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LEADER DEVELOPMENT: KEYSTONE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

The dismounted Infantry squad is the tip of the spear on today’s battlefield and will remain so for the foreseeable future. It is the squad that takes the fight to a determined, adaptive enemy in the last hundred yards, grapple with him in the urban and complex terrain of the current operating environment (COE), and ultimately defeat him by close combat, fire, and maneuver. We spare no effort in ensuring that the training of our squads prepares them for the challenges of the asymmetric warfare that defines today’s global war on terrorism. This training focuses on providing the Infantry squad overmatch in terms of lethality, sustainability, maneuverability, and leadership, and I want to talk about leadership in this Commandant’s Note.

While there is no shortage of definitions for leadership, we can agree that a leader must possess those qualities or attributes that enable him to motivate others to accomplish the mission of the organization or unit. He provides the purpose and direction to garner others’ support and — if successful — improves the organization, its morale, and the self-confidence of his Soldiers. While effective leadership has professional competence as its foundation, the leader must also possess the intelligence, moral character, and physical presence that will set him apart as a role model for his Soldiers. Over the last decade we have spent a great deal of effort ensuring that our Soldiers understand the deep-rooted values that define our Army and our nation, and have included emphasis on the Warrior Ethos in all aspects of leadership training.

The Maneuver Leader Self-study Program underway at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) is replete with opportunities to include leadership examples throughout students’ professional development readings. General Anthony Wayne’s capture of Stony Point, New York, on 16 July 1779; General Andrew Jackson’s victory at New Orleans on 8 January 1815; Colonel Joshua Chamberlain’s leadership in defending Little Round Top at Gettysburg on 2 July 1863; the defense of Outpost Harry from 10-18 June 1953; and the bitterly fought Battle of Ia Drang from 10-18 November 1965 are just a few of the exemplary battles in which both leadership and the tenacity of the American Infantryman were decisive factors. Each battle has its own lessons to offer, and we must continue to include these in our professional development instruction.

Civilian and military print and web-based periodicals and our professional bulletins continue to publish the leadership thoughts of our NCOs, including current and retired command sergeants major and other senior NCOs whose insights resonate throughout the Army. This input is proving invaluable as we institutionalize lessons and apply challenging and innovative approaches to leadership training to make sure our Soldiers and leaders are fully capable of fighting, leading, and winning across the entire spectrum of operations.

Leadership also implies a commitment to the Soldier and his family, and the MCoE is committed to providing world-class quality of life for Soldiers, Civilians, and Army Families. When then LTC Harold G. Moore was commanding the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam, the family support group concept first manifested itself at Fort Benning, with Mrs. Julia C. Moore’s attentiveness to the needs of the families and widows of the men serving under her husband, and has steadily evolved over the succeeding five decades. Today, the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Performance and Resilience Enhancement Program is being incorporated into professional military education at the MCoE. The Army’s concern for family members and civilian employees is highlighted through efforts to reinforce discipline through enforcement of standards, renewed emphasis on a zero-tolerance policy towards sexual harassment and sexual assault, and suicide prevention efforts.

The human dimension of our profession has assumed progressively greater significance over the past decade, and it is in this dimension that leadership is most critical. Battles are fought and won by dismounted Infantry squads of tactically and technically proficient Soldiers. These cohesive teams fight against asymmetric threats in ambiguous environments that demand a high degree of resiliency, and that is just what we are building into our leader development courses at the MCoE. Rigor has become the watchword as we examine our programs of military instruction, and officer and NCO students find themselves confronted with dilemmas for which they must find solutions. This was common in much of our instruction during the 1960’s, when a unit ambush on one day in Vietnam would become the teaching point of an Infantry Officer Basic Course two days later. Lessons learned was as important a teaching tool then as it is today.

As we continue to empower our junior leaders, we will continue to stress the increased opportunities for Soldier and leader development and include training on the employment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of their supporting weapons and data processing systems. This will enable them to more fully exploit their units’ capabilities while they execute their commander’s intent. The MCoE will continue to field adaptive, agile, innovative Soldiers and leaders trained to standard for an Army at war, and I welcome your suggestions and input as we execute the mission.

One force, one fight! Follow me!

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Lightening Soldiers’ loads has always weighed heavily on Rich Landry’s mind. While more and more equipment is being developed to assist them on the battlefield, Landry worries how Soldiers will carry it all over rugged terrain in places such as Afghanistan without incident or injury. As an individual equipment designer with the Load Carriage Prototype Lab, Product Manager Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment, at Natick Soldier Systems Center, that’s his job.

Recently, Landry and colleague Murray Hamlet were tasked to come up with another solution for a load carriage problem. They took the frame and suspension from the Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE) Medium rucksack and affixed a panel that allows a Soldier to add a variety of equipment or modular packs to accommodate unwieldy ammunition, medical or electronic loads, depending on the situation.

“This is just a pack board, or a foundation for an entire range of tactical equipment beyond that of what we call the Soldier’s fighting load,” said Landry, adding that the rucksack sometimes was in the way. “Anybody who’s carrying large, crew-served weapons would find this application useful, the mortar guys, who are carrying a base plate, the tube, the various rounds, etcetera. They could utilize a modular setup to support those unusual loads.”

As Landry pointed out, the MOLLE’s frame, made of injection-molded plastic originally used in automobile bumper technology, has already proved itself over 15 years in the field.

“Car bumpers have to survive that huge range of temperatures, extremely hot and extremely cold,” said Landry, “and that made perfect sense to us.”

To that sturdy frame, Landry added the adaptable panel.

“It’s very basic load carriage capability,” Landry said. “They still need to carry their basic, critical individual equipment, so we will provide a set of larger pouches, which will attach to the panel but still allow the larger items to be carried.”

That includes water, which presented an early stumbling block for Landry, until he added a little something to the MBP.

“You’ve got a pocket inside here that’s designed specifically for the hydration system,” Landry said. “It’s got a little bit of extra room, so you can actually put some smaller items — cold-weather clothing, wet-weather gear, ration components, things like that, down inside here.”

Landry, a former 82nd Airborne Division pathfinder, can’t wait to get the MBP into the hands of light Infantrymen.

“That is my customer,” Landry said. “It’s the guy that’s got to carry this on (his) back, and, obviously, light Infantrymen are kind of the soul of that. That’s where we get our best information on things like that, because they’re out there carrying it. Let’s see where we can make it fit, and let’s see what improvements we need to make to it.”

Landry and Hamlet will use the feedback from the Infantry and others to refine the prototype’s design.

“The great thing about this job is, every day is something different and you can always improve,” Landry said. “Everything can get better, and we can do that here.”

(Bob Reinert works for the U.S. Army Garrison-Natick Public Affairs Office, Natick, Mass.)
The way training is conducted on Fort Benning is continuously changing — changes that are a result of feedback directly from the field, said MG H. R. McMaster, commanding general of the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Ga.

“There’s a saying that war is the great auditor of all military organizations,” McMaster said. “We’ve learned so much after 11 years of combat, and we’re also making a grounded projection into the future, trying to anticipate the demands of future war, future armed conflict, and to make sure our Soldiers, our leaders and our units are prepared for those challenges.”

McMaster said most of the changes under way now on Fort Benning are continuations of initiatives begun well before he took command in June 2012.

“All of our priorities here are really aimed at one overall objective, which is to improve the combat effectiveness of the maneuver force,” he said.

To do that, MCoE leadership is focusing on six areas: education and leader development, training, capabilities development, doctrine, combat development, and best practices for the health of the force.

**EDUCATION AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT**

“The No. 1 priority of all of these efforts is leader development and education because Soldiers will follow a good leader anywhere,” McMaster said. “So it is the preparation of leaders for those responsibilities that is most important to all of us here at Fort Benning. Because we have very complex environments … we’ve had to replicate those conditions in training, and we’ve also had to develop a higher degree of competence in a broad range of skills with our instructors. So the way our instructors are trained and educated has changed dramatically.”

McMaster said there is a continued emphasis on instructor certification, giving instructors college credit to reflect their proficiency in certain fields and making sure they are subject matter experts in the areas they teach.

Another initiative on the horizon is a maneuver leader self-study program, which takes a holistic look at leadership to grow and prepare Soldiers for their next duty assignment.

“This program will give maneuver leaders the opportunity to study the profession on their own,” McMaster said. “It won’t just be a reading list. It will be a description of how to conduct study of war and warfare and leadership and responsibilities as officers and noncommissioned officers across a career.”

This matters, he said, because “the strength of our Army” comes down to lieutenants leading platoons and sergeants leading Soldiers.

“What our leaders have to be able to do is they have to be able to visualize the battle,” the commanding general said. “They have to be able to see their forces in context of the terrain, the enemy, civilian populations, the multinational or indigenous forces they’re operating with — all these complicating factors — and then be able to visualize that operation in a way that allows them to be able to do some planning. We need leaders to think ahead of where they are. We need leaders to be able to make decisions based on that thinking ahead … issue simple orders as they make those decisions and then also fight and report simultaneously so we maintain our situational understanding.”

**TRAINING**

“We’re going to continue to make our training more effective,” McMaster said. “At Fort Benning, the content of our training is important, the skills we develop; but, our example and how we train is important because Soldiers and leaders carry that with them to the force. So we have to be the best at training in our Army.”

That means an emphasis on outcome-based education, combined arms, fundamentals such as navigation and marksmanship, and consolidating lessons learned in training.

Along with improvements made in existing training, new methods of instruction have been developed. Prime examples are the Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT) course and the Adaptive Soldier Leader Training Environment (ASLTE) approach to training.

“War is unpredictable; war is confusing, so we replicate that in training,” McMaster said, referring to ASAT and ASLTE. “We help Soldiers understand their environment better — to be able to identify the presence of the extraordinary, the absence of the ordinary — so they have an early warning of enemy activity.”

**CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT**

“What we’re doing now is looking at formations at the lowest level and beginning with our squads,” McMaster said. “It’s our squads who make contact with the enemy under oftentimes what are conditions of parity. We don’t want a fair fight — ever — so how can we improve the combat capabilities internal to the squad?”

Answers include improving firepower, lightening Soldiers’ loads to make them more agile and providing better optics, he said.

“Firefights with the U.S. Army should be very short and end very quickly in our favor,” the general said. “This is an important aspect of the ground combat vehicle effort where we can deploy nine skilled, tough, courageous Infantrymen into a position of advantage with overwhelming firepower support.”

This new focus on the squad reinforces the Army’s approach to modernization — which involved infusing larger formations with capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, precision strike and improved optics — “by turning it on its head,” and where the “focus is bottom up,” McMaster said.

The effort to improve the squad as a fighting force is currently being expanded, he said, and will carry over into effort from the platoon to the brigade level.

**DOCTRINE**

“Another change that’s ongoing here is in the area of doctrine,” McMaster said. “Our doctrine is being completely rewritten. What a huge opportunity that is. Our Army has just come out with our
The manuals focus on the essentials, he said, including leader development, mission command, training, and how the Army fights as an army. McMaster said that Fort Benning’s doctrine revisions will emphasize the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security operations and how to develop and operate with indigenous security forces at the brigade level and below.

“We’ll now refine those (manuals) and inform our doctrine writing from lessons from combat and projections into the future,” McMaster said.

**COMBAT DEVELOPMENT**

While capabilities development focuses on the squad as the foundation of the decisive force, analysis of other formations from platoon to brigade continues.

How the squad operates internally is important, McMaster said, “but what’s maybe more important is how that squad fights as part of a team, how they access combined arms capabilities, how they communicate and they receive data so they know where their squad is in relation to other squads. (That) allows you to conduct fire and maneuver at a higher level. It allows other units to move into positions of advantage over the enemy.”

When it comes to maintaining overmatch over the enemy, enhancing capabilities of brigades is imperative, McMaster said. An example is the ground combat vehicle. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is required to preserve our advantage in mobility, deploy Infantry squads under the most advantageous conditions and preserve our ability to conduct fire and maneuver to close with and defeat current and future enemy organizations.

Collaboration is also key, the general said. “What’s great about Fort Benning is … the way leaders across Fort Benning are sharing and borrowing ideas, continuously improving and innovating,” he said. “We’ve learned a lot. What’s critical is integrating all arms in the fight. That applies to leaders at all levels.”

**BEST PRACTICES**

There is a continual evolution, McMaster said, toward making the MCoE a better organization by seeking out best practices and innovations.

“(Many) innovations have been in the area of the cognitive, psychological and really the moral and ethical preparation for combat,” he said. “What’s different about Iraq and Afghanistan from, I think, any of our other wartime experiences is that many of our Soldiers and many of our units are in environments of persistent danger over an extended period of time. So how do we equip our Soldiers, our leaders, our units to deal with combat stress over time — and also to deal with the debilitating effects of combat trauma?”

One solution is the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program, which highlights physical, emotional, social and spiritual fitness as means of developing individual resilience.

So far, the initiative, including the Performance and Resilience Enhancement Program, has been a success, McMaster said — “tremendous in terms of equipping Soldiers to cope with these difficult issues and these difficult environments.”

Along with service members, Families and civilians are also part of the “best practices” outlook for Fort Benning.

“What we want to do here and I think what we’ve largely accomplished is to provide the best experience for our Soldiers and Families,” McMaster said. “We want to make Fort Benning the place people want to come back to.”

(When this article was written, Cheryl Rodewig was serving on the staff of Fort Benning’s newspaper The Bayonet.)

**Soldiers fire targets from the prone-supported firing position at McAndrews rifle range on 31 January 2013 at Fort Benning.**

Photo by Patrick A. Albright
As crews become familiarized with the M2A3, M3A3 or M2 Operation Desert Storm-Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs), new equipment training teams and master gunners have many resources at their disposal to train all types of BFV tasks. Preliminary training is essential to the future success of BFV crews. This training should encompass individual, hands-on, and crew-level training. One essential element for BFV crew success during gunnery as well as steady through-put on a gunnery range is a proper and expedient zero. This requires crews to have both an understanding and familiarization of zeroing procedures.

Zeroing procedures can be found on the Commander’s Tactical Display (CTD). These steps are laid out in step-by-step order. However, understanding how these procedures are performed as well as the sequence in which they are conducted is essential in order to increase BFV crews’ efficiency once they are on the ready line. The following training technique developed at the BFV Master Gunner School will not only allow crews to better understand zeroing procedures but will also provide a hands-on training experience without having to fire a live round.

**Construct a Zero Practice Board**

Begin with a board approximately the size of a half sheet of plywood. Paint a 1/10th scale truck target (10.2 inches x 10.2 inches) center mass of the board and four (4) different shaped aim points (approximately 5 inches x 5 inches) placed on the four corners of the board (see Figure 1). We chose a truck target for the simplicity of its shape and ease of painting on plywood. It will also give the crew an accurate representation of the thermal signature they should receive from a truck target on the range. Potentially, this could be created on the back of an existing worm/tracking board.

**How to Use**

Place the board approximately 120 meters in front of the BFV. The 1/10th scale target at this range provides the BFV crew an accurate representation of what they will see when looking at a full scale target at 1,200 meters. The truck target would be the “zero target” and the designated shapes would be “point of impact.” These scales and ranges can be adjusted to suit your training area. However, it is recommended that the scale of the target and range to target be adjusted appropriately.

Utilizing this training aid, the BFV crew will be able to replicate all 25mm chain gun zeroing steps found in the CTD. When the CTD indicates to fire the first round to zero, the vehicle commander (VC) will instruct the gunner to do so. The gun will stop in misfire due to no recoil from an actual round being fired. The gunner will go through normal misfire procedures by hitting the SEAR/MISFIRE button, ensuring the same ammunition type is selected, and that single shot is selected. He will then squeeze the trigger again, bringing the gun back to sear.

Upon completing the gun cycle, the VC will select and announce a shape to serve as the “point of impact.” The gunner, using the manual hand wheels, will ensure he is still center mass of the zero target. The VC will select AIM POINT on the CTD, and the gunner will use the Gunner’s Hand Station (GHS) to electrically move to the designated shape or “point of impact.” Once on the point of impact, the VC will select CALCULATE and SAVE on the CTD. The gunner will use the manual hand wheels to get back on the original zero target and prepare to “fire” the next round.

**Final Thoughts**

This simple training event will increase a crew’s level of knowledge on zero procedures, familiarize them with the options of the zeroing screen on the CTD, and expedite their time zeroing during live-fire gunnery tables. On an A3 series or ODS-SA BFV, achieving an accurate zero can be done very efficiently and in little time. The lag in time comes from a crew’s lack of basic understanding of zeroing processes and procedures.

Please be aware that this training aid is for preliminary training before moving to the range. Using this technique after properly boresighting the 25mm may cause the Improved Bradley Acquisition System (IBAS) to exceed adjustment parameters and require the gun to be re-boresighted.

**Notes**

1 Figure 12-3, page 12-11 of FM 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Gunnery, provides a good overview.

SSG Jeffrey Turcotte is currently serving as a Bradley Master Gunner Course instructor at Fort Benning, Ga.
The Army has learned a great deal during the last 11 years of combat operations, but basic crew competencies within the mechanized force have eroded. Many mechanized Infantry units deployed to Iraq without their Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) or took a reduced number of vehicles.

Naturally, commanders focused training on critical tasks due to the limited training time available rather than training on vehicles and equipment, like the BFV, their units would not use during combat operations. This reality led to lost knowledge and experience of the BFV. There was a high percentage of NCOs within armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) that had little to no BFV experience.

The BFV can be intimidating to a Soldier coming from a light Infantry unit because he has probably spent months walking patrols in Mosul or the Arghandab River Valley and perfected the art of leading a fire team or squad in that environment. He prided himself on mastering every weapon system within his element and is now faced with learning the capabilities and limitations of this 66,000-pound beast.

As a commander for a mechanized Infantry company, this was exactly the situation in which I found myself. The majority of my NCOs had come from multiple deployments with either the 101st Airborne Division or the 10th Mountain Division. When I saw an NCO with a combat patch from a mechanized unit, they frequently told me things like “I was a guy in the back.” While observing the unit in both the motor pool during maintenance operations and in training, it was obvious that critical Bradley skills were missing. I realized that as the saying goes, “It may not be your fault, but it is your problem” and it had to be fixed. So how would a company commander change the culture?

Trying to train these atrophied skills may seem like a daunting task. It is essential that the company commander breaks it down to the basics and fundamentals. I broke my thought process down to three key phases: Maintenance, Gunnery Skills Test (GST) Tasks, and Gunnery Preparation. Each one is a critical and fundamental building block and leads to success in the next step. Working through them — gaining real expertise and incorporating platform expertise into the overall unit culture — is essential for progression to the real work of developing tactical and combined arms proficiency.

Maintenance

Command maintenance
A company’s command maintenance program can be a very effective gauge of the knowledge base of many of its first-line leaders. Are the NCOs actively engaged in conducting preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS)? Do they have the appropriate manuals and are they using them? Is the company executive officer present and actively tracking vehicle and equipment status? The company commander must ensure that his weekly motor stables are executed properly to develop the baseline knowledge of the BFV within the formation. To do this, he needs to approach command maintenance as a training event rather than simply “a maintenance day.” Effective planning and communication will determine the commander’s ability to institute a successful command maintenance program.

A company commander must communicate his expectations to his subordinates. Remember that many of the key leaders within the organization could have limited experience in dealing with armored vehicles. What is correct in the eyes of the company commander may not be intuitive to them. Set aside time at training meetings to detail your expectations for command maintenance. The company commander needs to clarify who is expected to be involved and what their roles are. You will likely have to get
smart yourself, as I did. Some one on one with the right NCO will enable your ability to issue clear guidance.

Make sure Soldiers are present. The best way to accomplish this is to have the morning formation in the motor pool. Command maintenance is a vitally important training event. The company commander has to task his subordinate leaders with ensuring maximum participation. Distractions such as appointments and meetings will happen, but the leadership must work to reduce this as much as possible. If the Soldiers are not present to conduct maintenance, they do not get the constant hands-on experience with their fighting platform. This will reduce the effectiveness of the company’s other crew-related training programs.

Ensure that DA Form 5988-Es (Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheets) and necessary technical manuals are present. Do not waste time waiting on the printing of 5988s and for delivery to the maintenance line. These can usually be printed the duty day prior and ready for command maintenance day. Command maintenance can quickly deteriorate into a simple walk around of the vehicle and not a thorough PMCS without the proper technical manuals on hand. It is essential that the appropriate reference document is not just on hand but actually used. Not only does it ensure the PMCS is done correctly, but it is an excellent training tool to show to subordinates not just what they are supposed to do, but why and how.

Include maintenance personnel into your command maintenance program. Whether the company’s maintenance support is contracted or Army personnel, they have a vested interest in your maintenance success. An efficient and effective program is also a win for maintenance personnel. A company commander must coordinate with the supporting maintenance element to have them present in the company’s area of the motor pool. They can be an incredible asset in teaching Soldiers how to properly conduct PMCS.

Leaders must not only be present, but involved. If leaders at all levels are not actively involved during command maintenance, it will not be successful. Leaders need to engage Soldiers during command maintenance. This involvement is the surest way to communicate the importance of maintenance activities. One successful technique is to have a Soldier teach the company commander what he is doing. This enables the commander to gauge his subordinate’s skill level and gives him an easy way to engage with his Soldiers.

Train subordinate leaders. A leader professional development (LPD) program needs to include a variety of topics including platform-specific skills. Executing a short series of maintenance-focused LPDs is a worthwhile investment of time. Company commanders can request maintenance subject matter experts (SMEs) to properly train their sergeants and staff sergeants during LPDs. An intense focus on maintenance training will reinforce this command priority. Additionally, opening lines of communication between unit leaders and maintenance supporters can only have a positive effect on the company’s maintenance program.

Driver Training
For many units, driver’s training programs are an afterthought. However, this program can actually have an incredible effect on the company’s maintenance program. Unfortunately, it is rarely managed as the high-payoff training event that it is. It is an incredible opportunity to allow Soldiers to get their hands on the equipment. This can significantly increase a new Soldier’s familiarity and comfort level with the Bradley.

AR 600-55, The Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program, requires PMCS training in the program of instruction. Many units do not cover this training thoroughly and simply show students how to read a 5988-E and do a quick walk around the vehicle. Include a PMCS certification as part of the company’s driver training program. Most unit driver training courses are approximately a week long. During a five-day course, it is not difficult to incorporate two days of PMCS training and certification and reinforce daily through before, during, and after checks.

My company’s master driver established a five-day program that included two days of PMCS training and certification into the operator/driver training course. The first day of PMCS training covered the hull, and the second covered the turret. The key to using this course as a bridge to transition inexperienced or previously light Infantry Soldiers was in following the guidelines below:

Include maintenance personnel into PMCS training. (See my previous comments.) The motor pool is full of BFV SMES. Coordinate in advance and have them instruct PMCS during your driver training.

Ensure that driver training classes have the correct instructor/student ratio. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle Training Support Package for Driver Training Programs (TSP 071-W-BFVS) requires a one-to-three instructor/student ratio. It is incredibly important to stay as close to this ratio as possible. More than once, I witnessed only one NCO with 10 Soldiers huddled around a vehicle resulting in only two or three Soldiers actively engaged. Require leaders to go through the training. It is vital to the company’s success to have the NCOs go through the PMCS training, even more so if they are coming from a light Infantry background or are inexperienced with the BFV. NCO expertise is fundamental to NCO success. While there is an expectation for individual responsibility, enabling them through a well-executed and resourced company event will go a long way returning mechanized units to proficiency.

Gunny
Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) and GST Training
Many units fail to take the necessary preparatory steps to set the conditions for a successful gunnery even though they routinely identify and protect the time on the training calendar for BATS and GST. Follow the guidance laid out in FM 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Gunnery. A seasoned master gunner is a great asset for planning required preliminary gunnery events, but many master gunners lack practical experience. Your involvement and self-study is critical to achieving your desired training outcomes. Your master gunner will appreciate the support.

Ensure compliance with the 8-Step Training Model. Like any other training event, the company will get out of it what they put into it. Following the principles in the 8-Step Training Model will enable sound execution. Company commanders should ensure that leaders have gone through the appropriate steps and planned the training event appropriately with a synchronized concept.

Certify Instructors. Even though it is a step in the training model, its importance is worth reinforcing. Company commanders must certify their instructors. My company typically established a board consisting of myself, the first sergeant (1SG), the master gunner, and...
the platoon sergeants. This allowed me to ensure every instructor could not only perform the task but also teach it exceptionally well. We put the certification time on the training calendar and protected it. This also gave us the opportunity to ensure the subject matter that the instructors were teaching was correct according to doctrine and the technical manuals rather than relying on past tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The most important reason for solid certification is the role your instructors will have on standards within the unit.

Focus more on the teaching ability than the rank. The abilities of the instructor to communicate effectively are far more important than their rank. I have had specialists in charge of teaching a GST task because they were the most effective teacher I had available. Company commanders should never forget that the purpose behind the training is to develop a skill set within the unit — not just to execute a training event — and should always choose the best person for the job. Also, company commanders should not be afraid to ask other units within the organization for help when the company lacks qualified personnel.

Competitions can enable success. Crew competitions within the company can help develop both morale and focus. It is hard for someone to get motivated to pull a 260-pound cannon in and out of a vehicle all day. Adding a sense of competition can reinforce both a winning attitude and reinforce task standards. Competitions can be as simple as the 1SG telling each platoon to give him someone to disassemble the 25mm cannon and give the winning crew a day off, or they can be multi-company events involving GST, BATS, and other special events. In the end, Soldiers will practice and rehearse on their own to be the winner.

Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)

One of the best training tools available to bring Soldiers together as a crew is to have them shoot a virtual gunnery in the CCTT once they complete preliminary gunnery through Table II. The CCTT is capable of executing a virtual crew or section gunnery even though it is commonly used for platoon-level collective tasks. The CCTT provides the additional benefit of incorporating the driver, thus enabling the entire crew to work as a team. Executing a Gunnery Table VI rehearsal in CCTT prior to going to a live range can have a very positive effect on crew qualifications scores, especially with the more inexperienced crews. Additionally, in the current fiscal environment, this low cost training aid can save a unit valuable time, ammunition, and money. However, company commanders should closely manage this training to ensure it is as much of a rehearsal as possible.

My company had vehicle crew evaluators (VCEs) in the after action review (AAR) room monitoring everything the crews did and said when we used the CCTT for gunnery preparation. A VCE in CCTT can actually monitor more information than they can during a live gunnery. The VCE is able to give the crew a solid AAR with immediate replays of the video and audio. Crews that were “on deck” for executing the virtual gunnery table would sit in the AAR room and monitor the firing crew as well. This enabled the crews to learn from each other’s mistakes. The rapid throughput CCTT gunnery allows also makes it a very valuable tool.

The essential component to successfully integrating Soldiers and NCOs into a mechanized unit is through effective use of every available opportunity to get hands-on training with the BFV. Constantly working with the components of the vehicle through maintenance and opportunity training will have a dramatic effect on a Soldier’s comfort and eventual expertise with the system. Leaders must approach every event with the thought process that it is a training event, rather than “Maintenance Monday” to ensure that these opportunities are maximized.

Reconstituting these critical skills within combined arms teams is more important than ever before with our shift to decisive action competencies. Commanders must create cultures of expertise and master these fundamentals if we are to effectively train combined arms operations and all its inherent complexities.

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No more fair fights at the squad level. That’s one of the chief goals emphasized by Army leaders as we unwind from more than 10 years of war and prepare for potential future operations. But how do we set the conditions for dominance at the lowest echelons? One major enabler will be the network.

Having the right information at the right time is key to tactical overmatch. As the Army upgrades its tactical communications network, a major focus is equipping dismounted leaders and Soldiers with tools that provide the type of situational awareness and communications capabilities that were previously only available in vehicles or command posts. This will enable our ground troops to cover a larger area while staying connected and make informed, timely decisions as they engage the enemy.

At the same time, the new network will also give the team, squad, and platoon unprecedented reach-back to share voice and data with forces at company level and higher. Rather than waiting for information to filter up and down the chain of command, the network now “flattens” the picture so all echelons throughout the brigade combat team (BCT) have near real-time awareness of the battlespace.

For these reasons, the Army has made networking the Soldier the centerpiece of its modernization efforts. After two years of Soldier-driven doctrinal development, evaluation, and integration, we are now fielding a suite of upgraded, integrated, and systems-engineered equipment, known as Capability Set (CS) 13, to select Infantry BCTs who are slated to deploy to Afghanistan this year.

Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division’s 3rd BCT at Fort Drum, N.Y., and 4th BCT at Fort Polk, La., were the first to receive CS 13 when fielding began in October 2012. The new network will arrive in Afghanistan as U.S. forces continue to retrograde, turning over many of their forward operating bases and other infrastructure to the local forces, thus gradually losing fixed network locations. CS 13 systems provide mobile satellite and robust radio capabilities for commanders and Soldiers that can be used in vehicles and while dismounted as they conduct security assistance and some combat missions.

The Systems of Capability Set 13

CS 13 is designed to allow small units to stay connected while conducting dispersed operations in austere environments and rugged terrain. At the team, squad, and platoon levels, this is accomplished through the Rifleman Radio, which unlike past radio models is not limited to line-of-sight communications. The Rifleman Radio runs the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), which allows the radios to form a mobile, ad-hoc network, with the radio acting as its own “retrans.” For example, if a platoon leader positions two squads on either side of a mountain with a Rifleman Radio-equipped buddy team on top, the two squads can talk directly to one another without relaying the information through the middle element. They can communicate faster and with more precision.

But the Rifleman Radio goes beyond just voice communications; it also connects with smartphone-like handheld devices known as “Nett Warrior” to transmit text messages, GPS locations, and other data. Fielded to team leaders and above, Nett Warrior provides advanced navigation and situational awareness capabilities by displaying the locations of Soldiers and leaders on a digital geo-referenced map. This allows the leader to see...
and understand the position of his forces and maneuver them as appropriate to accomplish missions — more quickly and accurately than they could using a radio, map, and compass. As one platoon leader who tested the system put it, “We use it mainly for navigation and then putting in our last-minute locations before an assault, or if we’re setting in a support position. It’s pretty easy to put that on the map and say, ‘Just go here.’ You don’t have to worry about whether they’ve shown up at the right place or not.”

Nett Warrior is also an interesting case study in Army leadership listening to its Infantrymen. After several years of development based on the program’s original requirements, earlier versions of the system had a backpack computer that weighed about 14 pounds. After Soldiers vetted the system through the Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs) — a series of semi-annual field exercises where a full BCT assesses new communications technologies in realistic operational scenarios — they provided feedback that Nett Warrior offered valuable situational awareness but was too bulky to carry. Army leadership quickly modified Nett Warrior to arrive at the current version: Android-based smartphones that link to the network through the lightweight Rifleman Radio. These changes saved the Army $800 million and resulted in a more usable end product for the dismounted Soldier that can be delivered to more units on a faster timeline.

To connect lower echelons back to the company level, CS 13 also includes a variety of vehicle-mounted radios. These radios act as a conduit for voice and data between the dismounted Soldier, his unit, and higher headquarters, allowing small units in austere environments to pass information up and down the chain of command without having to rely on a fixed infrastructure.

At the company level, CS 13 will provide key leaders with vehicles equipped with Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2, the Army’s mobile tactical communications backbone. Known as the Soldier Network Extension (SNE), the configuration item installed on these vehicles extends satellite communications from the brigade down to the company level for the first time. Using its on-the-move satellite communication systems, the SNE will be used to “heal” and extend lower echelon tactical radio networks for geographically separated elements blocked by terrain features. The SNE also allows the company level to connect into the WIN-T backbone and provides them with “bigger pipes” for more capacity to reliably send and receive messages.

The WIN-T Increment 2 Point of Presence (PoP), which is installed on the vehicles of key leaders at battalion, brigade, and division echelons, provides even greater capacity than the SNE. It enables mobile mission command by providing secret level on-the-move network connectivity, both line-of-sight (terrestrial) and beyond-line-of-sight (satellite). PoPs allow commanders to utilize many of the mission command systems that they have in the tactical operations center (TOC) inside their vehicles while on the move.

Together, these integrated systems untie the commander from his TOC and put the dismounted Soldier into the network. They provide Soldiers and leaders with constant situational awareness and the ability to rapidly share what they know across echelons and vast distances. Instead of adjusting their operations in order to get the information they need, units will have the information with them when they need it. That is a powerful change, one that will empower small units to seize the advantage and help do away with the fair fight.

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Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division drive a vehicle equipped with WIN-T Increment 2 during the Army’s NIE 13.1 on 9 November 2012. WIN-T Increment 2 is a major upgrade to the tactical network backbone that enables mobile mission command.
Using training teams to assist in the development of host nation forces is not a new concept. Advisors have been a part of the U.S. military’s mission almost since its inception. Recently, the difference between the various forms of advisory or training teams has been in how they are sourced, what the composition of the team is, and what part of the military they are from. Operating as part of the first “wave” of security force assistance teams (SFATs) to deploy to Afghanistan has presented some unique challenges. These challenges, as well as best practices, are what I would like to highlight in this article.

So what is an SFAT? An SFAT is a team of eight to 15 mid-career officers and NCOs that is developed to advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Over the years, many Soldiers have been a part of training teams (military transition teams, security transition teams, or even an operational detachment alphas) with an ANSF training mission. As the ANSF have matured, their need for tactical training from U.S. forces has decreased while their need for specific guidance and advising has increased. The SFAT was created specifically with the mission to professionalize the ANSF. The SFAT also brings access to enablers that can be used in support of ANSF missions and has specific skill sets to enable mentorship across all staff sections and warfighting functions.

My team’s mission is to advise the 3rd Kandak of the 3rd Zone Afghan Border Police (ABP) in the Spin Boldak District of Kandahar Province. Our task organization originally called for a major as the team leader, a captain as executive officer and operations advisor, and an officer from each of the specific staff functional branches: signal, logistics, and intelligence. In addition to these, the team is authorized three drivers, a fires NCO, and a medic. How the team actually ends up being comprised is almost totally up to the unit being tasked. As our SFAT came entirely out of an Infantry battalion, the team is comprised of more NCOs than officers and is made up almost entirely from a mechanized rifle company. The SFAT will typically have a conventional battalion that owns the battlespace and is responsible for all effects in the area while also controlling and managing enablers.

The ABP in Regional Command (RC) South have never had advisors before April 2012 and are almost a paramilitary force. They are much closer to soldiers than policemen as the majority of their engagements are direct fire or initiated by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They are much less professionalized at the lower levels, especially when compared to the Afghan National
The Afghan police force (ABP) in the 3rd Kandak is primarily composed of fighters from the Kandahar Province. Many of these commanders are former mujahedeen fighters and have long histories and trust with one another.

One of the key ways the SFAT impacts the ABP is by providing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) enablers; this is an interim solution until the ABP builds robust organic capabilities. Being able to request and provide enabler support when needed is one of the key ways advisors can build rapport with the advised force. This is especially important during emergency situations and of itself is an argument for having embedded advisors with the ABP. The first time the SFAT provided aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for a wounded ABP soldier, the tone of the relationship between the SFAT and the kandak commander improved markedly. Additionally, being able to get helicopter resupply to beleaguered checkpoints or close air support (CAS) during an ABP troops-in-contact event improved the SFAT’s standing in the kandak commander’s eyes. By providing this support, anytime the SFAT needed information, human intelligence (HUMINT), or even a high value individual captured, the ABP were far easier to work with and more receptive to the request.

Route clearance is by far the most requested and used enabler by the ABP. All of the ABP kandaks are working hard to develop explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and route clearance patrol (RCP) capabilities, but as an interim solution ISAF route clearance is used to maintain freedom of maneuver for the ABP in the district. Developing a good working relationship with the RCP commander is critical for the SFAT. The second most requested asset is close air support or fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR). As far as close air support, unless the ABP are actively engaged with ISAF present, it is very difficult to clear fires. Finally, MEDEVAC or coalition medical support is also frequently requested. Using these assets effectively is a huge challenge, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for their use will be discussed later.

This leads into the crux of advising — how to replace coalition enablers with ANSF capabilities? As far as the RCP and IED-Defeat capabilities within the ABP, there are two parallel courses of action (COAs) as well as a tertiary coordination effort. The primary COA is to train teams in every kandak in explosive handling and reduction. The parallel effort is to train an EOD team in the quick reaction force kandak which could respond to other kandak’s areas to remove IEDs. The tertiary coordination effort is to at some level integrate the ABP with the ANA RCP teams, allowing the ABP to request and receive RCP support from the ANA. To date this hasn’t happened, but it is a working goal. The ABP will have access to ANSF EOD capabilities, but for simpler devices the local commander will need to be able to reduce that device to maintain freedom of maneuver in his operating environment (OE). These types of IED reduction tactics are very important in terms of replacing U.S. enablers with an ANSF solution that is sustainable and practical.

Replacing ISAF air support with ANSF air support is more challenging. The Afghan air force will for the foreseeable future be far less robust than what has been provided by ISAF. The ability to affect this as a kandak-level advisor is certainly limited. However, instead of using CAS to protect the checkpoints, one tactic is to simply improve fighting positions. Typically attacks against checkpoints are uncoordinated fire-and-maneuver attacks. More often they are a group of three to five insurgents with AK-47s firing on a checkpoint. CAS is not always available, and relying on their U.S. mentors to get close air support to repel every enemy attack is simply not sustainable. Instead, our team focused on getting checkpoint commanders to see the value in increasing the amount of cover and the overall survivability of their checkpoints. Sometimes this is done through ANSF funds, but it can also be achieved by getting the kandak staff to request materials through the ANSF supply system. For example, in our OE it took four months to get HESCO bastions to a checkpoint, and another month to convince the checkpoint commander to fill them. The commander ended up hiring a front end loader out of his own pocket because the nearest ANA engineer unit was more than two hours away. This took a considerable amount of time, but this particular checkpoint is now the most hardened checkpoint in the area and will last for years with minimal maintenance. While this doesn’t take the place of CAS, it does reduce the dependency

Photo by 1LT Richard Norris

U.S. Soldiers and Afghan Border Policemen prepare for a meeting with local elders on 5 June 2012.
and denies the enemy the quick IO (information operations) victory of attacking a checkpoint and killing or injuring policemen.

Though improving checkpoints reduces the need for CAS, there are situations where CAS is required, such as during dismounted patrols in remote areas. Thus, there is a need to establish a battle drill with the battlespace owners (BSO) for employment of CAS. Our SOP involved receiving the report from the ABP and the request for air support at the kandak headquarters. That report was then translated into a CAS nine-line and relayed to the BSO battle captain and joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). The SFAT is critical in terms of pulling the necessary information from the ANSF to get a CAS request. The other hurdle is clearance of fires. Without U.S. advisors on the ground with the ANSF, it is very difficult to clear fires. Instead, a show of force is often the only way to affect the enemy safely and avoid blue-on-green or civilian casualties. It is very important for the SFAT to develop a relationship with the BSO staff and commander to “husband” a CAS request through the appropriate staff channels. Too often a CAS request will sit at battalion or brigade because of a lack of understanding of the problem or desired battlefield effects.

Employing a 12-man team with a conventional BSO requires some creativity. BSOs will set their own requirements for what constitutes a minimum force requirement for a patrol. Also, each time the SFAT goes on a mission in its entirety, it forces the team to focus on one task (outside the wire) and removes advisors from helping the kandak staff conduct battle-tracking, mission command, requests for support, etc.

One tactic that we developed was to divide the kandak’s operating environment into three distinct OEs. This enabled us to assign an SFAT member as the primary advisor for a geographic area, and he retained responsibility for the checkpoint commanders in his area. Splitting the OE is what drove the development of the “mini-SFAT.” Vehicles — each with a senior advisor, driver, gunner, guardian angel/overwatch element — then became the mini-SFAT platform, which enabled the SFAT to have an element with every maneuver element (typically a rifle platoon) on large battalion missions. This worked because we had a habitual relationship with a BSO company that lived at our combat outpost. The company typically provided a full platoon for security whenever we patrolled.

This approach had four distinct benefits. First, it gave every advisor an operational focus in addition to a staff focus (intelligence, communication, logistics, etc.), allowing the advisor to see what was happening on the ground with the organization and advise checkpoint commanders in the field. Secondly, it involved every member of the team in advisor operations. Breaking the team into this small of an element, with the security of a rifle platoon from the BSO, enabled every member to advise either at the leader or Soldier level, enhancing composite team understanding of the OE and the ABP kandak’s capabilities. Third, it prevented the team leader from being the only advisor and the ABP from only wanting to talk to the team commander. If the team commander went to a checkpoint, the checkpoint commander would only want to engage with him. This presented a problem on kandak-level operations where the focus is advising the ABP to enable junior leaders, where at the same time every junior leader will only talk to the team commander. Lastly, if we needed to conduct a checkpoint assessment or engage a checkpoint commander, then only one third of the team was required to complete this task. Having the mini-SFAT partnered with a platoon allowed the other advisors to continue mentoring at the kandak level.

Having a good relationship with the BSO unit is what makes this technique work. Of course, there are times when the BSO has
tasks for their platoons to complete that may not fit with the SFAT mission perfectly. In these cases, accomplishing our SFAT tasks under the construct of time and space within the BSO requirements became necessary. For instance, if the BSO had a patrol scheduled that would essentially drive by one of the ABP checkpoints we needed to assess, it was easy to add an SFAT truck to the patrol and two hours to the mission and accomplish both units’ tasks with the same patrol. Where it gets more complicated is on large operations. For those, the SFAT simply developed a list of tasks that needed to be either trained or assessed with the ABP. As opportunities arose to complete these tasks, they were completed rather than trying to dictate to the BSO when, where, and how the SFAT needed to be on the battlefield to accomplish its mission.

Another tactic that the team developed was sharing human intelligence that had been gathered by the ABP both within the ABP kandak itself and with the BSO. Nearly every village in the OE has at least one cell phone in it, and that cell phone is controlled typically by the village elder. One of the goals for both the SFAT and the ABP over the last nine months was to get every village to have the kandak operations officer’s number or the kandak commander’s number. That way, the villagers would have a means to call the ABP with information or intelligence. The ABP operations officer or commander would receive at least three to four HUMINT reports a week. These reports would be shared with the advisors. Additionally, as the advisors developed relationships with various checkpoint commanders, the checkpoint commanders would also call the SFAT with HUMINT reports. The SFAT would then share that information laterally with the kandak intelligence officer, who would disseminate to all the checkpoints, as well as with the BSO intelligence officer to either corroborate or leverage additional U.S. collection assets. There were numerous times when the BSO would be able to corroborate intelligence with an ABP HUMINT report and vice versa.

Interpreters are key to an SFAT and should not be overlooked. Interpreters can make the team successful or struggle. There were two specific occasions in which quick-thinking interpreters literally saved ISAF lives and numerous other occasions in which the interpreters helped the SFAT save face and preserve ABP relationships. Early on in the deployment when the SFAT was new to the OE, an interpreter spotted an indicator that an IED was nearby and literally shoved a U.S. Soldier out of the way to prevent him from stepping on it. Another instance involved a deliberate clearance of a village in which the ABP misunderstood what the attached female engagement team was doing with regards to searching a specific female on the objective. The interpreter recognized that the policemen were agitated and was able to get word to the SFAT and the ABP commander who responded and calmed the situation. Ensuring that reasonable measures are taken to make interpreters feel a part of the team and included in operations goes a long way to building this relationship. Before every meeting or mission, a deliberate interpreter plan should be made so that all members of the team know where the interpreters are and which member of the SFAT they should be working with.

Finally, being an SFAT is a rewarding mission. It isn’t perfect and can have its challenges. One of the most important things our team learned early on was the necessity to maintain three distinct relationships. The first relationship is with the advised or partnered force. The improvement of the ABP was our mission; without their trust the mission would not get anywhere. The second relationship was with the BSO; in order to build rapport with the ABP, you have to have access to BSO-owned enablers. The BSO is reluctant to give up enablers unless they are confident their use will achieve desired effects in their battlespace. Having a good working relationship with the BSO staff and commander is the only way to get a seat at the table and full access to enablers. Lastly, the relationship with other SFATs is very important. There was an SFAT at our kandak’s higher headquarters, and having a good working relationship with them ensured information would flow to our kandak and material issues could be resolved with the help of the higher HQ’s SFAT. Also, sharing TTPs and combining logistics convoys with other SFATs made those tasks far easier to accomplish. Overall, the experience of being an SFAT in southern Kandahar was rewarding professionally and personally. Every day was unique and watching the ANSF organization as it grows and develops over time is rewarding indeed.

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The operations officer for the 3rd Zone Afghan Border Police speaks during a rehearsal for an operation in the district of Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, on 27 September 2012.
LESSONS FROM A CHANGE OF COMMAND

CPT LUKE H. RYAN

The task gradually sank in somewhere around the second cup of coffee at a Starbucks on Fort Irwin, Calif. The 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division was in the final days of regeneration after Training Rotation 12-08 at the National Training Center. As executive officer (XO) of Blackfoot Company, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, I had transitioned from focusing on “XOing” the Infantrymen of my company through whatever “the Box” could throw at us to planning for the obscure company change of command (CoC) that was tentatively scheduled for a Thursday afternoon a little more than four weeks into the future. I felt a tightness in my chest as it dawned on me that this CoC — this one event — would probably be the most time-consuming and monumental task of my military career.

Even though I had more than 30 days to prepare, I was concerned I would not be ready. Like anything difficult, the end of the struggle always includes the benefit of hindsight, of lessons, that if only known and applied early in the process, would have made life and the job significantly less painful. However, experience is the cruelest of all teachers, and the greatest growth always takes place after the most difficult of times. Everything that we do as Soldiers develops a muscle. Confidence, patience, and perseverance are muscles like any other. The more you challenge and stress that muscle or ability, the stronger it becomes.

Executing the Blackfoot Company CoC highlighted areas of my own leadership and organizational abilities (and embarrassingly, patience) that require profound improvement. The CoC also demonstrated a degree of selfless service and support from platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, commodity shop NCOICs, and an entire Infantry company that will shape me for the rest of my life. Lucky are the XOs who are given the opportunity to compete in the crucible that is a change of command.

Disclaimer: Having been the person primarily responsible for executing a CoC in no way qualifies me as a subject matter expert. This article is nothing more than a list of suggestions and techniques that Team Blackfoot developed for our CoC. It is also where we’ve consolidated some important information about Army property that really lies at the foundation of a successful understanding of how to manage and properly account for the millions of dollars worth of government property given to a Stryker Infantry company. It’s written from the perspective of the XO and basically attempts to provide a roadmap for my brother and sister XOs as they work to accomplish the objective of a CoC: To set the conditions for a seamless change of leadership and to provide the incoming commander with the physical ownership of a fully equipped unit without negatively impacting the regular training and operations of the company.

Planning and executing a CoC is a military operation that requires the same attention to detail and deliberate, rehearsed steps as any other large scale military event. The inventory of all property with the incoming commander is the decisive point of the operation; however, the work is not done until you’re off the objective and safely home. The fundamentals of leadership apply, even during the horror that is a CoC. Delegate, spot check, and make corrections; always lead from the front; and lead by example. Let’s begin.

INSERT AND INFIL

This is your movement to the objective. The prep work is where you set the conditions for success. The most important part of this phase is generating the paperwork that will be your execution checklist (EXCHECK). The EXCHECK in this case is the list (using numerous DA Form 2062, Hand Receipt/Annexes) that identifies everything that must be inventoried. You’ll also need to develop the plan of action (i.e. the schedule — what will be inventoried and when) and you’ll need to delegate the plan to the sub-hand receipt holders who control the property. (It’s basically steps 1-5 of the troop leading procedures [TLPs].
1. Receive the mission;
2. Issue the warning order;
3. Make a tentative plan;
4. Start movement — get the sub-hand receipt holders organizing their equipment;
5. Conduct recon — identify all the property you need to inventory).

Property Book

The first place to start is with the company’s property book. The property book (or commander’s hand receipt) identifies all of the end items that belong to the unit. The “end item” is not simply one piece of equipment. It is the collection of items that creates a functioning piece of equipment. (For example, the HMMWV on the property book is not merely the truck itself. It includes add-ons such as the shovels, fire extinguishers, warning triangles, etc., that allow the operator to properly employ the equipment.) During a change of command, the devil is in the details.

Component Lists
Now that you have identified all of the end items the incoming commander will sign for, step two is to identify all those details (the devil!). These “component parts and materials” that make an end item ready for its intended use fall into one of three categories:

1. Components of an end item (COEI) — spare/repair parts identified in technical publications that make up the sum total of the end item.

2. Basic issue items (BII) — those essential items required to operate the equipment and to enable it to perform the mission and function for which it was designed or intended.

3. Additional authorization list (AAL) — items that are not required to operate the piece of equipment but can be ordered to enhance or improve the function. AAL is not required when accounting for a piece of equipment, but it is purchased by a commander to make the equipment more effective.

COEI and BII are considered part of the end item. An end item is not complete if it is missing these items. When you buy a new camera, you are also expecting certain COEI/BII such as the cord to connect to your computer, the memory card to store the photos, the battery, the lens cap, the instruction manual, etc. If it was delivered to you without those component items, the camera would be practically useless. Army property is no different.

So how does an overwhelmed XO determine what is COEI or BII? The Army provides a handy list in the technical manual (TM) for each piece of equipment. A list of all COEI and BII needs to be generated for each end item on the property book, and these component lists are typically written using a DA Form 2062. You’re going to have to go through the most recent TM of every piece of equipment on the property book in order to generate the component hand receipts for the equipment that the new commander will sign. It’s not enough to use the same component lists that were used at the previous change of command. If the TM has changed with new COEI or BII added to an end item, the end item is now incomplete without those extra pieces.

The best resource for generating those component lists is available on a website called ETMs (electronic technical manuals) Online — https://www.logsa.army.mil/etms/online.cfm. The TMs are available in PDF (portable document format) and are easily searched using the search function to identify the COEI and BII (typically found at the back of the manual). Take the time to print off the pages from the TM that identify the COEI and BII when researching and building these component lists. Save them as a reference as you account for every piece of equipment owned by the company.

(Bad news first!) Building the component lists is extremely tedious and probably one of the most time-consuming parts of planning and executing the CoC; however, (now the good news!) the time you devote to developing accurate lists of all the additional pieces of property that are accountable with the end item, the easier it will be during your actions on the objective when you are trying to actually conduct the inventory. The component list is the detailed map that identifies what needs to be on display.

**Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE)**

Once a component list is complete, it needs to be updated into PBUSE. This has the added benefit of a couple things. Shortages are easily ordered through PBUSE, and when sub-hand receipt holders sign for equipment, the PBUSE hand receipt should accurately reflect what components are with the end item. Key takeaway: if it’s not clearly identified as a shortage, with a shortage annex initiated by the commander, whoever signs for an end item is signing for all of the COEI and BII associated with that end item. Additionally, and most importantly for XOs, as you work to build the component lists, one of the greatest benefits PBUSE provides is the identification of COEI and BII accounting requirement codes (ARCs). Property items can be classified as one of the following:

**Nonexpendable** — property that is not consumed in use and that retains its original identity during the period of use; ARC code of “N.”

**Durable** — property that is not consumed in use and does not require property book accountability, but because of its unique characteristics requires control when issued to the user; ARC code of “D.”

**Expendable** — property that is consumed in use, loses its identity in use, or is not consumed in use but costs less than $300; ARC code of “X.” Expendable items can be further sub-classified as either accountable (items of such a nature as to require additional supply and issue controls) or consumable (items that are consumed upon use).

The ARC will become important during reconciliation after the inventories are complete when the CoC memo and financial liability investigation of property loss (FLIPL)/report of survey are generated.

**AZIMUTH CHECK**

Before you even think about bum-rushing that clearing in the woods and assaulting what you think is the objective, always (always!) ensure you are where you think you are. Call it a tactical...
pause, call it a map check, call it a chance to catch your breath before you frantically send your message over the radio. Call it what it is — a “rehearsal.”

**Pre-inventories (Every Mission Requires a Rehearsal, Every Time)**

Congratulations! Now that you have acquired the property book (which tells you every end item the new commander will be responsible for) and now that you have built the component lists for each end item and entered that information into PBUSE to identify the ARC for each component or basic issue item, the sub-hand receipt holders (platoon leader, platoon sergeants, commodity shop NCOIC’s, i.e., anyone who has signed for a piece of property on the commander’s hand receipt) finally have all the documentation they need to know exactly what they need to find and layout. This is where you accomplish steps six and seven of the TLPs (complete the plan and issue the final order). One step left! (Supervise and refine is basically the step where you execute that plan you’ve so carefully crafted. That means it’s almost showtime!)

Pre-inventory layouts are key. You’ve given the sub-hand receipt holders the list of what they need to layout, and the pre-inventory layout is where they identify what they are missing (and they will be missing things). Sometimes the component list that you’ve given to them will be the first time that they ever knew they were responsible for certain COEI or BII; other times (most often), they need the incentive to dig through lockers and tough boxes and containers to find all the additional pieces that were never used. Sometimes, COEI and BII are legitimately missing or broken, but the paperwork was never updated and the replacement parts were never placed on order. The pre-inventory provides you and the sub-hand receipt holders the time to acquire those items through the Army Free Issue System before the new commander conducts his inventories.

**EXECUTION**

**Pop quiz: How do you eat an elephant?**

**Answer:** One bite at a time.

It’s finally showtime. Armed with the property book, the PBUSE-generated component lists, and the pages from the TMs that identify the required COEI and BII, you’re finally ready to physically show that equipment to the incoming commander. Remember, slow is smooth and smooth is fast. You need to alleviate all issues and concerns a person could have when assuming responsibility for millions of dollars of property. Here are some recommendations:

1. Conduct the inventories based on the sub-hand receipt holder. Inventory all the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) equipment on one day; the arms room on another; communications equipment on another, etc. It will place a large burden on those individual sub-hand receipt holders, but it will also concentrate and focus their efforts. This schedule is also a tremendous opportunity for the OIC/NCOIC to get a better understanding of all the equipment they have and allows that hand receipt holder the opportunity to explain the function and capabilities of equipment that may be unfamiliar to the incoming commander. Immediately after the inventory is complete, have that sub-hand receipt holder re-sign the sub-hand receipt. (Boom! That’s four birds with one stone!)

2. Arrange serial-numbered items in sequence. Part of the inventory is an opportunity to provide the incoming commander with a strong first impression. Being organized is key. It takes a few additional minutes to put things in order so the incoming commander can verify the items by serial number in a simple step-by-step process. Smooth. Everything is as organized as possible.

3. The same applies when inventorying COEI and BII. Arrange those items in the order they are found on the component list. The best way we found to layout COEI and BII was in a grid with all of the items for a specific serial-numbered end item (vehicle B24 for instance) on one axis; the other axis can be the specific component/basic issue item (one ax, four headsets, one screwdriver, etc.). After inventorying the serial-numbered end item, it is a simple process to move down the line checking all of the additional component and basic issue items.

4. Maintain a daily roll-up of all the items that were inventoried during that day with a list of all the issues and discrepancies that were found. This will help when you’re composing the change of command memo and trying to remember what administrative adjustment reports (AARs) needed to be submitted to the property book officer (PBO).

**EXFIL AND EXTRACTION**

The final part of executing a successful CoC comes after the inventories are complete. This phase consists of organizing all the information about missing and broken COEI and BII, ensuring that sub-hand receipt holders have signed for the correct property, accounting for any
discrepancies with the property book or the component lists, updating and making corrections to the master property book and PBUSE, ordering parts, filling shortages and trying not to get emotional (i.e. cry). The key is to stay organized. Maintain the system you developed by focusing on organizing property by end item.

**Shortage Annexes**

Build the shortage annexes directly from the component lists you used to conduct the inventories. Shortage annexes are basically the opposite of component lists; they identify what COEI and BII are missing from particular end items. Where a component list catalogs all of the COEI and BII, a shortage annex only lists what is actually missing.

The common practice is not to generate or include a shortage annex if there are no COEI or BII missing, but what happens if a shortage annex is lost or misplaced? Now it would seem that whoever signed for the end item is now responsible for those items that were legitimately missing when the sub-hand receipt holder took possession of the property. That’s not taking care of Soldiers.

Recommendation: Generate and maintain a shortage annex for every item on the property book, even if the shortage annex is blank. If it is included with all the other shortage annexes, it will clearly identify that all COEI and BII were present at the time the sub-hand receipt holder took possession. Maintain the shortage annexes with the component lists and important pages from the TMs for each end item. Organize it by line item number (LIN), the same way it is organized and listed on the property book.

**Change of Command Memorandum and FLIPL**

The CoC memorandum should be a complete roll-up of any issue, discrepancy, or question that was identified during the CoC. This is where your daily roll-ups will come in handy as you discuss all of the issues that were encountered during the inventories. Some examples from Blackfoot Company’s CoC memo include:

* A brief overview of the situation and timeline when the CoC inventories were conducted;
* End items that did not have a TM or other official publication (in order to generate comprehensive and correct component lists);
* Problems or inaccuracies that required some sort of correction to the property book; and
* New end items that were issued to the company (and not reflected on the property book) during the inventories.

The CoC FLIPL or report of survey is generated after examining all of the shortages you identified. Build a comprehensive list of all the shortages and determine the cost to purchase a replacement. Create an Excel file that lists every item with price and include it with the DD Form 200.

**The Ceremony**

Once you’ve hit that decisive point — that place in time where the battle is sure to be won — (This will happen somewhere during the actual inventories when everything finally starts working smoothly, when the sub-hand receipt holders have all the equipment laid out without issue, when it’s finally starting feel smooth and you honestly consider not sleeping in the office this one night?) that’s when you need to start thinking about the actual ceremony. Compose an invitation (two pages: the invitation and a strip map). Turn it into a PDF file and e-mail it out to as many people as possible. Write up the program (six pages: cover, sequence of events, outgoing commander’s bio, incoming commander’s bio, words to the Army and branch/unit songs, back page with company logo).

Resourcing the ceremony is pretty straightforward; it’ll just require someone to make contact with the morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) directorate and reserve things like the podium, chairs, tent, etc. (delegate and spot check, remember!) The earlier you’re able to make that reservation, the less stress you and those commanders will experience as the date gets closer.

XO, you’re the narrator. Compose the script. If there’s time, run it by the command sergeant major to make sure you’re reading the correct unit history and not planning on an overly wordy ceremony (remember that bit about lessons learned the hard way?!). Remember to rehearse. Buy the red and yellow roses. Assist the incoming commander with planning the reception and acquiring the coolers for drinks, plates, plasticware, napkins, etc. Become the party planner. And on the day of days, relax. Thank the team that did the heavy lifting and share the lessons learned with your peers. Good luck!

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The Evolution of Ranger School: Supporting the Squad as the Foundation of the Decisive Force

MAJ Peter C. Vangjel and Capt Michael Filanowski

The Army has learned valuable lessons over the past 10 years of war, particularly with respect to small unit leadership. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been fought primarily by platoons and squads operating independently from higher headquarters, where the decisions made by their leaders have had both operational and strategic-level impacts. The Army has identified that this new, complex environment requires increasingly adaptive leaders. A primary concern is how best to prepare leaders for this environment prior to their arrival in theater and, further, how to maintain the capabilities of our experienced small unit leaders when the current conflict comes to a close. The Army has refined its doctrine and its learning model based on lessons learned from the past 10 years as well as assumptions about future combat.

The Army has also identified a necessary focus area — the Squad: Foundation of the Decisive Force (SFDF) initiative. The Army’s plan to generate overmatch against its adversaries at the squad echelon is highly techno-centric. Each of the plan’s six dimensions, including education/training, focuses on technology. While these initiatives will prove beneficial to the Infantry squad, as Napoleon said, “The moral is to the material as three is to one,” and the real source of combat power for the squad will be found in the human dimension. Former Maneuver Center of Excellence Commanding General MG Robert Brown identified this in 2011 stating, “When we began we thought most of the improvements would be mostly materiel systems... What we found, though, is that most of the change is needed in the human dimension — training and leader development.”

Fortunately, the Army has a low-cost, pre-existing program directly geared toward the human dimension and toward increasing the combat power of squads and platoons — the U.S. Army Ranger School. As the Army’s understanding of the future of warfare, leadership, and training has evolved, the Army’s premier leadership course has evolved as well. Ranger School is positioned to be the decisive operation in the effort to gain squad overmatch. This article highlights the refinements that the Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) has made to accomplish this mission.

Background

In existence for more than 60 years, the U.S. Army Ranger School has produced the world’s best small unit combat leaders with the goal of sending these leaders out into the Army to make the force, as a whole, more proficient. Commanders have been able to expect three things of a Ranger graduate:

- He is mentally and physically tough;
- He is tactically proficient; and
- He can lead Soldiers in the harshest and most strenuous conditions.

These expectations of Ranger graduates have not changed over the years, but the conditions and standards for them have. As the Army adopted Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 and began to focus on SFDF, we in the RTB conducted a self-assessment to determine how we could nest our efforts with these refinements and create a better product — specifically, a better Ranger graduate. We identified that while the first two outcomes of the course remain consistent with the requirements of combat leaders on the ground, the standards for the third outcome — excellence in leading Soldiers in combat — have changed with the current nature of ground conflict. Our goal was to evolve the course so that we maintained the physical and mental stress on students and continued to develop their tactical acumen, but also produced a Ranger graduate who was more flexible, more adaptable, and more at-home in the complex, dynamic, and uncertain environment of combat. As we tell students, the days of “Smart Rangers” or “Strong Rangers” are over — the Army now needs its Ranger-qualified leaders to be both.

Approach

The refinements to the course required careful design. Simply
imitating common scenarios from the contemporary operating environment would not be enough and, in fact, could infringe upon the unique benefits of Ranger School. Here, we do not teach tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), nor do we train Soldiers for specific environments; these are best left to unit and pre-deployment training. In the Ranger course, we teach combat leadership. Ranger School focuses on the fundamentals that are common to all environments, in all types of combat, in order to provide the student with the tools upon which he will consistently rely. We also endeavor to present the students with unfamiliar conditions — something they have never experienced — in order to train them to apply the fundamentals when faced with the unknown. Focusing too heavily on the contemporary operating environment would negate these benefits and prepare students only to “fight the last war” rather than any war. Also, a key concern was to maintain the physical/psychological rigor and ensure that students had a firm grasp of tactics, which we primarily measure by applying the principles of patrolling.

With these constraints in mind, the RTB initiated a major course modification with two primary initiatives:

1. Implementing sprint/marathon missions and
2. Incorporating Adaptive Soldier and Leader Training and Education (ASLTE) into both the instruction and grading procedures.

The changes to the course have occurred on differing timelines and with differing emphasis within the RTB due to the varied missions of the three Ranger Training Battalions (RTBns). The progression of the students through the 4th, 5th, and 6th RTBns follows the “crawl, walk, run” model. The 4th RTBn trains leaders on the fundamentals of squad-level tactics at Fort Benning, Ga. In this phase, the Ranger instructors (RIs) are much more directive and focus on students learning the fundamentals to standard. The 5th RTBn in North Georgia trains mountaineering skills and introduces students to platoon-level operations. This phase must move the student’s mindset beyond the mental processes used during the first phase at Fort Benning and, accordingly, students are evaluated primarily by the outcomes of their actions. Instructors in this phase transition from a directive method of instruction to one of facilitating education. The 6th RTBn conducts platoon-level operations in the swamps of Florida. This is the “run” phase in which RIs transition from facilitating to a more observational approach. At this point, students are expected to be proficient and demonstrate their ability to adjust to novel and changing conditions. Due to their differing roles, the approach of each battalion with respect to these two initiatives varies; however, the battalions are nested and the approaches work with the sequence of the course program of instruction (POI) to facilitate the student’s development as he progresses through each phase.

**Sprint/Marathon Concept**

It is no secret that every Soldier arrives at Ranger School with a general idea of what it will entail. Stories have been told, books have been written, and field training exercises follow a similar format for much of the course. We label this familiar format the “marathon” patrol. During a typical marathon patrol, students conduct the troop leading procedures (TLPs) in a secure patrol base, execute an extended movement to the objective, and then conduct actions on the objective (usually either an ambush or raid), followed by another movement and establishment of a patrol base to conduct priorities of work. Typically, there are chance contacts or other minor events en route, but the patrol is characterized by very deliberate planning (in accordance with the Ranger School standard) and physically strenuous movement, with one main tactical objective. Marathon patrols allow instructors to easily evaluate the performance of a student via a step-by-step process. This style of patrol reinforces the fundamentals of small unit patrolling and provides students with the opportunity to conduct detailed planning and then execute that plan. The patrols also allow for repetition of the full TLPs and a thorough understanding of them, which is critical for small unit leaders. The physical rigors of this style of patrol also reinforce the students’ resiliency.

The most prevalent negative aspect of this type of training, however, is its predictability. Students can generally anticipate when they will make contact with the enemy because of the similar format (though sleep deprivation can hinder this process). On these patrols, no unexpected event is significant enough to force students to deviate significantly from the plans they developed. The long movements and standard format have resulted in an endurance-focused event, with a student mindset of “one foot in front of the other.” Some simply trudge forward in an effort to make it through the patrol rather than treating the mission as they would in combat.

To counter the negative aspects of this type of patrol, our cadre developed the “sprint” patrol concept. During these patrols, Ranger students experience more than six major events in a 24-hour period, most of which are unexpected. Whereas the focus of the marathon mission is training the deliberate TLP process, the focus of the sprint mission is to adjust and apply the process in a time-constrained condition. Sprint patrols are characterized by intelligence-driven scenarios that alter the planned mission in order to test a Ranger student’s ability to make decisions, utilize critical thinking, and adapt to a dynamic situation. Sprint missions do not have a typical format. Ranger students might begin the day planning for a deliberate mission and then step out of the patrol base only to receive a fragmentary order (FRAGO) completely changing the entire patrol. They would then be expected to conduct an abbreviated mission analysis, followed by rapid execution of that plan. Another example would be a patrol encountering an enemy force during movement to its planned objective, and in the destruction of that force, acquire intelligence that requires the patrol leader to alter his original plan. The intent is that students determine the necessary planning and execution in a five-minute or 30-minute time period, rather than a typical three-hour period. Sprint missions require adjusting the total distance covered on a patrol but with no loss of difficulty as the mental stress on students is increased. The end state is that students must exercise adaptability and initiative in order to react to unpredictable situations.

Because each type of patrol has benefits, the RTB maintains...
both in a set ratio, though not a set battle rhythm (this is determined by the various RTBns and their RI companies). After conducting several pilot classes in early 2012, the RTB commander approved the concept. The implementation has done much to eliminate the “checklist mentality” that many students bring to the course. Previously, their focus was on accomplishing each step of the process in an exact fashion and order. Students’ performance and capability suffered as they worried more about “checking the blocks” during their patrols and became overly concerned with the process rather than the outcome of their actions. The sprint missions have forced students to modify that checklist in accordance with their analysis of the mission, enemy forces, time, terrain-troops available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), thus appropriately applying the fundamentals they have been taught, rather than attempting to rigidly apply a predetermined format to varying situations.

**Incorporation of Adaptive Soldier and Leader Training into the POI**

The sprint/marathon concept was the catalyst for the second initiative — incorporating ASLTE into the Ranger School POI. The Ranger course is first and foremost a leadership course. We have typically used patrolling as the vehicle to evaluate leadership. As we began to implement the sprint/marathon concept, we asked ourselves if our grading format for the field training exercises — the observation report (OR) — was the best tool to evaluate these types of missions and, more importantly, to inculcate the qualities we require of a Ranger graduate. It became clear that our grading format applied more to patrolling than leadership. As we continued to update our instruction in alignment with ALM 2015, we discovered that it provided tools for evaluating leadership in a more direct manner.

During the development of the sprint concept, we focused on the 21st century leader competencies outlined in ALM 2015. Some of these were applicable to our course, others were not. We identified those we believed we could train and then refined them. We developed measures of performance for these competencies and then began working on a process for evaluating them. Our most significant unanswered questions from the implementation of the sprint concept were: “How do we better evaluate the intangible competencies?” and “How do we train our instructors to do so?” Again, our intent was to grade leadership more directly and focus on the outcomes of the students’ actions. Through working groups of RIs, a revised OR format was created and then modified and refined over a period of six months and multiple test classes. The end result is currently being implemented. The previous OR format was solely a task/condition/standard (T/C/S) approach that focused on inputs rather than outcomes, consisted of a series of checklists for each tactical task, and relied on a mathematical formula for determining percentages and passing rates. The new format is narrative-based, better facilitates counseling, provides a more holistic assessment of the student, focuses more directly on leadership, and allows the RI much greater flexibility. It is designed to progress from general assessment down to more detailed levels as necessary. The leader competencies we identified are the basis for the leadership evaluation, and the principles of patrolling are the basis for the tactical evaluation. The primary focus is the patrol summary and the assessment of the students’ strengths and weaknesses, but we also retained an Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)-type reference to which the instructor can tie his tactical assessment. The revised evaluation is a hybrid of the T/C/S and the outcomes-based training approach.

The most significant foothold for implementation was to familiarize and train the RIs, an ongoing effort as we incorporate ASLTE into our combat techniques training and improve the presentation of instruction to

Ranger students conduct mountaineering training on the sheer cliff faces of Mt. Yonah. Not only does this training promote confidence and build trust, but students will also use these skills later in their graded patrols.
the students. ASLTE and the new evaluation form have now been incorporated into the certification process, and all RIs have received training, counseling, and mentoring, ultimately enhancing their own teaching and mentoring abilities. One of the often overlooked benefits of the Ranger course, and a focus equal to the instruction of students, is the caliber of NCOs who leave this duty station and return to deployable units. They are experts in small unit operations, master instructors, and skilled facilitators who are combat multipliers for units receiving them.

**Ranger Training is the Right Answer For Our Combat Formations**

Ranger School is far from a legacy course with an antiquated view and outdated method for inculcating leadership. No other unit provides the broad scope and unique challenges that the Ranger Training Brigade offers. All of our instructors are combat veterans, most with multiple deployments. They come from every unit and have served in every theater. This diverse group has seen every technique under every condition that can be encountered and can thus provide a unique perspective. Cadre this experienced and so dedicated to the goal of preparing young leaders for combat will turn adequate leaders into great ones. Regardless of rank, every student takes something away from Ranger training — tangible or intangible — and learns a great deal about himself in the process. The course has maintained its rigorous and exacting standards while simultaneously evolving to meet 21st century combat leadership requirements. The U.S. Army Ranger School remains the premier leadership course in the military and the best preparation for combat a leader can have, regardless of deployment history. The coveted Ranger Tab worn by graduates distinguishes experts in the field of adaptive ground combat leadership.

The U.S. Army, however, is dangerously short of Ranger-qualified personnel. As of December 2012, Army brigade combat teams have 19 percent of their Ranger-coded positions, in the ranks of private through sergeant first class, filled with Ranger-qualified leaders. RTB is also consistently operating below its maximum capacity. This unfortunate trend means that units are less proficient — and therefore less effective — than they could be. While the future is uncertain, we do know that regionally aligned forces will be focused on a particular area of the globe for smaller unit operations. Further, only a percentage of units may be deployed in support of security force assistance team missions, leaving larger numbers of Soldiers and leaders at their posts to continue training. Ranger School provides the perfect opportunity for a commander to send promising leaders for special training and to enhance the combat capability of his unit during these ongoing operations.

The key to gaining the overmatch envisioned in SFDF is to be found in the human dimension. As COL John Boyd said, “Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Machines don’t fight wars. People fight wars. It’s in the minds of men that war must be fought.” This is as true at the squad level as it is at the strategic level. The Army needs junior leaders who can execute mission command, who are tough, tactically proficient, and adaptable, and who are skilled in leading Soldiers. This is exactly what the Ranger course creates. Ranger-qualified team leaders and squad leaders are the ultimate combat multipliers at the squad level.

**Notes**


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Ranger students plan and present an operations order in their patrol base while maintaining tactical posture on the perimeter. Field planning is an essential skill reinforced in Ranger School.
The Army finds itself today, not for the first time in its history, in a period of noticeable change and transition as it prepares to fight the next enemy, whenever, and wherever that may be. If current events in the Middle East and elsewhere are a reliable indicator of such potential conflict, Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond T. Odierno had it right when he said in November 2011 that:

“As our ability to predict the future has repeatedly proven far less than perfect, if not wholly unreliable, uncertainty has become the watchword of the contemporary strategic environment. The future is not imponderable, however. The perils and challenges of the years ahead are well appreciated even if they are not fully known. The enemies we face now and into the future are adaptive. We must be prepared to anticipate and defeat myriad hybrid threats that incorporate regular warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality. We can be certain — although we do not know to what degree — that our adversaries will pursue a multidimensional approach to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and deny our strategic interests.”

In 2012, company commanders of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division trained for decisive action (DA) operations — defined by Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, as the “simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment” — to meet the evolving and uncertain threats of the future that GEN Odierno spoke of. After returning from Afghanistan in July 2011 where it served essentially as a light Infantry force, the brigade drew its modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) fleet of armored vehicles, completed two gunneries, and executed several weeks of intense maneuver training at Fort Carson, Colo., culminating in a DA rotation (13-02) at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif., in November 2012.

As commander of an Infantry company in the 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment — one of the brigade’s combined arms battalions — I learned much during the yearlong training regimen. My goal in this article is twofold. First, I want to encourage other company commanders who are undergoing DA training for the first time. Second, I want to offer some practical advice on training successfully for DA at the company level. I write all of this humbly, recognizing that we (my company and I) are not perfect and still have a lot to learn and train on.

Train to a Level Where You Can Do All Things Well
Because the definition of DA involves the simultaneous application of operations, the unit has to recognize that it must be proficient at all of the major elements of decisive action — offense, defense, and stability operations — and understand that these elements can and likely will overlap. Further, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept, states that “Army forces capable of effective combined arms maneuver and wide area security at both the operational and tactical levels provide joint force commanders the ability to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.” From the very
outset, this informs leaders at all levels that success at DA implies that leaders have to be agile, adaptive, and proficient in operating in difficult environments. This holds especially true considering a unit may have to execute a variety of operations against an enemy composed of complex elements at any given time. Understanding that the execution of combined arms maneuver and wide area security is fundamental to success is critical.

Given the resource-constrained environment our Army finds itself in right now, and understanding that this environment will likely continue for the foreseeable future, the Army has several important decisions to make as it trains for DA. What is the proper balance, and how do you train both combined arms maneuver and wide area security at the same time? How much offensive vs. defensive vs. stability operations should we train? These and other questions are important, and the Army will likely spend a good amount of time getting this balance right.

At NTC, my company often found that our ability to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security at the same time would make or break us. On more than one occasion, we found ourselves focusing outward on known enemy forces and activity far away while operating traffic control points in urban areas right next to us. This proved that the dimensions of the DA fight remain in all directions, perhaps with an emphasis on a certain area or enemy unit at certain times. To help ensure unity of effort, the understanding of a clear and concise commander’s intent is paramount to success. In more than one instance, a known and understood commander’s intent at the lowest level helped ensure that efforts were made in the right overall direction.

For any company that is currently completing DA training, my recommendation is to incorporate as many diverse scenarios into training as possible. Practice traffic control points, civilians on the battlefield, and detainee operations while preparing to conduct a defense. Conduct a deliberate attack into a built-up area and follow with an immediate key leader engagement. Training diversely, while potentially resource and time intensive, does two very important things. First, it exposes leaders and Soldiers to just how diverse the operating environment can be in certain instances, and second, it reveals the importance of developing a simple but thorough commander’s intent. For example, our brigade situational training exercise (STX) included a movement-to-contact lane during which local farmers and villagers came out to our tactical assembly area (TAA) prior to the mission. These civilians on the battlefield demanded answers and assistance from us and were angry that U.S. forces in the area damaged local crops while maneuvering. I learned in this lane that a majority of my Soldiers wanted to focus on the engagement with civilians instead of continuing to prepare for the mission ahead. Moreover, this scenario made me understand that a solid commander’s intent was critical to effective prioritization against multiple competing demands — the civilians were treated properly in the near-term, but the interaction with them did not overshadow preparation for the upcoming mission.

The Lessons of the Last 12 Years Must Be Integrated into Future Training

In a DA fight, the enemy might consist of an armored battalion kilometers away, criminal elements three buildings down, or a robust terrorist network dominating the main supply routes with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Thus, the lessons learned during the last 12 years of war are still extremely valid and must not be forgotten. These lessons include the importance of training for specific cultures and languages, tactical site exploitation, and in some cases, conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) methods such as living amongst the population.

As our company prepared to conduct a key leader engagement in the town of Ujen at NTC, I had limited time to distribute political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-physical environment and time (PMESII-PT) information about the town. Interestingly, it was the squad leaders who continued to press for more information. In other words, they knew there was an information gap. When asked why they continued to want to know a certain piece of information about the town’s residents, one of the NCOs spoke up and said, “Sir, without that piece of information, my job is going to be 10 times harder.” He had made a valid point, and one that I had initially overlooked. Like so many of our young Soldiers and NCOs with combat experience, he knew the information he needed to successfully complete the mission he had been assigned.

On another occasion, when it came to conducting tactical site exploitation after a deliberate attack into a built-up area, it was again the junior NCOs of the company who knew exactly what information to gather, how to gather it, and what needed additional clarification or scrutiny. When an interpreter came to assist us in our mission of conducting initial partnership with the Ujen police, the junior NCOs and squad leaders took control of the interpreter, and along with their own language-trained Soldiers immediately conducted patrols.

So much of the combat experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan by our young Soldiers, NCOs, and junior officers will continue to be put to great use in the years ahead, even as new threats emerge and we as an Army prepare to meet them. This experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Army’s young Soldiers must continue to be drawn out, discussed, and implemented wherever applicable in the years to come and will only serve to strengthen an already strong corps of adaptive and flexible junior NCOs. Over the next several years, senior leaders at all levels need to fight the human flaw of training to strengths and comforts only. Instead, trainers must recognize their unit’s weaknesses and train to improve them.

Planning at the Company Level Requires Discipline and Knowledge of What Assets Are Available and How Best to Use Them

In an otherwise technology-saturated world, the idea of going “old school” during planning — to include the use of 1:50,000 maps and terrain models — must be embraced. Operating analog also requires that higher headquarters understand and do the same where needed. It does no good to receive a ground-reference graphic (GRG) of an urban area to be used for a deliberate attack the next day, complete with labeled building numbers and intersections, if you cannot distribute enough for the key leaders in your company to operate off of as well. The lack of copy machines and printers in the company command post (CP) isn’t a bad thing, but it means that the company CP must be able to produce a few products
deemed important by the commander quickly and effectively. And, to the degree where technology is used, its importance cannot be overstated. For example, the ability to build and distribute a graphic via the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is a huge help for a company commander trying to command and control an operation.

Regarding available assets, companies and other echelons will continue to receive and utilize a myriad of enablers, to include civil affairs and military information support operations (MISO) teams, heavy engineers with bulldozers, and air defense sections, to name just a few. Regardless of who and what the enabler is, a brief understanding of their capabilities and limitations will assist the commander in integrating the asset into the fight. While working with enablers is nothing new, incorporating them into the DA fight requires a solid in-brief with each enabler element, even in the most time-constrained of environments. Otherwise, the company runs the risk of wasting an asset which truly could be used elsewhere on the battlefield.

At the same time, it is important for the company to understand that enablers can and should still contribute to routine functions the company conducts, such as security within the TAA and while on the move. While this may sound obvious, what is important to consider here is that some of your enablers, particularly those who are attached from outside organizations, may not be as well trained as you for a DA fight. Not every enabler has spent the last several months practicing pulling security in the TAA, shooting gunnery, or conducting a movement to contact the same way you have.

Company Intelligence Support Teams (COIST) Serve an Important Role, But You Have to Define That Role

In the DA fight, a COIST is still a valuable asset to be trained and developed. Unlike what many COIST elements may be used to during the last several years, the COIST of today, like the company it serves, must be able to analyze multiple items and data sets simultaneously. Instead of focusing solely on IED hot spots in a certain area or the particular behaviors of a known Taliban-influencer, the COIST in DA may find itself dissecting an enemy mechanized infantry company’s order of battle or learning the cultural composition of an urban area. What the team does and focuses on depends largely on the commander’s guidance, which may change several times in a day due to the nature of the fight. If you make it a priority, the COIST will pay huge dividends, but it has to be tied in tightly to the planning and execution of company operations.

We utilized our COIST daily at NTC by partnering it with our Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operator. Often, the Raven was the only asset in the air for the entire battalion; therefore, its ability to see people or vehicles was extremely important. The Raven would have been near-useless, however, without the COIST’s ability to analyze reporting and other intelligence to determine whether the vehicles being looked at by the Raven were enemy or not.

Alternatively, the Raven operator proves, assuming he is talented, that the Raven is an excellent piece of equipment in the DA fight, even while you’re on the move. When possible, try to incorporate your COIST into planning during major training events. Give them good information on the enemy and expect them to help you analyze the terrain; also try to fly the Raven at home station whenever possible. It can still pay dividends as it looks for potential breach points of obstacles, identifies enemy ambush locations, or overwatches obstacles in the defense.

A Soldier’s Ability to Remain Physically and Mentally Tough in Difficult Environments Impacts the Organization

For many Soldiers used to the comforts of a forward operating base, it is a rough change to live in a more austere environment. Rucksacks strapped to the sides of armored vehicles house the gear of individual Soldiers and the organization, and the ability to train this at home station is paramount during every possible exercise. In an environment with no showers, individual hygiene and collective field sanitation remains vitally important to prevent sickness and maintain positive morale. More importantly, the unit learns that redundancy in carried equipment is important in terms of sustaining operations when equipment breaks, but one important consideration must be accounted for — the unit carries everything, and an extra crew-served machine gun carried by the unit takes away space from carrying other things. We learned quickly that without extra containers or tough boxes, every individual’s load, as well as the company’s, is important. Learning the art of living in the field while on the move for extended periods of time is extremely valuable — Soldiers and leaders learn that they must perform basic tasks such as drinking water, eating, and changing clothes from time to time to take care of themselves and their subordinates. Failure to do these things in an environment where one is constantly on the move can negatively affect the unit’s ability to accomplish the mission successfully.

I look back on how far we as a company have come in the last 12 months as we have trained for DA. There is no doubt that it has been a busy and an intense year of training. But it has been an immensely rewarding one as well, and I genuinely believe that those in my company would agree. I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, NCOs, and officers who have made it all happen. As the Army continues to shape itself for the next generation of potential combat during this period of change, it will need to draw on the past experiences and lessons learned during more than a decade of recent combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and also recognize that DA by its very nature implies ambiguity and the necessity to conduct a myriad of differing types of operations. Thankfully, the Army recognizes the importance of talented, flexible, and adaptive Soldiers and leaders who understand not just how to recognize a problem but also how to solve it.

CPT Pete Erickson is currently serving as commander of A Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Fort Carson, Colo. His previous assignments include serving as a platoon leader with the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky.; a platoon leader and executive officer with the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis, Wash.; and brigade maneuver planner with Headquarters, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. CPT Erickson is a graduate of Airborne, Ranger, and Air Assault schools as well as the Maneuver Captains Career Course. He earned a bachelor’s degree in American politics from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.
Saber Junction 2012
Exercise Sets Stage for Post-Iraq/Afghanistan Training

Decisive Action Training Environment
A n exercise conducted in October 2012 in Germany — the largest in more than two decades in terms of the training area committed, the scope of operations, and the number of participants — provided a template for the way U.S. ground forces will incorporate the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan as they train for future operations.

Saber Junction 2012, which was conducted at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas, brought together almost 4,000 participants from the Army’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 17 allied and partner nations, as well as other U.S. government agencies.

Saber Junction represents a lot of firsts as it sets the stage for post-Iraq and Afghanistan training, explained Army LTC Eric Smith, brigade observer-controller-trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).

Rather than training specifically for counterinsurgency operations — the focus of the center’s training rotations for the past decade — participants conducted the full spectrum of combat operations as they also faced medium- and high-intensity threats. This decisive action training environment (DATE) is incorporated in the Army’s new unified land operations training doctrine. It’s transforming training not just at the JMRC in Germany but also at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.

“The Army has decided that there are a whole lot of important lessons we have learned coming out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have to keep those,” Smith said. “But we can’t just train for those environments. We have to train for something that is going to happen in the next 10 to 15 years, and that is what the DATE is.”

The hundreds of military aircraft and wheeled and tracked vehicles that participated in Saber Junction required more expansive maneuver space than the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas in Germany offered. So, for the first time since the Return of the Forces to Germany exercise series ended in 1989, participants operated across a sweeping area that encompassed not only the two training areas but also the Bavarian villages, forests, and farmland between them.

The extended maneuver rights area, more than 1,300 square miles, was only slightly smaller than the massive National Training Center in California’s Mojave Desert, said Ernest Roth,
Joint Multinational Training Command’s maneuver control officer, who negotiated with the German government to get the required permissions.

“We needed a lot of area to replicate the appropriate battlespace because of the mission sets the 2nd Cavalry Regiment will be called upon to execute in terms of low-, mid-, or high-intensity conflict,” Roth said.

“It requires a lot of space to work the command, control and communications piece and all the digital constructs,” he explained. “And at the same time, this gives the Soldiers a variety of terrain in order for their leaders to meet certain training objectives based on realistic terrain like what they could have to fight on.”

Smith called the chance to conduct the largest U.S. maneuver exercise in Germany since 1989 vital to ensuring U.S., partner, and allied countries are prepared for the future.

“It’s absolutely critical, as we move forward, to be able to do that,” Smith said. “Because then, we really stress the units in terms of their ability to operate over distances, to communicate, to run logistics. All of those things get worked that wouldn’t if constrained to just the training areas we have.”

Carefully constructed training scenarios were designed to force participants to stretch beyond the experiences many of them gained in Iraq or Afghanistan.

“As we look toward these threats in the future, we really have to go back and challenge some of our basic assumptions we have going in,” Smith said. “Because we have been doing a similar mission for the last 10 years, we run the risk of assuming that this is how things are going to be for the next 10 years. But this type of environment forces people to go back and say, ‘Hey, I have gotten used to doing this for a decade, and I have grown accustomed to one thing. But now I have to do something else.’”

That “something else” will continue to include interagency partners, said Jim Derleth, JMRC’s senior interagency training advisor. He was instrumental in getting seven U.S. agencies to commit representatives to the exercise, integrating their goals, capabilities and authorities into the play.

“If you don’t have the rest of the [U.S. government] involved in a DATE rotation, how can you replicate the conditions that the military will be asked to accomplish?” Derleth questioned.

Training scenarios have been designed to ensure that military participants recognize their tactical operations can’t be conducted in a vacuum, and have to support U.S. government goals, he explained. “The question will be how this fits into the bigger context of U.S. foreign policy or U.S. national security policy,” he said.

Saber Junction, Derleth said, will help ensure that interagency cooperation strengthened during the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan continues into the future. “We are trying not to lose those lessons;” he said. “If we don’t keep track of the lessons of the last 10 years, we are not going to be effective.”

Donna Miles writes for the American Forces Press Service.

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**Preparing the Stryker Reconnaissance Troop for Decisive Action**

CPT MATTHEW A. PERDUE
1LT KYLE D. SULLIVAN

A fter more than a decade of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the training for today’s leaders at the company level and below has focused heavily on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Given the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq, the pending withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, and the volatile areas of the Middle East and Africa, the importance of continuing to hone the Army’s combined arms maneuver skills without neglecting the importance of COIN operations is paramount.

In October 2012, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) executed a decisive action training environment (DATE) exercise in Germany. The DATE allowed units to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict — offense, defense, support, and stability operations — against the hybrid threat of a near-peer competitor opposing force (OPFOR) combined with terrorist, insurgent, and criminal elements.

As a troop commander in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s reconnaissance squadron (4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment), my challenge was taking a troop (Outlaw Troop) — whose last combat experience was successfully fighting in a COIN environment in Kandahar City — and shaping the Soldiers and leaders into a unit that could execute combined arms maneuver across challenging terrain against a complex enemy.

The key to success for the troop, squadron, and the regiment boiled down to one word — training. A PowerPoint presentation on how to conduct a zone reconnaissance is not the way to refine the skills needed by each of our Soldiers. The only way that a unit learns how to accomplish the missions it is assigned is to get its Soldiers out of the classroom to get their boots and vehicles muddy through tough and realistic training.

The troop’s preparation for the DATE started seven months prior with new officers, NCOs, and Soldiers. Following the reset phase of the unit’s Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, all of the troops from 4th Squadron began a collective training regimen, which spanned from individual tasks such as basic rifle marksmanship and crew-level Stryker gunnery, through a series of platoon- and troop-level live-fire exercises and external evaluations (EXEVALS). The scouts honed their reconnaissance and security skills while our mortar sections enhanced their ability to provide timely and accurate indirect fires.

The squadron’s culminating training exercises prior to the DATE were a series of squadron-level maneuver exercises at both the Hohenfels Training Area and in the German countryside. The training focused on traditional reconnaissance troop tasks: troop leading...
In preparation for the DATE, the easy (and for many, the preferred) assumption was that we would encounter more of a conventional threat within the hybrid threat with very little COIN operations and minimal interaction with the civilian populace... The reality is that the probability of fighting on a battlefield void of civilians is extremely low to nonexistent in contemporary warfare.

The Stryker vehicles proved effective while moving from the tactical assembly area to the troop’s initial screen. The troop was able to move into the screen quickly while providing more armor protection and fire power than lighter reconnaissance units. The fire power provided by mounted crew-served weapon systems combined with dismounted machine gun teams and Soldiers with personal weapons proved sufficient for the initial enemy contact consisting of enemy dismounts and technical vehicles (pickup trucks with mounted heavy machine guns).

As the enemy contact increased to armored vehicles, the importance of echeloning fires at the troop and platoon-level became paramount. Platoon leaders incorporated Javelin teams into their screen in conjunction with pre-planned indirect fires from the troop’s organic 120mm mortar section in order to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and disrupt the enemy main body. As we quickly learned, an additional key to success is properly using the terrain to maintain the ability to observe the enemy early enough to provide reaction time and maneuver space. Properly echeloned and coordinated direct and indirect fires are of little use when the first visual contact with enemy elements is made at less than 100 meters, as they are rapidly advancing towards your screen.

As the situation developed within the squadron’s area of operations and the civilian population began to have more of a shaping effect on the battlefield, O Troop’s mission quickly changed to a wide area security mission. The troop conducted route security, traffic control
points, and key leader engagements with local and provincial leaders. The Stryker vehicles once again proved effective during route security operations, which combined mounted and dismounted patrols. The ability of the platoons to be able to quickly maneuver on suspicious vehicles allowed a platoon to successfully interdict a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) before it could be used against the squadron commander.

Civilian considerations became increasingly prevalent throughout the DATE. Not only did troop commanders have to know the population dynamics within their areas of operation (AO), but they had to understand what was happening in the surrounding areas that would affect the local situation, becoming the commander’s area of influence (AI). Commanders may have assets such as Civil Affairs (CA) teams to assist with the local population’s concerns, but ensuring these assets also understand the “big picture” can be the difference between mission success and failure. Although O Troop had not specifically trained for the stabilization aspect of the DATE as much as for the offensive and defensive operations, battlefield experience from leaders, combined with professional enablers such as the CA teams, ensured success during several critical junctures.

Regardless of how much a unit trains, the level of discipline down to the individual Soldier-level will dictate how effectively a unit executes its missions. When elements are widely dispersed on the battlefield, it is absolutely crucial that leaders at all levels instill and maintain discipline. A lack of discipline on the battlefield translates into lack of security, which will in turn translate into deaths of Soldiers. When discipline is enforced and maintained by active and engaged leadership, Soldiers are able to shift from engaging enemy dismounts with crew-served weapons to providing local security during humanitarian aid distribution, all while continuing to be prepared to reinforce the squadron’s defense of its objective against a pending enemy-mounted counterattack.

To ensure mission success, we as an Army have to maintain the ability to simultaneously and continuously combine offensive, defensive, and support operations through a blend of combined arms maneuver and wide area security as stated in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations. We must maintain the ability to close with and destroy the enemy regardless of whether they are mounted in armored formations or if they wear civilian clothes and blend in with the populace. The Army must not forget the lessons the past decade of war has taught us. It is likely that the civilian populace will be the center of gravity of the battlefields on which we fight regardless if its focused on a wide area security or combined arms maneuver dynamic. Maintaining a versatile fighting force with dynamic and bold leaders who will lead our Soldiers on the field of battle is critical to ensuring our nation’s strategic objectives are met.

CPT Matthew A. Perdue is currently serving as the commander of W Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Rose Barracks, Germany. He previously served as commander of O Troop, 4/2 Cavalry; executive officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division; and tank platoon leader with B Company, 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment. CPT Perdue is a graduate of the Cavalry Leaders Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Scout Leaders Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Officer Candidate School. He earned a bachelor’s degree in rangeland ecology and management from Texas A&M University.

1LT Kyle D. Sullivan is currently serving as the executive officer for W Troop, 4/2 Cavalry. He previously served as a platoon leader with O Troop, 4/2 Cavalry. He is a graduate of the Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., in 2010 with a bachelor’s degree in computer science.
INTEL/RECON IN THE DATE

1LT JEREMY D. MOUNTICURE

In October 2012, members of 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment initiated movement from Vilseck, Germany, en route to the Hohenfels Training Area as a part of Saber Junction, a decisive action training environment (DATE) exercise. Throughout the exercise, the reconnaissance platoon was given the opportunity to perform more than 10 missions. As the forward “eyes and ears” of the squadron, the reconnaissance platoon executed in accordance with the squadron commander’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operation to confirm or deny the composition and disposition of the enemy and observe named areas of interest. There are seven doctrinal fundamentals relative to employing the reconnaissance platoon in support of squadron operations. The DATE facilitated the squadron’s ability to exercise a majority of these fundamentals, but there is always room for improvement.

Integrate the Staff in Reconnaissance and Surveillance Planning

Working with the staff is critical to the overall success of the platoon’s ability to accomplish its mission. Throughout the entire operation, the staff (primarily the S2 and S3) was constantly involved in the development of the reconnaissance plan. Through participation in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, we were able to assist the S2 in identifying gaps in the commander’s knowledge of the battlefield and then build the reconnaissance plan around the unknowns. It was this process that facilitated the platoon’s ability to ensure we were able to focus our reconnaissance on the commander’s critical information requirements and decision points.

Integrate Battalion Reconnaissance with Cavalry Squadron Reconnaissance and Surveillance Assets

I think this is one area where we as an organization have the most opportunity for growth. Integrating the reconnaissance platoon with reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) assets offers the commander the ability to configure his formations to cover more terrain and thereby gives him more situational awareness as to what is going on in the area of operations. The opportunity to integrate the two presented itself during defense operations when the squadron was tasked to conduct a guard. The reconnaissance troop was attached to the squadron and tasked to conduct a screen. Integration of the reconnaissance platoon into the screening operation would have proven to be successful because it would have reduced the gaps in coverage the enemy was able to exploit.

1LT Jeremy D. Mounticure is currently serving as the reconnaissance platoon leader with the 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Stryker Leader Course. 1LT Mounticure earned a bachelor’s degree in business administration from Florida A&M University.
In October of 2012, the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment (a Stryker reconnaissance squadron) participated in a regimental training exercise in the Army’s decisive action training environment (DATE) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The exercise was a two-week operation that tested the squadron’s capabilities in fighting hybrid threats consisting of both conventional threats and asymmetric forces.

In the weeks and months that led up to our operation, senior leaders within the regiment and squadron spent countless hours developing and refining the plans that would be utilized to conduct the first exercise of this magnitude in the Bavarian countryside since 1989. During these same weeks, the general perception of 4th Squadron Soldiers was that this was just another training exercise; they likely could not imagine the ramifications a training event like this could have for the regiment and U.S. Army Europe. The Soldiers dedicated the same degree of preparatory work and training they had applied to all the squadron internal training events that year — just as professional Cavalrymen in the U.S. Army are expected. Success or failure at this keystone event would come down to how Soldiers at the platoon level and below executed their orders and conducted themselves in accordance with the finest traditions of the Cavalry. The junior leaders within 4th Squadron would be responsible for leading these Soldiers within the parameters of their commander’s intent and ultimately bearing the weight of success or failure in the exercise.

The squadron had three essential tasks built into the initial mission. The first task was to conduct zone reconnaissance from Grafenwoehr Training Area (GTA) to Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) in order to defeat enemy forces in area of operations (AO) Dragoon. The second task was to pass an Infantry squadron, Task Force War Eagle (1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry), forward in the vicinity of Phase Line (PL) Patriots in order to allow them to penetrate to HTA. Finally, the squadron was to conduct wide area security in vicinity of the northern border of HTA. For Nemesis Troop, the mission involved a zone reconnaissance from the south side of GTA through the German countryside to the north side of HTA. Nemesis Troop was task organized to include an anti-tank platoon consisting of three TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire command-link guided) missile ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) Strykers and two reconnaissance platoons, allowing the troop to operate in “hunter-killer” teams and defeat enemy armor assets beyond the normal capabilities of a Stryker reconnaissance troop. The anti-tank platoon was given a “follow and assume” mission, and the two reconnaissance platoons’ tasks included identifying a series of possible enemy engagement areas and defeating any enemy within respective capabilities.

This article focuses on the movement and maneuver Nemesis Troop conducted during the first two days of the exercise, specifically highlighting the tactics and techniques utilized to overcome the diverse factors of terrain, civilian considerations, and enemy in a noncontiguous and non-permissive operating environment. Ultimately, despite a series of both real-world variables and training specific scenarios, the troop was able to accomplish these tasks through the adaptability and flexibility of its junior leadership.

Even before Nemesis Troop left the passage point at GTA, the leadership and Soldiers alike were well aware that the terrain they...
were tasked with reconnoitering was different from the typical maneuver training areas found on most Army posts. The majority of the Soldiers had operated in similar environments during several preparatory training events in the months preceding the DATE within the Weiden Maneuver Rights Area (MRA). However, this particular AO still offered unique challenges, particularly because of the sheer frontage each troop was tasked to cover. Supporting ranges and distances were oftentimes stretched to their limits. Nemesis Troop was given the eastern-most portion of the squadron AO, which spanned 10 to 15 kilometers from west to east at any given point and was geographically isolated from the remainder of the squadron on the eastern side of the Vils River. The terrain varied drastically, often compartmentalized into rolling fields, sprawling and dense woodland, and small pockets of tightly-packed urban areas. This made identifying, seizing, and controlling key terrain paramount to the overall success of the reconnaissance effort. Platoon leaders were given the freedom to conduct their own intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), from which they worked closely with their platoon sergeants and senior scouts to develop routes through the countryside that maximized both cover and concealment, as well as ones that offered the best vantage points from which to observe and control the previously identified key terrain.

Even with careful and attentive planning, the terrain rarely cooperated during the reconnaissance phase of the operation. Rural routes often could not support the sheer size and weight of the Stryker platform, and low-hanging branches hindered stealthy and rapid movement. Success under these conditions was not possible without competent vehicle commanders (VCs) who could make decisions rapidly and navigate with dated maps, at night, and in the unpredictable German climate. In the course of the movement to HTA alone, 1st Platoon performed a total of five vehicle recoveries. These missions were not staged variables built into the training scenario but rather the result of the real-world effects of terrain not specifically built for traffic by U.S. military vehicles. Just hours into the first night of the operation, the M1117 armored security vehicle (ASV) — manned by the attached combat observation and lasing team (COLT) — nearly rolled into a ditch when the narrow dirt trail the platoon was utilizing collapsed underneath the weight of the vehicle. This immediately presented a number of concerns for 1st Platoon, which was on a strict timeline to establish a squadron-level passage point before first light and was still more than 10 kilometers away. The vehicle could not self-recovery, nor could a Stryker offer much assistance in the recovery due to the angle at which the vehicle was stuck. Squadron recovery assets were requested, but they did not appear on site until well after first light. The situation dictated that the platoon break into two separate sections; Bravo Section stayed with the downed vehicle to provide local security while Alpha Section continued to maneuver forward to establish the passage lane. Section leaders became the key leaders of each operation, rapidly coordinating both the local security effort around the immobilized vehicle and the designated passage lane team while the platoon leader and platoon sergeant developed the situation for both the troop commander and the recovery assets from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT). The flexibility to continue the mission despite unforeseen variables was the direct result of junior leader competence, fortified by our repetitious training of basic soldier skills in the field. By understanding key tasks and possessing the confidence to take charge when superiors are preoccupied with other tasks, the leaders at the section level were able to overcome unforeseen adversity. Leaders at the platoon and troop levels were then able to supplement the section, providing security at the passage lane by reallocating a section from 3rd Platoon to assist. This ultimately ensured that the lane was established per the regimental timeline. In this instance, the initiative of junior leaders was the catalyst that gave senior leaders the time and necessary picture of the battlefield, enabling them to allocate the resources mandatory for success.

Another factor that increased the complexity of the mission was operating in areas populated by actual German civilians (not role-players). Leaders were challenged to factor civilian considerations into their maneuver, which included varied issues such as avoiding the destruction of cultivated fields, integrating into patterns of life, and preventing unnecessary property damage. Ultimately, these factors had the potential to turn the local populace against the squadron’s operational lines of effort if not handled appropriately. This was coupled with the fact that the Stryker platform does not blend in with small European automobiles or quaint villages in any capacity. Section leaders overcame these issues by planning bypass routes; when this was not possible, they utilized vehicle bounding or travelling overwatch to ensure the vehicles in their section could mutually support each other while crossing danger areas. These on-the-ground decisions stemmed from comprehensive rehearsals, effective communications, and the formulation of contingency plans during the troop leading procedures (TLP) process.
Soldiers also found creative ways to interact with the civilian population in order to gain a tactical advantage over the enemy. Curious local nationals would frequently seek out the seemingly-out-of-place military vehicles moving through their backyards (literally) to interact with the crews. Without hesitation, gunners or VCs would ask these civilians general questions pertaining to our priority intelligence requirements about other enemy military vehicles they may have seen and in what direction they were travelling. Our training exercises reinforced doctrinal tactics and allowed us to creatively exploit situations to collect the information necessary to accomplish the mission. The platoons learned invaluable lessons about how doctrine applies outside of controlled training environments, which translated into real-world confidence in the skills we trained and developed over months of field training exercises. The cumulative outcome of overcoming the effects of diverse terrain and civilian considerations prepared the troop for its first contact with enemy forces, which occurred soon after.

The enemy consisted of a hybrid threat composed of both conventional and unconventional forces, meaning Soldiers had to be prepared to make contact with everything from a T-80 tank to an unassuming civilian sport utility vehicle (SUV). Within roughly 15 minutes of leaving GTA, while the troop maneuvered in a column to the line of departure, 3rd Platoon observed a black SUV moving toward their position which suddenly changed directions and sped off. The vehicle was spotted several more times moving on lateral routes in the vicinity of the troop, but it failed to display clear hostile intent that would have been necessary for 3rd Platoon to apply lethal force against the vehicle. In the context of this vignette, it is clear the vehicle was in fact an unconventional forward reconnaissance element of the enemy. However, leaders had to consider the possibility the vehicle was simply being driven by an interested civilian with no knowledge of the training event taking place. The senior scout from 1st Platoon recommended that a hasty traffic control point (TCP) should be established in order to intercept the vehicle, but this fell outside the scope of the commander’s intent, and the platoon leader made the tough decision to continue mission. In another instance, the lead vehicle from 1st Platoon observed two enemy BRDMs stationary in the woodline adjacent to a cultivated field. While it was clear that contact with conventional enemy forces had taken place, the existence of a nearby village complicated the use of indirect fire assets against the enemy vehicles. The COLT, in conjunction with the troop fire support officer, had to consider the effects that indirect fires could have on the nearby town before the fire mission could be cleared. This increased the time it took to receive clearance from the commander and for the mortar section to drop rounds on target. In this instance, success resulted from not only having well-rehearsed fires but because flexible indirect fire personnel could factor in unforeseen civilian variables both quickly and effectively. The complex decisions made in these two situations capture only a brief glimpse into the multi-layered judgments junior leaders made regarding the second and third order effects of their actions. This was the cumulative result of reflexive and flexible leadership developed through months of field experiences, after action reviews, and the study of various conventional-conflict vignettes at the troop and squadron levels. What quickly became clear was that when given the proper training, junior leaders have the capacity to learn from mistakes and achieve results that transcend the expectations of their rank and duty position. The value of these lessons became apparent as the troop continued its reconnaissance push toward HTA and took on an even more complex mission.

As Nemesis Troop maneuvered toward HTA, they received an on-order mission to secure a key crossing point on the northern boundary, marked by the Lauterach River. After two days of continuous reconnaissance and combat without resupply, the troop was physically exhausted; yet through resourcefulness and planned foresight, our Soldiers transitioned smoothly into the next phase of the operation. Our usual training protocol, consisting of late-night start points (SPs) after full work days and fluid transitions from a refuel-on-the-move directly into screen operations, set the conditions for our troop to be ready for this change of mission. Contact had not yet been made with the enemy main body in the troop AO, and the tension the Soldiers felt was palpable. Once again, Nemesis Troop was given a mission that would directly affect the success of the regiment’s movement into HTA. The crossing site immediately presented two challenges — the bridge was much smaller than originally anticipated and was bordered by a high-speed avenue of approach. The platoons relied on the planning and rehearsals they conducted during TLPs to guide them through the task. Alpha Section of 1st Platoon established both overwatch of the crossing site and security down the high speed avenue of approach parallel to the river. The situation was complicated due to the high volume of traffic moving along the route; in fact, it would have been impossible to simply establish a TCP and stop all vehicular traffic moving along it without disrupting local patterns of life and affecting local stability as described in Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, Stability.

In order to overcome this complication, the Bravo Section leader of 1st Platoon recommended the use of a “chase” vehicle, which would remain concealed near the route until a suspicious vehicle moved into sector. At that point, it could either pursue or stop any suspicious vehicle with a hasty TCP. Throughout the troop, junior leaders’ recommendations were valued and aided considerably in the senior leaders’ decision-making process and subsequent flexibility and adaptability of the unit. By learning from mistakes made only days prior, 1st Platoon was able to successfully provide overwatch and establish security by acting on the recommendations of junior leaders. With the exposed nature of the crossing point, 3rd Platoon utilized a rapid tempo in order to provide them with the edge they needed to quickly establish local security of the crossing site and conduct a hasty field classification of the bridge’s military load capacity. Once established, the passage lane proved valuable and offered an axis along which the regiment penetrated into HTA.

Overall, the establishment of this passage lane was another learning point for the leadership born out of real-world conditions. The adage that the leader on the ground has the best perspective from which to make decisions based on the commander’s intent proved to be true in this case. The squadron provided Nemesis Troop with a task and purpose, from which the commander developed an
intent-based course of action for each platoon. This trust accounted for the flexibility complex contemporary operations require. Platoon leaders were able to adjust from changing conditions on the battlefield and develop plans that worked in the multi-variable DATE that could not be drawn from map reconnaissance alone. A balance of doctrinally sound planning, interspersed with the adaptability and flexibility of leaders on the ground, achieved desired results and led to mission accomplishment throughout the exercise.

The brief collection of vignettes above are a small example of the dozens of similar encounters that the Soldiers of Nemesis Troop experienced during the approximately two-day, 60-kilometer movement to the northern boundary of HTA. Each platoon cleared anywhere from four to six named areas of interest identified by the regiment as well as countless pieces of key terrain identified at both the troop and platoon levels during IPB. The environment the platoons operated in was diverse and often not favorable for the Stryker platform. Junior leaders at the platoon level and below demonstrated versatility, seeing firsthand how the conventional doctrine they had spent the previous six months mastering actually applied even under the most obscure combination of real-world variables. Success during the opening days of the DATE established the confidence and set the conditions for success throughout the remainder of the exercise.

While the platoons continued to face challenging new variables, the rigidity of HTA could not provide the complexity that operating in the Bavarian countryside did. In the weeks preceding the DATE, many leaders in the squadron made the point that success would be decided by leaders at the platoon level and below. Through drill and repetition, junior leaders mastered the basics of their craft and were effective at combining doctrinal techniques and tactics with versatility and flexibility. This article presents one perspective that is truly miniscule in the scope of the DATE as a whole, but it serves to prove that junior leaders have the capacity to influence the outcome of regimental operations on a complex battlefield.

The following Soldiers from Nemesis Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, contributed to this article:

1LT Bryan Bove is a platoon leader with Nemesis Troop. CPT Brandon Thomas is the commander of Nemesis Troop. His previous assignments include serving with the 3rd Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas, and as a Cadet recruiter with the U.S. Army Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, N.Y. He is a 2007 graduate of USMA.

The article was edited by LTC Chris Budihas, who is commander of the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He has 26 years of enlisted and officer experience in all forms of Infantry operations. His education includes a bachelor’s degree in political science, master’s in business administration, and a master’s in military arts and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Soldiers with the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment pull security during a decisive action training environment exercise, Saber Junction 2012, at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, on 25 October 2012.
LOGISTICS IN A DATE:
SUPPLYING OUR SOLDIERS IN THE NEXT WARE

CPT MIKOLA J. KING

Sabre Junction 2012 replicated a deployment to a hybrid threat environment within an allied nation where the regiment was pitted against local insurgents and an invading enemy mechanized brigade with near-peer technology and resources. In another departure from recent training center rotations, the U.S. did not enjoy air superiority. This rotation was also unique in the high number of NATO and U.S. partners participating. Finally, the rotation was not confined to the Joint Multinational Training Command “box” at Hohenfels, but utilized more than 30 limited training areas to include the towns, fields, and forests of Bavaria.

The civilian population of Germany in essence became the civilian population of the host nation with a realism that role players simply cannot reproduce. There were no forward operating bases (FOBs) or combat outposts (COPs). As the commander of a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), this meant rediscovering what the Army knew 15 years ago — how to run logistics on a battlefield with an ever-changing forward line of own troops (FLOT), where the command and control (C2), maintenance, and logistic infrastructures needed to be mobile and self-securing. This article addresses how the 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment tackled the mission, with some thoughts on where we were successful and what we learned to do better.

The regiment began planning for the decisive action training environment (DATE) almost 12 months in advance with a series of officer professional development (OPD) sessions that were hosted by the regimental commander and brought together all the troop commanders. These OPDs were used to build the regiment’s maneuver standard operating procedure (SOP) by farming out topics to groups of commanders. The HHT commanders were tasked to develop the regiment’s logistical support plan. To do this, we started with the well-established doctrine for a heavy brigade combat (HBCT) and adapted it to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) of a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). In the end, we decided each squadron would build a field trains command post (FTCP) and a company trains command post (CTCP); we would forgo a unit maintenance command post, as this was not supported by our MTOE.

The FTCP would be collocated with the regimental support area (RSA) and would process the collection of all classes of supply and the building of logistics packages (LOGPACs). In addition, the FTCP would interface with both the regimental support squadron (RSS) and the regimental administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC) to process casualty reports, battle loss packets, as well as receive new Soldiers and equipment to be pushed to the FLOT. The CTCP, located 1-5 kilometers (ideally) from the FLOT, provided forward maintenance and recovery assets, the squadron aid station, and an alternate C2 location if the tactical operations center (TOC) gets destroyed. In addition, the CTCP was to be the primary coordination point for all personnel and logistical information to be pushed from the troops to the FTCP using the CTCP’s more robust communications platforms.

Filling the Forward Support Company Void

The first obstacle to overcome in our organization, which we tackled long before the DATE, was the lack of a forward support company (FSC) to support each maneuver squadron — a serious oversight in how the SBCT is built. Our regiment’s solution was to build support platoons from the RSS to each of the three maneuver squadrons and to the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron. These support platoons are roughly 45-man elements at full strength and are comprised of mechanics, Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS) clerks, low density equipment repairers, fuelers, recovery operators, and a transportation section. Chronically short of Soldiers, we usually steal from our mechanics to run LOGPACs; however, we recognized that this would not be sustainable during steady state operations. Our first hurdle was how to build a robust transportation section without depleting our ability to perform maintenance. Our solution was to utilize 11Bs from the line troops whose physical profiles prevented them from performing their intended role as Infantrymen but were not so severe that they couldn’t be utilized as drivers. After a week of driver’s training, we had overcome our first obstacle.

Redundant and Distributed Communications

The FTCP cannot simply move to a location that provides solid line-of-sight communication with the TOC and CTCP; it must remain collocated with the RSA with its supply yards and supply support activity (SSA) to build LOGPACs, receive new Soldiers and equipment, and for security reasons. After the rolling terrain of Bavaria began to degrade communication, we had to re-tool the squadron PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan in order to maintain communication between the various C2 nodes and the FLOT. The Movement Tracking System (MTS) quickly became our primary means of communication between the FTCP and CTCP (not because it was the best, but because it was the most available). The lesson quickly became clear: redundant satellite communications must be part of the PACE plan. Whether it’s Blue Force Tracker (BFT), MTS, tactical satellite, very-small-aperture terminal (VSAT), or any other platform, there must be redundancy. There must also be distribution. Having communication between
the TOC, CTCP, and FTCP over a single system greatly reduces the
time it takes to communicate and greatly increases the accuracy of
reporting by eliminating the errors associated with the “telephone
game.”

Ensuring Adjacent Unit Coordination Includes Safe Routes for Logistics

Toward the end of the rotation, our squadron was tasked to
provide a guard force forward of where the regiment’s decisive
operation was preparing a deliberate defense. In almost all
respects, there was excellent adjacent unit coordination. However, a planning consideration overlooked by both our unit
and theirs was ensuring there were pre-coordinated corridors
left open to allow the movement of logistical convoys through
the obstacle belt to the forward area where our squadron was
located. The lesson learned was that adjacent unit coordination
is more than sharing tactical graphics, building restricted fire
lines, and having an SOP to conduct a forward passage of lines;
this is only a good start. The coordination must also include
ensuring each unit’s supporting logistical tail has access to their
FLOT. (The other option is to plus the troops up on all classes
of supply and have them go without a resupply until the FLOT
moves again — but this must be a deliberate decision by the
squadron commander).

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s DATE rotation was an eye-
opening education in logistics planning. As our squadron
alternated between the ground-eating tempo of the offense and the
resource-eating preparations of a defense, we learned to flex our
support personnel and equipment forward or rearward, juggling
security concerns with mission accomplishment. The departure
from FOB-based operations and constantly jumping to remain
with the FLOT forced us to shed much of the bulky, generator-
hungry equipment we thought we couldn’t live without. Operating
at doctrinal distances in a hybrid threat environment allowed us
to review our communication plans and how we forecast as well
as redefine what level of tactical risk was acceptable. As DATE
rotations become the normal, annual training event, units like
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment will continue to learn — and re-learn
— what unified land operations entail. The offense and defense
haven’t changed; the line troops are ready for the next war. The
steepest learning curve will be providing logistics in a non-
permissive environment with a competent and technologically
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A Soldier with the 2nd Support Troop, 2nd Cavalry Regiment
pulls rear security during heavy-load drop recovery operations
during Saber Junction 2012 on 17 October 2012.

Photo by SSG Pablo N. Piedra
When working with a multinational force, on the NATO ROE model (Military Committee [MC] 362/1, (ISAF) personnel, with the exception of national caveats, is based the ROE followed by International Security Assistance Force commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly. In Afghanistan, Associated Terms. (JP) 1-02, with other forces encountered, according to Joint Publication which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces will begin or engage in combat. The standing ROE (SROE) do not provide clear examples of hostile intent or acts for ground combat like it does for air or maritime. Hostile intent and hostile act will change over a period of time based on changing enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and Soldiers’/commanders’ awareness on the battlefield. The SROE and current enemy actions force leaders to constantly re-examine and redefine hostile intent. Historical trends indicate civilian casualty incidents seem to spike when new units arrive. Failure to have this discussion with higher and subordinates at all levels of leadership and ensure dissemination throughout the formation will lead to bad decisions on the battlefield. Knowledge of escalation-of-force (EOF) options available are important to know, understand, and rehearse daily. After action reviews (AARs) of each EOF and kinetic action debriefs can provide lessons learned and adjustments to commander’s guidance and TTPs. Dissemination among the force is a critical piece. Implementing and sharing lessons learned from internal or external post-incident 15-6 investigations throughout the force is a key component to an educated and well-prepared force.

Tactical directives are the subject of much debate. ROE and TDs are often referred to inaccurately or interchangeably; TDs tell troops what they should do while ROE instruct them what they can do. MC 362/1 provides interesting language on the distinction between ROE and TDs, stating that “ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions.”

The tactical directives in no way limit a unit’s right to self-defense, and commanders must reinforce this topic. However, the ground force commander must understand the situation and determine if he can maneuver his force away or even withdraw to effectively counter the threat. TDs are not constraints meant to limit response options but really to force a leader to consider numerous appropriate responses to an incident within the parameters of the engagement that are appropriate to a COIN fight. Commanders and leaders at all levels must understand and take into account the

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**Fires Decision-Making Wheel:**

*A Tool for Planning and Reacting at the Staff and Leader Levels*

**MAJ Mark S. Leslie, Maj Pete Kremzar, and Maj Lawrence Edeell**

“Never neglect details. When everyone’s mind is dulled or distracted the leader must be doubly vigilant.”  
— GEN (Retired) Colin Powell

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are complex and often require a unique blend of soft and hard power throughout the course of an operation. This is often determined at the lowest level of application. For those serving as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), there has been much debate and some considerable angst over the rules of engagement (ROE), tactical directives (TDs), and to a lesser extent, collateral damage estimates (CDE). Although each of these considerations have unique characteristics, they are intertwined in the decision-making process when determining the approach and application of force in Afghanistan.

While in Afghanistan from 2010-2011, leaders and staff with the 101st Airborne Division’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team were challenged daily with the application of force in accordance with the ROE, TDs, tactical considerations, CDE, and consequence management (CM) due to limited experience in combining these five components together in combat operations.

As a result of these critical decisions, key staff members of the brigade developed an illustrated wheel depicting all considerations that influenced decisions and subsequent actions and named it the Fires Decision-Making Wheel (Figure 1).

Although the classification of this article does not allow the discussion of the specifics of Afghanistan ROE, TDs, or CDE, it is worthy to review their doctrinal definitions.

Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered, according to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. When working with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly. In Afghanistan, the ROE followed by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel, with the exception of national caveats, is based on the NATO ROE model (Military Committee [MC] 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement). The ISAF ROE is coordinated with the 47 nations comprising ISAF and describe the circumstances and limitations under which forces will begin or engage in combat.

Enduring Freedom (OEF), serving as part of Operation
implications of a loss to innocent civilian life and its adverse effect on the overall mission. Kinetic engagements do not always require a kinetic response.

Tactical considerations are another critical consideration. Leaders must ask questions and consider second and third order effects to each situation. Is the proposed action a necessity for mission accomplishment or protection of coalition forces (CF) or Afghan lives? What other options do you have — lethal or otherwise? Is the proposed response in proportion to the action? Is it a cross-border incident and if so, is it necessary to the mission? Is the target on the no-strike list and if so, how do I propose a proportional strike against it if necessary? Who determines necessity? What is effective fire? Effective fire is defined as direct or indirect fire that if continued brings an immediate risk to life or limb of friendly forces. The challenge to this definition is that this determination is made by the senior leader on the ground (on-the-scene commander — OSC) receiving this effective fire (not from a leader at a command post or other location).

Proportionality is important to the decision maker on the ground (OSC) with regards to application of the decision wheel. It is more than just a consideration of CDE but more importantly, what is required (number of rounds, type of rounds, effects required) or if it is even necessary to effectively respond to the threat to allow friendly forces to minimize the threat or to allow friendly forces to break contact with the threat as outlined in the TD. For example, if a maneuver unit is taking effective fire from a populated area habituated by civilians, then the OSC may determine to use direct fire and/or smoke to break contact to minimize causalities and damage to civilian structures, especially if the terrain was not decisive to the operation or one that can be returned to at a later date with a more weighted effort of resources. On the other hand, if in the same situation and friendly forces cannot break contact because of the threat, then the use of force is authorized by the TD and ROE with proportionality as a guide. The OSC could begin with direct fire against the threat and then transition to precision munitions (if available) and then finally to standard mortars, artillery, and bombs if the situation continues to get worse. If the OSC has no choice but to neutralize the threat by destroying a structure through direct or indirect fire means (due to the fact that he is receiving effective fire and cannot break contact), then he is authorized to do so in regards to his right to self-defense and with proportionality guidelines in mind. Once this decision has been made by the OSC, he must understand the follow-on actions (CM, investigations, and payments) that must occur and the possible negative long-term ramifications from that decision. By applying the rule of proportionality into the final decision made by the OSC to apply an appropriate level of force, it can help mitigate the follow-on CM steps in terms of the justification (a 120mm precision round versus a 1,000-pound bomb).

Collateral damage is defined as the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack (JP 1-02). A CDE is an output of targeting and ensures there is a benefit to the mission, with reasonable precautions to ensure only legitimate military targets are engaged proportionally.

Know the CDE for each weapon system and the level in which each echelon is authorized to clear. A commander should try to send as many leaders as possible (especially fire support officers) to the Joint Firepower Course (hosted by the U.S. Air Force) in order to become more familiar with the application of close air support (CAS) and close combat attack (CCA). A fires standard operating procedure (SOP) is a must. It should clearly spell out procedures for all in the formation — not only leaders on the ground but those in tactical operation centers (TOCs) as well. Have a battle drill to verify CDE at multiple levels; TDs, and ROE must be developed to the squad level. In writing operations orders, CDE often gets lumped into the ROE annex, but it is probably more appropriate to place it in the fires annex.

CM is critical and is defined as the actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents (JP 1-02). ISAF defines this to include actions made by its forces to mitigate unintentional, but often unavoidable, negative perceptions of ISAF forces or Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) by the populace as a result of combat operations.

Additionally, once the decision is made, CM is vital in meeting the response required for long-term success in a COIN fight and in mitigating unintended consequences from the action. A good, solid, realistic, and executable CM action plan must be developed with the same attention to detail and analysis as the tactical action. The CM action plan must be carried out swiftly and deliberately as any other combat operation. At times, the CM action plan will require tactical patience on the part of the BCT and higher headquarters, as a task force will execute in accordance with their deep knowledge of the geographical and human terrain to determine the appropriate time to execute. Additionally, the inclusion of GIRoA and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the planning and execution of the CM plan as the lead organization is not just a cliché when it comes to CM. This is a must in successful execution and long-term gains.

Finally, a more recent consideration that is sometimes overlooked or marginalized is integration of ANSF and GIRoA officials in this process. Typically, they can be utilized during the CM process when engaging the populace if there is structure damage or civilian injuries during the contact to explain to the population why certain actions were taken by CF or ANSF. Just as important is the notification process through official GIRoA channels and Afghan media to ensure that the truth/facts get out first before other terrorist groups can use the information as an information operation (IO) talking point.

The TD provides a commander a method to express his vision for achieving the desired end state. The combination of the ROE and CDE create a framework for the commander to develop his TD. Consequence management is another process that ensures the desired end state is met; it reduces the perceived negative effects of U.S. forces’ actions. It is vital for leaders at all levels to understand how these intertwine and that each impacts the tactical decision-making process.
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01 lays out five simple questions that must be answered before engaging any target. These five questions are applicable questions at all levels and for all leaders when making the decision to engage. Once answered and integrated with the wheel, any user will have good guiding principles:

1) Can I positively identify (PID) the object I want to affect?

2) Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or noncombatant personnel, involuntary human shields, or significant environmental concerns within the effects range of the weapon I would like to use to attack the target?

3) Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by attacking the target with a different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still accomplish the mission?

4) If not, how many civilians and noncombatants do I think will be injured or killed by an attack?

5) Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to the expected military advantage gained, and do I need to elevate this decision to the next level of command to attack the target based on the ROE in effect?

Home-station training is a critical tool to prepare units for operations in combat and to provide some training for leaders at all levels on potential decisions they may have to make. A thorough review of the ROE, TDs, and CDE — while discussing vignettes of situations from combat — is a good place to start. Units could then hold detailed discussions at the platoon level and higher on what happened and how the situation could be handled better next time (if applicable).

Any engagement in a COIN environment will be complex; it is unlikely one will mirror another. Each will have unique circumstances and mitigating factors, but all will be scrutinized in application against the ROE, TDs, and CDE. A trained leader, well versed in the nuances, application, and interoperability of each consideration will prevail. The decision-making wheel is just a tool for planning and reaction at the staff and leader levels. It is a simple visual tool that captures all considerations required to ensure success of the mission and safety of the populace as well as leaders and Soldiers on the ground.

Notes


2. Ibid.

3. Positive Identification: The reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the law of warfare (LOW) and applicable ROE.

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The warfighters’ ability to conduct missions requiring escalation of force (EoF) capabilities has proven to be a critical element in our nation’s success in hybrid warfare because noncombatant casualties and collateral damage can have strategic implications. For instance, consider the implications of using lethal systems to return fire on insurgents that are intermingled among civilians in a crowded market. Perhaps some Infantrymen will neutralize the insurgents, but it is very possible that there will be civilian casualties. The latter will create negative fallout with the local population and the press, undoing the good work that preceded the event. Marines facing asymmetric threats lack adequate non-lethal (NL) capabilities to immediately neutralize or incapacitate targets without killing or permanently injuring innocent civilians.

The Requirement
The Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) to develop a plan to “significantly increase the capacity and capability of complementary non-lethal systems that supplement lethal systems and allow for increased options for force application relative to the threat with the ability to limit collateral damage and lethal effects.”

What does the Marine Corps need in order to isolate or incapacitate a threat before the threat engages friendly forces? The Non-Lethal Weapons Branch, Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) of CD&I, determined the answer using the results of the Program Objective Memorandum 12 (POM-12) Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) capabilities-based assessment, input from the Marine Corps Infantry Operational Advisory Group, urgent universal needs statements, and the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System. Identified requirements included the need for a NL system that has greater range to increase standoff, a more robust capability that can incapacitate area targets, and the ability to seamlessly transition from non-lethal to lethal fires.

The results of the analysis have led to the formalized requirement for the Mission Payload Module – Non-Lethal Weapons System (MPM-NLWS). MPM-NLWS will provide the MAGTF with an enhanced capability needed to conduct perimeter security, support urban patrols, control crowds, conduct convoy security, and defend entry control points and vehicle checkpoints. The MPM-NLWS turret-mounted on a high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) will provide Marines the ability to acquire, engage, and incapacitate a single target or a group of individuals at ranges from 30 to 150 meters. With its innovative NL thermobaric round, MPM-NLWS will enable the Marines to temporarily incapacitate a single, targeted individual or a small group of targeted individuals who pose a potential threat. By increasing standoff and providing temporary effects on personnel, MPM-NLWS will provide the Marines time to determine the nature of the threat before escalating force and will reduce collateral damage and injury to noncombatants.

Why Not Use Lethal Weapons?
Infantrymen can easily engage known targets lethally, but insurgents are often difficult to locate or identify. Knowing our intent is to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, insurgents try to blend in with the local populace and use innocent civilians to mask their attacks on U.S. forces.

Imagine well-armed, extremely lethal, tactically and technically proficient, combat-hardened Marines boarding their HMMWVs to conduct mounted combat patrols between forward operating bases (FOBs). The Marines move out from the FOB, aware of the dangers along the main supply route (MSR). As the convoy moves, Marines remain vigilant with weapons at the ready. As the convoy approaches the intersection of a busy marketplace congested with civilians, a lone insurgent shouldering a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) appears in the crowd. Spotting the insurgent, the turret gunner of the third vehicle screams into his radio, “Contact right!” and instinctively traverses his turret, mounted with an M2 .50 caliber heavy machine gun, toward the target. Drivers instinctively stomp gas pedals to the floor, hoping to race away from the enemy kill zone to a more tenable position. Knowing that employing kinetic weapons and causing unintentional civilian deaths can alienate the local populace and feed the global audience with pictures of dead civilians, the Marine gunners hold their fire and rely on the driver to maneuver away from the threat. Surrounded by innocent civilians, the insurgent manages to launch a warhead toward the second vehicle, striking the passenger side just forward of the HMMWV door. The result is potentially tragic.

Alternatively, the turret gunner could choose to use the M2 to engage the insurgent located within the crowd. The result of this action is potentially tragic as well.

Whether protecting a vehicle convoy, vehicle checkpoint, or...
an entry control point, warfighters will continue to face crowds of unknown intent. Whether the crowd is protesting, waiting for evacuation, or waiting for food distribution, warfighters will always need to protect innocent civilians and themselves.

The Role of MPM-NLWS

MPM-NLWS will provide Marines the capability to employ appropriate levels of measured force to accomplish their missions, while minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Warfighters will continue to face combatants within a crowd of noncombatants, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or some future theater of operation. Current Marine Corps non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are point target weapons (e.g., 12-gauge shotgun with beanbag rounds, M203 grenade launcher with a flash-bang payload) that can only engage targets effectively at short ranges. The current NLWs, with kinetic energy munitions, will not solve the problem addressed in the scenario above due to the lack of range, area coverage, and limited effectiveness against a determined threat.

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in conjunction with the Marine Forces, conducted a requirements analysis on the Marine’s ability to operate in a threat environment with escalation of force options. The analysis identified the need for new materiel solutions for capability gaps in conducting perimeter security, conducting urban patrols and convoy security (earlier scenario), controlling crowds, and conducting entry control points and vehicle checkpoints.

During 2005-2007, Marines from the operating forces participated in the process of writing the requirement document to address these gaps. Their efforts identified the following essential characteristics for a new EoF weapon system. The system must:
- Be collocated with a lethal weapon system (e.g. MK-19, M2)
- Deliver effects out to greater ranges
- Provide greater area coverage
- Provide extended duration of effects
- Have the ability to go from NL to lethal in a simple, rapid manner without the gunner losing situational awareness.

This system will give Marines the capability to engage a target within a crowd of people while minimizing the risk of significant injury or collateral damage. In November 2007, the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) validated and approved the requirement to field the MPM-NLWS requirement for all active and reserve Infantry battalions. The requirement also calls for additional rounds of munitions (e.g. kinetic, obscuration, illumination, lethal) to address future and emerging capability gaps. Future increments of the MPM-NLWS may include mounting to additional vehicles (e.g., Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle). In October 2011, the MROC revalidated the requirement for 312 systems that will begin fielding in Fiscal Year 2016.

Technical Challenges

Since the term “thermobaric” is most often associated with the term “fuel air explosives (FAE),” we need to change the perception that thermobaric munitions are always lethal. Industry is already addressing the challenge of adapting this new fuel air technology into NL munitions.

An analysis conducted from 2007-2008 determined that a tube-launched, NL thermobaric system would be the most effective means of incapacitating targeted individuals while reducing the risk of significant injuries and collateral damage. When compared to other NL stimuli (e.g., kinetic energy, obscurants, incapacitating chemicals, electro muscular disablers, flashbangs), NL thermobaric munitions were determined the best technical solution with the least risk. NL thermobaric munitions will cause temporary flash blindness and temporary hearing loss, incapacitating an individual or a crowd with a loud bang and an intense flash of light. The degree of flash blindness will be determined by the amount of integrated luminance produced. The effects of this flash will cause temporary visual obscuration, limiting the targeted individual(s) ability to see, take aim at friendly forces, and/or maneuver into restricted areas. The effects will be powerful and intimidating.

In the crowded market scenario in which the combatant was aiming an RPG at the HMMWV, the visual obscuration effect would have prevented the combatant from sighting-in the weapon on the Marines. In addition to the blinding light, the intense sound or temporary threshold shift in hearing will cause temporary hearing loss, limiting the targeted individual’s ability to hear or communicate commands from other insurgents. In time, the people affected will regain their normal sight and hearing, but the Marines will have had time to address the threat, either by taking the insurgent into captivity or by moving past the threat.

Warfighters must always be prepared to use lethal force if necessary. Therefore, MPM-NLWS will not degrade a Marine’s ability to use his lethal weapon system. Since MPM-NLWS is going to Infantry battalions, it must be collocated with lethal weapon systems on the HMMWVs. Human systems integration must continue to be a priority for the MPM-NLWS in order to ensure that it will not degrade the following:
- The gunner’s situational awareness
- The gunner’s ability to employ the lethal weapon system
- Lethal weapon system operation (e.g. MK-19, M2)
- Use of the HMMWV or the Marine Corps Transparent Armor Gun Shield (MCTAGS).

Conclusion

Seeking out and identifying the insurgent as a hostile target, isolating him from his human shields, and being able to bring force to bear on him remains a challenge that we must meet, and must meet in short order. The current MPM-NLWS program will meet this challenge by providing a NL capability that can incapacitate targets and increase standoff, while limiting the risk of collateral damage, yet not encumbering the use of lethal systems.

Notes

1 This article is a revised version of a article by Ray Grundy that appeared in the December 2009 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette titled “Mission Payload Module — Non-lethal Weapons Systems.”

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Chapter 1 of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, opens with an anonymous Special Forces officer’s famous quote that Counterinsurgency (COIN) “is the graduate level of war.” According to the field manual, an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” Conversely, COIN is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

This type of warfare is “graduate level” because insurgency is primarily a political problem, and as such, requires a political solution. People resort to violence when they decide their prospects of peaceful change are no longer feasible. In a March 1962 speech, President John F. Kennedy noted, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” However, conventional military forces structured for war against other state militaries are not very suitable to deal with insurgencies. In most cases, an army of sociologists, economists, and civil engineers would be more appropriate than an army of tanks, cannons, and gunships. Since no such army of social engineers exists, governments resort to the only organized structure with the discipline and manpower to do anything, and this is inevitably their militaries.

A proper organization designed and equipped for combating insurgents would necessarily be oriented towards the people whose hearts and minds are the disputed areas in the struggle. Such an organization would necessarily have to focus on building infrastructure, promoting commerce, creating jobs, and improving the health and well-being of the civil population to assure their support for the embattled government, to prevent them from throwing their support to the insurgent cause, and to win back those civilians who have already cast their lot with the insurgents. Counterinsurgency is, after all, state building. Finally and most importantly, the counterinsurgent organization must address the political problems that caused the insurgency in the first place if they hope to resolve it.

These are hardly the tasks soldiers are trained for, but there is one area of vital importance that a military force, and in some cases, only a military force can address. This is security, because it is from security that all other developments in COIN can follow.

Security is the very first priority of any counterinsurgent force. It must be established in an area before any other nonmilitary measures can even be attempted. The insurgents must be driven from an area and prevented from returning. Only then will the social, political, and economic measures taken by the government begin to be felt and results established for all to see. Sometimes the insurgents will take control over an entire area, such as a city or a region. But insurgents do not need absolute control of an area to advance their objectives. They only need to disrupt the flow of business or the comfort of the people in the area to get their point.
across and to undermine the authority of the government. Many times their objective is just that — to put on display the weakness of the government and its failure to protect its constituents and to cause people to question their leaders’ abilities and resolve. When people lose faith in their authorities, they look to another source of order, and the insurgents plan to fill this void.

Terrorism then becomes a favored tactic of the insurgents as a method of instilling fear into the people and highlighting the ineptitude of the government. Attacks can be sophisticated and spectacular, such as the destruction of key infrastructures like factories, bridges, and transportation hubs to bring about discomfort to the people and a loss of revenue to the government. Attacks can also be low tech, such as bombings of key targets like police stations and government buildings or assassinations of police officers and municipal officials. But terrorism can also be directed at the people — a massacre in a crowded area or targeted assassinations of people known to have cooperated with the authorities. The result is always the same: the people draw inwards and refuse to cooperate with the counterinsurgents out of fear for their own lives. Such passive resistance to the counterinsurgents still helps the insurgency. Insurgents also hope to cause the counterinsurgents to respond harshly, therefore alienating and angering the people and forcing them over to the insurgents’ side. The counterinsurgents must not be lured into this trap.

After being caught between two warring sides, civilians will eventually just crave some form of order. Most people just want to survive and resume their lives as if there was no conflict. The civilians, who are the key to the entire effort, will sit on the fence through the course of the struggle waiting to see which side will prevail. Civilians always support the winner, but they wait until it becomes evident who will win. This is why it is vital that the people be shown that the insurgency cannot win and that it is inevitable that the government forces will be victorious. This is a task only soldiers, not social workers, can accomplish. Once again, security is paramount to the war effort.

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In urban areas, the insurgents attempt to blend anonymously into the larger civilian population. This can be an advantage as well as a disadvantage for the insurgent. As the counterinsurgent has to comb through the masses, as if searching for a needle in a haystack, the insurgent has the problem of not putting all of his eggs in one basket, lest his whole network be compromised in a single bust. The urban insurgent must contend with the difficulties of mustering a sizable combat element from individuals scattered throughout a city if he wants to stage large attacks. First are the obvious logistical problems of armed individuals attempting to move themselves, their weapons, and equipment to an agreed upon location across town, through checkpoints and without being confronted by roving security forces at any moment. Secondly, the activity of counterinsurgent forces mounting random house searches and neighborhood sweeps make it not only difficult but stupid for insurgents to keep large weapons in their homes. In addition, the counterinsurgents have probably quarantined the city, controlling all of the entrances and exits with checkpoints and inspections making insurgent resupply difficult. Lastly, the sheer number of people in a city can cause an air of distrust among insurgents, forcing them to operate in small numbers of close associates they can trust.

Urban insurgents, forced to work in cells of only a few members, often resort to terrorism, because this is simply the easiest and most efficient way for them to resist. Their supply of weapons can be disrupted, forcing them to rely on what they already have, what they can capture from the counterinsurgents, and what they can produce at home. The spectacular attacks against counterinsurgent patrols with heavy weapons are more and more unlikely as the conflict in the city continues, giving way to bombings, indirect fire, and sniper attacks. The insurgents just don’t have the manpower or the equipment to fight these sophisticated and sustained battles, but they can chip away at security forces bit by bit before blending back into the civilian population. As a result, urban insurgent actions are less often battles than they are strikes — an improvised explosive device...
(IED) set off on a counterinsurgent vehicle, a single sniper shot at a soldier manning a post, a few mortars or rockets lobbed at a police station, a burst of fire on a policeman from a drive-by vehicle. The insurgents mount quick, short attacks before the counterinsurgents can respond and then disperse and blend in among the people again.

Like a policeman, the counterinsurgent soldier must be alert and have a sixth sense of things. He must exercise good judgment on when to open fire. He must be aware of the civilians that inhabit his battlespace so as not to accidentally kill a bystander, which could create more insurgents. As such, many of the most effective weapons in a conventional army’s arsenal are rendered useless in the urban setting. Tanks are severely handicapped in cities even in conventional war. Mechanized vehicles are confined to roads where IEDs are, and narrow streets or alleyways are impassable to them. Furthermore, the mechanized Infantry cannot stay far from their vehicles which require dismounted protection. Artillery may be widely used for illumination, but adjusting high explosive artillery shells in a city full of people and then dropping hugely destructive fire-for-effect missions will inevitably have a short round that falls on the wrong people. A single artillery battery could provide all of the indirect fire support needed in a city for illumination purposes. The rest may as well be made into Infantry.

Due to the severe restrictions placed on military organizations, most conventional military forces are inapplicable to operations in these settings. Much of urban counterinsurgency is police work, not only protecting and serving the rest of the population from the insurgents but also using keen intelligence gathering and disseminating services to track down, penetrate, and shut down insurgent cells and networks. The counterinsurgent soldier’s mission will be to walk the beat, displaying his presence and providing overt security to the population. This is in direct contrast to his insurgent opponent who hides among the population and can strike seemingly at any time. However, the counterinsurgent’s overt presence also makes him an easy target to the occasional sniper or bomber, causing his superiors to weigh him down with protective equipment. Though the equipment undoubtedly limits his range and restricts his movement, this may have to be tolerated in an urban environment because patrols are short. Typically, the urban counterinsurgent’s patrols are only a few hours long before going back to his patrol base.

Urban insurgencies are very difficult and require a highly sophisticated skill set that are simply not found in conventional militaries. Urban insurgencies require more of a law enforcement approach than a military approach. In my opinion, an urban counterinsurgency should be avoided in most cases; however, the fact is that most urban insurgent movements fail. They are easy to isolate, and as such, logistics are a problem for them. But it is usually their adoption of terrorism as a main tactic that causes the civilian population to abandon them. The counterinsurgent’s main priority in the city is to provide security and protect the population.

Insurgencies in rural areas represent a stark difference. Insurgents may try to blend in with the rural population, but this is not as important as it is in cities. Some rural insurgents operate far away from populated areas, in essence separating themselves from civilians. In fact, some rural insurgents operate in large units like conventional military forces. They often utilize heavy weapons and employ textbook infantry tactics from institutional military field manuals. They move freely in their regions, often patrolling their own areas of operations on a schedule like an institutional military. It is typically those insurgents in rural areas that offer sustained battles of higher intensity to the counterinsurgents. Though terrorism can never be ruled out as an insurgent tactic, the rural terrain lends to guerrilla warfare. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines guerrilla warfare as “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.”

As such, COIN operations in rural areas take on a more military approach than in the cities. With the civilian population widely dispersed or even nonexistent, the counterinsurgent force can bring some of its conventional weapons, such as artillery or close air support, to bear.

The difficulty for the rural counterinsurgent comes in dealing with the wide spaces he has to cover. COIN operations —whether in urban or in rural settings — are, to use a well-worn cliche, like searching for a needle in a haystack. In cities, the sheer number of people is the hay, and in rural areas it is the great spaces of often very rugged terrain. The counterinsurgents must be everywhere at once simply to deny space to the insurgents. This is the hard part because it is so impractical. Very rarely throughout history has a counterinsurgent force had enough troops to be everywhere, so forces should be divided into small units to spread troops out far and wide. Oftentimes, outposts of company strength and smaller will be scattered out into areas of solitary or overlapping influence. These units must be easy to resupply or be self-sufficient, so they must be kept simple.

This is difficult because conventional military structures are not organized to be so spread out, and the logistics required to sustain these forces can be more than the supply chain is capable of delivering. Furthermore, supply lines are a favorite target of insurgents, and no counterinsurgent force can keep extensive lines of communication open. It is a fool’s errand to attempt to do so because in COIN operations the only ground you own is the ground beneath your feet. Once you move out of sight of the ground you just cleared, it is no longer cleared. To continue to waste time and resources constantly clearing and re-clearing such ground only works to the insurgent’s favor. This is why overland resupply is discouraged if waterborne or airborne methods are available.

Rural COIN operations require lots and lots of simple formations that are scattered across the land and can operate independently and be easily sustained in the field. The optimum organizations of these troops are found in light Infantry formations, specifically in long-range reconnaissance and short-range ambush patrols. They are mainly squad and fire team-sized units capable of operating in the field for days at a time and have the sole mission of trying to make contact with insurgent forces. Their main method of contact will be by ambush and chance encounter. Since the objective is to establish contact with the enemy, the longer they are on patrol and the more ground they cover, the more chances they have of making contact with the enemy. These troops will be constantly on the move. Likewise, these troops need to be lightly armed and lightly

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equipped. The heavy body armor worn by urban counterinsurgents is counterproductive in these settings. In fact, boonies may have to be worn rather than helmets. Heavy weapons are impractical as well because of their size and weight; the gross amounts of ammunition required to feed them also inhibit movement.

In my opinion, rural insurgencies offer a more appropriate military response than those in urban areas. But this is not to say that every rural insurgency is favorable. Some rural areas are unfavorable due to their sheer size, terrain, or climate. Each must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Some situations are beyond the limit of a military to control or are not worth the effort to pacify.

Urban and rural operations are the two sides of COIN that an army must be prepared to fight in at all times. But there are definitely some areas of overlap. Some very basic tactics, techniques, and procedures can be utilized regardless of setting. First, counterinsurgents should conduct night ambushes every night at likely IED emplacement sites in order to kill/capture bomb layers and discourage use of IEDs. Second, they should conduct random house searches on every daytime patrol to discourage people from hiding weapons/building IEDs in homes. Third, conduct random vehicle searches to discourage the enemy from moving weapons by car. These snap vehicle control points should be short and fast, perhaps just a few car searches at a time before moving on. This is so the enemy does not find out and dispatch a vehicle-borne IED. Fourth, counterinsurgents should use indirect fires to illuminate suspected areas of enemy activity even if no friendly units are observing them. This is to make the enemy think they are being observed and discourage them from activity. Also, counterinsurgents should make a list of on-call targets of likely areas where a patrol may make contact just in case a patrol needs immediate suppression or illumination. Furthermore, they should establish on-call targets of likely enemy mortar/rocket launch sites to be able to respond to an attack and discourage enemy use.

These are just a few of the very simple things the counterinsurgent can do to shut down insurgent activity in an area. By preventing the insurgent from operating against him, the counterinsurgent is seizing the initiative and being proactive rather than reactive. This makes it hard to be an insurgent and may cause him to lose faith and give up.

Lastly, regardless of the setting, the political, social, and economic parts of COIN are undeniably important. This includes encouraging and assisting in commerce and the growth of the local economy and trade between neighboring towns. When business is good and people are making money, there is less of an incentive to join the insurgency. Unemployment and dissatisfaction breeds insurgents. Simple projects and public works like building wells, roads, collecting trash, establishing medical clinics, etc., not only provide jobs and improve living conditions but also build trust. These efforts often take the necessary steps to address the problems at the root of the insurgency.

But the best way military forces can facilitate this growth is first and foremost by providing security. This always has and always will be the purview of the Infantry. Unlike some of the other branches, there will always be a role for the Infantry in a COIN environment. Follow me!

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The TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless-guided) missile military occupational specialty (MOS), 11H, was rolled into the 11B MOS in 2004, and since then there has been little or no formal institutional TOW Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) training in the Army. The only formal TOW ITAS training currently in existence is the Heavy Weapons Leaders Course (HWLC) at Fort Benning, Ga.

The TOW ITAS Collective Skills Trainer (CST) was developed by the Close Combat Weapon Systems (CCWS) Project Office in coordination with the Software Engineering Directorate (SED) at Redstone Arsenal, Ala., and the U.S. Army Infantry School and HWLC at Fort Benning, to assist delta companies in Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) with conducting and sustaining collective TOW ITAS training. Optimally, the CST is used after the unit has completed a block of individual operator and gunnery training, to include individual gunner qualification with the ITAS Basic Skills Trainer (BST). (Individual training resources available upon request to the unit include HWLC mobile training teams (MTTs) and professional development and train-the-trainer classes by CCWS personnel.) The CST is available on request and at no cost to any Active Army or National Guard unit that employs the TOW ITAS missile system. This includes weapons and scout platoons. The CST is brought to the requesting unit by tractor trailer. The CST can be included as part of a HWLC MTT or requested as a stand-alone training event. The CST trailer has its own onboard generator to provide electricity, heat, and air-conditioning. All it requires from the requesting unit is a hardstand approximately 50 feet by 70 feet.

The CST debuted at the September 2010 Infantry Warfighting Conference at Fort Benning. It is housed in a 53-foot trailer with double slide outs and simulates five high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) configured as a light Infantry weapons platoon. The CST uses the Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) simulation environment to allow the weapons platoon to perform virtual training exercises for 15 crewmen on simulated 3D terrain databases. As the platoon performs on one of a variety of missions, the instructors are able to observe the performance of the platoon in 2D and 3D views and to monitor all radio traffic on the network during the mission.

At the end of the mission, the instructors hold an after action review (AAR) and critique the performance of the platoon. The intent of the AAR is not merely to tell the platoon members what they did right or wrong but to involve them in the discussion and draw them out to analyze their own actions and decisions. The simulated missions are conducted as situational training exercise (STX) lanes performed in real-time field training.

The CST was designed to meet TOW ITAS training shortfalls. However, TOW ITAS is deployed as part of a weapons platoon, in combination with HMMWV-mounted MK-19 grenade launchers, .50 caliber heavy machine guns, and M240B medium machine guns, not in platoons mounting only TOWs. The CST is configured as a weapons platoon in order to give TOW ITAS gunners the opportunity to train realistically at the platoon level in the same configuration they actually deploy and fight in.
There are currently six missions loaded for use during CST exercises, and more are in development. Missions and their tasks, conditions, and standards are taken from current heavy weapons doctrine in Infantry School manuals. The existing missions are: route clearance, support by fire/hasty defense, quick reaction force, delaying action, deliberate defense, and movement to contact.

There are two methods of conducting these exercises. The standard method is for the instructors that man the CST to act as company commander and conduct the missions straight from the manuals. The preferred method is for the delta company commander, executive officer, first sergeant, or one of the other platoon leaders to act as company commander. The unit is then able to train according to whatever unique standard operating procedures (SOPs) the unit has created, and the unit leadership assesses its Soldiers to its own standards.

The ITAS CST trains platoons, sections, crews, and gunners, but it is primarily a leader trainer. It gives platoon leaders, section leaders, and squad leaders the opportunity to practice communicating, reporting, and controlling movements and fires of their respective elements. Approximately half of what the instructors evaluate is what they hear on radio traffic. Does the platoon exercise good radio discipline? Do the leaders keep their higher elements well informed? Are their reports timely and brief? Other things evaluated include movement techniques, fire control, rules of engagement, and whatever else the using unit commander is most interested in.

There have been a large number of lessons learned collected from units operating in Afghanistan that are reflected in CST missions. Many units have found TOW ITAS to be invaluable to spot and acquire targets, get an immediate, accurate 10-digit grid for a spot report, or call for fire with the far target locator capability of TOW ITAS. The system can also be employed as a precision line-of-sight assault weapon where appropriate, particularly with the addition of the TOW Bunker Buster to the TOW family of missiles. The CST gives units the opportunity to practice and evaluate all of these capabilities and techniques.

The ITAS CST is a very flexible tool. We have the ability to alter missions to meet unit needs and requirements, or even to develop new ones from scratch. Our priority target units are those scheduled to deploy overseas, to rotate to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., or the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La., or to complete Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs), but we will meet any reasonable training request if we are able. It works best when the Soldiers in the simulators are an actual organic platoon, with each Soldier occupying his assigned battle roster duty position. Typically, we recommend that each platoon spend one to two full days in CST training. Again, the ITAS CST is available to requesting units at no cost to the unit.

To schedule time with the ITAS CST for your unit, contact one of the following POCs:

Steve Watts — (256) 876-2371, steve.watts@msl.army.mil
Mike Schrenk — (256) 842-0138, Michael.Schrenk@msl.army.mil
Sam Natale — (256) 842-9105, Sam.Natale@msl.army.mil
Jana Kerley — (256) 842-9977, Jana.Kerley@msl.army.mil

To schedule MTTs with HWLC, contact SFC Jason Debaca at (706) 545-5885/7499 or DSN 835-7499, or visit the course’s website at http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/197th/229/HWLC.

To schedule leader professional development and train-the-trainer instruction contact Perry Taylor at (256) 876-4185 or Perry.Taylor@msl.army.mil

SFC (Retired) Steve Watts completed 20 years of service as a TOW weapons system crewman. He retired in 1997 and since then has worked at Close Combat Weapons Systems at Redstone Arsenal, Ala., as a support contractor, developing training devices and materials for such weapon systems as ITAS and line-of-sight antitank weapon (LOSAT).
Understanding the fragility of civil-military affairs of Arab regimes is an important component in assessing stability and instability. The Arab Spring has seen the centrality of the armed forces in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. Yet both Egypt and Tunisia’s armies have handled the protests differently, and in the case of Egypt, the relationship between Egypt’s elected President Mohammed Morsi and the generals is a matter of much debate. It also presents a criticism of the elected Freedom and Justice Party — that it rules in collusion with the army.

This article, the fifth in a series highlighting Egyptian General Mohamed Fawzi’s memoirs, provides fascinating insight into the relationship between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his armed forces chief and best friend, Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer. Specifically, it highlights the struggle between the two over control of Egypt during the instability in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

Throughout the war, Amer’s quest for power and simultaneous deteriorating mental state caused a lack in communication between the leadership and those on the forefront of battle. In turn, this lack of communication was one of the largest contributing factors to Egypt’s imminent loss. Much has been written on this subject in the Arabic language, including an al-Jazeera documentary on Amer’s attempt to stay in power and challenge Nasser after the Six-Day War. However, little is available in English on the subject. Perhaps the book that best discusses elements of the struggle in the Arabic language, including an al-Jazeera documentary on Amer’s attempt to stay in power and challenge Nasser after the Six-Day War. However, little is available in English on the subject. Perhaps the book that best discusses elements of the struggle between Amer and Nasser can be found in Michael Oren’s Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. This article will offer readers intimate details from Fawzi’s perspective, to include his direct involvement in preserving Nasser from an attempted coup by Amer and his military clique in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. In many ways, one can argue that the obsessions with internal security, coups, and counter-coups have undermined the ability of Egypt’s military to project power.

President Nasser Takes Responsibility, Isolates Amer

Nasser took an extraordinary step for an Arab leader on 10 June, in what some have called a politically staged event. He appeared before Egyptian television and took responsibility for the military disaster of the 1967 war. He ended by saying that he would step down as Egypt’s president. Soon after the televised event, hundreds took to the streets of Cairo pleading that he not resign, and then that number grew to thousands. Although there were indeed hundreds of pro-Nasser operatives that initially whipped up the crowd, the tens of thousands who came out in support showed genuine solidarity. Before the end of the day, Nasser used this populist momentum to announce the removal of Amer from all military and government positions. Amer did not tender his resignation, however, and instead ignored the announcement. The discredited field marshal wondered why the people supported Nasser and not him as well. Amer stewed over why the Egyptian armed forces did not call for him to stay, such were his delusions and inability to accept the new realities after the 1967 debacle. Amer resigned in order to fight and plan to face the wrath of public opinion alone. The chorus of support for Nasser, the wounded Egyptian and pan-Arab leader, radiated to other Arab countries. Having managed Egyptian public emotion, Nasser, with Fawzi at his side, turned to the serious threats coming from the clique of military officers loyal to Amer.

Amer’s Inner Circle Reacts

Perhaps one of the most dangerous aspects of the 1967 Six-Day War occurred at
9 a.m. on 11 June. That was when 50 brigade- and battalion-level commanders convened in the Egyptian armed forces headquarters in Nasr City, Cairo. These officers, each in control of upwards of 300 men, demanded that Amer resume his command of the armed forces. Demonstrating outside the headquarters these officers chanted, “No commander except the field marshal!” Twelve armored military police vehicles surrounded the headquarters, with the intent of keeping Field Marshal Amer and these 50 officers in place. At Nasser’s residence at Manshia al-Bakri, a group of pro-Amer field grade officers surrounded the president’s residence. Fawzi threatened this mob with courts martial if they did not disperse. They left Nasser’s residence and made their way to Amer’s residence, forming a personal guard around the field marshal’s home in Giza. That same day, there was another situation where armed officers roamed the streets of Cairo, coalescing around Amer or Nasser. It was a delicate and tense situation that was brought about by Amer’s refusal to accept defeat and relinquish his position as war minister.

Amazingly, Nasser decided not to confront Amer on 11 June and also allowed military supplies to reach forces camped out near his home in Giza. The friendship between Nasser and Amer was too deep, and he agonized over the decision to move against a man that had been by his side since they were junior officers and who together undertook the 1952 Revolution that toppled the monarchy of King Farouk. Fawzi briefed a pained Nasser and kept him updated on the growing challenge Amer posed to his authority.

**Radio Cairo Announces General Fawzi in Charge**

On 11 June at 2:30 p.m., Radio Cairo announced Fawzi’s appointment as Egypt’s armed forces commander in chief. That same day, Fawzi spent several hours in Nasser’s home discussing replacements of ranks from field marshal to brigadier general. Fawzi recommended the governor of Aswan Province and former air force officer Madkoor Aboul-Eez be appointed as commander of the Egyptian air force and General Abdel-Moneim Riad as armed forces chief of staff. The decision to appoint Amin Howeidy as war minister rested with Fawzi, as he and Nasser had narrowed it to two names; the decision then hinged upon who Fawzi could work with best.

Fawzi and Nasser then discussed the presidential decrees Amer had urged and which ones would be rescinded immediately. The two focused on cancelling decrees, dealing with the military budget, and providing the war minister unquestioned signature authority and control over the budget without oversight by the national security committee. Law 66/25 that provided the military authority to adjudicate soldiers was cancelled. Fawzi and Nasser also agreed to make the military budget more transparent to the Egyptian bureaucracy (and thereby more transparent to the people). This was a strategic move by Nasser and Fawzi, as Amer’s power was derived from being a founder of the 1952 Revolutionary Command Council, his deep friendship with Nasser, and the cult of personality he developed within the armed forces. Amer treated the armed forces as his personal fiefdom and viewed it as the only institution capable of enacting national change.

**Amer’s Villa Transformed into an Armed Fortress**

Amer’s villa in the Cairo suburb of Giza was transformed into an armed fortress with four officers loyal to Amer commanding 260 soldiers from a military police contingent. This army presence was supplemented with about 30 villagers and relatives from Amer’s village of El-Minia, who acted as personal guards. Amer’s protégé, Shams Badran, used his own network of cronies, along with a few cashiered senior military officers, to form a competing center of power to salvage Amer. Badran contacted journalists, diplomats, industrialists, and members of Egypt’s Majlis al-Umma (Parliament) to lobby on Amer’s behalf and to pressure Nasser to keep the field marshal onboard. On the evening of 11 June, policemen failed to evict the troop presence from Amer’s villa, and there were exchanges of gunfire. Fawzi telephoned Amer, and his memoirs feature this exchange:

Amer: “Remove your troops and security men; I have (the) firepower to meet them round for round, Fawzi!”

Fawzi: “This is a situation unbecoming (a) field marshal and against the law! It was Jalal Hureidi (interior ministry and not the army) who placed these men and opened fire.”

Amazingly, Amer left Giza for El-Minia. Joining him was a large entourage of cashiered officers. Fawzi noted that it would take awhile for Nasser to reconcile the fact that Amer could only be removed by force, and that an opposition front and political threat to Nasser was growing with each passing hour.

**Amer’s Protégé Attempts a Coup Against Nasser**

Fawzi revealed a plot developed by Shams Badran. It involved a military coup against Nasser using the Eastern Front Army, headquartered in the Suez Canal town of Ismailiyah. The army would be supplemented by Saaqa (special forces) units still assessed to be loyal to Amer from the Cairo airbase of Inchass, some fighter pilots, as well as the 4th Mechanized Armored Division.

All of Egypt’s security apparatuses kept Nasser informed of this conspiracy. Intelligence gathered from the various security branches revealed that the plot was to take place during the three days Nasser was attending the Arab League Summit in Khartoum from 27 to 29 August 1967.
The plot was planned in Amer’s home in Giza and given the code name “Nasi” (victory). Nasser contacted Badran by phone and requested a list of all the members of the secret security apparatus he created. Badran denied that such an organization existed and that all soldiers were loyal to Amer. He also issued a threat to Nasser, saying that the armed forces would turn against him if he attempted to harm Amer. Nasser was then resolved to remove Amer by force if necessary, and he called on Fawzi to make the necessary arrangements. However, it would take Nasser until 24 August to make this decision. In the meantime, Fawzi worked with his cadre of officers to remove Amer loyalists from armed forces commands and formations.

**Nasser Moves on Amer**

At 1600 on 25 August, Nasser ordered Fawzi to forcibly enter Amer’s Giza home and then arrest all officers and military personnel inside and around the property. Amer was scheduled to arrive at Nasser’s home at 7 p.m. and remain there until Fawzi removed all vestiges of Amer loyalists from his home. Fawzi coordinated this task with officials representing the interior ministry and civil police, intelligence, and the information ministry. Amer’s home was cordoned off at 9 p.m., and Fawzi ordered that no one open fire without his express permission.

When Fawzi approached Amer’s front door, he found it chained; Badran and two others were present and armed with assault rifles and grenades. Fawzi began to communicate with Badran when rooftop shots rang out, which were later determined to be celebratory and unrelated to the tense incident unfolding. Little did those revelers know, their shots could have started a bloodbath that could have engulfed the entire city.

Badran finally surrendered and was taken into custody, but Fawzi still had upwards of 300 men inside the villa. Using a bullhorn, he ordered them to surrender their weapons and be transported to the Cairo military prison. Fawzi then ordered all civilians to do the same.

Fawzi’s forces entered the evacuated villa, and the search for the weapons cache lasted all night. At 5 a.m. on 26 August, Fawzi informed Nasser that the mission had been completed without any bloodshed or casualties. Amer was then escorted back to his Giza home and placed under house arrest with access only to his family. Despite these restrictions, Amer still tried to sway public opinion against Nasser by telephone. Nasser then had no choice but to place Amer in comfortable isolation.

**Amer Attempts Suicide**

Fawzi was in charge of moving Amer from his Giza home to the rest house; Generals Riad and Saad Abdel-Kareem (chief, presidential guard) assisted him with the mission. During the move, the field marshal was seen placing something in his mouth. He was taken to Maadi Hospital where his stomach was pumped. Unused capsules were located on his person and sent for analysis. From the hospital, Amer was taken to a guest house, and General Muhammad Laithi was placed in charge of the field marshal’s security and needs. During this time, Amer only asked for guava juice. He spoke with Fawzi and Riad regarding the current military situation and inquired about a massive arms shipment from the USSR. Once the cargo was offloaded, Amer felt that fighting would resume. He stated, “the President (Nasser) must cease this (incarceration of me) within 24 hours or he will be responsible for the outcome.”

General Laithi located two villas in the Cairo district of al-Maadi that could accommodate Amer’s medical and security teams. While Fawzi and Laithi were inspecting the new quarters on 14 September, they received word of Amer’s second suicide attempt at 7 p.m. Upon arriving at the guest house, Fawzi found Anwar Sadat and Amer’s older brother. The medical officer on duty thought Amer was sleeping but then found him unconscious at 6 p.m. Attempts to revive him failed, and Amer was pronounced dead at 6:40 p.m.

**Amer’s Death Enters the Lore of Arab Political Conspiracies**

In 2009 al-Jazeera TV aired a two-hour documentary on Amer’s suicide, interviewing his children and family members. It explored all the conspiracies, from stories about laced guava juice and slow-acting poisons to Nasser ordering him to commit suicide. Fawzi, who read the prosecutor’s report containing the autopsy, wrote that Amer ingested a subtle and slow-acting poison on 13 September; its effects were not shown until 14 September. This may explain the duty medical officer’s comment of seeing Amer sleeping before finding him unconscious.

Current generations of Egyptians, while aware generally of the struggle between Amer and Nasser, only understand sound bites; it is imperative to delve into details as this generation of Egyptians struggles to form a more perfect government. The perfection of a government that accommodates the diversity of 80 million Egyptians demands wisdom, which can only be derived from understanding the intricacies and perspectives of the past.

Overall, the internal struggles within the Egyptian government led the country to be gravely unprepared for the 1967 war. Specifically, the tumultuous relationship between Nasser and Amer took the focus away from battle strategies and efficient frontline communication, where it was desperately needed. Internal politics drove the two leaders to be more concerned with safeguarding the strength of their leadership than with a war victory. Ultimately, the power struggle between Nasser and Amer reached a concerning level with plotted coups and personnel betrayals, ending with Amer’s suicide.

With the state of Egypt’s government and its overall stability presently uncertain, the country’s past is as, if not more, important than current tribulations. Therefore, it is essential people understand the intricacies of the 1967 war in order to gain insight into how to handle future plights, especially those that may put Egypt in a situation where it will again be affected for decades.

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Guerrilla Leader: T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.

By James J. Schneider.
Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

As we all know, a book title can be extremely deceiving. In many cases, it can mislead you in terms of the book’s content. At times, this content can be a pleasant surprise, and the rewards can be considerable. Conversely, it can be a huge disappointment, and you find your valuable reading time has been dealt a significant blow. I, like many, have had my share of both experiences.

At first glance, James Schneider’s volume would appear to be “another” biography on T.E. Lawrence (with the focus on his years involved with the Arab Revolt). I say “another” because since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, interest in Lawrence has clearly escalated. Schneider’s title would suggest that this book should be added to this group. However, this is clearly not the case as readers will quickly discover.

What they will find is that Guerrilla Leader is far more than a volume reviewing Lawrence’s role during the Arab Revolt from 1916-1918. First and primarily, it is a book which analyzes and studies leadership. Second, it examines decision making and problem solving. Third, it provides readers with a comprehensive case study on the planning, preparation, and execution of irregular warfare with emphasis on guerrilla warfare. Finally, it delves into the psyche of Lawrence in a way previous authors have not attempted. It is a combination Schneider expertly blends together through his superb organizational skills and writing ability.

I believe there are few books that explore the art of leadership as well as Guerrilla Leader. The key factor in this is the author’s decision to study Lawrence. As Schneider states in his preface, “The influence of Lawrence on military leadership of the last century and into the present has been largely ignored, forgotten, or misunderstood.” Based on the previous books I have read on Lawrence, I would certainly agree with the author’s statement. Schneider has truly taken advantage of a valuable window of opportunity.

In studying Lawrence “the leader,” Schneider first sets the conditions for readers by describing the huge cultural and environmental challenges Lawrence faced in the Middle East. With that achieved, he utilizes a combination of Lawrence’s experiences during the Arab Revolt, Lawrence’s own words (captured from his books), and Schneider’s considerable personal expertise to discuss the essence of leadership. Within this discussion, Schneider provides numerous lessons learned and “nuggets” which are immensely beneficial.

Lawrence’s experiences during the Arab Revolt were filled with a truly unique problem set. Within Guerrilla Leader, Schneider examines the problem-solving and decision-making processes Lawrence utilized. He provides numerous examples in which Lawrence was successful and also highlights the times where Lawrence may have been lacking in the above areas. Once again, as in the discussion of leadership, this discussion is invaluable.

As in the case with Lawrence, the interest level in irregular warfare has also dramatically increased. There are few better case studies on irregular warfare (guerrilla warfare) than the Arab Revolt. Schneider is able to concisely provide readers with an overall understanding of the key events in which Lawrence was a part of. Within this context, he then combines Lawrence’s words and his own experience to discuss the principles and concepts of irregular/guerrilla warfare. I know I am being repetitive, but again, this is invaluable.

It seems in every Lawrence book, the author attempts to delve into his psyche. Schneider is no different in that regard, but his effort is far less ambitious than most. However, Schneider does key in on an area which previous authors have not focused upon. Within the book, the author contends that Lawrence suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from events during the Arab Revolt. Schneider discusses the effects PTSD had on Lawrence during the Arab Revolt and briefly touches on the effects it had during the remainder of his life.

In summary, Schneider’s Guerrilla Leader is one of the best books I have read in recent memory. It is a book which will clearly surprise readers in the various directions it will take them. Each of these directions provides numerous benefits to all readers no matter their previous knowledge or interest in Lawrence. Once again, we are reminded to heed the words, “Never judge a book by its cover.”

Shifty’s War: The Authorized Biography of Sergeant Darrell “Shifty” Powers, the Legendary Sharpshooter from the Band of Brothers.

By Marcus Brotherton.
Reviewed by Sarah Harden.

Reading Shifty’s War was an immense pleasure. Marcus Brotherton’s purpose of wanting to inform readers about a courageous, truly upstanding man and Soldier from World War II, one of America’s greatest times of distress, speaks to everyone. Whether you are someone who has never served in the
military, served for a short time, or served for many years, *Shifty’s War* will touch your heart. Written in first person by Brotherton as Darrell “Shifty” Powers, the story leads the reader through Shifty’s childhood in Clinchco, a small mining town in Virginia, through his training and time in Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, and to his life after the war. When Shifty was growing up in Clinchco, his father taught him how to shoot and how to both hear and feel, rather than just see, when out hunting. By learning to “see” with his ears instead of his eyes and becoming a talented shooter, Shifty became one of only two men in his 140-man company to achieve the title of “expert marksman” once he entered the Army.

In 1941, Shifty attended a vocational school in Norfolk for a machinist course. There, he met friends who would be with him for years and experienced life outside his small coal-mining hometown. Shifty and his friend, Popeye, soon joined the Army and were sent to Camp Toccoa, Ga., for one of America’s first paratrooper training programs. A short time into the training, the commanding officers got wind of Japanese troops marching entire nights and ordered Easy Company to march from Toccoa to Atlanta, about 120 miles away, in three days. From Atlanta, they would take a train down to Fort Benning. During Shifty’s time as a paratrooper, he parachuted into France on D-Day and fought in Normandy. A month later, he spent time fighting in Holland; battling in Bastogne, Belgium, during its harsh winter; struggling near Haguenau, France; and prevailing in the Ruhr pocket in Germany. After three years of fighting, Shifty returned home to Clinchco, married in 1949, and started raising a family.

This attention-grabbing authorized biography is a different piece of nonfiction. The way Brotherton writes, as if he were a small town resident like Shifty, makes the reader fall in love with this wonderful character’s memories, doubts, hopes, and life. Many times while reading *Shifty’s War*, I would become so wrapped up in the story that I would forget it was a historical nonfiction account, causing me to be impressed all over again by the way this book enthraps attention and reads like a story. As Shifty’s voice, Brotherton is charming, funny, and relatable. Even though the first-person voice seems a little out of place by the end of the novel, which takes place in more recent years, *Shifty’s War* is a pleasure to read and is a book you will not want to put down.

The inclusion of photographs, acknowledgements, sources, and an index makes reading this book both easy and informative. The sources section is broken up into chapters to give readers a simple process when they are looking for where Brotherton found his information. The index includes page number references to terms, people, and locations within the book. For those who read *Shifty’s War* and find they enjoy reading works from Brotherton, two of his many other works that might be of interest are: *A Company of Heroes* and *We Who Are Alive and Remain: Untold Stories from the Band of Brothers*.

In conclusion, *Shifty’s War* is a well thought-out and thoroughly researched pleasure of an authorized biography. Without a doubt, Shifty will lead you through the incredible account of his years as a boy living in a small coal mining town to his heartbreaking, yet triumphant journey through World War II.
In the Next Issue:

* Danger Close: Calculating Risk Within the ‘Last 100 Yards’
* Infantry Innovations in Insurgency: The Sri Lanka Experience