

Staff Department
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia

STUDENT MONOGRAPH
Advanced Infantry Officers Course
Class Nr. Two
1955-56

TITLE

COORDINATION IN COLUMN

Capt Robert D. McBride
Roster Nr 111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	2
INTRODUCTION	3
DISCUSSION	5
CONCLUSION	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21
ANNEX A	22
ANNEX B	23
ANNEX C	24

PREFACE

7 February 1956

The subject for this monograph did not come in a sudden flash of insight, as has been experienced by many authors. Rather, this all came about during a seven month period when I was serving as an instructor in the mountain camp of the Ranger Department, The Infantry School. This monograph, therefore, is respectfully dedicated to those unnamed students of the Ranger course who, because of their mistakes, made me walk many weary extra miles over the mountains of North Georgia in the snow and rain; and thereby gave birth to the ideas that form the subject of this paper.

The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author -- not necessarily that of The Infantry School or the Department of the Army.


Signature

INTRODUCTION

Almost everyone is familiar with the old parlor game that starts with one person whispering a message into the ear of the person next to him. The second person, in turn, whispers the same message to his neighbor, and so on, until finally the last person receives the message and recites it aloud to the group. The object being to show how quickly stories can become distorted when passed from one person to another.

A unit moving in column formation is in somewhat the same situation as are the participants in our parlor game. The commander of the column may have in mind a simple and logical sequence of events that he intends to follow. But when this sequence is transmitted to the column in the form of orders he may find that the results obtained therefrom may be somewhat different than planned. In many cases, the variance between the commander's orders and the unit's actions can be so great as to cause the failure of the mission.

It is the intent of this monograph to show how it is possible for a unit of company size or lower to radically deplete, or lose completely, its combat effectiveness through improper control and coordination while moving in a column formation. Since a company or platoon very seldom uses the column formation in an actual assault, any reduction in combat effectiveness while still moving in column can normally be assumed as having occurred prior to engagement in close combat. For a unit to lose its fighting potential before it has even engaged the enemy on the objective is to jeopardize the mission for no reason-- and forms a foundation for this monograph.

It was not until I had been commissioned almost five years that I finally realized how important it was for a small unit to have control of, and coordination within, its column movements if it was to execute its mission in the most effective manner. The full realization did not dawn on me until after I had returned from Korea and was serving as an instructor in the Ranger Department of The Infantry School. There,

while walking as an observer with the students on their patrol missions, I saw confusion and disorder occur time and again in the patrol columns -- and this in a training situation, where the only tangible enemy were the weather and terrain. Usually the cause for the confusion could be traced to a weak link in the chain; one man in the column who either did not know, or chose to ignore, his individual responsibilities with regard to control of the column.

It is hoped that this monograph will serve to refresh in the reader's mind the delineation of the responsibilities of both the leader and each individual in a properly coordinated column movement.

DISCUSSION

The word "coordination" appears somewhere almost daily in the career of an infantry officer. He reads it in field manuals, training circulars, operations reports and even monographs. He hears it in verbal orders, classroom lectures and informal discussions. In short, "coordination" becomes just another military term which is used a lot and practiced to a somewhat lesser degree. This is not to say that the word nor the act of coordination are in disrepute. On the contrary, coordination is essential at all levels. However, it seems to assume its greatest significance at higher echelons and is often disregarded at the small unit level. This is because coordination is normally thought of as occurring only between groups or units. This misconception should be discarded if we are to gain the full meaning and use of the word. Coordination begins with the individual soldier!!!

The purpose of coordination is to insure that all of the various agencies involved in an operation are working together toward the accomplishment of the mission; or, in trite terms, that the tails of the beast are wagging in unison. As one of the many "tails of the beast", the individual soldier is required to do his own coordination in combat. He accomplishes this verbally i.e. by talking to the men around him to tell them what he is doing or to relay information. He also coordinates visually by watching the men around him and insuring that his actions complement theirs. These simple actions by the rifleman are not usually considered under the heading of coordination, although by definition they fit the category.

S.L.A. Marshall states in Men Against Fire: "Squad unity comes to full cooperation between each man and his neighbor. There is no battle strength within the company or regiment except as it derives from this basic element within the smallest component" (4:127). The meaning of this statement is not changed if the word "coordination" is substituted for "cooperation" in the first sentence.

The officers and men of our army should be taught that the rifleman is as much responsible for coordination as the regimental commander. If the individual soldier learns and carries out his responsibilities with respect to coordination he will greatly enhance the execution of control by the chain of command; and the chances for success in battle are directly proportional to the measure of control.

The remainder of this discussion will be devoted to the citation of combat examples, which will bring out in detail the methods of control and coordination to be used in a column formation. Although applied specifically to the column, most of these methods apply equally as well to the other combat formations.

COMBAT EXAMPLE Nr. 1

At 0630 hours, 15 August 1950, a task force composed of three infantry regiments prepared to launch an attack in an effort to eject the North Koreans from a penetration they had gained in the Naktong sector of the Pusan perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to lead off the attack on the left flank of the task force zone in a column of companies, with Company A, 34th Infantry, in the lead.

The 1st Battalion's objective was a ridgeline a mile and a half long and approximately four hundred feet high. The Company A Commander summoned the 1st Platoon leader, outlined the plan of attack and designated the 1st Platoon to lead the company column.

Followed by the rest of the company, the 1st platoon moved to the southeast end of the ridge, formed into attack formation, and started up the ridge in a general northwest direction (Annex A). The platoon moved up the ridge line for about a quarter of the distance without any resistance. Then, two enemy machine guns, firing from the left, forced the platoon to the ground. When this happened the company commander ordered the 2d Platoon to pass through the stalled platoon and continue the attack.

The 2d Platoon was forced to the ground by enemy fire as they neared the 1st Platoon's positions. The leader of the 2d Platoon crawled

to a position beside the 1st Platoon leader who was lying on his stomach behind a Korean grave mound on the side of the hill. Just as the two platoon leaders had pinpointed the location of the two enemy machine guns holding up the advance, they were both wounded by the same bullet. The two officers immediately directed their platoons to open fire against the enemy guns. This forced the enemy to suspend fire and, under the leadership of the company commander, the attack moved forward along the ridge.

The attack moved forward steadily. Company A reached the first high peak at the southwestern end of the ridgeline at 0830 and stopped there to plan for the continuation of the attack. Beyond this point the crest of the ridge dipped slightly before rising again to the next peak. The next high point was a rocky cliff, about four hundred yards away, which lay across the long ridgeline and the direction of attack. In front of the point where the cliff joined the main ridgeline, there was a saddle on which several enemy soldiers were seen moving about. An enemy machine gun was located on top of the cliff itself.

The company commander pointed out the saddle in front of the cliff and told the platoon sergeant of the 2nd Platoon, who was now leading that platoon, to secure it. The 1st Platoon was assigned the mission of covering the movement of the 2nd Platoon by fire from an embankment on the high ground. Once the 2nd Platoon was in the saddle, the 3d Platoon would follow and reinforce it.

The 2d Platoon Sergeant lined up his four squads in the order they were to leave. He placed one of the squad leaders, a sergeant with considerable experience, at the end of the column to make certain that every man in the platoon moved out. The plan was for the platoon to move, in column, over the protective embankment and dash along the 100-yard-long ridge to the saddle.

At 0845 hours the first man jumped over the embankment and started running toward the objective. Three other men followed at fifteen-yard intervals, all of them running just below the crest of the ridge to

avoid enemy machine gun fire from the opposite (southwest) side of the ridge. As the fourth man left, the enemy gun on the cliff opened up and killed two men from the 1st Platoon. After that it became increasingly more difficult for each succeeding man to leap over the embankment and leave its comfortable protection.

But the rest of the platoon followed, each man about fifteen steps behind the man in front. No one was wounded until the next to last man rose to go and was struck by a burst from the North Korean gun. The sergeant bringing up the rear pulled him back, called the medics, and then, after notifying the leader of the 3d Platoon that he was the last man from the 2d, jumped over the embankment and ran.

All of this had taken no longer than five minutes. The last man had gone no more than a few steps when the lead man reached the saddle. As the members of the 2d Platoon reached the saddle, they formed a firing line along their side of the low ridge separating them from the enemy positions which were located some twenty yards away, on the opposite side of the saddle. Three or four men became casualties within a few minutes and slid down the slope a short distance to a protected area. The acting platoon leader and a medic moved to this position to care for the wounded.

At this point, the sergeant who had brought up the rear of the column arrived on the scene and took over the direction of the platoon which was now engaged in a bitter rifle and grenade battle with the North Koreans.

According to the plan, the 3d Platoon was to follow immediately after the 2d Platoon. The first man in the 3d Platoon column managed to reach the saddle. The next man, however, mistakenly turned left into another narrow ridge about two thirds of the way across. The remainder of the 3d Platoon followed this man and, as a result, became pinned down by such heavy enemy fire that it could move neither forward nor to the rear. Consequently, the entire 3d Platoon was lost to the remainder of the action.

The sergeant in the 2d Platoon continued to direct the fire of his men and attempted to cover the gaps that occurred as men became casualties. Several of the riflemen were already out of ammunition and, still unaware that the 3d Platoon was lost, it was obvious to the sergeant commanding the platoon that assistance would be needed to take the objective.

The battle continued to rage with ammunition running lower and more and more men becoming casualties. The platoon leader finally realized that his only course of action was to break contact and withdraw. He called down to the platoon sergeant in the gully to begin evacuating the wounded. The wounded started to move under cover of a draw between the two hills to a road at the bottom.

By 0932 the entire platoon had withdrawn to cover. Of the original 36 men in the 2d Platoon, only 10 were unharmed. Six wounded men reached the road. The remaining twenty men of the platoon were dead. The 1st Battalion's attack was discontinued and the men dug in to defend the ground they occupied (2:20).

ANALYSIS

In this situation is illustrated an extreme example of the use of the column formation. The movement of the 2d and 3d Platoons, from their covered position behind an embankment directly to the objective, could possibly be considered as a separate maneuver by each individual rather than by the unit as a whole. The fact, also, that the men were under enemy fire and had to move at a run adds to the uniqueness of this example. Nevertheless, from an overall viewpoint, it was a column movement, and the need for proper control was, if anything, intensified.

The 2nd Platoon, in spite of a breakdown in the chain of command, was able to make the move without too much delay or confusion. The credit for this belongs to the sergeant in the rear of the platoon column. He insured that the column kept moving over the embankment at the proper rate and with the correct distance between men.

The last man in a unit's column has two important functions of coordination: (1) to insure that every man in his own unit is moving, or

has moved out, along the designated route and (2) to coordinate with any unit to his rear on any facts that may effect the integrity of the entire column e.g. changes in direction or rate, halts, commencement of movement, etc. The sergeant in the 2d Platoon fulfilled his responsibilities, both with respect to his own platoon and to the 3d Platoon to his rear.

The fault for the breakdown in the two platoon column formation appears to lie entirely with the 3d Platoon, because they obviously had enough information to make the move to the saddle without further instructions. The first man in the platoon was able to reach the saddle with no difficulty. He either knew where the objective was or, as is more likely, was close enough to the man in front to follow him to the saddle.

Why did the remainder of the platoon fail to reach the objective? While waiting under cover in preparation for the move, the leaders had ample opportunity to brief their men on the mission. Since the saddle could be seen from their position, it would have been easy to point out, to some members of the platoon, the objective and the exact route to be followed. In spite of the fact that they were under enemy fire, an effort should have been made to have each man take a look at the objective. The more men in a column that know the route and final destination, the less likelihood there is of any large number becoming lost enroute. This apparent lack of effort to brief the men of the 3d Platoon is the most glaring error in the account and was a failure on the part of the leaders to carry out their responsibilities for control.

In the confusion of battle, however, it is possible for a man to become lost from a column even though he knows the route. The solution to this problem is maintaining contact with the man in front and to the rear. This will, at least, prevent the column from becoming separated. It probably would be expecting too much to say that the lead man in the 3d Platoon should have stopped running, while still under enemy observation, to insure that the man behind was following. The second man, therefore, was doubly obligated to maintain contact to his front. His failure to do this caused the loss of the 3d Platoon to the action and illustrates what can

result when a single man in a column fails in his responsibility for coordination.

COMBAT EXAMPLE Nr. 2

On 6 September 1950, the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment was given the mission of withdrawing from their positions and seizing Hill 465 and its adjoining high ground. The hill was located to the rear of their positions and had been occupied by North Koreans who had penetrated through gaps in the defensive line of the 1st Cavalry Division in an effort to seize the key terrain along the main avenue of approach to Taegu. The mission of seizing Hill 465 itself went to Company G. The rest of the battalion was to take the high ground south of Hill 465.

There was a light rain during the early morning hours of 6 September. The eighty men of George Company shivered in the rain and waited for the signal to move out. Soon after 0300 the column moved out with one platoon as the point, and another as the rear guard. The men moved cautiously knowing that the North Koreans were both in front of and behind them. Their movement was slow, also, because their heavy loads of ammunition and equipment made climbing of the steep and slippery slope very difficult. It was after 0800 when the company neared the top of Hill 465 (Annex B).

A short time later, the Company Commander and the 1st Platoon leader ran into the enemy while making a reconnaissance. An attempt was then made to assault the hill by the 2d Platoon with the 1st Platoon acting as base of fire. Several more attempts were made to seize the enemy positions during the day but all were unsuccessful.

At 1400 the Company Commander called battalion for help and was told that none was available. Instead, battalion ordered him to discontinue the frontal assault and issued him a new plan of attack. Company G was to wait until dark and then circle to the east side of the hill where they would join with the 1st Battalion and continue the attack against Hill 465 toward the west.

The company moved out in column to the north about 1900, following a steep rock gorge which gave them protection from small arms fire. Their

movement was slow and tedious (Annex C). It took several hours to move less than a mile. At one point they came under a volley of friendly artillery fire that resulted in one casualty. The company commander kept the column moving quietly and gave the order that there would be no firing under any circumstances in the hope that the North Koreans, who were all around them, would mistake the column for their own troops.

The column reached the bottom of the hill and then turned southeast along a trail for about a mile and a half. It was here that one man lost contact with the man ahead of him and the company became separated. Twenty men of the Weapons Platoon turned right along a trail that led back toward the east side of Hill 465. The remainder of the company, unaware of the split, continued on the correct route along the original trail to the east. Neither of the two groups realized for some time that the company had been split. When the company commander did learn that his advance guard was missing he decided to set up a perimeter defense and wait until after daylight to locate it.

When the Weapons Platoon leader discovered that his group was lost, he waited a short time, then decided to follow the trail they were on to reach the high ground. The twenty men moved haltingly along the uphill trail. They were carrying three wounded men in addition to a light machine gun and one mortar. Three times they encountered North Koreans in the dark but no one fired. Once it was necessary to halt the column to find five men who had fallen asleep during one of the halts. Two men from the end of the column crept back along the trail to look for them. Finally locating the sleeping men they awakened them and rejoined the column. It was now 0330 hours. Reaching a small flat area, the platoon leader halted the column to let the men rest. They crawled under their ponchos to light cigarettes and shortly the whole platoon was asleep.

In less than an hour it began to get light and the platoon leader awakened his men. They moved to the top of the hill where they saw that they were about three-quarters of a mile east of Hill 465. Investigating further they found freshly dug positions, some of which were covered with

brush and appeared to be occupied. This was found to be the case, so a skirmish line was formed to sweep the ridge. In short order they killed 12 North Koreans and captured 3 prisoners.

In his perimeter at the base of the hill, the Company Commander heard the firefight on the ridge. Since his position was poorly situated for defense, he decided to attack in the direction of the firing, which he assumed came from the Weapons Platoon. At 0800 hours the two elements of the company were consolidated.

That afternoon the company rejoined the rest of the battalion after having been out of contact for almost twenty hours (2:39).

ANALYSIS

This action typifies the type of problem most frequently confronted in a column movement i.e. movement at night, over rough terrain.

The problems of control in night operations arise again and again both in training and in combat. In spite of the increased emphasis now being placed on night training, the American soldier is still "groping in the dark", so to speak. Darkness has become the nemesis of the U.S. Army, and it appears that it will be ever thus.

Taking all the factors into consideration, Company G did surprisingly well in this situation. Any success they achieved, however, was in spite of their mistakes rather than due to a lack of them. The fact that the company was evidently blessed with better than average leadership was undoubtedly their saving grace.

The control exerted by the company commander during the movement down the rock gorge was exemplary. He insured that the column kept closed up and maintained a steady rate of movement---both of which are essential if a column is to make any progress at all during a night march. The technique of having each man hold on to the man in front to prevent anyone becoming lost is a good one and was necessary in this instance.(Annex C).

The fact that the column split and the forward element became lost while moving on the trail was due to a breakdown in individual coordination rather than in the control efforts of the chain of command. Two

men in the column failed to keep contact; one to his front and the other to his rear. As a result the column became split between these two men. In a column movement the soldier's responsibility for contact to his front somewhat outweighs that to his rear. This is especially true when the visibility is limited to a few feet. Therefore, the majority of the blame for the break in column, in this instance, can be placed squarely on the second of the above two men.

The incident of the five men falling asleep and failing to move out with the Weapons Platoon column was not an unusual one. Often men will become so fatigued that they will literally march in their sleep. When this occurs it falls upon the leader to continually exert his drive upon the men to keep moving and keep in contact. The commander cannot allow himself to become enveloped by his own fatigue, or he will lose all semblance of a column.

When moving out after a halt, the word should be passed down the line; then, to insure that all men are on their feet and prepared to move, a verbal count-off from the rear should be passed to the head of the column. This will insure that all men are accounted for prior to movement and will preclude the necessity later of searching for someone left behind.

The individual soldier is not excused from his responsibility in this instance. Each man must be sure that the men to his front and rear have fallen in before the column moves out. Any man seen to be falling asleep on the march should be prodded awake by his neighbor.

COMBAT EXAMPLE Nr. 3

On 14 February 1951, the 5th Cavalry Regiment was ordered to attack North along the road to Chipyong-ni, Korea -- a distance of fifteen miles. Their mission was to clear the route of enemy and join the 23d Regimental Combat Team which was surrounded by the Chinese at Chipyong-ni.

The 5th Cavalry, with attached tanks and artillery, moved out in column after dark on 14 February. About midnight the column halted at a destroyed bridge about half of the distance to Chipyong-ni and formed

a defensive perimeter for the night.

The 1st Battalion jumped off on foot at daylight to seize a critical terrain feature on the right of the road. The battalion engaged the enemy after moving only two hundred yards. The regimental commander then committed the 2d Battalion in an attack up the left side of the road. The Chinese resistance was firm, and soon a full scale regimental attack was in progress.

The advance lagged throughout the morning and the regimental commander finally decided that the enemy opposition was too strong for the infantry battalions to be able to reach Chipyong-ni by dusk. He therefore made the decision to use an armored task force to penetrate the enemy-held territory. All of the tanks - twenty-three in number - were pulled from the regimental column to form the task force. Company L, 5th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to accompany the tanks in order to protect them from enemy attempts to knock out the tanks at close range. The infantrymen were to ride on top of the tanks.

While the regimental commander reconnoitered the road to Chipyong-ni by helicopter, the commander of the tanks and the Company L commander worked out the plans at company level. They agreed that when the tanks stopped, the infantry would dismount and deploy on both sides of the road to protect the tanks. When the tank column was ready to proceed, the commander of the tanks would notify his tankers by radio; the tankers, in turn, would signal the infantrymen to remount.

At 1500 hours the 160 men of Company L mounted on the tanks. The infantry platoon leaders appointed one man on each tank to fire the caliber .50 machine gun mounted on the deck. The company commander issued instructions that any men becoming separated from the tank column were to make their way back to friendly lines if possible, or to wait near the road to be picked up later.

It was 1545 hours when the task force moved out, proceeding along the road with fifty-yard intervals between tanks. The column had moved about two miles when, suddenly, the tanks came under heavy enemy mortar

and machine gun fire. The lead tank stopped, and the entire column came to a halt. The tankers turned their guns on the Chinese and opened fire while the infantrymen dismounted to seek cover. Several members of Company L were wounded and either fell or were knocked from the tanks.

The regimental commander directed the fire. After a few minutes, realizing his best chance for success lay in keeping the tanks moving, he ordered the column to continue.

The tanks moved forward without warning and the dispersed infantrymen were forced to race to scramble aboard. In the confusion, thirty or more men, including two officers of Company L, were left behind. Later, they organized and returned to their own lines.

A short time later, the column again came to a halt and the infantrymen deployed once more -- some moved 50 to 75 yards off the road. The tanks and infantry fired furiously in an effort to keep the Chinese at long range. Once again the tanks began moving without notifying the scattered riflemen, and again many men from Company L were unable to remount. Less than 70 men were left on the tanks when the task force moved out after this second halt. Over 50 men were left on the side of the road, with no alternative but to seek friendly lines of foot. Several men from this group later became prisoners of the Chinese.

There were several more brief halts during the remaining three miles. The column was under almost continuous enemy fire whether halted or on the move. Many more infantrymen became casualties along the route and either fell or were knocked from the tanks.

At 1700 hours the task force entered the Chipyeong-ni perimeter and joined forces with the 23d RCT. Of the 160 infantrymen who had started out riding the tanks, only 23 remained; and of these, 13 were wounded. (2:134).

ANALYSIS

This example has been injected into the discussion to show that the necessity for coordination is not just confined to foot columns. Coordination in a tank-infantry column is more than a mere SOP function-- it is the keynote for success.

By the time the task force column reached its objective, Company L had lost 85 per cent of its fighting strength; Whereas the tanks had sustained comparatively minor losses. The fact that infantry was not required for this mission is evident, but not relevant to this discussion.

The commander of the tanks and the Company L commander obviously anticipated the necessity for coordination in the move to Chipyeong-ni. They made adequate plans to assure that the infantrymen would remount each time the tanks moved out. Why these plans were not executed is too vague to be pinpointed. Perhaps the task force commander was too headstrong and became carried away in his effort to keep the column moving at all costs. However, it would appear that all concerned would have learned their lesson after the infantrymen were left behind at the first halt.

It would have delayed the column only a few moments to have each tank wait until the riflemen were on board. Just a few words exchanged between the commander of each tank and the ranking infantryman on board would have been enough to coordinate the movement.

This example indicates plainly that the tankers and infantrymen of our army are not fully aware of each others problems and of the absolute requirement for continuous coordination between the two if they are to work together effectively.

FINAL DISCUSSION

In each of the preceding examples, an infantry unit was reduced in combat effectiveness due, in some portion, to poor column control and, in every instance, to a lack of coordination between the individuals in the column. As stated before, individual coordination is an integral part of the overall control.

The commander can take many measures to aid in his control of a column. One of these, as stated earlier, is to keep the individual soldier well informed. If each man knows the route, various check-points, and final destination of the column, his chances of becoming lost are greatly decreased.

The Chinese Communists make it a practice to brief as many subordinates as possible on details of an operation. As a result, their army exerts good control over their column movements. They must, of course, do this as a matter of necessity due to lack of communications (6:177).

Radio is another means the commander can use to control his column. Constant coordination can be maintained between elements of a column via the AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10. These should not be relied on too heavily, however, for obvious reasons.

Measures should be taken by the commander to assure that the column moves at a sustained rate of march. If the rate is too fast the column will be strung out and men may become lost. On the other hand, too slow a rate will allow men to bunch up and also cause undue fatigue for the effort exerted. The column's rate of march is usually peculiar to the type of terrain over which the column is moving. The optimum rate can only be determined through experience. Once this optimum rate has been established, it should not be speeded up or slowed down to any great extent.

Patrols in Korea were taught to move at the same rate regardless of terrain. The rate was based on the most difficult type of terrain that would be encountered. Once this rate was established, the patrols moved at the same rate even on terrain that would allow faster speeds (7:89). There are certain variables, of course, that will always effect the rate at different times i.e. the amount of equipment carried, the visibility, and the condition of the troops.

The use of the compass as an aid to column movement cannot be over emphasized. Too often faith is placed in only one man's ability to use a compass -- and he is normally found at the point of the column. Every man down to the lowliest ammo bearer should be well grounded in the use of a compass. The commander can appoint certain men at different positions in the column to intermittently use their compasses to double check the column's direction of movement. The more men checking in this manner the sooner a wrong turn in direction will be discovered.

Any measure for control taken by the commander can become invalid if the individuals in column do not function properly. Each man must be taught that he has a responsibility for coordination. A successful column movement entails much more than just "lifting them up and putting them down."

CONCLUSION


Two major conclusions have been derived from the foregoing discussion. First, and most important, is that there must be coordination between the individual soldiers in a column formation if proper control is to be maintained.

And, secondly, that improper control and coordination while moving in column can cause the reduction of a unit's combat effectiveness as efficiently as can the enemy's bullets.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. FM 7-10. Rifle Company Infantry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1949).
2. Gugeler, R.A., Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954). DS917.79
.093 bU
3. Lindeman, Arthur H. Jr., Capt, Inf., interviewed at Fort Benning, 6 February 1956, summary attached as Annex G.
4. Marshall, S.L.A., Men Against Fire (New York, N.Y.: William Morrow & Co., 1947). UB210
.M35 bU
5. Marshall, S.L.A., Report ORO-R-13. Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, October, 1952).
6. Rigg, R.B., Red China's Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., October, 1951).
7. Toth, G.G., "More on Patrol Support", The Infantry School Quarterly, Vol 44: pp 86-89, July 1954.

ANNEX A (Route of Company A, 34th Infantry - 15 August 1950)



ANNEX B (Route of Company G, 7th Cavalry Regiment - 6 September 1950)



ANNEX C (Statement by Capt Arthur H. Lindeman, Jr., 6 Feb 1956)

I was the platoon leader of 2d Platoon, Company G, 7th Cavalry Regiment during the period 5 - 8 September 1950.

On the night of 6 September, Company G withdrew from positions near the top of Hill 465. The night was overcast and visibility was almost nil. The company column followed a route down a steep, shale gorge to the bottom of Hill 465. Because of the rugged terrain and the poor visibility, each man in the column had to physically hold on to the man to his front in order to keep the column together and to insure control.

Arthur H. Lindeman, Jr.
Arthur H. Lindeman, Jr.
Captain, Infantry