

a threat, and engaged on the battlefield, light infantry units have a definite advantage over armor and mechanized forces. They can dig in. They can hide. They can move quietly at night. In many ways, they are more mobile on foot at three miles per hour than their mechanized counterparts are in their vehicles. Foot troops make better use of the terrain, leave a smaller electronic or visual signature, are not bound to lines of communication, and are the most capable at effecting surprise.

Ironically, light infantry can be organized, equipped, and trained for a fraction of the price of mechanized forces. Discounting the cost of the soldiers' pay, food, and ammunition, the purchase price of one new Bradley fighting vehicle — about 1.5 million dollars — could provide six or seven light infantry battalions with enough money to cover their operations and maintenance for a year.

It's time, therefore, for us to shift our budget priorities and doctrine to a more formidable infantry force

structure that is prepared to get to war fast and fight on our own terms.



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## Selfless Leadership

LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. L. SLOANE

When I started my military career a number of years ago, one of the first things I learned was that the most important aspect of military service had as its core the old adage that the mission and the men come first. I believed it then; I believe it even more now.

Unfortunately, too many of the Army's leaders today seem to have forgotten that, although the mission must come first, it is only slightly more important than the men. These leaders seem to be willing to sacrifice their men needlessly for the mission, especially when the accomplishment of the mission is linked in their minds with their own personal advancement.

Modern technology and the various management theories that have been applied to the Army have helped engender this idea that the men are expendable. The equipment and systems that have been developed

tend to promote the dehumanization of soldiers — the men have become mere commodities, a part of the equipment or the system. And because most of the management theories focus on the need for the people to support the organization in attaining a certain goal, they fail to recognize the corresponding obligations the organization has to its people.

The Army's leaders too often become so enmeshed in the details, in the micro-management of their own actions, that they lose sight of their overriding goal. Slowly, then, over a period of time, it becomes easy for them to compromise their inherent personal values for those of "the system." Their programs and budgets then become more important than their people, and accomplishment begins to outweigh human concerns. This is what convinces many outsiders that the Army's leaders do not really care for their soldiers, that they

lack the necessary moral courage to stand up for their men, and that they have mortgaged their integrity by deluding themselves as to their real goals.

It is quite evident then that one of the Army's major internal problems is the increasing selfishness of its leaders. But this is only a symptom; what we need to do is look at some of the underlying causes.

First, leaders need to be able to assess where they stand and what they can expect their future to be, but the individual leader finds it difficult to get the information he needs to make this assessment. Some of the recent changes the Army has made in performance assessment and career progression may prove beneficial in the long run, but they are not enough in themselves to bring about changes in the basic motivations of its leaders.

The Army also needs a far less narrow and less subjective system of

assessing performance and potential, and it must couple such a system with a revised career program. For example, individuals who reach high levels of competence before their retirement dates should be retained by the Army and used in positions where their experience and training can be put to good use. Perhaps they could be given special pay incentives to keep them productive and useful members of the military establishment.

Another cause of the rise in personal selfishness is the perception of many leaders that their standard of living is being lowered and that their benefits are being steadily eroded. Many of them also feel that the Army is not devoting enough of its resources to training and maintenance despite a seemingly increasing enemy threat. As a result, they question whether the country and its political leaders truly want and are willing to support an Army that is large enough for today's troubled world. This, in turn, causes them to sense that their superiors are interested in things other than people and to doubt that it is worth while for them to struggle to maintain high levels of unit readiness at great per-

sonal effort. Eventually, they become more concerned with their own well-being and security than with service to their country and duty to their mission.

Another problem is that, even with the eroding of benefits, many people are entering the service today for purely economic reasons rather than out of a sense of service or duty. In fact, with such motivations implicit in its recruiting and retention programs, the Army cannot help attracting the self-interested and self-concerned, thereby insuring ever-increasing numbers of selfish leaders for the future.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley once said, "A man is not a leader until his appointment has been ratified by his men." While the Army's primary purpose may well be to equip, train, and employ its units anywhere in the world, if its leaders do not show a sincere concern for their men and establish a strong bond with them, their leadership will never be ratified. This does not mean that the leaders must pamper their men or relax their standards of discipline. It does mean that they must place the interests of their men first. If they do

this, the men will then put their mission above all else, and the mission will be accomplished.

The Army must come to grips with the fact that many of its leaders have deviated from its inherent concern for its men and must help these leaders get back on the right track. Only by providing them with the means through which they can better see themselves and look toward a secure future, can the Army hope to motivate them to look outward, away from themselves and toward their men.

If the Army's leaders can find it within themselves to be truly concerned for their soldiers' lives and welfare, then nothing will be able to stop the Army from carrying out its mission to defend this great country.



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# The Balance

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In the whole process of developing leaders over a period of time, there will be one general malfunction. The leadership of the unit will continue to operate, even with this malfunction, but it won't run smoothly on all cylinders. This malfunction has to do with *balancing*.

Two big factors underlie all we know about Army leadership: the accomplishment of the mission, and the welfare of the men. Mission and men.

Leaders are always working with these two basic factors. Whenever and wherever possible, a leader tries to balance them so that both the

needs of the mission and the needs of the men are met. But there are times — sometimes in peace, often in war — where the needs of both cannot be met. The balance cannot be kept. A leader must choose one over the other. In these few situations, and the leader must make them few, the mis-