


UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

Fort Benning, Georgia

9 October 1968

OPERATIONS OF THE 5TH BATTALION, 31ST INFANTRY,
197TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, IN A CIVIL DISTURBANCE
OPERATION DURING THE PERIOD 5 APRIL 1968 TO
12 APRIL 1968 IN THE CITY OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.
(PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A BATTALION S3)



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Advanced Course No 4

Roster No 47, Advisory Group No 11

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INTRODUCTION

As civil disturbances increased in Washington, D.C. during the week of 1 April 1968, the 5th Battalion 31st Infantry, 197th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia, increased its planning activities contingent upon quelling a civil disturbance in any large population center in the United States. Friday, 5 April 1968, the battalion received OPLAN Baltimore from Headquarters Task Force 197 (TF 197) and final details on OPLAN Polar Bear (5th Bn 31st Inf plan) were written and submitted to the Commanding Officer, Task Force 31 (TF 31).

At 052000, April 1968, TF 31 received a message from TF 197 requesting the number of deployable officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men the Task Force had available as of that time. This information was desired in 30 minutes to be relayed to Commanding General Third Army. Captain Michael P. Eskew, as Task Force S3, reported to Task Force Headquarters and assembled the desired information, which was relayed to TF 197 at 2050 hours. After assembling the information and reporting it, I went to TF 197 Headquarters where Captain Juris Jaunitis was on duty in the S3 Section and asked him what information he had regarding whether or not the Task Force was to be deployed and if so, to which city. No additional information was available at that

time. During the course of the conversation, LTC Nixon, TF 197, S3, returned from a meeting with United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) Commanding General, Major General John W. Bright, Jr., and related that although the possibility of TF 197 being employed in a civil disturbance was discussed, no specific information as to when and to what city was available. At this time no alert notification had been made to TF 197 and the work that was done only created questions in the minds of the Commanders and staff as to the possibility of whether or not TF 197 would be deployed. TF 197's normal mission is that of USAIC/USAI3 support. Prior to the events of the preceding several days, the contingency mission of civil disturbance was considered a remote possibility.

At 060020 hours, April 1968, TF 31 was alerted for movement; means and target city unknown. Due to the time of day and day of week, an assumption of 100% present-for-duty fill within two hours after notification was nullified. The battalion filled to 39% strength by 0830 hours and remained at that strength throughout the operation. Personnel who had departed on leave or pass prior to alert notification were not recalled. Attachment of one platoon from the 988th Military Police Company was effected by 0515 hours with no difficulty.

At 1845 hours, both method of movement (air C119 and C124 aircraft) and target city (Washington, D.C.) were given to TF 31. This information was given in

advance of receipt by TF 197, of the Department of the Army Deployment Order which was received at 071400 hours, April 1968.

The first aircraft, a C119, departed Lawson Army Airfield at 071550 ~~hours~~ ^{April} with LTC James P. Johnson, CO TF 31, aboard. It landed at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., at 071935 ~~hours~~ ^{April}, almost two days after the initial alert was received by TF 31.

THE BRIGADE PLAN

With guidance provided by Headquarters Department of the Army and Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps, late in March 1968, the 197th Infantry Brigade (TF 197) prepared their OPLAN Baltimore which was to be the first OPLAN in a series written for specific cities in the eastern portion of the United States. This plan organized a brigade size force, designated TF 197, of 1900 men for employment into the disturbance area as part of Task Force XVIII, commanded by Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps. As part of TF XVIII, TF 197's mission was to deploy into a target city, quell civil disturbance, restore law and order, and redeploy out of the city.

The plan was specific in nature and covered the dissident groups within the city of Baltimore quite well. It was written utilizing only C130 aircraft, which later proved to be a fallacy within the plan.

The term Task Force was utilized to describe units of Task Force XVIII and this term was carried over into the Brigade plan and consequently to the battalion plan.

As per the true definition of the term, "task force", TF 197 did not meet the criteria, in that its attachments consisted of a Military Police company only. To maintain accuracy throughout this monograph, the term task force will be utilized, i.e.: TF 197 and TF 31.

THE BATTALION PLAN

As opposed to TF 197 plan, TF 31's plan was general in nature and not directed toward any specific city. The information contained in this plan outlines the planning guidance and desired preparation to be made by the company size elements of TF 31.

The plan, as written by TF 31, required that sufficient equipment be deployed to enable the task force to be independent for lights, communication, and mobile patrols. It also contained the fallacy of being prepared specifically for C130 aircraft. This fallacy was corrected upon completion of Operation Baltimore.

Under this plan, the task force is organized into a five company configuration (four rifle companies and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company) utilizing four platoons in each of the rifle companies. The attached Military Police platoon, which the task force is allocated in the brigade plan, is designated to provide one Military Policeman per committed rifle squad and a Military Police NCO to be assigned to the company commander of each committed rifle company. The remainder of the platoon is to be utilized as mobile patrols or on periods of rest when not committed.

Other than the fallacy of designating a particular type of aircraft, the plan proved to be quite effective and complete when the task force utilized it for deployment within only three days of submission of the final draft!

THE EXISTING SITUATION

The existing situation will be discussed in two parts; first, the national situation, then the military situation of TF 31 prior to receipt of the alert for deployment.

THE NATIONAL SITUATION

A riot or civil disturbance in our Nation's streets is not a completely new occurrence; however, in recent years the size, number, and scope of them has increased drastically. During the winter of 1967-1968, the leaders of the dissident groups in our Nation promised that the summer of 1968 would be the most violent in recent years. On the evening of 4 April 1968, the murder of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee, triggered a series of events that led to the fulfilling of the promises of the dissident leaders. It was quickly apparent, within hours after Dr. King's death, that within many major cities of the United States, a grief-stricken populace was giving vent to anger, shame, bewilderment, and opportunity to the extent that law and civil order were deteriorating rapidly.

The Army, which has responsibility for civil disturbance control, once Federal troops are ordered into

an area, began to step up its state of preparedness concurrently with the rising tide of civil disturbances which culminated in the employment of an excess of 36,000 United States Army personnel into 3 cities for civil disturbance control duty.

MILITARY SITUATION OF 5TH BN 31ST INFANTRY

The assigned mission of the 5th Battalion 31st Infantry, as part of the 197th Infantry Brigade, is troop and equipment support to the United States Army Infantry School and Center. This mission requires the commitment on a five workday basis, in excess of 85% of the battalion which presents a major obstacle to training.

Many of the USAIS commitments involve training and practice in the skills which are required in riot control duty; however, training time must still be devoted to formal riot control training as well as other required Infantry skills.

Another major problem in training of the battalion is the short retainability of personnel. Although the companies of the battalion present a good progressive program of training, it is very unlikely that a man who attended the first hour of instruction will be in the unit when the last period is presented.

The contingency mission of civil disturbance control, which seemed somewhat remote considering assigned mission, prior to alert for deployment was, however, given priority of training time by the Commanding Officer of TF 31.

Approximately one month prior to deployment, a new Army Subject Schedule (Army Subject Schedule 19-6-(T)) was received by the battalion. This schedule was immediately studied by the commander and staff and changes from the prior schedule were programmed^m for instruction. As of 14 March 1968, 60% of the battalion, by the commander's evaluation, was considered qualified for duty in civil disturbance control. By the first of April, 78% of the battalion had received the required training. (For required training, see Inclosure I). This training, plus the fact that 60% of the personnel of the battalion were combat veterans of Vietnam, were definitely key factors in the success of the operation. ✓

It should be noted that, in order to accomplish the required training, relief from commitments was requested by the commander. As a result, USAIC granted a two day relief from all commitments and the battalion was able to accomplish the required training.

THE NARRATION

On Friday, 5 April 1968, the battalion was "doing business as usual" and the normal passes and leaves were granted. At 060020 ~~hours~~^{April}, when the alert to be ready to move on 6 hours notice came, normal alert notification and readiness postures were not assumed. This was largely due to two things. First, the battalion's normal mission, such as it is, does not lend itself to practice of these notifications and procedures; secondly, and perhaps most importantly, it was due to the lack of

information pertaining to deployment or mission upon deployment.

With the attachment of the Military Police Platoon at 0515, the battalion had its equipment loaded and a force of 578 officers and men ready for deployment.

As the morning progressed, it became apparent to the commander and staff that the actual deployment or physical move would not take place immediately. Based on this, company commanders were instructed to conduct additional training for their companies in civil disturbance operations and the commanders and staff gathered at task force headquarters to work out final changes to the draft plan which had been completed only 24 hours earlier.

As night came, information was relayed to TF 31 to be prepared for a 2200 hour departure and that Major General Wright desired to meet with and talk to the assembled task force. In his talk to the task force, MG Wright emphasized the eight Special Orders for members of the Army engaged in civil disturbance operations contained on GTA 21-2-7. (See Inclosure II.) These Special Orders are also part of the required training and the GTA is to be issued to troops when engaged in this type operation. The GTA was available in TF 31 and the members had been issued the card. MG Wright's talk had a very positive effect in pointing out the significance of these instructions.

After MG Wright's talk, TF 31 bedded down for the

night, still without a firm departure time. Although the "where and how" questions had been answered, the big puzzle was still "when".

THE DEPLOYMENT

Early on Sunday morning 6 April 1968, the "when" question was finally answered. TF 197 would depart Lawson Army Airfield with TF 31 leading at approximately 1100 hours this bright and sunny Sunday morning. Due to required crew rest, this departure time also had to be delayed until 1550 hours when, after experiencing a problem of no ~~Departure~~ Airfield Control Group, the first aircraft with LTC Johnson and SGM James E. Bell aboard, lifted off. Upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., TF 31 was again faced with an airfield problem. At the arrival airfield, however, the problem was not as great. Guides had been arranged for by Commanding General, First United States Army and a bivouac area was being set up. LTC Johnson was given a number in Washington to call to report the status of the arriving task force. This number later turned out to be the Department of the Army Operations Center. This number served greatly to show the impact and scope of this operation to LTC Johnson and his staff.

At 2346, with the arrival of the last chalk of TF 31, a move that involved 320119 and 30124 aircraft sorties, control of the arrival airfield passed to the Commanding Officer TF 197, whose staff arrived with the last chalk of TF 31.

The bivouac area provided for TF 31 was large and adequate for proposed operations. It consisted of GP medium tents and canvas cots. This, together with the lighting equipment which had been included as part of TF 31's plan, provided quite adequate accommodations for a task force that had largely been on the "go" for two days.

With the coming of morning, 7 April 1968, new questions were formed in the minds of the commander and staff of TF 31: "Had we gone all this distance and through the turmoil of assembling, waiting, and moving just to be placed in reserve?" This question was largely brought about due to the distance from the troubled part of the city and the absence of further orders.

The infamous old quote of millions of soldiers, "hurry up and wait", was negated when, at approximately 1200 hours, orders were received to initiate planning for possible road movement to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. At 1215 hours, orders were received which directed TF 197 to conduct a road movement to Baltimore, Maryland. TF 31 received its order at 1245 hours and began movement at 1315 hours. For movement, TF 31 was augmented with 13 civilian buses. This was necessary because the task force had deployed with vehicles for command and control, supply, and mobile patrols, but not for troop movement.

By 1600 hours, TF 31 had arrived at Baltimore and had begun setting up its GP and company areas in

Druid Hill Park. In Druid Hill Park the commander of TF 31 was able to place his units in such a manner as to facilitate communications and forming of vehicle convoys. The company commanders were able to rehearse their plans and conduct training away from public view.

The separation from local civil police was easily overcome by locating the task force communications officer with a radio in the police district headquarters.

THE INSERTION AND EMPLOYMENT

At 1615, LTC Johnson and Captain Eskew went to TF 197 CP and received an order to effect coordination and conduct a reconnaissance in order to insert two rifle companies into the task force area of operations (AO) as indicated on Overlay #1. This was accomplished and by 080030, April 1968, A and B Companies had been inserted and assumed responsibility for their respective AO's.

The AO, taken over by TF 31, had previously been the responsibility of the 47th Engineer Battalion of TF XVIII, which was now operating as Task Force Baltimore. The area consisted chiefly of non-whites living in multi-storied, closely packed, houses. The area was dotted with the usual grocery, liquor, and cheap clothing stores which are habitually found in the slums of our Nation's cities. It should be remembered, however, that the city of Baltimore has among the best housing conditions of cities in the Nation. Also located within the AO was a police emergency command post established by the Chief of the Baltimore City Police and a four engine fire station.

} needs rewording

Close coordination was maintained with these facilities by the company commanders within whose AO they were located and by Captain Eskew, who moved freely throughout the TF AO during the entire period of the operation.

By direction of Task Force Baltimore, one magazine of ammunition was issued to each man and three CS chemical grenades were issued to each committed squad. The magazines were not to be taken from the pouch without approval of LTC Johnson and the CS grenades were not to be employed without approval of the company commander concerned.

A and B Companies were inserted, utilizing civilian buses from the Transit Company of Baltimore. These buses were attached to TF 31 for the duration of Operation Baltimore and proved to be quite valuable. The drivers knew the city well and were an asset, not only for intelligence, but also for ease of movement.

At 0125, the attachment of six civil policemen and three police cars was effected. One car with two policemen each were attached to each of the committed companies for intelligence, communication, and detainee control reasons. This gave the task force dual lines of communication to the police. The remaining team was used by the TF CO and staff to become more familiar with the AO and it's inhabitants. The platoon leader of the attached Military Police platoon was able to establish the rules and procedures which led to a greater degree of efficiency in handling detainees. } with who

The term "attachment of civil police" is another term that is used differently in Civil Disturbance Operations. It, in this case, does not imply command, logistical, or legal authority over the civil police, but simply means that as long as the receiving unit operates in a particular police district, the same police personnel will be continually utilized at the receiving commander's ~~discretion~~^{DISCRETION}. This was possible in Operation Baltimore because all city and state forces were directly responsive to the Commander, TF XVIII.

Few problems were experienced the first night by A and B Companies in their respective AO's; however, within two or three hours after the curfew (1900-0700) had been lifted, activity greatly increased. The first indication of trouble developed at approximately 0720 hours when A Company reported that several groups of persons were beginning to gather and by 0900, the situation had developed to the point that the task force recon platoon was inserted and attached to A Company because ~~their~~^{ITS} AO contained the most trouble spots. At the same time, E Company was alerted for employment into the part of the AO, which is shown on Overlay #2.

Troops were used to protect fire fighting crews, to control looters, and to seal off trouble areas. Shortly after the recon platoon was inserted, activity in A Company's AO decreased greatly. At the same time, however, a noticeable buildup of activities was experienced

in B Company's AO. By 1400, the situation had reached such a level that it was determined ¹⁷⁵ ~~their~~ AO should be divided and E Company was deployed to assume responsibility of a portion of the AO. B Company had experienced several fires, lootings, and a possible sniper incident.

Throughout the remainder of the afternoon the three companies remained busy with reports of weapons being distributed, a fire bombing, and other such reports, all of which proved to be false but required detailed checking out. Other actions which were not false were missing person reports, crowd gatherings, and additional fires and looting.

At 1730 hours, C Company, which was understrength, was deployed into A Company's AO and A Company was relieved to become TF 31 reserve with B Company, which was also relieved. The recon platoon was detached from A Company and attached to C Company. E Company spread out to assume responsibility for the entire B Company and E Company AO, as B Company had done the night before.

With the imposition of the curfew, the TF AO quieted considerably and by 2000 hours the relief of A and B Companies was complete. By midnight it became apparent that the area had quieted down for the night and the recon platoon returned to the task force base. At this same time, C and E Companies were given the opportunity to rest a portion of their units. This configuration was used until 101200 ~~hours~~, April 1968 when TF 31's

AO was greatly expanded.

At 101200, April 1968, the 29th Infantry Division, Maryland National Guard, was relieved to be given 24 to 36 hours of rest. As a result, TF 31's AO was expanded three to four times its original size. (See Overlay #3.)

In order to accomplish the mission of quelling disorder and securing the expanded AO, all committed companies were augmented with two additional 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks from TF 31 Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). This action removed the remaining uncommitted mobility of HHC and left it with no vehicles for the supply, maintenance, or communications platoons. On future operations, TF 31 will deploy with additional 1/4 ton trucks to overcome this contingency.

The communications officer, who had been at the police emergency command post, moved to the Police District Headquarters to cover the entire new AO. Throughout Operation Baltimore, liaison officers were exchanged and AO boundaries were established by TF 31, as nearly as possible, to coincide with police boundaries. This provided for maximum utilization of the attached civil police.

During the period 101200 hours to 101600 ~~hours~~, April 1968, significant events were limited to one looter and the placing of static patrols around a food distribution point. The committed companies utilized this period to establish their command posts and become familiar with

their new AO's.

At 1600 hours, TF 31 received notification that 200 state policemen, who had previously guarded the commercial areas of downtown Baltimore, were being recalled and that TF 31 now had responsibility for this critical area without their assistance. Direction was further issued to give special attention toward security of Charles Center complex. Based on this information, the Commander of TF 31 inserted C Company with operational control (OPCON) of one platoon of B Company. A Company was placed under OPCON of C Company. E and B Companies were directed to continue operations in their assigned AO's. (See Overlay #4.) With the concentration of forces in the area, very little action occurred. In this area, significant events for the rest of the night were limited to one incident of looters being detained and two incidents of curfew violation.

The curfew had been extended until 2200 hours for the first night since TF 31's arrival in Baltimore and during the period when the reallocating of the downtown area was being accomplished. B Company was experiencing a large amount of activity in ¹¹⁵their AO, consisting of burglary, break-ins, and a suspected sniping incident.

E Company was experiencing much the same type of activity with the exception that ¹¹⁷they reported two Molotov Cocktails were thrown into a school in their AO. E Company was able to extinguish the fire with little

damage to the school.

In order to adequately cover the AO of B Company, which had the most action, TF Pope, which consisted of a company reinforced with two platoons of 1st Battalion 58th Infantry, TF 197 was attached to TF 31. They were inserted and given responsibility for an AO as shown on Overlay #5 at 110030, April 1968.

For the remainder of the night activity in TF 31's AO was extremely light. At 0630, TF Pope was released to return to its parent organization, with the only significant event of the evening in its area being the employment of a CS grenade at the request of the civil police.

THE RELIEF AND RETURN

At 110700, April 1968, TF 31 received orders to extract all of its elements and that the 29th Infantry Division would reassume responsibility for the entire AO. This was accomplished by 111100, April 1968.

The period from 111100 ~~hours~~ to 121300 ~~hours~~, April 1968, was devoted to relaxation, care, and maintenance, and preparation for redeployment to Fort Benning. At 1300 hours, 12 April, 1968, the task force departed Druid Hill Park for Martin Marietta Airfield located outside Baltimore and at 1516 hours, the first aircraft, a C119, departed for home station. The last plane landed at Lawson Army Airfield at 2400 hours, one week after deployment.

This entire operation was conducted with the use of only six CS grenades and no live ammunition being fired. Throughout the operation the presence of the American Infantryman and, only when required, his bayonet was sufficient force to successfully accomplish the mission.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. On Sunday, 6 April, a fallacy in the plan of TF XVIII became apparent. TF 31, as the lead element, began to airload for departure, the old Army adage reference air deployment that "the airloading unit can't load itself out", was profoundly demonstrated once more.

TF 31 struggled through the greater part of the airloading until Col. Sidney M. Marks (Director, Brigade and Battalion Operations Department USAIS at that time) arrived at Lawson Army Airfield and discovered the near impossible task of TF 197. Col. Marks quickly called members of his department and other personnel of USAIC with experience in airloading and assembled a Departure Airfield Control Group to assist TF 197.

2. Utilizing a park for a command post or base of operations was a departure from the procedure utilized by other units when employed in a civil disturbance role.

Many of the advantages of utilizing schools, city police or fire stations, as has been previously advocated, are obvious. The fact that latrine and shower facilities are present and that an extensive communications network exists are certainly among them. Another

obvious advantage is the ease of coordination and flow of intelligence data that is possible with co-location with the local civil departments.

The advantages of a park over a police or fire department headquarters or a public school basically centers around security and control. If the task force is so located, they are not as vulnerable to acts of terrorism that endanger personnel and equipment and also indirectly from things such as flying glass, crumbling walls and other incidents connected with building destruction. The greatest advantage, however, is the room and seclusion for security and control offered by a large park.

In Druid Hill Park, the Commander of TF 31 was able to place his units in such a manner as to facilitate communications and forming of vehicle convoys. The company commanders were able to rehearse their plans and conduct training away from public view. The disadvantages to use of a park are mainly logistical because sanitation facilities must be made available, tentage and commercial telephone lines must be installed, and, depending on the weather, there is a certain loss of comfort. The other significant disadvantage is the distance from the local police for matters of coordination and intelligence.

TF 31 was provided outstanding logistical support by the Commanding General 1st United States Army. The task force was issued sufficient GP tents and cots to

house the troops, portable sanitation facilities, a field shower unit, ration meals, and other essential logistical items on a timely basis.

The separation from local civil police was easily overcome by locating the task force communications officer with a radio in the police district headquarters.

3. The city of Baltimore had established a police court to run on a continual basis and close coordination and control was absolutely necessary to insure maximum efficiency. Gaining a conviction, after detainment in a civil disturbance operation, is always a problem, but the establishment of the continual court was a good solution. It required the coordination and control which TF 31 was able to effect due to the attachment of the civil police.

4. For resting their troops, the commanders of companies C and E utilized the attached civilian buses. The buses were ideal for this purpose because they were comfortable, mobile and most importantly because they removed, from public view, the resting soldiers.

A delicate balance of visible troops is required in civil disturbance operations because excessive troops visible in a particular area excites the dissidents just as insufficient troops do. In this regard, the civilian buses were an outstanding asset. They were familiar to the public, as opposed to a large military truck, and at the same time, they offered mobility and comfort.

TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

1. It became apparent that even though TF 31 had 4 1/4 ton trucks, 5 1 1/4 ton trucks, and 2 2 1/2 ton trucks in the operation, this was insufficient transportation. An additional 2 1/4 ton trucks and 2 1 1/4 ton trucks should be deployed per company to insure adequate transportation is available for mobile patrols. This additional transportation is cited, considering that civilian buses or other means of mass movement would be available.

2. The task force should be bivouaced and operate from a park, using tents for housing and control headquarters as required. This proved very satisfactory as it allowed the TF Commander to place the companies exactly where he wanted them, insuring good communications, control, and security.

3. A liaison officer with organic communications capability should be sent to the local police headquarters to effect coordination and exchange intelligence data between civilian police and the military commander in the AO.

4. Military Police squad leaders should be co-located with company commanders to insure proper detention, recording, and reporting procedures are used.

5. Plans should be prepared to facilitate ease of loading and planning for each type of aircraft available for movement.

6. A Departure and an Arrival Airfield Control Group

should be designated from a higher headquarters than the deploying unit.

7. Curfews should be imposed as early as possible during civil disorder and should be strictly enforced.

8. Emphasis should be placed on Infantry small unit basic patrolling as a means of patrolling and securing an area in Civil Disturbance Operations.



Michael P. Eskew
Captain, Infantry

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2. Graphic Training Aid 21-2-7, Special Orders for Civil Disturbance (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 1968).
3. OPLAN Baltimore (Fort Benning, Ga.: 197th Infantry Brigade, April 1968).
4. OPLAN Polar Bear (Fort Benning, Ga.: 5th Bn 31st Infantry, April 1968).
5. Johnson, James P., personal interview (Fort Benning, Ga., 10 September 1968).
6. Saunitis, Juris, personal interview (Fort Benning, Ga., 10 September 1968).

THE REQUIRED TRAINING

The required training as listed in Army Subject Schedule 19-6-(T), 7 August 1967 is as follows:

UNIT TRAINING (32 Hours)

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>LESSON</u>
2	Introduction to Civil Disturbances and Riot Control Operations.
2	Military Leadership, Responsibilities, and Discipline.
2	Introduction to Formations.
4	Squad Formations.
4	Platoon Formations.
4	Company Formations.
2	Riot Control Agents and Munitions.
2	Special Considerations and Recent Lessons Learned
2	Overall Aspects of Riot Control Operations.
8	Unit Field Training Exercise.

COMMAND AND STAFF TRAINING (16 Hours)

2	Command Responsibilities
1	Legal Aspects of Riot Control Training
1	Fundamentals of the Application of Force in Riot Control Formations.
2	Recent Lessons Learned
2	Planning for Riot Control Operations.
8	Practical Exercise (CPX).

NOTE 1 Commanders and Staff are urged to attend UNIT TRAINING.

NOTE 2 Army Subject Schedule 19-6, February, 1968, supercedes Army Subject Schedule 19-6-(T) and was received by 5th Battalion 31st Infantry in late April 1968.

INCLOSURE I

SPECIAL ORDERS

1. I will always present a neat military appearance. I will conduct myself in a soldierly manner at all times and I will do all I can to bring credit upon myself, my unit and the military service.
2. I will be courteous in all dealings with civilians to the maximum extent possible under existing circumstances.
3. I will not load or fire my weapon except when authorized by an officer in person, when authorized in advance by an officer under certain specific conditions, or when required to save my life.
4. I will not intentionally injure or mistreat civilians, including those I am controlling, or those in my custody nor will I withhold medical attention from anyone who requires it.
5. I will not discuss or pass on rumors about this operation.
6. I will if possible let civilian police make arrests, but I can if necessary take into temporary custody rioters, looters, or others committing serious crimes. I will take such persons to the police or designated military authorities as soon as possible. It is my duty to deliver evidence and to complete evidence tags and detainee forms in accordance with my instructions.
7. I will allow properly identified reporters and radio and television personnel freedom of movement, unless they interfere with the mission of my unit.

3. I will avoid damage to property as far as possible.

INCLOSURE II