Hal Moore on Leadership: Winning When Outgunned and Outmanned

By LTG (Retired) Harold G. Moore and Mike Guardia
Maple Grove, MN: Magnum Books, 2017, 155 pages
Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon

For readers of Infantry Magazine, LTG Hal Moore needs no introduction. He was a legendary Soldier who made incredible contributions on and off the battlefield. These contributions were sparked by his tremendous leadership skills. Undoubtedly, Hal Moore belongs to a select group of individuals who could lead in any environment. Moore’s thoughts on leadership are now captured in the superb volume aptly entitled Hal Moore on Leadership: Winning when Outgunned and Outmanned.

Every book has its own unique story as to its process of moving from an idea to eventual publication. Clearly, Hal Moore on Leadership had its own distinctive chronicle. Moore began crafting his words and thoughts on leadership several decades ago on a yellow legal pad. These words were then typed by his wife, Julie (the only person who could read his handwriting), onto an old Dell computer in Microsoft Word. As events transpired in Moore’s life, the future book justifiably was put to the side.

Several years ago, Moore and his family felt it was time to complete the project. After some arduous work, they were able to retrieve Moore’s words from the computer. However, they soon discovered that someone with a unique skill set was needed to assist in transforming these words into a book. Enter Mike Guardia.

Guardia truly possessed the credentials required to aid in this challenge. First, Guardia had established a superb reputation as a writer. This included a body of work comprising several award-winning volumes. Second, he served as an active duty Armor officer from 2008-2014. Finally, Guardia had already developed a relationship with Moore and his family. This association began many years earlier when he was crafting a biography on Moore aptly titled Hal Moore: A Soldier Once... And Always, which was published in November 2013. Guardia truly developed a bond with Moore during the book’s research and preparation.

So what can readers expect from the volume? Both Moore and Guardia provide their thoughts on the volume’s content, purpose, and value in the book’s initial pages. Moore states, “This book is not an autobiography. It’s not a ‘how to’ book on military leadership, the chapters include selected periods in my life. Covered will be leaders, leadership, and experiences which made life-long impressions on me; and lessons learned — most of which have application in all fields of endeavor.”

Guardia adds his thoughts in the volume’s introduction. He remarks, “Hal Moore on Leadership offers a comprehensive guide to the principles that helped shape Moore’s success both on and off the battlefield. They are strategies for the outnumbered, outgunned, and seemingly hopeless. They apply to any leader in any organization. These lessons and principles are nothing theoretical or scientific. They are simply rules of thumb learned and practiced by a man who spent his entire adult life leading others and perfecting the art of leadership.”

In order to capture these lessons and practices, Moore and Guardia have organized a volume which truly highlights Moore’s thoughts on leadership. They begin the volume by stressing what in Moore’s vast experience are his four basic principles of leadership. Moore initially developed these principles as a young officer serving in the Korean War. The principles are:

1. Three strikes and you’re not out.
2. There’s always one more thing you can do to influence any situation in your favor. And after that, there’s one more thing.
3. When nothing is wrong, there’s nothing wrong — EXCEPT there’s nothing wrong. That’s when a leader has to be the most alert.
4. Trust your instincts.

Each of the above principles is addressed in detail, and this chapter truly sets the conditions for the rest of the volume.

In regards to the remainder of the book, Moore and Guardia utilize it to provide readers with examples from Moore’s past in which leadership was at the forefront. He includes events which cover the period from his childhood until his retirement from the U.S. Army in August 1977. In between, they obviously focus on Moore’s combat tours during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. However, there are also many references to Moore’s garrison experiences which will resonate with many.

Throughout the book, readers will find dozens of “Moore Leadership Nuggets” inserted within the text. Moore and Guardia have highlighted these by using bold text or placing them in bulleted lists. They have aptly named these lists as, “Moore’s Observations, Lessons Learned, or Relearned.” For the reader, this is an excellent technique which greatly aids in finding these for future reference.

At about 150 pages, this is not a very long volume. However, it is an extremely powerful book and certainly not
short on quality. It is a volume which will appeal to and greatly benefit a wide variety of readers. Be it on the battlefield, the boardroom, or the athletic field, leaders and future leaders will find this to be an invaluable book and tremendous resource. Unquestionably, there is much to be gained from reading Hal Moore on Leadership.

**Triumph at Imphal-Kohima: How the Indian Army Finally Stopped the Japanese Juggernaut**

By Raymond Callahan

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017, 212 pages

Reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck,
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

In 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army, simultaneous with its lightning advance down the Malay Peninsula to Singapore, thrust into British-controlled Burma and relentlessly advanced towards the Indian border. The Indian Army was revealed to be nearly inept and was all but destroyed in the process. Smashed British and Commonwealth units, including the 17th Indian Infantry Division, trickled back to India to refit, recover, and eventually re-engage the Japanese. Under the leadership of General William Slim, the reborn Indian Army — with American and British assistance — pushed back into Burma in 1944 and administered the largest defeat to the Japanese up to that point in the war. The fall, rebirth, and rise of the Indian Army, along with perceptive analysis of British-American combined warfare and logistics, make *Triumph at Imphal-Kohima* a valuable work that offers lessons for today’s military.

British policy from the outbreak of war in Europe through 1942 was a large part of the reason the Indian Army suffered such staggering initial defeats at the hands of the Japanese. The Indian Army was largely considered a manpower pool for British interests, with its long-service regular troops sent to Africa and the Middle East to support colonial defenses and the war against the European Axis. These regulars were largely led by British officers as Indian officers were limited in numbers. To backfill the Indian Army, drafts of replacements largely led by British officers as Indian officers were limited in numbers. To backfill the Indian Army, drafts of replacements largely led by British officers were designed to support the Indian Army. Under Slim’s leadership, however, “the training regime was so intense that even the babus — the Indian non-combatant clerks... were required to do physical training.” Furthermore, an emphasis on jungle warfare training refocused the Indian Army on the task at hand. The standardization of jungle warfare training helped incorporate lessons learned and disseminate the best tactics, techniques, and procedures to defeat the Japanese.

The impacts of terrain, logistics, weather, and disease also played a major role on the campaign in Burma. Perhaps most striking was the impact of logistics on sustaining combat units. The Indian Army had to rely on single track roads that were not designed for heavy traffic and were incapable of surviving monsoon seasons. This anemic infrastructure significantly hampered mobility and sustainability of Indian operations. As an example, “in August 1942, only seventy-two truckloads of supplies made it through from Dimapur to Imphal,” a distance of several hundred kilometers and a major axis of Allied advance. Immense efforts were undertaken to strengthen the lines of communication throughout India and into Burma in order to support the Indian Army. Those logistics assets, however, were low-density, and high-demand units such as the Americans needed the same trucks, trains, and airfields to support Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Chinese, putting further strain on an already weak system and requiring cooperation between the Allies.

Author Raymond Callahan does an excellent job of describing the differing political objectives of the British and Americans in the China Burma India (CBI) Theater. America’s desire to support Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Chinese forces came into conflict with British desires to recapture their colonial possessions of Burma, Malay, and Singapore. Coupled with personality conflicts between the British leadership and American General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, the difficult nature of combined warfare in Burma becomes readily apparent. As Churchill remarked, “the only thing worse than fighting with Allies is fighting without them.”

The battle itself is rather quickly covered in the book. Slim’s objective of pinning the Japanese at the gateways to the Imphal plain while his XXXIII Corps reopened the Dimapur-Imphal Road were accomplished through the use of combat boxes which broke up Japanese attacks, slowed their advance, and fixed them while they were in turn counter-attacked or surrounded. Fighting in and around these boxes devolved into a “conflict of platoons, companies, and occasional battalions.” The logistics efforts before and during the battle were leviathan. “Delivering 12,250 reinforcements and 18,800 tons of supplies, and flying out 13,000 sick and wounded and 43,000 noncombatants, [Operation] Stamina’s 7,500 sorties were absolutely essential to Slim’s victory.” In short, Slim designed the battle, the rebuilt Indian Army fought it at the small unit level, and Allied transport planes kept it supplied through to victory.