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**WHAT SHOULD BE THE ANTI-GUERRILLA
WARFARE DOCTRINE FOR THE BATTLE GROUP?**

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PREFACE

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The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author-
not necessarily that of the United States Army Infantry School or the
United States Army.

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INTRODUCTION

This treatise will discuss the anti-guerrilla warfare doctrine, where this doctrine is initiated and the active and passive measures to be incorporated into the composition of this doctrine.

"The term guerrilla warfare is used loosely to describe all kinds of irregular warfare. It is generally associated with broad movements that may be briefly described as:

1. A people's war or revolution against existing authority.
2. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by an external power) to bring about a change in the social political order of a country without engaging in a formal, declared war.
3. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized forces as a phase of a normal war.
4. Operation, generally of a short duration, conducted by detached regular forces in the enemy rear areas." (7:2)

The definition in 3 above will be dealt with primarily. Number 1 and 2 above were not considered as being applicable to the Battle Group. The definition in 4 above was considered to be applicable to the Battle Group as pertains to infiltration or penetration and to be dealt with in that light.

Note is made of the limited amount of research material available. There are numerous articles, FMs, and books on guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare but very little on the doctrine.

DISCUSSION

Who is to say what the next war will be? It might be similar to wars and conflicts of the past and it might be so radically different that tactics and theories of the past will have to be abandoned or modified. Instead of waiting and using the trial and error method, many principles and doctrines can be determined in the interim and put into effect. True, these doctrines are subject to change and may be outmoded before they are firmly seated, but this is the purpose of a regular army; to determine principles and try them in field training problems etc., and arrive at procedures that are tested, short of combat, for the military to use in combat, should the need arise.

Highly mobile shock units used in conjunction with atomic firepower support might well be given missions of hitting hard and quick the vital areas with little or no concern to occupying and holding large land masses. The use of atomics will necessitate greater dispersion and occupation of strong points. This dispersion, as a precaution to vulnerability as lucrative targets, will offer more and better targets for guerrilla type warfare. Any participant who fails to recognize the importance of guerrilla warfare, both actively and passively, may suffer severe losses and/ or defeat.

The occupation of strong points, leaves vast areas uncontrolled and ideally suited for guerrilla strongholds. "Anti-guerrilla operations, to be successful, must be based on a broad, realistic plan that coordinates not only the political, administrative, and military phases of the operation, but also the activities of adjacent areas and anti-guerrilla commands." (7:32)

Guerrillas are highly dependent upon the support of the civilian population for food, water, shelter, protection from detection, and

quite often intelligence. There must be a clear and definite attitude toward the civilian supporters by the commander concerned.

Before delving too deeply into the anti-guerrilla tactics, the broad aims of guerrilla strategy might be defined into five general purposes:

1. "To capitalize on the enemy's inability to defend himself and his important installations at all places at all times by making use of surprise, mobility, deception, evasiveness, and concentration of forces.
2. To inflict casualties upon his troops.
3. To cause damage to his supplies and installations and delay to his operation.
4. To lower his morale and prestige.
5. To maintain (or destroy) the morale and the will to resist of the population." (7:8)

"To prevent, minimize or combat guerrilla warfare, doctrine is formulated and plans developed for a specific area threatened by a guerrilla menace. This doctrine based on a detailed analysis of the country, the national characteristics, and the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people, must be realistic." (7:36)

In many areas a friendly guerrilla force may be developed if a sympathetic movement is organized and exploited to the fullest extent. This is conversely true in that a poor plan may arouse the hatred of the people into a hostile guerrilla band. This was vividly displayed in World War II by the German treatment of the occupied Russian people. Some of these people even welcomed the occupation until the Germans either by ignoring the civilian problems or through the use of unnecessary force angered the populace into hostile guerrillas. (5:36)

"Our National Government is responsible for formulating doctrine and policy toward foreign countries. The President of the United States administers our national doctrine and policy through the various governmental agencies. After hostilities break out, our national aims and policies to be imposed on occupied or liberated countries are administered through the Secretary of the Defense. When a theater of operations is organized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the Secretary of the Defense, specify the mission and responsibilities of the theater commander. Responsibility remains with the highest echelon of command to anticipate, detect and evaluate a guerrilla menace, and to insure understanding of policies and uniformity of action against a dissident populace and hostile guerrilla forces." (7:37)

In combatting guerrillas there are no key words or quick solutions. The military principles hold true but quite often as previously mentioned have to be modified. It is desirable to destroy the guerrilla. This is facilitated by isolating him from all the civilian support, and preventing reinforcements or resupply from his allied forces. Isolating the guerrilla from the civilians includes winning the populace through propaganda, and keeping him occupied and provided with the basic needs of food, shelter, clothing and protection." (6:74) "In every country under military occupation there are people in all walks of life whose ardent desire is the return of peace and normalcy." (5:36)

When a commander moves into an area he follows the normal sequence of establishing security and administrative control. Military government is established. The economic, political, and war aims are clearly publicized. Bold, aggressive action is initiated and continue against the guerrillas, their command and logistics.

Guerrillas are most vulnerable in supply of food, arms, ammunition, morale and leadership. Their security is poor during darkness and inclement weather. Control of anti-guerrilla units must be retained at high levels and extensive coordination of lower and adjacent units is necessary. It is of little value for a command in one area to carry out vigorous anti-guerrilla operations and the adjacent unit exercise only passive measures. The guerrillas will merely cross the boundary and wait for the danger to subside or be diverted, and then return. (2:31)

The quantity and quality of troops employed to combat guerrilla is important not only from a military viewpoint but a political one as well. During World War II the Germans used second-rate poorly-equipped troops against the Soviet partisans. These forces often became the laughing-stock of the populace. (5:34)

The estimate of the situation, knowledge of the terrain, and a thorough reconnaissance are of paramount importance and are not accomplished with a single patrol or a pair of binoculars alone. Without these, any expedition into a guerrilla infested area can be no more than a plunge in the dark and will lead to excessive losses in men and equipment.

Other items of grave importance are up to date maps and photos which cover the areas of known or suspected guerrilla activity. Only when the anti-guerrilla forces' knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the guerrillas' can success derive.

Anti-guerrilla tactics also requires the use of interpreters. The natives will have much knowledge concerning the whereabouts, frequency of guerrilla raids, and the language, but a unit is handicapped if forced to rely upon natives for this information. Therefore,

the need exists for intelligence, counterintelligence, and interpreter personnel.

Typical guerrilla actions operate at great speed and surprise. They appear, complete their mission, and withdraw. Once they have disappeared, it is practically impossible to pick up their trail. This guerrilla characteristic requires the anti-guerrilla forces to be rapid also, in their pursuit. This mobility might be accomplished in one or a combination of several ways. One is the use of standby mechanized troops (APC); this unit would be of such magnitude as to deplete the front line units, and still be unable to cover the entire sector, for not only does the guerrilla hit fast, but will normally strike in several places at once. "In World War II, during a main German attack, the main line of a railroad that had to handle the supplies for three German armies was blasted by Russian partisans at two thousand points in a single night and was so effectively disrupted that all traffic was stalled for several days."(4:106) The use of helicopters is probably the fastest means of transporting troops to the scene and in pursuit of the guerrillas. Again, one might say the requirement would still be high as to the number of troops required. The thought is, that these helicopter borne troops would be better equipped to continue pursuit and accomplish defeat in detail. Also, the cross-country capability would enable these forces to be responsible for a much larger sector or area. This large sector of responsibility will entail the employment of good reliable communication. It is virtually impossible to combat guerrillas or any other force without communication. In guerrilla dense areas, the communication equipment might be supplemented over and above the standard allowances. Through the use of a quick-call (direct if

possible) to the anti-guerrilla units, troops are dispatched by helicopters and might be able to arrive at the scene before the guerrillas have a chance to pull their disappearance act.

Constant use of both the helicopter and the liason aircraft is important for the surveillance of areas that are suspected or known to be infested with guerrillas. Special aerial photos of these areas might reveal well camouflaged guerrilla strongholds, or location of areas suitable for air-drops. Barring other priority missions, the use of radar, TV, and/or infra-red will facilitate the location of strongholds or confirm suspected locations.

Communications play a vital role in guerrilla warfare. It is essential for transmitting information and requesting resupply. Therefore, counter-communication is equally important in anti-guerrilla warfare. Emphasis is placed on monitoring and locating guerrilla radios. Communication personnel can also jam guerrilla channels, and well trained operators can enter guerrilla net(s), obtain information and/or mislead the guerrilla forces.

A guerrilla menace should be countered at the earliest possible time by aggressive action. Security measures alone, allow the guerrilla opportunity to unify, train, and develop coordination and logistical support. Successful offensive action forces the guerrilla to devote most of his time and effort to self-preservation. It is rather hard to attack while defending with the same forces. This is especially true for the guerrilla whose attacking ability rests in his surprise and not numbers. Placing the guerrilla on the defense or on the run, has a tendency to lower his morale and disrupt the command structure, communications, and supply system(s).

The purpose of offensive action is the destruction of the

guerrilla forces. Continuous pressure is maintained against the guerrilla, keeping him on the move, disrupting his security and organization. Never allow him to recoup his losses. Do not allow him to "coil for the strike" or fight where he desire to defend. Surprise is the key in all anti-guerrilla operations. It often requires the use of unorthodox methods. Extreme caution is exercised in the planning, preparation and execution of operations to prevent the guerrilla from receiving any advanced warning. This involves the avoidance of sudden changes in location of troops and supplies, and may require the quarantine of villages by guards to prevent the civilian supporters of the guerrillas from giving warning.

To achieve this surprise and to counter the mobility of the guerrilla the anti-guerrilla unit must possess greater mobility, and communication. The commander will develop this mobility and communication through initiative, improvisation, and aggressiveness.

There are generally three forms of offensive action against guerrillas. These forms are encirclement, attack, and pursuit. These forms of offensive action will not be discussed further but can be found in any of the guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare manuals.

It may often be advisable or even necessary to organize and utilize anti-guerrilla units. These units are organized, equipped, and trained to combat guerrilla forces by using guerrilla methods. They are an effective means of carrying on offensive action with relatively small forces. This unit requires special skills and above all, teamwork. They must be thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the habits of the hostile guerrillas. This unit is also capable of conducting missions of reconnaissance, security, and destruction of

guerrilla forces.

The anti-guerrilla units may be given detailed missions but normally are given broad missions and areas of operations. They are not limited by boundaries and operate in the area the hostile guerrilla unit(s) operate.

"Personnel, that constitute an anti-guerrilla unit, are selected, preferably from volunteers, who are best qualified. They require intelligence, self confidence and physical stamina. Hunters, trappers and combat seasoned veterans are particularly well suited. Their ability to work harmoniously within the group is more important than their individual inherent or acquired assets. Units must be organized that will operate without friction for prolonged periods of time under unusual strain. Specialists and technicians for communication, medical, demolition, and interpreter needs are included in each team. Once the unit is organized, it lives, trains, and operates as a team."(7:64)

There are many variables to consider in the organization of an anti-guerrilla unit. Some of these are the terrain, climate, radius of operation, resupply, mission, hostile, guerrilla menace, and the supporting units. A typical organization is shown in Annex A. To facilitate cross-country mobility, concealment, and resupply, the strength of the unit is kept to a minimum.

The training of an anti-guerrilla unit will vary, as with the organization, to meet the special conditions of the area. Many subjects are common to any anti-guerrilla unit. Some of the Subjects are shown in Annex B.

Mention should be made of some of the factors to be considered in anti-guerrilla operations. The Troops employed will require special consideration and command attention. Morale of these personnel is a serious problem. This is due to the isolation of their

operation and the grueling tasks of trying to route and destroy an unseen and often invisible enemy. It requires they be on the go continuously for days without even the comforts normally afforded a TO&E unit. Resupply is extremely difficult but facilitated to some extent by the use of Army aircraft and improved communications in areas where hostile air and anti-aircraft do not exist. Aerial resupply and evacuation (a big morale factor) are further hampered by the frequent changing of position of anti-guerrilla units and the effects of weather.

These anti-guerrilla units also lack the support of automatic weapons of the TO&E unit. The requirement for cross-country mobility renders these weapons too much of a luxury. Also, the support of armor is quite often impossible due to the inaccessible terrain in which these operations are conducted. Artillery cannot always support for many and varied reasons; lack of observers in the area of operation, (this can be supplemented by members of the anti-guerrilla unit), confinement of the area, indefinite location of the enemy, close proximity of friendly troops, range of the weapons, etc. Artillery and armor principles of employment may be modified to allow limited support.

Close air-ground support is very effective. Tactical air control parties (TACP) in liaison aircraft with UHF and HF radio equipment communicate with ground parties (HF) for targets and guide the close support aircraft (UHF) in on the target.

So far, only the active measures have been discussed. There are equally as many passive measures. Many of these might well be covered in other separate SOP's but it is felt they merit mention under one title, "Passive Anti-Guerrilla Measures."

The first of these is security, to include; troops; installations, both front and rear; supply discipline; lines of communication; troop convoys; and supply convoys. Each of these will be discussed separately from the standpoint of some of the security measures to be taken. The degree of ingenuity of the commander concerned will determine the success of his security.

1. Troop security should be emphasized by all commanders. Personnel who have not experienced guerrilla raids are not cognizant of the danger that exists. This is especially true in rear areas, where personnel have a tendency to drop their guard. In World War II the Germans utilized all their personnel, in that troops going on leave, transferring etc. carried their weapons and acted as security on the transportation means they were utilizing. (5:28)

2. Installation as discussed here is intended to mean any unit outpost, security post, listening post, ammo dump, etc. These are most susceptible to guerrilla attacks because of their relative small size and physical separation from other units. Personnel should be capable of self-preservation and conducting their own defense against small guerrilla attacks. Command guidance and supervision is given to these units in reference to physical obstacles like mines, wire, alarms, illumination, searchlights, patrols, scout dogs, and all around defense.

3. Supply discipline is instilled in every soldier. It should be pointed out that lost or stolen equipment might very well turn up in the hands of the guerrillas to be used against them.

4. Long lines of communication are difficult to secure from guerrilla attacks without the use of a large number of personnel, which cannot always be spared. "Railway installations and rail

traffic are secured by establishing defined areas of responsibility from theater command down through subordinate commands like army, communications zone, and area commands. Standard operating procedures, to include security measures, are announced by theater directives. (3:89) Bridges, tunnels and underpasses are handled in the same manner as installations in 2 above.

5. Convoys are very susceptible to guerrilla ambushes. Even troop convoys are vulnerable without convoy security detachments.

a. An armored infantry unit is highly suited for a security detachment. A possible formation using such a unit is shown in Annex C. A security detachment is divided into two elements; a holding element, and an attacking element. The security detachment might also include medical personnel and engineers, depending upon the size of the convoy, distance to travel, and the imminent threat of guerrillas.

b. Reconnaissance aircraft may be used with convoys, with or without a security detachment. They are highly beneficial for their communication, visibility, and capability of calling and directing close support aircraft and artillery fire.

c. All convoys are thoroughly briefed to include all personnel. Each and every man knows exactly what he is to do and when. Contrary to general opinion, convoy speed is kept slow (10 to 15 mph) in suspected areas. This facilitates the stopping and unloading of personnel. Drivers stop their vehicles in the tracks of the front vehicle with no attempt to pull to the shoulder for these areas frequently will be mined. Automatic weapons will fire continuously to the flanks, commencing fire upon the order of the convoy commander, in areas of likely ambush. Once hit, the troops detruck and fire

at likely targets. The security detachment commander issues orders placing one of the prearranged attacks into effect, preferably an envelopment. (3:95)

d. When a security detachment does not accompany the convoy, part of the available troops are placed well forward in the convoy and a strong detachment in a vehicle(s) that follows the main body by about three minutes. Conversely, with par. c above, a fairly fast speed is maintained. Areas precluding fast speeds are reconnoitered by foot troops. Granted this slows the convoys but gives a better assurance of getting the convoy to its destination. Vehicles damaged by mines will move to the shoulders if possible, to allow the remaining vehicles to pass. Troops from the disabled vehicles will return the fire. Once clear, the ambush area, troops will dismount and attack back. The rear guard, by means of radio contact with the main body, will dismount and attack the flank of the guerrilla force. Both attacking forces exercise extreme caution to preclude firing upon one another.

"The dispersion of units in counter-guerrilla operations places a strain on communication facilities throughout a command. The greatest difficulties are in the lower echelons. Operations are expanded throughout all echelons and this increases the communication requirements. Local facilities are fully utilized to help expand the communications nets. These facilities, however, are not reliable. They are not only extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attacks but are exposed to use by the guerrillas. Radio is the most flexible of the communication means. Special consideration is given to the need for additional and special communication equipment. (3:36)

All personnel of the army receive some training that is beneficial

in anti-guerrilla warfare. The training received in Infantry tank teams, night attacks, raids, marches etc, plus 4 hours on Anti-infiltration and anti-guerrilla warfare must be incorporated into the commanders concept and decisions. The individual soldier must be reminded (retrained if necessary) of the techniques he knows and shown how to apply them in various situations.

CONCLUSION

It is the conclusion of the author that the future battlefield will consist of great dispersion between units and these units will be very susceptible to guerrilla warfare. The anti-guerrilla doctrine must be based on a broad realistic plan incorporating the political, administrative, and military phases of operation, in all areas and commands. The doctrine requires a detailed analysis of the country, the national characteristics, and the customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people.


"Our National Government is responsible for formulating the doctrine and policy toward foreign countries....After hostilities break out, our national aims and policies are administered through the Secretary of the Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the theater commanders....Responsibility remains with the highest echelon of command to anticipate, detect, and evaluate a guerrilla menace, and to insure understanding of policies and uniformity of action against a dissident populace and hostile guerrilla forces."

Control of anti-guerrilla units must be retained at high levels to insure that the guerrilla is uniformly pressured in all areas. The requirements of mobility, maps and photos, communication equipment and personnel, intelligence and interpreter personnel cannot be furnished at Battle Group level. It is further concluded that this anti-guerrilla unit(s) will be organized no lower than Division level.

The Battle Group will conduct primarily passive anti-guerrilla measures, using the offense against a known force in its area by independent action and reinforcing or supplementing the anti-guerrilla

unit. The passive measures will be SOP for the Battle Group to include the security of troops, installations, convoys, lines of communications, and emphasis on supply discipline.

ANNEX A-(Typical organization of a special anti-guerrilla unit)



- Hq: 1 COMDR
 1 PLAT SGT
 1 PLAT SGT ASST
 1 RADIO OPR
 1 RADIO OPR ASST
 1 MED NCO
 1 MED NCO ASST
 2 MSGR -----
 SUPPLY DETAIL --
 NATIVE GUIDES &
INTERPRETTERS
 2 SMG CAL .45
 7 CBN CAL .30

- Sqd: 1 LDR
 1 LDR ASST
 1 RMAN AUTO
 1 RMAN AUTO ASST
 5 RMEN -----
 1 RIFLE AUTO
 1 SMG CAL .45
 7 CBN CAL .30

ANNEX B - (Anti-guerrilla training subjects)

Field craft (adapted to the terrain and climatic conditions of the area.

First aid.

Water skills.

Weapons.

Clothing and equipment.

Physical training.

Map reading and sketching.

Scouting, patrolling, and sniping.

Communications.

Air-ground operations.

Artillery sensing.

Unarmed defense.

Demolitions and booby traps.

Security

Night operations.

Special tactics (ambush, raids, etc.)

Intelligence.

Hostile guerrilla forces.

Native populace.

Language.


Questioning guerrilla prisoners and native civilians.

Use of native guides and collaborators.

Supply and administration.

Field exercises.

ANNEX C-(Possible formation of a convoy in hostile guerrilla area)



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