



Illustration by Marc Simonetti

Artist rendering of a U.S. Army commander shaping the deep fight with lethal fires from field artillery, attack aviation, and fixed-wing aircraft. This painting is box art for Wargame: Airland Battle from Eugen Systems and published by Focus Home Interactive.

HOW ENABLERS SHAPE THE DEEP FIGHT FOR THE BCT

CPT COLIN MARCUM

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Forwards

During my time as the commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, TX, I had the opportunity to truly appreciate how effects on the battlefield can shape the execution of courses of action and conduct of both friendly forces and that of the enemy. I knew that in most instances the greatest threat to mission success and force protection happens during the close and security fight, but as my time went on I began to see how effectively shaping the enemy in the deep fight days before changed operational and mission variables during the close fight to create an advantage for us. As a result, I made sure the staff of my warfighting functions dedicated a portion of their planning time, and the brigade's resources, to not only fighting the close/security fight but also to shaping the deep fight in order to set favorable conditions. I knew if this was accomplished it would arguably make future planning that much easier for, as you see, the deep fight of today has the potential of being the close fight of tomorrow.

The following article discusses how the BCT's enablers affect the deep fight to shape the enemy's decision-making cycle, create overmatch in friendly capabilities, and set conditions necessary for success in the decisive action of the close fight. Written by CPT Marcum, one of my previous fire support officers, with a collaborative effort from the other effects-producing enablers of my previous



staff, this article will define the deep, close, and security fights and what are considered enablers; how effects compound and cascade throughout the operational environment; how to use the targeting process to set the conditions necessary for future success; then finally, how to logically incorporate these concepts into the military decision-making process (MDMP).

If a brigade staff thinks about the operational environment in this way and proactively executes a comprehensive targeting process to set conditions in the deep fight, then not only will the brigade's staff find shaping conditions on the battlefield much more intuitive, but it will also lead to mission success and better force protection for the organization.

— COL Charles Masaracchia

2/1 ABCT Commander, July 2014 - June 2016

Shaping the deep fight for a BCT can be broken down into the balancing of ends, ways, and means with risk. The enablers represent the means and it is the BCT fire support coordinator's (FSCOORD's) duty to ensure all the available means are feasibly employed and synchronized together in their ways. To start the discussion in the planning phase we asked three fundamental questions:

1. How can we change the enemy's course of action to that which favors ours?
2. How and where can we attrite the enemy to provide overmatch?

You will never have all the assets you would like or the time to employ them, and these inevitable shortcomings become the operational risk. One risk we were not willing to accept is keeping an asset on the shelf. Therefore, the third question became:

3. Is every available enabler in the fight?

This article will discuss the concepts, methods, and staff processes that will lead the reader and a brigade staff to the answers to these questions.

— LTC Brandon Anderson

*Fire Support Coordinator/Battalion Commander,
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As with any shaping operation, shaping the deep fight seeks to “establish conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.”¹ In the case of a BCT, that decisive operation will occur in the close fight. Therefore, when we discuss how enablers shape the deep fight we are referring to how we set the conditions necessary for the BCT to be successful in the current and subsequent close fights. This is done through planning, synchronizing, and employing enablers in such a manner that has a calculated effect upon the threat which can be qualitatively and quantitatively measured at a particular time and space prior to the decisive operation. Before delving further into how this is accomplished, common terminology must be established in order to prevent a conflict in semantics.

What is the Deep Fight?

The “deep fight” can mean different things to different people, but for most it deals with the difference in operational reach for various organizations. For this article, the term “deep fight” will be a time and space relationship for a BCT, based on Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0's definition of a “deep area.” See Figure 1 for the doctrinal definitions for deep, close, and security areas, but the deep fight is that area

which “extends from the forward boundary of subordinate units to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon in contiguous operations.”² When conducting combined arms maneuver, the deep area for the BCT would consist of the terrain beyond that of the cavalry squadron's battlespace but still within the boundary assigned to its brigade.

During friendly offensive operations, the deep area would include territory beyond the enemy's main and subsequent defensive positions and the furthest point the reconnaissance squadron may establish a screen for the brigade. For defensive and retrograde operations, it is simply beyond the boundary of the area of operations (AO) for the forward-most units within a BCT's area defense. In the deep area one may find enemy mission command elements and their sustainers, long-range cannon and rocket artillery, air defense assets, operational reserves, forward arming and refueling points (FARP) for rotary wing, and possibly airfields and hangars for fixed-wing aircraft. Those assets in the deep area enable the enemy more freedom of maneuver throughout the AO and provide their commander the ability to weight their main effort accordingly. Delivering effects against these assets will invariably affect the enemy's course of action (COA) as they eventually enter into the close fight with friendly forces.

	Deep	Close	Security
Contiguous	An area forward of the close area that a commander uses to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area. Typically, the deep area extends from the forward boundary of subordinate units to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon in contiguous areas of operations. In this sense, the deep area relates not only in terms of geography but also in terms of purpose and time.	An area assigned to a maneuver force that extends from its subordinates' rear boundaries to its own forward boundary. Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations through maneuver and fires in the close area and position most of the maneuver force within it. Within the close area, depending on echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping operations.	Focus on the protected force, installation, route, or area. Protected forces range from echelon headquarters through artillery and echelon reserves to the sustaining forces. Protected installations can be part of the sustaining base or part of the area's infrastructure. Protected routes and areas involve securing a range from specific points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridgelines and hills) to large population centers and their adjacent areas.
Non-Contiguous	The area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas of operations. The higher headquarters controls deep areas within its area of operations. In some instances, a deep area may focus along a single line of operations. In other instances, a deep area may focus along multiple lines of operations in various directions and distances. The mission variables of METT-TC will impact how leaders define a deep area.	The area within the subordinate commanders' areas of operations. The higher commander may redefine the boundaries of specific areas of operations as necessary to shape operations, reallocating resources to ensure subordinate headquarters can adequately cover their assigned areas of operations.	

Figure 1 — ADRP 3-0's Description of Deep, Close, and Security Areas for Contiguous and Non-contiguous Areas of Operation

The deep fight, as is the deep area, is both spatial and temporal. The deep fight of today may become the close fight of tomorrow, and our tankers and Infantrymen may very well be witnessing the effects of last week's deep fight as they maneuver through the battlespace. If the decisive operation occurs during the close fight, then it should be the goal of the BCT to leverage assets during deep operations that will make accomplishment of the mission in the close fight much easier. The use of these assets enables the commander to shape the course of the battle to their advantage, and it is the reason why we refer to those assets as "enablers."

What Are Enablers?

There is no definitive answer to this question. The term "enabler" can be found permeating through our professional discourse (such as this article) or talked about in planning tents and the floors of current operations. The problem with the term is that even though it is so pervasive, there is no established definition as to what it means. Enablers have become one of those contextual terms where we all generally understand what it means though can't necessarily put it into words easily. It is a, "I know it when I see it" type of situation. We will attempt to appropriately define the term before we proceed any further.

The non-military definition for "enabler" most closely associated with our usage is, "a person or thing that makes something possible." References made to enablers in military articles and distributed publications emphasize that they are augmented capabilities that directly support mission accomplishment, but they may not be necessarily required if other enablers and their effects can be furnished. In this case,

our definition for enabler will be "an organization or capability that supports a particular COA and/or accomplishment of a particular objective." An enabler in this case is not universal but instead situation dependent. For example, a field artillery battery can support an infantry battalion in the defense with fires, and in this case artillery would be considered an enabler as it enables the infantry to accomplish its mission. Conversely, the field artillery battery could receive a platoon of infantry to help augment its battery defense, and that maneuver platoon would be considered an enabler by alleviating some of the security responsibilities for that battery.

For the BCT, its COAs and objectives revolve around the decisive operation and supporting the main effort. In this case, the main effort is generally a maneuver unit (cavalry squadron, infantry or armor battalion). Additionally, since enablers are augmentations to the capabilities of the BCT, this would preclude the incorporation of those elements from the mission command and sustainment warfighting functions (WfF) as they are critical to the functioning of a brigade. So for this organization, the enablers can be found throughout the other WfFs (the entirety of fires and protection as well as certain elements within movement and maneuver and intelligence WfFs).

When talking about shaping the deep fight for the brigade, however, we limit ourselves to just those that can produce effects within the deep area. Therefore, since protection is focused on supporting the close and security fight, they are precluded; however, their subject matter expertise can still be leveraged. As a result, for the remainder of this article when referencing enablers, we will be discussing those

particular enablers that shape the deep fight for the BCT, and that includes: field artillery, air defense artillery, information operations (IO), electronic warfare, aviation, information collection (IC), and the tactical air control party (TACP). For more information regarding what these enablers are and what they provide to the brigade, reference the following "Know Your Enabler" section for more insight: <https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/32013>.

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the enemy's reserve would indeed support maintaining control of that key terrain, but with a properly worded requisite condition — such as "secure and hold key terrain on Objective X-Ray — more options may be presented. For example, the BCT can employ a military deception (MILDEC) plan in order to delay movement towards the area; electronic warfare can be employed to disrupt their ability to

mission command; IO can employ a non-lethal leaflet drop to encourage the units and members of that reserve to surrender or desert; or airpower can be employed to destroy critical ramps and bridges on avenues of approach to prevent their movement into the battlespace.

Shaping the Deep Fight

When we shape the deep fight, we are setting the conditions necessary for the brigade to be successful in the close fight. As enablers, we achieve this through an effects-based approach to affecting the enemy's COA (Figure 2). This is accomplished through working backwards from the commander's desired endstate. Once we know where we need to be, we then assess the mission and operational variables of that AO to determine the conditions that need to be set through the application of desired effects in order to meet that endstate.³ Finally, we associate available assets, or enablers, that can achieve those desired effects and plan their employment accordingly.

An important component in this process is an accurate assessment of what needs to be achieved in order to reach that desired endstate. There can be multiple options available to set a requisite condition, but it requires having a proper definition of success. A requisite condition should be a statement on the state of some variable within the AO and not directly linked with an effect. If you immediately associate a condition with an effect, then that limits an organization's ability to utilize all enablers to support the operation.

An example of an improper required condition would be the destruction of the enemy's operational reserves if instead the actual intent was simply to secure and hold a key piece of terrain. The wording of the condition would limit planners to employing lethal enablers to achieve destruction. Destroying

For every potential target on the battlefield, there are numerous options for which to engage them with lethal and non-lethal effects in order to shape their behavior — both physically and psychology. As expounded by Edward A. Smith from the Department of Defense's (DoD's) Command and Control Research Program:

*"The physical effects alter behavior by dealing with the physical means of an observer to wage a war or to carry out a course of action. The psychological effects alter behavior by affecting the cognitive process of the observers so as to shape will. The physical effects are focused on destruction and the incapacitation of forces and capabilities, including by rendering an observer incapable of mounting a coherent action (chaos). The psychological effects span the domain of reason, the rational decision-making process, and the domain of belief, the emotional impacts on decision-making. They lap over into the physical domain where they induce chaos, but focus on foreclosure, shock, and psychological attrition."*⁴

When discussing the ability of enablers to deliver different types of effects, we envision the impact upon the enemy's COA through the use of compounding and cascading effects where physical effects also produce psychological effects — and vice versa — throughout the enemy's formations and chains of




Figure 2 — A Flow Chart Depicting How Desired Endstates Are Planned and Met

While a COA will naturally begin with the execution of capabilities, the staff utilizes backwards planning in order to determine how to mold COAs to shape conditions required of the endstate. (Graphic courtesy of author)



Photo by SGT Demetrius Munnerlyn

The execution of leaflet drops by psychological operations companies create non-lethal behavioral responses amongst local audiences. When associated with other lethal and non-lethal effects, the additional leaflet drop can create a compounding effect that compels an adversary or neutral party to respond in such a way as to produce an advantage for friendly forces.

command. When employing Army attack aviation to project power into the deep area with the desired effect of destroying an enemy command post, you obviously have achieved a destructive effect on its personnel and equipment, but it also cascades throughout that organization. At the lower echelon, you have the physical effect of loss of communication with higher as well as the potential psychological effects of uncertainty and fear. When conducting IO with the desired effect of disrupting an enemy organization through a leaflet drop suggesting desertion or surrender, you may naturally produce an immediate psychological effect, but potentially you may also create a physical effect through the reduction of their combat power.

The art of the employment of enablers comes when one synchronizes multiple effects to produce a compounding effect which yields more than the sum of the results of those individual efforts. In the case of the leaflet drop, friendly forces may have only been able to convince a handful of enemy personnel to desert, but with the destruction of their higher's command post by aviation and the resulting behavioral change of uncertainty and fear, the effects of that leaflet drop may be enhanced, resulting in more deserters. Additionally, much like a fire that feeds itself, each desertion produces an effect in and of itself and increases the psychological effects on everyone around it. A cascade of desertions may result in the entire unit surrendering to friendly forces if not already evaporating into the countryside thanks to the employment of multiple enablers to producing compounding and cascading effects.

during the targeting process.

The Targeting Process in the Deep Fight

The targeting process seeks to focus the efforts of an organization in such a manner that specific effects are created against particular targets in a calculated manner so as to set the conditions necessary for the commander's desired endstate. In any particular AO, there are generally more targets present than assets available to deliver effects, and in the case of creating compounding effects when more than one asset may be utilized to shape the behavior of a particular target or set of targets, there is further scarcity in means available. It is a conflict between two principles of war: mass in concentrating multiple assets to create powerful compounding and cascading effects, and economy of force in ensuring that assets are not ineffectually wasted on targets when they could have been more efficiently used supporting another important effort. The targeting process will seek to balance these two.

To support this balance, the staff is provided targeting guidance from the commander. This guidance "describes the desired effects to be generated by fires, physical attack, cyber electromagnetic activities, and other information-related capabilities against threat operations."⁵ It should delineate how enabler efforts support the friendly COA for the immediate close and security fight as well as provide overall direction for how targeting should employ enablers to affect the enemy's COA in the deep fight. This is an important distinction to make as shaping the deep fight will happen concurrently with the close and security fight, and a determination needs to be made

on where a particular asset will be employed. If all you have today is a flight of two AH-64 Apaches, you can't have them conduct a deep attack against an HVT/HPT and simultaneously have them provide close combat aviation support for troops in contact. The targeteers will have to assess where to weigh available assets to achieve the best effects, but thanks to the targeting process and an effects-based approach, they can utilize all of the BCT's enablers and weaponize a solution to this problem.

The targeting officers involved in planning the shaping of the deep fight have to not only know how assets produce effects throughout a system but also the nature of the targets themselves to determine whether the effects can even be achieved. For many, destruction of an enemy mission command node and killing enemy leadership would appear to cause significant disruption in their operations. For state actors with weak mission command, like North Korea and Iraq, this would be the case since they have inflexible chains of command where not much trust is placed in the capabilities of subordinate leadership to step up at critical times. Conversely, for state actors with strong mission command, like Russia and United States, the loss of a leader may be tragic, but it is within the culture to always have someone ready to step up to fill the void. For non-state actors and transnational threats whose mission command is decentralized, like ISIS and Hezbollah, their ability for long-range planning may be impacted, but at the tactical and operational level they function generally independent of one another.

Targeting is About Behavioral Responses

Knowing the nature of the target — how it will react to a specific effect both physically and psychologically — is the most critical and complex element of targeting as it requires in-depth knowledge of that target.

“Our objective in executing effects-based operations is to somehow create a unity of effect that focuses all action and thereby masses their effects toward a particular behavioral objective... The problem once again centers on what observers see and how they interpret what they see.”⁶

On 7 December 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy utilized airpower to employ destructive effects against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and crippled a significant portion of the fleet's combat power. Their desired endstate was not to defeat the United States militarily, but to leverage enough influence in theater to force the United States to terms favorable to Japan, or at the very least, weaken them to the extent that they would not be able to array enough combat power to halt their expansion throughout the Pacific. One requisite condition to meet their desired endstate, therefore, was the destruction of the Pacific Fleet.

Short of destroying the fleet's aircraft carriers and harbor facilities, they did meet the condition that they set out to accomplish but failed to understand the behavioral nature of the United States. The current state of conditions between the United States and Japan created an unintended negative behavioral response — a psychological effect — which went against their desired endstate. While their military element of national power was setting conditions for open conflict, the

Japanese diplomatic and informational elements of power were still working towards peace. Though the Japanese government sent a telegram stating their cessation of diplomatic efforts, basically stating the two nations were now in armed conflict, the timing of its delivery after the attack changed the American behavioral response. Instead of demoralization and defeatism, that attack created a sense of betrayal which required vengeance and rallied the nation to war — the opposite reaction the Japanese intended.

This example emphasizes the true intent of most military operations, and that is to shape the will of the enemy to our own. We shape their will through the effort of creating calculated behavioral responses. We create those responses through the application of lethal and non-lethal effects on the battlefield in concert with the effects created from other elements of national power. So, while some may say that we in the military focus on destruction of the enemy, they are both right and wrong. The targeteer focuses shaping the behavior of the target, sometimes through destruction. But when all enablers are available, the targeteer will utilize whatever is necessary to create the desired effect and the resultant behavioral response.

Focusing on effects to create psychological responses is all well and good; however, the following questions arise: “Knowing that shaping behavior is necessary in order to defeat an enemy, how is that actually accomplished and how does the BCT go about shaping the deep fight in this manner?” The answers come from getting into the enemy's decision-making process and disrupting it, thereby preventing them from executing their COAs coherently which creates psychological effects counter to effective mission command.

The Enemy's Decision-Making Cycle

Arguably, the brigade would prefer to decisively engage an enemy organization that is not only attrited but also disorganized. A disorganized force that is unable to carry out its COA, or was unable to finalize a COA by time of engagement, will not be able to put forth a unified effort at that critical place and time. Since the brigade seeks to emerge the victor from the decisive engagement in the close fight (which stated previously is the main effort), then naturally the BCT will seek to utilize its enablers to begin shaping conditions in the deep fight towards that desired endstate. The first method is to simply compel the enemy to change their COA that will allow the BCT to strike where the enemy is weak and avoid where they are strong — a basic warfighting tenet. The other method, however, is the one that keeps their leaders off-balance, frustrates and demoralizes their operation planners, and overall creates an air of uncertainty throughout their ranks. This second method involves getting into their decision-making cycles and defeating their ability to produce feasible and coherent plans for their subordinates to follow.

Within the targeting/intelligence community, we refer to the decision-making cycle as the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. The OODA loop is inherent to all individuals, groups, and multi-tiered organizations, and simply refers to the process in which they react to stimuli in the environment. Some form of stimuli is first observed, and then the individual or unit




Figure 3 — Depiction of the Enemy's Decision-Making Cycle in the Friendly Force's Deep Area

Through the use of effects at the right time and place, the enemy's observe, orient, decide, and act process is continuously interrupted, preventing them from developing a unified plan. This culminates when the enemy is decisively engaged in the new close fight unprepared. (Graphic courtesy of author)

orients its efforts towards determining a response. A COA is then decided upon that will achieve a desired effect, and finally they action that COA. Once that action is completed, then new stimuli will be observed and the process is continued again indefinitely. This is always occurring, with no respite, and will not stop until the observer is no longer capable of observing stimuli (i.e., destroyed).

A comprehensive, feasible, and actionable COA for an organization requires a relatively unmolested OODA loop to have occurred. The enemy would have observed the AO under its current conditions, oriented planners and resources to develop a plan, decided upon a COA to follow, and then actioned that COA. During the OODA process if new stimuli is introduced, it may force the adversary to re-start their OODA process if they thought this new information was critical enough to do so. Imagine you were about to utilize your assets to introduce new stimuli while the opponent was in the process of either orienting their capabilities or deciding upon an action. Now, if this new information was significant enough that, once observed, they would have to cancel their current process and re-orient, this would cause frustration for the organization and potentially confuse subordinates that may have been provided warning orders and have started preparing for a COA that will no longer be executed. If you were able to continue to leverage effects on the enemy that forced them to constantly re-orient and re-decide on a COA, they would not be able to regain the initiative, would be forever reacting to your efforts, and would not be able to put together a coherent and effective plan.

In the case of the deep fight and shaping the enemy COA through disrupting their OODA process, the BCT is effectively shaping the conditions of the future close fight while the current close fight is still being waged. In Figure 3, we see this process from the perspective of the enemy as they prepare for future operations within the BCTAO. They initially observe the conduct between their forces and that of the BCT during the close fight, and begin planning for their future COA 72-96 hours out. They will orient their planners to conduct mission analysis, develop COAs, and potentially wargame them before coming to a decision on how to execute the future fight against our forces. However, thanks to the timely employment of cascading and/or compounding effects throughout the deep area, the enemy commander and planners have to drastically change their assessment of the current conditions. Because this newest assessment is so significantly different from their initial calculations, all previous planning is no longer valid, and they have to re-orient their planners to develop new COAs.

Through its employment of effects in the deep fight by its enablers, the BCT is able to keep the enemy's decision-making cycle in a state of constant reassessment up until their forces are decisively engaged in the close fight. When contact is finally made between this enemy and the brigade, the failure to develop a coherent plan will mean they will not be able to unify their efforts, mass their combat power, and maintain a comprehensive security plan. The enemy's subordinate units will be forced to react to contact and will have to rely on individual initiative with limited support from

their higher echelon. Even if the effects upon the enemy didn't create an overmatch in capabilities, the BCT would still have a tremendous advantage by having a unified effort for the close fight against a force that has none.

Creating Overmatch in the Close Fight

Creating overmatch, however, can be a much simpler affair than trying to shape the behavior of the enemy. Assessing whether the enemy has been behaviorally shaped requires skilled analysts and measures of effectiveness (MoEs) tied with well-defined identifiers to determine that success. However, even a novice can tell whether destructive effects were achieved on a tank, howitzer, or combatant. Measures of performance (MoPs) and effectiveness are easier when it comes to creating overmatch, at least in regards to lethal fires. What is overmatch, you ask?

The Army's Operating Concept for 2014 defines overmatch as, "The application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent to prevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics."⁷ In layman's terms, in comparing capabilities with the enemy — like armor or artillery — then you ask yourself three questions:

- Do we have more of them than they do?
- Are ours more advanced than theirs are?
- And do we use ours more effectively than they do?

If the predominant answer is "yes," then you have overmatch.

An American-crewed M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank could be said to be on equal footing to that of a Russian-crewed T-90A Main Battle Tank. There is no numerical superiority to either side. Both tanks have similar qualities, and both crews are competent in the operation of their vehicles. If you put a North Korean crew in that T-90A, however, then you have an American overmatch because of the superior training that American tank crews receive. Switch the one T-90A with a battalion's worth of T-34-85, and you have superiority in numbers but inferiority in technology. The enemy's guns aren't powerful enough and their mobility and traversing speeds are not as fast as the Abrams. They also lack gyro-stabilization to shoot on the move like the Abrams. In this case, the Abrams tank has overmatch due purely to technology.

So what does this mean for the BCT? Overmatch can be used as a tool or criteria to assess whether a particular operation will be successful. If the brigade had an appropriate level of overmatch in all areas, then the commander could confidently conclude that even if their most comprehensive COA fails to go as planned then success can still be achieved with what is physically present on the battlefield. One option is to create this overmatch through evaluating the enemy's organization and mission, determining locations where they are weaker, and then engaging them there with the mass of the BCT's combat power. Alternatively, the BCT can create overmatch through the use of lethal and non-lethal effects from enablers in the deep fight.

An armored BCT commander may only be concerned about overmatch in armor. The commander has on hand only 16 fully

The commander's desire for overmatch can be met through the use of all enablers. Lethal fires can remove enemy capabilities from the battlefield, and non-lethal fires can prevent enemy capabilities from entering the AO at the wrong time and place.

operational M1A2 Abrams, but intelligence suggests there are upwards of 20 T90s operating in the deep area. It will have to be assumed that when the enemy in the deep area becomes engaged in the close fight that they will attempt to coordinate all their armor to engage friendly forces. The friendly commander will execute offensive operations into the deep area but wants to achieve a 2:1 overmatch in armor if possible. That means 12 enemy tanks will need to be removed from the equation in some fashion. This is where the enablers step in.

In planning: Analysis and prediction of armor locations using named areas of interest (NAIs) are associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to attempt to identify enemy T90s in the deep area. Certain NAIs are then associated with lethal and non-lethal weapon systems and are promoted to targeted areas of interest (TAIs). The FSCOORD, brigade fire support officer, and targeting officers work with other staff cells in order to develop an effects-based COA to shape enemy armor in these TAIs in order to create that desired overmatch for the commander.

In execution: Lethal effects from long-range field artillery, deep-striking attack aviation, and fixed-wing aircraft are delivered against positively identified armor concentrations in order to attrite them with destruction or neutralization fires. Non-lethal effects from electronic warfare, IO, and other enablers can be used to shape the enemy's actions by preventing their combat power from being massed with the remainder of the enemy through diverting, delaying, degrading and/or interdicting them.

The commander's desire for overmatch can be met through the use of all enablers. Lethal fires can remove enemy capabilities from the battlefield, and non-lethal fires can prevent enemy capabilities from entering the AO at the wrong time and place. Achieving overmatch, in conjunction with shaping enemy COAs by interfering with their decision cycles, will reduce risk and result in an easier close fight. In the case of creating effects on those 12 enemy tanks, if you destroyed six of them with a kinetic strike from fixed-wing aircraft and degraded the communications of six others using electronic jamming (so that they don't receive the order to move towards the BCT objectives), then you have successfully created armor overmatch. The brigade should now only expect to meet eight T90s in the close fight at best.

It must be noted, however, that in order to achieve any success in shaping the enemy in the deep fight that the BCT needs to achieve two things. First, the friendly OODA process needs to be safeguarded. Naturally, if the enemy is able to disrupt our decision-making cycle, then we will not be able to

plan a COA to do the same to theirs. Second, in order to disrupt the enemy's decision cycle and create overmatch in the deep fight, it will need to be planned and resourced during the same MDMP effort that developed the COA for the current close fight. This means that as the BCT conducts staff estimates and develops COAs for the objectives of the close fight, they also have to dedicate time to develop COAs for shaping the enemy in that deep fight throughout the operation. Shaping the deep fight will take place concurrently with operations in the close fight, and the BCT's challenge will be to determine where to dedicate its limited resources.

Supporting the Close Fight vs. Shaping the Deep Fight

As previously stated in the targeting process, there are always more targets than assets to engage them with — especially if one desires to create a compounding effect against a single target with multiple enablers. The brigade understands that shaping the deep fight is important for future operations and impacting the enemy's ability to influence the current close fight, but the conundrum it faces is that every asset used to shape the deep fight may interfere with its ability to support the close fight. Economy of force, a principle of war, states that a force should support the main effort with the preponderance of its capabilities available while only providing to those shaping efforts the minimal amount of resources necessary to accomplish their tasks.

In most situations, the brigade will try to retain as many assets as possible to support the close fight — where Soldiers' lives and mission success most reside — but it is important to also weigh the shaping operations in the deep area heavily as well. Why is this? Because the deep fight will become the close fight of the near future just as the close fight now was at one point the deep fight of the recent past. Imagine if 96 hours ago the brigade utilized its enablers to attrite and influence the current threat they are now facing; then this close fight would pose much less risk to the unit's mission. Brigade enablers could shift more assets to shaping the next deep fight because of the success of the last deep fight. It will take a very competent BCT staff to accurately understand the conditions of the AO, the nature of the enemy, and the necessary effects to consistently and effectively shape the enemy 72-96 hours out. If this can be done, however, the results will be exceptional. Risk to friendly forces and mission accomplishment will be greatly reduced during execution of the close fight thanks to a significantly weakened or shaped threat.

Target assessment and weapon selection in the close fight are important elements when it comes to freeing up brigade-level assets for the deep fight. Proportional fires are important in order to select just the right weapon systems to achieve the desired effects. We could utilize cannon and rocket artillery or drop bombs from fixed-wing platforms, but if the target in question was a squad of dismounted infantry then the same effect can be achieved with mortars and maneuver forces. Unless absolutely critical for mission accomplishment or force protection, brigade- and division-level assets should not be utilized when company- and battalion-level assets can do the same job — not to mention these are more timely and

effective as well. The allocation of lethal and non-lethal assets should be planned out during COA development and vetted during wargaming to ensure both the close and deep fight are provided the resources necessary to shape the battlefield conditions toward their desired ends.

Takeaways in Shaping the Deep Fight

The brainpower of a BCT staff is often absorbed in planning and resourcing the upcoming close fight. It is the main effort and there is significant risk associated with decisively engaging the enemy, but it is important to remember that the execution of this main effort — the conditions by which it will be fought — was shaped by what the BCT did in the recent past. Success or failure can therefore also be attributed to the effort the brigade put into fighting the deep fight.

If you take nothing else away from this article, try to remember these key points:

- Ensure every enabler is actively engaged in planning the shaping of the deep fight;
- Ensure enablers are not planning in a vacuum, and that they are constantly working in concert within one another in order to unify their efforts to shape those conditions;
- Develop a plan that utilizes cascading and/or compounding effects in order to make the most of the BCT's resources;
- Compare the nature of effects with the nature of the enemy to ensure that desired effects are achieved and negative effects are not produced;
- Look to deliver effects in order to impact the enemy's decision cycles to keep them off balance and create uncertainty;
- Utilize both lethal and non-lethal effects to create friendly overmatch; and
- During MDMP, avoid directing enablers to solely support the close fight — an effectively shaped deep fight now can mean an easier close fight later.

Notes

¹ ADRP 3-0, *Operations* (November 2016), 1-12.

² *Ibid*, 1-11.

³ *Ibid*, 1-6.

⁴ Edward A. Smith, *Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2002), 256-257. Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/ebo_smith.pdf.

⁵ Army Techniques Publication 3-60, *Targeting* (May 2015), 1-2.

⁶ Smith, 281.

⁷ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-3-1, *Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (31 October 2014), 47.

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