

little problems that worry them sick, having to do with families back home, etc., and the commander can usually relieve his mind."

It is apparent from these various comments that there is no set equation or magic formula that can turn a soldier into a successful leader. But an infantry officer who wants to be a leader has an obligation to learn as much as he can about the many qualities that are a part of leadership; he will be entrusted with the welfare of an invaluable and irreplaceable resource — the American soldier. And studying the leadership experiences of others, both good and bad, is one way for him to learn how to succeed at it.

In 1918, Major C. A. Bach, a member of the 7th Cavalry, addressing a group of officers at Fort Sheridan, said:

When you join your organization you will find there a willing body of men who ask from you nothing more than the qualities that will command their respect, their loyalty, and their obedience.

They are perfectly ready and eager to follow you so long as you can convince them that you have those

qualities. When the time comes that they are satisfied you do not possess them you might as well kiss yourself good-bye. Your usefulness in that organization is at an end.

That's what leadership is all about. No one has ever said it any better.



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Sustaining Battle



LIEUTENANT COLONEL BENNET S. JONES

In recent years, the United States Army has developed new tactical doctrine to meet the challenges of the 1980s, particularly in a European environment. At first, such concepts as "come as you are," "first battle," and the "ten-day war" were in vogue. Some of these new concepts arose not because they were tactically sound but because the Army did not have the forces and material to fight a major war using its past battlefield doctrine.

In fact, it has only been in the past

year or so that the Army has become comfortable with its new doctrine because many of the questions that doctrine raised have been answered by units on the ground while they were undergoing opposing forces exercises. Today, therefore, sustainability has become one of the foremost subjects for conjecture, since most U.S. military professionals now feel that they can fight and win the next battle if the necessary resources are made available in the right amount and at the right time.

Unfortunately, while the Army may have discovered the effectiveness of rapid offensive actions directed at critical locations and decision points on a battlefield, it does not seem to have done as well with such sustainment concepts as forward area maintenance, resupply, and battlefield evacuation. Sustainment on a modern battlefield simply cannot be tied to the Army's present complex administrative and logistics systems, because it takes an inordinate amount of a commander's time to purge,

reconcile, and fine tune these systems.

It is easy enough, for example, to find a logistician who will gladly expound on such subjects as CONUS-based support concepts and the need for supply management information. It is not as easy to find one who can teach a support platoon leader in a mechanized infantry battalion how to get a tanker and pump unit (driven by a private first class who is without a radio and map) from a field trains location to an improved TOW vehicle on a forward battle position.

Somehow, then, the Army must find a way to lift the burden of peacetime administrative and logistics demands from the backs of its company and battalion commanders so that they can focus their energies instead on molding combat ready fighting units. It must also find the answers to its sustainment problems so that it can put beans, bullets, and petroleum products into the mouths, weapons, and vehicles of its soldiers when they need them. The Army will not be able to sustain a battle in a fluid environment such as it expects in the next major war if it does not identify its sustainment problems and develop practical solutions to them.

REALITY

Several of the Army's how-to-fight manuals — notably FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations, and FM 100-5, Operations — do discuss the organization for service support operations and identify the principal participants. But the charts and diagrams in them are simplistic. They include a lot of graphics with sweeping arrows that are supposed to explain how to arm, fuel, fix, and man battlefield weapon systems. The catch-words, phrases, and italicized statements that fill the text of these manuals may appear profound at first, but when they are looked at more closely they merely announce the obvious. For example, this is one of the more astute observations: "The quicker a unit can load

up, the faster it can deploy."

The Army's sustainability doctrine, therefore, appears to be focused more on "who should" rather than on "how to," and it does not seem to be based on reality. Today's mechanized infantry and armor battalions, for example, have only limited cargo carrying capabilities. And there are not enough authorized front-line ambulances to evacuate casualties to battalion aid stations, which are located much farther to the rear than they were when the Army's evacuation procedures were established in World War II. In addition, the manuals fail to address such important real-world questions as these:

- How can ammunition and repair parts resupply procedures be established to adjust to changes in a brigade's task organization?

- When a unit tows a damaged vehicle to the rear and determines that it cannot be repaired at the unit level, how does the unit's executive officer or the battalion's S4 tell a forward support element that additional maintenance teams are needed? And whose recovery vehicle should be used to tow the damaged vehicle farther to the rear when necessary for repair by "technical experts," as specified in FM 100-5?

- How can other damaged vehicles be recovered if a unit's recovery vehicle is involved in towing operations?

Despite the burdensome nature of peacetime regulations and constraints, units in Europe are trying to find ways to solve the problems associated with unit sustainability. One battalion started with its leaders questioning the adequacy of their task force's support when that support was organized into the traditional field and combat trains.

In a series of opposing force field exercises, the battalion trains were found to be less than responsive to the rapidly changing tactical situations. While the combat trains were busy being captured, for example, the field trains were busy trying to find out where the company trains had gone. Eventually, the field trains, normally located near the brigade

trains, were pared down to the absolutely essential elements and these were dispersed throughout the battalion's area. They were also placed under the control of a battalion logistics operations center (LOC). The LOC itself was located well forward, while a network of logistical release points (LRPs) was established near the initial and subsequent battle positions designated in the battalion's operations plan. An emergency resupply package (Class III and V) tailored specifically for the units occupying the battle positions was placed at each LRP.

As the tactical situation developed, the LOC directed recovery vehicles, additional ammunition and petroleum supplies, ambulances, and other needed support to the appropriate LRP. Company executive officers, supply sergeants, and first sergeants never had to go farther to the rear than the supporting LRP. Battlefield casualties and damaged vehicles were evacuated by the companies to the LRPs, where either a battalion or a forward support element took over.

The LRP approach is but one way battalions in the field are trying to find answers to sustainability questions. It shows what can be done by commanders and, hopefully, it will be noticed by those charged with developing doctrine and publishing how-to-fight manuals. It might also cause those in the Army's higher echelons to consider publishing "how-to-sustain" manuals, for if the Army is to win the next battle, it will have to be able to sustain the units and soldiers who will be fighting that battle.

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