

Per Unitatem Fortitudo
(Strength Through Unity)

Mission Command in a Multinational Environment

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“There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies — and that is to fight without them.”

— Sir Winston S. Churchill¹

Today’s operational environment is dynamic and complex. Potential adversaries are capable of interconnecting multiple dimensions of warfare simultaneously, including cyber and information, conventional and unconventional, and regular and irregular. Nobody can counter these alone. As one surveys the different theaters of operation, it is apparent that a combined approach is essential. We’ve seen this recently in conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it has been an enduring requirement in the European theater. To prevail against these threats, forces must be able to integrate into a multinational force capable of operating across the range of military operations and do so at every level of command. More importantly, they have to be able to do it quickly — there must be a unified speed of recognition (of the threat), speed of decision, and speed of assembly, an ethos LTG Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army Europe, has described as “fight tonight.”²

In order to fight tonight, multinational forces must have a common purpose and vision unified through the exercise of mission command. Due to its central European location and its geographical proximity to likely coalition and alliance partners, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, is uniquely suited to train and reinforce these multinational mission command principles. This article discusses the importance of the mission command philosophy within a multinational task force environment and demonstrates some best practices to reinforce and generate functional multinational mission command.

Multinational Mission Command

Mission command places a premium on command responsibility. It recognizes the challenges associated with a dynamic operational environment and therefore empowers subordinate commanders with great independence and latitude to accomplish the mission. According to joint doctrine:

Mission Command Philosophy

Exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Guided by the principles of...

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander’s intent
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Use mission orders
- Accept prudent risk

The principles of mission command assist commanders and staff in blending the art of command with the science of control.

Figure 1 — Principles of Mission Command⁴

“[M]ission command... enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. Mission command is built on subordinate leaders at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.”³

In organic units, it is still challenging to have mission command permeate an organization. The best commanders foster disciplined individual and group initiative throughout their careers. They are approachable, take the time to know their subordinate leaders, give clear and concise commander’s intent, ensure a common understanding through collaborative dialogue, encourage disciplined initiative, and underwrite risk. Throughout, they build trust and mutual confidence. This leads to great units and great accomplishments, no matter what the mission. But imagine leading a multinational task force composed of 10 or more different countries — what’s your approach? Can you achieve the same level of trust, or are you doomed to failure?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) foundational doctrine for planning, execution, and support of allied joint operations — Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01 (D) — acknowledges commanders’ responsibilities to enable freedom of action, initiative, and decision making. But it also acknowledges the differences in mission command style among the different services and nations and therefore defines the following mission command prerequisites necessary for multinational formations:

- *“Commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint operational matters, taking account of component issues only as necessary. (Unified and fully integrated and interoperable command)*
- *The subordinate commander must understand fully the operational commander’s intentions and what he is required to achieve, and be free to exercise initiatives based on that understanding, within a minimal level of control imposed from the higher level of command. (Decentralized control)*
- *There should be an active involvement in the doctrine development process by the nations and a common understanding of the operational doctrine governing the employment of forces. The latter is achieved through education, training, and exercises. (Education, training, and exercises)*
- *Trust (total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another) is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams. Trust expands the commander’s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust is based on the mutual confidence that results from the demonstrated competence of each member of the team. The opportunity to observe each member’s capabilities in training builds trust and confidence in a Joint Force.”⁵ (Trust)*

This last principle — trust — is probably the most important as it drives and enables the other three. As GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower once observed, “mutual confidence [is the] one basic thing that will make allied commands work.”⁶

Training Multinational Mission Command

JMRC trains and reinforces these principles using a variety of different types of exercises, each with a different purpose (but always multinational, theater-specific) and with an emphasis on interoperability. During a recent rotation, COL Phil Brooks, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, pointed out, “JMRC provided the RAF [Regionally Aligned Force] an opportunity to work with multinational allies in a complex environment each day.”⁷ It does so by immersing (task-organized) multinational units into realistic, high-intensity, demanding training environments against a world class opposing force (OPFOR) capable of replicating real-world challenges. The result is a fully trained and interoperable coalition capable of not only countering threats but defeating them soundly.

Some exercises are focused on our enhanced forward presence (eFP) partners in the Baltics; others may be focused on multinational airborne units that are their nations’ crisis response forces, U.S. Army Europe’s rotational armor brigade combat team (ABCT) with NATO high response ground forces, or assigned and rotational U.S. forces. Regardless of the construct, all exercises are necessarily multinational because of the operational reality — that is how we’ll fight should a crisis arise. Further, they are designed to reflect what might actually occur in a European contingency operation, including the pairing of most-likely partner forces into a multinational task force. Because every exercise is composed of different nations, with distinct capabilities, expertise, national interests, etc., no two exercises are ever the same. Therefore, each exercise will be designed with different considerations in mind. Because they can become quite nuanced in their complexity, JMRC multinational exercise design relies on a Joint Exercise Life Cycle (JELC).




Figure 2 — Sample Multinational Task Organization

JELC

The JELC provides the framework for every exercise. Fundamentally, it is a 440-day operations process with heavy emphasis on Army Design Methodology wherein JMRC and participating partner nation leadership drive conceptual and detailed planning necessary to execute a complex multinational capstone exercise. The cycle itself is a milestone-based process but remains adaptive given the dynamic nature of the theater. It culminates in producing a world-class, demanding rotational exercise in a training environment that replicates the theater.

Success in this challenging environment begins with the multinational task force commander and the overall ability of the organization to achieve mission command. The JELC provides a platform for the commander to build his team and establish meaningful personal relationships with his staff and his subordinate commanders and their respective staffs. A popular refrain among senior leaders acknowledges, “[w]hen faced with a difficult problem, it’s best to put five friends in the room. They’ve got trust and will assume risk. If you want to fail, put together five strangers.”⁸ By design, the JELC seeks to develop the camaraderie necessary to succeed.

During the JELC, planners and staffs routinely meet one another at the variety of planning conferences and start building the team and the operational environment from the bottom up. Ideally, the multinational task force commander starts dialogues with the subordinate unit commanders as the JELC cycle matures. Shortly before the final planning conference, JMRC facilitates a conditions check during which the brigade and battalion commanders in the multinational task force brief the U.S. Army Europe deputy commanding general. They brief their training objectives, training path, an assessment of their units’ abilities to execute mission essential tasks, and any issues or concerns. This helps to provide a common visualization of the conduct of the rotation and level of preparedness.

Joint and Combined Academics Program

During the JELC, leadership and observer-coach-trainers (OCTs) facilitate a week-long unit development session, known as the Joint and Combined Academics Program (JCAP). It is purposely tailorable and scalable to the exercise and the units’ training objectives. During JCAP, the OCTs review trends and lessons learned; facilitate detailed back briefs from all units on their capabilities; teach classes targeted to the units’ requirements and specific to the rotation; facilitate working groups and planning rehearsals; issue a detailed warning order that drives initial planning and a deployment order that drives reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); and most importantly, they include team building and commander visualization events to drive confidence building. Throughout JCAP, the OCTs reinforce the importance of interoperability across the human, procedural, and technical domains and share best practices.

Ideally, representatives from all exercise partners participate in the JCAP. As mentioned above, facilitators issue a warning order to the training unit during JCAP, thereby allowing units the ability to conduct mission analysis on the various/multiple capabilities of the multinational formation. Often, they will do this through a unit capabilities brief. In this regard, JCAP provides an opportunity to build commander understanding and visualization and staff situational




Figure 3 — U.S. Army Europe Joint Event Life Cycle Model

understanding. Further, it begins the process of earning trust among partners who will soon be task organized in order to counter the threat defined in JMRC's signature Decisive Action Training Environment-Europe (DATE-E).

Replicating the Threat — DATE-E

Units are organized to support operations under the rubric of DATE-E, which is built upon the same foundation as the familiar Atropian/Arianian-based DATE 2.2 scenario. However, it is aligned/nested with the strategic NATO Skolkan exercise scenario so that it fits within the broader NATO context of operations. It is built upon the NATO Article 5 principle of collective defense — an attack against one NATO member is an attack against all.⁹

The fictitious Skolkan scenario occurs in Europe, where forces end up in conflict against a near-peer competitor and hybrid threats in an operating environment that replicates tremendous complexity across a range of military operations and all aspects of PMESII-PT (physical, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure - physical environment, time). Colonel Mindaugas Steponavicius, commander of the Lithuanian Iron Wolf Brigade, called the combat environment “intense and most importantly — realistic.”¹⁰

Finally, the DATE-E scenario incorporates enduring and emerging doctrine, including tactics, techniques, and procedures seen recently in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. For example, JMRC replicates multi-layered enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); well-synchronized and overpowering fires capabilities; increased use of electronic and cyber warfare; and enemy “gray zone” activities — those actions below the level of conventional warfare but still offensive in nature.

Replicating the Joint Task Force, Adjacent Units, and Unified Action Partners (UAPs)

Multinational task forces rarely — if ever — operate in autonomous environments. They most often work for a higher headquarters and likely in coordination with adjacent units and unified action partners. While the task force commander is the primary driver of mission command within his unit, he is also a participant in his higher commander's efforts — it is unavoidably a 360-degree effort throughout. As AJP 1-0 (D) recognizes:

“All military planning should be coherent with other non-military and potentially multinational and non-governmental initiatives intended to stabilise and create a self-sustaining secure environment. A NATO military response must therefore be integrated into a wider overall framework or a comprehensive approach. In taking these and other security factors into account, there is no fundamental difference in the planning and execution of any operation across the full range of NATO's military capabilities.”¹¹

This reality is replicated at JMRC through a blended training environment that includes live, constructive, and virtual components. There is always a higher headquarters as the higher control (HICON) that represents a NATO Rapid Deployment Corps Headquarters. In some cases, that headquarters is a real division or corps-level joint task force, such as the Rapid Reaction Corps – France. During most rotations, there is also at least one live, multinational brigade headquarters in a command post exercise, serving as an adjacent or forward unit.¹² This allows for realistic command and staff coordination events with higher and adjacent units, including back briefs, updates, command visits to the unit in the field, etc. The unit in the “box” fighting force-on-force is able to leverage the effects of the HICON, primarily with respect to intelligence fusion, targeting, and effects on the virtual deep fight. Similarly, how well a unit screening in front of an adjacent unit operates can affect the unit in the box.

JMRC incorporates these units in a way that presents the multinational task force commander and staff with a more complete and holistic multinational operating environment. This is all done through a blended training environment of live, constructive, and virtual effects so the HICON deep fight in simulation is as real to the brigade as the fight against the live OPFOR. Further, JMRC populates up to five cities with 150 (contracted) civilians on the battlefield. As a result, the commander does not just “see himself” from an internal perspective but also within the larger context. He must inform those other echelons in a way that builds a common visualization, mutual confidence, and disciplined initiative within his stated intent. In short, he must execute mission command.

Finally, the scenario fully integrates an array of UAPs, including actual interagency members, government officials, nongovernmental and international organizations, and police. It also includes media and a replicated internet with Twitter and multiple news media websites. All of these resources provide substantial depth to the operational environment. UAPs support the unit’s overall situational understanding and are absolutely fundamental in supporting a number of tasks, especially stability tasks early in the operation.

RSOI

Upon arrival at JMRC, units are immersed in activities to replicate RSOI tasks (NATO: RSOM - reception, staging and onward movement). The Albertshof cantonment area replicates a tactical assembly area (TAA) wherein units plan, build combat power, confirm capabilities, back brief the HICON on progress and issues, draw classes of supply, validate mission command and fires systems, review procedures, plan, and rehearse. Units also designate and embed liaison teams and associated equipment in higher and subordinate units. Most often, these liaison teams act in an “advise and assist” capacity rather than just observing and reporting. Depending on the situation and capabilities, units may also embed small teams with operational, fires, and intelligence expertise; Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) systems; One System Remote Video Terminals (OSRVT); and full digital command post nodes (CPN) internet protocols.

To the extent it has not already been accomplished prior to arrival, RSOI provides multinational units the opportunity to determine specifics of their consolidated capabilities, national authorities, and policies. Often, units take the



Figure 4 — Sample Unit Capabilities Brief Agenda




Figure 6 — Essential Elements of Interoperability

time to execute a static display of weapons and capabilities (“petting zoo”) where they co-locate critical assets to demonstrate capabilities. This serves the further purpose of overall situational understanding among the members of the coalition, which in turn builds trust, prevents fratricide, etc. Units often realize that they have tremendous assets or capabilities that they had not previously fully appreciated. For example, during one recent rotation, a brigade task force task organized a Belgian intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) company as part of the task force reserve. Later, the brigade discovered that the Belgian company had significant technical capabilities (such as cameras and digital/voice communication equipment) that were not being leveraged. Once discovered, the task force significantly adjusted the Belgian company’s mission and tasks to account for that capability. In another rotation, a brigade discovered that it had a Romanian platoon whose sole purpose was to lay and mark both persistent and non-persistent minefields. This freed up engineer and artillery assets and allowed for greater engagement area development.

The goal of RSOI at JMRC is not just to build combat power; it is also for commanders to develop better understanding so that they can visualize, describe, and direct their new formations accordingly and so that staffs build and maintain their own situational understanding. In turn, this will help to drive the operations process during the exercise.

The Operations Process

As discussed throughout, units use planning activities to build situational understanding. They optimize the steps of their respective operational planning processes (such as the military decision-making process, the British Army Combat Estimate, the NATO Operational Level Planning Process, etc.) in order to resolve the challenges associated with multinational interoperability.¹³

Most of the characteristics of a multinational operational planning process are similar to any other national/organic operational planning process. However, during multinational operations, the planning process must be more deliberate. A multinational task force’s complexity is significantly more nuanced due to language, culture, law, national policy, etc. As the primary participant in — and the driving force of — the operations process, commanders must first recognize these nuances in order to gain complete situational understanding of the operational environment. The brigade commander requires more robust confirmation briefs from subordinate commanders that include not just higher and subordinate units’ respective tasks and purposes but also matters regarding capabilities, resources, etc. As a result, before subordinate units publish orders, the multinational commander convenes a course of action back brief to ensure all are operating within his intent and appropriately coordinated with adjacent units.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the multinational operations process is the incredible importance of rehearsals. During rehearsals, commanders and key staff continue to reinforce a common situational understanding to ensure a common approach to the operation. Commanders and their respective staffs focus on identifying and



Multinational soldiers conduct a combined arms rehearsal at JMRC. (Photo courtesy of authors)

fixing issues rather than following a set script. Afterwards, commanders huddle to discuss final adjustments.

The task force commander and key staff then visit subordinate units to build and reinforce a collaborative approach. Throughout the fight, the battle rhythm and routine — combined with focused commanders' updates and conference calls — further reinforce unity of effort. When mission command is a focus and executed comprehensively, the results are astounding.

Interoperability

Interoperability among nations and across the human, procedural, and technical domains is heavily emphasized in the European theater and a priority for NATO. In response to Russian aggression in Crimea, NATO agreed at the Warsaw Summit to an eFP of four multinational battalion battle groups, composed of forces from 16 different countries, in the Baltic States and Poland.¹⁴ The post-summit communiqué further stated, "Interoperability of our armed forces is fundamental to our success and an important added value of our alliance."¹⁵ Interoperability reinforces the "fight tonight" ethos and NATO's credibility to reassure allies; it is also fundamental to deterrence. Interoperability also acknowledges that members of the coalition are reinforcing and complementary, if not necessarily the same in terms of doctrine, organization, etc.

Success in interoperability generally correlates directly to achieving functional mission command. Therefore, in every endeavor, training multinational mission command requires a strong emphasis on interoperability. According to AJP 01(D), "the effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict, depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently." Interoperability necessarily includes three dimensions — human, procedural, and technical — and their importance in "the ability of a joint force to achieve its commander's objectives."¹⁶

To track progress, OCTs emphasize, monitor, and assess interoperability efforts throughout the planning and execution of the rotation. A "scorecard" is updated daily, and the issues are discussed at every brigade and battalion after action review (AAR) so that any interoperability issues are identified and resolved.

Allied joint operations should be prepared for, planned, and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of the forces which members dedicate to an operation. Interoperability has three dimensions: technical (e.g., hardware, systems), procedural (e.g., doctrines, procedures), and human (e.g., language, terminology, and training) which are discussed briefly below.¹⁷

Human — The human dimension centers on building relationships and includes the need to overcome language and cultural barriers. It's also about the personal efforts to build mutual confidence. Building this dimension, especially trust and confidence among commanders, occurs from initiation of planning for the exercise through force-on-force execution in simulated combat.

Procedural — The procedural domain primarily revolves around ensuring key procedures (such as battle rhythm,

TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES													
UNIT	Secure Comms (Type 1 encryption) Have capability Y/N? Did they bring to exercise Y/N?	Digital Fires Transmission Devices (i.e. U.S. Army AFATDS) Have capability Y/N? Did they bring to exercise Y/N?	Digital COP Have capability Y/N? Did they bring to exercise Y/N?										
BDE	NA	N/Y* HIQ augmented with DEU Fires cell to enable ASCA digital link	Y/Y										
BDE	Y/Y	Y/Y	Y/Y										
BN	Y/Y	Y/Y	NA										
BN	Y/Y	Y/Y	NA										
BN	Y/Y	Y/Y	NA										
BN	#	TASK (Ref: TC 3-90.6; 10AJRH1)	INITIAL	Rehearsals		DELAY			DEFEND			ATTACK	
				E1	E2	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8
BN	1	Execute the Operations Process (71-89-5100)	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5
	2	Display a Common Operational Picture (71-8-5316)	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	5	5	5
	3	TTPs for Offensive Air Support (STANAG 7103)	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
	4	Conduct a Movement to Contact (07-6-1072)	3	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	3	5	5
	5	Conduct an Attack (07-6-1030)	4	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	3	4	4
	6	Conduct a Defense (07-6-1028)	4	0	0	3	3	3	4	5	0	0	0
POSITIVE TRENDS / STRENGTHS						COACHING FOCUS							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehearsals to refine BN TACSOP and TOC Battle Drills Companies proficient in use of AT weapons 						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of Mission Command Displacement Criteria Use of Fires to enable displacement Air Assault Planning (AMB vs AMCM) 							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TASK NOT OBSERVED TASK NOT EXECUTED TASK EXECUTED; MAJOR DEFICIENCIES; UNLIKELY MISSION SUCCESS 						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TASK EXECUTED TO A HIGH STANDARD; MISSION SUCCESS EXPECTED UNIT DEMONSTRATED MASTERY OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION & TASK EXECUTION 							

Figure 7 — JMRC Interoperability Scorecard

clearance of fires, airspace coordination, etc.) are commonly understood. These will never be entirely common across formations, but those most critical to the fight need to be. JMRC is partnered with the NATO Standardization Office (NSO), which is the keeper on NATO standards, and the goal is to apply NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and other relevant NATO doctrine, such as Allied Land Command’s training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs), during rotations. These are reviewed and agreed to during the planning cycle and exercised during the force on force. Feedback is then provided to refine the doctrine.

Technical — Finally, there is a technical component to interoperability, the focus of which is normally on achieving secure FM communications, a digital common operating picture, and digital fires, especially via the Artillery Systems Cooperation Activity (ASCA) that allows the sharing of digital fires. This is perhaps the easiest of the dimensions for multinational units to address, as it deals with tangible, material items rather than the more ephemeral aspects of people and systems. However, that is not to say that operating in a degraded, or even analog, environment is not important. On the contrary, in those very likely situations given our adversaries’ capabilities, the unit must rely even more heavily on the trust and confidence gained in the human and procedural domains.

Conclusion

According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey, there are three key attributes of mission command — understanding, intent, and trust.¹⁸ The three necessarily work in concert. In describing how important understanding is to mission command, GEN Dempsey references Carl von Clausewitz’ concept of “coup d’oeil” — the “inner eye” of the commander.

“When all is said and done, it really is the commander’s coup d’oeil, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship. Only if the mind works in this comprehensive fashion can it achieve the freedom it needs to dominate events and not be dominated by them.”¹⁹

Developing this coup d’oeil is difficult, and doing so with multinational partners is even more difficult. GEN Dempsey states, “Leaders at every level must contribute to a common operating assessment of context, ‘co-creating it’ as operations progress and situations change.”²⁰ We must continue to build and refine our mutual understanding of operating as a multinational force as recent history suggests that this will continue to be the environment in which we fight. Developing this multinational understanding will enable clear and concise intent, which will in turn drive trust among multinational partners.

The current and future operational environment dictates that success in war and peace requires allies. NATO’s eFP initiative serves as a timely and relevant example. The U.S. Army also is now fulfilling an enduring but rotational “heel-to-toe” requirement for an ABCT and combat aviation brigade in theater to enhance U.S. forward presence

and speed their ability to get to the fight. Collectively, these forces will operate across many nations and would have to quickly aggregate and operate as seamlessly as possible.

Should conflict arise, units will fight as part of multinational commands; therefore, training and exercising as such is essential. Succeeding in that type of environment requires allies and partners building common understanding of the problems, common visualization of the mission, and the mutual confidence and trust to operate together and in a way that encourages disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. JMRC is focused on this reality and therefore exclusively concentrated on training multinational mission command. Hopefully, after reading this article, you walk away with a greater appreciation for why and how units are being trained at JMRC as well as some practical tactics, techniques, and procedures for exercising mission command in a multinational environment.

Notes

¹ Viscount Alanbrooke, diary, 1 April 1945, as quoted in Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West, 1943-1946* (London: Grafton Books, 1986), 445.

² LTG Ben Hodges, "U.S. Army Europe and Its Role in Deterrence," *Defense News* (5 December 2016). Accessed 12 March 2017 from <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/lt-gen-ben-hodges-us-army-europe-and-its-role-in-deterrence>.

³ Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 January 2017), II-2.

⁴ Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2012), 1-3. Accessed 12 March 2017 from <https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>.

⁵ Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D) (NATO Standardization Office, December 2010), 6-4. Accessed 12 March 2017 from [http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/ajp-01\(d\).pdf](http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/ajp-01(d).pdf).

⁶ Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 July 2013), I-3, quoting from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, circa 1948. See also, Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address to the Nation" (17 January 1961), "Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect." Accessed 12 March 2017 from <http://mcdams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm>.

⁷ COL Phil Brooks, commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, comment during the rotational after action review. The 1/3 ID was conducting its mission as the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) in Europe at the time.

⁸ Unattributed.

⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949. Accessed 12 March 2017 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.



Multinational battalion commanders back brief Colonel Mindaugas Steponavicius (left) during Exercise Allied Spirit V at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, on 8 October 2016. (Photo by PFC Randy Wren)

¹⁰ Colonel Mindaugas Steponavicius, e-mail message to LTC Kevin Saatkamp, 6 March 2017.

¹¹ AJP 01(D), xii.

¹² Note: However, JMRC does not allow any of the higher and adjacent activities to drastically affect the brigade in the box because they are the primary training audience.

¹³ For more information on planning in a multinational task force, see Joel Gleason and Patrick Bryan, "A Tool for Parallel Planning in a Combined Brigade Combat Team," *Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide* (Center for Army Lessons Learned, July 2016): Appendix C. Accessed 12 March 2017 from <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-18.pdf>.

¹⁴ Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 40, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. Accessed 12 March 2017 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ AJP 01(D), 3-4.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion of multinational interoperability broken down by warfighting function, see *Multinational Interoperability Reference Guide* (Center for Army Lessons Learned, July 2016). Accessed 12 March 2017 from <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/16-18.pdf>.

¹⁸ GEN Martin E. Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper" (3 April 2012). Accessed 12 March 2017 from <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/missioncommandwhitepaper2012.pdf>.

¹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard & Paret edition/translation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 578.

²⁰ Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper."

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