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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TACTICS USED BY THE
ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS BETWEEN 5 AND
10 JUNE 1967 DURING THE 6-DAY WAR (RESEARCH).

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TACTICS USED BY THE
ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS BETWEEN 5 AND
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview. On 5 June 1967, Israel launched a coordinated attack against the neighboring Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.

B. Scope. The period between 5 June 1967 (when Israel first launched her air and ground attack) and 10 June 1967 (when Egypt sued for a cease-fire through the United Nations) will be the concern of this paper. I shall analyze tactical points which were the key factors in determining the outcome of this conflict.

C. Objectives. I shall analyze the tactical strategy used by the Israelis in the air-war phase of the conflict and shall focus on tactics used in the Sinai campaign. These points will be examined to determine why the Israelis were so successful in overcoming numerically superior odds in their defeat of the Arabs. In addition, an attempt will be made to determine the tactical errors made by the Egyptians which contributed to their disaster.

D. Method of Development. I shall conduct this study in the chronological order of events.

II. BODY

A. The Air War.

On the morning of 5 June 1967 at 0745 hours, Israeli jets departed to make coordinated attacks on 10 of Egypt's most important airfields. "Three of these ten airfields were in the Cairo region (Cairo-West, Almaza, Inshass), three in the Canal area (Kabrit, Fayed, Abu Suweir), and four in Sinai (el Arish, Jebel Libni, Bir Thamada, Bir Gafgaga)." (15:320) (Appendix A)

There were two major objectives of these first strikes. One was to destroy the Egyptian MIG-21 interceptors on the ground. The other was to eliminate the Tu-16 medium jet bombers which could strike the heart of Israel. (15:322)

Flying low (approximately 150 feet) to avoid Egyptian radar, the first wave of Israeli attackers struck 10 Egyptian airfields simultaneously. This feat was accomplished by the minute planning of the Israelis and the professionalism displayed by the Israeli pilots. (15:321)

The time of attack was chosen for various reasons. The first was an anticipation by the Israelis that the Egyptians would be expecting an attack at dawn and when an attack did not come they would let their guard down. The second was the fact Israeli pilots could have more sleep if the attacks were made at 0745 and, thus, be more alert for the events of the following 2 days. The third was that the Israelis determined the morning mist, which was usually over the Nile, the Delta, and the Suez Canal, would be dispersed by 0730. The final reason for the 0745 attack was that this attack

would mean that it was 0845 in Egypt. At this precise time, many generals and Air Force personnel would be caught on the way to their offices. (14:261) ✓

The success of the strategy used by the Israeli Air Force was described by Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill in an analysis of the airstrike in which they stated that the success of the Israeli Air Force was contributed to the incredibly fast turn around time. "For aircraft striking the main Egyptian bases in the vicinity of the Canal the rotation would have been as follows:

Time to target: approx 22½ minutes.
Time spent over target: approx 7½ minutes.
Return to base: approx 20 minutes.
Ground turn around time: approx 7½ minutes.
Total: approx 57½ minutes." (14:263)

These statistics showed that the first wave of attackers were back over their targets within 1 hour. With three successive waves of attacks over Egyptian airfields, it was virtually impossible for the Egyptians to reorganize after the first strike.

After completing the destruction of the 10 major airfields, the Israeli pilots began the systematic destruction of Egyptian radar sites and SAM-2 missile sites. It was reported that all 23 Egyptian radar stations were destroyed, but only a limited number of the SAM-2 sites were damaged. (15:323) The fact that only a few SAM-2 missile sites were destroyed did not discourage the Israelis since it was determined that the air defense capability of the SAM-2 missiles was nil. (15:323)

Following the elimination of the Egyptian Air Force, the Israeli Air Force turned its attention to the air forces of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. These countries did not enter the war until 3 hours after the Israeli attack on Egypt. By then it was too late because these small air forces had to deal with the brunt of the Israeli airpower. (15:328)

The only serious air penetration over Israel by any of the Arab air forces came on 6 June when a lone Tu-16 bomber dropped three bombs on the town of Natanya in Israel. The pilot, an Iraqi colonel, thought that the town of Natanya was Tel Aviv. After completing his bomb run, the Iraqi colonel headed home but was met by heavy antiaircraft fire and downed near the Afula area in Israel. As a retaliatory measure against the Iraqi air attack, the Israeli Air Force staged an attack on the Iraqi Air Base at H-3 and destroyed most of the planes of the single Iraqi MIG-21 squadron. (See Appendix A) In conjunction with the raid, a strike was also made against a pumping station near the Jordanian border. Similar blows were dealt to Syria and Jordan. (15:329) ✓

By the end of the second day, only Israeli planes could be seen in the skies, and it was an undisputed fact that Israel was the ruler of the skies in the Middle East.

For a statistical review of the Israeli airstrike see Appendix B.

B. The Land War: Disposition of Israeli Forces.

The disposition of Israeli forces in the land war prior to 6 June 1967 consisted basically of slightly more than three divisions. One division was commanded by General Israel Tal and was composed of two brigades, mostly armor. Another was commanded by General Arik Sharon. It was made up of three mixed brigades of some armor, artillery, paratroop, and infantry units. The third division was led by General Avraham Yoffe and was activated at the end of May 1967. This division included two armored brigades and was composed entirely of reserve troops. (11:162) ✓

Including the separate armored brigades not mentioned previously, the Israelis had a total of 11 armored brigades at their disposal. In analyzing the deployment of these armored brigades, we find that six brigades plus two armored groups were utilized on the Egyptian front. (See Appendix C) Three brigades with one or two armored groups were deployed on the Jordanian front, and one brigade was allocated to the Syrian front. (15:331) ✓

The Israeli paratroop forces consisted of four brigades. Three of these were assigned to the Egyptian front, and one was deployed on the Jordanian front. (15:331)

The total frontline infantry strength of the Israeli forces was composed of about 10 infantry brigades. Four of these were assigned to the Egyptian front, five were sent to the Jordanian front, and one brigade to the Syrian front. (15:331) ✓

Prior to 6 June, the Israeli artillery strength embodied a dozen brigade equivalents. Of these 12 brigades, six were deployed on the Egyptian front, four were assigned to the Jordanian front, and two were sent to the Syrian front. (15:331) ✓

Accurate figures on the total number of tanks utilized on all fronts have not been released, but it can be assumed that about 650 tanks were assigned to the Egyptian front, 350 were allocated to the Jordanian front, and 100 were to be utilized on the Syrian front. The total number of fighting forces allocated for the three main battlefronts are as follows: 65,000 troops allocated for the Egyptian front, 50,000 allocated to the Jordanian front, and 25,000 allocated to the Syrian front. (15:331)

It has been stated by a few Israeli writers that some of the above-mentioned units were to be held in reserve until the results of the Israeli airstrikes were known. If the results of the airstrikes were favorable, then all of these units could be committed, and the task of strategic reserve could be given to the Israeli Air Force. (15:331) ✓

C. Israeli Forces: Advantages and Disadvantages.

1. Advantages.

a. From a personal interview between Lieutenant Colonel Aried Tuvia of the Israeli Defense Forces and this author, it was

ascertained that the Israelis had instituted a training program for their reserve units which would enable them to be ready to fight when called upon. This was the primary reason the Israelis were able to put an additional 120,000 men in the field in 3 days. (17)✓

b. The destruction of the Egyptian Air Force enabled a concentrated effort of tactical air support to Israeli ground troops.

c. The quality of the Israeli fighting men was far superior to that of the Egyptians. (11:170)✓

d. The administration of the Israeli Army was highly professional and flexible. (17:36)

e. The Israeli Army exhibited a high standard of equipment maintenance. (17:36)

2. Disadvantages.

a. The Israelis were surrounded on three sides by hostile forces.

b. The Israelis were equipped with various types of equipment which called for a complex logistic system. (14:365)✓

c. The Israeli forces were inferior numerically in strength of both men and equipment. (10:170)

D. The Land War: Disposition of Egyptian Forces.

Prior to 6 June 1967, the Egyptian regular army was estimated at 160,000 men. On the eve of the war, there was a concentration of 120,000 Egyptian troops deployed in Sinai. It is easily understood at this point that the largest portion of Egypt's strength was concentrated on one front and that a defeat of this force would mean defeat for the entire Egyptian regular army. (15:332)✓

Deployment of the various Egyptian divisions in the Sinai Peninsula was as follows:

The Palestinian Division, consisting of two brigades with tank and artillery support, was deployed in the Gaza Strip and was well entrenched in a network of fortified positions. (See Appendix C)

The 7th Division, composed of four infantry brigades and one artillery brigade with tank support, was deployed in the southwestern part of the Gaza Strip and the northeastern corner of Sinai. The positioning of this division controlled the northern axis into the Sinai Peninsula. The 7th Division's boundaries extended from Rafah to el Arish. It consisted of a series of heavily fortified positions. (See Appendix C)

The 2d Egyptian Division, encompassing two infantry brigades and two armored groups, was deployed in the area surrounding Abu Ageila and controlled the central axis route to the Sinai

Peninsula. This position was vital to the Egyptians because it controlled an important road junction in the Sinai. (See Appendix C) (15:334) ✓

The 6th Division contained four motorized infantry brigades, one armored brigade, and one artillery brigade. It was used to form a triangle in the area of Kuntila-Nakhl-Kusseima. The purpose of the triangular defense of this division was to protect the southern axis into the Sinai. (See Appendix C) (15:336) ✓

A mobile task force, commanded by General Shazli and consisting of one motorized commando brigade, one armored brigade, and one artillery brigade, was located in the center of the 6th Division's triangle. The mission of the mobile task force was to reinforce the division in defending the central and southern axes into the Sinai. (See Appendix C) (15:336)

The 3d Division was made up of three motorized infantry brigades, two armored brigades, and two artillery brigades. This division was concentrated to the west of the 7th and 2d Divisions in the general vicinity of Bir Hama. Their mission was to reinforce all of the divisions protecting the three main axes into the Sinai. (See Appendix A) (15:336)

The 4th Egyptian Armored Division, along with one motorized infantry brigade and one artillery brigade, was deployed westward of all other Egyptian divisions in the vicinity of Bir Gafgafa-Bir Thamada. (See Appendix C) (15:334-336) ✓

E. Egyptian Forces: Advantages and Disadvantages.

1. Advantages.

a. The Egyptian forces in the Sinai had strength superiority over the Israelis in both men and equipment. (11:170) ✓

b. Egyptian positions in the Sinai were constructed in three belts of defense which should have provided defense in depth. Strategic reserves were located in positions that could easily reinforce units defending the three main axes of the Sinai. (15:336)

c. Egyptian artillery was considered by experts to be superior to that of the Israelis. (11:170) ✓

2. Disadvantages.

a. The loss of the Egyptian Air Force during the first day of the war resulted in lack of tactical air support for ground forces.

b. There was a hasty and ill-prepared buildup of Egyptian troops in the Sinai prior to the 6-day war. (11:165)

c. The Egyptian Army was composed of soldiers who were highly emotional, easily excitable, and not susceptible to military training. (18:36)

d. Egyptian officers lacked flexibility and could not adjust to changing situations. (11:168) ✓

e. The standard of maintenance of equipment, especially tanks and airplanes, was extremely poor. (11:169)

f. The Egyptians depended on field telephones rather than radio for communications. Thus, failure of communications was inevitable. (11:170)

F. Israeli Offensive Strategy.

The code name for the offensive against the Arab armies by the Israelis was Operation Nachonim and was the sole work of General Itzhak Rabin. (5:86) Operation Nachonim consisted of three major phases. The first phase was to be a coordinated attack against Egypt's strongest defensive sectors. Secondly, an armored division was to outflank the Egyptians by using the tactic of bypassing the mountains east of the Suez Canal, thus, blocking the retreating Egyptians. The third phase was to be the systematic destruction of the Egyptian Army. (15:338-339) ✓

The first phase of Operation Nachonim was to be a coordinated attack by the divisions of Generals Tal and Sharon in coordination with an envelopment operation conducted by General Yoffe's division. The divisions of Generals Tal and Sharon were to attack the perimeters at Rafal and Abu Egeila, thus, placing restrictions on the Egyptians' ability to reinforce one another. In unison with the attacks of Generals Tal and Sharon, one-half of General Yoffe's division was to attack the Egyptians' second line of defense in the vicinity of Bir Rahfan, in order to destroy any reinforcements coming out of this area. The remaining half of General Yoffe's division was to follow up the penetration by General Sharon's forces in the Abu Egeila area. This tactic would mean that fresh troops would be in a position to destroy the second line of Egyptian defenses in the Jebel Libni area. General Tal's secondary mission after breaking through at Rafal was to fight his way to el Arish and turn south, thereby closing the envelopments of the Egyptians with the first half of General Yoffe's division at Bir Lahfen and with the second half at Jebel Libni. In coordination with the northern attacks, General Sharon would be completing the destruction of the Abu Egeila perimeter and preparing to attack the defensive network at Kusseima. The fall of Kusseima would mean complete destruction of the Kusseima triangle and the route of the Egyptian Army. (15:338) ✓

The second phase of the operation was highly flexible, since this phase depended on the outcome of the first phase. Basically, this phase centered on the total destruction of the second line of Egyptian defense and on the rush to the Suez Canal by Generals Tal and Yoffe to engage the Egyptian 4th Division. This move by Generals Tal and Yoffe would force redeployment of the Egyptian 6th Division and necessitate movement of General Shazli's force to avoid being trapped east of the passes. Upon redeployment of these Egyptian forces, General Sharon would move to the south to engage them while an armored brigade from Kuntilla would pursue the Egyptians and complete the envelopment of the remaining forces on the western Sinai. (15:338) ✓

The final phase of Operation Nachonim was to maneuver the remaining Egyptian armor units into a position in which they would have to fight and to destroy them. Also, the mopping up of pockets of resistance bypassed by advancing units would be completed. The ultimate aim of the war, the capture of Shaim el Sheikh, would be assigned to naval and airborne units and would be conducted as a separate operation. (15:339)

The tactical plan to deal with Jordan and Syria was to maintain a defensive posture on their fronts. Therefore, the greater part of the Israeli fighting forces could be deployed on the Egyptian front. This portion of the overall tactical plan was the only part that was changed to any degree, since the Israelis believed at the beginning of the war that Jordan and Syria would not pose a significant offensive threat. (15:358-360)

G. Egyptian Strategy.

At the outbreak of hostilities in the Sinai, the Egyptian forces were poised in an offensive and defensive role. (15:334)

The defensive strategy of the Egyptians consisted of three major defense lines plus a strategic reserve. (See Appendix C) This method of defensive employment could provide defense in depth and control of the three major axis routes into the Sinai. These positions contained elaborate fortifications of concrete bunkers, connecting trench lines, and numerous lanes of barbed wire entanglements interlaced with mine fields and backed by concentrated artillery and antitank weapons. The third line of Egyptian defense was in the areas controlled by the 4th Armored Division. This division was also used as the strategic reserve for the first two lines of defense. The overall Egyptian scheme of maneuver was to provide a system of defensive measures which could control an Israeli advance and mount a counteroffensive when needed. (15:334-336)

H. Conduct of Operation Nachonim.

In conjunction with the Israeli airstrikes on 5 June 1967, the Israeli land war began. (15:339)

* The first major objective of the war, assigned to General Tal, was to secure the area of Khan Yunis at the southern end of the Gaza Strip. This area was surrounded by the Rafah defense perimeter and consisted of trenches, pillboxes, artillery emplacements, barbed wire, and 8 miles of minefields on each side. After an artillery bombardment was fired on the city of Khan Yunis, Israeli tanks and infantry pushed forward and overran the city. Following the capture of Khan Yunis, General Tal moved his forces to the southwest in order to attack the main Egyptian perimeter at Rafah. The battle of Rafah was fought as an envelopment offensive, with one-half of General Tal's force making a frontal assault while the other half moved through the sand dunes and attacked the Egyptians from the flanks and rear. Even while the battle of Rafah was still in progress, a portion of General Tal's armor was breaking through at Al Giradi. By the end of the first day, the defenses at Rafah had been crushed, and Israeli troops were beginning their assault on el Arish. El Arish, which was to fall on 6 June, meant the total defeat and routing

of the 7th Egyptian Division. After the destruction of the Egyptian forces at el Arish, General Tal split his division. One portion of the division continued to advance westward along the northern axis of the Gaza Strip toward Qantara. The other part wheeled south, attacked, and overran the position at Bir Lahfan, thus, linking up with one-half of General Yoffe's division which was advancing from the south. (See Appendix C) (15:339-353)

While General Tal was overcoming resistance in the north and rushing toward el Arish, General Yoffe's division was advancing through the sand dunes with a twofold mission. One of General Yoffe's brigades, under the command of Colonel Issachar, was to assist General Sharon's division in attacking the Egyptian positions in the Abu Egeila area. The rest of the division was to advance toward Gebel Libni to intercept any reinforcements going to assist in the defense of el Arish and to link up with one-half of General Tal's division advancing south toward Jebel Libni. Shortly after this brigade reached the junction connecting Bir Lahfan, Abu Egeila, and el Arish, two Egyptian brigades appeared on the road to el Arish. In the night battle which followed, the two Egyptian brigades failed to break through and retreated before daylight, leaving 14 burning tanks on the battlefield. The split forces of Generals Yoffe and Tal joined on the following day outside of Bir Lahfan and marched south toward Jebel Libni which was to fall on 7 June. (Appendix C) (15:339-353)

The Abu Egeila offensive operation was given to General Sharon's division combined with the flanking brigade of General Yoffe's division. This Egyptian perimeter controlled the junction of roads which led to Ismaelia, el Arish, and Kusseima. Therefore, it was one of the most important objectives of the war and one of the most formidable entrenched perimeters the Egyptians had constructed. At 2245 hours, the attack on Abu Egeila began with a 20-minute artillery barrage followed by an air assault of Israeli paratroops into the Egyptians' rear, a frontal attack by Israeli armor and infantry, and a flanking attack by the second half of General Yoffe's division. After 20 hours of fighting, the Abu Egeila defensive perimeter was taken, resulting in the opening of the main axis to the Sinai and the destruction of over half of the Egyptian 2d Division. Thus, we find that by the morning of 7 June the situation was that General Yoffe had eliminated the opposition in the Jebel Libni position, rejoined his split forces, and was rushing to overcome the defensive at Bir Hassana. General Tal had overwhelmed the positions at el Arish and was advancing westward on two axes toward Bir Gafgafa and the Mitla Pass. (15:339-353)

After overrunning the positions at Abu Egelia, General Sharon's division was moving southwestward pursuing elements of the retreating 6th Division and Colonel Shazli's force, which was retreating along the southern axis. The first phase of Operation Nachonim had been successful with the destruction of the first and second defensive lines of the northeast triangle. The 7th, 2d, and 3d Egyptian Divisions had been completely routed, and the 6th Division and Colonel Shazli's task force had been compelled to retreat. (Appendix C) (15:339-353)

The second phase of the operation was to seal the fate for all the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. General Tal succeeded in the destruction of the positions at Bir Gafgafa and Qantara, thereby

eliminating the two escape routes in the north. The remaining escape routes, which consisted of the Gidi Pass and the Mitla Pass, were closed off by General Yoffe's forces. From the south, General Sharon was sweeping remaining Egyptian forces in front of him toward the Mitla Pass where they were intercepted by General Yoffe's troops and the Israeli Air Force. (Appendix C) (15:339-353)

The third and final phase of the operation called for the total destruction of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. This mission was carried out with the same precision as the first and second phases. General Tal raced toward the Suez Canal from the north. General Yoffe remained at the Gidi and Mitla Passes neutralizing the fleeing Egyptians. General Sharon completed his objective of pushing the retreating Egyptians into the Mitla Pass, where they were caught between him and General Yoffe. The destruction at the Mitla Pass was viewed by an observer who stated: "One 1.8-mile stretch of the Mitla Pass is so jammed with blackened Egyptian equipment that it is virtually impossible to get a vehicle through it. From a small rise, the scene resembles a huge junkyard. At one place in the pass there is a Soviet jeep-like vehicle. A truck is on top of it. On top of that there is another truck. On top of all three there is a Soviet tank that was apparently driven there by a frenzied driver trying to find some way through the bottleneck." (15:349) (Appendix C)

I. Results of the Operation.

Militarily, the 6-day conflict resulted in the complete devastation of the Egyptian armed forces. The swiftness of the Israeli forces broke the backs of the Egyptians' seven divisions located in the Sinai. The Egyptian battle casualties were approximately 10,000 troops, 1,500 officers, and 40 pilots. Another 5,000 soldiers and 500 officers were captured. At the beginning of the conflict, Egypt had approximately 1,000 tanks in the Sinai. Of these, 800 had been destroyed or captured intact by the Israelis. This loss in armor totaled about 60 percent of the entire armor force of the Egyptians. The Egyptian artillery loss was proportionately higher. The loss of equipment by the Egyptian forces amounted to 80 percent of the total equipment in the Egyptian Army. The Air Force shared a fate similar to that of the Army. The loss of Egyptian aircraft amounted to 299 of the original 431 aircraft owned by Egypt prior to the war. (15:324)

The most impressive capture made by the Israelis during the conflict was the seizure of a launching base for SA-2 ground-to-air missiles, which was discovered intact between Mitla and the Suez Canal. (2:154-155)

The Israeli losses in the 6-day war were not quite as staggering as those of the Egyptians. | The personnel losses were 275 officers and men killed and 800 wounded. || The total loss in equipment has not been published, except for the fact that the Israelis lost 61 tanks. In terms of aircraft lost, the total was 26, of which 19 were lost during the first 2 days of the conflict. (15:350 and 6:88)

In conclusion, it can be found that Israel accomplished 100 percent of its war objectives. It reopened the Strait of Tiran for shipping, destroyed two-thirds of the enemy, and captured the Sinai Peninsula. These deeds were accomplished by a force which was numerically inferior in both men and equipment. (15:349)

III. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

A. Egyptian Forces.

1. The principle mistake made by the Egyptians was their underestimation of the striking power of the Israeli Armed Forces.

2. Since the alert status of the Egyptian Armed Forces was slackened after the dawn hours, a successful air attack by the Israelis was accomplished. (15:321)

3. The buildup of troops in the Sinai was made with such haste that a complete state of confusion and administrative chaos was widespread throughout the Egyptian field forces. (11:163)

4. The mistake which proved fatal to the Egyptians in the Sinai was the overestimation by the Egyptian High Command of the quality of the officers and men and their state of readiness for war. (11:163)

B. Israeli Forces.

1. The tactics of surprise, speed, and maximum mobility used by the Israelis enabled them to achieve a quick victory.

2. The precise planning by the Israeli Command Staff provided the tactical strategy and state of readiness for men and equipment required to overcome the Egyptian forces.

3. The combination of mistakes made by the Egyptians, prior to and during the war, proved that a complete misunderstanding of the situation by the Egyptian High Command was dominant in Egypt. Their inability to change with the situation demonstrated the poor state of training and discipline in the Egyptian Armed Forces. It was found by the Egyptians that superior numerical forces was not enough to win a war.

The overwhelming victory accomplished by the Israelis proved that their armed forces were ready for action when the time came. The individual fighting man had been trained and was indoctrinated to the point that the ultimate in superb qualities were brought out when required. The high standard of maintenance necessary for a swift mobile force was demonstrated by the Israeli forces in their Sinai campaign. The opposite was true of the Egyptians whose equipment fell into the Israelis' hands because of its failure to operate efficiently.

The unrealistic view of tactics and military doctrine by the Egyptians established a vulnerability which the Israelis could use to their advantage. The military guidance provided by the Egyptian High Command proved that the command staff had no concept of what the military situation was in the Sinai prior to the war. This fatal mistake soon spelled doom for the Egyptian forces and provided a total victory for the Israelis in the Sinai.

IV. EFFECTS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I feel that Israel, after being placed in an untenable position, had no recourse but to strike. The aggressive acts of Israel's hostile neighbors made it quite clear that they were making plans for Israel's extermination.

The results of the 6-day war proved that a numerically inferior force, using precise planning, ingenuity, courage, and determination can successfully defeat a numerically superior force if that force does not have similar qualities. These superior qualities were shown by Israeli combatants, demonstrating that a self-determined nation, under a unified system, can overcome a precarious situation and reach its ultimate goal.

The devastating defeat of the Egyptians demonstrated the fact that although their forces were numerically superior, their training, tactics, and military discipline were totally inadequate. This implicates the necessity for thorough indoctrination of any armed force before engaging in hostilities.

The political and psychological effect of the Israeli victory has put Israel in a more favorable bargaining position with her Arab neighbors. It is felt that only through sincere negotiations and possible concessions by all concerned can a lasting peace settle over the Middle East.

These are my recommendations:


1. That all commanders involved in tactical planning be familiar with tactics used by the Israelis and Egyptians in the 6-day war so they will be able to benefit from the examples of the Egyptian mistakes and Israeli strategy.

2. That Israeli plans used for the training and alert of reservists be analyzed to determine if any portion would be applicable to the United States reserve program.

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APPENDIX A - Map "A" - Locations of Israeli Airstrikes



SOURCE: Bar-On, COL Mordechai, Israel Defense Forces, Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co., 1968.

APPENDIX B - Statistics of Egyptian Aircraft Losses


EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES

	Existing Before the War	Destroyed on Monday	Destroyed During Entire War
MIG-21's	163	90	100
SU-7's	55	12	14
MIG-19's	40	20	30
MIG-15/17's	100	75	95
Tu-16's	30	30	30
IL-28's	43	27	30

SOURCE: Table XXII (15:324)

In addition, 56 transport planes, 10 MI-6 helicopters, and seven MIL-4 helicopters were lost by the Egyptians. (15:323-324)

APPENDIX C - Map "B" Disposition of Israeli and Egyptian Forces Prior to 5 June 1967



-  - EGYPTIAN INFANTRY DIV.
-  - EGYPTIAN ARMORED DIV.
-  - ISRAELI DIV.




SOURCE: Bar-On, COL Mordechai, Israel Defense Forces, Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co., 1968.

MAP C

SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN
IN SINAI

APPENDIX D - Map "C" Graphic Representation of
Operation Nachonim



- LEGEND**
- ISRAEL FORCES
 - ENEMY FORCES
 - ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
 - DIVISION
 - BRIGADE
 - BATTALION
 - COMMAND HQ
 - AMBUSH/BLOCKING POSITK
 - HELICOPTER LANDINGS
 - CONCENTRATED TANK P

SOURCE: Bar-On, COL Mordechai, Israel Defense Forces,
Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co., 1968.

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