Operational or Garrison:

Targeting is Targeting

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The purpose of this article is to outline a way to conduct the targeting process during garrison operations. Garrison targeting will focus the brigade combat team (BCT) staff on internal functions while training the staff to conduct targeting in an operational environment. A garrison targeting process follows the same structure as the operational process to alleviate work. Tasks developed during the process follow the same flow as it would in the operational process. This process will provide synchronization for the staff, assist with prioritization of tasks, and will lead your unit to mission accomplishment within a garrison environment.

Targeting in Garrison

The targeting process is a science that relies on mathematical measurements which denote whether something has changed based on a pre-determined commander’s vision and end state. The basis of this science resides in the **decide, detect, deliver, and assess** (D3A) framework. The critical piece of any targeting process is **assess**. Without a formalized method of assessing our actions in an operational environment, the overall process will fail due to decisions made on irrelevant data. If the targeting process is a work of art, how does the staff master the art? How can we develop a process months ahead of a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation? Can a staff utilize a different way of conducting targeting that will develop the process earlier without a tactical order on hand? The answers to these questions are the same. Utilizing the targeting process during garrison operations will aid in staff development and will provide a tested process to use for CTC rotations and future deployments.

The staff can easily do this by applying the methodology of the targeting process to assess training, personnel, readiness, equipment, and other requirements during garrison operations. The garrison targeting process requires the adherence to the four targeting principles that are required to conduct operational targeting. The process focuses the staff to achieve the commander’s objectives. The staff uses non-lethal means to determine desired effects and must participate across all warfighting functions. The staff conducts analysis and then prioritizes and assigns an asset/enabler to achieve the desired effects. The assets/enablers become the garrison agencies that must synchronize in order to conduct military training events. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-60, **Targeting** (formerly FM 3-60, The Targeting Process), defines a target as an entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action. Garrison targeting uses this definition to identify the entities and objects as internal unit personnel and functions. To summarize, the only change to targeting from operational to garrison is the focal point — enemy (operational) to internal (garrison).

One of the main reasons for implementing a garrison process should be to work through as many targeting cycles as possible to perfect the process used in combat operations. Many units participate in a CTC’s Leader Training Program (LTP) prior to a rotation without a fully developed targeting process. LTP is not for development of the targeting process; it is for the military decision-making process (MDMP) that will drive the operations during the rotation. Units operate this way not from a lack of understanding; it comes from a desire to use targeting only for operational purposes. Units tend to shrug off the process used during deployment, only to rely upon a lackluster system to track our training and readiness for the next
deployment. Do we know if our unit training level meets mission essential task list (METL) requirements? Is the METL assessment formal and based upon quantifiable data, or have we based the assessment on false or subjective data?

Another reason for implementing a garrison targeting process includes the development of the assessments of garrison-related tasks. The staff at all levels must be able to provide the assessments of training other than the three letters T (trained), P (needs practice), and U (untrained). While conducting targeting during combat operations, measures of performance (MOP) ask the unit if the mission execution was according to standard. If the execution of the task deviates from the approved execution, the MOP is not accomplished. The staff designs the measures of effectiveness (MOE) to assess the desired effect of the training event on the end state. Conducting assessments in this manner provides the commander with an assessment of unit capabilities (MOP) and the projected impact on future operations (MOE). The unit’s training proficiency during garrison operations prepares them for the eventual deployment to an operational environment. Adopting a formal system of assessment will enable the staff to identify critical shortfalls in training early enough to correct the deficiencies prior to deploying to a combat environment.

Utilizing the targeting process to drive operations in garrison could lead to several positive changes. The targeting process provides synchronization for the staff and forces the staff to practice the targeting process prior to a brigade field training exercise (FTX), CTC rotation, or even deployment. The staff can alleviate a large percentage of the “everything is a priority” tasks. Additionally, when utilizing the MOP and MOE assessment criteria, the staff will truly assess the METL, overall strengths, and the team. This will also allow the commander to know his full formation for future decisions.

Additionally, the transition to operational environment targeting will become fluid. Units that apply this system will not have the slow start most units will feel upon arrival and instead can hit the ground running. Units can train on this process for several months prior to their CTC rotation and deployment. The only flaw at this point is the work to build and implement the process!

**Implementing the Process**

Prior to beginning the iterative process of targeting for operational environments, the staff conducts design and MDMP for the assigned mission. One of the slight differences between garrison and operational targeting is not necessarily conducting MDMP. The operational environment for garrison targeting is the brigade, battalion, or company so the higher unit mission and subsequent outreach to deployed units is not required. Development of a concept sketch will aid in developing understanding within the staff for the targeting process. At a minimum, the concept sketch should display task development through assessment (see Figures 1 and 2).

The garrison process will require elements of the design methodology to develop current assessments and initial commander’s intent, to look forward into the future and project a desired end state, and to identify lines of effort (LOEs). The next step in developing a working process is developing the operational approach with LOEs and conceptual end states. The conceptual end states will develop further as the staff comes together and identifies the realistic LOE end states by warfighting function (WFF). In order to help identify the time frame for end state accomplishment, the design team designates a point on the long range planning calendar (LRPC). This point can be prior to a CTC rotation or deployment. The final assessment of the unit should provide the commander with a complete snapshot of the unit. The LOEs need to be broad enough to encompass the majority of garrison tasks normally associated with the defined subject but precise enough to limit ambiguity (for example, readiness, Ready and Resilient
Campaign (R2C), or training). The LOE working groups could — and should — take the place of the normal meetings such as the training meeting.

The unit executive officer (XO) will assign the staff responsibility over a developed LOE by WFF. The staff action officer for the LOE is required to determine a feasible/ accomplishable end state as outlined in the operational approach. Additionally, the staff proponent will need to conduct a pre-working group meeting in order to outline two to three steps necessary to attain their end state. These steps will provide initial decision points for the working group. These steps are still somewhat broad, but each cycle the working group will propose tasks for the unit/units to conduct in order to provide assessments for the decision points (see Figure 3 for an example campaign plan with developed end states).
After developing the concept sketch and the campaign plan, the staff will present the process to the commander for decision. The staff will ask the commander to decide on the implementation of the process after reviewing the campaign plan and concept sketch. This can also be accomplished with a deskside brief to the commander with the XO and/or S3. After the commander approves utilization of a garrison targeting process, the next step is to place the meetings onto the battle rhythm. If a battle rhythm is not in place, be prepared to provide an example to the commander during the decision. The implementation of a battle rhythm is the decisive piece for sustaining the targeting process. Starting the process will involve developing assessments; each meeting will review the assessments to identify tasks that are required to accomplish the end state. The working groups will need a starting point.

Assessments are the primary driving force behind the garrison targeting concept. The assessments must incorporate using MOPs and MOEs. As stated in ADP 3-60, a “MOP answers (questions) such as are we doing things right...” In other words, did the unit accomplish the task assigned to it in the manner outlined for completion of the task? For MOEs, we are looking for the desired effect of the task. In garrison, we can look at increases or decreases in actions taken by our Soldiers. The garrison MOEs, much like non-lethal MOEs associated with operational targeting, will take time for the assessments to be reported. This does not make the assessments less important as decisions will require accurate and relevant data. Attempting to measure the impact of a training event on overall readiness will take time, but immediate results can be gathered through creative questions during after action reviews (AARs). Care must be taken to understand that the immediate results may or may not predict future performance. Immediate, near-term, and long-term MOEs can be developed to provide a comprehensive assessment.

For the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division process, the MOEs have been broken down further to identify the indicators that build towards MOE accomplishment. In Figure 4, the MOE is developed by identifying the increase or decrease of the desired effect as compared to a similar time period. This is fairly simple
for garrison targeting as the desired effects are changes to data points that are required for reporting. For instance, alcohol-related incidents are reported each month or quarter; a decrease in alcohol-related incidents would be compared to the same time period as the last fiscal year. MOEs and indicators should be tied to decision points for the commander. The indicators can also be tailored to answer specific questions. Were all subordinate units able to complete training during the allotted time period (additional time allocated on LRPC)? Was the training conducted in the proper facility/range? Did the task require outside agency support (mobile training team)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Assess</th>
<th>Evidence/Reporting</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO4</td>
<td>MOE 2.1.1 — Increase in unit readiness levels in medical, physical, and spiritual readiness as compared to FY14</td>
<td>% of soldiers meeting body composition standards</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SO5</td>
<td>MOE 3.2.4 — Decrease in high risk or negative behavior as compared to 4th QTR FY13</td>
<td>% of soldiers meeting MRC 1 and 2 categories</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO6</td>
<td>MOE 3.2.5 — Increase in participation with transition and sponsorship programs as compared to FY14</td>
<td>% of soldiers completing SPL-TAP program</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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ACRONYMS

BIT — Behavioral health; ET5 — expected term of service; FY — fiscal year; IDES — Integrated Disability Evaluation System; MAW — Mountain Athlete Warrior; MRC — medical readiness checklist; MOE — measure of effectiveness; QTR — quarter; SPL-TAP — Soldier for Life — Transition Assistance Program

Figure 4 — Example MOE Assessments

A key aspect of developing the garrison process is that the products that are used for executing the process should be the same products that are used for the operational process. In order to continue to receive maximum support and target development for the operational process, ensure that changes to the products are minor and do not create confusion. The participants in the working group will come from across the staff to include subordinate unit liaison officers (LNOs), so simplicity in the process is important. This process does not require 50-100 slides; the working groups are more effective with discussion. The staff should not have to dedicate half of the duty day to get through one meeting. Keep the meetings as short as needed, and the process should be simple to understand to keep the staff functional and efficient.

As discussed above, LNOs are required from subordinate units. The operational process will require LNOs to ensure that the staff is not planning in a vacuum. The garrison process requires the same personnel. During the process, the staff will identify tasks that will involve subordinate units and will take time away from their training plans. Additionally, it will require the subordinate units to nest their operations within the construct of the garrison process. These two reasons are not detrimental to the process if the LNOs actively participate within the process and within their unit. Units that select their best officers to become LNOs will make the overall team better and will have a greater impact on the subordinate unit’s operations. A targeting process without participation from the subordinate units may not function at full capacity.
The Meetings

The process begins with the **assessments working group** (AWG). During the AWG, the entire targeting team is present to review the consolidated assessments (MOP/MOE) to provide a current picture of the unit prior to task development for the cycle. This meeting identifies changes to previous cycle assessments, identifies staff section responsibility to provide updates to assessments, and prepares the staff for the cycle. Additionally, the staff will review the end states and the commander’s intent for the current cycle. The working groups will meet, according to the battle rhythm, upon completion of the AWG.

The working groups for this process will be the driving force behind task (target) development. The working groups meet to discuss current and past cycle assessments, future recommendations for the quarterly training guidance, and tasks to complete to achieve the end state. The working groups become focus groups for their individual areas. For example, the training working group will focus primarily on the training proficiency of the unit in relation to the approved METL. Officers, NCOs, and other post agencies outside of the BCT staff participate in these meetings as LNOs or as subject matter experts. For instance, R2C has an abundance of subject matter experts at division level or at Army Community Service (ACS) who can provide vital information for task development. (These outside agencies compare to the interagency subject matter experts available during operations in theater or in a joint environment). The working groups compile the targets/tasks in a concept of operation (CONOP) format for proposal during the targeting meeting. It is the responsibility of the working group lead to establish the assessment criteria for each target. If the assessment criteria fail to define the desired effect, the assessment will be subjective or open for interpretation. The results of inadequate assessments will reflect on multiple engagements of the same or similar task.

The **targeting meeting** synchronizes all developed tasks from the working groups. Due to limited funding, enabler support, additional resources, and white space on the LRPC, synchronization and prioritization of the tasks must happen during the targeting meeting. Additionally, we review our overall end states, commander’s intent, and current assessments. The team prioritizes the task proposals according to the impact towards the end state, the commander’s intent, and available white space on the LRPC. Additionally, this meeting provides the XO and the deputy commanding officer (DCO) a current picture of the targeting cycle to aid in the delivery of the decision brief.

The **decision brief** is the forum for each LOE lead to present nominated targets to the commander for approval. The commander receives a review of the end states, the intent, and current assessments prior to the presentation of the targets. Assessments provided to the commander include analysis of the current state of the unit and troop-to-task ratios. The commander needs to know where the unit stands in space and time in relation to the end state and their intent. During the presentation of tasks to the commander, each LOE lead will provide the task’s purpose. The purpose should reflect the impact that the task will have on the accomplishment of the end state. Upon approval, targets then move to the task tracker for execution, further planning (dependant on the complexity of the task), or awaiting timeline to publish in the weekly fragmentary order (FRAGO). The decision brief is also the forum to ask for commander’s intent for the next targeting cycle. The current assessments could reflect a shift in direction, in which the commander could update the targeting team on the intent. This may also require a FRAGO to update all units involved on the shift in commander’s intent.

**Task Evolution**

A task simply does not just appear on the training calendar. If assessments are clear and tied to decision points, identification of tasks will become second nature to the staff. The working groups must be meticulous when developing tasks. The targeting team must ensure that all tasks nest with the end state and commander’s intent.
For example, during the AWG the staff identifies an increase in alcohol-related incidents across the unit. The R2C working group attendees acknowledge the trend and begin to formulate solutions. During the R2C working group, discussion focuses on tasks that can reverse the trend within the unit. These tasks can include increased emphasis on safety briefings, training events, and increased leader involvement. One task that the staff presented to the commander is a training event in which a person who has lost a family member by a drunk driver will speak to each subordinate unit. Another idea is to locate a person who killed someone while driving drunk to speak during a one-hour time block. The working group assigns a task to an action officer to develop for the targeting meeting.

During the targeting meeting, the action officer presents the developed task and identifies enablers/resources required. This task requires the use of the post theater and outside agency support. The action officer ensures that the division Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) representative is present for the decision brief. The S3 identifies white space on the calendar and provides the action officer possible dates for the class. This task is given a date of 12 weeks out. During the decision brief, the commander receives the updates to the assessments with emphasis on the measurements that associate with the presented tasks. The ASAP representative provides emphasis for the task and individuals who will present their story. The ASAP representative reports that the speaker cannot access the installation due to felony conviction. The action officer then asks the commander for the decision on the presented task, and the commander either approves, disapproves, or modifies the task.

The assigned MOP/MOE for the task becomes available for assessment upon completion of the task. The MOE will measure the alcohol-related incidents for the 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year (FY)15 as compared to the 1st Quarter of FY14. The staff determines that the MOP and MOE is complete for this task. The task is now a viable option to re-attack prior to historic alcohol-related incident windows. Additionally, the staff can now explore the next cycle assessments to determine the next task, which will move the unit to the end state. The same process described above can relate to every task associated with garrison operations to include M4 zero and qualification. The MOP is the percentage of individuals who participated in marksmanship training prior to qualification event. The MOE is the increase in expert/sharpshooter percentages as compared to previous 1st Quarter M4 qualification results.

**Conclusion**

Implementing the targeting process during garrison operations will enhance any unit prior to a CTC rotation or deployment. The simplicity of the process, combined with subject matter experts within each WFF, will alleviate the “everything is a priority” mode of operations. The targeting process accomplishes the commander’s intent, provides a path to success for the unit, and keeps the staff focused on the end state. Prioritization of tasks ensures subordinate units are allocated time to accomplish individual and collective training without compromise. Implementing this process will be a win for your organization.

For example products or help in developing the process for your unit, contact travis.e.smith.mil@mail.mil. We will provide the products in order to alleviate some of the development work. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask.

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