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BEACHHEAD OPERATIONS OF THE 3D BATTALION, 361ST INFANTRY
(96TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE ASSAULT OF OKINAWA
1-4 APRIL 1945
(HYUKYUS OPERATION)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion S-3)

Type of operation described: INFANTRY BATTALION IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

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BEACHHEAD OPERATIONS OF THE 3D BATTALION, 381ST INFANTRY
(96TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE ASSAULT OF OKINAWA
1-4 APRIL 1945
(RYUKYUS OPERATION)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion S-3)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry in the assault of Okinawa (Ryukyus Campaign) during the period 1 April - 4 April 1945.

To orient the reader with events in the Pacific leading up to the actual invasion it will be necessary to discuss the incidents preceding this major operation.

The battle for the Philippine Islands began on 20 October 1944 when the newly organized XXIV Corps comprising the 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions under command of Lt. General John R. Hodge, and the X Corps composed of the veteran 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division invaded Leyte, Philippine Islands. (1)

On 9 January 1945 the Sixth Army invaded Luzon, Philippine Islands and by 4 March 1945 Manila was completely in American hands. (2)

The conquest of the Philippine Islands was only partially completed when the first penetration of the inner defenses of the Japanese empire took place with the invasion of Iwo Jima by the veteran 4th and 5th Marine Divisions on 18 March 1945. (3)

The war in the Pacific was progressing very rapidly and the anticipated end of the war in Europe would release large forces for redeployment to the Pacific Theater. (4)

The capture of the Marianas and Philippine Islands placed us some 1300 miles from the Japanese homeland and the capture of Iwo Jima had advanced the line to within 640 miles of Tokyo. The next problem confronting (1) A-8, pp. 13, 16; (2) A-6, pp. 19, 31; (3) A-1, p. 660; (4) A-6, p. 59.

the Allies was to secure a position in the Nansei Shoto Chain which extends from Kyushu down to Japanese held Formosa prior to the invasion of the homeland. (5) (See Map No 1)

Okinawa, the principal island in the Ryukyus chain and only 350 miles from the island of Kyushu, was selected as the final target prior to the invasion of the Japanese homeland. Okinawa, an island approximately 67 miles long; and varying in width from 3 to 10 miles, is surrounded by a coral reef extending 300 to 1000 yards off shore and a seawall ranging in height from 2 to 10 feet. The reef and seawall greatly increased the hazards of an amphibious operation. The northern area is generally rugged, mountainous, wooded, undeveloped and of little military importance, while the southern area consists mostly of rolling country, broken by numerous escarpments*. The southern area contains the greater number of the towns, roads and communication centers. Practically all of the 430,000 inhabitants live in the southern portion and Naha, the capital city, had a prewar population of 65,000. (6)

Okinawa is located in the temperate zone and has a relatively high and equable temperature throughout the year. The Ryukyus chain is in the typhoon region where three to six typhoons may be expected to strike yearly. 1 April 1945 was selected as the target date for Operation Iceberg considering this time of the year would be most favorable for military operations. The island became a prefecture of Japan in 1879 and Americans were excluded by the Japanese thereby greatly hampering our intelligence efforts. (7)

The well trained and disciplined 32d Japanese Army defended Okinawa. Lt. General Mitsuru Ushijima was placed in command August 1944 and had under his command 56,000 - 58,000 combat troops; major units consisted of the 62d Division from China, 24th Division from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, 27th Tank Regiment and the 1st Artillery Mortar

(5) A-1, p. 663; (6) A-8, p. 79; (7) A-11, p. 2.

*Ground about a fortified place, cut away steeply to prevent hostile approach.

Regiment. It was estimated his forces would be considerably strengthened by the conscription of natives for service units and use in the front lines when necessary. The Japanese 9th Division was shifted from Okinawa to Formosa in December 1944 in anticipation of an attack on this island. (8)

The invasion of Okinawa and outlying islands was necessary for the following reasons:

a. Primarily to establish air bases from which to attack the main island of Japan to secure sea approaches and to secure airfields for our land based fighters to cover the invasion of Japan.

b. To support operations along the coast of China.

c. To sever the Japanese air and sea communications between the empire and territory gained by conquest.

d. To acquire bases for future operations and continuous pressure against the enemy. (9)

To accomplish this objective the necessary task of gaining control of the air and sea fundamentally fell to the navy. Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr; was selected as the Commanding General of the new US Tenth Army, activated for this important operation. Three Marine Infantry Divisions and four Army Infantry Divisions were alerted and eventually took part in the capture of Okinawa. (10)

The plan for the landings envisaged the following:

map 2,
1. Kerama Islands to be assaulted beginning L minus 6 to secure an anchorage and naval base.

2. The Keise Islands to be captured on L minus 1 to enable Corps long range artillery to be landed and support the main landings on 1 April.

3. Tenth Army to land on L Day - 1 April 1945 on Hagushi beaches with two corps abreast; III amphibious Corps on the left (north) and the XXIV Corps on the right, (south). (11)

(8) A-7, pp. 2, 3, 4; (9) A-9, p. 37; (10) A-8, p. 79; (11) A-6, p. 62.

Lt. General Buckner was given the following mission:

"Assist in the capture, occupation, defense and development of Okinawa Island and establishment of control of the sea and air in the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyus) area; with the eventual aim of extending control of the Nansei Shoto by capturing, defending and developing additional positions". (12)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Lt. General Mitsuru Ushijima, the Commanding General, 32d Army sent his Chief of Staff, Lt. General Cho, to Tokyo in January 1945 to obtain the strategic plan to be used in case of attempted landings on Okinawa. He was told not to oppose the landings since the Kamikaze Corps and suicide boats would destroy the US Navy and leave the American forces stranded to be annihilated. Meanwhile General Ushijima continued the improvement of field fortifications and organization of students attending the university in Naha into guerrilla units. (13)

Lt. General Simon B. Buckner Jr had been placed in command of all Expeditionary Troops. Admiral C. W. Nimitz was in command of the United States Pacific Fleet and Joint Expeditionary Force by Vice Admiral R. K. Turner. (14)

Admiral Nimitz envisioned the overall strategy would consist of isolating the Okinawa area by long range air and naval striking units and the destruction of the enemy by joint operations of air, naval and ground forces. (15)

Task Force 58 commanded by Vice Admiral Mitscher began an attack on the Japanese homeland 18 March and continued attacks on Kyushu, Honshu, Shikoku and the great Jap naval bases of Kobe and Kure until 23 March 1945. The Fifth Air Force, operating from Luzon; struck Formosa daily from 18 to 25 March. The XXI Bomber Command hit the industrial cities of Honshu from the Marianas. The Japanese were beginning to feel the full might of our

(12) A-12, p. (1-0-2); (13) A-7, Part V, p. 2; (14) A-2, Chap. II, p. 1; (15) A-6, p. 60.

navy and army air force. The Japanese high command wondered where we would strike next. (16)

The 77th Infantry Division was given the mission of landing and capturing the Kerama Retto group prior to L Day. The Keise Islands were to be captured on L minus 1. (17) (See Map No 2)

The III Amphibious Corps, commanded by Lt. General R. S. Geiger, was to land on Hagushi beaches on the Tenth Army left flank (north) with the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions in assault with the mission of driving to the east coast and turning north to seize the Ishikawa Isthmus to prevent the arrival of reinforcements from the north. (18) (See Map No 2)

The XXIV Corps, commanded by Lt. General John R. Hodge, was to land with the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions in assault, 96th Infantry Division on the right (south) to split the island as rapidly as possible and turn their drive to the south. The strategy was to divide the Japanese 32d Army thereby making their annihilation much easier. (19) (See Map No 2)

The 2d Marine Division was to execute a feint on the southeastern tip of Okinawa on L Day and L plus 1. The 27th Infantry Division, floating reserve prepared for employment anywhere in the zone of the Tenth Army. (20)

7th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions were engaged in combat in Leyte, Philippine Islands, until 10 February 1945 and came under the Tenth Army during the period 10 to 22 February 1945. (21)

Training was almost negligible since the units were scattered and had to construct their own camps. Some training in breaching and scaling seawalls was conducted. (22)

We will now turn our attention to the 96th Infantry Division, which as a part of the XXIV Corps and Tenth Army was assigned to: (See Map 3)

(16) A-6, pp. 63, 64; (17) A-4, p. 7; (18) A-5, p. 145; (19) A-14, p. 6; (20) A-6, p. 62; (21) A-13, p. (4-0-3) (22) A-13, p. (4-4-4).

a. Land at 0830 1 April 1945 on Beaches White and Brown and defeat and destroy all enemy forces encountered in its zone of action.

b. Capture the commanding hills along the line Sunabe-Sukugawa-Hill 102 and hill mass south of the line Sunabe-Fuenzan-Kue in its zone of action.

c. Protect the corps right (south) flank and secure the objective line marked L plus 10 and be prepared to continue the attack to the south on corps order. (23)

Major General James L. Bradley, Commanding General 96th Division, ordered the 381st Infantry and 383d Infantry Regiments to land abreast, 381st Infantry on the left (north) and 382d Infantry in reserve.

During the 115 days of combat on Leyte, the division had received valuable training and morale and fighting spirit were excellent. Orders were received and planning began for the Ryukyus campaign while the troops were still engaged in clearing out isolated pockets of enemy resistance on Leyte and Samar. (24)

The 96th Division was designated an amphibious division in the spring of 1944. The division was trained by the Marinee at Camp San Luis Obispo, California and completed the training at Camp Callan, California and made landings on the coast of California prior to embarking for the island of Oahu. During the four weeks at Oahu the division made battalion landings on Oahu and a Division landing on the Island of Maui. (25)

The amphibious training was climaxed by the assault on Leyte, Philippine Islands, 20 October 1944. The division was well trained and morale was high for the assault of Okinawa. (26)

Last minute training period was short as the division stressed individual and small-unit training. The three regiments held extensive training for their infantry assault teams in the use of flame throwers and

(23) A-2, Chap. I, p. 1; (24) A-2, Chap. I, p. 1; (25) A-8, p. 9, Personal knowledge; (26) Personal knowledge.

demolitions. Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes were received two weeks before the operation and last minute instructions were given in their use. (27)

Two exercises were held in preparation for operation Iceberg. A rehearsal which included the ship-to-shore movement phase of the operation was conducted on 17 March. This included the landing of the four assault battalions and the embarkation and movement to the line of departure of the remaining five battalions. The deficiencies discovered were corrected. A second rehearsal held on 19 March included the landing of all three infantry regiments. The two rehearsals were of utmost importance to the naval personnel but the battalion landing teams were not able to advance sufficiently inland thereby decreasing the value to the infantry. All landings were made on Leyte. (28)

(See Map No 3) ^{? Now} We will not discuss the terrain overlooking Brown and White beaches on Okinawa. The beaches were composed of coral sand and guarded by a reef located from 350 to 425 yards off shore. At low tide parts of the reef were above water. Numerous hills or pinnacles extending from the beaches to a depth of 2500 yards and ranging in height from sixty to three hundred feet afforded the enemy excellent positions from which to observe and fire on the beaches and on which to organize strong points to resist our advance. A narrow gauge railroad roughly parallels the coast line. Most of the houses had a wall of stone or adobe around them which afforded the enemy excellent cover and concealment. Stone burial vaults* also provided excellent cover for riflemen and gun positions. (29)

The disposition of the Japanese 32d Army on Okinawa was unknown but the Division G-2 did not expect the enemy to defend the beaches in greater strength than one infantry battalion in the zone of the 96th Division. (30)

(27) A-2, Chap V, p. 2 and Personal knowledge; (28) A-2, Chap V, pp. 2, 3; (29) A-3, p. 7; (30) Personal knowledge;

*The dead are buried in concrete burial vaults on top of the ridges for religious reasons.

With all necessary preliminary planning, loading and embarkation, training and rehearsals completed the assault elements commenced loading on 23 March and the remainder of the division embarked 24 March for the Okinawa operation. The convoy of LSTs sailed from Leyte Gulf on 25 March and the troops waited anxiously for their arrival at the target. (31)

The 1st phase of Operation Iceberg began while the combat divisions were enroute to Okinawa. On L minus 6 day (26 March 1945) the 77th Infantry Division began the assault on the Kerama Retto. The troops established beachheads and by 29 March organized resistance had collapsed. The following day the islands were declared secure. During this operation the 77th Division destroyed over 350 Japanese suicide boats loaded with high explosives and designed for ramming our naval shipping under cover of darkness. (32) (See Map No 2)

On 31 March 1945 the 77th Division seized the small island of Keise Shima about 20,000 yards from the Hagushi beaches and 11,000 yards from Naha city. The 420th Corps Field Artillery Group (155mm guns) were landed and in position ready to support the landings early 1 April 1945. (33) (See Map No 2)

Since L minus 7, 25 March, Okinawa had been under intermittent bombing and gunfire which would continue until the landings were made. (34)

THE BATTALION SITUATION

The 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was in the town of Catbalogan, Samar Philippine Islands when the division received orders for Operation Iceberg. The battalion returned immediately to Leyte and rejoined the remainder of the regiment. Planning orders were received on 5 February and only six weeks remained to receive replacements, equip the men, train, rehearse, load and complete the final details for the invasion. Fortunately, the casualties in the battalion were light on Leyte and the majority of the

(31) A-2, Chap VI, p. 1; (32) A-6, p. 65; (33) A-3, p. 145; (34) A-1, p. 666.

key non-commissioned officers remained with the companies. The battalion had received ample amphibious training and little time would be required. The battalion S-3 instructed the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon to construct a vertical wall and the boat teams were given intensive training in scaling walls. In case the troops encountered a high seawall on Okinawa no delay would occur in climbing the wall. The engineers built ladders which became organic equipment for each landing vehicle track. (35)

No firing ranges were available nor did time considerations permit construction so, all beer cans and bottles were conserved and used for targets as a field expedient. The resulting firing range corresponded to a shooting gallery comparable to one found at a fair or carnival in the states. (36)

Physical and mental conditioning was stressed. Detailed training was given in map reading, scouting and patrolling, individual training, demolitions, and leadership during the extensive mopping up on the islands of Leyte and Samar. (37)

Operation Order 1-45 gave the following missions to the 381st Infantry:

1. Regimental Combat Team 381 lands on White beaches, 1st Battalion on the right, 3d Battalion on left, 2d Battalion in reserve, advances inland defeating and destroying all enemy forces in its zone of action.
2. Maintain contact with 3d Battalion 32d Infantry, 7th Division on the left.

Plans for the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry were as follows: (See Map 4)

Battalion Landing Team 3-381, Company I on right, Company L on the left, Company K in reserve lands on 1 April at 0830 on Beach White 1 and moves rapidly inland destroying all enemy in its zone of action; remove all enemy mortar and small arms fire from White Beach 1, captures commanding (35), (36), (37) Personal knowledge.

hills along line Sunabe-Sukugawa-Hill 102. (38) (See Map No 4; Table 1 page 35 and Table 2 page 36 for landing diagram and boat loading assignment.)

In reference to Class I supplies; each man was to carry (1) D, (1) K and (1) assault ration and two full canteens. These were to be issued prior to debarkation. Full Field rolls would be left aboard ship and only toilet articles, extra pair of socks and other minor articles of clothing were taken. The jungle poncho was issued to all soldiers for protection against the rain and elements. (39)

The critical terrain features in the zone of the 3d Battalion were the railroad running parallel to the beach approximately 650 yards inland, Highway #1 and Hill 102. The battalion zone was divided between Companies to avoid confusion and to prevent the by passing of enemy groups. Numerous rifle pits and possible machine gun emplacements dotted the area behind the wall and along the beach. Cross country mobility was excellent. Observation and fields of fire favored the enemy. (40)

The two rehearsals familiarized all boat teams with their leaders. Company C 170th Engineers was attached to the battalion with the mission of relieving the infantry of all beach responsibilities. The company was designated the Shore Party Company and landed detachments early to mark the flanks of white beach and to blast two holes in the seawall. (41)

Lt. Colonel Nolan, 3d Battalion Commander, had at his disposal liaison officers with sufficient communication from the navy, naval air, artillery and 4.2 mortars. Complete plans were coordinated to ensure utilization of all available fires. (42)

Troops were payed ten dollars in Japanese yen to be used as legal tender with the natives. The yen was also interchangeable one for one with the regular Japanese yen. (43)

To bring the battalion officer strength up to authorized T/O four

(38) A-3, p. 2; (39) Personal knowledge; (41), (42), (43) A-2, Chap VI p. 1 and personal knowledge; (40) A-3, p. 8

outstanding non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves on Leyte were given battlefield promotions to the grade of 2d Lieutenant.

(44)

The convoy departed 25 March from Leyte and the trip to the target was uneventful except the convoy was hit by a storm lasting over two days which caused a great deal of seasickness. During the trip the briefing and details were given down to and including the riflemen. The order was not disseminated below the company commander prior to boarding ship.

(45)

When the division sailed from Leyte to Okinawa the information program was instituted with a transcribed fighting address by Lt. General Simon B. Buckner Jr., and on the eve of the landing a message from the division commander, Major General James L. Bradley, was read to the troops.

(46)

As the ships arrived in the China Sea and commenced launching landing craft the battalion operation officer was confident the men were ready for whatever resistance would be met on the beaches. (47)

BATTALION SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT PLAN

The battalion S-3 attended a meeting of all Infantry Battalion and Regimental S-3's at Division Headquarters on 5 February 1945 to discuss the Ship to Shore Movement Plan for the impending operation to be known as Operation ICEBERG. This plan prescribed the number of landing craft per wave; the general landing formation of each battalion to include the number of Landing Vehicle Track (LVT) per wave; the loading of assault personnel on Landing Ship Tanks (LST); and the number of boat teams. In amphibious operations the primary unit in the Infantry Division is the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and in the Battalion Landing Team the success or failure of the operation hinges on how well the boat teams are tactically

(44), (45), (46), (47) A-2, Chap VI, p. 1 and Personal knowledge.

organized and the fighting ability of each.

The 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry was to land on White 1. It was decided each battalion would land with two companies abreast and eight Landing Vehicle Track vehicles in each assault wave. Each battalion landing team was to be assigned three Landing Ship Tanks to transport the battalion and landing craft to the target. After considerable discussion it was decided that the assault companies plus attachments in each assault battalion would be loaded on one Landing Ship Tank. The Commanding General felt the advantages gained in coordination and final briefing would more than over shadow the danger of losing both companies in case of air or submarine attack. The second IST would carry the Reserve Company, miscellaneous Engineers with bulldozers and other heavy equipment. This plan was approved by the Division Commander and the Regimental Commanders on 10 February, only five days after the initial meeting. Only six weeks remained for planning, training and rehearsals. (48)

Lt. Colonel Daniel A. Nolan Jr., Commander, 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, and his staff held a conference on 11 February to make preliminary arrangements for the battalion plan. The Battalion Commander decided I and L Companies would land in assault on White 1 -- I Company on the right; K Company in Reserve would land in the 5th Wave in rear of both assault companies. (49)

Lt. Colonel Nolan ordered the Battalion S-3 to immediately prepare draft of boat assignment tables, Landing Diagram and IST Loading Plan for Operation Iceberg. The Battalion S-3 was notified all landing craft would be LVT-4 (Landing Vehicle Track - Capacity 25 boat spaces excluding weapons and ammunition) with the exception of three LVT-2. The author will attempt to clarify a few points regarding these types of landing craft. The important differences between the LVT-4 and LVT-2 are in size

(48) A-2, Chap III, p. 5; (49) Personal knowledge.

and construction. Both LVT's are full track with 1/2 inch armor plating and capable of moving equally well on water or land. The capacity of the LVT-2 is only 15 boat spaces while the LVT-4 will handle about 25 soldiers fully equipped. The LVT-4 is much the superior type as the stern ramp makes for faster and safer debarking of troops and permits the handling of vehicles and all types of cargo. (50)

The following troops were attached to the battalion and comprised (BLT-3) Battalion Landing Team 3 - 381st Infantry: (51)

	<u>O</u>	<u>EM</u>
3d Battalion 381st Infantry	35	825
3d Platoon Antitank Co. 381st Infantry	1	33
3d Platoon Cannon Co. 381st Infantry	1	21
3d Platoon Co. A, 321st Engineer Battalion	1	44
3d Platoon Co. A, 321st Medical Battalion	2	30
Battalion Medical Section	2	20
Lt O & Forward Observer Sections, 361st FA Bn	3	28
Detachment 593d Joint Assault Signal Co.	3	14
3d Platoon Co. C, 519th Military Police Bn	1	46
Photo Assignment Team		1
Bn & Forward Sec. 88th Chemical Bn. (4.2)	1	9
Company C 170th Engineer Battalion	5	183
3d Platoon 293d Port Company	1	64 (a)
1/2 728th Am Track Battalion	5	255 (b)
Co. A, 780th Am Tank Battalion	4	112 (c)
Naval Gunfire Lt O & Party (Naval Officer)	1	5
Naval Gunfire Spotter O & Party (Arty O)	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
	67	1695

(a) The 3d Platoon 293d Port Company was attached to the landing team only for operational control and was not loaded on Landing Ship Tanks

(50) Personal knowledge; (51) A-3, Opn Order

assigned to the battalion nor did they enter into the boat loading or landing on White Beach 1.

(b) Personnel were crews of Landing Vehicle Track assault craft and did not figure in loading tables.

(c) Company A, 780th Am Tank Battalion was assigned one Landing Ship Tank and formed the first wave comprising Am Track Tanks with 75mm howitzers mounted. Company A, 780th Am Tank Battalion landed with 14 assault tanks in the first wave.

The Battalion S-3 decided to set aside for planning purposes two landing craft for the command group. These two vehicles were arbitrarily numbered 0 and 00 for control purposes and in this manner easily distinguished as not a part of a wave. The battalion executive officer was separated from the battalion commander in case the assault LST was sunk, and loaded on the LST with K Company in reserve. The battalion commander and his observation post group were transported with I and L Companies.

The complete Ship to Shore Movement Plan, after considerable shifting of personnel, was submitted to the battalion commander on 4 March and after minor changes, approved on 5 March 1945. (52)

See Table 1 - Landing Diagram -----Page 35

See Table 2 - Boat Assignment Table -----Page 36

THE ASSAULT - 1 APRIL 1945

On Easter Sunday 010705 April 1945 LSTs of the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry arrived in their respective areas and proceeded to launch amphibious craft according to plan. The long awaited landings were about to begin. The Battalion Landing Team ate an early breakfast aboard ship with the uppermost thought in every soldier's mind, "What will the Japanese do to prevent our landing?" The public address system announced, "All personnel proceed to the tank deck and prepare to load LVT's. The veterans of the Philippines knew the stage was set.

(52) Personal knowledge.

The troops were loaded by 0705 and the assault craft began driving off the loading ramp into the China Sea and headed for the Line of Departure approximately 2,000 yards off shore. The rumble of supporting naval gunfire and air bombardment grew intense. LCI Rocket, 40mm and 4.2 mortar boats pounded the beaches. The assault waves were formed according to plan and headed for White Beach 1. The 75mm guns of the 780th Amphibious Tank Battalion in the first wave opened fire on the beaches and continued to fire on beach installations while advancing toward the beaches. The landing time was selected at high tide to enable craft--other than track landing vehicles--to get over the reef. About 350 yards off shore the alligators hit the reef but continued toward shore without interruption.

(53)

The 3d Battalion Landing Team, under heavy supporting fire hit the beaches at 0830 and surprisingly not a single shot was fired by the enemy. (See Map 4) Companies I and L quickly pushed inland. The battalion commander and his Observation Post group landed at 0838 in rear of the 3d wave. All boat teams landed per schedule and the assault echelons headed for the vital railroad 650 yards inland. After a hasty reorganization, Companies I and L made contact by SCR-300. By 0930 the railroad was cut and the battalion had not suffered one casualty. The town of Sakugawa, Hill 160, and the coastal road to our front were the next objectives. Companies I and L moved forward when suddenly a large shell exploded in rear of I Company on the right flank. The battalion S-3 believed the navy was firing short. In a few minutes two more rounds landed in the battalion zone. Company I immediately radioed the firing was coming from Hill 160, 300 yards to the front. Lt. Colonel Nolan, the battalion commander only gave one command to the company commander, "Get that gun now!" Lt. Kline notified his 1st and 2d Platoon Leaders that due to the nature of the hill

(53) Personal knowledge.

and the dangers of a two platoon assault he would use only the 1st Platoon, Company I. 2d Lt. Salvatore E. DiNuzzo, platoon leader 1st Platoon made a quick estimate of the situation and decided to use two squads in the attack. Four Amphibious Tanks were moved forward, just in the rear of the 1st Platoon to provide direct fire support of the 75mm guns mounted on the AmTracks. Each squad was organized into an assault detachment carrying demolitions, fragmentation and white phosphorous grenades. The support squad was organized similarly and was carrying a flame thrower in addition to its organic weapons. The platoon was able to advance within 100 yards without drawing fire from the Japanese Outpost. Suddenly the Japs opened fire with rifles and one Light Machine Gun as the platoon reached the base of Hill 160. The Amphibious Tanks with direct fire quickly silenced the small arms fire but the Nips started throwing satchel charges and grenades. The platoon halted and was hesitant in advancing so Lt. DiNuzzo quickly moved in front of his platoon and after this display of leadership the squad moved forward. By the use of fire and movement the two assault squads moved close enough to cause the enemy to abandon the five inch coastal gun and seek refuge in a small cave. The flame thrower was moved forward and the full force of the flame was placed in the cave aperture. The flame destroyed the remaining Japs. Twenty-three Japanese were killed and the only casualty suffered by the 1st Platoon was Lt. DiNuzzo, the Platoon Leader. It was necessary to evacuate the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant assumed command. The gun was demolished by placing several ten pound charges under the carriage. Hill 160 was in our possession. (54)

The 1st Battalion, 381st Infantry on the regimental right flank advanced very rapidly but their advance was delayed when friendly naval planes subjected the troops to a bombing and strafing attack. The naval air liaison officer quickly halted the air attack and luckily the 1st

(54) Personal knowledgs.

Battalion suffered only a few casualties. The 1st Battalion was delayed in their advance by the strafing and a gap in depth was discovered between the assault battalions of the 381st Infantry. (55)

By 1300 Highway 1 and Sakugawa were captured without resistance. (See Map 1) Lt. Colonel Nolan and the battalion S-3 were closely watching the hour tick by and knew the prominent terrain feature Hill 102 must be captured prior to darkness. From Hill 102 the enemy could launch a counterattack with observation over the entire landing beaches. Captain Frederick G. Caldwell, Company Commander Company L on the battalion left flank reported no enemy could be observed on Hill 102. The battalion commander decided to take no chances so he turned to the Air Liaison Officer and asked for an air strike consisting of rockets, bombs and ending in a strafing mission on Hill 102. The air strike was quickly cleared and the carrier radioed a squadron of 7 planes from one of the carriers would make the strike in five minutes. The planes rocketed, dive bombed and strafed the hill. Company L jumped off immediately and to their surprise the hill was captured without a fight. Hill 102 was a large undefended fortress. A series of caves were dug through the base of the hill and tunneled to meet an attack from any direction. The enemy was aiding our attack by yielding important terrain without a fight. (56)

Colonel Michael E. Halloran, the regimental commander 381st Infantry, appeared on the scene and expressed his satisfaction at the excellent advance made by the battalion. By 1600 the 3d Battalion had advanced inland 3,000 yards and decided to try and capture Shido before dark. Progress continued with only sniper fire slowing up the advance of the infantry. The spirit of the troops was superior as they moved out for Shido. Major Howard R. Miles, Battalion Executive Officer, landed with the sixth wave and communication with the Battalion CP was established and operating. (55) A-8, p. 86; (56) Personal knowledge.

The troops' water supply was getting low as the advance had been made during temperature in the 80 degrees. About 800 yards to the Northwest of Shido terrain with deep ravines, gullies, foliage and sharp escarpments was encountered. The battalion commander did not desire to dig in for the night in this area since the observation and dangers of infiltration would make our position for the night very precarious. The battalion S-3 was notified to radio regiment we were halting for the night in present position and overlay of battalion positions would be forwarded to Regimental CP. (57)

The 383d Infantry, on the Division right and driving south with their flank anchored on the coastline, made substantial gains and by nightfall had captured Kue and had stopped for the night just northwest of Momobaru. (58)

The 361st Field Artillery in direct support of the 381st Infantry was landed via DUKWS by 1400. The Field Artillery Liaison Officer with the 3d Battalion immediately established radio contact and was anxious to register the artillery prior to darkness. The battalion commander was concerned primarily with the terrain to our direct front. Visibility was poor and the area was covered with trees and thick foliage, making an attack on our positions during the night very dangerous. The artillery was registered and the battalion commander and the S-3 made a personal reconnaissance of the entire front and decided on digging in with two companies on the main line of resistance. (See Map No 4) Due to the gap between the 32d Infantry (7th Infantry Division) on the left and the 1st Battalion, 381st Infantry on the right, the battalion was disposed in a modified perimeter for the night. The flanks would be bent to the rear and the reserve company would defend the battalion rear with the Battalion Headquarters (-) and Company M (-) disposed generally in the center of the perimeter. 1st Machine Gun Platoon was placed in direct support of (57) Personal knowledge; (58) A-8, p. 89.

I Company on the right. The 37th mm Antitank Guns were placed on the battalion right to cover the trail leading into the positions. The 81mm Mortar Platoon registered their mortars in the deep ravines and avenues of approach in the woods. Company K, in reserve, dug in and moved its flanks forward to tie in with the front line rifle companies. The diameter of the perimeter was approximately 600 yards. The battalion hastily dug three man foxholes and by 2000 the battalion was gradually completing the gun emplacements and individual shelters. The Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer had arranged for illumination during the night by firing one naval shell every three minutes. In case of attack the rate would be stepped up to one every minute. Communication was established by laying wire to each company and tying in with the Battalion switchboard. (59)

The S-4 resupplied the battalion with water and ammunition. The battalion commander and the S-3 made a complete inspection of the positions and felt the battalion would be able to stand off an attack -- if and when it came. (60)

As the sun set a strange feeling came over the battalion with the realization that we had driven 3,000 yards in the heart of Okinawa without the Japanese putting up a fight. The temperature dropped from a high of 80 degrees during the day to the low 50's. Rolls were aboard the ship so the soldiers hunched in their ponchos to keep warm. They were set for the enemy but as the night passed without an attack the morale of the battalion improved. The only incident during the night was a small infiltrating group endeavoring to get through our lines in an attempt to reach the beaches. No casualties were sustained and only three Jap soldiers were killed. (61)

WHERE ARE THE JAPANESE?

Rumors were flying that the Japanese had abandoned Okinawa and shifted to the island of Formosa. Since Formosa was our cover plan it seemed (59), (60), (61) Personal knowledge.

possible that maybe the Japanese had decided to let us capture Okinawa without a fight. The navy reconnaissance planes reported seeing troops moving in the hills to the south. G-2, 96th Infantry Division, reported the Corps 155mm Gun Group on Keise Shima was shelled the night of 31 March by guns of 150mm caliber from positions in the area of Naha. The natives had disappeared to the north and south. The Marines driving to the north reported that only small scattered groups of Japanese were encountered. The location of the Japanese 32d Army was not established. The Japanese air force did not appear over the beaches and as the night passed the 96th Division realized it had come to stay until the job was finished. (62)

THE SECOND DAY AND CAPTURE OF SHIMABUKU

The field order for the second day, 2 April 1945, gave the Third Battalion a simple order. (See Map No 5) "Continue the attack 0800 with the mission of capturing Shido and Shimabuku." The battalion ate an early breakfast of K Rations and rolled their ponchos and made preparation for the continuation of the attack. Lt. Colonel Nolan ordered the attack and designated the line of woods as the area of departure. Jump off called for I Company on the right, K Company on the left and L Company following I Company by 200 yards, thus protecting the battalion right flank. A ten minute artillery preparation was fired on the town of Shido. The battalion crossed the Area of Departure on time and plunged into the woods to its front. (63)

By 0900 the battalion had advanced 600 yards through the woods without receiving any fire. (See Map No 5) The advance was continued and as the battalion approached the high ground near the outskirts of Shido an obstacle which would hamper our progress was encountered. The Japanese had dug an antitank ditch across our entire front. The Antitank ditch was reinforced with mines, logs and barbed wire. The ditch was 10 feet in depth and 14 feet in width making it impassable to track and wheeled (62), (63) A-14, p. 20, Personal knowledge.

vehicles. Coincident with the discovery of the antitank obstacles, the 3d Platoon, Cannon Company was landed over the reef and reported for action about 0930. The 3d Platoon, Cannon Company was equipped with Self Propelled 105mm Howitzers mounted on M-7 chassis. Knowing that enemy resistance was sure to stiffen, the appearance of the Cannon Platoon was most welcome. The battalion commander made a hasty reconnaissance and decided to move forward without transport. The obstacle proved to be no hazard to foot troops. The division was anxious to secure all the terrain possible in a minimum of time. (64)

Due to the absence of the enemy the battalion observation group moved forward with the assault echelons. Lt. Colonel Nolan ordered the front line troops to set fire to the town of Shido. The battalion moved into Shido and only sniper fire was received. Every hill was a fortress and mines were only half buried. It appeared the enemy abandoned the positions only a few days previous and placed the mines along their route of withdrawal. The battalion S-3 notified the 3d Platoon, Company C, 321st Engineers to dispose of the mines and make plans to move a bulldozer forward and bridge the antitank ditch along the narrow road leading into the town. The time was 1230 as the battalion left Shido and passed through the woods and entered open terrain again. Observation was excellent and the weather was aiding the entire Tenth Army in no small measure. (See Map No 5) The small village of Yamaji lay between the battalion and its main objective for 2 April, namely Shimabuku. K Company passed through Yamaji and no enemy were discovered. As the leading elements advanced into the open, artillery fire began to fall 300 yards to the front. The units quickly dispersed into small ravines and no casualties were received. The artillery stopped as suddenly as it began and the fire was estimated to be 150mm. It was apparent the troops had entered a long range pre-arranged concentration for as they moved out of the area the enemy stopped (64) Personal knowledge.

firing. The battalion was ordered to halt pending a reconnaissance and issuance of new orders for the seizure of Shimabuku. (65)

The battalion commander followed by the S-3, Artillery Liaison Officer, Naval Gunfire Officer and Battalion S-2 stopped at Road Junction A which was 500 yards northwest of Shimabuku. (See Map No 5) The Reconnaissance party then proceeded 300 yards to the south in order to reach an excellent vantage point which we shall call Hill 68. This small jagged, rocky hill gave observation over the entire terrain. As the staff members reached the OP and looked toward the town they noticed that the entire area was extremely level and without vegetation or covered routes for the attacking infantry. The battalion plan included an attack with two companies abreast - K Company on the left and I Company on the right. Luckily the attached Cannon Platoon was able to rejoin the battalion prior to the attack by passing through the zone of the 7th Infantry Division. The self propelled 105mm howitzers would support the attack by overhead fire. The plan called for the navy to fire a ten minute concentration followed by a five minute artillery preparation. Time of attack was set for 1600. The unit commanders were assembled on Hill 68 and necessary orders were issued. The battalion jumped off following the navy and artillery preparations and reached within 100 yards of the city when K Company on the left was shelled heavily by 50mm and 81mm mortars from positions in the zone of the 7th Infantry Division near the battalion left flank. K Company, caught in the open, hit the ground as the fire continued. The intelligence Observation Post Section spotted the Japanese firing their mortars from open positions 800 yards north of Shimabuku. (See Map No 5) The artillery liaison officer called for fire but the fire direction center would not clear the mission since it was out of our zone. Finally the 81mm Mortar Platoon took the positions under fire and silenced the enemy mortars. It is felt the Japanese hid in a cave when the 7th Division passed through

(65) Personal knowledge.

this area and our fire only drove the Japanese back into the cave. Since it was but a small delaying force the battalion commander gave orders to continue the attack. (66)

K Company suffered five casualties from the mortar fire. By this time I Company on the right had entered the town, receiving only sporadic rifle fire. K Company moved ahead when the mortar fire lifted. The 105mm firing by the Cannon Platoon frightened the Japanese and the majority slipped out of the town and disappeared to the south. Approximately 20 Japanese were killed in this action. The town of Shimabuku was cleared of all enemy by 1730. (67)

After clearing the town and notifying higher headquarters that our supplies were low, the regimental commander ordered us to halt on the high ground 500 yards southeast of Shimabuku. The battalion S-4 appeared on the scene and informed the battalion commander that the antitank ditch serving our main supply route was still impassable. This announcement came as a severe shock to the battalion commander as the regimental S-3 had reported the road would be repaired by dark. The battalion was tired, hungry, and in need of water and ammunition. (68)

In the meantime the regimental commander had committed the 2d Battalion, 381st Infantry in the gap between the 3d Battalion and 1st Battalion. As the regiment started the turning movement toward the south the regimental front was greatly increased. (See Map No 5) The 32d Infantry on our left had reached the eastern coastline thereby being the first unit to sever the island. The Corps Commander realized it would be necessary to change the boundary between the 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions. The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions continued their drive to the north against light resistance. (69)

For the night K Company reverted to Battalion Reserve and L Company moved forward to take over the Battalion left flank. I Company would tie in with L Company on the left. The battalion defense was to consist of (66), (67), (68) Personal knowledge; (69) A-6, p. 67.

a reduced perimeter since no friendly units were within 800 yards. While the battalion was digging in, Lt. Colonel Nolan, in conference with the B-4, decided something had to be done about the supply situation. The Regimental Commander stated the engineers could not repair the Battalion Main Supply Route since all available bulldozers and personnel were engaged in setting up beach installations and building runways over the reef so supplies could be unloaded direct into vehicles. (70)

Lt. Colonel Nolan asked the Air Liaison Officer what the chances would be for an air supply drop from the carriers. All airplanes operating in the area were stationed aboard carriers as the distance was too great for fighters to fly from Iwo Jima or the Philippine Islands. The air liaison officer contacted the regimental air officer and he stated he would begin work immediately on the details of an air drop for the morning of 3 April 1945. (71)

The battalion continued digging in and just prior to darkness a soldier from K Company decided to remove the enemy artillery triangulation station near the hill top. Just about the time the station was removed heavy 75mm fire began to fall in the K Company area. (See Map No 5)

The location of the Jap 75mm Field Gun could not be located but the general direction of fire was from the vicinity of Hill 161. During this short barrage the battalion suffered two men killed and three men seriously wounded. Shimabuku shelling cost the battalion one of their most valued soldiers, 1st Sergeant Walter M. Korejwo of K Company. Sergeant Korejwo had been with the third battalion since activation at Camp Adair, Oregon and had completed 29 years and seven months active service when he was killed. The loss of this man shocked the battalion and especially Company K.

The battalion commander immediately placed artillery fire and direct 105mm fire from the Cannon Platoon on the suspected firing position. The (70), (71) Personal knowledge.

enemy withdrew. The tactics of the Japanese were proving to be difficult and most unusual. Strike at long range with various weapons; then disappear before you could strike back. A few days later the Japanese returned to their normal method of fighting to the last man and holding at all costs.

The battalion dug in as darkness fell over the island. 2200 hours 2 April 1945 word was received from regiment that the air drop had been approved. (72)

THE NAVY AIR DROP

1st Lt. Edward O. Logan, Battalion Communication Officer, was given the mission of selecting a Drop Zone and also to mark the zone with fluorescent panels. The battalion asked for Rifle Caliber 30 Ammunition, 81mm Mortar Ammunition, water and rations to be dropped. Lt. Colonel Nolan was anxious to receive the drop early on the morning of the 3d so as not to delay the attack scheduled for 0800. Final coordination and plans were completed with the naval carrier task force and the earliest the navy could make the drop was 1000. This was later than desired but the battalion could not move without additional supplies so the plan was accepted. The arrangements for the air drop were coordinated through the naval air liaison officer working directly with the battalion commander and splendid use was made of naval air communication. The night of 2 April was quiet except that a strong Jap Patrol of men moving along a trail toward the town of Shimabuku stumbled into a section of heavy machine guns on the left flank. The machine gun section opened up and with assistance from the riflemen all Japs were killed. No casualties were sustained by the battalion during this action. The battalion made plans for the air drop early the morning of 3 April and continuation of the attack to the south. An area was cleared on the level and open ground 200 yards southwest of Shimabuku. (See Map No 5) The air drop was to be (72) Personal knowledge.

made by 9 Navy TBF's, and each different type of supply would be dropped by a different colored parachute. All available panels were used and the final signal for the air drop would be the use of a green smoke shell in the center of the selected area. The planes arrived 0945 and the drop commenced without any trouble. Each plane made two runs over the area dropping supplies on each run. Sixty gallon of water, 6,000 rounds of Caliber 30 Ammunition, 100 rounds of 81mm Mortar Ammunition and 1 D ration for the battalion and attached units were dropped. The supplies were quickly retrieved and separated. To our consternation the Caliber 30 ammunition was loaded in five round clips for the '03 rifle, mortar ammunition was rusty and about 40 percent of the rations were spoiled. Even though the drop was only about 50 percent effective it prevented any further delay in the attack. (73)

BEACHHEAD SECURED - 3 APRIL 1945

The time of the attack was set for 1030. The battalion plan was to move out and advance in column of companies until resistance was met. The battalion would now turn to the south since the 7th Division was moving along the western coastal road and the boundaries had been moved to the west. (See Map No 6) The objective for the day was the L plus 10 line which would overrun Hill 138, Unjo and reach Hill 165. (74)

(See Map No 6) The battalion moved out in a column of Companies - K, I, Battalion Headquarters Company, L, M (-) - at 1030. The rate of advance was increased due to the lack of opposition and to compensate for the initial delay caused by the air drop. Hill 138 was reached at 1130 and no enemy was encountered. The advance continued at a rapid pace and as the time passed the gap between the companies increased. The last message received from K Company was about 1500, stating they had passed through Unjo and would move on the prominent hill mass 165. The battalion commander ordered I Company to pass through Unjo and search (73), (74) Personal knowledge.

the town for any bypassed Japanese meanwhile contact with K Company was lost. The Battalion Command Group decided to halt the remainder of the battalion in the town of Unjo. No enemy was discovered in Unjo and a message had been received that the divisional boundaries were being changed for the attack of 4 April. The 381st Infantry would be passed through by the 184th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division and upon relief the 381st Infantry would move across the island into an assembly area near Futema and be prepared to be committed anywhere in the division zone. (75)

Communication was finally reestablished with K Company through artillery channels about 1730. Captain Harold W. Butler, Company Commander stated his company was ambushed on hill 165. The company reached the base of Hill 165 without a shot being fired and started toward the hill top. Just as they reached the summit the company was pinned down by terrific machine gun, mortar and rifle fire. The initial fire killed the Artillery Forward Observer and injured one of the radio operators. Several casualties were sustained by K Company. The company could not move and they were about 1000 yards in front of the battalion. Captain Butler was ordered to remain in position and attempt to break off contact with the enemy after dark. The adjacent battalion commander from the 7th Infantry Division rendered fire support and aided the company in evacuating the casualties and withdrawing from the hill. Company K rejoined the battalion at 2200 near Unjo. The intentions of the enemy were becoming evident. He would remain in well prepared positions and only lightly man the outposts of his main line of resistance. (76)

The beachhead was now secure. The Tenth Army had cut the island in two segments. On the north the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions had made substantial gains and the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions had driven (75), (76) Personal knowledge.

south against light resistance. The Tenth Army now held an area 15 miles long with their flanks anchored on the eastern and western shores.

(77)

RELIEF OF THE 381ST INFANTRY

The 381st Infantry Regiment had driven across the island and secured the L plus 10 line on 3 April 1945. The casualties in the regiment were light and valuable terrain was secured. 0730 on the 4th of April the 184th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division passed through the 381st Infantry, the latter reverted to division reserve at 0800. The 3d Battalion was tired and welcomed the relief, even though it would be of only a short duration. The regiment completed the movement into an assembly area near Futema 041730 April 1945. (78)

In summary, the amphibious landing was efficiently conducted and in three days the battalion had driven across the island and to the south a distance of 11,000 yards. The battalion killed approximately 93 Japanese during this three day engagement and our casualties totaled eight men killed and seventeen men wounded. The enemy did not fight, but the battalion landing was so organized that a determined enemy would have had difficulty slowing our advance. The initiative and aggressiveness displayed by the battalion was encouraging. Communications were excellent and the coordination between supporting fires left nothing to be desired. The Amphibious training had certainly paid off on the battlefield. The battalion was later to engage in the toughest fighting for the island of Okinawa. (79)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In analyzing this operation we must realize the successful landing on Okinawa and subsequent capture 82 days later came shortly before the (77) A-6, Map 14; (78), (79) Personal knowledge.

war ended. Many of the benefits that could have accrued from the capture were never exploited. Also the psychological effect of the Ryukyus Campaign on the Japanese people is difficult to estimate. Actually, the battle for Okinawa was the battle for Japan itself.

From the defenders point of view the enemy had excellent observation, good fields of fire along the beaches and extensive cover and concealment. The Sunabe hill mass in the zone of the 96th Infantry Division overlooked the beaches and could have been used as an excellent delaying position. The seawall and reef could have been used as serious impediments on a defended beach.

General Ushijima's decision to not oppose the landings and hand the Yontan and Kadena airfields over without a fight was a serious mistake, and he is to be severely criticized.

The rehearsals conducted in the Philippines proved to be very beneficial. However, actual firing must be conducted during all amphibious landings. It was fortunate the units had left the battlefield only two months previous to the assault, since no firing ranges were available for zeroing weapons.

The assignment of personnel to landing craft must be carefully considered since the boat team is the primary fighting unit in the battalion landing team.

The orders for the landings were simple, concise and easily understood. Maps were plentiful and extremely accurate. Maps of 1/12,500 scale were issued down to and including squad leaders. Only one terrain model of the beaches was available. The reserve company and the battalion executive officer were denied the many advantages gained in studying the terrain aid. It is believed the fighting speech recorded by Lt. General Buckner and distributed to all ship's captains to be played to all troops was a moral booster and an excellent manner for a high commander to speak to his troops. The individual soldier realized his

*Maki
decision
see page 7.*

commander was interested in his welfare.

The initiative displayed by Lt. DiNuzzo in destroying the five inch naval gun on Hill 160 was commendable and emphasizes the need for combat leadership.

Modification of TO and E for the operation proved to be sound. The heavy weapons company carried Light Machine Guns ashore and each rifle platoon was organized into an assault echelon. Each squad was equipped with two Browning Automatic Rifles and the 3d squad in each rifle platoon carried demolitions and a flame thrower.

No major changes in amphibious doctrine were produced but this operation only served to further test these methods and to improve techniques.

The SCR-300 and SCR-536 radios were excellent when used within their capabilities.

The failure of the engineers to restore the Battalion Supply Route was costly. It is believed in the initial stages of an amphibious operation an armored bulldozer must be attached to the assault battalions so their progress will not be slowed down.

The supply drop by the navy was successful but since the ammunition was loaded in 5 round clips for the '03 rifle, rations spoiled and mortar ammunition rusty and not safe for firing it was of little assistance. Supplies for the infantry must be fresh and supplies aboard carriers must be kept current.

The battalion commander in an amphibious operation must be endowed with the highest qualities of leadership. He must not only be trained in the use of his organic supporting fires but also the correct utilization of air and naval gunfire. Lt. Colonel Daniel A. Nolan Jr, fulfilled the necessary requirements. The four officers given battlefield commissions on Leyte, Philippine Islands continued their outstanding performance of

leading troops in battle.

The 77th Infantry Division landings in the Kerama Retto accomplished a highly important mission by accident, namely, the destruction of the 350 suicide boats which were unknown to intelligence agencies.

The coordination and cooperation between the Army, Navy and Marines was without a doubt the finest of the entire war. It can be credited in no small degree to the late Lt. General Simon B. Buckner, Jr.

During the 11,000 yards advance made by the battalion the flanks were constantly exposed with no fatal results. War is a game of chance and calculated risks must be taken by amphibious troops since the entire operations fall into this category.

The death of 1st Sergeant Korewjo, a veteran of 29-1/2 years service severely jolted the entire regiment.

Every soldier in a landing must be assigned to a specific boat to avoid confusion and the breakdown of tactical unity.

The planning was initially on a high level and division staffs continually aided the battalion landing teams by personal visits and conferences.

The reef proved to be no obstacle to the landing force by the use of the amphibious track vehicles.

LESSONS

1. Ground force units may be supplied by naval aircraft operating from carriers.
2. The battlefield is an excellent source for the selection of officers.
3. Amphibious operations are highly technical and all participating troops must be well trained and given ample time for rehearsals.
4. Tables of Organization and Equipment must be modified in Amphibian assaults. *General*

5. Naval gunfire is a potent weapon when employed in direct support of the infantry.
6. A transcribed message by a high commander is an effective method of speaking to his forces.
7. The Ship to Shore Movement phase is the critical moment in a landing on a hostile beach.
8. Signal Communication is extremely vital in coordinating the various arms participating in a landing.
9. The Flamethrowers are invaluable to the infantry in the reduction of gun emplacements and enemy strong points manned by a fanatic enemy.
10. In war, calculated risks must be taken to accomplish a mission.
11. The boat team is the primary fighting unit in a battalion landing team.
12. Planning for an amphibious assault must be at a very high level.
13. Adjacent units must be assisted whenever possible.
14. The commander of a battalion landing team must have special training in the use of air and naval support.
15. Orders must be brief, timely and easily understood by all subordinate commanders.

TABLE NUMBER 1 - LANDING DIAGRAM

H HOUR 0830 - 1 APRIL 1945

1st Wave - Amphibious Tanks H Hour

14 Tanks, 75mm Howitzers

2d Wave H Plus 2

Assault Platoons, Light Machine Gun Secs Companies L & I



3d Wave H Plus 6

Support Platoons, 60mm Mortar Secs L & I, HMG Section Company M
FO 361st FA, Naval Gunfire Spotter

37	36	35	34	33	32	31
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4th Wave H Plus 12

Company M (-), 3d Platoon Company A, 321st Engineers

47	46	45	44	43	42	41
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5th Wave H Plus 18

Company K (-), Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, Battalion
Communication Platoon (-), Battalion Executive Officer
2-1/4 T Trucks

58	57	56	55	54	53	52	51
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6th Wave H Plus 24

Battalion Antitank Platoon, Battalion Communication Platoon (-)
Company C 170th Engineers (Shore Party) Battalion Medical
Detachment

68	67	66	65	64	63	62	61
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Free Boats-Not assigned to a Wave

0	00
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Forty Amphibious Track Vehicles were necessary to transport the assault echelons of the battalion landing team. This does not include the 14 Amphibious Tanks which comprised the first wave.

TABLE NUMBER 2 - BOAT ASSIGNMENT

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
1st Wave - 14 Amphibious Tanks-75mm Howitzers mounted - H Hour 0830		
0	*Battalion Commander and Orderly	2
	S-3	1
	Naval Gunfire Liaison 0 and Party	6

*Boat Team Leaders are underscored

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
	Air Liaison O and Party	4
	Commanding Officer Co M and Messenger	2
	Intelligence Section - Scouts	2
	Amphibious Track Commanding Officer	1
	Battalion Clerk	1
	S/Sgt Intelligence Section	1
	Liaison Section 780th Amphibious Tank Battalion	3
		<u>23</u>
00	<u>Battalion S-2</u> and Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Section	4
	Communication O and Battalion Communication Platoon	7
	Artillery Liaison O and Party 361st FA	4
	Liaison Sergeant Co C 170th Engineers	1
	Forward Observer Co C 88th Chemical Bn	3
	Assistant Battalion Surgeon and Detachment	4
	Operation Sergeant, Battalion Intelligence Section	3
		<u>26</u>

(LVT-4)	<u>Boat Division 2 - Wave 2 Assault Platoons, LMGs Cos I & L</u>	
21	Platoon Leader and Messenger 1st Plat Company I 1st and 2d Squads, 1st Plat Co I	2 <u>24</u> 26
22	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> and Messenger 1st Plat Co I 3d Squad 1st Plat Co I 1st LMG Squad, Section Sergeant Weapons Plat Co I Guide and Messenger 1st Plat Co I Co Aid Man	2 12 6 2 <u>1</u> 23
23	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> and Messenger 2d Plat Co I 3d Squad 2d Plat Co I 2d LMG Squad, Weapons Plat Co I Plat Sergeant, Messenger Weapons Plat Co I Guide 2d Plat Co I Co Aid Man	2 12 5 2 1 <u>1</u> 23
24	<u>Plat Leader</u> 2d Plat Co I 1st and 2d Squads, 2d Plat Co I Messenger 2d Plat Co I	1 24 <u>1</u> 26
25	<u>Plat Leader</u> 1st Plat Co L 1st and 2d Squads 1st Plat Co L Messenger 1st Plat Co L	1 24 <u>1</u> 26
26	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> and Messenger 1st Plat Co L 3d Squad 1st Plat Co L LMG Section Sergeant and 1st Squad Weapons Plat Co L Messenger Weapons Platoon Co L Guide and Co Aid Man 1st Plat Co L	2 12 6 1 <u>2</u> 23

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
27	<u>Plat Leader</u> and Messenger Weapons Plat Co L	2
	Plat Sergeant and 3d Squad 2d Plat Co L	13
	Guide Messenger 2d Plat Co L	2
	2d LMG Squad Weapons Plat Co L	5
	Co Aid Man	<u>1</u>
		23
28	<u>Plat Leader</u> 2d Plat Co L	1
	1st and 2d Squads 2d Plat Co L	24
	Messenger 2d Plat Co L	<u>1</u>
		26

<u>Boat Division 3 - Wave 3 Support Platoons, Mortar Sections</u> Companies I & L; HMG Section Co M; Forward Observers 361st FA; Naval Gunfire Spotter		
31	<u>Plat Leader</u> & Messenger 3d Plat Co I	2
	1st Squad 3d Plat Co I	12
	1st 60mm Mortar Squad Weapons Plat Co I	5
	Company Headquarters Co I	3
	Plat Leader Weapons Platoon Co I	1
	Battalion Intelligence Section	<u>1</u>
		24
32	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> & Messenger 3d Plat Co I	2
	3d Squad and Guide 3d Plat Co I	13
	2d 60mm Mortar Squad Weapons Plat Co I	5
	Company Headquarters Co I	5
	Section Sergeant 60mm Mortar Section	<u>1</u>
		26
33	<u>Commanding Officer</u> Co I	1
	Communication Sergeant, Bugler, 1st Sergeant & Msgrs	6
	3d Squad 3d Plat Co I	12
	Forward Observer 361st FA	4
	3d 60mm Mortar Squad Weapons Plat Co I	<u>5</u>
		28
34	<u>Plat Leader</u> 1st MG Plat Co M	1
	1st Section 1st Platoon Co M	14
	Section Leader 1st Section and Msgr 1st Plat Co M	2
	Instrument Corporal and Co Aid Man	2
	Naval Gunfire Spotter and Party	<u>6</u>
		25
35	<u>Plat Leader</u> and Messenger 3d Plat Co L	2
	1st Squad 3d Plat Co L	12
	1st 60mm Mortar Squad Co L	5
	Co Headquarters Co L and Co Aid Man	5
	Plat Sergeant Weapons Plat Co L	1
	Battalion Intelligence Section	<u>1</u>
		26

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
36	<u>Commanding Officer</u> Co L and Co Headquarters	5
	2d Squad and Guide 3d Plat Co L	13
	2d 60mm Mortar Squad	5
	Forward Observer 361st FA	4
		<u>27</u>
37	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> & 3d Squad 3d Plat Co L	12
	Company Headquarters Co L	7
	3d 60mm Mortar Squad Co L	5
	Messenger Co L	1
		<u>25</u>

Boat Division 4 - Wave 4 Company M (-) 3d Platoon Co A, 321st Engineers		
41	<u>Reconnaissance Officer</u> Co M	1
	Plat Sergeant 1st HMG Plat Co M	1
	2d Section 1st Plat Co M	14
	Company Headquarters Co M	4
		<u>20</u>
42	<u>Section Leader</u> 1st Sec 3d Platoon Co M	1
	Section Sergeant & 1st Sec 3d Platoon Co M	17
	Plat Sergeant 3d Plat Co M	1
		<u>19</u>
43	<u>Section Leader</u> 2d Section 3d Platoon Co M	1
	Section Sergeant & 2d Section 3d Plat Co M	17
	Company Headquarters Co M	7
		<u>25</u>
44	<u>Plat Leader</u> 3d Plat (81mm Mortar) Co M	1
	Messenger and Instrument Corporal	2
	Sec Ldr, Sec Sergeant & 3d Section 3d Plat Co M	18
		<u>21</u>
45	<u>Plat Leader</u> 3d Platoon Co A 321st Engineers	1
	3d Plat Co A 321st Engineers	25
	Engineer Equipment	4
		<u>30</u>
46	<u>Plat Leader</u> & Messengers 2d Plat Co M	3
	Section Sergeant, 3d Section 2d Plat Co M	15
	Instrument Corporal 2d Plat Co M	1
	3d Plat Co A 321st Engineers	4
		<u>23</u>
47	<u>Section Sergeant</u> 4th Section 2d Plat Co M	1
	Plat Sergeant 2d Plat Co M	1
	3d Plat Co A 321st Engineers	10
	4th Section 2d Plat Co M	14
		<u>26</u>

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
	Boat Division 5 - Wave 5 Company K (-) Reserve Co; Bn Ammunition and Pioneer Plat; Bn Executive O & Command Post Group; Battalion Communication Plat (-)	
51	<u>Plat Sergeant A & P Plat</u> 1st & 2d Squads A & P Plat 1/4 T Trailer Battalion Communication Plat	1 16 <u>10</u> 27
52	<u>Plat Leader A & P Plat</u> 3d Squad A & P Plat 1/4 Truck Battalion Communication Plat	1 8 <u>16</u> 25
53	<u>Message Center Chief</u> and Bn Communication Plat 1/4 T Truck with mounted radio Air Liaison Sec	13 <u>14</u> 27
54	<u>Battalion Executive Officer</u> S-1-CO Battalion Headquarters Co 1st Sergeant, Co Headquarters, Sergeant Major Battalion Communication Plat Regimental Intelligence & Recon Section Chaplain	1 1 4 15 5 <u>1</u> 27
55	<u>Plat Leader</u> 1st Plat Co K Messenger 1st Plat Co K 1st & 2d Squads 1st Plat Co K	1 1 <u>24</u> 26
56	<u>Commanding Officer</u> Co K Communication Sergeant & Bugler 3d Squad 1st Plat Co K Plat Sergeant & Messenger 1st Plat Co K 1st Light Machine Gun Squad Weapons Plat Co K Guide 1st Plat Co K Co Aid Man	1 2 12 2 7 1 <u>1</u> 26
57	<u>Plat Sergeant</u> , Guide, Messenger 2d Plat Co K 3d Squad 2d Plat Co K Plat Sergeant & Messenger Weapons Plat Co K 2d Light Machine Gun Squad Co K Co Aid Man	3 12 2 5 <u>1</u> 23
58	<u>Plat Leader</u> 2d Plat Co K 1st & 2d Squads 2d Plat Co K Messenger & Co Aid Man 2d Plat Co K	1 24 <u>2</u> 27

Boat Number	Units, Personnel	Boat Spaces
Boat Division 6 Wave 6 - Battalion Antitank Plat, 3d Plat Co K, Weapons Plat Co K, Co C, 170th Engineers (-) Shore Party, Battalion Communication Plat (-)		
61	<u>Shore Party Reconnaissance Officer & Detachment</u> Plat Sergeant Battalion AT Plat 1st Squad Battalion AT Plat 1 37mm AT Gun	4 1 10 <u>10</u> 25
62	<u>Shore Party Reconnaissance Officer & Detachment</u> 2d Squad Battalion AT Plat 1 37mm AT Gun	4 10 <u>10</u> 24
63	<u>Plat Leader</u> Battalion AT Plat 3d Squad Battalion AT Plat 1 37mm AT Gun	1 10 <u>10</u> 21
64	<u>Plat Sergeant & Co C, 170th Engineers (Shore Pty)</u> Bn Communication Platoon	20 <u>7</u> 27
65	<u>Plat Leader & Messenger</u> 3d Plat Co K 1st Squad 3d Plat Co K 1st & 2d 60mm Mortar Squads Co K Company Headquarters Co K Plat Sergeant Weapons Plat Co K	2 12 10 3 <u>1</u> 28
66 (LVT-2)	<u>Plat Sergeant & Messenger</u> 3d Plat Co K 2d Squad 3d Plat Co K Guide 3d Plat Co K Company Headquarters Co K	2 12 1 <u>4</u> 19
67 (LVT-2)	<u>1st Sergeant</u> Co K Company Headquarters Co K 3d Squad 3d Plat Co K 3d 60mm Mortar Squad	1 2 12 <u>5</u> 20
68 (LVT-2)	<u>Surgeon</u> 3d Battalion Medical Detachment Medical Detachment	1 <u>15</u> 16

The first six waves consisted of assault infantry and other essential personnel. Subsequent waves comprised loads in Landing Craft Medium (LCM)

and Vehicle Personnel (VP). The landing craft other than Landing Vehicle Track were loaded with vehicles, bulldozers, M-29 Weasels, Self Propelled 105mm Howitzers-Cannon Company and Naval Beach Platoon. The reef made it impossible to predetermine whether craft other than track vehicles could pass over the reef at high tide.

Waves were transported to Okinawa on Landing Ship Tanks as follows:

1st Wave: LST 570

2d & 3d Wave: LST 940

4th Wave: LST 70

5th & 6th Wave: LST 782.