

MONOGRAPH

General Subjects Section  
Academic Department  
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL  
Fort Benning, Georgia

ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE  
1947 - 1948

THE OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE 31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT  
(PHILIPPINE DIVISION)  
7 DECEMBER 1941 - 9 APRIL 1942  
(PHILIPPINE ISLAND CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Regimental S-4)

Major Everett V. Mead, Infantry  
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS #2

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Index.....	1
Bibliography.....	2
Introduction.....	3
Organization of 31st Infantry (US).....	3
Transportation.....	5
Supply.....	6
Location of 31st Infantry Regiment (US).....	7
8 December 1941 to 11 December 1941.....	8
The Move to Bataan.....	9
Landing by the Japanese on Luzon.....	10
The Move to Abucay and Mabatang.....	11
The Move to Layac Junction.....	12
Move to the Olongapo Zig-Zag.....	13
Return to Layac Junction.....	13
Fortifying the Pandan Position.....	16
The Abucay Hacienda Action.....	17
Wawa.....	22
San Vicente.....	23
Quiet Period.....	24
The Break-Up.....	25
Analysis and Criticism.....	28
Lessons Learned.....	30
Map "A"--Location of 31st Infantry (US) at start of war. Route of move to Bataan.	
Map "B"--Jap landings on Island of Luzon, Philippine Islands.	
Map "C"--Movements and positions from 24 Dec. to 4 Jan. 1942.	
Map "D"--Movements and positions from 4 Jan. to 15 Jan. 1942.	
Map "E"--Movements and positions from 15 Jan. to 4 April 1942.	
Map "F"--Movements and positions from 4 April to 9 April 1942.	

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A-1 MacArthur and the War Against Japan  
By Frazer Hunt (TIS Library)
- A-2 War with Japan (7 December 1941, August 1942)  
US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. (TIS Library)
- A-3 Monograph of Major Charles Underwood, 1946 (TIS Library)
- A-4 Monograph of Major Eugene B. Conrad, 1946 (TIS Library)
- A-5 Personal diary of Lt. Col. Jasper E. Brady Jr., USA  
C.O. 31st Infantry (US)  
Used to confirm dates and movements of 31st Infantry (US)
- A-6 General Wainwright's Story  
By General Jonathan M. Wainwright, 1946 (Personal Possession)
- A-7 G-2 Reports of II Corps on Bataan (8 December 1941,  
9 April, 1942)  
Used to verify movements and dates.
- A-8 Epic of Corrigedor-Bataan  
By Lt. Comm. T. C. Parker  
US Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1942.

A-4 Used to verify movements and operations of 31st Infantry (US)

A-7 Used to verify movements and dates.

A-2)  
A-6)  
A-8) Listings from here furnished background only.

THE OPERATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE 31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT  
(PHILIPPINE DIVISION)  
7 DECEMBER 1941 - 9 APRIL 1942  
(PHILIPPINE ISLAND CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Regimental S-4)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the movements and operations of the 31st Infantry (US) Philippine Division, in the defense of Bataan, Philippine Islands, from 8 December 1941, the beginning of World War II, to 9 April 1942, the surrender of the Bataan forces.

The dates in this monograph are one day ahead of dates in the United States, as the Philippine Islands are geographically located west of the 180th meridian.

The 31st Infantry (US) Philippine Division was organized in 1916, and has never served in the continental limits of the United States.

The 31st Infantry (US), 45th Infantry (PS), 57th Infantry (PS), 26th Cavalry (PS), 23rd and 24th Field Artillery (PS), Detachments of the 12th Medical Regiment, and "C" Company 14th Engineers comprised the Philippine Division. All of these units were regular army units.

All units of the 31st Infantry had lost approximately one-half of their officers, and an average of 10 of their best NCO's per company. These people were taken as cadres for training the Philippine Army that was being inducted.

ORGANIZATION OF 31ST INFANTRY (US)

There were approximately 1600 officers and men in the 31st Infantry regiment (US). About one third of these men were pre-

vious service men. The balance had had less than four months training. The Rifle Companies had approximately 95 men per company, and the Heavy Weapons Companies approximately 110 enlisted men per company.

The 31st Infantry was reasonably well equipped, considering units back in the States. The individual soldier was equipped with the M1 rifle. Each Rifle Company was organized into two Rifle Platoons and one Weapons Platoon. The Weapons Platoon had two sections; one of light machine guns and one of 60mm mortars.

The 60mm mortars were never used as there was no ammunition available for them. As a result, mortars were turned in on 8 December 1941, and light or heavy machine guns issued in lieu of the mortars, thereby making two machine gun sections in the Rifle Company's Weapons Platoon.

The Heavy Weapons Company was equipped with two 81mm mortars, two .50 caliber machine guns, and sixteen heavy .30 caliber machine guns.

The Anti-Tank Company, a newly organized company in the 31st Infantry regiment (US), was equipped with six 37mm anti-tank guns. Three of these guns were old World War I vintage, M-1916, and three were new types, M-3.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company was sadly lacking in communication equipment. Their equipment was out-dated even then. A very few SCR 195 "Walkie Talkies" were available. Each company was equipped with a SCR 131 CW radio--range still a question. Telephones were at a premium, as was wire. Qualified radio personnel were not available for our antique communications.

Service Company was equipped with  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton Chevrolet and Dodge trucks. Transportation will be discussed next in this

monograph.

### TRANSPORTATION

In discussing transportation, the reader must, of necessity, turn his memory back to December 1941.

The old C & R cars were items of issue and were used as command vehicles for Regimental Staff Officers, Battalion Commanding Officers, and Heavy Weapons Company Commanders. All organic cargo trucks were  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4 x 4, single dual wheels in the rear. Of these vehicles there was a definite shortage.

Weapons Carriers were the old  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton, narrow bed vehicles, issued to the Heavy Weapons Companies for transporting their weapons and ammunition.

The versatile jeep was still in its infancy. The 31st Infantry (US) had two jeeps; one was used by Headquarters Company as a message center vehicle, the other was lost early in the war.

When the regiment had to make its first move, every type of vehicle imaginable was used. To name a few: taxi cabs (all makes, sizes and colors), privately owned vehicles, pickup trucks, and busses from approximately six major bus companies operating in the Philippine Islands. The busses were much different from our busses in that they were not enclosed. Just imagine our busses with the whole bed and floor of the vehicle built lower to the ground. In place of an aisle down the center of the inside, vision a solid seat from side to side. Then just slice the sides of the bus off and place a step along each side running the length of the bus. Then imagine the top lowered about two feet, and that is it.

These busses used different types of fuel. Some were diesel burners, some used alcohol, and still others used gasoline.

This presented quite a supply problem. When the busses came to us, they were fully equipped with Filipino drivers, assistant drivers, and conductors w/whistles per vehicle.

Our total transportation consisted of: one staff sedan, three motorcycles, eight  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4 x 4, C & R cars, thirty-three  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton w/carriers, twenty-five  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4 x 4, cargo trucks, two  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4 x 4, maintenance trucks, fifty-six assorted busses, and eight taxi cabs.

### SUPPLY

There was no problem on .30 caliber ammunition, but .45 caliber pistol ammunition was not so plentiful.

There was only 2000 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition on the Island at the start of World War II, which had to be divided between the three regiments of the Philippine Division, as they were the only units having 81mm mortars. When the supply was exhausted, 3" trench mortar ammunition had to be used in the 81's. This type ammunition was very unsatisfactory, because, due to age, it was about 70% duds.

Hand grenades were not too plentiful; those available proved to be about 50% duds. For a time, hand grenades were manufactured on Bataan, using sections of bamboo, old nails for fragmentation, gasoline, and a piece of dynamite, fuse and cap. These were highly unsatisfactory.

Gasoline was rationed, making movement very difficult. Only certain vehicles were allowed to be operated and these vehicles had to be operated on three gallons per week. (1)

Replacements for all types of ordinance matériel were practically non-existent. The Supply Officer tried to get replacements for two light machine guns, and was issued two Marlin Navy machine guns wrapped in newspaper over cosmoline.

(1) A-5, p 23

The newspaper had date lines of 1918. They were of little value, as they were issued without belts, and the regular .30 caliber belts would not feed, thereby causing numerous stoppages. They had to be turned back to Ordinance.

Clothing was very difficult to replace. The troops could have used the clothing that had been needlessly abandoned in Manila's port area warehouses.

I hesitate to mention food; there was so little of it. The second week of the war, the regiment went on a salmon and rice diet. Of course we could supplement this diet with carabao, monkeys, QM pack mules, and carametta ponies--when they could be found. In January 1942, we were placed on half rations and two meals a day. By March 1942, we were receiving 1.6 ozs. of salmon per ration and 4 ozs. of rice. Filipinos received 8 ozs. of rice. (2) We were getting less than 1000 calories a day, which is hardly enough to sustain a fighting man.

#### LOCATION OF 31ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (US)

On 8 December 1941, the 31st Infantry (US) was stationed at the Post of Manila, Manila, Philippine Islands.

Normally the 1st Battalion was quartered in the south end of the Walled City, or Intramuras, as it is sometimes called in the Islands. The Army called it Cuartel de España. Other units located in the "Walled City" were: Post of Manila Headquarters, Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company and Anti-Tank Company.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were quartered in the Estado Mayor, some six or seven blocks east, on the west bank of the Pasig river, approximately one and one half miles up the river from the mouth where it empties into Manila Bay.

Just before Pearl Harbor, the Estado Mayor was cleared

(2) A-5, p 12

for additional hospital space. So, of a necessity, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were forced to find quarters elsewhere. The 3rd Battalion moved into temporary barracks just outside Carabao Gate, the main entrance to Fort McKinley. Fort McKinley was approximately 10 kilometers southeast of the Post of Manila. (3) (4)

The 2nd Battalion was in tents on "B" Range Road, approximately two miles due east of Nichols Field, and approximately three miles west and slightly south of Fort McKinley.

This was the location of the regiment as of 8 December 1941.

8 DECEMBER 1941 to 11 DECEMBER 1941

General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of United States Armed Forces in the Far East, ordered the 1st Battalion to remain in Manila to prevent civilian disturbances and guard the port area.

The morning of 8 December 1941, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were placed in position on the east side of Nichols Field, with a mission to protect against paratroop attacks to seize the air field. (See Map "A")

At 0145, 9 December 1941, I was on the telephone in the regimental C.P., when a call came in from G-2 that we could expect enemy planes over in about fifteen minutes. As the Battalions already had their orders, I alerted the two Battalions and then aroused the C.O. and other staff members.

We waited nervously, but nothing happened. So everyone went back to sleep but myself. I still had an hour to do on the telephone.

At 0300 the planes did come over, dropped their sticks of bombs, hitting Nichols Field, setting fire to one hangar, (3) A-4, p 4, (4) A-5, p 10

and destroying the Pan-American beacon station nearby. One bomb dropped in the regimental area, but no casualties were sustained.

At 0800, 9 December 1941, the two Battalions were moved up on Alabang Trail (see map "A"), a high ridge running north and south, just south and west of Fort McKinley. The Battalions dug in and awaited orders.

At 1100, 10 December 1941, Nichols Field was bombed again and our troops and positions were strafed. Only one casualty was sustained.

#### THE MOVE TO BATAAN

On 11 December 1941, the 31st Infantry (US), less the 1st Battalion, was alerted to move north. The 1st Battalion was to join the regiment later.

All day the 11th of December we received all types, sizes, and makes of transportation to make the move. The regiment was very short of organic transportation. We moved out from the "Alabang Trail" at 0230, the morning of 12 December 1941.

The road net to Bataan consisted of one hard surfaced National Highway, number 3. The planing and co-ordination of the move by G-3 and G-4 of Division was very poor, as several units were moving at the same time. Traffic control was sadly lacking. As a result, by daylight, the highway was jammed and clogged with vehicles bumper to bumper; an ideal target for enemy aircraft. We saw several flights of enemy planes, but none apparently spotted the convoy, or had orders to ignore traffic.

The busses and taxis we were using, in addition to our organic transportation, had Filipino drivers who could not understand the necessity for distance between vehicles.

Other units, of necessity, were using the same means of

transportation. The vehicles were all mixed up--no one could tell whose vehicles were ahead or behind.

Finally, at about 1600, 12 December 1941, the regiment arrived at Kilometer Post 137 on the Pilar-Bagac Road. (See map "A") All distances on the Island of Luzon are measured from Manila. This meant it had taken us  $14\frac{1}{2}$  hours to move 137 kilometers.

We went into bivouac. On the morning of 13 December, the 3rd Battalion went into position astride the Pilar-Bagac Road, just east of the barrio of Bagac. The 2nd Battalion in reserve. The mission was to guard against an attempt by the Japanese to establish a beachhead in Bagac Bay.

While in this static situation, extensive reconnaissances were made of the surrounding area, and as far north as Ft. Stattenburg.

The troops were trained constantly.

#### LANDING BY THE JAPANESE ON LUZON

The first Japanese landed on Luzon at Aparri on 10 December, with an estimated strength of a reinforced brigade. (7) (See map "B")

On 12 December, the Japanese landed a reinforced Division at Vigan. (8) (See map "B")

The main Japanese landing occurred on 21 December. They hit the beach at Lingayen Gulf with an estimated force of five divisions plus army troops. (9) (See map "B")

These landings were made with practically no opposition--a glaring example of "too little, too late". (10)

(7) A-3, p 35, (8) A-3, p 35, (9) A-3, p 36, (10) A-1, p 32

## THE MOVE TO ABUCAY AND MABATANG

On 24 December at 1100, the regiment was moved north to the barrio of Abucay, at Kilometer Post 109, on the main highway from Manila. (See map "C") The regiment was to fortify a position just north of Abucay, approximately one and one half kilometers, which placed the position on the north side of the barrio of Mabatang, Kilometer Post 107½.

The 31st Infantry (US) was to prepare the position from Manila Bay on the east, to a point approximately 2000 yards west of the barrio of Mabatang.

This position was to be the MLR running from Mabatang to Mt. Natib. This sector was to be in the II Corps.

The peninsula was later to be divided into two Corps-- I Corps was to be formed by the west half of Bataan, and the II Corps was to be formed by the east half.

Bataan was divided by an imaginary line drawn down the center from north to south, roughly splitting Mt. Natib, passing just west of Mt. Samat, and continuing on south to split Mt. Mariveles.

The 25th of December 1941, or Christmas day, was spent in stringing wire, digging in, and fortifying the line. Machine gun emplacements were dug, fire trenches and communication trenches to the rear were dug for purposes of supply, feeding and evacuation of casualties.

Directly in front of this position was swampy ground, and it could be flooded easily and thoroughly in a minimum of time. The only entrance into the position was by way of the main north-south road, which was covered by anti-tank protection and mined for demolition.

We remained in this position until 28 December. We continually improved this position during the time it was occupied.

While at this position, the 1st Battalion rejoined the regiment in a piecemeal fashion--about one company a day until all had rejoined.

A, C, and D Companies made the trip from Manila to Bataan by way of Corrigedor. On the way over, and while at Corrigedor, they were bombed heavily. As a result, they lost most of their equipment and sustained several casualties. Of necessity, they were forced to abandon their organic transportation in Manila. They pulled out just ahead of the Japanese advance occupation troops. "B" Company came to Bataan by truck and bus, making the trip just ahead of the Japanese.

The entire 1st Battalion was not in shape for combat, due to their disorganization and loss of equipment. The replacing of their lost equipment presented a serious supply problem, due to the lack of extra or replacement weapons, and equipment available on Bataan.

The 1st Battalion was not used until the regiment returned to Layac Junction for the second time.

#### THE MOVE TO LAYAC JUNCTION

On 28 December 1941, at 1800, the 31st Infantry (US), less the 1st Battalion, moved north once again; this time to Layac Junction just north of Hermosa, and just south of the road Junction to Olongapo, and on the high ground commanding the highway, the road junction and the Dina Lupihan Bridge, directly to our front. (see map "C") This position afforded an excellent field of fire. The ground sloped gradually to the road junction, bridge, and highway.

Here again we started digging in, preparing a delaying position. Stringing wire and preparing for an all-around defense. The regiment worked here until about 1430, 31 December

1941.

#### MOVE TO THE OLONGAPO ZIG-ZAG

At 1430 on 31 December, the 31st Infantry (US), less the 1st Battalion, was ordered to move to a position on the Olongapo road, which leads to Subic Bay on the west coast of Bataan. (See map "C") At about 1700 we crossed the bridge to our immediate front and turned west toward Olongapo.

We arrived at the new position at approximately 2000. These positions had been partially prepared by the 4th Marine Regiment and 31st Infantry Division (PA). We picked up quite a lot of ammunition here and several machine guns that had been abandoned by the 31st Infantry Division (PA).

Our mission was to hold this position against possible landings in Subic Bay by the Japanese, and attempt to cut off the troops of the Philippine Army who were falling back to Bataan from North Luzon and South Luzon.

After all troops had safely passed through Layac Junction, the 31st Infantry (US) was to blow up the Olongapo Zig-Zag and the bridges, in order to deny passage, or at least delay the enemy troops--then to withdraw, if possible, to our position at Layac Junction.

Up to this point, we had been used for "Position Preparing Troops", so it seemed, but that was to change.

#### RETURN TO LAYAC JUNCTION

At about 1700, 4 January 1942, the 31st Infantry (US), less one Battalion, was ordered to perform their demolition and move to Layac Junction. The move was completed at about 2200. The regiment was joined by the 1st Battalion, which had been fairly well equipped by this time. The previous

positions that were partially prepared at Layac in late December, were not re-occupied. A new line was established a little farther to the south. This necessitated a night reconnaissance, while the troops were being fed in the bivouac area. (See map "D")

The next morning, 5 January 1942, the troops once again started digging in and preparing a defensive position, and sincerely hoping they could use this one. Their wish was to be granted.

The 1st Battalion was on the right, and 2nd Battalion on the left, with the 3rd Battalion in reserve.

The MLR was about 1000 yards south of Layac Junction. The 1st Battalion, 23rd Field Artillery (PS), and 1st Battalion 88th Field Artillery (PS), were in support of the 31st Infantry (US). The main highway was the regiment's right boundary. The high ground to the southwest was the left boundary. The entire regimental front was approximately 1200 yards.

The 71st Division (PA) was on the right, and the 26th Cavalry (PS) was on the left of the regiment.

The regimental front ran almost due east and west, but starting on our right flank, the 71st Division (PA) line started bending back to the south, making their front the shape of a rainbow.

At dawn, on 5 January 1942, by observing to the front, we could see the Japanese going into position, and see artillery being emplaced.

Our own artillery began to fire upon the Japanese positions with their 75mm guns. At 0900, the enemy began counter-battery with their 105's, and by mid-afternoon had completely silenced our artillery--they completely destroyed the 23rd

Field Artillery guns. They had us on every count--heavier guns, and many more of them. This artillery fire continued for about nine hours. At approximately 1500, 5 January 1942, the enemy launched an attack on the 71st Division (PA) just east of the 31st Infantry's (US) right boundary. The 71st Division (PA) was driven back, which left the right flank of the 31st Infantry (US) exposed.

This was the first actual combat of the 31st Infantry (US), and, as a result, "B" Company did not stand up very well. "L" Company of the 3rd Battalion, which was in reserve, counter-attacked and restored the line.

The enemy then began an attack on the left of our front, between 2nd Battalion and 26th Cavalry (PS). The entire front was receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire, but very little damage was being done, and the enemy was not pressing too much. In short, everything was going well.

Orders were received from II Corps at about 2200 to withdraw at 0130. The 31st Infantry (US) was to be the rear guard. A, E, and K Companies were to remain as the covering shell for the regiment.

The 26th Cavalry (PS), and units of the 31st Infantry (US), were forced to move parallel to the front, due to lack of roads and trails to the rear. The only axis of communication was the main highway north and south.

The movement had been completed and the covering shell was just withdrawing, when the enemy launched a night attack. "E" Company was completely cut off, and sustained heavy casualties. The remnants of the Company, including the Company C.O., were forced to make their way to the rear, cross country, rejoining the regiment two or three days later on the Orion Cut-off.

(See map "D")

### FORTIFYING THE PANDAN POSITION

The regiment was given about two days to reorganize, replace what little equipment that was available, and prepare for further action.

On 9 January 1942, the regiment was ordered to occupy and prepare for defense, a position 400 yards south of the Pandan river. (See map "D") This position was at Kilometer \* Post 139, on the main north-south road on the east side of Bataan.

The regimental front was approximately 1500 yards wide. It extended from the Bay on the right, to a point 1000 yards west of the main road. From the main road to the east, or to the Bay, was approximately 500 yards. The 2nd Battalion was on the right, the 3rd Battalion on the left.

As this position is approached from the north, it is very flat for about 3 kilometers. This flat land extends up to the Pandan river, with rice paddies on either side of the main road. The river was about 150 feet wide, water 10 to 12 feet deep, the banks practically vertical and 40 feet high.

From the Pandan river south, the flat terrain continues for 350 yards, then in the next 50 yards, the ground rises abruptly to a height of about 100 feet, and continues to rise for another 150 feet.

This was to be the position we were to prepare. It was an ideal position for defense--the field of fire was excellent, visibility was unobstructed--in short, we would be literally looking down the Japs throats. The high ground to the rear, and southwest up the Demologue Trail, afforded excellent O.P's for our regiment, and also the supporting artillery.

This position was to be the right flank of the final organized defensive line on Bataan. The troops moved on the posi-

tion at about 1430 and started digging in again.

This position was very well prepared. All the wire available was used to wire in our complete front. It would have taken a Houdini to pass it. The only gap in our sector, was the main road leading over the bridge to our front. Wire was available, however, and ready to fill in the gap. Charges were ready to be set off for demolition of the bridge over the river--in fact everything was so well organized, that everyone was looking forward to the time when we could welcome the enemy in their attempt to penetrate our stronghold.

To get into our position, the enemy would have to traverse the 3 kilometers to our direct front, across rice paddies, in combat formation, or come down the main road. All wheel or track vehicles, of necessity, would have to approach by the main highway. When the river was reached, it would have to be crossed, which would not be an easy task in view of our commanding position 400 yards away. With the bridge blown out, the river would have been an ideal tank trap and road block.

The Heavy Weapons Companies of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, had 24 machine guns, each laid on final protective lines with interlocking bands of fire. These machine guns had been retrieved where Philippine Army units had left them. It would have been very interesting to have watched the Japanese try to come in.

But again it seemed as the regiment had been used as labor troops, as on the night of 15 January 1942, we received orders to move.

#### THE ABUCAY HACIENDA ACTION

On the night of 15 January 1942, at about 2000, we received orders to move north and go into a bivouac area approximately

5 kilometers west of Balanga, in the vicinity of an old Philippine Army Cadre barracks. (See map "E")

The move was accomplished by 0300, 16 January 1942, a distance of about 20 kilometers. The troops were carried by busses--the type that was described earlier in the monograph.

We remained here until about 1200, 16 January 1942. At this time we were ordered to move up to the MLR at once and fill a gap left open by the fading out of the 51st Philippine Army Division.

The regiment was on the road in less than 20 minutes, with the 2nd Battalion as the advance guard.

The route taken was up the "Back Road", a trail running approximately parallel to the main road, and about 5 kilometers west. (See map "E") The trail led up to an intersection with a road that ran from Abucay (the first position we prepared), west to the Hacienda just east of Mt. Natib. This trail ran parallel to the front lines, and about 800 yards in the rear. It was under artillery fire almost constantly during daylight hours.

The move was finally completed, and a march outpost established by 2000, approximately 2000 yards east of the Hacienda. (See map "E") An immediate reconnaissance was begun, but very little could be done at this hour. Everyone was worn out after the 22 kilometer march with full equipment. While on the "Back Road", the regiment was harassed all along the route by Japanese aircraft, and after reaching the Abucay-Hacienda trail, by artillery fire and aircraft bombings. This can get to be quite annoying, especially when friendly aircraft <sup>are</sup> if non-existent.

At about 0130 the troops were moved up to within 700 yards of the Hacienda. During this move, the troops received small arms fire.

The 31st Infantry (US) was ordered to attack from this position at 0815, 17 January, and attack north (at this time we were headed west), with a mission of restoring the MLR that had been pushed in by the Japanese, when the 51st Division (PA) disintegrated, leaving the 41st Infantry Division's (PA) left flank flapping in the breeze. The terrain to the front was rugged, and the mountains were quite heavily wooded--the open areas were covered with tall cogon grass and cane fields.

The regiment was to attack with two Battalions abreast, and one in reserve. The 1st Battalion on the left, 2nd Battalion on the right, and 3rd Battalion in reserve.

The two Battalions jumped off at 0815, 17 January 1942. The attack proceeded very well, and good progress was made for about 1000 yards. Heavy fire from small arms and mortars was received by both Battalions. In this distance, the command post of the 51st Infantry Division (PA) was recaptured. The C.O. and his C.P. personnel were unharmed--they had been completely surrounded.

Just beyond the C.P. of the 51st Infantry Division (PA), the 2nd Battalion met very strong resistance, and was stopped.

The 1st Battalion hit the flank of this strong point, floated to the left, and proceeded on up to the original MLR, the objective, with very little resistance. The resistance hit by the 2nd Battalion later proved to be a reinforced regiment.

It must be remembered during these operations that the regiment has approximately 1600 men, and they are trying to fill a gap formerly occupied by a division.

The attack by the 1st and 2nd Battalions was not well coordinated, liaison was not maintained, and contact between Battalions was negligible. The regiment had very little artil-

lery support, and no tank or air support.

20  
103  
Later the 45th Infantry (PS) came in on the right flank of the 31st Infantry (US), but again the attack was not coordinated, and met with little success.

The Japanese seemed to be everywhere, due to the infiltration that had been going on for about three days prior to the arrival of the 31st Infantry (US).

The 2nd Battalion was never able to reduce the salient in their sector, although they repeatedly tried.

On 19 January 1942, a partially co-ordinated attack was launched. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 45th Infantry (PS) on the right, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 31st Infantry (US) on the left. The 3rd Battalion 45th Infantry (PS) on the left flank of the 31st Infantry (US). The attack started at 1600 and ended at 1900, with very little success. The Japanese seemed to be reinforcing their troops daily, seemingly attempting to keep the left flank of the II Corps open for ease of infiltration and eventual breakthrough.

During the period of 18 to 20 January 1942, repeated attempts were made to reach the objective, but without complete success. We requested tank support for our attacks, but our request was refused; very little artillery support was available. The artillery could not fire in daylight, as flights of Jap dive bombers were searching for their position constantly. If they so much as fired a round, the Japanese were on them like a swarm of bees. The mass of fire laid down by the enemy was deadly. They used mortars, artillery, aircraft, and heavy small arms fire to inflict very heavy casualties on our troops. The infiltration of the enemy continued unabated, causing great confusion in our Battalion and Regimental C.P. areas. Sniping by the enemy was constant.

From 20 January to 24 January 1942, we were forced to go on the defensive. The enemy attacked, and attacked, and attacked again. Each time it became more difficult to repulse these attacks. The men had received very little in the way of hot food, very little, if any sleep, and had been attacking against definitely numerically superior forces, with all the supporting weapons necessary to hold their positions. In short, our troops were dead tired--practically out on their feet. Most of the companies, by this time, had only 20 to 35 effectives. During the period from 20 to 24 January 1942, the Japanese had out-flanked the 3rd Battalion 45th Infantry (PS) on our left, and was making our position untenable.

On 25 January, at 1430, the regimental C.O. 31st Infantry (US) received orders to withdraw that evening starting at 2030. One company from each battalion was to act as covering shell for the rest of the regiment. The route of withdrawal was down the trail to Abucay on the main north-south road, then south on the main road to a barrio near Wawa. (See map "E")

Just as the regiment was preparing to withdraw, the Japs seemed to sense it, and launched a terrific night attack. After that attack, Japs were piled high in front of machine gun emplacements almost too high to fire over. They almost reached our lines this time, due to the reduced strength of the companies and lack of fire power. After the attack was repulsed, the withdrawal was continued as ordered. As the troops came out of the line, marching slowly and laboriously, they looked like walking dead men. They had a blank stare in their eyes, and their faces, covered with beards, lacked any simillance of expression. They hadn't been able to wash or shave for nine days; their clothes were in shreds--they looked like anything but an efficient fighting force, and little wonder, considering the

days just past and their state of malnutrition.

Co-ordination of the withdrawal was completely lacking. The trail was clogged with troops and vehicles all the way down to the Junction of the "Back Road", as other units were also withdrawing at the same time. We were held up here for two and one-half hours. If the Japanese had only interdicted this road, they could have ended II Corps resistance on Bataan at that time. The Japanese Field Artillery, it is felt, was registered in on this road, as it was shelled all during the daylight hours and had been adjusted by liaison aircraft. We called this type aircraft "Maytag", referring to the similarity of sound between their motor and the Maytag washing machine motor.

The covering shell was to withdraw at 0300, 26 January 1942. As they started to withdraw, the Japs again launched an attack. The covering shell was forced to fight a delaying action until they were screened by the tanks that were serving as movable pill boxes. Self-propelled guns were also employed along the route. Visibility was excellent, as the moon was up and it was almost as light as day. As the covering shell passed behind the screen of waiting tanks and SP's, they were followed quite closely by Japanese in force. The Japanese either did not see the waiting tanks and SP's, or just plain didn't care, for after the tanks and SP's finished with them, there were approximately 1000 less Japs for the Emperor to count, or count on for further service.

#### WAWA

By 0400, 26 January 1942, all units of the 31st Infantry (US) had reached an assembly area at the barrio of Wawa (see map "E") on the main road, and were being fed a hot meal; the first hot food in two days.

The 31st Infantry (US) was acting as a rear guard for the II Corps, while the rest of the troops were occupying the position from the Bay to Mt. Samat, on the Pandan position.

On 27 January 1942, the regiment was ordered to move into the sector of the Pandan position formerly prepared by the 31st Infantry (US). En route, however, we were ordered to proceed to an area 2 kilometers west of Limay on trail #20. (See map "E") This movement was accomplished on foot.

Three days were used in taking baths, shaving, cleaning and checking equipment, and just plain resting.

#### SAN VICENTE

On about 1 February 1942, we received orders to proceed north to a point on trail #2, on the San Vicente river. (See map "E") The move was made by busses and started at 1700 and completed by 0100, 2 February 1942.

We had been moved up to this position as a reserve force, in the event of a breakthrough by the Japanese in a sector in which they were pushing hard. The emergency passed and the 31st Infantry (US) moved back south on 9 February 1942. The move was started at 2030 and was made by busses. The only difficulty encountered was the traffic control. The regimental S-4 had requested the green light over trails #2 and #10; the request was granted. But shortly after the road march was started, many vehicles were encountered coming in the opposite direction. The trail had been set as one way traffic to the main road. This traffic caused the regimental S-2 vehicle to run off an embankment in attempting to allow an on-coming vehicle to pass, turning the C & R car over, breaking the arm of the S-2 and injuring the back of the regimental Dental Officer. Many of the busses were bogging, by having to pull partially out of the trail, and getting stuck due to the overload and

lack of clearance of the vehicles.

On 10 February 1942, the 1st and 2nd Battalions went into a rest area on the Alongon river, just off trail #22,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of the main north-south road, and 8 kilometers north of Lamao. (See map "E") The regimental Headquarters and 3rd Battalion moved in on trail #24 on the Lamao river, two miles west of the barrio of Lamao near II Corps Headquarters. (See map "E")

#### QUIET PERIOD

Up to 1 February 1942, the Philippine Division had been under the command of the II Corps, which commanded the east half of Bataan.

On 1 February 1942, the Philippine Division, by order of General Douglas MacArthur, became USAFFE reserves. (11)

The period from 12 February 1942 to 3 April 1942 was spent in reorganizing, conducting training in use of cover and concealment, and scouting and patrolling. During this period we received a few replacements from the M.P.'s, Chemical Warfare Companies, and the Quartermaster. The majority of these men had never fired a rifle and were completely ignorant of Infantry tactics. They all had to be trained and qualified with the rifle. All these replacements were willing and learned rapidly.

The regiment was not actually engaged in combat during this period, but we were suffering casualties every day. Malaria and dysentery were taking a heavy toll. Propholactic quinine had been stopped in early February 1942--as a result malaria was getting the upper hand, and every day the men were getting weaker and weaker from lack of food. Our ration consisted of 4 ozs. of rice and 1.6 ozs. of salmon per man per day--hardly enough to sustain life, let alone fighting men.  
(11) A-7, p 20

We had barely enough quinine to treat the actual cases of malaria. Approximately fifty per cent of the regiment was down with malaria or dysentary at all times. Those who were up and around, were either just recovering or coming down with one or the other of the diseases.

Temporary hospital areas were set up in the batallion bivouac areas, and patients were treated by batallion Surgeons to relieve the terrific load on the two field hospitals that were already full to overflowing.

#### THE BREAK-UP

During the month of March 1942, G-2 reports were showing the steadily reinforcing of the enemy with men and matériel. (12) An all out offensive was expected prior to the rainy season which usually started in June. It was anticipated that the Japanese wanted to finish up the Bataan campaign before this happened, or they would probably be stalemated till after the rainy season. If they had only known how critical our food supply was, they could have waited us out and accomplished the same result. Our food would have lasted until about 15 May 1942. (13)

On about 1 April 1942, the Japs started a heavy shelling and dive bombing attack of our front line. This heavy shelling and bombing continued unabated for four days.

On 4 April, at 1700, the regiment was alerted, and at about 1900 we started moving out--moving north.

Before the batallions could move out, however, the men had to be checked for physical fitness. A conservative estimate would be that one third of each batallion was left in the rest area to be evacuated to the hospital later.

(12) A-7, p 73, (13) A-5, p 23

Some men moved out with their battalions who could hardly walk; they had left sick beds to join their outfits, not wanting to be left behind.

Men who moved out were less than half effective.

Our orders were to move to the junction of trail #10 and #2. (See map "F") The regiment reached this point at about 0200 on 5 April 1942.

From a position on the Bololo river near trail #2 at about 0400 on 5 April, the C.O. of the 31st Infantry (US) issued his orders. He ordered the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry (US) to move at once to secure trail #44 from trail #429 to trail #2. (See map "F")

The 2nd Battalion 31st Infantry (US) passed through the 1st Battalion 31st Infantry (US) and ran into enemy resistance, just west of the trail junction of #44 and #429. From the 21st Infantry Division (PA) sector, heavy firing could be heard. The remnants of the 21st Infantry Division (PA) had been completely encircled in a night attack and had disintegrated.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were ordered to attack and restore the RRL of the 41st Division (PA) in front of Mt. Samat, supported by artillery and a battalion of light tanks. Just before the battalions moved out, the men were served a hot meal and issued three meals of "C" ration. These rations had been carried on the kitchen trucks throughout the entire Bataan campaign as an emergency ration. If used before USAFFE released them, the individual would have been court-martialed.

By morning of 6 April 1942, the regiment had ~~some~~ less than 800 men. On two occasions the regiment was cut off and had to fight its way out.

On the morning of 7 April 1942, at 0900, the remnants of

K12

the 31st Infantry (US) was ordered to withdraw to Lamao. (See map "F") Very few men reached Lamao, as the retrograde movement was across rough country and heavily wooded areas, and contact and control was very difficult. Straggling was extremely difficult to prevent. The men were so tired and weak that they were forced, in many instances, to destroy their machine guns in order to get out themselves.

The II Corps resistance had been almost completely neutralized by this time. The few men who reached Lamao were reorganized and proceeded back to the Alongon river to rejoin the regimental C.O. and a few more men of the 31st Infantry (US). It was here that the remnants of the Philippine Division made its last feeble attempt to check the onrushing Japanese. At the end, the strength of the 31st Infantry (US) was about 250 officers and men.

The night of 8 April 1942, the few remaining men and officers started south toward Cabcaban (see map "F")--they had been told a white flag was going forward on the morning of 9 April, 1942. The morning of 9 April, the Japanese caught up to the column and took over a very tired and exhausted handful of American soldiers. Defeated? Yes, but not by the Japanese alone.

✻ ✻

✻ ✻ All dates and movements were checked with A-3, A-4, and A-5.

## ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In studying the action of the 31st Infantry (US) in the defense of Bataan, much could be said in criticism of the overall action. The criticism would, of necessity, encompass higher Headquarters commanders as well, and must be included to complete the picture.

Initially, the war plan WPO-3B was not placed into effect until too late to get what few supplies were available to Bataan, and, as a result, tons and tons of meat were left in San Miguel's cold storage plant in Manila. The port area Q.M. warehouses in the dock areas were abandoned, with clothing and equipment of all types left for anyone who had ambition enough to walk through the warehouses and pick them up. Most of which could have been used to advantage on Bataan.

There were not enough Infantry troops on the Island, and not sufficient supporting units, i.e. tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft, air corps, medical, and mechanized cavalry. The units that were there were not well equipped or trained; many of the troops being still in the recruit stage. All this had a direct bearing on the operations of the 31st Infantry (US).

In the beginning of the war, the regiment was used almost entirely as labor troops. The 31st Infantry (US) prepared two defensive positions; the right flank of the Abucay-Hacienda line, and the right flank of the Pandan-Samat line. Neither of these lines were ever penetrated by direct frontal attack.

In the Abucay-Hacienda action, the regiment was committed too late, and without artillery support or tank support.

The attacks made at the Hacienda were not well co-ordinated.

The maps we had were not up to date and were not accurate.

Captured Jap maps were much more complete and up-to-date.

The troops had insufficient food and were not fed often enough of what little we did have available.

There was insufficient medicine supplies, particularly quinine to combat malaria, which abounded in Bataan. As malaria and malnutrition took its toll, it also sent morale to the bottom, making leadership doubly difficult.

It is believed that the troops should be told the truth about a situation. Never give them unjustified rumors based wholly, or in part, on an anticipated or hoped for event, if there is the least doubt that it will not become an actuality.

It is better to give them facts, be it good or bad. The example that is referred to, is the bulletin published by USAFFE Headquarters with orders to read it to all troops, which in substance said, "Keep up your courage, as hundreds of planes and thousands of men are on the way". It is true they were on the way, but nothing was said about the length of time it would take them to arrive on Bataan. Naturally, the sick, starved, ragged, tired, hoping troops on Bataan, grasping at a straw, expected them very soon. For a time this affected their morale considerably, but later, toward the end, it is believed it made them more determined than ever to make it cost the Japs as much as possible.

The failure of the Japs to take full advantage of their undisputed air superiority was a grave mistake. They could have ended the defense of Bataan much sooner if they had bombed the bridge at Columpet, thus cutting off entirely the South Luzon forces and most of the North Luzon forces from entering Bataan.

The Japs failed to exploit their penetrations at Abucay-Hacienda, stopping their drive when success was within their

grasp, and allowing the defenders to withdraw to a previously prepared position. Many times they failed to follow up their advantage by not continuing their drive--thus prolonged the campaign.

In the final analysis, it is believed that the 31st Infantry (US) and the rest of the Philippine Division, used mostly as reserve troops in case of a break in the line, were always committed too late, thereby losing the full value of their fighting capabilities.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

1. A good offense is the best defense.
2. The indecision of higher Headquarters impares success.
3. Properly trained Staffs on all levels are essential.
4. Good leadership is necessary to success in combat.
5. Missions should be assigned to units commensurate with their strength and capabilities.
6. Attacking or defending Infantry should have adequate support from other units.
7. Infantry alone in the attack can never be entirely successful.
8. Troops must have adequate food and medical supplies.
9. Reconnaissance is very important in any operation.
10. Morale should be given great consideration.
11. Co-ordination and timing in an attack must be carefully considered.
12. A unit should be committed before the situation becomes hopeless.
13. Give the troops the true picture of the situation.
14. In a retrograde movement, routes of withdrawal should never necessitate movement parallel to, and in close

proximity to the main line of resistance.

15. Inadequate road nets hampers resupply and movements.

16. Commanders should know all about the situation at all times.

17. Intelligence is absolutely essential.

18. Friendly air force is a must, and it must make its appearance over our troops, whether it is on a mission or "just flying over". It is a terrific morale factor.

19. 37mm anti-tank guns were not of sufficient caliber to stop Jap tanks.

20. Adequate communications is essential.

21. A unit should never be committed piecemeal.