

assessing performance and potential, and it must couple such a system with a revised career program. For example, individuals who reach high levels of competence before their retirement dates should be retained by the Army and used in positions where their experience and training can be put to good use. Perhaps they could be given special pay incentives to keep them productive and useful members of the military establishment.

Another cause of the rise in personal selfishness is the perception of many leaders that their standard of living is being lowered and that their benefits are being steadily eroded. Many of them also feel that the Army is not devoting enough of its resources to training and maintenance despite a seemingly increasing enemy threat. As a result, they question whether the country and its political leaders truly want and are willing to support an Army that is large enough for today's troubled world. This, in turn, causes them to sense that their superiors are interested in things other than people and to doubt that it is worth while for them to struggle to maintain high levels of unit readiness at great per-

sonal effort. Eventually, they become more concerned with their own well-being and security than with service to their country and duty to their mission.

Another problem is that, even with the eroding of benefits, many people are entering the service today for purely economic reasons rather than out of a sense of service or duty. In fact, with such motivations implicit in its recruiting and retention programs, the Army cannot help attracting the self-interested and self-concerned, thereby insuring ever-increasing numbers of selfish leaders for the future.

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley once said, "A man is not a leader until his appointment has been ratified by his men." While the Army's primary purpose may well be to equip, train, and employ its units anywhere in the world, if its leaders do not show a sincere concern for their men and establish a strong bond with them, their leadership will never be ratified. This does not mean that the leaders must pamper their men or relax their standards of discipline. It does mean that they must place the interests of their men first. If they do

this, the men will then put their mission above all else, and the mission will be accomplished.

The Army must come to grips with the fact that many of its leaders have deviated from its inherent concern for its men and must help these leaders get back on the right track. Only by providing them with the means through which they can better see themselves and look toward a secure future, can the Army hope to motivate them to look outward, away from themselves and toward their men.

If the Army's leaders can find it within themselves to be truly concerned for their soldiers' lives and welfare, then nothing will be able to stop the Army from carrying out its mission to defend this great country.



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# The Balance

DANDRIDGE M. MALONE

In the whole process of developing leaders over a period of time, there will be one general malfunction. The leadership of the unit will continue to operate, even with this malfunction, but it won't run smoothly on all cylinders. This malfunction has to do with *balancing*.

Two big factors underlie all we know about Army leadership: the accomplishment of the mission, and the welfare of the men. Mission and men.

Leaders are always working with these two basic factors. Whenever and wherever possible, a leader tries to balance them so that both the

needs of the mission and the needs of the men are met. But there are times — sometimes in peace, often in war — where the needs of both cannot be met. The balance cannot be kept. A leader must choose one over the other. In these few situations, and the leader must make them few, the mis-

mission must come first.

There are those few times when our Army will not, cannot, and should not "be fair." The whole meaning of Army leadership rests on this law: the mission must come first. So does the meaning of "soldier," and "service," and "duty."

In the balancing business the mission side of the scale requires, to put it simply, knowing your job in excruciating detail. It requires technical competence. Without it, an Army leader can never lead for long. Just talk won't work. The troops will know.

The men side of the scale requires the leader to know his soldiers. He must know what's inside of them, what makes them do things or not do things, what turns them on or off, what they can do and what they will do under stress, and when they're afraid, or tired, or cold, or lonely. These are the things he needs to know about his soldiers. They're what tells him how a soldier measures up on the "able and willing" gauge.

You, as a leader, must try to balance between these two requirements — mission needs and men needs. And it is precisely here, in this "balancing" business, where leaders most frequently fail. It is here where young sergeants and young lieutenants have their greatest difficulties and where even old leaders, despite their wisdom, sometimes lose sight of the ultimate purpose of leadership. The problem arises because of the relationship that exists between the soldiers' happiness and satisfaction on the one hand and their productivity and mission accomplishment on the other.

Common sense might tell you that happy, satisfied soldiers will get the job done better. From this, a leader, especially if he's a new sergeant or new lieutenant, might well assume that if he can somehow keep his soldiers happy and satisfied, then they will be more productive, more likely to get the mission accomplished. But the strange chemistry of leadership just doesn't work this way. A thousand scientific studies of leadership, and a thousand lessons of



leadership experience, both prove that what seems to be a natural, common-sense assumption is precisely wrong!

In simple terms, mission accomplishment builds morale and esprit far more often than the other way around. When soldiers and units do the things that soldiers and units are supposed to do, that's when morale and esprit are highest. That's why the one best way to build will is to build skill. That's why those new basic training graduates are so fired up about soldiering and about the Army. That's why unit esprit is at its peak when the unit has a good exercise going out in the field.

If leaders don't know both sides of this leadership scale — the needs of the mission and the needs of the men — in full detail, they'll be forever getting the scale tilted the wrong way. And when that happens, the soldiers' time, or the soldiers' spirit, or the soldiers themselves will be wasted.

There are times, in training, when you may be led astray. You may see cold, wet, muddy troops coming in from a night field exercise at 0200 and say, "Hell, let's let 'em get a hot shower and some sleep; then we'll pull maintenance when it's light enough to see." And there are times just like that in war when a bloody

and shot-up company may be stalled in its assault, for the second time, halfway up a hill. You say, "Hell, they just can't do that again. Let's dig 'em in, pound that hill with Red-Leg, and ask battalion for reinforcements." If you love your troops, in the noble way that good leaders do, both these decisions, at the time, may seem to be just common sense. But both are taking the easy way out, and both violate the ultimate purpose of Army leadership.

Now you can, and should, argue this point. But if you're talking about leadership, there's no way you can win. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task. And in the final analysis, when the action shifts to the battlefield for which you are now preparing, mission must come first. As you lead, and as you build leaders, this law must be, flat-out, the cornerstone of your foundation.

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