels our enemies to change their behavior. Maintaining such a force requires high levels of adaptability throughout each echelon of the Army. Only Soldiers with tactical skill and operational flexibility can effectively respond to changing tactical situations in support of our nation’s strategic goals and interests.

This is where the company commanders fit into the concept of strategic landpower. Much like company-grade officers did in Iraq and Afghanistan, the company commander of the future must be mentally agile enough to thrive within the parameters of mission command. Developing leaders who can do so, while providing clear task and purpose to their subordinates, will be critical to the success of any mission across the range of military operations. Effective Army commanders, including those at the company level, do not use fiscal constraints as an excuse for failing to develop the best possible mix of training, equipment, and regional expertise they can within their formations. Rather, they motivate their people and guide their units in a way that makes optimal use of available resources to create adaptive, effective forces.

Our Army has three primary and interconnected roles: prevent conflict, shape the international environment, and win the nation’s wars. The company commander has important responsibilities in each of these.

Prevent Conflict

It is prudent here to define what a conflict is. Since the term gets thrown around a lot and attached to a lot of different situations, it is easy to misunderstand the doctrinal meaning. Conflict is an armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Irregular forces frequently make up the majority of enemy combatants we face now, and may continue to do so in the future. Conflict is often protracted, geographically confined, and constrained in the level of violence. Each one also holds the potential to escalate into major combat operations.

Many of the contingencies to which the United States responded militarily in the past 50 years have been appropriately defined as “conflicts.” The same can reasonably be expected in the future, but with the addition of cyberspace.

As was true during the Cold War, many of our greatest successes in the future will not occur on the battlefield; rather, maintaining peace may be our greatest achievement. This will be no easy task, as global tensions and instability increase in ungoverned or weakly-governed spaces around the world. History has taught us that without a capable, highly trained land force the United States has little influence in many of those spaces. That land force, our Army, must remain the best equipped, best trained, and most combat-ready force in the world if it is to have the strategic effect we seek. That readiness is built from the bottom up.

This is the first critical point where company commanders must help shape the future. As owners of the training schedule, commanders have the critical role in developing team, squad, and platoon skills. Commanders ensure that broadening training like language, geographical, and cultural familiarization is done effectively in a rigorous manner. Soldiers from the generation that fought in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be satisfied with training focused on artificial scenarios and made-up adversaries, so their commanders need to be innovative about preparing well-coordinated, realistic training. Subordinates must be challenged, and they have to feel their challenges have a direct linkage to future operations. In order not to lose 12 years of combat-proven leader development, company grade officers must find a balance between building an Army prepared for the range of military operations and succumbing to pressure to “get back to the way it used to be.”

Unfortunately, possession of such a trained and ready force is useless if it cannot affect regions where trouble is brewing. As units reposition from overseas bases and return to the United States, it becomes more crucial than ever for the Army to adopt an expeditionary mindset and improve its expeditionary capability.

To do so the Army is aligning units to specific geographical regions and arranging them into scalable and tailored expeditionary force packages that meet the needs of the joint force commander across the range of military operations. In short, our Army will be better postured to generate strategic influence anywhere in the world, and as part of the joint force, deter aggression.

In this construct, company commanders must conduct operational environment training specific to their region. Becoming familiar with the people, cultures, and languages of the region in which one’s unit will operate is critical to the success of a CONUS-based Army. Conventional-force companies learned much over the past 12 years as they executed missions historically reserved for Special Forces. War is fundamentally a human endeavor, and understanding the people involved is critically important. Company commanders cannot now ignore the hard-won lessons of their predecessors by ignoring one of the Special Forces’ key tasks of understanding the operational environment. Those who meet this intent and enforce standards during this training will ensure we pay those lessons forward to the next generation.

Shape the Operational Environment

During peacetime, the Army is continuously engaged in shaping the global environment to promote stability and partnership capabilities. We do this for several reasons, the most important of which is maintaining peace in pursuance of American national security interests. Where conflict has already broken out, engagement helps keep it contained and may even lead to a peaceful resolution. By helping to build partner capacity and trust, forward-engaged Army units greatly add to regional and global stability. Moreover, by building strong relationships of mutual trust, we facilitate access and set the conditions for success in any future combined operation in a particular region or country.

But what are shaping operations, and how are they executed at the company level? Shaping operations are defined as those operations, occurring at any echelon, that create or preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Thus, engagement by regionally aligned forces positively shapes the environment in which the Army operates throughout the range of military operations. This aligns with the notion of the “strategic corporal,” which recognizes that in the information age the actions of individuals and small groups can have widespread impact well
beyond what was intended at the time. Every action has a reaction, and it is necessary for junior officers to be aware of the role their Soldiers and unit play in the overall strategic goals of our nation.

As part of regionally aligned shaping operations, the Army will employ a careful mix of rotational and forward-deployed forces, develop relationships with foreign militaries, and conduct recurring training exercises with foreign partners to demonstrate the nation’s enduring commitment to allies and friends. Where we share mutually beneficial interests with an ally, the Army enhances that partner’s self-defense capacity and improves its ability to serve as a capable member of a future military coalition. More capable allies generate a stabilizing influence in their region, and tend to reduce the need for American military interventions over time.

Shaping operations do not end with planned training engagements by forward deployed units. Other actions the units or even small groups of individual Soldiers take can have a shaping effect. Those actions will run the gamut from brigade- or division-sized assistance after a natural disaster to a single act of kindness to a foreign student in an Army school who later rises to high levels in his nation’s armed forces. Regardless of the specific activities that have a shaping effect we conduct, all should convey to our intended audiences the clear message that while we are committed that have a shaping effect we conduct, all should convey to our intended audiences the clear message that while we are committed to peace, our nation protects its friends and defends its interests.

Instilling this understanding among our Soldiers and junior NCOs to everyone is aware, we are facing austere times ahead. This will continue to be the case, and I thank you for your service and sacrifice as we move towards making the Army of 2020 and beyond the best in the world.

Win the Nation’s Wars

Despite our best efforts to shape a stable global environment and prevent conflict, violence is likely to remain endemic to the human condition. As it has been said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.” While we do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war, we must ensure there never will be a day when the U.S. Army is not ready to fight and win wars in defense of our nation.

What is a war? Historically, war has been defined as a conflict carried out by force of arms, either between nations or between parties within a nation. However, as we consider hostile acts in cyberspace, the definition of war and acts of war will continue to evolve. For example, large-scale cyber attacks against government operations or critical infrastructure — such as in the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict — can reasonably be considered acts of war. Leveraging the technological savvy of today’s Soldiers requires leaders with an engaged interest in their development. This will require junior leaders from the same generation who are as adept at leader development as they are technologically competent.

To defend our nation, the Army must maintain the capacity to conduct strategically decisive land operations anywhere in the world. Though we will always conduct such operations as part of a joint force, we also acknowledge that war is a clash of wills that requires the ethical application of violence to compel change in human behavior. Here, company commanders make a dramatic contribution to the application of strategic landpower by being tactically and technically proficient in the execution of combined arms maneuver and wide-area security. Without successful tactical execution, the best strategic concepts are doomed to failure.

The U.S. Army Capstone Concept lays out the details of what capabilities the Army must sustain as well as provides some guidance on how the force may be employed in the future. But it all boils down to one crucial point — an Army that cannot win on the battlefield is of little worth to the security of the nation. As everyone is aware, we are facing austere times ahead. This fiscal reality cannot be an excuse for not doing our duty or losing sight of our purpose. In the final analysis this country will one day — maybe soon — ask us to deploy to some distant land, close with and destroy an enemy, and then build a secure and lasting peace. Our Army is uniquely qualified to ensure the training necessary to make those things happen, thanks to the strength of our NCO Corps. Commanders must leverage the experience of their senior NCOs and find creative ways to properly train the fundamentals, despite resource constraints. We’ve successfully done it before in our Army, and we are counting on our young leaders to do it again.

**Conclusion**

It was often platoon and company leadership who took the lead solving strategic issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will continue to be platoon and company leaders who keep the Army the well-trained and globally responsive force our nation needs to deter our adversaries, protect our friends, and defeat our enemies in the 21st century. The U.S. Army must have company commanders who understand strategic landpower and their role in it. Seek out opportunities to ingrain your training events within the framework of strategic landpower. Write articles for your branch’s professional journal discussing the impacts of strategic landpower for your specialty. You can find the Strategic Landpower White Paper online at [http://www.arcic.army.mil/appDocuments/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf](http://www.arcic.army.mil/appDocuments/Strategic-Landpower-White-Paper-06MAY2013.pdf), and on company commander discussion forums. This paper is the primary reference for strategic landpower concepts and the one jointly approved by the Army Chief of Staff, the Marine Corps Commandant, and the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

It is the responsibility of senior Army leaders to set the conditions to make you, and our Army, successful. Your senior leaders appreciate what you do every day. These will be challenging but exciting times, and I thank you for your service and sacrifice as we move towards making the Army of 2020 and beyond the best in the world.

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**GEN Robert W. Cone** is the commanding general of TRADOC. His previous assignments include serving as commander of III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas, and deputy commanding general - operations for U.S. Forces-Iraq. GEN Cone graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned as an Armor officer in June 1979. His complete biography can be viewed at [http://www.tradoc.army.mil/Bio.htm](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/Bio.htm).

**CPT Jon D. Mohundro** is special assistant to the commanding general, TRADOC. His previous assignments include serving as commander of Company E, Forward Support Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; squadron S4, squadron assistant S3, and a troop executive officer with the 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood; and a platoon leader with the 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division.
HINDSIGHT: BROADENING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGING YOUR CAREER

MAJ ERIC B. ALEXANDER

Editor’s Note: The goal of this article is to provide rising company-grade leaders with information to encourage them to make knowledgeable choices about their assignments. These choices are critical following captain-level key developmental (KD) assignments. The author does not speak for the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) and has never worked at that organization. Furthermore, he is only providing a personal account of his particular experience for the benefit of junior officers.

One of GEN Raymond Odierno’s expectations for the future of Army leadership is “to develop bold, adaptive, and broadened leaders.” This broadening process begins sooner than most may think. Many young maneuver, fires, and effects (MFE) officers are unprepared for post-company command assignments. This is not the fault of HRC, but of the officers themselves. It is their job to manage their own careers. Do not confuse this with “careerism,” however. Careerism is just the opposite; it focuses on “gaming” the system to get what is wanted. Some of the Chief of Staff of Army’s (CSA) leadership criteria. Serving as company-grade officers in combat and wartime environments has created bold and unbecoming an officer. Career management is about adaptive planning for a flexible future and remaining on track to meet the person’s goals. Prudent officers have a plan and use that plan to manage uncertainty in the future. Officers should look at where they want to go, make a plan, and keep HRC informed as time passes. Career management is also about accepting deviations from the plan as conditions change. HRC is there to help, but officers must be responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen in their career.

Anecdotal evidence shows that many officers are unaware of “broadening opportunities” until they are too late to compete. I was one such officer who was fortunate enough to call HRC at the right time to compete successfully. My experiences participating in a broadening opportunity convinced me of the need to spread the word to fellow officers so they could benefit from my lessons learned.

A decade of conflict and operating in ambiguous environments with host nation and coalition partners has provided our Soldiers and leaders with many experiences that fit some of the Chief of Staff of the Army’s leadership criteria. Serving as company-grade officers in combat and wartime environments has created bold and adaptive leaders. These experiences will be invaluable to developing future leaders once deployments begin to dwindle, but that is a topic for another article. The Army offers many opportunities to develop the third criteria in the CSA’s vision of future Army leaders — “broadened.”

The Army has three general types of assignments: operational, developmental, and broadening. Examples of operational assignments are serving as platoon leaders and company commanders. Examples of developmental assignments are serving as company executive officers, specialty platoon leaders, staff assignments, etc. The third type the Army calls “broadening” opportunities. These opportunities expose officers to a variety of institutions, cultures, and perspectives that are outside traditional Army assignments. It is very easy for an MFE officer to abdicate career decisions in the early years of their service. There are many reasons for this. MFE officers may not know how long they want to stay in the Army; they may feel that they have very little input into their early career decisions; or they may be relying on the relatively fixed timeline for promotion and assignments for junior officers to make the decisions easy. On the other hand, many young MFE officers feel that operational and developmental assignments better prepare them for promotion and success, or they think they would enjoy operational assignments more and do not seek other opportunities. For these and many other reasons, it is easy for smart, motivated young officers to arrive at the end of their first KD assignment without a plan.

Following company command, the variety of options open to young MFE leaders widens rapidly. For those who have not been active in managing and planning their careers, it can be bewildering and surprising. The tendency is to avoid the discomfort of ambiguity and go with the path of least resistance. This does the Army and the officer a disservice because it suboptimizes personnel assignments. The best advice is for officers to contact their branch managers regularly. This avoids ambiguity. However, if officers are in frequent touch with their branch then they are already managing their careers. Some officers are unaware of the opportunities available following KD assignments because they do not know to ask or they are not looking far enough forward to ask branch the right questions. For officers to whom this is new information, there is a wealth of opportunities available following company command if they have the foresight to plan. Many of the branches provide a timeline that shows windows for broadening and developmental assignments. There are 15 different broadening opportunities alone on the HRC website. Each of these broadening opportunities selects multiple officers each year and is open to a range of year groups (YG). Additionally, these assignments are above and beyond other branch-specific opportunities or advanced civil schooling (ACS).

Officers should research broadening opportunities six to 12 months before they take company command or begin their first KD assignment. There is no clear next assignment following KD time. It is essential to be prepared before the KD time is complete or they will find themselves wherever the Army needs them. This may not be where they best serve the Army, where they would like to be located, or doing what they enjoy. First, it takes time to read and digest all the military personnel (MILPER) messages to find opportunities of interest. It is also critical to assess how the opportunities will affect family situations and career timelines. Depending on when company-grade KD time is completed, it may not be advisable to take certain broadening opportunities because it could prevent officers from being competitive for promotion by delaying field-grade KD assignments. Those opportunities also may not support the officer’s family balance. However, depending on the assignment, many broadening assignments provide an advanced
degree and support ample family time. In addition, they offer access to professors and key leaders that drive national and Army policy as well as set those officers’ files apart from their peers. Some of these experiences also truncate the time required to complete the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). All of these factors necessitate a discussion with the branch representative sooner rather than later.

If the timeline supports a desired broadening assignment, officers should examine eligibility requirements next. Each opportunity is unique in prerequisites for year group, grade point average, Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and more. The GRE requires substantial preparation. Furthermore, if the exam is taken in haste resulting in a low score, retesting may be an option, but the Educational Testing Service keeps GRE scores on file. So, even if a higher score is achieved on the retest, graduate schools receive all of the officer’s scores, which could affect acceptance. Therefore, officers need to make sure they identify if the GRE is required early enough to allow sufficient preparation time. Also, keep in mind that GRE results are only valid for five years from the test date. During this entire process, it is essential for officers to communicate with their branch representatives about their plans. HRC is a resource for officers to ensure they understand where they stand and what they need to do to compete for these opportunities.

Once officers decide to compete for one of these assignments, then they need to begin assembling their packets and submit them before the deadline in the MILPER message. This is more complicated than it sounds. First, the officer needs to see if any waivers are needed for the eligibility requirements. This can be a tedious process so the officer will need time to get the proper paperwork for submission. Second, many of these opportunities require multiple letters of recommendation usually from a colonel or above. This may even involve writing draft letters and submitting them to the recommender for refinement. This all takes time if the officer wants to receive the types of letters that are needed for selection. Next, the officer needs to work on any writing requirements for the application. Many of the opportunities require writing samples on various topics specified in the MILPER message. They are usually personal, and the word limit is low, requiring brevity. Writing about themselves makes many people uncomfortable and requires serious effort to produce a good product. I went through seven drafts each before submission of two 500-word essays. In addition to all of these requirements, the officer usually needs to provide official copies of undergraduate transcripts to include in the application packet. These take time to arrive so planning is critical. Finally, once a packet is submitted, it goes before a selection board. I have no knowledge of the HRC selection board process and therefore will not speculate.

I am currently in a broadening assignment and can attest to the need for thorough preparation. I scrambled to compile all the required inputs to meet the selection board deadlines. Despite the effort required, the rewards of the broadening assignment outweigh the work to obtain it. The ability to focus on our profession through the lens of an academic environment that is not part of the military education system is a very liberating feeling. Other unique points of view will challenge ideas and probe the deeper questions with fewer preconceptions. These academic opportunities synergize powerfully with the combat experiences that many officers have already obtained. Utilization in positions that leverage officers’ talents and expand their horizons follows the academic portion of the program. The most exciting part about most of these opportunities is that officers can return to operational assignments more recharged and competitive than ever.

Coming out of company command into a world of seemingly unlimited possibilities is daunting and overwhelming. MFE junior officer assignments are very linear and do not require significant officer involvement to remain on track. That allows many officers to neglect planning their careers because they can succeed early on without much management. The key is to have the foresight to think ahead so that when the time comes and the choices are much less clear officers are prepared to manage their careers. Broadening assignments are not the only opportunities after KD time and they may not be every officer’s idea of a desirable assignment. It is still important to look into these assignments to confirm or deny the preconceptions of desirability. It is also important to have multiple options available in both developmental and broadening opportunities in case officers are unable to pursue their preferred courses.

As leaders, officers need to do the research and invest in their careers, even if they are thinking about leaving the Army. The time will pass rapidly from lieutenant to captain, and before long the officer is looking at promotion to major. That is not the time to realize that career progression requires management. In hindsight, I was fortunate to have been able to take advantage of this opportunity. Reliance on “luck” rather than a conscious effort to plan to take advantage of the opportunities that the Army provides to its leaders is not a good course of action. Broadening assignments serve to benefit officers, but more importantly, they strengthen our Army for an uncertain future.

Notes

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Communicating at Home: The Relevancy of Inform and Influence Activities in the Garrison Operational Environment

MAJ JAMES PRADKE

Army doctrine, specifically Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, posits, “The Army profession is a calling for the professional American Soldier from which leaders inspire and influence others.” There exists a misperception in the garrison operational environment, however, that inspiration and influence responsibilities pertain only in deployed operational environments. This does not imply that inspirational leaders in garrison are not existent but that there exists, in contrast, little effort to understand and utilize legitimate influence activities to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to the garrison formation.

From training to discipline, the art of inspiration and ability to influence play an integral role in the daily activities of all military leaders. “Leadership is the process of influencing people...”1 The art of influence lies congruent with provisional responsibilities of purpose, direction, and motivation demanded of leaders to accomplish any given mission at any time.2 Considering influence as the ability to motivate and inspire, information delivered via expressed words and actions, demonstrating purpose and direction, forms the foundation upon which influence activities in a garrison environment gain effect.

The purpose of this article is to first define garrison inform and influence activities and thus create awareness for military professionals. Second, this article encourages leaders to hold information operations (IO) professionals accountable for the development of initiatives in support of leadership, embracing inform and influence activities as a means to inspire. Third, this article inspires IO professionals to consider the utilization of creative garrison inform and influence activities to positively influence Soldier actions otherwise contrary to the policies and decisions of brigade leadership.

Defining Garrison Inform and Influence Activities

Disappointingly, IO professionals throughout the garrison operational environment are misunderstood and underutilized. One challenge facing the IO community stems from within. By far, the IO professional’s misinterpretation of responsibilities within a garrison operational environment is the greatest detriment to success. The misinterpretation and lack of ability to communicate the IO professional’s contributions to a garrison staff, regardless of echelon, breeds confusion amongst leaders and results in a misappropriation of a key enabler. Skeptics within the IO force continue to question their existence as a critical component in the mission command warfighting function. There are those within the community who feel strongly that garrison IO professionals should perform additional staff responsibilities within the operations or fires staff function. There is a reason inform and influence activities serve a key role in mission command as a warfighting function. Within the organization, “inform and influence activities are the integration of designated information-related capabilities to synchronize themes, messages, and actions” with intent to inform and influence.3 This definition justifies garrison inform and influence activities as a mission-essential synchronized function.

The garrison operational environment is unfamiliar to those leaders who have found themselves in continuous rotations to deployed operational environments. Immediately upon return from deployment, many Soldiers found themselves being recycled in preparation for another rotation. According to a USA Today article on repeated troop deployment, 47 percent of the active duty deployed force experienced multiple deployments as of 2010.4 Understanding the garrison operational environment may prove challenging for a force transitioning from a rigorous deployment cycle to a more regular training and maintenance cycle. That said, today’s garrison operational environment consists of a constrained force of Soldiers and leaders struggling to adjust from high operational tempos with forgiving standards to regimented schedules with stricter policies of adherence.

The Garrison Operational Environment

Operational environments influence employment capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.5 Commonalities between a garrison operational environment and a deployed operational environment are the information environment (including cyberspace), physical areas, and relevant information systems. The nature and interaction of systems paired with an understanding and visualization of the environment will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts garrison operations.6

Not to be confused with the physical environment, the information environment consists of information and cognitive dimensions as well as varied locations and systems by which Soldiers within the organization receive and process information. The information environment may include dissemination of information via leadership throughout the formation, display boards, family readiness groups, social media, garrison and local cable television stations, post and local newspapers, and organizational activities, to name a few. The garrison information environment includes any facet of information dissemination that a commander may use to inform the organization.
Physical areas are those where Soldiers reside, train, operate, and socialize. These may include the favorite local hang out or bar, housing units, the Post Exchange, gyms, outdoor recreation facilities, the chapel, local shopping malls, motor pools, ranges, training areas, conference rooms, and more. Defined, the garrison physical area includes physical locations where leaders engage Soldiers with intent to inform, inspire, and influence.

Garrison operational environment systems consist of ways of delivery (ends = ways + means) regardless of desired end state. These are the systems leaders rely upon to inform, inspire, and influence. From unit Facebook pages to standard policy memorandums, from battalion commanders to squad leaders, the more efficient leaders are in using creative ways of information dissemination, the more effective they are in building initiatives which have impact and longstanding results. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, and direct in the garrison operational environment as they would in a deployed operational environment. Using the information environment, physical environment, and relevant information systems, commanders build initiatives to achieve outcomes (see Figure 1).

**Doctrine**

Contrary to what some in the IO professional community believe, current doctrine provides ample definition supporting garrison responsibilities of information operations to the lowest level. These responsibilities are not defined in FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*. FM 3-13 merely prescribes the function, tasks, and conduct of inform and influence activities within a given environment. Garrison inform and influence responsibilities are discussed in ADRP 6-22; ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*; arguably in ADRP 3-0; and inherently lie within any doctrine discussing leadership.

Inform and influence activities support a leader’s responsibility to influence and motivate people to “pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions.” It is important to note these responsibilities are relevant to the organization. Whether deployed or in garrison is inconsequential. The military professional who understands that inform and influence activities are a function of command support adopts the responsibilities of the commander as his own. Simply, the IO professional, regardless of environment, supports the commander’s initiative to “influence and motivate the formation to achieve goals, pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.”

ADRP 6-0 fails, somewhat, in defining the broader scope of responsibilities of an IO professional. ADRP 6-0 limits inform and influence activities to three primary functions: public affairs, military information support operations (MISO), and Soldier and leader engagement respectively. The challenge with this is the military community tends to embrace these three capabilities, along with FM 3-13, as the complete scope and function of the information operations professional. Leaders, in addition to those just mentioned, question the relevancy of inform and influence activities in a garrison environment arguing that functions performed by the S7/G7 in garrison are redundant to those already performed. The information operations professional is neither a public affairs officer nor do they conduct MISO. Deployed and in garrison, IO, public affairs, and MISO professionals provide partnered capabilities which nest within the overall initiatives of the commander. In garrison, the IO professional designs and coordinates large scale information initiatives utilizing multiple enablers to support a leader’s requirement to provide purpose, direction, and motivation. When in the absence of guidance, the IO professional is responsible to the commander and the initiatives inherent within the command.

IO professionals grow frustrated when efforts to establish garrison inform and influence activities are thwarted by those ignorant to the relevancy toward achieving leadership outcomes (healthy climates, fit units, engaged Soldiers and civilians, etc.).

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**Figure 1 — Underlying Logic of Army Leadership**
stronger families, sound decisions, expertly led organizations, and mission success). To achieve these outcomes, IO professionals must be persistent in defining the demographic of the organization, establishing the garrison inform and influence activities working group (G-IIAWG), and developing initiatives which support leadership efforts to achieve outcomes previously mentioned.

Overcoming Varied Demographics and Culture of the Unit

The understanding of organizational composition or demographics provides information necessary for shaping themes, messages, and talking points that adequately address command information initiatives. Brigade, division, and corps level organizations consist of varied subaudiences throughout. Thus, messages and talking points delivered via a single system may be better disseminated through multiple delivery systems each of which is designed to inform a specific audience. Consider the 2011 campaign, “The Army Profession.” A new private first class in the Army may define professionalism in a completely different manner than a veteran sergeant first class. Additionally, the manner in which they understand the Army’s definition of professionalism also differs. Drilling down even further, a married private first class may receive and define professionalism on a different level than a unmarried private first class. This isn’t to say one is more educated than the other. Simply stated, different demographic groups throughout organizations receive and understand information differently based on culture, upbringing, status, and experience. While there exist exceptions to the rule, messages designed for a specific demographic are better received than those delivered to broad audiences.

The Garrison IIAWG

The G-IIAWG is responsible for supporting a leader’s information end state by providing enabling capabilities which diversify ways of delivery through the use of varying agency means. The G-IIAWG embraces support agencies in garrison as partners whose interests align with leadership outcomes sought by commanders. For example, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) commander whose interest lies in improving the fitness and wellness of his unit may expect to see a working group with enablers and partners from the military family life consultants, the garrison wellness center, family advocacy, the unit surgeon, suicide prevention, the master fitness trainer, substance abuse prevention, county and state police, provost marshal, judge advocate general, public affairs, S3, chaplaincy, social services, and others. The coordination and integration of all activities related to unit fitness thus becomes the responsibility of the IO officer while execution of those activities remains the responsibility of those agencies. The working group meets regularly to measure the effectiveness of its performance on specific information initiatives. The commander relies on the working group, consisting of garrison and off-post agency experts, to provide ways and means to inspire and influence Soldiers to achieve improved individual and organizational levels of fitness.

Conclusion

To develop garrison initiatives aimed at organizational goals, IO professionals must take the time to understand leadership aims and objectives. The IO officer (along with the G-IIAWG) is capable of defining measures of performance and measures of effectiveness which demonstrate progress and clarify needs for adjustment. Quantifiable measures demonstrate overall initiative effectiveness, define whether or not the operational information environment is changing, and aid leaders in decision-making responsibilities. To understand command objectives, the garrison operational environment, and how to shape future initiatives, the relationship between the IO officer and the leader requires open communication and information exchange. The stronger this relationship, the more effective the overall thematic design.

In summation, garrison inform and influence activities are no less relevant than those while deployed. While the operational environment is clearly different, the understanding, visualization, and description of the information and physical environments paired with the use of varied systems remain inherently the same. As in a deployed environment, the G-IIAWG consists of civilian agencies whose interests and means support the commander’s desired end state. The working group meets regularly to assess progress and measure the effectiveness of its performance. As leaders apply garrison inform and influence activities to achieve outcomes defined in ADP 6-22, they should understand the relevancy of their information operations officer and hold IO professionals accountable for the development of initiatives focused on garrison leadership outcomes. This is best achieved through open communication and mutual understanding. According to ADP 6-22, leaders inspire and influence people to accomplish goals. Army leaders motivate people to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions. These result in the betterment of the organization and encourage growth which ultimately leads to mission success — the goal of every leader.

Notes

1 ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership.
2 Ibid.
3 ADRP 6-0, Mission Command.
5 JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
6 Ibid.
7 ADP 6-22.
8 Ibid.

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America’s First Company Commanders

LTCOL (RETIRED) PATRICK H. HANNUM, USMC

Most Soldiers know the birthday of the U.S. Army is observed on 14 June each year, but few can explain what happened on that day in 1775. This is a story that every Soldier needs to know. What occurred that day was a very modest beginning of a national army — the Continental Army. The Continental Congress authorized three different colonies to recruit 10 companies of Infantry, not just Infantry companies but rifle companies. These 10 companies needed Soldiers and leaders resulting in the selection of 10 (and later 13) men to command the newly authorized companies — the first company commanders in the national army.

The American Colonies went to war against the British Army on 19 April 1775 at Lexington Green with a force of volunteer colonial-controlled militia. Since there was no nation and no national army, the colonies only coordinated their independent activities through the Continental Congress. As the military situation unfolded in the spring of 1775 and as a collection of militia from several colonies converged around Boston, it became evident a national army with formal leadership accountable to the Continental Congress was an absolute necessity to execute coordinated military efforts of the United Colonies.

The army that laid siege to the British Army at Boston in the spring of 1775 was a regional rather than a national army. This New England regional army, called the “Army of Observation,” initiated the siege of Boston and fought the Battle of Bunker Hill on 17 June 1775. This Army of Observation, reinforced by units from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia in August 1775, formed America’s first truly national army. The New England militia armed itself with many different types of weapons, primarily smoothbore weapons or muskets because the settled farming areas of New England lacked a hunting tradition requiring rifled weapons. Rifled weapons, first introduced to North America by the Swiss immigrants and perfected by American gun makers, were found primarily in the western portions of the middle and southern colonies. Congress clearly understood the differences between muskets and rifles when they made the decision to form the first units of the national army.

The day prior to George Washington’s appointment as the commander in chief of the Continental Army, Congress began the process of building a national army. The core of the national army began to form on 14 June 1775 when the Continental Congress authorized the formation of 10 rifle companies — six from Pennsylvania and two each from Maryland and Virginia. Congress specified the term of enlistment for the riflemen as one year and set the strength of the companies at one captain, three lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, a drummer or trumpeter, and 68 privates, for a total of 81 men. The simple wording of the enlistment contracts of the riflemen is outlined in Figure 1. Congress specifically authorized rifle companies. Rifles were standard weapons on the colonial frontier or backcountry. Frontier riflemen were excellent marksmen; Congress appropriately recognized the military value of soldiers who could kill the enemy at over 200 yards. The men in the first rifle companies provided their own clothing and rifles, facilitating the rapid recruitment, organization, and deployment of these initial units.

When the Continental Congress
took action to form the Continental Army on 14 June 1775, they envisioned recruiting these 10 companies of riflemen for service as a light infantry force reporting immediately to George Washington for operations around Boston. The resounding response by the various county committees in Pennsylvania, specifically in the western and northern counties, prompted Congress on 22 June to authorize eight Pennsylvania companies that would form a battalion. On 11 July, Congress added a ninth Pennsylvania company. General Washington’s first national army consisted of these 13 rifle companies, with the nine Pennsylvania companies formed into a battalion. When Congress approved the rifle companies, they authorized the respective colonies to identify the officers Congress appointed to command. This initiated the practice that continues to this day by which Congress appoints all commissioned officers in the U.S. military.

Figure 2 contains a copy of one of the surviving commissioning appointment letters offered to the rifle company commanders. This document was issued to John Lowden from Northumberland County, Pa., and signed by John Hancock, president of the Continental Congress. The appointment letters to the first company commanders in our first national army read strikingly similar to those issued by the U.S. Congress to commissioned officers serving in the armed forces today.

Because the colonies and counties nominated the officers to receive Congressional commissions, local politics played a major role in determining who would command the initial companies formed from their respective colonies. The empowerment of local revolutionaries who collaborated through local Committees of Safety and Correspondence came to dominate the political process. Nowhere was the transition from conservative loyal colonial governments to those favoring separation from Britain more evident than in Pennsylvania where the radicals gained control of the government and revised the state constitution. This transition from a loyal conservative government to one dominated by revolutionaries or patriots resulted in the appointment of men committed to the revolutionary cause to command the first 13 companies to make up the new American Army.

Unlike today’s system of identifying companies by a letter of the alphabet, revolutionary era units were named for their company commander, even after that individual departed from the parent regiment or battalion. This practice combined with non-standard record keeping and the loss of many personnel records early in the revolution complicates tracking units to the company level. This practice also links the names of the first 13 company commanders directly to the companies they recruited for their first year of existence. Despite the difficulties associated with linking history and lineage of colonial and revolutionary era military units, one unit in today’s U.S. Army that draws its lineage from the original rifle companies is the 201st Field Artillery Regiment, West Virginia National Guard. This unit traces its history to the Captain Hugh Stephenson Company drawn from members of the Berkeley County (Va.) militia. The Berkley County militia traces its roots to 1735. Many units in today’s U.S. Army have a very complex lineage. This complex lineage is perhaps one reason the Army has failed to embrace the simple facts associated with these 13 rifle companies. They were the first units in the national army. That army grew and changed many times between 1775 and 1783 when it was disbanded. But the simple fact remains; it was the formal element of military power that helped create the United States of America. Without this Army that began with 13 rifle companies, America in its current form would not exist today.

The men selected to command the rifle companies were also responsible for recruiting the enlisted men to serve in the ranks. These leaders all came from the frontier or backcountry of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia where a strong patriot sentiment existed. The first 13 captains appointed to serve as rifle company commanders were from Maryland (Michael Cresap and Thomas Price), Pennsylvania (James Chambers, Robert Clulage, Michael Doudel, William Hendricks, John Lowdon, Abraham Miller, George Nagel, James Ross, and Matthew Smith), and Virginia (Daniel Morgan and Hugh Stephenson). The nine Pennsylvania companies were organized into the Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion, which holds the distinction of being the first battalion in the national army and was initially commanded by Colonel William Thompson.

Soldiering is always a demanding business; the conditions during the American Revolution proved challenging for the new
These men recruited, organized, and began moving their companies toward Boston within four weeks of Congressional authorization. They were dedicated men, energized by concepts that not only led to America’s independence but were later enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The riflemen’s independent behavior, part of their culture in the “backcountry,” added to Washington’s problems in establishing firm and standard discipline in the new national army. Washington required the independent-minded riflemen to perform guard and entrenching duties along with New England units. The riflemen detested these assignments. The riflemen in Captain Ross’s company broke open the local guard house and removed one of the sergeants “confined there for neglect of duty and murmuring.” Several senior officers seized the sergeant and ordered him confined in the guard house in Cambridge. Thirty-two members of Ross’s company returned about 20 minutes later and headed to Cambridge to release the sergeant. Washington, notified of the events, arrived on the scene with Generals Lee and Greene. About 500 New England troops, billeted near the riflemen, responded and ended the incident by surrounding Ross’s units would join Arnold’s expeditionary companies cast lots to determine which company commanders of the riflemen to accompany Arnold. The company commanders of the rifle companies cast lots to determine which units would join Arnold’s expeditionary army. Captain Morgan of Virginia and Captains Hendricks and Smith of Pennsylvania provided the riflemen to supplement the bulk of the force (10 companies of musket men from the New England states).27

In attempting to task organize his army for the movement to Quebec, Arnold experienced resistance from the three rifle company commanders. They insisted their chain of command ran through their chosen leader, Captain Morgan, to Colonel Arnold, and no other man would command them. This was a simple manifestation of their independent frontier culture. Morgan, Hendricks, and Smith also explained they held commissions from the Continental Congress and refused to subject themselves to command by New England militia officers.28 Arnold conceded the point and placed Morgan in overall command of the three rifle companies, forming the army’s first division. With the issue of command settled, Arnold’s force departed Fort Western on the Kennebec River on 25 September, commencing an epic struggle against the wilderness.29

Arnold’s force, including the rifle companies, began the expedition from Cambridge on 11 September 1775, and after extreme hardship, 10 of the original 13 companies assigned arrived on the north side of the Saint Lawrence River at the gates of Quebec on 14 November. Included in these 10 companies were the three rifle companies. The slow movement, loss of physical stamina, and lost and damaged weapons and equipment due to the unforgiving Maine wilderness closed the window of opportunity for an immediate attack into Quebec City. Arnold had to wait for the American forces advancing up the Hudson River Valley to link up with his force that survived the trek through the Maine wilderness, which numbered less than 600 effectives.

When this link-up occurred in early December, Brigadier General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold immediately made plans for an attack of the fortress of Quebec. In the assault on 31 December 1775, the Americans were repulsed with heavy loss. Montgomery, the overall commander, was killed (the first general officer killed during the revolution), and Arnold was wounded; the three rifle companies suffered heavily in killed, wounded, and captured. Hendricks was killed, Morgan was captured, and Smith was absent, likely because he was ill. Lieutenant Steele led Smith’s company and was captured after being wounded in the hand, losing three fingers. Three of the 13 rifle companies making up the new national army ceased to exist after the attempt on Quebec.

Morgan’s and Smith’s careers in the Continental Army were not over, however. Morgan was eventually paroled. Smith continued to serve during the winter near Quebec and during the spring-summer retrograde from Canada down the Hudson River Valley.30 Morgan’s subsequent military service
is iconic. His service to the nation and the Continental Army resulted in his identification as the “Revolutionary Rifleman.” Morgan is best known for his victory over Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens, S.C., in January 1781.31 Morgan remained a controversial figure even in death. In 1951, a group of preservationists from South Carolina showed up at Morgan’s grave in Winchester, Va., determined to move his remains to the Cowpens Battlefield in South Carolina, where Morgan would be properly enscribed. Morgan remained in Winchester, and the descendants of his original rifle company helped dedicate a more appropriate granite monument.32 Smith’s subsequent military service as a major and lieutenant colonel in the 9th Pennsylvania has recently come to light and is awaiting further documentation. Smith is interred in Warrior Run Cemetery near Milton, Pa.; local militia accompanied his body to the cemetery, rendering a 21-gun salute. Plaques provided by the Masonic order and a Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission Roadside Marker commemorate his service to the nation. Both Morgan and Smith went on to have political careers prior to their deaths in 1802 and 1794, respectively.

The 10 remaining rifle companies participated in siege activities near Boston during the winter of 1775-76 while the surviving members of the three rifle companies in Quebec either suffered in prison cells or continued the siege outside the walled city of Quebec. On 9 November 1775, the riflemen responded to the British raid at Lechmere’s Point in Cambridge where a number of riflemen received wounds, but none were killed.33 After the evacuation of Boston by the British, Washington began repositioning his forces south to defend New York City and the surrounding area. The rifle companies began moving to New York during mid-March 1776.34 Stephenson’s Virginia company and the two Maryland companies (Crescep’s — now commanded by Moses Rawlings — and Price’s — commanded by Lieutenant Otho Holland Williams) operated from Manhattan and Staten Islands. Thompson’s remaining seven companies, later designated the 1st Continental Regiment on 2 January 1776 (after 7 March 1776 was under the command of Colonel Edward Hand) operated on Long Island patrolling the southwest beaches for signs of British amphibious operations.35

Because the original rifle companies enlisted for only one year, their enlistments expired on 30 June 1776. Many of the original soldiers reenlisted and served in the new or reorganized units created from these original 10 surviving companies. The men from the three companies captured at Quebec and fortunate enough to survive their imprisonment, returned on parole to New York in September 1776. Much changed during the first year of war for these original rifle companies. Of the original 13 companies, three were essentially destroyed at Quebec although Smith’s company (with Smith still in command) may have retained some unit cohesion at Quebec and mustered the remaining riflemen, some whom were sick and did not participate in the attack on 31 December 1775. Hendricks’ and Morgan’s companies, with Hendricks dead and Morgan captured, suffered such high casualties the units essentially ceased to exist as companies.36

Both Maryland companies had new commanders. The remaining Virginia company continued under the command of Captain Stephenson until his promotion to colonel to command the new regiment that included the Maryland and Virginia companies.37 This regiment, formed 1 July 1776 as an extra Continental Regiment (the Maryland Virginia Rifle Regiment), contained four Maryland and four Virginia companies. As the one-year enlistments of men initially members of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion (later designated as the 1st Continental Regiment) expired, at least 240 enlisted men reenlisted into the new 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, including some of Hendricks’ and Smith’s men paroled at Quebec. Of the original nine company commanders, only Clulage and Ross remained as part of the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, and by September 1776 both of those men had moved on.38

The first year of the revolution saw the British evacuate Boston but brought no quick end to hostilities for the Americans. Congress and Washington knew a well-trained army needed longer enlistments and greater continuity. The new regiments offered men contracts requiring three years or the duration of the war. Prodded by Washington, the Continental Congress developed and implemented a plan to build a national army of 26 regiments for the 1776 campaigning season, and later 88 infantry regiments for 1777.39 As the Continental Army restructured to deal with the changing circumstances, the significance of the contributions of the first company commanders was overshadowed by the larger and grander events of 1776 and beyond. The events of 1775 — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic — are fundamental to understanding how the American Revolution unfolded.40 The U.S. Army and historians should not overlook the national army’s modest beginnings. Collectively, these 13 company commanders recruited, organized, trained, and led into combat the first 1,000 Soldiers to serve in America’s first national army. These men not only embraced the “Spirit of 1775,” they lived it. Below is a brief summary of the men and their revolutionary service.

Maryland
Maryland’s two companies were recruited in Frederick County (then the entire western portion of the state); both Cresap and Price mustered into service on 21 June at Frederick:

**Michael Cresap** served until his death caused by an illness on 18 October 1775; Moses Rawlings then assumed command of his company. Cresap was a well-known trader and land developer living on the Maryland frontier. He served as a militia captain during Lord Dunmore’s War and was present at the Battle of Point Pleasant (Ohio) in 1774 prior to his appointment to command one of Maryland’s rifle companies. He is interred in Trinity Church Cemetery in New York City and his home, the Michael Cresap House, located in Allegany County, Md., was listed on the National Registrar of Historic Places in 1972.41

**Thomas Price** served with his company until January 1776 and was promoted to major serving in Smallwood’s Maryland Regiment throughout 1776. He then took command of the 2nd Maryland regiment during December of 1776. His regiments saw action during the Siege of Boston, the New York Campaign, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. He resigned in April 1780 and died in Frederick, Md., in May 1795 at age 62.42

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s nine companies represent manpower
contributions by seven northern and western counties. Pennsylvania’s company commanders appointed on 25 June 1775 include:

**James Chambers** hailed from Cumberland (later Franklin County); he eventually received a promotion in March 1776 and went on to serve as the lieutenant colonel of the 1st Continental Regiment, later designated 1st Pennsylvania Regiment (the reorganized Thompson’s Rifle Battalion). He was advanced to colonel of the 10th Pennsylvania in March 1777 and served only two months with the 10th before returning to command his old regiment, the 1st Pennsylvania. His units participated in the Siege of Boston, the New York Campaign, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine (where he was wounded on 11 September 1777), Paoli, Germantown, and Monmouth. He retired on 17 January 1781; he died at age 61 on 25 April 1805 and is interred in Falling Spring Presbyterian Church Cemetery, Chambersburg, Pa.43

**Robert Clulage** was from Bedford County and served through the reorganization of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion from the 1st Continental Regiment to the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment. His units participated in the Siege of Boston and through the New York Campaign until his resignation on 6 October 1776.44

**Michael Doudel** (Dowdle) hailed from York County, including portions of modern Adams County, and served for only two months after his company joined the Army at the Siege of Boston, resigning on 15 October 1775 because of poor health.45

**William Hendricks** and his company were from Cumberland County and served at the Siege of Boston for a month before making the incredibly difficult expedition to Quebec under Colonel Arnold’s command (September to November 1775). He was killed in the assault of Quebec on 31 December 1775. Along with Captain Hendricks, two enlisted men were killed and 59 men were captured, including 2nd Lieutenant Francis Nichols.46

**John Lowdon** hailed from Northumberland County, which then included portions of modern Union County. According to Francis B. Heitman’s *Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army During the War of the Revolution, April 1775 to December 1783*, Lowdon served in the Quebec Campaign in the force advancing on Quebec via the Hudson River Valley and was wounded at Montreal on 12 November 1775. This appears inaccurate because only two companies of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion participated in the Quebec Campaign (Hendricks and Smith). He may have been wounded on 9 November 1775 at Lechmere’s Point, Cambridge. He apparently survived his wounds and returned home to Northumberland County where he obtained a warranty deed on 300 acres of land in May 1785. His name continued to appear on tax lists through 1798, likely the year of his death.47

**Abraham Miller** was from Northampton County and served as a regular for only three months after his company joined the Army at the Siege of Boston, resigning 9 November 1775. He served in the Pennsylvania militia in 1776, died in 1815 at age 80, and is interred in Elmira, N.Y.48

George Nagel was from Berks County and served with his company until he was advanced to major in the 5th Pennsylvania on 5 January 1776. Transferred to the 9th Pennsylvania, he served as lieutenant colonel and commanding officer (no colonel assigned) from May 1777 to January 1778 when he was promoted to colonel and transferred to command the 10th Pennsylvania. His units participated in the Siege of Boston, the New York Campaign, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth. He retired on 1 July 1778 when the 10th and 11th Pennsylvania Regiments were merged, eliminating a colonel’s billet. He married Rebecca Lincoln, who was the sister of President Lincoln’s great grandfather; he died in Reading, Pa., in 1789 at age 53.49

**James Ross**, from Lancaster County, served through the reorganization of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion into the 1st Continental Infantry and subsequently served as a major in both the 1st Continental Regiment and the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment. His units participated in the Siege of Boston, the New York Campaign, Trenton, Princeton, and Brandywine. He resigned on 22 September 1777, 11 days after the Battle of Brandywine.50

**Matthew Smith** and his company served at the Siege of Boston for a month then made the march to Quebec under the command of Colonel Arnold. Smith survived the Quebec Campaign because he was absent at the time of the assault, likely ill as were 200 other members of Arnold’s force. During the 31 December 1775 assault, seven men from his company were killed and 35 captured. After returning from Canada during 1776, he served as major and later lieutenant colonel of the 9th Pennsylvania. His units participated in the Siege of Boston, the Quebec Campaign, Brandywine, and Germantown. He resigned on 23 February 1778 while his regiment was at Valley Forge to serve on the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania (1778-1780, representing Lancaster County). He served as Prothonotary (modern clerk of courts) of Northumberland County from 1780-1783 and died in 1794.51

**Virginia**

**Daniel Morgan** entered service on 22 June at Winchester, Frederick County, and was a veteran of significant frontier service including Braddock’s Campaign (1755) and Lord Dunmore’s War (1774). Serving at the Siege of Boston for a month, he led three companies of riflemen on the march to Quebec under the command of Colonel Arnold. He was captured in the attack on Quebec on 31 December 1775. Most of his company was killed, wounded, or captured in that assault. Morgan was later paroled and appointed colonel of the 11th Virginia in November 1776; the regiment was designated the 7th Virginia in 1778. He successfully commanded a task-organized rifle corps in the Hudson River Valley, contributing significantly to the American victory at Saratoga in 1777 and returning to Washington’s main army in time for action at Whitemarsh. After Monmouth, he resigned because of Anthony Wayne’s promotion to brigadier and command of a light corps, an assignment for which he was more qualified. At

Collectively, these 13 company commanders recruited, organized, trained, and led into combat the first 1,000 Soldiers to serve in America’s first national army. These men not only embraced the “Spirit of 1775,” they lived it.
the insistence of General Horatio Gates, Congress appointed him a brigadier general in October 1780, and he commanded half of the southern army at Cowpens in January 1781 where he soundly defeated a British force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. After the Revolution, he represented Virginia in the United States House of Representatives and died in 1802.52

Hugh Stephenson formed his company in Mecklenburg (now Shepherdstown, Berkeley County, and now West Virginia), mustering into service on 21 June. He previously served as a company commander during the French and Indian War; Washington thought highly of his abilities. He was promoted in June 1776 to become the first colonel (June-September 1776) of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment, an Extra Continental regiment because of its two-state composition. His units participated in the Siege of Boston and the initial phases of the New York Campaign; his command of the regiment was short-lived because he died in August or September 1776 in his home county while recruiting to fill his regiment.53

By December 1776, 18 months after the formation of a national army based around 13 rifle companies, all 13 original company commanders had moved on. Cresep, Hendricks, and Stephenson were dead; Lowden, wounded, left the army; Clelage, Doudel, and Miller resigned; Ross and Smith were majors (Ross with the 1st and Smith the 9th Pennsylvania); Chambers and Nagel were lieutenant colonels (Chambers with the 1st and Nagel the 9th Pennsylvania); Morgan and Price commanded regiments (Morgan the 11th Virginia and Price the 2nd Maryland).

Soldiers and all Americans should embrace the modest beginnings of the U.S. Army on 14 June 1775 and pay tribute to the first 13 company commanders who stepped forward to lead America’s first rifle companies. As an institution, the U.S. Army should seriously consider teaching each Soldier about the heritage associated with service to the ideals of 1775 applicable in today’s contemporary operating environment. Selfless service, to the ideals enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, is as applicable today as in 1775. Efforts to instill basic knowledge about the modest beginnings of the U.S. Army, explicitly linked to the formation of the initial 13 rifle companies, may pay handsome rewards in creating a common heritage and simple theme that every Soldier be proficient with his rifle. Soldiers have a proud heritage that must be linked to the American military traditions emanating from the members of the first national army and its first 13 rifle companies of 1775.

Notes
6 Ford, Journals, 90.
7 Ibid., 104; Wright, Continental Army, 5.
9 Ford, Journals, 100.
12 Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775-1783 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M246, 138 rolls).
14 Wright, Continental Army, 51, 93, and 157.
Dressed in typical attire of back-country riflemen, Revolutionary War living historians in Virginia prepare for a reenactment. The round hats and hunting shirts are the same as those described in the accounts of the first riflemen referenced in this article.

Photo courtesy of author

Dressed in typical attire of back-country riflemen, Revolutionary War living historians in Virginia prepare for a reenactment. The round hats and hunting shirts are the same as those described in the accounts of the first riflemen referenced in this article.
RALLY POINT FOR LEADERS: BUILDING AN ORGANIZATION’S MISSION COMMAND CULTURE

LTC SCOTT A. SHAW

Mission command — we all talk about it, and we all want to have it in our organizations. In his April 2012 white paper on mission command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey wrote: “Our need to pursue, instill, and foster mission command is critical to our future success in defending the nation in an increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment” where “smaller units enabled to conduct decentralized operations at the tactical level with operational/strategic implications will be the norm.”

GEN Raymond Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, has further stated “Done well, [mission command] empowers agile and adaptive leaders to successfully operate under conditions of uncertainty, exploit leading opportunities, and most importantly achieve unity of effort.” In the same speech, GEN Odierno stated that “Mission command is fundamental to ensuring that our Army stays ahead of and adapts to the rapidly changing environment we expect to face in the future.”

Finally, GEN Robert Cone, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), presented his perspective during the Association of the United States Army’s (AUSA’s) Mission Command Symposium on 20 June 2012 in Kansas City, Mo. (see Figure 1).

In order to get to the objective — and through the risks posed by the danger, uncertainty, and chaos produced by a complex operating environment — units must practice mission command in this age of tactical, operational, strategic, and fiscal uncertainty. While the definition of mission command can be found in our doctrine, the question remains as to how to train mission command and further how to train mission command in the austere environment now facing the Army. This article will first briefly define mission command according to our Army doctrine and then prescribe a method that can be used to create a mission command culture using leader-prescribed readings within a unit, regardless of size. This article will point to an avenue for leaders to better themselves as individuals, but the primary focus is on building a unit plan — staff or troop unit — that can help a commander or staff leader train and educate subordinates. This unit plan must be focused on attaining the six principles of mission command:

1. Build cohesive teams through mutual trust,
2. Create shared understanding,
3. Provide a clear commander’s intent,
4. Exercise disciplined initiative,
5. Use mission orders, and
6. Accept prudent risk.

In order to obtain a mission command culture inside of an organization, a commander or staff leader must create a cohesive organization based on shared understanding and mutual trust. The easiest, most cost effective manner to do this is through a directed reading program coupled with discussions led by the commander or staff leader to reinforce the readings. This kind of program creates a rally point for leaders within their organization.

Mission Command Defined
So what is mission command? Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, states that “Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of military operations.” A mission command philosophy is guided by the six principles that were listed above.

Pictorially, the relation from what the Army is tasked to conduct — unified land operations — to a mission command philosophy looks like Figure 2.

So that should clarify what it is, right? Maybe. Commanders can build cohesive teams quickly, but mutual trust and shared understanding is something that takes time. Further, discerning what prudent risk is at a leader’s level is very difficult. Prudent risk is “a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the
commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost.” That’s challenging for a company-level leader who’s never faced that sort of decision before. Those kinds of experiences cannot be taught in a classroom. They must be taught in a unit, and given our current fiscal state, they must be done for less than the cost of putting a Bradley on its side, followed by the subsequent recovery, and then a day or two in the field trains. But at least there’s an objective to drive toward. The objective is decentralized operations in a complex environment.

In order to achieve a mission command culture, a leader — any Army commander or staff leader — must pursue the six principles of mission command. A leader must build a cohesive organization through rigorous training that leads to mutual trust and shared understanding generated by a clear commander’s intent. An organization with those qualities will enable the commander to accept prudent risk because he or she knows that subordinate leaders will exercise disciplined initiative to accomplish the purpose of the operation outlined in the mission order.

When I was a platoon leader in Korea in 1997-1998, this was accomplished by going to the field and conducting gunnery, force-on-force training, and live fires on a quarterly basis evaluated by the appropriate level of trained evaluator. Staff sergeant master gunners evaluated every crew qualification, and the battalion commander with his staff evaluated each platoon. Hard training, coupled with the supervision and evaluation of commanders, is truly the best way to train an organization toward a mission command culture. While there are certainly units in our Army now that are still training at that level, there are also many units that are training at a lower readiness level due to the reduction in forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the austere environment of which we are now part. The availability of training resources is surely not a guarantee of a mission command culture, but it may make things easier through repetition.

Whether a unit is training for a known deployment or not, a method is needed to foster a mission command culture. That method should be directed reading. Directed reading is relatively inexpensive in terms of training dollars and Soldiers’ lives and can provide the leader a classroom without casualties or loss of equipment. The only cost is time — the time to conduct the directed reading/discussion and the planning time associated with setting up a reading program. Unlike virtual or game-based training where the method is limited to the simulation’s abilities or participant throughput, directed reading allows for a large population of leaders to be educated simultaneously. Directed reading enables the leaders of a large organization to discuss a topic without significant training resource overhead.

Several commanders have used reading plans in the past with great success. COL Michael Kershaw regularly published a memo titled “From my Bookshelf” that he would pass out to officers inside and outside of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. MG (then COL) H.R. McMaster published a reading list for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment prior to their 2005 Iraq deployment that aimed to educate the leaders of the regiment on the complexity of the impending deployment. The efforts of both of these commanders produced leaders with a set of tools for a complex mission.

Each unit needs a different plan since each unit has a different state of readiness and a different timeline. Units are going to receive new leaders and lose others due to schooling or moves. A plan must be able to accommodate the arrival of new leaders as well as the exit of established leaders; it must also be flexible to change if given a new or amended mission.

Toward a Unit Reading Plan

Figure 3 depicts an example of how leaders might array their leader development reading plan toward a mission command culture.

The unit or staff leader needs to assess his time available in the unit and plan his program accordingly. While some is better than none, a sequential program is much better than a “some” program because a sequential program equips a leader with an arsenal organized for battle. Most company and field-grade leaders will be in a specific position for about a year with many rotating at the six-to-nine month mark. Centrally selected commanders at the battalion and brigade levels are largely locked in for 24 months. The chart, and this method, is organized to build a mission command culture by embodying the six characteristics presented previously. In order to accommodate the turnover in a unit, by the leader or the led, the program is broken into six-month cyclic segments. Most leaders will admit to learning through repetition or significant emotional event. This model provides for repetition so that the later possible significant emotional events are fewer and less intense. Most leaders are in position for 12 months and thus unable to do a third or fourth turn; however, a dedicated six- or 12-month period of leader development in many organizations will send better leaders to future units.
The cycle starts with what mission command is and what Army command policy is (and requirements derived from it), and then demonstrates methods by which leaders operate. It establishes a base, and then every six months it reinforces that base to accommodate new leaders or changes to policy. The cycle continues into month two with ethics in order to allow a commander or staff leader to lay out expectations for ethical behavior in the unit and the Army. Month three features a regional topic in order to give leaders familiarity with the global environment. Month four continues into month two with ethics in order to allow a commander or staff leader to lay out expectations for ethical behavior in the unit and the Army.

Figure 3 — Example 24-Month Leader Development Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Reading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and Command</td>
<td>ADPs/ADRP 6-22, ADP/ADRP 6-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>1. <em>The Generals</em> by Thomas E. Ricks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. <em>Darker Shades of Blue</em> by John P. Kotter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Blackhearts</em> by Jim Frederick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &quot;Kill Company&quot; by Hal Moore and Joe Galloway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (Middle East/Levant)</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>We Were Caught Unprepared</em> by Matt Matthews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>The Syrian Rebellion</em> by Fouad Ajami</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Young Men and Fire</em> by Norman McLean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>A Bell for Adano</em> by John Hersey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>The Echo of Battle</em> by Brian McAllister Linn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Ender’s Game</em> by Orson Scott Card</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (Korea/China)</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Guerrilla Warfare</em> by Mao Zedong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>On China</em> by Henry Kissinger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <em>Proud Legions</em> by John Antal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (West/South Africa)</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>The Graves Are Not Full Yet</em> by Bill Berkeley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Diamonds, Gold, and War</em> by Martin Meredith</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <em>Journey into Darkness</em> by Thomas Odom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional (Iran)</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>A Modern History of Iran</em> by Ervand Abrahamian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Lipstick Jihad</em> by Azadeh Moaveni</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <em>Guardians of the Revolution</em> by Ray Takeyh</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional (Middle East/Levant)</td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Arabs at War</em> by Kenneth Pollack</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. <em>Six Days of War</em> by Michael Oren</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <em>The Heights of Courage</em> by Avigdor Kahalani</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Leadership and Command

Leaders — both company and field grade — need more training and education on leadership and command to include:

1. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, and what actions it allows;
2. What mission command is and is not in the organization;
3. Changing organizations with a change model; and
4. How to mentor junior officers and lead peers.

Leaders and commanders need to be guided through ADP 6-0 and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRPs) 6-0 to ensure understanding of the true nature of mission command. Leaders and commanders need to be thoroughly instructed in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and ADRP 6-22 so there is more in-depth understanding of Army leadership. Company-grade leaders need field-grade leaders to talk to them about the Kotter and Starry models of change to help them better their organizations.4 To that end, leaders should read and discuss AR 600-20, ADP and ADRPs 6-0 and 6-22, as well as books on leaders in combat such as LTG (Retired) Hal Moore and Joseph Galloway’s We Were Soldiers Once...and Young, Supreme Command by Eliot Cohen, Grey Eminence by Edward Cox, Leading Change by John Kotter, Prodigal Soldiers by James Kitfield, and The Fourth Star by Greg Jaffe.5

Regional

It has been proposed that we were unprepared for Iraq and Afghanistan because general purpose forces — brigade combat teams and those who support them — didn’t initially understand the culture of the locations into which we went. While both are very diverse — from Anbar to Diyala with Baghdad in the middle; from Nimroz to Kunar with Kabul in the middle — they can be broken down into pieces. If we are to stay relevant, we must be prepared to go anywhere in the world with some semblance of cultural awareness and quickly achieve functional cultural understanding. Our forces are already regionally aligned as our 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division is aligned to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). We have learned that the cultural differences between the Sunni and Shia are vast; how much more so between South Africans and Ethiopians or South Koreans and Indians? We will continue to engage in Africa, Europe, Asia (both Central and South), Australia, and South America
### Table: Regional Readings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North and East Africa</td>
<td>Africa’s Armies by Robert Edgerton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surrender or Starve by Robert Kaplan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia on $5 Dollars a Day by Martin Stanton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and West Africa</td>
<td>The Graves are Not Yet Full by Bill Berkeley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journey into Darkness by Thomas Odom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diamonds, Gold, and War by Martin Meredith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant)</td>
<td>A History of Modern Iran by Ervand Abrahamian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lipstick Jihad by Azadeh Moaveni</td>
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<td>Six Days of War by Michael Oren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Heights of Courage by Avigdor Kahalani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India)</td>
<td>Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monsoon by Robert Kaplan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War Comes to Garmser by Carter Malkasian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia (China and North Korea)</td>
<td>On Guerilla Warfare by Mao Zedong</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On China by Henry Kissinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proud Legions by John Antal</td>
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<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Forgotten Continent by Michael Reid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comandante by Rory Carroll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5 — Regional Readings**

— and while not a continent, of course the Middle East. In the commander’s period of instruction, he or she must give attention to regional education. Iran and Syria have special considerations different from those of the sub-Saharan region of “the continent.” The globe can easily be divided into several regions of study: 1. North and East Africa; 2. South and West Africa; 3. The Middle East with special emphasis on Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant; 4. South Asia with emphasis on Pakistan and India; 5. East Asia with emphasis on China (including their relations with India, Afghanistan, and Nepal/Tibet) and North Korea; and 6. South America.

There are too many books to name on specific regions, but Figure 5 covers some I would start with.

Books lead to great discussions, but there are also many websites that can provide regional information on potential problem locations. Each combatant command provides reference material for hot spots in their areas of responsibility, but *Foreign Policy* magazine’s Failed States Index provides a concise look with further reference material links.

### Planning

Staffs and small unit leaders depend on assumptions and knowledge of procedures. A division-level assumption about the friendly, enemy, or the physical/human terrain turns into a company or platoon fact that might cost a Soldier his or her life. Our assumptions about enemies have led us to believe that the death or capture of individuals would surely crumble an organization, which later proved untrue. We make assumptions and then many times do not re-visit them to confirm that they are still valid or necessary. In order to better train our staff leaders and commanders about the danger of assumptions, leader professional development sessions could be built around the following books: *Young Men and Fire* by Norman McLean, *A Bell for Adano* by John Hersey, *Not a Good Day to Die* by Sean Naylor, *The Outpost* by Jake Tapper, *Black Hawk Down* by Mark Bowden, *Intelligence in War* by John Keegan, *Seven Deadly Scenarios* by Andrew Krepinevich, and *Age of the Unthinkable* by Joshua Cooper Romo. Each of these books demonstrates assumptions being made that were costly or could have been costly later and will help our future planners and commanders in the making and validating of their assumptions.

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**Friendly**

Leaders often spend many hours dwelling on the aftermath of things gone wrong such as suicides, motorcycle accidents, attacks on combat outposts, or acts of indiscipline that led to civilian casualties. Leaders spend a tremendous amount of time on the post-event period — the post-mortem — trying to figure out “why” something happened. Typically, this period results in many “a-ha!” moments — missed cues — in the connecting of the dots that led to the death of a Soldier, the loss of a base, or the deaths of civilians due to the acts of Soldiers. Many books describe events in which leaders missed cues that might have prevented the loss of life in Iraq and Afghanistan. These books could be read and then discussed over a month within the unit’s target audience. The target audience could then take that discussion back to their subordinate units and help junior leaders identify the dots that are out there to connect to make an operational picture, potentially giving an advantage or preventing further loss.

In order to attempt to gain the advantage in every situation, we must understand not only our potential adversaries and the terrain on which we may fight but also ourselves. Leaders must take a critical look at our Army in good and bad times. We need to read and discuss the battles that we have won and lost to see what factors, distant from the battlefield, caused victory or defeat. Books like *The Echo of Battle* by Brian McAllister Linn, *An Army at Dawn* by Rick Atkinson, *Once an Eagle* by Anton Myrer, *The Utility of Force* by General Rupert Smith, *America’s First Battles* by Charles Heller and William Stofft, *Kevar Legions* by John Sloan Brown, and *Ender’s Game* by Orson Scott Card provide hours of material that can be focused on a discussion of ourselves and our Army.

Training and education do not only have to deal with tactical, operational, or strategic issues; they need to be on garrison procedures as well. While not placed on the chart, any of the topics could be replaced or augmented by a month of discussion on garrison procedures. Junior officers often complain that they are micromanaged in garrison. We need to strive for a mission command culture in garrison, too, as it is where we will spend most of our time in the immediate future. While the Army Red Book describes many of the challenges leaders face, there are other training and educational opportunities for leaders.
published ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, as well as the Army Training Network (ATN) can help leaders better utilize the resources that they are charged with while still conducting terrific training. It is possible to conduct a quality live-fire or situational training exercise within the allocation of ammunition, using land that is properly requested and used within the installation regulation, but it is only possible if commanders and staff leaders — company, battalion, and brigade — take the time to educate their subordinate leaders in a professional development session on training management. This session could be held once in the six-month cycle and cover the procedures for requesting land and ammunition, the specifics for the best use of ranges and training areas, and the conduct of a training meeting in your formation.

Conclusion

True, the program outlined above is a lot of reading in an already busy training or work schedule, but leaders must ask themselves and their subordinates, “Is the time that I am investing in our future leaders worth a Soldier’s life?” Of course the answer is “yes.” This education for our leaders must be planned with the same fervor as a platoon live fire or an upcoming rotation at a live or virtual combat training center. True, the program outlined above is a lot of reading in an already busy training or work schedule, but leaders must ask themselves and their subordinates, “Is the time that I am investing in our future leaders worth a Soldier’s life?” Of course the answer is “yes.” This education for our leaders must be planned with the same fervor as a platoon live fire or an upcoming rotation at a live or virtual combat training center.

Notes


6 The Failed State Index for 2012 can be found at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/reports/2012.

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MANEUVER SELF-STUDY PROGRAM

The MSSP consists of books, articles, doctrine, films, lectures and practical application exercises to help educate maneuver leaders about the nature and character of war, as well as their responsibilities to prepare Soldiers for combat, lead them in battle, and accomplish the mission. Visit the program’s website at www.benning.army.mil/mssp.
On 20 June 2011, insurgents ambushed an Afghan National Army (ANA) company in the Shigal District of Kunar Province, Afghanistan. The ambush developed into an ANA battalion-level engagement with support from U.S. forces. Despite forcing the enemy to retreat, the battle resulted in one American killed in action (KIA), two Afghan KIA, and several ANA wounded in action (WIA). Two days later in the same district, U.S. and Afghan forces responded to time-sensitive intelligence and decisively counterattacked an insurgent ambush resulting in 14 enemy KIA and zero loss to coalition forces. Most importantly, the 22 June victory won the population’s support with lasting effects for local security. On 20 June, Bravo Company and our Afghan partners experienced tragic losses; on 22 June, we won an invigorating victory.

None of these events matched Bravo Company’s most intense, complex combat experiences, but they provide lessons for leaders partnered with indigenous forces. Moreover, the combat actions reveal an endearing perseverance among Soldiers and the direct benefit of strong community relationships in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

From April 2011 until April 2012, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, operated out of Combat Outpost (COP) Monti in Kunar Province. Bravo Company, in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), secured the population of Asmar, Dangam, and Shigal Districts in coordination with the local Afghan government and tribal elders in order to build an independent ANSF and increase the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Historically, Asmar, Dangam, and Shigal had been administered under a single Asmar government. Thus, Bravo Company’s three-district area of operations (AO) can be expediently called Asmar. Bravo Company intimately partnered with an ANA battalion, or kandak, with approximately 800 soldiers. The kandak headquarters (HQ) was located with Bravo Company’s command post at COP Monti. Additionally, Bravo Company partnered with a 450-man Afghan Border Police (ABP) kandak, which was headquartered in a compound nearby. Bravo Company also advised three local district police forces. Without a Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) to support us, our rifle company’s NCOs and junior officers shouldered an astonishing share of a complex partnership mission in a particularly lethal environment.

In Kunar Province, the terrain is rugged and highly restricts
In Asmar, the Kunar River flows north to south, splitting the AO into east and west parts. This river significantly influenced local demography, politics, and enemy activity. Bravo Company’s AO shared a 50 kilometer border with Pakistan, and insurgents readily infiltrated the region. Yet, the Kunar River provided a significant obstacle for enemy movement, and bridges were key terrain for their operations.

Our ANA partners were also new to Asmar. Their kandak had moved to COP Monti from another province four months prior to our arrival. Before this move, a single Afghan rifle company from a different kandak was the only ANSF maneuver force in the area. Thus, the ANA were still building initial relationships with a long-neglected local community. In our first two months of partnership, the ANA grew increasingly comfortable conducting independent reconnaissance patrols in a steady-state COIN environment.

Despite recognizable shortcomings, the kandak possessed many redeeming qualities. First, many of the men were tenacious fighters. They did not shirk from a fight. Afghan hesitation for unilateral actions came from reasonable misgivings about insufficient indirect fire support. Many ANA platoons had been together for three years and endured fierce fighting in Nangarhar, Kunar, and Nuristan provinces. They wanted to do well, and we quickly developed strong relationships at all levels. As we fought and patrolled together, our mutual trust grew.

In the beginning, we directed considerable effort towards building the kandak’s command, control, and communication (C3) functions. They were very novice at maneuvering platoons and companies. Officers struggled to use radios and give effective commands. No one was able to accurately track formations in real time. The battalion commander (who I will refer to as HG) adequately managed administration functions, but he could not maneuver companies or supervise a planning process. Similarly, company commanders poorly maneuvered platoons, and troop leading procedures were rarely followed. The kandak had good raw ingredients but needed considerable mentorship.

Americans must remember high-context cultures require firm relationships before commencing business. Too often, Army leaders rely on a projected concept of professionalism to drive effective partnered action with indigenous counterparts. At the tactical edge, effective partnerships rely substantially on personal relationships. In Afghanistan, you must first become friends before telling someone what to do. A paraphrased Kunari proverb: *If you take a Pashtun to heaven by force, he will fight you until his last breath, but if you make a Pashtun your friend, he will go with you to hell.* As American partners, we had to temper ambition and develop those critical bonds first.

Unless I was on patrol, I met with HG a minimum of four times daily. We had breakfast tea at 0900, lunch at 1200, kandak staff meetings at 1900, and evening tea at 2100. I also worked with the kandak operations officer in our combined tactical operations center (CTOC). The ANA had five maneuver companies, two of which were located at ANA COPs in Dangam and Shigal districts. Bravo Company was responsible for supporting more than 1,200 ANSF personnel and three underfunded district governments. If our critical tasks were numerous, supporting tasks were simply...
overwhelming. In a commendably decentralized approach, the brigade and battalion allocated Bravo Company considerable resources. We had a four-man maintenance team to run a robust motor pool, and we had a forward aid station with a physician’s assistant. We also had Army cooks to run a chow hall for three hot meals a day. Despite great enablers, Bravo Company remained a motorized rifle company with a tremendous workload.

A superb Infantry lieutenant led the eight-man company intelligence support team (CoIST) for the first three months of the deployment before leading one of Bravo Company’s rifle platoons. The rest of the CoIST was poached from the line platoons. Two NCOs on their third deployment led six young Soldiers new to combat. Despite being green, the young Soldiers possessed unique talents. One Soldier boasted several years as an Ohio police officer with a passion for network analysis. The CoIST and I were organically joined, and I considered them my brain trust. From friendly network analysis to debrief collection to synthesizing targeting packets, the CoIST provided adaptive, accurate information for rapid decisions. The CoIST and I would sit multiple times each day and talk freely about the AO. Moreover, at least one CoIST rep accompanied me in meetings with locals multiple times each day and talk freely about the AO. Moreover, at least one CoIST rep accompanied me in meetings with locals and on patrol. Platoons also took CoIST reps on missions. During named operations, CoIST personnel manned vehicles for the first sergeant (1SG), executive officer (XO), and other HQ vehicles. They shared nearly every Bravo Company firefight with the rifle platoons. Thus, the CoIST remained respected combat Infantrymen connected to reality on the ground.

From the CTOC, the fire support officer (FSO) and his NCO coordinated all fire missions. Bravo Company had its organic mortar section with 120mm and 81mm mortars. Only direct-fire 60mm was under my approval, and all other missions required battalion coordination for airspace clearance and a collateral damage estimate (CDE). We also had access to a fire battery platoon with two 105mm howitzers in direct support. Again, I approved direct-fire missions. The fire direction center (FDC) was located in my CTOC immediately to the right of my FSO. To my FSO’s left, my attached tactical air control party (TACP) manned their radios and a video up-link. The Air Force assigned Bravo Company a full-time joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) and his apprentice radio operator maintainer and driver (ROMAD). On almost all operations, the FSO, his RTO, and the JTAC traveled with me.

COP Monti housed a four-man brigade human collection team (HCT) to develop sources. My CoIST and I worked intimately with them, and they went on patrols at their discretion. Bravo Company also received occasional support from civil affairs and a military information support team (MIST).

Bravo Company had many assets, a diverse mission, and significant autonomy. Five distinct ANSF partners and three district governors required a lot of attention. My 1SG supervised our NCOs, mentored Afghan senior NCOs, and assisted the XO with the nightmare of American and Afghan logistics in Kunar.

Platoon leaders (PLs) received considerable autonomy to build complex, lethal COIN environment continues to impress me in reflection.

Americans must remember high-context cultures require firm relationships before commencing business. Too often, Army leaders rely on a projected concept of professionalism to drive effective partnered action with indigenous partners. At the tactical edge, effective partnerships rely substantially on personal relationships.

The Night of 20 June
At 2200 on 20 June, I entered HG’s office. I had just come from a meeting with 2nd Platoon. We had lost a Soldier that day — Bravo Company’s first KIA. I yearned for work to bury the awfulness. Alone with my interpreter, HG lamented his failure as a commander. He had lost Soldiers before, but today was different. Today, he failed as a tactical commander.

The day had indeed been a debacle. Insurgents had ambushed an independent ANA company conducting a logistics patrol on the main supply route (MSR) 15 kilometers south of COP Monti. North of Farish Village, the insurgents’ initial volley inflicted a near-catastrophic strike on the company commander’s truck. With casualties trapped in a burning vehicle, the ANA were fixed in the kill zone. A fiery ANA platoon sergeant (PSG), reacting to a desperate situation, bravely led his men up a 500-foot bluff and routed the insurgents from their nearest and most deadly high-ground positions. Rather than retaining key terrain, the PSG aggressively pursued the retreating insurgents deeper into the mountains.

Cleverly, insurgents had prepared a reserve in subsequent battle positions with a solid defense in-depth. The aggressive ANA platoon overreached and fell into the insurgent trap. The enemy used machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to fix the ANA in a draw between two ridgelines. Bravo Company and the kandak reinforced the ambushed ANA to retrieve the lost platoon. The ANA PSG was fatally wounded trying to rally his men’s retrograde, and his senior squad leader was then killed doing the same in his stead.

When I arrived on the scene with 2nd Platoon and HG’s tactical command post (TAC), three ANA companies were already spread across the mountains with zero command and control. At the battle’s peak, four ANA companies were desperately trying to develop a coherent action. Along with close air support (CAS), I controlled scout weapons teams (SWTs — Kiowa helicopters) and attack weapons teams (AWTs — Apache helicopters) in support of a massive, disorderly ANA maneuver. The kandak lost all situational understanding, and reporting from various ANA elements was extremely poor. Meanwhile, insurgents patiently tightened their noose on the trapped ANA platoon.

HG grew exceedingly frustrated with the chaos. In desperation,
he handed full operational control of the kandak to me and told me to save his battalion. Many moments from that day remain quite vivid in my memory, and that moment of leadership defeat continues to haunt me. Though we eventually rescued the ANA platoon, the day was too costly.

Hours after the battle, HG, an Afghan-American interpreter, and I sat together sharing unspoken sadness and disappointment. HG lamented his failure as a commander. Since he had already assessed his leadership failures, my constructive feedback was unnecessary that night.

We sat and sipped tea in quiet for a good while. HG broke the silence, "Take my kandak."

I asked for clarification, "What do you mean, friend."

"I have failed my battalion. I can no longer lead them. I don’t know how. From now on, this is your kandak. You saved my men; you climbed the mountain and got them out. You led them and got my men out. You did all of that. I could not figure out what to do; I froze, but you didn’t. You and your Soldiers did what I could not do."

"Brother, we all made mistakes. The kandak has a lot of improvements to make, but we will make them together. I am not leaving for another 10 months. In three months, your kandak will be 10 times better than it was today. But, we need to train, and I need you. These are your men; you must teach them to persevere."

"Whatever you say, we will do. Without you, we are all lost." This gloomy line hit hard.

"Brother, together we will overcome this, but from now on I want be much more direct with you, ok? I am going to tell you how to do a lot of things better. Before, I was quiet and let you do things your way. Now, I want to be more direct. I will always give advice in private, but I want you to let me be more direct. You know I do these things out of love, not disrespect."

HG swore, "You are my brother. We will do this together just as you said."

"Qadam peh Qadam." Step-by-step was my mantra for the deployment. It kept my sanity and also reduced Afghan frustration with the seemingly insurmountable challenges in front of them.

Despite all our outreach to the community, the tribal elders in southern Shigal had failed us. They had not reported any enemy movement in the area before the attack. Their bystander negligence contradicted publicly made promises at previous jirgas to support the ANA. HG and I agreed to host an emergency jirga the next day. We needed to exploit that day’s setback and seize the initiative in the valleys.

### The Jirga as a Conduit for Change

In Kunar, legitimacy is greatly built on local elder support. Cynically, some buy favor with earmarked projects or even plain bribery. In Asmar, relationships with power brokers come in two tiers. Relationships built on quid pro quo fade after the last payment is exchanged; money does not bind Pashtun honor. In contrast, profound relationships are slowly built on Afghan chivalry. If a Pashtun binds his honor to your fate, he will forfeit his life if necessary to protect it. Unlike Western society where such fidelity seems quixotic, tenacious Pashtuns adhere to such a code. Though distorted by centuries of foreign incursions, Kunar’s ancient warrior culture continues to live a code of yesteryear.

In Asmar, an Infantry company commander is neither an ambassador of America’s goodwill nor a colonial master. Kunari Pashtuns yearn for him to be a warrior. Yet, the Pashtun narrative describes many flavors of warrior leaders. Some tactical commanders mimic an authoritarian tribal elder; the unit constitutes the tribe. In this instance, guns and money define power, and such leaders enter the fray of local politics with an aggressive persona. This approach can quickly stir deep-seated resentment from former British and Soviet invasions.

In the valleys of Asmar, Americans using this approach assured disappointment. In a single day in the 1980s, local Mujahedeen fighters had annihilated an entire mechanized Soviet battalion near COP Monti. I spoke to Afghans who had served on both
sides of the Soviet conflict, and death toll estimates for Soviet forces was unanimously appalling (in excess of 300 KIA). Many bearded men in my jirgas had lost fathers, sons, mothers, and wives to aggressive fair-skinned men from faraway lands. To them, American firepower was impressive but routine and even somewhat despised as cowardice.

While warlords had brutally governed local areas in other parts of Afghanistan, Asmar’s tribes avoided domination under a single authority for centuries. Asmar’s legacy cycled between collaboration and conflict. No single tribe fully controlled the area, and peace only occurred through consensus. When a tribe chose to bully the valley, other tribes built alliances to thwart their ambition. After generational cycles of violence, the local people had ordained a particular form of collaborative governance and damned all other approaches.

For Kunari Pashtuns, those who ruled with the sword were destined to face its edge. Kunar’s Pashtuns are hard people with impressive grit. From the time they are born, death is an intimate part of life. Most children struggle to survive their first five years. Healthcare is primitive, and a minor illness can kill. When you meet a 60-year-old Kunari man, he is one of the finest examples of human survival. His family and clan are likewise tenacious. Such resilient people make terrific friends and terrible enemies.

In the highlands of the Hindu Kush, revenge remains an integral foundation of tribal law. In the short term, a strongman can subjugate valleys. Pashtuns appreciate strength, but they rarely respect it alone. Eventually, a strongman wrongs a rival and excites relentless passion for revenge. Blood feuds last generations, and dominion built with violence without a superior conciliatory architecture inevitably breeds feuds. Thus, a strongman breaches tribal dynamics at his peril.

To understand their culture, I had to understand Asmar’s heroes, and Kunaris idealized the warrior-poet. He talks at barely audible volume, never yells, and rarely loses his temper. He listens more than he speaks. He writes poetry about his homeland, battle, and love. He is a devout Muslim, speaks in parables, and quotes the Prophet when explaining reasons for action. The Kunari hero respects women at all costs in peculiar ways that are unapologetically chauvinistic. The Kunari hero is a powerful fighter with extensive combat experience, but he does not brag about his exploits. Others attest to the hero’s deeds, and their narratives act as historical record for local people. The Kunari hero is charitable without showmanship. A Kunari hero knows he is powerful and does not need to crow. Importantly, a Kunari hero offers reconciliation from a position of strength as a man of forgiveness vice a weak man desperate for allies. As a company commander in Asmar, I sought to emulate these characteristics whenever congruent with my professional ethic.

Pashtuns readily recognized the incredible power American company commanders control. I did not need to constantly remind elders of my power over “guns and butter.” Most Pashtuns savor battlefield heroics, and many respect America’s warriors. Though other international and non-governmental organizations work in Afghanistan’s valleys, U.S. forces rapidly execute infrastructure projects like no one else. My esoteric paradigm was to emulate someone who Pashtuns respect and support. I must be an American warrior-poet. I wanted them to see a man of strength working towards reconciliation, eager to listen to elders, respectful of Islam, and attentive to Pashtun culture. Once they became my friends, the old men would duly tell stories of American exploits, honor, strength, and courage in the valleys. No Taliban radio broadcast, pamphlet propaganda, or radical sermon could refute their testimony.

If Americans mistakenly offend tribal sensibilities, insurgents often intentionally ignore them. The derision between insurgent outsiders and Asmar’s local communities illustrated a simmering struggle between imported, dogmatic Islam and ancient tribal culture. Young men with adolescent beards descended on isolated villages demanding patronage for their righteous mission. Often, these fighters coerced communities to do their will. At local mosques, they preached for village sons to redirect their allegiance from irrelevant grandfathers towards jihad.

The fighters showcased flashy weapons and genuine ruthlessness to intimidate the community. Yet, with these actions, insurgents humiliated elders, who had spent decades building a reputation among their people as their protector. Though insurgents rarely insulted the elders explicitly, their actions remained insolent. Their behavior gained safe havens but brittle loyalty. The majority of Asmar’s communities saw insurgents as one of many foreign powers who had come, ruined, and left Afghanistan. The most effective psychological victory insurgents wielded in Asmar were lies about America’s acts against Islam. If I changed perceptions arising from these falsehoods, my conduit to the community would open wide.

My first jirga in April 2011 was indicative of our long road. HG and I conferred the night before about talking points. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce the new American commander at COP Monti. All the old men who came were polite, but analysis revealed none were influential elders. The

The author speaks at a formal Shigal Distrit jirga that was hosted by the district governor and had more than over a 100 elders from the Mamund and Shinwari tribes in attendance.
guests were emissaries sent to reconnoiter the new Americans. The act was not an insult: I was not yet worthy of meeting top elders. This event revealed the tacit rank structure in Kunar’s tribes. Those in the higher echelons do not meet junior elders as equals, and I was still a low-level elder. Throughout the deployment, power shifts within tribes were exposed at jirgas as an elder moved up in seating arrangements, which indicated a rise in stature. Likewise, I needed the community to promote me to sufficient levels of influence to be successful.

For Afghans, meeting with Americans is a gamble. In land of immense poverty, an elder’s reputation is his greatest asset to bequeath posterity. The village looks to chief elders for safety, and the social contract between an elder and his people is precious. If an elder bets on the Americans at COP Monti, then he bets against the insurgency. Elders were wagering their entire family for generations, and many naturally sought to hedge against such a dire downside.

In Pashtun culture, the design of a meeting is crucial to the outcome. In my first month at COP Monti, Afghans persistently tried to seat me at the center of the back wall facing the entrance. In Pashtun culture, this seat is reserved for the most powerful person. Though I initially accepted the kindness, the arrangement sent the wrong message. There was a pervasive attitude in the valleys that American commanders were viceroy. Likely derivative from colonial rule and Afghan monarchies, Asmar’s leaders were publicly deferential to American authority. Though such niceties appear sincere and beneficial, they reinforce a harmful dichotomy of outside ruler versus local subjects.

I was not a military governor sent from Kabul to collect tributes. I was not there to manipulate tribes against one another and dominate. I was there to support the people, build unity, and facilitate legitimate democratic government. Thus, the “colonial master” paradigm contradicted our mission. As in modern community policing, perceptions often determine reality, and changing perceptions translates to success on the ground. In Asmar, jirgas are the primary vehicle to influence perception and begin transformation.

I proposed that since government officials were the legitimate authority in the Asmar, they should be sitting at the head of the room. After a few pleasant debates, the Afghans acquiesced to my insistence. Not only did this impact the community’s mindset, but self-perception changed among Afghan officials. With a simple seating change, district governors assumed a posture of authority. For years, Americans had dictated local governance and marginalized lackluster officials. Admittedly, district governments were dysfunctional and suffered tiresome corruption. Yet, if perception drives reality, then constructive displays of an empowered government can drive actual progress.

Often, Pashtuns cut deals with authorities behind closed doors to parry others doing the same. Naïve American commanders with budgets for infrastructure projects are prime targets for such mischief, and a new American arrival to Afghanistan is quickly besieged with such tactics. An American commander with good intentions is vulnerable to seemingly benign friendships with proactive Afghans (who usually speak the best English in the valley). These Afghans eventually draw the unwitting American into a web of alliances. Though the American is trying to provide maximum benefit for the community, these interlocutors adroitly direct American benevolence towards their family, clan, and tribe. As a result, the American’s friendly network narrows to a small cluster of locals. Before the first 90 days are complete, an American has been cornered to the exclusion of many other power players in the valley. The excluded elders gradually stop attending jirgas and passively support insurgent activity because they share no allegiance with America or Kabul. The commander serves the rest of the deployment without 75 percent of the population.

With book knowledge and tactical experience in Iraq, I knew enough to be cautious. In the end, the jirga proved the best conduit for transparency. Firstly, I made decisions with public group consensus from all tribes and Afghan officials. Privately, I always consulted my closest partner, HG. The focus on consensus building forced Asmar to work together, set priorities, and solve grievances. After several months, the Afghans grew comfortable leading their council, and I happily diminished my mediator role. Admittedly, the one-year deployment required significant tongue-biting; it is hard for an American officer not to interject and fix a problem.

At COP Monti, we held jirgas at least once a week. Typically, the guests arrived in the morning around 0900. HG and I greeted them at the gate and escorted them to the jirga room. The meeting began once everyone was seated in their proper place on the rug. We started with a Muslim prayer, and HG introduced the jirga’s agenda. Starting from the lowest level, each power broker spoke in turn for roughly 10 minutes each. Despite my position in the seating chart, I normally spoke last. This contradiction to cultural norms was necessary because many decisions relied on American support (financial, operational, etc). My speech was a response to everyone’s concerns.

After an hour of speeches, the stoicism immediately changed to humor. We all relaxed from the rigid cross-legged pose and leaned against the wall. ANA aides brought tea and soda for the guests. We bantered about life and less serious topics. Everyone laughed. Then, the ANA brought in a lunch of meat, bread, rice, fruit, and raw vegetables. After eating, we closed with a prayer. HG and I escorted guests to the gate of the compound for proper farewells. We had a mosque on COP Monti run by the ANA kandak’s imam. Many guests went to midday prayers at COP Monti before heading home.

Unlike most meetings, the jirga after the Farish incident was in the afternoon. The time indicated a heightened degree of seriousness because we would not host the standard celebratory lunch. This approach is not offensive; it simply signals the jirga has specific purpose. Everyone in Asmar knows when someone meets with the ANA and Americans at COP Monti. If we invite a small group to an ordinary jirga in the morning, uninvited elders misinterpret their tribe’s exclusion. Normal jirgas honor elders and add political chits. An afternoon jirga is understood in the valleys to be a business meeting without fanfare.

We met the elders at the gate and respectfully escorted them to the jirga room. One of them was a very senior elder of the Shinwari Tribe, and he spoke for everyone. The elders expressed their greatest condolences for our losses. They reported 11 insurgents were killed and six wounded in Farish. The report matched our low-level voice intercepts (LLVI) from the day before.

Though they did not concede culpability, the elders admitted a deep distrust for coalition forces. For years, the ANA and Americans promised to end the insurgency and failed. Now, their
villages were at the mercy of rampant banditry. Moreover, 2014 was a prevailing thought in their minds: Americans were looking for an exit, and the villages would be left to fend for themselves. The American withdrawal from Nuristan Province in 2010 foreshadowed Kunar’s future.

Their fear was genuine, and support for Kabul meant a stand against the insurgents. To marginalize their legitimate concerns would be stupidly disrespectful. Their villages truly suffered the insurgency without much help from Kabul, and I appreciated their candor. For the first time in the deployment, our meeting was raw and stripped of phony minuette. I could sense HG and the elders moving closer towards a constructive agreement.

To assuage their fears, HG and I reframed 2014’s importance. With the “surge,” ANA and American presence in Kunar was greater than ever before. In 2009, one American platoon and one ANA platoon occupied COP Monti. In 2011, an entire rifle company plus attachments was partnered with an entire ANA kandak. Their resentment at years of neglect was understandable but no longer valid. Times had changed, and the ANA was here to stay in force. Americans would leave behind a capable, powerful Afghan military.

The chief elder accepted our framework for future cooperation. They agreed the ambush brought dishonor to their people and apologized for our losses. Throughout the meeting, HG proposed all our talking points. At the end, I spoke briefly at HG’s behest. I simply implored them to report insurgent activity to Afghan forces and that without their help, peace would never be achieved. I swore American support for the ANA and requested that elders intimately support HG. I dared them to test us — call us, report enemy movement, and let us prove our resolve. The meeting ended with many condolences and promises of future cooperation. Time would reveal the jirga’s success.

**The Elders Place their Bets**

Without conferring with 2nd Platoon, I removed them from the patrol schedule to allow time for grieving and preparation for 23 June’s memorial service. The jirga had successfully distracted me from the loss. On the evening of the 21 June, 2nd Platoon’s PL came to my office to back brief his patrol the next day, which had been approved a week prior. They planned to travel with 1st Coy (company) to recon a local clinic and conduct key leader engagements. I questioned their readiness to execute so soon. He stated his platoon had completed all coordination with ANA partners to include combined rehearsals. Their sense of duty was unsurprising; they were good Infantrymen. The PL’s attitude was correct: we were not going home and had to continue the mission. I acquiesced to a firm request from a stalwart leader.

I met with each ANA company commander individually for tea throughout the late afternoon. The 3rd Coy commander was especially irate. He blamed the kandak commander for the loss of his men and said the incompetence of the kandak was a reflection of his leadership. This commander was the best Afghan company commander in the kandak, and his men truly respected him. I was sad to see him in such a state. He was venting frustration and grief, and he knew I understood the emotions. I gave him my own medicine: focus on the mission and learn from mistakes. We swore to work together and enhance our partnership.

Second Platoon left before dawn on a all-day patrol. An hour before midday prayers in the valleys, HG rushed into my office with an interpreter. Animatedly, he yelled a stream of Pashtu. “One of the elders is on the phone. He says insurgents are in the mountains in Shigal.” HG shook his hands with enthusiasm, yelling Pashtu at me while cupping the cell phone.

I gently placed my hand on his shoulder, “Let’s go to the CTOC.” We walked across the hallway while he continued chatting excitedly on the phone.

HG relayed to me the insurgents’ suspected location and said that the elder had watched them resupply their positions with a water and food.

I asked, “Has he seen any bombs placed in the road?” I was concerned for the growing trend in eastern Afghanistan of complex ambushes using large, buried homemade explosives.

HG shook his head, “No. There is nothing on his side of the river. The enemy is all on the opposite side in machine-gun positions.”

In the CTOC, HG and I conferred with the elder on the phone. I gave HG additional questions to ask regarding the number of insurgents and types of weapons systems seen.

**Developing the Situation**

While HG continued his phone conversation, I radioed 2nd Platoon’s PL. The platoon was in a village about five kilometers north of the enemy. At this time, I had not decided on a course of action. Just two days prior, we had lost an American and two Afghans in a firefight with insurgents on the same road in the same district. Was today a trap? Could I trust the elder? Any offensive maneuver operation in this area required a deliberate operation with multiple platoons; the terrain east of the river was horrendous and under the control of several enemy groups. We had drafted brigade operations for the area, and they were waiting in eastern Afghanistan’s lengthy docket of to-do lists.

Also, we would need fire support from the 155mm howitzers in our adjacent battalion to the south. Though we shared a very positive relationship with our sister battalion, the area’s terrain hindered communications. Even with a 120mm mortar firing point (MFP) at 2nd Platoon’s positions, we still required an FDC to coordinate airspace and CDE approvals. We had FBCB2 computer systems in every tactical vehicle for contingency communication. Unfortunately, FBCB2 was not an approved tool for call-for-fire missions. Consequently, Bravo Company would be wholly reliant on tactical satellite (TACSAT) or relay via 2nd Platoon to reach an FDC. Hoggimg a TACSAT channel for fire missions prevents other units from submitting emergency reports like medical evacuations. Thus, responsive fires on 22 June relied on rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.

In a hasty time-sensitive strike without the option to flank, we had to use attack by fire (ABF) to defeat the insurgents. The firepower-centric approach offered doubtful reward alongside a substantial risk. Yet, the elder was daring us to act. Were we bluffing when we promised to support the local people if they supported us? If we failed to act, would the elder ever call the ANA again? Would his village ever support the ANA? Tracing this COIN mindset, an information victory exceeded tactical outcomes. To win the population, we must prove our value to them. Was this the right time to assume tactical risk in COIN to win the people?

The PL from 2nd Platoon requested to recon the area of interest, but I told him to continue with his mission as we developed the situation. I did not want insurgents to realize they had been compromised. First Platoon was on quick reaction force (QRF)
After issuing the company mission statement, I sat with 1st Platoon’s PSG and gave him a concept and we adjusted some details together. I told him to develop a graphical target list worksheet for his fires plan. The CoIST had photos of the exact mountains from the point-of-view of a vehicle on the MSR. I wanted our Soldiers to rehearse the plan in detail so there was no hesitation once the engagement started. If the enemy had recoilless rifles, we needed to kill them after their volley’s signature exposed their positions.

I next sat with the 3rd Coy commander and HG to review the plan. After HG’s approval, the 3rd Coy commander privately conferred with me in the CoIST room. I knew his character, and I knew he was not a coward; he was simply assessing risk. After a quiet, brotherly discussion, he affirmed my decision and left to meet 1st Platoon’s PSG for combined rehearsals. Each vehicle commander had a panoramic photo of the mountains with targets and target reference points marked. It was as close to reality as a video game. Every gunner, truck commander, and key leader knew exactly how to identify the enemy and communicate their positions using the common graphics. Moreover, 1st Platoon’s terrain and enemy analysis predicted with surprising accuracy the enemy’s location of key weapon systems. Thus, rehearsed targets translated to responsive, lethal strikes in the firefight.

The SWTs arrived on station at 1230. After I gave them a long explanation of the situation, they were excited for the mission. They had not seen anything in the valleys as they flew north, but we all knew the enemy adeptly hid from helicopters. I asked them to recon our route to deny enemy IED emplacement. I then told 2nd Platoon the plan over the radio. After 20 June, they were rightfully eager to slay the enemy, but there was no time to pull them out of sector, conduct combined rehearsals with the ANA, and cross-level the TOW vehicle. Moreover, I needed someone to be an immediate reserve for casualty evacuation and reinforcement as well as a communications relay between the ambush site and COP Monti.

At 1245, we departed COP Monti. As we left, the HCT reported that their source had verified all our information. Just two days prior, our company and the ANA had experienced a lackluster day battling against insurgents entrenched on the high ground. Then, the enemy had the initiative while our response was amateurish duty (we always had a platoon in reserve as a QRF while the third platoon secured the COP). I called the 1SG and 1st Platoon’s PSG to the CTOC.

Second Platoon was an excellent reconnaissance platform. For weeks, the platoon and their Afghan partners scoured the physical and human terrain in Shigal District. During daylight hours, Shigal’s markets were filled with local people and surprising normalcy. After sunset, almost all civilians stayed indoors, but 2nd Platoon spent the night with the ANA using observation posts (OPs) and dismounted maneuver to interdict insurgent movements.

Their zone and area reconnaissance missions built a robust operating picture, which proved extremely helpful for a commander making decisions that day. Second Platoon’s debriefs to the CoIST updated our Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR) database with photos and detailed analysis of mounted and dismounted routes. The PL’s rapport with the locals facilitated effective jirgas. The platoon’s culturally literate approach enabled targeted projects in the areas.

Normalcy. After sunset, almost all civilians stayed indoors, but the enemy’s desires were elementary. If there was ever a time to assume risk, this was it.

The suspected enemy leader was a known weakling, and his tactics were weak. He was a weak tactical leader looking for an easy win to build prestige. HG agreed with my estimation.

He was an older leader known to be struggling to improve his stature with the insurgent groups in the area. His group was not involved in the Farish ambush, but I assessed that he may have smelled vulnerability in American and Afghan forces after our losses there. He was a weak leader looking for an easy win to build prestige. HG agreed with my estimation.

Ten minutes after HG entered my office, I chose to assume tactical risk. First, we had to win the people. Second, this ambush was a hasty copycat of another group’s success two days prior. The suspected enemy leader was a known weakling, and his tactics were weak. If there was ever a time to assume risk, this was the enemy I wanted to fight. Lastly, the ANA needed a victory. My Soldiers were resilient professionals, but 3rd Coy was devastated from the loss of their favorite platoon sergeant. The 3rd Coy commander needed to be reinvigorated, and I asked HG to have 3rd Coy support the mission. Another company was responsible for the district, but they were already on a reconnaissance mission with 2nd Platoon. I whispered to HG, “dray yem company zaroot laere” (3rd Coy needs this). HG nodded in concurrence.

Making Our Move

My XO, 1SG, FSO, JTAC, CoIST OIC, and 3rd Platoon’s PL and PSG were all present for a formal order to 1st Platoon’s PSG. I told him to conduct troop leading procedures (TLPs) and focus on rehearsals. It was 1145, and the enemy was not going anywhere until 1500. It would take 40 minutes to reach the target area so I allocated 45 minutes for TLPs, giving us plenty of time to move south without revealing our intent. If we went too fast, the enemy’s informants would notice our conspicuous rush.

An OH-58D Kiowa from the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade flies over Bravo Company positions during a mission in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in October 2011.
and hasty. Now, we were on the offense, and we had taken the tactical pause to rehearse a plan and control the tempo. Hopefully, surprise was equally won.

Based on intelligence and terrain analysis, I gave the SWTs an eight-digit grid of a likely enemy position. Though the SWTs did not detect enemy movement, I asked them to drop a green smoke grenade. In my CTOC, HG was still on the phone with the elder. Watching from his village, the elder reported the smoke was 10 meters from the enemy’s position. A few minutes later, HCT reported a confirmation from their source. The PSG’s target worksheet was dead-on.

I wanted SWTs to have a full 45-minute station time when we reached the ambush site. I asked them to FARP (forward arming and refueling point — go reload ammo and fuel up) for a 1330 time-on-target.

With 3rd Coy in the lead, we departed COP Monti at a standard pace. Second platoon was well-positioned in vicinity of the Shigal District Center. I used TACSAT and FBCB2 to update battalion, but 2nd Platoon also eavesdropped on company net and relayed reports through their platoon net to COP Monti. At COP Monti, all reports were submitted via Internet relay chat software to battalion.

As we passed 2nd Platoon, I maintained communications with COP Monti. As we passed through Shigal Village, LLVI announced, “The Asmar Americans are coming, get ready.” The signal intercept confirmed human intelligence and initiated enemy radio silence.

On cue a kilometer from the objective, 3rd Coy’s vanguard accelerated and seized its traffic control point in the south without incident. First Platoon’s lead section entered the area at 10 kilometers per hour. The platoon’s formation and pace had been perfect, and the rear section was already in its battle position before the PSG’s section crested the spur before the kill zone. SWTs, returning with 45 minutes of fuel, were less than one minute out over the horizon.

I was at the crest watching as the PSG ordered his section to floor it. They sped though the kill zone at 30 kilometers per hour. The sudden acceleration down the dip and through the kill zone surprised the enemy. The insurgents initiated their ambush with recoilless rifles, and I saw three impacts in the vicinity of the bridge behind the PSG’s vehicle.

After the recoilless rifle fire, the enemy opened up with multiple medium and heavy machine guns. PKM and DShK rounds were striking the engagement area, but we were very well prepared. First Platoon’s 2nd squad leader was in the TOW vehicle acquiring targets, and the SWTs were right on time. Comically, as our vehicles were lit up with enemy fire, I breathed a sigh of relief — we had synchronized assets perfectly.

The firefight was a solid 25 minutes of gunfire, but the fight was familiar to Bravo Company after two months in Kunar. We fired three TOW missiles with devastating effects. The MK47, an incredible upgrade to the MK19 automatic grenade launcher, had its own excellent optics and allowed accurate 40mm grenades. The enemy’s plan had fallen apart, and their array of forces could only mass fires on the preplanned kill zone. Thus, the MK47 and TOW vehicle were relatively free to acquire and destroy. The rest of the formation used .50 caliber machine guns to neutralize the enemy. I controlled SWTs as a maneuver force, assaulting the enemy from above while coordinating necessary shift fires and

An Infantryman assigned to Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, Task Force No Fear, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, scans for insurgent activity at an observation post outside of COP Monti on 5 May 2011.

Photo by SFC Mark Burrell
cease fires from our vehicles.

From 1st Platoon’s forward observer on the fires net, my FSO received additional grid locations and worked with the JTAC to develop refined grids. On company net, my FSO and 1st Platoon’s PSG reported locations that enabled me to coordinate assets. The firefight was the most seamlessly controlled engagement we had ever been in. Our rehearsed plan was executed to the letter. As the firefight began to slow, fixed-wing CAS support arrived and dropped two bombs on enemy cave systems. The blasts hit just after I released the SWTs to FARP.

The TOW Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) allowed 1st Platoon’s squad leader to verify effects. SWTs had expended all their ammunition. The two bomb drops had shaken the enemy, figuratively and literally. With the ITAS, we confirmed six insurgents KIA. The MK47, SWTs, and CAS engagements required more effects-based estimates.

For the next 20 minutes, we assessed the situation. Everyone in 1st Platoon had suffered machine gun fire, but the recoilless rifle fire remained thankfully inaccurate. The enemy was too disrupted to bracket their deadliest weapon.

The insurgents chose to reengage 20 minutes after the helicopters left. The enemy had readjusted their fires to be less oriented on the kill zone. The enemy was trying to match our ABF positions with their own. Fortunately, our optics proved supreme. Soldiers from 2nd Squad executed another TOW strike. Enemy recoilless rifle fire was now inching towards the TOW vehicle. The enemy was trying to disable our greatest weapon. The impacts crept as close as 50 meters. Although 1st Platoon readjusted positions when possible, they nonchalantly focused on engaging enemy targets. With more refined grids, we dropped another bomb on an enemy cave system across the river from the kill zone.

After 20 minutes, SWTs returned, and the enemy ceased fire as they came over the horizon. For 10 minutes, nothing happened. I told SWTs to save ammunition and just reconnoiter. The F-15 flying 15,000 feet overhead reported a grid to the enemy DShK. The position was on top of a mountain peak nearly impossible for us to see on the ground. The bunker was well outside the max effective range and angle of our weapons. Kunar’s insurgents were adept at plunging fire from the high ground, and I was not surprised with today’s tactic. We received approval for the bomb drop and waited for the F-15 pilot to complete data calculation. Once we cleared rotary from the airspace, he could come in hot.

The enemy had made no movement since the helicopters returned. So, the SWT pilot proposed a plan: “We will pull back over the horizon as though we are going to FARP and see if the enemy makes a move. Then, we will be inbound in 30 seconds.”

Since we had a bomb stacked, SWTs could execute their plan while the plane dropped the bomb. Their feint would clear the airspace. When the SWTs departed south, the pilot released his bomb. The enemy, unable to detect the F-15 flying 15,000 feet above the clouds and its bomb descending upon them, opened fire. Two DShK rounds smacked the side of my vehicle in 30-second intervals. The DShK has a distinct crack, and we could hear the outgoing round reverberate in the valley. We stared at the mountain peak with anticipation. Just as the second DShK round echoed in the valley, a bomb leveled the bunker.

From the enemy’s perspective, the bomb was god-like in responsiveness. The DShK had fired a measly two rounds in a minute and was immediately destroyed. Suddenly, the enemy launched a barrage of machine-gun fire, but SWTs were back on station destroying targets. LLVI indicated an enemy retreat, and their gunfire ceased. In the gulch immediately across the river from my position, the enemy curiously released several canisters of white smoke: they were executing a textbook break-contact drill. Yet, for SWTs, the enemy’s smoke simply marked their exfiltration route. SWTs expended all their ammunition into the enemy’s withdrawal. Having well exhausted their authorized flight hours for the day, the SWTs returned to their base.

We remained on the objective for an hour to ensure our victory was clearly recognized in the valleys. Villagers slowly returned to the streets eager to witness the battle’s aftermath. The ANA company commander was at my position, and people gaped at us joking on the road. We had taken a stand against the enemy in the area, and they witnessed our unmistakable victory. Soon, the elder called HG and reported that all enemy had fled. He reported that the other elders were ecstatic with the combined American-Afghan operation.

In a display of unabashed swagger, we deliberately withdrew slowly from the battlefield with our ANA partners in the lead. As we traveled back through Shigal Village, people in the market were giving “thumbs-up” to 3rd Coy. The ANA’s confidence was on the mend and ready for the long fighting season. Reports indicated that 14 insurgents were killed and 11 were wounded.

In Closing
The broader effects of 22 June were truly noticeable. IED reporting to the ANA in Shigal District reached 100 percent. After 22 June, all IED emplacements were reported to the ANA or local police and not a single IED was detonated on ANA or Americans. The victory on 22 June also began to heal the setback from 20 June. Afghans and Americans were understandably frustrated with the costly day. Yet, we had a long deployment remaining and a tough mission to accomplish. On 23 June, we held the memorial service for our fallen comrade and our Afghan brothers, and the reality of our loss remains indescribable. Though the loss was our first, it was not our last. Bravo Company had even more violent and complex fights later in the deployment. Nevertheless, 22 June marked a beginning of a renewed, robust ANA partnership.

It marked a beginning of effective cooperation with the local population. It proved Afghan and American resolve to everyone in the valleys. Though 22 June was not the decisive point in Asmar’s security battle, it marked the day Afghans and Americans seized the initiative to win the people and never let it go.

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About a year ago, I reviewed Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, and learned about a number of changes. The new doctrine applied the operations process to training management, revised the mission essential task list (METL) concept, and introduced the idea of key collective tasks (KCT). The new training doctrine also included Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS). CATS provide task-based, event-driven training strategies to assist commanders in planning and executing training events that build and sustain Soldier, leader, and unit proficiency in METL. CATS are part of the Digital Training Management System (DTMS), a web-based tool that helps plan, resource, and manage unit and individual training at all levels. All of these resources are available on the Army Training Network (ATN), a one-stop shop for training products and services — https://atn.army.mil.

Through ATN’s Ask the Trainer feature, I inquired about using the CATS planning tool for METL development. The CATS program team answered all of my questions, and I invited them to the 72nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s training center this past January. CATS team analysts provided instruction on the updated training doctrine and automated tools. We provided the analysts with feedback and recommendations on updating the unit CATS. The visit was so valuable that we brought the CATS team back to provide CATS instruction to the entire brigade’s leadership (every officer, command sergeant major [CSM] and operations NCO) as a precursor for METL development at the battalion and company levels. The CATS team’s assistance can help any Infantry unit improve training, develop leaders, and implement Army training doctrine.

The CATS Program is a Department of the Army (DA) program managed by the Combined Arms Center Training (CAC-T) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. CATS replaced the Army Mission Training Plans (MTPs) in 2007 and are now the primary reference for unit training guidance. CAC-T sends mobile training teams (MTTs) to units to train, educate, and assist Soldiers and leaders on the use of CATS, DTMS, and ATN. These teams also clarify training doctrine in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0 and ADRP 7-0. Over the past six months, the CATS MTT has conducted about 20 unit visits and solicited suggestions for improving CATS. The operational Army’s recommendations help the CATS team improve training strategies, which are developed by the Army proponents at the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) centers and schools.

The CATS Program is governed by Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development. It is implemented by TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation. It also supports AR 220-1, Commanders Unit Status Report. The CATS program consists of three components: the Combined Arms Training Strategy, the ATN CATS Viewer to examine training strategies, and the DTMS CATS Planning Tool. It allows unit leaders and trainers to manipulate the baseline unit information within the training strategy to develop a unit specific training plan.

Training Strategy

CATS assist leaders and trainers in developing unit-specific training plans to achieve training readiness. They integrate mission essential tasks (METS) and standards in weapons training (STRAC)

Figure 1 — Example from HHC Infantry Battalion CATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATS Task</th>
<th>Extracts from CATS Planning Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-1201</td>
<td>Execute the Operations Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-1203</td>
<td>Conduct Battalion Deployment/Redeployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-TS-4661</td>
<td>Conduct Fire Planning (Fires Cell)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-1207</td>
<td>Perform Intelligence (S2) Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-TS-1007</td>
<td>Conduct a Movement to Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-TS-1011</td>
<td>Conduct a Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-TS-1008</td>
<td>Conduct an Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-1003</td>
<td>Conduct Area Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-1202</td>
<td>Conduct Battalion Disaster Management (ARNG Only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-TS-2123</td>
<td>Conduct Sustainment Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-TS-5304</td>
<td>Execute Gunnery Table I-VI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
consistent with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model readiness cycle process. CATS are based on the company-level tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). The headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), detachment (HHD), troop (HHT), or battery (HHB) unit CATS capture both the company and higher headquarters’ training requirements (see Figure 1).

There are two types of CATS: unit CATS and function CATS.

**Unit CATS:** Unit CATS are TOE-based and focus training on the unit’s mission, capabilities, and functions. CATS are composed of task selections that are descriptive of a unit’s missions, capabilities, and/or functions. Task selections are groupings of individual tasks (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-1).

**Function CATS:** Function CATS address functional capabilities common to multiple units and echelons, providing a strategy to train for functional capabilities common to multiple units and new missions.

**Collective Tasks:** A collective task is a clearly defined, discrete, and measurable activity or action which requires organized team or unit performance and leads to accomplishment of the task to a defined standard. A collective task describes the performance of a group of Soldiers in the field under actual operational conditions, and contributes directly to mission accomplishment. It may also be a mission requirement that can be broken down into specific training events.

**Unit Task List (UTL):** TRADOC proponents perform analysis on the mission, capabilities, and functions of each unit TOE. Proponents identify the collective tasks necessary for the unit to accomplish its mission as well as the unit’s capabilities and functions. The tasks are organized as a UTL for each TOE. A CATS-generated report (in PDF flat-file format) from DTMS or ATN includes the UTL at the end of the CATS report. The UTL for a unit is also found in DTMS in the CATS Planning Tool.

**Task Selections:** Task Selections are based on the unit’s mission, capabilities, and functions. In some cases, a task can be broken down into sub-tasks.

**Computed Frequency:** The computed frequency is based on the collective task and is determined by the unit’s METL. During the training event, the task is completed under actual operational conditions, and contributes to the performance of a group of Soldiers in the field.

**Task Selections:** The task selection is the activity or action that is performed by the unit to accomplish a mission requirement.

**Frequency to Training TS:** The frequency to training TS is the number of times the task selection is performed during a training event.

**Event(s):** The events listed are the activities or actions that are performed to accomplish the task selection.

**Types of Events:** The types of events are the activities or actions that are performed to accomplish the task selection.
cases additional task selections are identified to address specific activities and requirements found in doctrine. They are titled to correlate with the TOE mission, functions, or capabilities (see Figure 2).

A task selection is a grouping of collective tasks from the UTL that are logically trained together. Because a collective task can support multiple missions, capabilities, and functions, it could be included in more than one task selection. Each task selection recommends frequency on how many times the task selection and collective tasks should be trained to achieve and sustain task proficiency in accordance with ARFORGEN. Task selection frequencies consider ARFORGEN cycles, turnover, turbulence, and skill decline. For example, if a task selection frequency is six, then it is recommended that the task selection be trained at least bimonthly using any combination of the events.

The task selection, with its associated collective tasks and recommended training event frequency, provides a baseline recommendation for the unit leader and trainer to consider when developing the unit training plan (see Figure 3).

When developing the unit training plan, unit leaders and trainers can modify each task selection by accepting, deleting, or adding collective tasks. They also can change the recommended training frequency of each task selection to meet training objectives and task proficiency. Task selections:

- Provide recommendations on training audience (TOE units and elements), what (collective tasks), and how often (event frequency) to train.
- Provide crawl-walk-run training events that allow the unit to achieve proficiency on the UTL collective tasks and often span multiple task selections.
- Offer more than one event for each task selection.
- Can be a MET at battalion and company levels (per ADRP 7-0).

**Training Event:** CATS provides a method or means to train the selected collective task(s) for a specific task selection. Each event provides recommendations about the training audience, how to train, and necessary training resources. Each task selection lists multiple events that provide the crawl-walk-run training methodology for collective tasks. Based on the unit leaders and trainers assessment of the collective task proficiency, one or more recommended training events can be included to achieve task proficiency. The events provide options to commanders to accommodate training at the appropriate level of difficulty based on their training readiness assessment.

When developing the unit training plan, the unit leaders and trainers can manipulate event-specific recommendations to meet their objectives. Figure 4 provides an example of information specified for each event.

**Event Iteration:** This is the number of times the event is recommended to be trained during each ARFORGEN phase. The total recommended iterations for all of the events in the task selection will not exceed the task selection frequency. Iterations for training for Regular Army (AA) and Reserve Component (RC) units will be different because the units have different ARFORGEN training requirements and do not have

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**Figure 4 — Example Event for Rifle Company (INF BN, IBCT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event: STX for Conduct an Attack (Live)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Iterations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cycle</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train/Ready 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train/Ready 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Reserved Iterations:**               |
| **Cycle** | **Frequency** | **Duration** |
| Reset     | None          | 0 hours      |
| Train/Ready 1 | None     | 0 hours      |
| Train/Ready 2 | None   | 0 hours      |
| Train/Ready 3 | Annually (1) | 24 hours     |
| Available | Annually (1) | 24 hours     |

**Condition:** Walk

**Training Audience:** COMPANY HEADQUARTERS, RIFLE PLATOON HEADQUARTERS, RIFLE SQUAD, WEAPONS SQUAD, MORTAR SECTION

**TADSS:** MILES - Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (1)

**Training Gates:**

- **Action Gates:** Class for Conduct an Attack, STX for Conduct an Attack (Virtual)
- **Facilities:** Local Training Area
- **Purpose:** To train the unit in the tasks associated with conducting an attack.
- **Outcome:** The unit demonstrates proficiency in applying tactics, techniques, and procedures; SOP items; and tasks related to conducting an attack in a live environment.

**Executive Guidance:** The battalion provides and/or coordinates for resources to include observer/controllers, appropriate cues and responses, and an opposing force (OPFOR). The OPFOR could be another platoon/company from the battalion conducting its own STX, e.g. defense. The scenario should provide for training on successfully maneuvering to and occupying an attack position. The unit places effective direct fires and indirect fires on the enemy element, destroying it or causing it to withdraw. No friendly unit suffers casualties or equipment damage as a result of fratricide. The fire support team (FIST) should be fully integrated into the training in order to incorporate both direct fires and fire support. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2/BFT) should be trained to enhance situational awareness. Training is conducted during both day and night, and in various MOPP levels. More complex and challenging conditions should be included in the scenario in order to sustain and enhance training proficiency and readiness. Training support packages (TSPs) for this training can be retrieved from AKO at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/628259. Scroll down to “McOE Collective Training Documents” and open the hyperlink for either H, I, or SBCT TSP.
the same number of annual training days.

**Event Duration:** This is the recommended duration of the event, in hours, and includes time to execute the training, to conduct after action reviews, and to retrain if necessary. The duration of the events is designed to fall short of the number of training days available to the AA or RC force as specified in the ARFORGEN training templates. To confirm the training day calculation, you should avoid double-counting an event if it is recommended for multi-echelon training.

**Training Audience:** These are the units, elements, or individuals in the unit TOE recommended to participate in the event to achieve the commander’s desired end state and level of proficiency. An entire unit or certain individuals can be specified. Where units or individuals not contained in a unit’s TOE should participate, the applicable TOEs are included.

**Multi-echelon Training:** Multi-echelon training is the simultaneous training of a unit’s subordinate elements under the umbrella of a higher-echelon event. For example, while the battalion staff participates in a brigade command post exercise (CPX), the battalion HHC and other subordinate companies could concurrently conduct situational training exercises (STXs) or live-fire exercises (LFXs). The multi-echelon training listed with each event lists other CATS task selection events from subordinate elements, staff sections, or other units that may be included.

**Facilities:** Facilities recommended for the event include ranges, classrooms, maneuver area requirements, and other Army training support system (TSS) requirements not addressed in the training aids, devices, simulations, and simulator (TADSS) section.

**Training Gates:** These are recommended events and task selections the unit should be proficient in prior to training the event. The identification of training gates provides a method to achieve a level of task proficiency before training the next higher level event to:

- Avoid serious personal injury or equipment damage;
- Ensure the training audience will be sufficiently qualified and trained to benefit from participation in the current event; and
- Ensure the training audience will be proficient enough to not hinder training for other participants.

Generally, there are four types of training gates: collective task gates, action gates, drill gates, and individual tasks.

**Warfighter Training Support Packages (WTSPs):** A WTSP is a complete, detailed, exportable package integrating training products, materials, and information necessary to support operating force training. WTSPs provide the details for securing...
the training materials, venues, and other necessary resources identified in each unit task selection event supporting the DA-approved METLs for designated units. If a WTSP is applicable to an event, it is listed.

**Resources:** This identifies resources projected to be used during the event. Data is based on the TOE equipment of the training audience.

**The DTMS CATS Planning Tool:** The CATS Planning Tool is a database program that allows unit leaders and trainers to manipulate the baseline unit information within the training strategy to develop a unit-specific training plan. The CATS Planning Tool is the preferred resource to develop a unit training plan because it is integrated with DTMS. Users can use a number of functions within the CATS Planning Tool to view, select, assess, and schedule holistic, doctrinal, or unit-selected METL-focused tasks and training events. To access the CATS Planning Tool, the user must have a DTMS account with the appropriate permissions.

The steps to access the CATS Planning Tool:

1. From DTMS main menu, select “Planning” then “CATS” to access the DTMS CATS Planning Tool.
2. The DTMS CATS Planning Tool will load the unit CATS by default, or it can be “switched” to a different CATS using the “Switch CATS” feature.

Some of the major functions of the DTMS CATS Planning Tool provides are:

1. **The METL tab.** It is comprised of two windows: Key Collective Tasks and CATS Doctrinal METL. The Key Collective Tasks window facilitates unit selection of collective tasks and task selections to support training to proficiency on each METL in the unit’s METL. The CATS Doctrinal METL window shows the proponent-defined METL-focused collective tasks and task selections.
2. **The Training Events Matrix.** It depicts the holistic, unit-selected or proponent-defined METL-focused training strategy. It shows the relationship between the task selection and its associated training events, to include recommended frequencies and duration. The strategies are aligned to the ARFORGEN cycle and are differentiated by component.
3. **The CATS Wizard.** It provides a step-by-step process for viewing, assessing, selecting and scheduling collective tasks, task selections and training events. It incorporates them into a planning calendar.
4. **The Doctrinal Calendar.** It facilitates unit planning by importing CATS training events in the unit planning calendar.

**The ATN CATS Viewer:** The ATN CATS Viewer is a database program that allows unit leaders and trainers to manipulate the baseline unit information within the training strategy to develop a unit-specific training plan. CATS by default, or can be “switched” to a different CATS using the “Switch CATS” feature.

The steps to access the ATN CATS Viewer:

1. Go to the ATN page; under the Unit Training Management Enabler tab, select Combined Arms Training Strategies.
2. Access search CATS.
3. Search by TOE, title, or by proponent.
4. Select unit CATS to view.
5. View unit CATS.
6. To view CATS task selections and tasks, click on the blue hyperlink CATS task selection. A separate window will appear with associated tasks.

Collective task data provide a hyperlink to the training and evaluation outline (T&E) for each task. The T&E also captures supporting collective and individual tasks and its references.

**Conclusion**

During the last few years, the Army’s operational tempo has been so high that Soldiers received top-down, prescribed training to support theater requirements. Army leaders are now regaining their skills in unit training management. While they know the unit training management process since it mirrors the operational process, they must now learn the training support capabilities available to them at home station. The CATS team helped educate and refocus my unit on how to plan and conduct training requirements using doctrine and doctrine-based tools. My advice to other units facing similar challenges: Visit ATN and DTMS for your training information and requirements and use CATS. CATS will save you time by providing proponent-approved strategies that will allow you to extract a customized unit training plan to prepare your unit for its next mission. And if you’d like a little more help, then use the “Ask the Trainer” feature to get the support and assistance you need.

**CATS Internet Resources**

The ATN CATS Viewer website: https://atn.army.mil/dsp_CATSviewer01.aspx#.


**CATS Reference Sources**

AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (4 August 2011)
AR 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies (15 April 2010)
TP 350-70-1, Army Training and Leader Development (4 August 2012)
ADPR 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders (23 August 2012)
TR 350-70, Systems Approach to Training Development, Management, Processes and Products (6 December 2011)
TP 350-70-1, Training Development in Support of the Operational Domain (24 February 2012)
Army Training Network (ATN) – https://atn.army.mil

SGM Charles Covington is currently serving as the operations sergeant major for the 72nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Texas Army National Guard in Houston. His previous assignments include serving as operations SGM for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment in San Antonio and as operations sergeant for the 72nd Brigade’s Special Troops Battalion in Huntsville, Texas.
During recent unit visits to armored brigade combat teams by the TRADOC Capability Manager - Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT), master gunners expressed they have a lack of dummy training ammunition for Bradley crews to effectively conduct gunners skills tasks (GST) 4B and 5B in accordance with Training Circular 3-20.21.1, Individual and Crew Live-Fire Prerequisite Testing. Training Support Centers (TSCs) don’t stock .50 cal, 7.62mm, or 25mm Dummy Drill & Inerts (DDI); however, some TSCs carry 120mm dummy training ammunition. One set of training ammunition is not enough for an entire ABCT to attain and retain proficiency on GST. FM 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Gunnery, outlines two vehicles per GST station. In order to support this requirement, combined arms battalions (CABs) must have access to two sets of training ammunition per GST station.

Recommendations

TCM-ABCT recommends that units conduct inventories to identify available/serviceable training dummy rounds in all rifle/armor companies and scout platoons. Dummy rounds generally outlast links, and links can be requested from the ammunition supply point (ASP) to reduce the total Army requirement needing ordered. Units need to order shortages necessary to support unit GST requirements for two vehicles per station in accordance with TC 3-20.21.1 and FM 3-20.21. Battalion and/or brigade master gunners need to access the Total Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS) to order 25mm and 7.62mm dummy ammunition.

Bradley Training Dummy Rounds Breakdown

25mm-470 total rounds/CAB; 7.62-40 total rounds/CAB (math below)

25mm Ammo (DODIC A967): 235 ea M794 rds x 2 = 470 rds/CAB (1/Rifle Company)
70 M794 Dummy rounds for Load AP Ready Box
75 M794 Dummy rounds for Load HE Ready Box
45 M794 Dummy rounds for Load AP in Feeder
45 M794 Dummy rounds for Load HE in Feeder

7.62 Coax Linked Ammo (M172): 20 ea rds x 3 = 40 rounds per CAB for M240C GST
Note: Scouts and HHC can use the company ammunition for training.

If battalion and brigade master gunners require assistance in TAMIS, brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) ammunition managers and the ammunition technician can order DDI through TAMIS to support training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) requirements outlined in DA Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in Training Commission (Appendix B), which can be found online at http://www.asc.army.mil/tcmlive/strac/firstpage.asp. The POC for DDI is MAJ Debbie Lovelady (debbie.c.lovelady2.mil@mail.mil).

An M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle from the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division fires on its first engagement during gunnery Table VI on 4 November 2013 at Fort Stewart, Ga.

Photo by SGT Richard Wrigley
SGM (Retired) Derek D. McCrea is currently serving as the training, leadership development, and safety integrator for TCM-ABCT, Jacobs ASG. His previous assignments include serving as the MCoE Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) transformation SGM; operations SGM for the 197th Infantry Brigade; operations SGM for the 158th Infantry Brigade, operations SGM for the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment; first sergeant for C Company, 3-15 IN; first sergeant for A Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor; and first sergeant for HHC, 1-64 AR. McCrea has ABCT deployment experience during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and III. He has a master’s degree in business administration from Columbia Southern University.

A SUCCESS STORY: ENGINEER MASTER GUNNER INITIATIVE

SGM (RETIRED) DEREK D. MCREA

Unit commanders have identified an increased need for Bradley master gunners (MGs) as armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have transferred from conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to conducting simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations in an operational environment comprised of a near-peer threat. Bradley MGs serve as technical and tactical experts for commanders on the training and employment of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

Prior to 2011, the Bradley MG Course had two separate training tracks for MGs to receive institutional training based off of the variant of BFV assigned. The two courses to train Bradley MGs were the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm (ODS) Course and the M2A3 (A3) Course. In 2011, the two courses were combined into a single Bradley MG Course. Prior to 2012, 12B engineer MGs were fighting off of the M2A2 ODS BFV and received their training in the ODS Course. In 2012, engineers began receiving M2A3 BFVs, and the U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES) was faced with a requirement for 12B MGs to be qualified on the A3 variant.

From 2012-2013, USAES worked closely with the Army Human Resource Command (HRC) to better manage its master gunner population. The school first identified a shortage of MGs and Bradley-experienced Soldiers in Korea in the fall of 2012. Since the turnover rate in Korea is so high, it is very difficult to maintain qualified crews. To address this, USAES worked with HRC to assign Soldiers to Korea based upon J3 and D3 additional skill identifiers (ASIs). The J3 ASI identifies NCOs who graduate from the Bradley MG Course, and the D3 ASI identifies Soldiers who were qualified to operate or maintain the BFV during 19D One Station Unit Training (OSUT) at Fort Benning, Ga. Based on their success with the Korea model, in the near future the Engineer School’s strategy is to rotate the current J3 population through the bases and units that have the requirement for Bradley MGs. USAES’s strategy has been successful in attaining 366 percent of the J3 ASIs for the 12B population.

TRADOC Capability Manager - Armored Brigade Combat Team

TCM-ABCT serves as TRADOC’s centralized manager for all activities related to the ABCT. The office serves as the ABCT Soldier’s user representative to the Program Executive Office (PEO) Ground Systems, Program Manager (PM) ABCT, Department of the Army, TRADOC, and the MCoE. In the past year, TCM-ABCT has completed trend analysis from five separate decisive action training environment (DATE) rotations at the National Training Center/Joint Readiness Training Center (NTC/JRTC), seven unit visits/umbrella week data collection efforts, and multiple leader engagement sessions with ABCT officer and NCO leaders attending training at Fort Benning to develop an observations, insights, and lessons (OIL)-based doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) integration action plan. Since 2010, TCM-ABCT has conducted 31 unit visits to identify trends and assist the Army with improving ABCT capabilities.
Jungle Reconnaissance and the Pivot to the Pacific

1LT MATTHEW E. MILLER

A U.S. Soldier in New Guinea during World War II once said, “It rains for 300 days and then the monsoons start.”1 This poses an ominous warning for today’s Army intelligence planners faced with the “pivot” to the Pacific. For the past 12 years, Army intelligence has made great strides in surveillance and reconnaissance. The high-tech flying sensors and platforms of the 21st century have performed with remarkable success in the desert and mountains of Iraq and Afghanistan; however, will these same systems befall the historical challenges and technical limitations of past forays into the Pacific? Sandstorms will be replaced by monsoon rains and the barren landscape replaced by triple canopy jungle, rendering even a 1.8 gigapixel sensor array nearly useless to a ground commander. The reality is that commanders in the Pacific will again find themselves relying on the oldest surveillance platform in the inventory — the individual U.S. Soldier.

A myriad of challenges will arise when the U.S. Army is asked to return to the jungle, but perhaps the most dangerous will involve military intelligence’s ability to provide the combat commander accurate and timely intelligence in an environment which has become alien to U.S. Soldiers. Monsoon conditions, low dense cloud levels, and a triple canopy jungle are not uncommon conditions in the Pacific Rim. These challenges to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite reconnaissance may inevitably leave the ground combat commander and his intelligence staff blind in the first months or even years of our next military action in the Pacific. This inability for the technological wizards to provide “real-time everything” would leave U.S. forces vulnerable to inferior, ill-trained forces with a vast knowledge of their regional terrain and environment. Of course, a defense-spending boom will seek to turn our UAVs into flying boats, and our next generation sensors will be transitioned from their desert configuration into technological marvels, able to endure any ensuing typhoon. However, will the technology be able to be adapted in a timely and usable manner that provides sufficient information for operations in the Pacific? Or will combat commanders and intelligence staff be forced to rely on old technologies that are ill-equipped to operate in other parts of the world? Should the U.S. Army be developing alternatives to ensure the military will possess adequate and useful tools and skills to operate in every environment?

Since the closure of the U.S. Army Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) at Fort Sherman in Panama, jungle operations training has almost disappeared. Over the last few years, a few Soldiers have been afforded the opportunity to attend foreign jungle warfare training abroad. However, these lucky few will do little to satisfy the ground reconnaissance requirements of conventional forces tasked with humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, or combat operations in the Pacific. The 25th Infantry Division is standing up a jungle operations leaders course in Hawaii, but the lessons from World War II and Vietnam clearly spell out the need for training beyond a basic jungle warfare course.2 A true jungle ground reconnaissance capability is essential for any unit to be successful in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.3

Southwest Pacific Area & Vietnam

In 1942, the U.S. Army began its campaign across the Southwest Pacific Area. This theater was a vast swath of thousands of islands to include the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, the western Solomon’s, and New Guinea — the second largest island in the world. The after action reports from Southwest Pacific campaigns consistently outline the requirement for long-range jungle reconnaissance capabilities.4 The U.S. Army in 1942 did not possess experience in a jungle environment and did not have a jungle reconnaissance program. The lessons learned report from the U.S. 37th Infantry Division following Bougainville noted the patrol distance required of jungle reconnaissance in the Southwest Pacific theater was far greater than had been expected and recommended units plan for patrols of up to 35 miles.5 The U.S. Marine Corps quickly realized the need for improved intelligence capabilities. As noted in the after action reports of the 3rd Marine Division in Bougainville, commanders emphasized the necessity of long-range reconnaissance in the complex terrain of the South Pacific’s jungle islands. This resulted in the 3rd Marine Division recommending that light armored scout units be reorganized into light ground reconnaissance units assigned to headquarters intelligence sections.

The U.S. Army’s 32nd Division joined the Australians in New Guinea for the Buna-Gona Campaign in 1942. The division, which had no previous jungle training, was thrown into an alien environment of dense jungle and impassable streams. Additionally, ground intelligence was
almost nonexistent with staff estimates of enemy troop strengths and field fortifications produced far from the battlefield. The battle of Buna resulted in high American casualties and the relief of the division commander (General Edwin F. Harding) by the Allied Supreme Commander (General Douglas MacArthur) after just two weeks. The reality of sending untrained soldiers into a jungle environment to face an enemy skilled in jungle warfare prompted the new commander of the 32nd Division (General Robert L. Eichelberger) to initiate a formal jungle warfare training program. The program emphasized constant "scouting and patrolling" in jungle terrain as a key to future Army operations in the Pacific.7

Our forgotten lessons from the Southwest Pacific Area have been captured in FM 72-20, Jungle Warfare (1944). The manual defines ground reconnaissance as "one of the most important means available to the commander for gaining information of the enemy." To take FM 72-20 a step further, jungle reconnaissance in complex terrain during inclement weather will likely be the only means to gain timely information about the enemy. Additionally, the field manual warns against reliance on the use of aerial photography as a sole means of reconnaissance as the solid jungle canopy will obscure dramatic changes in typography and troop movements. The airborne platforms of the 21st century are a great leap from MacArthur’s Army Air Corps in the Pacific, but flying in a typhoon is still flying in a typhoon. When the storms arrive, the ground commander will be on his own with his Soldiers.

Leap forward 25 years from World War II, and the U.S. Army found itself in another jungle war in Vietnam. The jungle skills learned during previous engagements in the Southwest Pacific Area had atrophied, and the U.S. Army was again in need of a jungle reconnaissance capability. The solution in Vietnam was the same as it was in World War II — build the plane while in flight. In 1966, GEN William Westmoreland approved the development of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Recondo School to be run by the 5th Special Forces Group. The course was three weeks in length and designed to train Soldiers in the “art and science of long-range reconnaissance techniques” in the jungle.8 The demand for skilled jungle reconnaissance was so high in Vietnam that Recondo School included live-combat reconnaissance patrols, patrols in which students were injured and killed leading to the course’s unofficial moniker of “deadliest school on earth.”9 As the cycle of Army priorities evolved following the Vietnam War and even more so after the Cold War, jungle warfare was again relegated to military history.

The challenge of day-to-day ground reconnaissance in the Pacific will continue to be the purview of the conventional ground unit. Soldiers will be tasked with conducting operations...
in an operating environment for which very few have any jungle experience or training. The lost arts of jungle warfare will leave ground commanders blind even in the most sublime of Pacific operations. Battalion and brigade S2 shops will struggle to provide timely and accurate battlefield intelligence in an environment where UAVs and other airborne platforms may be grounded. Commanders will be forced to send their Infantrymen, scouts, and long-range reconnaissance units into the jungle.

The U.S. Army’s current programs of instruction in reconnaissance are highly evolved and arguably some of the best instruction in the world. However, one key issue plagues all Army reconnaissance training for the Pacific; none of the current courses are taught in a jungle environment and there is no realistic way to simulate this challenging operational environment. Although the fundamentals are the same, history repeatedly demonstrates the same axiom — terrain cannot be underestimated. That is why the Army maintains a Northern Warfare Training Center and a Mountain Warfare School — to ensure skilled personnel are ready to act under specific conditions and in specific environments.

The U.S. Army’s Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course is located in Fort Benning, Ga., and offers impressive training in the planning and conduct of “reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition fundamentals.”10 However, the task organization and skills sets required for the jungles of the Pacific area of operations would leave Soldiers in some of the most dangerous terrain in the world with little knowledge of how to operate. Another highly developed program of instruction in reconnaissance is the U.S. Army Armor School’s Army Reconnaissance Course. This course provides instruction in the reconnaissance fundamentals to include zone, area, and route reconnaissance, communication, and mission planning. The course teaches terrain analysis and even reconnaissance in an urban environment.11 The problem is all of these reconnaissance fundamentals are taught at Fort Benning — not in a jungle environment. For the task at hand, both of these courses serve a valid and defined purpose in the U.S. Army, and the curriculum provided in these courses would contribute greatly in the development of a jungle reconnaissance school.

The Solution

The solution to the challenges of intelligence collection in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility is the creation, or rather the reactivation, of a U.S. Army jungle reconnaissance course. The Fort Sherman Jungle Operations Training Center, which was focused on conducting battalion training rotations in jungle warfare, is unrealistic in an era of fiscal constraint. One option between no jungle training and training entire battalions is the reactivation of the U.S. Army Recondo School. This will serve the Army in three very distinct ways. First, it will provide the combat commander with a readily available means of conducting ground reconnaissance in a jungle environment at the onset of a crisis without having to scramble to learn about the operating environment on a flight to the crisis zone.

Secondly, it will provide the Army with a trained cadre of trained jungle experts. This cadre of school-trained jungle experts can form the instructor staff for a large-scale jungle warfare course similar to that of the U.S. Army Jungle Operations Training Center in Panama or can augment the 25th Infantry Division program in Hawaii. In a relatively short period, the Army could stand up a program of instruction large enough for training battalion or brigade-sized elements. Lastly, establishing this course forward in the Pacific would provide Soldiers the opportunity to train closely with our Pacific partners and learn from their jungle expertise.

Regardless of the advances in technology, the ability for ground commanders and their intelligence staff to employ effective ground reconnaissance in a jungle environment is an absolute necessity for the U.S. Army’s “pivot” to the Pacific. The value gained training with and learning from our Pacific partners at a U.S. Army jungle reconnaissance course far out in the Pacific far outweighs the cost of transporting Soldiers to and from the school. The 25th Infantry Division’s jungle warfare course is a great start; however, the fact remains that the Army needs a long-range jungle reconnaissance course taught in an actual jungle.

Notes

3 Ibid.
4 Operations in the Bougainville Campaign, 1 November-28 December 1943, 3rd Marine Division, 1943.
5 Lessons Learned by the 37th Infantry Division in the Bougainville Campaign, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, 1 August 1944.
9 Ibid.

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GFP Accountability:
Part I — The Unknown Gorilla

COL JAMES KENNEDY

This is the first in a two-part series on government-furnished property (GFP). This article defines the problem, addresses the importance, and lays out the Army way ahead. The second article will help clarify myths or misperceptions about GFP. GFP is arguably the most misunderstood supply and accountability function within the Army. This is not just a logistics issue as some believe but an Army issue that must be understood by all leaders and branches.

There are two types of government property: GFP and contractor-acquired property (CAP). DoD Instruction 5000.64 defines GFP as “any property in the possession of, or directly acquired by, the government and subsequently furnished to the contractor (to include sub-contractors and alternate locations) for performance of a contract.” GFP includes but is not limited to spares and property furnished for repair, maintenance, overhaul, or modification to an Army contractor to provide specified or functional services and support to accomplish the tasks and/or responsibilities outlined by a negotiated statement of work/performance work statement (SOW/PWS). CAP is defined as “any property acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor for performing a contract, and to which the government has title. CAP that is subsequently delivered and accepted by the government for use on the same or another contract is considered GFP.” GFP can be either military standard equipment, commonly called “green equipment,” or non-standard equipment, commonly termed “white equipment.” GFP is an umbrella term that contains two categories: government-furnished equipment (GFE) — items that do not lose their identity such as generators and trucks; and government-furnished material (GFM) — items such as parts and construction materials that lose their identity when consumed through use and other low-dollar items that may not qualify for property accounting purposes but retain some limited residual identity characteristics that requires control upon issuance to a user.

In support of auditability requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) guidelines direct the Army to ensure we have all government property, to include GFP, accountable within an accountable property system of record (APSR) not later than the end of fiscal year (FY) 2017. Additionally, in 2011, the DoD noted GFP accountability as a material weakness in its annual statement of assurance report to Congress. Establishing accountability onto government property records is essential for several reasons. First, as good stewards of taxpayer dollars, we are entrusted to properly account for and control government property, regardless of who has physical control. Next, as a contract ends, military standard GFP items may be needed to fill unit shortages or non-standard items screened for utilization to support other contracts or at other Army locations, thus reducing costs to purchase equipment we already own.

A contractor uses a heavy duty forklift to move a container on Camp Delaram in Afghanistan on 7 June 2012.

Photo by SSgt Raul Gonzalez, USMC
accomplishing this mandate presents the Army with a large challenge which some say is akin to “trying to eat a running elephant with a plastic fork.” The Army G4 estimates there are approximately 31,300 open contracts containing GFP. Within the Item Unique Identification (IUID) Registry, which tracks items above $5,000 in value, contractors have entered approximately 167,000 items with a total value of around $8 billion with about 70 percent of these being capital items valued at more than $100,000 each. Unfortunately, the reliability of GFP in the IUID Registry is not known. Additionally, in Property Book Unit Supply – Enhanced (PBUS-E) and Defense Property Accountability System – Enhanced (DPAS-E), the Army has accountability of around 39,000 items of GFP with a value of roughly $950 million. In Afghanistan, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) are tracking 156 contracts with about 356,000 items valued at $938 million. ARCENT and AMC determined the Army will retain roughly 14,000 items (5 percent of the total in Operation Enduring Freedom) valued at $47 million with the remainder being disposed of in Afghanistan through transfer to the Afghanistan government or Defense Logistics Agency-Disposition Services (DLA-DS). All these numbers provide some scale of the GFP accountability issue, yet none show the complete picture. We are unable to determine the full scope of the problem; we only know it is bigger than our documented information implies.

As far back as 2008, numerous audits and investigations have mentioned a Service failure to properly account for and oversee GFP. There are numerous reasons for the present accountability situation. The 2007 re-write of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 45, Government Property, changed how we do business. Prior to the re-write, the contractor was responsible for maintaining the fiduciary records of all government property. After 2007, the responsibility of maintaining these records fell upon the government. The contractor is now only responsible for the stewardship of the government property, including maintaining serviceability and records documentation. Next, prior to 2001, GFP was issued primarily to contractors supporting depots or program management offices so there was no focus in the Army on this subject. Additionally, while Army policies and procedures to properly account for military equipment in units are in place, GFP was not treated as “Army property” and no specific GFP doctrine or policy was published or included in educational development. Therefore, leaders and supply personnel (including me on two occasions) took actions that they believed were proper but were incorrect. Often, GFP was laterally transferred to contractors and dropped off the Army (unit) property books thus removing it from government accountability. As a result of these conditions and the exponential growth of GFP in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is now in the situation of not having accountability in an APSR of the majority of GFP. While there is a great deal of GFP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the problem exists in the institutional Army as well, where contractors perform maintenance, execute large construction projects, manage dining facilities and ammunition production plants, and perform many other vital service support functions.

Management of GFP involves a mindset change in how we think about this property once it is provided to the contractor. GFP accountability and management is quite different than what military leaders and property managers were taught about accountability of unit equipment.

The Army is taking necessary steps to get the process moving in the right direction. The Army G4 has taken the lead to synchronize and integrate the GFP effort with stakeholders. PBUSE was updated to include all of the DODI 5000.64 required data fields and contract information. PBUSE will be used predominately by most organizations and units, while DPAS-E will be utilized by mainly depots and program managers. The Army G4 added GFP supply policy into AR 735-5, Property Accountability Policies, in May 2013. The Army will focus on bringing GFE back to Army records in FY14 and FY15. As requiring activities are bringing the GFE to record, processes will be developed in FY14 to gain accountability of GFM in FY15 and FY16. Finally, AMC will develop a material system that will collect and match data from the contracting database, IUID registry, Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) receipts by contractors, DPAS-E, and PBUSE data to
ensure we are accurately capturing and reconciling GFP across all systems, thus achieving enterprise asset visibility.

The Army will focus on GFE for the next two years using a two-pronged attack. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement (DASA[P]), through the heads of contracting activities and with the help of requiring activities, is identifying all contracts that have GFE and ensuring all contracts contain required FAR and DFAR GFP clauses and accurate GFP listings. As GFP lists are identified, the requiring activity — the organization that required the contract and pays for the service — will identify a property book officer (PBO) who will catalog all equipment and add the equipment under a UIC identified for each contract. Procedures are outlined in AR 735-5.

A July 2013 Army G4 GFP Tiger Team Workgroup consisting of sustainment, materiel, contracting, and policy subject matter experts identified 25 initial doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) gaps to resolve. Some of the more critical ones are:

• Developing techniques and procedures for GFP;
• Training for leaders and supply personnel;
• Resourcing additional civilian property administrators (1103 series) to fill the positions that are currently 39-percent filled;
• Improving government oversight of property management actions;
• Including AMC in the GFP disposal process;
• Adding GFP to the CSDP;
• Addressing GFP accountability in Global Combat Support System-Army (GSS-A); and
• Addressing readiness reporting for GFP in maintenance policy.

While the task of bringing all this property to record in PBUSE seems to be straightforward, there are two choke points:

1) The cataloging of hundreds of thousands of items for non-standard line item number (NSLIN) and management control number (MCN) from ACCS Engineering Systems Integration Plan (AESIP), and
2) The resources it takes to enter equipment into the APSR. It is critical that the PBOs prevent inaccurate data being placed into the APSR.

There are numerous challenges with this ongoing effort to improve accountability. The most critical is the need for a strategic communications plan to inform leaders as well as supply personnel of the requirements, procedures, and reasons why GFP accountability is critical for Army fiduciary responsibility and readiness. The use of a legacy system, PBUSE, with little funding for improvements as the Army transitions to GCSS-A, will also be challenging. Additionally, historical documentation is not available for current GFP in the vast majority of cases. Despite the challenges, if we are able to keep to our milestones and implement the changes, we should be able to obtain enterprise visibility of GFP by 2nd Quarter, FY15 while we continue to bring equipment to record.

The Army has three years to “police the GFP battlefield” from over a decade of neglect to meet the FY17 deadline. There are numerous agencies involved with dedicated people who want to solve the problem. With the right leadership, emphasis, tracking, and resources, the Army will conquer this mountain of equipment and paperwork — thus obtaining enterprise visibility, accountability and auditability of GFP. This endeavor will make us better stewards of taxpayer dollars and improve Army fiduciary responsibility and readiness during this period of ongoing fiscal uncertainty. We owe it to the Army to ensure better use of resources and not have to refight this problem in the future.

For more information on GFP, visit the DoD GFP website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/pepolicy/accountability/accountability_GFP.html or the Army G4 website at https://g357.army.pentagon.mil/OD/LOC/G43/Contingencyoperation/default.aspx.

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the opposite has been true. Most notably, there are several examples which show is not true. In the history of the U.S. Army, there are several examples which show the opposite has been true. Most notably, after the last major, protracted conflict (Vietnam), the Army steered away from the idea of long drawn out counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and towards a force focused on lightning-quick maneuvers designed to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy and bring down an opposing state in the quickest possible manner.

We are once again at a crossroads as our involvement in Iraq has ended, and we are winding down our involvement in Afghanistan. Amidst budget issues, personnel uncertainty, and the lack of a clear future mission, the Army is left to figure out how to focus and train Soldiers, units, and leaders for future combat operations. Depending on one’s observations, an individual might conclude that COIN is done and that future wars will be fought in “conventional” means against opponents such as Iran or North Korea. Other opinion-makers look at the situations in places like Mali or Somalia, and see a continued campaign against terrorists, insurgents, and criminal threats. Depending on the scenario they see, one may advocate for returning to pre-9/11 training focused on large scale, decisive operations while others may focus on continued training geared towards countering the hybrid threats faced in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. To put it more bluntly, in more commonly used terms, do we focus on “getting back to the way things were” or “building on all the combat experience and lessons learned from multiple deployments and years of war?”

The reality is that we have to focus on a full range of possible operations (which is also what the most recent Army doctrine tells us to do in FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations.) The world right now has a mix of state threats and non-state organizations which seek to harm the U.S. and our allies. This is not a new world order, just one that America has become much more aware of in the last 10 years thanks as much to 9/11 as to the internet and mobile phones. So how do units prepare for essentially “anything and everything?” They have to integrate the past and the future, both recent history and forgotten history, mixed with some knowledge of world realities, to come to an understanding of what we will likely face in the future.

This is a complex idea that could be debated ad nauseam at the expense of time and focus, but there are certain truths from “the way things were” and “the lessons learned from war” that leaders should build into training plans for deployments and operations in conflicts and areas we have yet to see, much less understand.

In this article, I will present goals that should guide unit training plans and attempt to support the inclusion of those goals with current and historical evidence while also offering simplified ideas for training to accomplish these goals. Hopefully, the collection of these goals will represent an agreeable way forward between advocates of returning to a conventional approach and experienced practitioners of COIN who want to capture hard-won experience.

The ideas here are essentially threads for training operations that can be infused into every training scenario. They are a basic framework for leaders looking to maximize training for an uncertain future battlefield. Completely framing the next fight is difficult until it happens, but leaders can focus on a broad range of skills that create the conditions for success across all types of situations.

The goal in adopting these priorities is not to usurp commander’s guidance, mission essential task list (METL) priorities, or other training requirements, but to give leaders a way for achieving multiple training objectives on top of those previously established training plans. They are intended to train technical and doctrinal skills as much as they are intended to train leaders in how to be agile and adaptive leaders.

Just like previous successes, the outcome of the next major conflict will be determined in large part by our preparation. The goal of our training and themes should be to break down this complex environment into ideas that our junior leaders and Soldiers can understand.

**Training the Fundamentals**

The 75th Ranger Regiment long ago adopted the “Big 5” goals for training: marksmanship, medical skills, battle drills, physical training (PT), and mobility. Put simply, these are basic skills that can be integrated into every training scenario and they are important to every level of conflict. When Soldiers don’t know exactly what to expect — or simply for the fact that conflicts can quickly change based on a variety of influencers — these are core skill sets that leaders can always plan training around if they want to build a force that is lethal and survivable. Fortunately, in an era of current and future budget cuts, they are often skills which can be trained at a basic level with relatively few resources.

The best way to train fundamentals is repetition and frequency. Like any learned skill, they are perishable over time. However, training just one of these skills at a time can be very time and resource intensive. Therefore, leaders should seek to integrate these fundamentals into every training scenario and environment until infusing them into every event becomes second nature.

One example of integration could be going to a range. Regardless of the mode of transportation, mobility procedures can be trained any time a unit moves personnel between two points. Soldiers should learn to conduct movement briefings, practice convoy standard operating procedures (SOPs), and familiarize themselves with various roles within the vehicle. Once at the range, Soldiers can dismount just off of a road and move tactically onto the range for occupation. This could involve a short patrol that reinforces dismounted
movement SOPs, then an occupation that includes setting up overwatch and security positions. Obviously once Soldiers are on the range, they focus on marksmanship, but medics in attendance should also come prepared to conduct round-robin training as Soldiers rotate off the range.

This is only a basic example and the ways to integrate these components into every aspect of daily Soldier life are limited only by the creativity and work ethic of leaders. The key is to keep training repetitive and regular but also challenging in order to increase competency and maintain focus.

In the area of fundamentals, leaders should also consider reemphasizing field time and fieldcraft in their training plans. The nature of operations over the past 10 years has allowed the Army to live and work from forward operating bases (FOBs)/combat outposts (COPs). This will likely not be the case in future low-intensity or high-intensity conflicts, particularly at the beginning. Simple things like field hygiene, priorities of work, choices and preparation of equipment, and long-term sustainment are things that many of today’s young Soldiers haven’t had to think about. The transition to FOBs from field life is much easier than transitioning from FOBs to the field, and many of the habits for living outdoors can only be built by actually spending time in the field.

**Training Adaptable Leaders … Who Understand the Bigger Picture**

Possibly one of the biggest failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan was a failure to understand the nature of the insurgency that was building right beneath our noses. We must train leaders who understand the varying nature of conflict, and more significantly, train leaders in the capability to adapt to the phase of conflict they are in. Similar to the Marine Corps’ concept of “The Three Block War,” Army leaders may find themselves moving from full scale conflict to peacekeeping operations or from stability and support operations to targeted raids to remove insurgents from the battlefield.

Inherent in getting this right is an understanding of what is going on with the population that surrounds a unit. In order to properly assess these factors, leaders must be capable of interacting and receiving feedback from the local populace, higher level staff, and their own subordinates. They can hold beliefs about what stage of conflict they are operating in, but they must also be able to have that belief challenged in order to redirect their efforts in an appropriate manner.

Training adaptable leaders is one of the hardest things we are called upon to do simply because it is hard to develop metrics for success and is reliant on styles of thinking that may require significant adjustments for even the most intelligent, capable, and successful leaders. One of the most immediate ways leaders can train adaptability is through developing a professional reading program. In almost any environment, leaders can push their subordinates to read pieces about historical and current foreign conflict. Using these examples, units can generate discussion about how future scenarios might compare to these conflicts and how leaders did or did not make good decisions when faced with them.

**Getting Back to Conventional Conflict**

Eleven years of war have clearly made it harder to allocate time to “conventional conflict” against a fully armed state, or what FM 7-0 refers to as “major combat operations.”

In light of getting back to the planning fundamentals, we must rehearse our
planning and execution of large-scale conflict. Yes, COIN is messy and difficult, but its success is also based largely on thousands of small interactions that are often a result of the focus areas of leaders and organizations. COIN is something that needs to be understood, but training COIN when we don’t know where we’ll apply it can mean a severe loss of focus, and more importantly, it could mean we train for the wrong COIN fight by setting up a hubris that makes us miss cultural nuances or what stage a particular insurgency is in.

Conversely, large-scale land warfare is also hard, and many young leaders fail to give it credit because they associate it with a rigid culture that existed while this type of warfare was en vogue. Truthfully, we need to get back to understanding and rehearsing what it looks like to fight as a company, battalion, brigade, or division element. If pushed for the truth, many company and even battalion level leaders would probably reveal that they have not been involved in any type of training that involved fighting with even company-sized formations. Moving these chess pieces can be difficult, and we are lacking in the types of fast, heavy warfare that allowed us to be so successful in Desert Storm and the Thunder Run.

Unfortunately, training these kinds of maneuvers requires extensive time, dedication, and resources. The ability to facilitate this type of training often lies at the brigade level and above, but this doesn’t mean it can’t be trained at the company and battalion levels. Leaders at these levels must plan training that accomplishes company-level tasks that are a part of these operations. They must also be willing to step outside of their comfort zone and learn through reading.

“Soft” Engagement Matters as Well

The fear of many young leaders is that the imperatives for training conventional conflict will absorb the skills required and acquired over the last 10 years for engaging with a population. This includes everything from human terrain mapping, to key leader engagements (KLEs), to cultural understanding, to patrolling, to developing networks both for understanding and engagement. Whatever our next mission is, no matter how small or how large, these components will be a requirement.

Conducting humanitarian operations requires engagement with local leadership but so does the aftermath of major combat operations. In a time where our relationships and reputation matter, there is a good chance the U.S. military will continue to be involved in exerting soft power by looking like the “good guy” in helping out where we are needed around the world. However, in the event we have to execute hard power by launching an invasion or similar action, we are sure to need a plan for after the fact and that plan will certainly involve the skills of “soft” engagement. If the last 10 years have taught us anything, it’s that we can’t expect to win with might alone.

Therefore, these skills should be continually integrated into training plans for all types of operations. On the back of a combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) or combat training center (CTC) rotation focused on high intensity conflict, leaders should engage in KLEs, network analysis, and cultural engagement that mimics what a post-conflict environment might look like. Training these scenarios is not necessarily straightforward, but it also isn’t necessarily resource intensive.

Perhaps one of the most often ignored requirements for any type of warfare, but particularly one that requires engagement with a population or non-uniformed enemy, is enemy and terrain analysis. Units should make efforts to build training scenarios against all types of enemies, from those using tanks to those using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They also need to spend time building the capability to analyze populations, engage with official and unofficial leaders, assess security situations, and otherwise identify the capacity and shortfalls involved in creating a stable security situation.

Commanders should look for opportunities to put these practices to work through building thought capacity. Though less nuanced than efforts to understand a foreign population, young leaders can apply network-mapping techniques and soft engagement skills simply by looking at the environments that surround them at home station.

Understanding Technology

The deployed environment offers maximum exposure to the U.S. military’s many technological developments that have occurred over the past 11 years. Enabler elements, which may be located across the country, are suddenly integrated into everyday practices, and concepts for their use become practical realities. Through often unfortunate circumstances, the deployed environment also gives Soldiers a chance to see enemy technology up close and personal. As the Army transitions out of Afghanistan, we must continue to not only capture lessons learned but also continue to integrate advanced technology into training. Today’s young Soldiers grew up with the internet, tablets, and cell phones. They can learn military technology quickly if they are just given the chance.

This is perhaps the most difficult aspect to train for and anticipate, particularly because our younger Soldiers who are even just 10 years behind current company commanders, are often much more adept at using technology than those determining training goals and plans.

Looking at individual experiences over the last 10 years could lead one to focus training to a certain type of area at a certain period of time, as could looking back to the Cold War. The reality is that Iraq was different from Afghanistan, Ramadi different from Baghdad, 2007 different from 2010. To train for the next war, we need to focus on skill sets adaptable to all phases of conflict. If we look at the entire last 10 years, that becomes apparent. Understanding the imperatives of high-intensity conflict led to successful invasions (they were successful in overthrowing existing governments, regardless of the merits of their intentions or the success of the aftermath), but understanding how to transition from violence to peace also became important. Sustaining those gains towards peace through engagement with locals and training host nation forces also proved to be the linchpins for removing U.S. forces from the situations. The key to training for the next fight, whatever it may be, will be training focused on all phases of conflict. Those leaders who understand phased conflict, as opposed to being validated on their ability to conduct violence, will be the leaders who create success for U.S. forces.

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Fangs of the Lone Wolf, Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars, 1994-2009
By Dodge Billingsley
with Lester Grau
Reviewed by 1LT Wesly McCullough

The Russians have given our military a lot of lessons learned on the modern day battlefield. For example, we have learned a lot about our enemies in Afghanistan from the Russian fight against the Mujahedeen. The Russian-Chechen Wars from 1994-2009 are another Russian battle that we can take many lessons learned from and apply it to modern-day counterinsurgency operations. Fangs of the Lone Wolf by Dodge Billingsley gives a unique perspective into this war by taking firsthand accounts of the conflict from the point of view of the Chechen combatant. They do this by not focusing on the geopolitical situation in the conflict but instead on the actual fight between Russian and Chechen forces. Although there are many differences between the Russian-Chechen Wars and what we face in Afghanistan, there are still many valuable points that can be taken away from this book.

This book is a fantastic venue for leadership professional development (LPD) because it is written into short vignettes that discuss an aspect of the war between the Russians and the Chechens. These subjects range from all aspects of armed conflict such as attacks, raids, and the defense of lines of communication. All of the vignettes also have very easy to read graphics to illustrate the particular battles and give the reader a great picture of how each event took place. Billingsley is able to capture the way a force structured very similar to our enemy operates and some of the common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that they use. This alone would be a valuable lesson to learn for leaders across the Army regardless of branch or rank.

Another great aspect of this book is that the author does not just focus on what the Chechen irregular forces did; he also covers how the Russian forces conducted the war. This book highlights the importance of synchronization and the use of combined arms in the counterinsurgent fight. There are many examples in the book where the Russian army would not coordinate fires and maneuvers and this caused either a delay or a failed mission on their part.

I would strongly recommend this book for combat arms Soldiers of all ranks. It is a fascinating book that is written from a very unique perspective and sheds light into how organized and well-prepared irregular forces are on today’s complex battlefield. The way that Billingsley captures the essence of this war is incredible and is a worthwhile read for any rank or military occupation.

Marshall and His Generals, U.S. Army Commanders in World War II
By Stephen R. Taaffe
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011, 427 pages
Reviewed by Chris Timmers

They are all here — the key generals of the European and Pacific theaters of war... the names you know (MacArthur, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley) and the names you don’t (Courtney Hodges, Walter Krueger, Alvan Gillem, and Troy Middleton).

With more than 500 footnotes derived from 14 archives and more than 200 primary and secondary sources, author Stephen Taaffe has assembled an impressive bibliography. When we read that Fifth Army commander Mark Clarke was a prima donna or that many high-ranking officers found George Patton both flamboyant and profane, we believe it given the quality and depth of Taaffe’s research.

In selecting generals who would command hundreds of thousands of men, Marshall didn’t seek the most intelligent officers, nor even those with the most combat experience (Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Willis Crittenberger had no combat experience whatsoever). He regarded integrity, sense of duty, enthusiasm, and a can-do attitude as far more important attributes in a general.

Nonetheless, as Taaffe shows, not all of Marshall’s choices were first rate. Generals are humans, too, and a number of them were more interested in advancing their careers before prosecuting the conflict and seeing a quick and successful outcome. Clark’s obsession with personal glory led him to defer pressing retreating German forces up the boot of Italy in favor of entering Rome as a conquering hero. In so doing, he allowed German forces precious time to regroup, re-supply, and dig in.

And as bright as Douglas MacArthur was, he failed to move his air force from the Philippines after learning of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor the day before. On 8 December 1941, Clark Field (Manila) was attacked by the Japanese and its fleet of aircraft destroyed. No less than historian Samuel Eliot Morison opined: “If surprise at Pearl Harbor is hard to understand, surprise at Manila is completely incomprehensible.”

Taaffe tells a story in very readable prose. His thumbnail biographies of the generals and their lives after WWII are both informative and, in some cases, moving. The men who wore four stars in the war did not exactly come home to lives of idyllic pleasure. And he offers contrasts between what we think we know of these men and what they achieved. For example, everyone knows of George Patton’s successes leading the 3rd Army (“Patton Dashes Across the Rhine” read a headline in Stars & Stripes on 23 March 1945), but how many Americans know of Courtney Hodges,
whose 1st Army took more ground, secured more villages, and suffered more casualties? My guess: not many.

As comprehensive, as thoroughly researched, and as easy to read, how could this book have been better? Maps. Taaffe has two by my count — one showing southern England and northern Europe, the other depicting an overview of the Battle of the Bulge. But none show the other major battles in Europe or any of the battles in the Pacific. I agree this book is about generals and “generalship.” But sooner or later when discussing generals in a wartime scenario, maps of major campaigns become indispensable. Of particular surprise was an absence of maps of two major operations: Overlord (June 1944) and Market-Garden (Sep 1944). And Operation Varsity (March 1945), the largest single day airborne (parachute and glider) operation in history, isn’t even discussed.

But don’t let that stop you; Marshall and His Generals should be required reading for any officer who aspires to someday wear stars.

Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov
By Geoffrey Roberts
Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon

The man. The myth. The legend. In the past, much has been written in regards to Soviet General Georgy Zhukov in each of these aspects. However, the past several decades have seen very little published on Zhukov. This is intriguing for two reasons. First, during this period, vast amounts of previously unavailable material tied to the Soviet World War II efforts have been released from the Soviet archives. Second, there has seemingly been a recent resurgence in the publishing of World War II-related books and specifically, biographies on the war’s leading figures.

Author Geoffrey Roberts has seized an opportunity to release a much needed new biography on Zhukov entitled Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov. In a relatively short volume, Roberts has written a very focused discussion of Zhukov. Those seeking a detailed analysis of every battle fought on the eastern front will not find it in this book. What they will discover in Roberts’ pages is perhaps the best personalization of Zhukov that any biographer has captured.

Within his volume, Roberts states, “The Zhukov legend has continued to grow in post-Soviet times. But new sources of evidence make it possible to disentangle the seductive myth from the often ordinary reality and to truly capture the complexity and contradictions of a man who rose from peasant poverty to become a great general and a hero not only to the Russian people but to all those who value his incomparable contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany.”

Roberts meets the challenge of providing readers a concise, superb understanding of Zhukov because of several factors. First, he benefits from his expertise in 20th century Soviet history, which includes publishing six previous books in this genre (volumes on Stalin, the Soviet entry into World War II, and the Battle of Stalingrad). Second, Roberts has done an excellent job of culling the new material tied to Zhukov and determining what readers would find beneficial. Finally, the author stays on task throughout the volume and does not stray into areas that previous books on Zhukov have focused on.

I believe readers will find three relationships which Roberts emphasizes within the book particularly beneficial in understanding Zhukov. These are: Zhukov’s relationship with his family, Zhukov’s complicated relationship with Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, and finally Zhukov’s relationship with history. In each of these, Roberts provides details and analysis previously missing in prior studies of Zhukov. Let me elaborate on each of these relationships below.

Of all the above relationships, clearly the one least addressed by historians is Zhukov’s relationship with his family. Roberts utilizes numerous newly found resources to aid in painting this picture. Within this image, he discusses many events and facets of his family life including details on his marriage and eventual divorce to his first wife, Alexandra; his affair and the death of his second wife, Galina; and his relationship with his children (sometimes rocky). Roberts provides a rare glimpse into a side of Zhukov most of us have overlooked or erroneously believed somehow did not exist.

Any author writing a biography on Zhukov would be remiss if he did not address his relationships with Stalin and Khrushchev. Clearly, each of these was far more complex than the average reader assumes. Additionally, they did not end up well for Zhukov (dismissed by each). Roberts dissects these relationships (in particular with Stalin) very effectively.

I believe Roberts is at his best when he discusses the battle Zhukov fought in his later years in his attempt to revive his legacy and rebuild his reputation. In particular, two areas stand out in this discussion. First, he provides significant background on the events leading to Zhukov being essentially written out of the Soviet history of World War II for many years. Second, he presents in-depth analysis on the subsequent steps Zhukov took to regain his position in the Soviet record. The key action being the writing of his memoirs, in which Roberts seeks to separate fact from fiction within Zhukov’s pages.

I have found that most military biographers find it difficult to remain relatively unbiased in their analysis of their subjects. Many tend to be too lavish in their praise while a smaller percentage utilize their volume to attempt to tarnish the achievements and performance of their subjects. I believe Roberts has strived to be as balanced as possible. Readers will not mistake Roberts’s great respect and admiration for Zhukov within his pages. However, they will find that the author is also highly critical of Zhukov’s decisions and some of his traits.

In conclusion, those desiring significant detail on the battles of the eastern flank would be far better served with a David Glantz book. Others seeking a biography focused more on Zhukov the general should obtain volumes written by Otto Preston Cheney or William Spahr. However, those who want an excellent foundation on beginning to understand Zhukov must read Stalin’s General. Unquestionably, Roberts has chipped away at the myth, verified parts of the legend, and most importantly, captured the man.
IN THE NEXT ISSUE:

*The Leadership Imperative: A Case Study in Mission Command
* DNNE Fuses Infantrymen’s Capabilities With Technological Advancements