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Title  
The Role of the S-2 in Unit Training

Captain Harold S. Tavel

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## PREFACE

The author first became acquainted with the inherent difficulties present in the current method of unit intelligence training when he was detailed S-2, 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment. A graduate of the EUCOM Intelligence School, he was assigned as cadre Intelligence Officer when the 6th Infantry was activated in October, 1950. Just prior to joining the 6th, the writer served as assistant S-3 of the 18th Infantry Regiment.

Appreciation is expressed to the members of the staff of the Infantry School Library, and members of the Intelligence Committee, The Infantry School, for assistance given in the preparation of this study.

Information included in this monograph is unclassified. The works and speeches listed in the bibliography with a higher classification were only used as background study.

Except as cited, the views or opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or The Infantry School.

5 April 1954

  
HAROLD S. TAVEL  
Captain Infantry

## INTRODUCTION

Is our present doctrine regarding intelligence training in the infantry regiment sound? A comprehensive study was undertaken after World War II and the following were among the deficiencies mentioned time after time:

A study of reports and documents from organizations and personnel involved in combat operations...., indicate that several deficiencies in military activities existed, outstanding among [sic] these deficiencies were; lack of understanding and appreciation of military intelligence at all levels; failure of patrols to properly execute their assigned missions; reconnaissance agencies not adept in making simple military sketches and not thoroughly familiar with military maps or aerial photos; improper reporting and dissemination of information; imperfect orientation of personnel as to enemy intelligence; failure to properly process PW's especially at the lower levels of command....<sup>1</sup>

In the analysis that follows much emphasis will be placed on the close correlation between timely and effective combat intelligence and efficient unit intelligence training. This study reveals, that on the working level of the battalion and regiment, intelligence training doctrine as now established is not fully sound because:

1. the S-2 must go through the S-3 in order to schedule both direct and integrated intelligence training for the combat elements.
2. the S-2 does not directly train and work with his greatest collecting agencies—the combat soldier— but rather supervises, inspects, coordinates, and tests his training.

Intelligence is important and for the S-2 to succeed in combat he must play a vital role in training the soldier to be intelligence conscious. He cannot properly train his agencies in the secondary role that is assigned him now. He must be given a more direct and prominent role to play in training.

The logical place for the S-2, because of his interrelated knowledge of the weather, terrain, and the Aggressor enemy, is to be in charge of writing, and conducting the unit tactical training problems.

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<sup>1</sup>. Army Ground Forces Intelligence Conference, T-2, The Ground General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, June 1947, p. 5.

As a result of his writing and conducting these problems, the S-2 and S-3 must form a team early in training- a team in which the two staff members are equal partners. Better combat coordination and cooperation should follow.

One of the weaknesses of the present system is the lack of sufficient opportunity for the S-2 to get practical training, the three elements of combat intelligence- weather, terrain, and enemy. In order that the S-2 may further train the unit and himself in fighting a realistic foe a non Table of Organization Aggressor unit is proposed on both the Battalion and Regimental level. As a result the S-2 will actually practice combining the three elements against a real foe. The lower level commanders and soldiers will receive detailed training by the S-2- hence the troops will receive the personal training needed to drive the vital facts of intelligence home and they will also get to know him. Not as an obscure cloak and dagger man but in reality an approachable and interesting person.

The vital fact, however, will be the shot in the arm that tactical unit training will receive. Soldiers will be more effectively trained, intelligence wise and combat wise, when opposed by effective and well trained Aggressor units.<sup>2</sup>

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2. FM 30-101, The Maneuver Enemy, Department of the Army Field Manual, January 1953, p. 2.  
The Journal, January 1953, p. 2.

## DISCUSSION

Before beginning any study formulating the role of the S-2 in unit training, two fundamental questions must be developed regarding the S-2 as an entity: first, what are the S-2's duties in combat; and second, is a primary staff officer necessary to perform these duties?

What are the S-2's duties in combat? The primary purpose of the S-2 is to provide combat intelligence to a commander and to supervise the countermeasures that deny the enemy such intelligence.<sup>1</sup>

What is combat intelligence? "The primary object of combat intelligence is to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather, and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions."<sup>2</sup>

Thus the S-2 has primary staff responsibility for three areas that effect combat operations-- the weather, the terrain, and the enemy. Obviously, combat operations to be successful need current, timely, and positive intelligence in all three fields.

Weather and terrain are indivisible in combat operations-- just how does the "2" gather information on weather and terrain, analyse the two, and tell the commander what effect they will have on the enemy and on the friendly forces? Weather is studied with three effects in mind: First, visibility; second, trafficability; and third, temperature. The raw weather report is obtained from higher headquarters, normally in three types of predictions: the short range forecast-- about 12 hours; the medium range forecast-- 12 to 24 hours; and the long range forecast-- over 48 hours.<sup>3</sup> Significantly and obviously, only through experience and practical application can this raw data be converted into valid probable effects on terrain and operations.

Terrain is studied from its five military aspects: Critical terrain features; obstacles; cover and concealment; observation and fields of fire; and the avenues of approach. These aspects must be

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1. Army Ground Forces Intelligence Conference, C-1, The Ground General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, June 1947, p.4.  
2. Combat Intelligence Handbook, Staff Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, September 1953, p. 8.  
3. Ibid p. 9.

translated into specific information for the use of the commander. For example, the definition of critical terrain is, " a terrain feature, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant."<sup>4</sup> Without going into great detail, the S-2 must positively tell his commander answers to questions such as these. What is the critical terrain in the area? Is it that hill? that bridge? that road? that high ground? Why is it critical? What terrain must we hold or take to accomplish our mission?

Obstacles are classed into three general categories: those features which impede foot troops; wheeled vehicles; and tracked vehicles. Both natural and artificial obstacles must be considered. For instance, obstacles to military movement not only influence our defensive positions but determine the direction of our attack, dictate our formation, and even have a vital bearing on the equipment used.<sup>5</sup>

Cover must be evaluated in relation to all weapons of modern combat—small arms fire, direct fire weapons, high trajectory weapons, proximity fuse type weapons, and atomic weapons.<sup>6</sup>

Concealment is not necessarily cover, although most terrain features that provide cover will also afford concealment from ground observation. Tall grass, shrubs, woods, or weather conditions such as fog, haze, falling snow provide concealment but little or no cover.<sup>7</sup> The S-2 in making the terrain estimate must tell his commander the cover and concealment available to both forces.

Observation permits us to see. The best observation generally exists from the highest terrain feature in the area. Observation is limited or denied by such weather factors as fog, precipitation, night, wood, or brush. Should high ground overlook our area from terrain outside the unit area the tactical effect of such observation must be considered.<sup>8</sup>

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4. Ibid p. 9.

5. Ibid p.10.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid p. 12.

8. Ibid.

A field of fire is an area into which a weapon can fire effectively. All types of weapons must be considered.<sup>9</sup> The S-2 must tell his commander the inter-relationship of fields of fire, cover, observation, and their effects on his mission.

An Infantry School textbook describes the full meaning of an avenue of approach in the following way:

An avenue of approach is a route to an objective.... and we are now going to select the routes to these terrain features that are available to ourselves or the enemy..... Initially we include all likely avenues or routes.... analyse the advantages and disadvantages of each, finally choosing the best avenue of approach. The best avenue of approach chosen ....<sup>10</sup> will not necessarily be the route over which a unit will attack.

After analyzing a piece of terrain in light of the five military aspects, the S-2 tells the commander certain conclusions: first, he describes in detail the road net and the effect the road net will have on both enemy and friendly operations. Second, he will determine the tactical effects of an area. Will the terrain favor the enemy or our forces and how can we minimize the enemy's advantages and maximize our advantages. Third, the S-2 tells the commander the best route of attack or the most likely enemy thrusts into the critical terrain of the battle position.<sup>11</sup>

Wars are fought and won against a fighting enemy. Just what questions will the commander want to know about the enemy? The S-2 tells his commander where the enemy is, how strong the enemy is, and what the enemy is doing.<sup>12</sup>

The enemy fights from terrain. Hence, the basic duty of the S-2 is to continuously advise the commander and his staff of the ever changing enemy capabilities in relation to the terrain and weather. Only a mature officer possessed of intrinsic and sound judgment can appreciate and analyse the variables--thus giving his commander a good estimate. If the "S-2" does not function properly the commander is operating in the dark--hearing no evil, seeing no evil, and getting his unit "clobbered". The goal of the S-2 is to produce combat int-

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9. Ibid  
10. Ibid  
11. Ibid, p. 13.  
12. Ibid, p. 15.

elligence in order that the mission may be accomplished with the fewest casualties.<sup>13</sup>

Can't the S-3 section do the same work and therefore make the S-2 unnecessary in the regiment an battalion? Two divergent opinions are apparent upon investigation on the need of S-2's at this level. Colonel Stanley N. Lonning in a report to the Acting Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School regarding staff organization of a proposed battalion in a revised infantry division (there are no regiments in this new division) said, " Staff Organization. The staff organization within the brigade headquarters and battalions will be based on the British staff structure. The system combines the functions of operations, training, and intelligence under one staff officer. This organization provides efficient staff functioning and requires less personnel to operate the staff agencies."<sup>14</sup>

Obviously, from the stated reference much considered opinion believes that smoother staffwork would occur if intelligence was subordinated to operations.

The German staff a division level was similarly composed of an operations officer group and an administrative officer group. How did intelligence fare under this set up? In a study of German operational intelligence the researchers were appalled at the contempt that the German officer had for intelligence. For instance, " It is true to say that the price the Germans paid for their successful offensive warfare during the first three years of war was neglect of operational intelligence. It seemed to them that they could well afford to do so, because the conduct of the war was solely dependent on German plans and German operation."<sup>15</sup>

The study goes on to state,

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13. Ibid, p. 3.

14. Letter. Proposed Reorganization of the Infantry and Airborne Divisions, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, 23 April 1953.

15. German Operational Intelligence, Produced at GMDS by a combined British, Canadian, and U.S. Staff, April 1946, p. 124.

All German reports and documents stressed that the G-2 [S-2] was a subordinate of the G-3 [S-3]. It is natural, in any Army, that operations should be the more important staff function. Under the German system, however, intelligence was more than usually condemned to a secondary position....the German's themselves seemed to have felt the shortcomings of this system because they point out constantly how important it was for the G-2 to be able to get along with the G-3. They stressed the need for character and personality in the G-2, but do not seem to have realized that the organizational position of equality for the G-2 would have made his value less dependent on his personality." 16

German operational intelligence has shown that one of the big weaknesses in the German intelligence structure was a lack of a clear cut intelligence channel as well as the extra link in the chain of staff responsibility occasioned by the S-2 going through the S-3 to get information to a commander. Under their system information took too long to get out of the headquarters and critical information that had a great bearing on an operation could be and many times was damned up by a S-3<sup>16</sup> keeping critical news from a commander.<sup>17</sup>

Under the separate section concept as used in the American Army not only does a "2" work for a commander and his staff, but he part of a big team that sends information in all directions. A good example occurred-

in England shortly before the invasion of France, one battalion commander actually came to his division G-2 with this curious complaint: 'Why should I waste one of my officers to do your work?' This thinking obviously was completely scrambled. And until he changed it, which he did, his own S-2 was incapable not only of doing productive work for him, but equally incapable of fitting into the intelligence team. When, in Normandy, the G-2 sent the battalion commander by courier a complete picture of what the enemy had in front of the battalion (little of which incidentally had been produced by the commander's own S-2), the CO arrived abruptly at another line of thought. He saw that combat intelligence is a two way street; that it is crowded<sup>18</sup> with traffic going both ways and branching off at every lateral artery; that what his S-2 did might not have effected his own unit but could have effected someone else's; that somebody else's S-2 had effected his unit most materially; that you have to do something with the material you get and that without teamwork, the entire intelligence structure is as sturdy as a bamboo hut in a typhoon.<sup>18</sup>

This study has therefor revealed that an S-2 is necessary in a battalion and regiment and that he should be a full-fledged staff

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16. Ibid, p. 126.

17. Ibid, p. 105.

18. Lieutenant Colonel Stechman Chandler and Colonel Robert W. Robb, Front Line Intelligence, 1st Edition, (Washington 1946), p. 5.

officer responsible to a commander and functioning in effective intelligence channels<sup>19</sup> up the line, laterally across the line, and certainly down the line.

What steps does the S-2 go through in producing combat intelligence? Briefly stated and stripped of all non-essentials the collection effort seeks to exploit certain sources of information. At the S-2 level these sources are Prisoners of War, Enemy Documents, Air Photos, Enemy Activity, Enemy Material, Enemy Communications, Maps and Terrain Models, Weather Maps and forecasts, and certain other sources such as studies, refugees civilians, evadees, enemy press and radio.<sup>19</sup>

Certainly the S-2 can't physically collect this information himself. Logically he first determines what the commander must know in order to accomplish his mission, and then he makes a plan using all available help in order to help him gather this information.

This study will only evaluate that portion of the intelligence channel that has to do with the relationship of the S-2 with the commander and staff and subordinate units and men in unit tactical training. Certainly it is valid to assume that all concerned must be trained to recognize and report through the proper channels intelligence matters. The commander and staff must know the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence effort and ~~so~~<sup>so</sup> must the S-2 know the strengths and weaknesses of the particular units and individuals gathering this information.

Just how is this information collected? There are four principle ways in which agencies collect information: reconnaissance, interrogation, study of Order of Battle reports, and intelligence reports.<sup>20</sup> Although the S-2 is concerned with all of them the main S-2 training will naturally be directed toward the reconnaissance method.

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19. Combat Intelligence Handbook, op cit, p. 19.

20. Ibid, p. 23.

What does the word reconnaissance imply? Appropriate<sup>MI</sup> field manuals define reconnaissance as directed effort in the field to gather information on the enemy, terrain, or resources. The S-2 must plan the reconnaissance of his unit. Inherent in the definition is the implication that the S-2 will aggressively search out and use all the methods at his disposal to find information- patrols, OP's, requesting photo missions, map and terrain studies, adjacent units, supporting units, and certain passive measures, such as Shell Reports.<sup>21</sup>

Patrols are very important as a source of enemy information - but to be successful a patrol must be properly briefed, properly organized, properly debriefed, and naturally properly conducted. It follows that the S-2 must have practical work in organizing, briefing, and debriefing patrols. He should also have a personal relationship in training of these patrols.

Observation posts are established and supervised by the S-2. These OP's are normally manned by organic intelligence personnel. They must be able to see and report information. Naturally the S-2 will train these personnel.

Maps and air photos provide the broad base around which the search for unknowns are started. An intelligent and trained reconnaissance of air photos will reveal significant data in relation to enemy activity.

Continuous means must be employed during combat to locate enemy artillery pieces as well as enemy mortars. The primary organic method used is the counterfire platoon at regiment. However other means are available to the S-2, the primary among them<sup>MI</sup> is the shellrep turned in by the front line soldier.

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21. Ibid, p. 25.

By its very nature, only by detailed and convincing training can the front line soldier be trained to report enemy shelling.

The other main source of reconnaissance information is the front line soldier doing his combat job. He must be trained to see and report information. Only by the S-2 establishing rapport with the soldier will much needed information come to light. This rapport must be established during training.

Enemy Documents and Prisoners of War are another prime way to get information. In order to fully exploit the potential the frontline soldier must know how to capture a prisoner, how to search him, how to evacuate him, and how to secure him. The soldier must be trained to look for documents, and he must realize the importance they have. Only proper and interesting training <sup>must</sup> can accomplish this.

What does the S-2 do with this information once it is collected? Briefly the intelligence section must do four separate actions:

First- the information must be recorded, on a work sheet and situation map.

Second- the S-2 must make analysis of this information by interpreting in relation to other information and evaluating the source and agency sending the material in.

Third- the S-2 must draw conclusions, and be prepared to tell the commander and staff what this information will have on the weather, terrain, and enemy capabilities.

Forth- the S-2 must positively make certain that the intelligence will be received by the people who need to know in time- lower units, adjacent units, higher units, supporting units, and his own staff.

How effective is this system in combat? There is no doubt that the present system is sound.<sup>22</sup> The failings in the system are re-

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22. Army Ground Forces Intelligence Conference, op cit, p. 9.

lated to personalities and training of commanders, staff members, tactical units, and individuals; the system in combat is sound.

What is the present intelligence training doctrine? By studying official documents we find, (in the infantry battalion)

Specific duties of the S-2 include -- (1) Supervising and training, battalion intelligence personnel, and controlling them during operations. (2) Planning and supervising intelligence and counter-intelligence training for all personnel of the battalion, in conjunction with S-3.....

Specific duties of the S-3 pertaining to training include-- (1) Preparing recommended training directives, programs, orders, field exercises, and maneuvers, based on plans approved by his commander.<sup>23</sup>

(in the infantry regiment)

The S-2 has the following specific duties: (1) He supervises and coordinates the training of the regimental intelligence personnel. (In coordination with S-3.) (2) He supervises ~~the~~ intelligence and counter-intelligence training of all personnel in the regiment. (In coordination with S-3.).....

The S-3 has the following specific duties which pertain to training: (1) He plans and prepares training directives, programs, orders, field exercises, and maneuvers.<sup>24</sup>.....

Strangely enough, however, is the S-3 told to cooperate with the S-2 in intelligence training matters. ( FM 7-20, March 1950; FM 7-40, January 1950).

Present intelligence doctrine states that very close coordination must exist between the S-2 and S-3. The S-2 prepares the intelligence part of the unit training and supervises the execution. The S-2 informs the S-3 of the amount of time needed for intelligence training and of requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors-- then in collaboration they work out the details. In addition, the S-2 can provide much integrated intelligence training if the S-2 works closely with the S-3 in providing enemy situations for the troops to develop. These situations have to do with planting documents and PW's and the like.<sup>25</sup>

23. FM 7-20, Infantry Battalion, Department of the Army Field Manual, March 1950, p. 16.

24. FM 7-40, Infantry Regiment, Department of the Army Field Manual, January 1950, p. 19.

25. Combat Intelligence Handbook, op cit, p. 62.

We have developed the intelligence training picture both from the combat duties of the S-2 and the training duties of the S-2. From our discussion we have developed that the general types of intelligence training needed by the individual soldier are:

- (1). Know how to patrol and perform reconnaissance type missions.
- (2). Be able to capture and quickly pass to the rear enemy soldiers and material.
- (3). Be able to observe an area and accurately report enemy information. Write this knowledge, accurately on a message.

- (4). Submit shell reports.
- (5). Read Maps and Air photos.
- (6). Deney intelligence to the enemy.

Intelligence personnel in addition must know:

- (1). How to maintain a situation map.
- (2). Assist in preparing reports and overlays.
- (3). Process captured material and PW's to the rear quickly and with maximum "milking" of tactical information.
- (4). Select and operate OP's.

The S-2 has been given a specific mission- to provide his commander with certain information; yet, paradoxically the very people that will provide him most with the information he needs to be a success-the front line soldier- are trained by someone else. The important personal touch, so needed to sell individuals, is taken away from him and placed in the hands of the unit leader. The emphasis of the unit leader is toward marksmanship, unit tactics, and other problems. The author can state through personal experience that effective intelligence training cannot be accomplished unless the S-2 plays more than a planning and supervising role. He must personally train, not as units but as individuals, the eyes of the regiment- the front line soldier.

Here we have an inherent weakness in our system. Through personal <sup>and is</sup> experience, the author believes that there is not enough work in training for a S-2 to do. The energetic and efficient S-2 needed in combat can easily be replaced in training with no apparent [sic] ill effects. The fault lies in the system, the S-2 must be given more work to do in training; work that can be effectively gauged as to efficiency by a commander; work in which the S-2 can personally train the front line soldier as well as his own section or agencies.

A commander is a very busy man in training-- he is always having to plug holes in "dykes". There are never enough men, capable men, to go around. Is it logical for a commander to place one of his limited top-notch men in the "2" spot, especially since the "2" only trains physically about 10 men in the battalion and less than that in the regiment. Not likely. Added to the burden of the S-2 is, "a lack of appreciation of the capabilities, limitations, and uses of intelligence by commanders of all echelons." 26.

Additionally, how is the S-2 going to get training in practical work himself. Schooling is fine, but what the "2" needs is practical field work with the individuals who are going to work for him. Here we have the burden of the S-2, having to coordinate intelligence training with the "3" from a position distinctly that of the underdog. Exactly the condition we deplored in the German Combat Intelligence system.

The problem is bare..... In order for a commander to <sup>design</sup> the type of energetic officer needed to properly train, in intelligence matters, his unit, he must be given additional duties in training to place him on some semblance of equality with the S-3. A positive job in which the commander can make quick and sure evaluation of the "2" and his knowledge of the terrain- weather- and enemy. A job in which the "2" personally trains individuals

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26. Army Ground Forces Intelligence Conference, T-2, TGGG, Fort Riley, Kansas, June 1947, p. 7.

will be the close working relationship between the S-2 and the front line soldier who will make up the bulk of the Aggressor detail. The S-2 will be able to impose his personality and physically train the front line soldier to be intelligence conscious.

The optimum size Aggressor unit on a battalion level would be 1 officer (S-2) and 37 Ealisted Men. The breakdown would be as follows: each rifle company would furnish 9 men, one rifle squad; the entire intelligence section; the counterfire and intelligence sergeant. The members of the rifle squad would be detailed for one week periods, reporting for duty to the S-2 dressed of course in Green Aggressor uniforms. At the end of a week, a new squad would take over for each company, At the end of 9 weeks the S-2 would have worked with just about all members of the front line units.

What good would this system do? First of all it would give the S-2 practical work in training himself to match the weather, terrain, and enemy; Second, the S-2 would be out training - the men could see him and evaluate him and he could evaluate the men, getting to know individual capabilities; third, it would give a commander a positive method of evaluation of the "2", you may be sure a mediocre officer would not last in such a sensitive spot; and lastly and very important, there would be a marriage of the "2" and the "3" because they would have to work very closely together in training.

Under this system we would not have the spectacle of what one G-2 did to keep his "2"s busy in training. Taking that cue, we started to put out more poop sheets, have more reports, which made it more important for the battalion commander to see that the "2" job at that level was a full time job.

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Combat Intelligence Problems in Divisions and Smaller Units, Transcript of Intelligence Conference, HQ, Third Army, Fort MacPherson, Georgia, 23-24 January 1953, p. 41.

## CONCLUSIONS

The system employed to develop combat intelligence on the S-2 level is sound.

The system of intelligence in the regiment is not fully sound because: during unit training:

(1). A non practical working arrangement with the S-3 in unit intelligence training. The present system calls for the S-2 to be a definite underdog, the S-2 must get along with the S-3.

(2). Very little chance for the commander to evaluate the S-2's performance under combat like conditions.

(3). The S-2 has little opportunity to impress his personality and abilities on the command.

(4). A great opportunity fo a lazy "2" to ease off.

(5). Except for GPK's and the like, very little chance for the "2" to get practical work in integrating the three elements- weather, terrain, and the enemy.

(6). Lack of a unified system in the unit for using Aggressor.

Under the proposed system of having the S-2 responsible for writing training problems and commanding a permanent Aggressor unit:

(1). Commanders would more logically put a more competent officer in a S-2 because the commander would be getting immediate value of him.

(2). Have closer coordination between the "2" and the "3".

(3). Better unit intelligence training would follow because the "2" could more effectively teach through practical work the "need to know" aspects of intelligence.

(4). Intelligent Aggressor utilization would greatly aid the unit perform combat type missions

(5) A much closer rapport would be established between the front line soldier and the S-2.

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# Lesson Plan

Title of Lesson: The Role of the S2 in Unit Training

## Essential Information

Day and Date:

Hour:

Place:

Class:

Instructor: Captain H. S. Tazzel

Assistant: Capt W Taylor

Uniform & Equipment: A (Instructor)

Faculty  
Monograph

References: 8 Student Monograph

Advisor: Lt Col English

Training Aids: 2 charts (2nd left), Chalk, eraser, blackboard.

Rehearsal:

Lesson Objective: To demonstrate to the student the duties of the S-2, to show him why we need an S-2, to outline present intelligence training doctrine, to show the weakness in the present doctrine to prepare the Aggressor unit as an answer.

## Lesson Outline

1. Introduction

(4 minutes)

a. Pose the question - Is our present doctrine on intelligence training sound?

b. Combat reports show glaring weaknesses

- (1) Military commanders not knowing combat & intelligence
  - (2) Failure of patrols
  - (3) Failure to read maps and photos.
  - (4) Failure to pass on information
  - (5) Failure to orient in counter-intel.
  - (6) Failure to properly process P.W.'s
- c. Pose the Question Why.

## 2. Discussion

13 min

a. What does an S-2 do?

- (1) Provide combat intelligence
- (2) Provide continuous estimate for C.O.  
& staff.
- (3) Evaluate information
- (4) Plan Reconnaissance
  - (a) Patrols
  - (b) OP's
  - (c) Map & Air photos
  - (d) Counterfire

b. Is the job important?

- (1) yes. Cite Fanning report.
  - (2) Rebut Fanning report with a German Operational System where "2" subordinate to the "3"
- b. Lack of intelligence channel

slow down flow of information  
C. Commander gets his intelligence  
second hand through eyes of  
"3."

c. The job is necessary at S-2 level  
in combat

d. The present interrelationship of the  
S-2 to the S-3 in training.

(a) S-2 must cooperate with S-3  
but the S-3 need not with S-2

(b) S-2 does not train the men  
who are his eyes but  
usually plans and supervises  
the intelligence training

e. The weakness of the present system

(a) Little chance to evaluate to S-2  
by C.O.

(b) Little chance for S-2 to impress  
personality on command.

(c) A sinecure for one who wants one

(d) Lack of unified system of using  
aggressor.

f. The end result - Commander find  
that there is not enough for an  
aggressive young officer to do hence  
they put weak officer in spot

## g Remedy.

- (1) Have S-2 take over S-3's job of conducting exercises
- (2) Have S-2 organize a permanent Aggression unit. On Battalion level - 1 off and 37 EM
  - 1 Rifle squad each <sup>sub</sup> company
  - Intelligence section
  - b. Rotate rifle squads each week.
  - c. Eventually train whole battalion.

## h Result of Remedy

- (1) More Competent Officer as "2"
- (2) Have closer cooperation between "2" and "3" because "2" now equal to "3"
- (3) Better unit intelligence training follows.
- (4) Better unit tactical training because of better and more coordinated every detail
- (5) C.O. could evaluate S-2 easier.
- (6) Closer rapport between front-line units
- (7) S-2 know better the capabilities of unit

### 3 Conclusions.

3 minutes

- a. Restatement of training problem  
(S-2 responsible for intelligence train no clear cut authority)
- b. The aggressor unit under the S-2 the answer because it makes the "2" a driving force in training.
- c. One need not to get better intelligence training, modern combat means fast moving situations, better and more timely intelligence the key, better and more realistic intelligence training the answer.

The END