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ADVANCED OFFICERS' COURSE  
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THE CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.  
1900

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MARGINAL ABBREVIATIONS USED.

➤ B.	Brown, Fred R.	"History of the Ninth U.S. Infantry. 1799-1909."
➤ Da.	Daggett, A.S.	"America in the China Relief Expedition."
➤ De.	Denby, Charles	"China and her People."
➤ G.	Gano, William Addeleman	"The History of the United States Army."
➤ L.	Lynch, George	"The War of the Civilizations; being a record of a 'Foreign Devil's' experience with the Allies in China."
M.	Martin, W.A.P.	"The Siege in Peking; China against the World; by an Eye-Witness."
➤ P.E.	Personal Experiences	(of the Author)
➤ P.	Pope, Benjamin E.	"The Causes of the Boxer Uprising and the Battle of Tientsin."
➤ R.	Rockhill, William W.	"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901."
➤ Tha.	Thayer, William Roscoe	"The Life and Letters of John Hay."
Tho.	Thomson, H.C.	"China and the Powers; a Narrative of the Outbreak of 1900."
We.	Weals, B.L. Putnam	"Indiscreet Letters from Peking."
Will.	Williams, Edward Thomas	"China Yesterday and Today."
➤ Wil.	Wilson, James Harrison	"Under the Old Flag."
V.	Velde	"Retrospect of the Events in Peking during the Summer of 1900." Vol. IV, The Infantry Journal.

## THE CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION

### INTRODUCTION

- (1) In the provinces of Shantung and Chili-~~li~~ during the years just previous to 1900, there was much suffering caused by such natural things as floods and droughts, and such unnatural things as dishonest tax collectors and grasping, overbearing foreigners. The average Chinaman during that period was very ignorant, and exceedingly superstitious. When he began to try to solve the riddle of his troubles, his superstition came to the front and told him that his troubles all came from allowing foreign devils to live in his country. Had they not brought the railroad with its terrible noise to disturb the Spirits? Had they not, in laying its track, moved, cut through or destroyed the graves of many ancestors, thus hindering their proper worship? (2) Yea, all these things they had done and more, for in order to make one of their bridges strong was it not necessary to bury children under it? Did not the missionaries gather children for this very purpose and also that they might have on hand plenty of children's eyes and hearts to use in making medicines? All these things the Chinese believed. What, then were they to do? The answer seemed simple--kill or drive out all foreigners.
- (3) Some two hundred years before this time a Chinese secret society was organized under the name of I-Ho-Tuan, Righteous Harmony Fists. In 1900 this society gained adherents very rapidly because they had some organization, and used as a slogan "Kill the foreign devils!" In Shantung the governor, Yu Hoi-en, aided them (4) and though the Imperial Government, under some pressure, had to remove him as governor after the murder of a missionary, yet almost at once he was given another province, where he worked his will on foreigners by allowing the worst massacres of that terrible year. The influence of this society, now widely called "Boxers", spread to the

Imperial City and received the goodwill of the old Dowager Empress and most of her ministers.

(5)  
Da. 11

(5) During May, 1900, the outrages against foreigners became so numerous that the diplomatic representatives in Peking became alarmed and called on their governments for guards. Warships were sent to the mouth of the Picho River and some few guards were landed and sent to Peking by rail. They arrived just in time, for the last train out of Peking left on June 3rd, and the boxers were swarming into the city. On June 5th much of the detested railroad

(6)  
Tho. 9

line was torn up. (6) Late June the 10th the Ministers in Peking called on the consuls at Tientsin for more assistance. (7) Up to

(7)  
Tho. 12

this time small bodies of foreign troops were assembling at Tientsin, and the total there June 10th was 1945 men, 8 machine guns, 6 small field pieces and one six-pounder, from the following nations: English; German; French; Japanese; Russian; American; Austrian; and Italian. When the call for troops came the Russians and French did not wish to start until more troops were present, especially as 2000 Russians were to start from Port Arthur June 11th. However, their objections were overruled and on June 10th what is known as the Seymour Expedition left Tientsin for Peking.

#### THE SEYMOUR EXPEDITION

(8)  
Da. 13

(8) The Seymour Expedition was commanded by Admiral Seymour, an English naval officer, with Capt. McCalla of the U. S. Navy as second in command. The expedition started by train, intending to repair the track as they went along. A day and a half out of Tientsin they were attacked by a large body of Boxers. At Lang Fang, a little over half way to Peking, they found the track gone and their way blocked by imperial troops with some artillery. The expedition was forced to retire. A broken bridge caused them to abandon the train and follow the river. Boxers opposed them continually. Rations gave out. June 22nd they reached and stormed the Hsi-Ku arsenal, eight miles north of Tientsin. Here they found rations, ammunition and medical supplies. During the ten days they had lost

295 men killed and wounded.

#### RELIEF OF TIENTSIN

The Seymour Expedition drained Tientsin of foreign soldiers, and in a very short time conditions there became very dangerous.

(9)  
Da. 18

(9) The American Consul called on Rear Admiral Kempff, senior naval officer with the fleet, to send more men to Tientsin. Maj. Waller, of our Marine Corps, arrived at the mouth of the river June 18th with a small battalion of Marines from the Philippine Islands. He was at once ordered to proceed to Tientsin. On June 20th he got together a train at Tong Ku (end of the railroad near mouth of Pie-ho River), and with it moved his men to within twelve miles of Tientsin. At this point he caught up with a detachment of 400 Russians. The two commanders got together and decided to make no advance until the next day, as more Russians and also some British troops were to arrive at that time. However at 2 a. m. the next day (June 21st) the Russians sent word that they were moving on and asked the Americans to come along. Maj. Waller did not want to start, but neither would he be left behind, so a start was made. The Americans had one Colt gun--it was used as an advance guard. Near Tientsin enemy fire stopped the movement. ~~The~~ Colt gun jammed, and was disabled and discarded. The Russians retreated, sending word that they would halt four miles below the previous camp. The Marines were forced to retire, acting as a rear guard for the Russians. This day the 123 Marines marched about thirty miles, fought for five hours, and managed to bring in their four dead and nine wounded. During the afternoon and night of this day 600 Russians, 600 British, and small detachments of German, French and Italian troops arrived at the camping place. (10) June 24th this body of troops forced their way into Tientsin, relieving the situation there somewhat. After reaching Tientsin the troops received word that what was left of the Seymour Expedition was cooped up in the Hsi-Ku arsenal. On June

(10)  
Da. 26

26th some troops were sent out, and this expedition was at last returned to Tientsin.

#### THE TAKU FORTS TAKEN

(11)  
Da. 15

At the mouth of the Pieho River were the Taku Forts. (11) The various foreign naval commanders felt that it was necessary for them to occupy these forts, as they sat right on the line of communications with Tientsin and Peking. Against the wishes of the American admiral word was sent to the commander of the forts that he must surrender or the forts would be assaulted. (12) Before the time to make his decision was up a gun was fired from a fort at one of the foreign gunboats in the river. Troops were at once landed and the forts were captured, June 16th, with the help of the guns of the naval vessels in the river (except the American).

(12)  
Tho. 31

(13)  
Tho. 23

(13) When word reached Peking of the demand for the surrender of the forts and then of their capture it was considered as a declaration of war, and word was sent to the foreign ministers to leave Peking within twenty four hours. The ministers refused, believing it would mean certain death for them to attempt to reach the sea. The ministers started to assemble at the Chinese Foreign Office to protest against the order. (14) The German minister was killed on his way there, and on June 20th Chinese troops opened fire on the legations.

(14)  
Da. 16

#### GENERAL SITUATION, JUNE 30th

(15)  
Da. 16

(15) At the end of June the general situation was about as follows: In Peking a total of 450 foreign soldiers, guarding as best they could all foreigners there and many Christian Chinese. At Tientsin a foreign force, slowly increased in size, holding the railroad and foreign section of town, while the walled native city was full of boxers and Imperial troops. The Taku forts had fallen, and the railroad could be operated between Tong Ku and Tientsin.

## THE CAPTURE OF TIENTSIN

(16)  
B. 445

(16) It became very necessary to drive the imperial troops and boxers out of the walled city of Tientsin, as they were constantly firing on the foreign section and the railroad station, causing many casualties. July 11th and 12th the 9th Inf. (less 1 bn.)

(17)  
B. 450

U. S. Army and about 300 U. S. Marines reached Tientsin from the Philippine Islands. (17) The attack above mentioned had been arranged for July 13th by the Commander of the British, French and Japanese troops. Col. Liscum of the 9th U. S. Inf. arrived in Tientsin on the 11th, but when night of the 12th arrived he had <sup>only</sup> a memorandum designating the place of his regiment in the column to march to the battlefield. ~~But~~ Otherwise he had no orders, nor does it appear that he had learned much about the ground over which his troops were to operate. Reveille was at 1 a. m. There was a mud wall surrounding all the inhabited part of Tientsin including the walled

(18)  
B. 450

city. (18) The attacking troops formed south of the southeast part of this wall, in three columns facing almost west. The French column was near the wall; Japanese about 500 yds. to the French left; and 500 yds. still farther to the left was the last column, composed of British, Americans and a few Austrians. Attacking from the east side of the city were the Russians and Germans. Gen. Fukushima (Japanese) was the senior on the south side. Brig. Gen. Dorward (British) commanded the third or left column. (19) The total strength

(19)  
Da. 28

of the whole attacking force was 5650 men with a small amount of artillery. At 5:30 a. m. troops were in extended order, facing the mud wall, directly south of ~~them~~ <sup>it</sup>. (20) The 9th Inf. in single

(20)  
B. 452

rank with one pace between men. The lines were directly south of the Taku (south) Gate of the walled city and of an arsenal in the mud wall. The Chinese fire came from the walled city. Our troops moved up to the mud wall to get protection from the Chinese fire. The Japanese formed inside the mud wall and started advancing toward

(21)  
B. 453

the Taku Gate. (21) A British staff officer told Col. Liscum

(22)  
Da. 24

to support the left of the Japanese. (22) The Colonel moved his regiment, ~~made~~<sup>over</sup> the mud wall and extended to his right (east) under cover of an old moat and road bank. He did not extend very far in this direction until a heavy enfilade fire reached the line from a group of mud huts some thousand yards to the northeast. The regiment, in single line, changed front under heavy fire and advanced toward the houses. When they had arrived within about one hundred and fifty yards they were halted by ponds that they could not pass. They lost many men. Ammunition gave out. Many brave deeds were performed, but they could do little except suffer until they were withdrawn after dark. Their Colonel died at the front and about twenty-five percent of the regiment were killed or wounded. The Japanese by nightfall were in possession of mud houses near the Taku gate and at daylight next morning blew the gate open and the city was entered. The allied artillery had fired about all their ammunition into the city. It was on fire in many places and there were many Chinese casualties inside. The Chinese troops withdrew to the north and west. This fighting relieved the tension at Tientsin at a heavy cost but the main mission was still ahead.

#### RELIEF EXPEDITION STARTS TOWARD PEKING

By the end of July the number of foreign troops at Tientsin had increased somewhat. On the American side the 14th Infantry less ~~one~~ battalion, and Battalion F, 6th Field Artillery, had arrived from the Islands. A transport was in from the States with General Chaffee and the 6th Cavalry aboard. On August 1st a conference of Generals was held. It was decided to start for Peking on August 4th, (23) the column to be composed of:

(23)  
Da. 57

Americans	2500
English	3000
French	800
Japanese	8000
Russians	<del>4300</del>
Total	<u>18600</u>

The effectives probably did not exceed 1600<sup>0</sup> men. clarity

#### ENGAGEMENT AT PEI-TSANG

Japanese reconnaissance showed that the Chinese were holding a strong line of works near Pei-tsang, about eight miles north of Tientsin.

(24)  
P.E. (24) The expedition marched out of Tientsin in the afternoon, August 4th, and went into camp a few miles to the north. On the 5th, reveille was at 2 a.m. Troops moved out in the dark. The Japanese led the attack at daybreak. Firing was very heavy for some two hours. The American troops were in reserve. When it came their time to move, they found the works in front clear of the enemy. The Chinese, Imperial troops, retreated to Yang Tsun about twelve miles from Pei-tsang, and the place where the Tientsin-Peking R.R. crosses the Pihoh river.

#### ENGAGEMENT AT YANG TSUN

(25)  
P.E. The Commanders agreed that on the 6th the Japanese should continue up the right bank while English, Americans, Russians, and French should cross on a Jap pontoon bridge and move up the left bank, following the general line of the railroad. (25) The British moved with their left on the river and were followed by the French and Russians. The Americans moved to the right until they struck the railroad, then moved along near it with the 14th Infantry in advance. The march was through corn and sweet potato fields which were very soft. The heat was intense. Water gave out. The battle began at about a two mile range. The railroad was on an embankment which stood up some fifteen feet above the plain and gradually turned to the left pushing the troops toward the river. (26) General Chaffee moved the 9th Infantry and ~~Battalion F~~, 5th Field Artillery, to the east side of the railroad and moved against some small villages on that side. The 14th Infantry and the British (Indians) mixed as the railroad limited their front. There were some grave

(27)  
P.E.

mounds on the line of advance, the only shelter from the artillery fire and, ~~as~~ <sup>it was</sup> reached ~~it~~, the rifle fire, (27) Many of the Indians remained behind these mounds. The 14th Infantry was in ~~these~~ lines. The leading line assaulted and cleared the village to the front and the railroad bank. Advancing for two miles under fire on such an intensely hot day and without water was too much for most of the men. The very strongest were about down. Some died from the effects.

(28)  
Da. 63  
P.E.

(28) Just after the 14th Infantry had reached its ~~own~~ objectives the Russians and English batteries caused considerable loss by firing into the position. The Chinese retreated in fairly good order in the general direction of Peking.

#### MARCH CONDITIONS TO TUNG CHOW

(29)  
Da. 72  
P.E.

On August 7th the Allies rested a day to ~~put~~ up supplies and bury the dead. After this date the Japanese were allowed to move in front followed by the ~~Japanese~~ <sup>Russians</sup>. This formation caused the American troops to march through the heat of the day. (29) Many who experienced those marches agree that never before nor since have they seen the sun effect men as it did there. Men dropped almost by squads, some of them never recovered though most would finally reach camp after dark. Much of the marching was through tall corn with powdery dust, ankle deep, and not a breath of air stirring. The days to Tung Chow, August 12th, followed each other like a nightmare. There was no fighting. Tung Chow was a walled city. The gates were shut but when the Japs blew them open early August 12th they found the Army had gone. One sad thing about this expedition is the effect it had on the country. (30) In the city of Tung Chow many women killed themselves at the approach of the armies. Men saw one room with about twenty dead women in it. The troops hardly passed a town until they saw it burst into flames. There was much cruelty. An Allied soldier was even seen carrying

(30)  
P.E.

a baby on his bayonet! Practically none of the villagers who remained until the Allies arrived, escaped with their lives. From Tong-ku to Tung Chow the country appeared to be completely devastated though of course the Chinese troops and the Boxers had something to do with this.

(31)  
Da. 75

After Tung Chow was found deserted the Japanese advance guard moved on a few miles while all the rest of the expedition went into camp around the city. (31) The Russian commander General Linivitch sent a note to the other commanders requesting that the expedition rest for a day as his men were tired out. All others objected to this but he said he could not move, so the others agreed to use the 13th in making reconnaissance toward Peking. A canal, with a parallel road just north of it, runs from Tung Chow to Peking. The Japanese were to cover the country to the north of the road. The Americans along and south of the canal. The British to the south of the Americans. The conference decided that on the 14th the armies would move up to the line established by the Japanese advance guard and then another conference would be held to decide how to attack Peking on the 15th.

(32)  
Da. 76  
P.E.

(32) General Chaffee on the morning of the 13th took the 14th Infantry, Reilly's Battery and the Cavalry troops and pushed forward into the American Sector. No real resistance was encountered, so he ordered the rest of his command to close on the advanced troops. This move was completed about midnight, 13th and 14th of August. During this night heavy rifle fire was heard to the west with now and then considerable artillery fire. Reveille was early the morning of the 14th. Some rations had arrived and as the troops were trying to get breakfast, more firing was heard toward the front.

(33)  
Da. 78

(33) General Chaffee had sent his Cavalry troops to the front. The General rushed over to the Colonel of the 14th Infantry and said "Give me some soldiers, quick, my Cavalry is surrounded!" The 2d

(34)  
P.E.

Battalion, 14th infantry, was hurried to the front but found it was all a mistake so returned to their breakfasts. (34) Shortly after breakfast the movement forward began. General Chaffee had Reilly's Battery placed in a corn field near a small village with some companies of the 14th infantry deployed in the dense corn between the Battery and Peking with a village on a canal at their right flank. General Chaffee and his staff were up on a mud house behind the right of this line, watching the effect of the artillery fire on a Peking wall tower that they could see. Lieutenant J. F. Gohn, commanding Company E, 14th infantry, climbed up on the same house to watch the fire. At this time quite a heavy rifle fire broke out in

(35)  
P.E.

the village to the right of the line. (35) General Chaffee turned ~~turned~~ to Lieutenant Gohn and said "Lieutenant, assemble your company and go down into that village and find out what that fire is and stop it if you can." The Lieutenant assembled the company and moved into the village, coming out on the canal. The canal was partially filled with canal boats much like those of the United States.

(36)  
P.E.

The people of the village had all hidden in these boats. (36) When Lieutenant Gohn arrived in view there were allied soldiers (of one nation) on the boats, firing and stabbing into the mass of men, women and children. The poor people began to surge up to get out of the boats and away, when the soldiers on the bank, under command of a fat officer, fired volleys into the mass. Women threw their babies into the canal and jumped in after them. A naked child staggered across the deck, its back running blood. This was an almost instantaneous picture. Lt. Gohn had been some little time finding the place. Almost at the same instant Gen. Chaffee and his staff rode up. His language does not look well in print, but he told one of his staff to "tell that officer to get his men out of my lines." The General turned to Lt. Gohn and said; "If he does not go take a squad of men and put him back." He went.

(37)  
P.E.

(37) After this heart rending incident Lt. Gohn's company continued along the canal (on the tow-path, south side, in single file, Lt. Gohn in the lead) towards Peking. The grass was high on either side of the path, but before long the company came close to the northeast corner of the Chinese City wall. A few of the men crossed the bridge over a kind of moat there, and stood gazing up at the tower and the wall. Fire was opened on them from the wall to the south of the corner, so they just stepped around the corner out of reach. As the men of the company came up out of the deep grass they rushed across the bridge and around the corner of the wall. (38) They then moved west along the wall

(38)  
Da. 80  
P.E.

toward where the wall of the Tartar City reaches to the north. They did not get far before fire from the Tartar wall stopped them. They collected behind a bastion. Col. Daggett and Capt. Leonard, the Adjutant, caught up at this place.

It seemed there was only one direction left to go, and that was up, onto the wall. No scaling ladders were at hand, but there were many holes in the wall and it seemed to have no guards at this point. A successful attempt to scale the wall

(39)  
Da. 82  
P.E.

was made and (39) at 11 a. m. the U. S. flag was flying there and the wall to the south had been cleared while rifle fire had reduced the amount of Chinese fire coming from the big tower on the corner of the Tartar Wall, about 300 yds. away. This tower had four rows of port-holes, sixteen in a row, on each side.

The Americans started west along the <sup>top of the</sup> wall to see if they could get into the big tower. On the way they came to the Tung Pien gate and found hiding there Russian soldiers who had come up during the previous night and had tried to relieve the legations

(40)  
Da. 75.

single-handed after (40) their general had notified the Allies that his men could not move for another day, as they were too tired. Chinese fire had held them cooped up with their artil-

lery useless, until the arrival of the Americans released them.

(41)  
P.E.

From the gate it could be seen that there was no way into the tower from the Chinese City wall, so the Americans went down a ramp into the Chinese city. (41) An American staff officer joined them there and led about two squads out in the open to charge this tower over an open space of about 150 yds., where from the bottom of the tower up to the first row of port-holes there was about fifty feet of smooth brick wall. Perhaps, being an Ordnance Officer, he intended to blow it up. An officer of the regiment came on the scene in time to call the men back.

Co. H of the 14th Infantry followed Co. E into the city, and they were followed by Btry. F, 5th Field Artillery, by way of the gate.

(42)  
P.E.

Along the south side of the Tartar wall was a moat with some water in it. Parallelling the wall and some 150 yds. from it was a street with mud houses on each side. One at a time (42) ~~the men of these companies ran the gauntlet~~ the men of these companies ran the gauntlet from near the gate to the shelter of the above-mentioned street. There roofs were manned and fire opened on the south Tartar wall. Reilly's guns were handled about the same way, and by 1 p. m. practically all the Chinese fire was silenced. More companies of the 14th Inf.

(43)  
Da. 91

came up, but none knew where the legations were. (43) The British entered a gate in the east side of the Chinese city wall, after the Americans had driven the Chinese away, moved in and around the American left and into the legation grounds without firing a shot. America cleared the way, but the British entered the legations first.

The Japanese moved against a gate in the east side of the Tartar city wall. They had more opposition, and did not get into the city until the morning of the 15th.

As a special mark of honor the 14th Inf., U. S. Army, was moved into the British legation grounds to let the people there

(44)  
Da. 89  
P.E.

see what their rescuers were like. The troops were ragged, dirty, sick and tired. The rescued people had put on their best. (44) It was some contrast. The troops had little food but they still had bread and mule meat. However it was a tear producing meeting. Those rescued had been expecting death or worse for some fifty days and their losses were very heavy.

#### THE BATTLE FOR THE FORBIDDEN CITY GATES

(45)  
Da. 96  
P.E.

The night of the 14th the American forces camped just south of the south wall of the Tartar city. Sniping from the west continued through the night. The next morning the column formed, 14th Inf. in front, and moved west. (45) As they arrived opposite the gates leading into the Forbidden City Gen. Chaffee pointed them out to the colonel of the 14th and said; "There are the gates of the Forbidden City, go take them." Start at the gate in the Tartar wall at the south side of the Forbidden City and count the gates to the north, or into that city. There are five of them, one after the other. The gate in the Tartar wall was already in American hands. The second gate was just a barrier, as it had no towers flanking it. Reilly had guns on the Tartar wall above the gate, some firing west along the wall and some firing into the forbidden city. American Marines and some of the 9th Infantry were placed on the Tartar wall and in the tower to fire over into the city. Some of the 14th got on the low wall beside the second gate, and so brought their fire to bear on the third gate towers. (46) In going from the second gate to the third gate one passes side entrance gates at the right and the left. Some companies of the 14th were led around through the burned section east of the Forbidden City to the east side gate. However they could not open it until other troops let them in from the inside. (47) At the second gate Col. Daggett asked for guns to blow the gate open. The gates were fastened on the inside with one iron bar and one large wooden bar. Some of

(46)  
P.E.

(47)  
P.E.

Reilly's guns were brought up and were used to break the bars. Troops were then pushed in and before long they reached the third gate. This gate (it had five entrances, regular tunnels through the wall, about one hundred feet long) was opened in the same way. The fourth was like the others, bars were shot open. Company E, 14th Inf. rushed through and met a heavy fire from the towers of the fifth and last gate some three hundred yards away. Buildings were along the sides and many tents, with banners before them, were pitched in the area between. (48) The company took what cover it could and replied to the fire while the artillery fired through the gate opening. After silencing the Chinese fire, the men moved up to the last gate. Through its crack they could see carved marble steps leading up to the first throne room. (49) As they were getting the guns up to shoot open this last barrier to the center of the Forbidden City, orders were received to leave the gate shut and withdraw! It gave them a terrible feeling to leave what they had so dearly won. The foreign ministers for some reason decided it would be best not to occupy the Forbidden City. The troops were withdrawn and returned to camp. Among the American losses this day was Captain H. J. Reilly, Field Artillery, killed on the Tartar Wall while observing the fire of his battery.

(48)  
P.E.

(49)  
Da. 103  
P.E.

The action of August 15th really brings to an end the fighting work of the Relief Expedition and all though most of the troops were retained for some months in Peking, and many more were landed and moved to Tientsin, yet the actual relief of the legations was over.

#### ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

##### POLITICAL

There is a question as to whether or not the siege of the legations would have taken place if the forts at the mouth of the Peho had not been directed by the foreign naval commanders (except Americans,) to surrender.

(50)  
Tho. 30

(50) Sir Claude MacDonald in his dispatch of September 20, 1900, stated "We had up to this moment no information whatever that Tientsin was in any danger, still less that the line to Taku was menaced, and we have therefore failed to understand the urgency of the naval authorities' actions, and were inclined to construe it as premature, if not needlessly provocative."

(51)  
Tho. 26

(51) It is said that one of the most influential Chinese officials had actually prepared a petition to the Emperor entreating him to suppress the Boxers and protect foreigners, but when news of the fall of the forts came he tore it up saying that the Powers had made war on China and there was nothing to do now but resist to the end.

(52)  
Tho. 27

(52) Many missionaries state that they were perfectly safe until news of the fall of the Taku forts arrived. The forts at the mouth of the Lutai River intimated that they would do nothing unless attacked. They were let alone until late in September.

There was no hostile move made by the Taku forts until they had been directed to surrender within twenty-four hours.

(53)  
Da. 23

(53) Japan was near at hand with a large well trained army. Why was she not allowed to bring in quickly a well equipped force and relieve the legations probably within thirty days? Among the fighting forces there were bound to be differences of opinion as to what to do and when to do it. Each must have been influenced by what he thought his government would want as well as what he knew they wanted from the instructions received from them.

(54)  
Da. 15

(54) For instance, the American admiral refused to help assault the forts at Taku because he believed that to be an act of war against China while he had been instructed to act differently by Washington. However he was not <sup>slow</sup>~~alone~~ in giving all the help he could toward the relief of Tientsin and Peking.

## TACTICAL

During the whole of this period it was of course difficult to get coordinated movement between the different allies because each commanded a separate army and there was no one head. (55) However, there were places where ~~our~~ commander agreed to work under another as the Americans under General Dorward, British Commander at Tientsin. (56) In this case the orders and instructions given the 9th Infantry were very vague and no effort appears to have been made to acquaint Colonel Liscum with the plan of action or of the terrain, causing him to make some fatal moves. (57) He formed his regiment in one long skirmish line with no supports or reserves. (58) He moved it in this formation by the flank and then in a column of files led by himself. He misjudged the position of the Japanese and supported the wrong flank. (59) His formation (one skirmish line) required him to change front under a heavy enfilade fire. Having no knowledge of the terrain he moved his regiment, at the cost of his own life, into a position from which there was no escape until after darkness had set in. (60) Attempts to relieve him were made by sending more men toward him.

At Yang Tsun the Americans and British were joined together because their sectors were not properly given out and understood, this causing heavier losses. At the same place the artillery did not keep check on its infantry, with the result that our own shells caused a good share of our losses.

(61) Movement of the whole force in one column forced some troops to march through the terrible heat in the middle of the day. As there were practically no roads, a much broader front could have been used and the march losses lessened.

## LESSONS

1. In international complication where naval and army

officers may be called upon to act for their governments the senior officers should be chosen for their knowledge of political and diplomatic affairs as well as for their knowledge of the art of war.

2. Where troops of two or more nations must work together on some mission, it will probably shorten the time required and lower the cost of the operation for them first to get together and choose one as leader and then take orders from him.

3. In action be sure of your sector before you start. Keep in it. Remember why we need supports and reserves. It is impossible when under heavy fire to change front without terrible losses. If a force is held up do not reinforce it - send reinforcements around the flanks of the opposition. Marching on broad fronts reduces the total number of hours marched, so the heat of the day need not be endured. Be sure you know where your objective is, so that you may reach it. (The 14 Infantry did not know where the legations were, so the British got in ahead.)