BOOK REVIEWS

The Battery Press of Nashville, Tennessee, has sent us five more of its recent reprints. In its airborne series are: FOUR STARS OF HELL: THE 501st PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN WORLD WAR II, by Captain Laurence Critchell (354 Pages. $18.95); THE WINGS OF PEGASUS: THE STORY OF THE GLIDER PILOT REGIMENT, by George Chatterton (282 Pages. $18.95); FREELY I SERVED, by Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski (203 Pages. $16.95); and NIGHT DROP: THE AMERICAN AIRBORNE INVASION OF NORMANDY, by S.L.A. Marshall (425 Pages. $18.95). And in the Press's combat arms series there is the HISTORY OF THE 398th INFANTRY REGIMENT IN WORLD WAR II, edited by Bernard Boston (208 Pages).

These reprints, like all the others we have seen from this Press, are extremely well done.

We have also received the last volume in the Department of the Army's Vietnam Studies Series. It is DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973, by Lieutenant General Charles R. Myer (Superintendent of Documents, 1982. 109 Pages. $5.00, Softbound). As its title implies, this monograph concentrates on the Vietnam communications experience at division level and lower.

From the Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth we have received two more in its series of Leavenworth papers: THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE: THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, by Timothy T. Lupfer (July 1981. 73 Pages, Softbound), and FIGHTING THE RUSSIANS IN WINTER: THREE CASE STUDIES, by Allen F. Chew (December, 1981. 51 Pages).

Lupfer's study deals with a wartime evaluation of tactical doctrine and offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in bringing about doctrinal changes during battle. Chew's study, which includes both World War I and World War II examples, illustrate certain common lessons, many of which are valid today and worth an infantryman's study.

Finally, we have received from the Arco Publishing Company five compact but most useful reference books: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO WEAPONS OF THE MODERN SOVIET GROUND FORCES, edited by Ray Bonds (1982. 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, by Frederick Myatt, (1982. 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS, by Frederick Myatt (1982. 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO MILITARY HELICOPTERS, by Bill Gunston (1982, 159 Pages); and AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE AIR WAR OVER VIETNAM: AIRCRAFT OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA CONFLICT, by Bernard C. Nalty, *et. al.* (1982, 159 Pages). Each guide sells for $8.95 and each contains numerous photographs and drawings, many of which are in color.

Here are a number of other books we want you to know about:

THE IMAGE OF WAR, 1861-1865, VOLUME II: THE GUNS OF '62. Edited by William C. Davis (Doubleday, 1982. 460 Pages. $35.00). This second volume in what is developing into an outstanding pictorial history of the Civil War lives up to the high standards set in the first of the planned six-book series. This one concentrates on the "fighter's year" — 1862 — "a year of almost constant turmoil in embattled America." Using 650 photographs and nine tightly written essays, the editor and his publisher have produced another splendid volume. The photographic collection, in particular, is the keystone to the book; it is most impressive and represents one of the finest Civil War undertakings in this century.

GREECE AND ROME AT WAR. By Peter Connolly (Prentice-Hall, 1981. 320 Pages. $30.00). The author has three other books on ancient military history to his credit. He is also a recognized authority on ancient arms and armor and does his own illustrations, which, in themselves, are outstanding. He uses two other specialists — Brian Dobson and Roger Tomlin — to prepare separate chapters on the Roman Army during the empire. This is a superbly presented volume that can be of invaluable assistance to the student of ancient military matters.

THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898. By David F. Trask. The Macmillan Wars of the United States (Macmillan, 1981. 654 Pages. $29.95). It has been several years since a volume in this particular Macmillan series was published. We were particularly pleased to see this one appear when it did because this particular war has never received a great deal of attention from U.S. military historians and because of the rising interest in the entire Caribbean basin.

David Trask is a U.S. State Department historian and calls his book a "military-political history." He has good reasons for doing so, for he concentrates as much on the political and diplomatic aspects of the war as he does on its military happenings. In doing so, he offers interpretations that differ widely from those that we are accustomed to hearing and reading about.

This is one of those books that should be read and studied by all infantrymen. It is also a most worthy addition to the Macmillan series on the wars of the United States.

THE IMPOSSIBLE VICTORY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE FOR THE RIVER PO. By Brian Harpur (Hippocrene Books, 1981. 202 Pages. $19.95). The author served as a junior officer in the British Eighth Army in Italy in 1944 and 1945 and recalls quite vividly the terrible weather and terrain conditions under which the war in Italy was fought. He is particularly good at depicting the hard life of the front-line soldier.

And, yet, the title of his book is somewhat misleading. It is more a story of the events that led up to the battle for the Po River, and of the differing personalities, such as Mark Clark, Harold Alexander, and Richard McCreery, who occupied the highest positions in the Allied hierarchy and who were directly responsible for the final Allied victory in Italy.

Harpur, a British journalist, writes well, and his interviews with Clark and McCreery are classics of their kind. He may be partial to the British Eighth Army and its heterogeneous grouping of units, but none can doubt the depth of his feelings for the "poor bloody infantryman." This brief extract should show you what we mean:

"Make no mistake about it, the Infantryman had the worst job as well as the most important job in the whole war. At the end of the day, often a long, frustrating, and very frightening day when he saw his friends shot to pieces around him, and he knew it was his turn next, no ground was gained, no skirmish nor battle won, without that heroic and anonymous figure the ordinary infantryman winkling out his adversary at the point of his bayonet."

SOVIET ARMED FORCES REVIEW ANNUAL, VOLUME 5, 1981. Edited by David R. Jones (Academic International Press, 1981. 329 Pages). Once again, David Jones has pulled together a mass of most useful information to give us an overview of the Soviet armed forces, the fifth time he has done so in this series of annual publications.

There are several excellent essays in this particular volume, some of which deal with nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare, subjects which are becoming of great interest in this decade. There are also the usual large number of tables and charts. All in all, this is a most useful reference work.

And here are our longer reviews:

THE ROAD TO KHARTOUM: A LIFE OF GENERAL CHARLES GORDON. By Charles Chevenix Trench (W.W. Norton, 1979. 320 Pages. $13.95). Reviewed by Rear Admiral George L. Phillips, United States Navy, Retired.

In 1884, General "Chinese" Gordon was killed at Khartoum in the Sudan, far up the Nile. His death came as the climax of a career that was possible only in England's golden age of 19th century Victorian imperialism.

Son of a general and with considerable family influence behind him, he was commissioned at 21 in the prestigious Royal Engineers, which launched him upon a life of restless activity, one marred by controversy, eccentricity, and megalomania. Because of his unstable character, it is fortunate that his service with troops was practically nonexistent. His talent as an engineer might well have been used to good advantage under close supervision, but perhaps as a bit of War Office wisdom he gravitated to independent advisory duties in the Crimea and then in China, attaining along the way some popular publicity, a flesh wound, and the nickname "Chinese." Urged on by his tremendous and immodest self-esteem and a hero-worshipping press, his star was in the ascendant.

Gordon seems to have had plenty of time for his self-indulgence. A holiday visit to Constantinople and a chance meeting with the Egyptian Khedive Ismail brought about his involvement with the equatorial province of the Ottoman Empire, where he was sent by Ismail to be governor.

He warred with slave traders and weeded out corrupt and incompetent officials, but then quit for a post under the Viceroy of India, which he held for only two days. It was again on to China and then to Mauritius, in uniform as a Royal Engineer.

Eventually, unrest in the Egyptian Sudan, stirred up by the fanatic Mahdi, led to Gordon's appointment as Governor General under the intricate system of British overlordship of Egyptian rule. Arriving in Khartoum in February 1884, he was soon besieged by the Mahdists, although he managed to evacuate the considerable contingent of civilian residents by river steamers. Things went from bad to worse. Starvation, disease, unceasing attacks, and desertion took a rising toll, until in January 1885, after a siege that had lasted almost a year, the final enemy assault brought his death.

Gordon had accomplished little in his search for glory, which had brought out the worst in him. A hard drinker, vain, headstrong, conceited, a religious fanatic, and insubordinate, he had the habit of editing or changing his orders at his personal whim. With these character blemishes and a lack of administrative ability, Gordon had little going for him except a reckless courage, which, in the end, was his undoing.

This is a worthwhile study of Victorian colonial politics, and it illustrates the complexities of statecraft without close communications and government control. A greater man might have won success. Unfortunately, Gordon was not a greater man.

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

WAR AND RACE: THE BLACK OFFICER IN THE AMERICAN

MILITARY, 1915-1940. By Gerald W. Patton (Greenwood Press, 1981. 214 Pages. $25.00). Reviewed by Lieutenant John J. McGrath, Fort Benning, Georgia.

From the Civil War until just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, blacks served in the United States Army in war and peace as members of separate, segregated units. Although the black enlisted man found a place in such illustrious regiments as the 10th Cavalry and the 24th Infantry, prior to 1898 there were only three black officers in the entire Army.

In this scholarly work, Gerald W. Patton analyzes the role of the black officer in the Army from just before World War I to the beginning of World War II. The picture he paints is not a pretty one. Patton writes, for example, of the many injustices during World War I faced by the black officers who had been brought into the Army to serve with the two black divisions that were raised as part of the National Army. It is interesting to note that in Europe the French treated the blacks better than their fellow countrymen did, and that the Army's leaders considered the black officers unfit to be combat leaders because of "innate racial characteristics."

As a result, the Army viewed the World War I experience with black officers as a failure and after 1918 the role of the black officer in the peacetime Army was sharply curtailed. By 1940, in fact, there were only two black combat arms officers on active duty.

The coming of World War II restored the role of the black officer in the military services, although the Army's units remained segregated for the duration of the war.

Patton's book, another in the series entitled Contributions in Afro-American and African Studies, is a work for the scholar rather than for the reader interested in popular history. It has been intensely researched and contains a large number of detailed footnootes and a comprehensive bibliography. It demonstrates how the opinions and prejudices of a society can be used to distort the decision-making process of the U.S. Army.

THE SOVIET ART OF WAR: DOCTRINE, STRATEGY AND TACTICS. Edited by Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Westview Press, 1982. 323 Pages). Reviewed by Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF Directorate of Soviet Affairs.

Don't be fooled by the title of this book. It is not a collection of paintings and prints of the Red Guard in the Russian October Revolution or of Stalingrad and Kursk in World War II. The connection is there, however, because this is an excellent collection of Soviet writings on doctrine, strategy, and tactics that range from the 1917 Revolution up through the early 1980s.

The editors of this volume are eminently qualified to put together such a work. They served two tours with the U.S. Defense Attache's office in our Moscow embassy and currently possess the largest collection of Soviet writings in the United States.

Soviet military art bears no resemblance to any art-like field of knowledge, but forms one part of a hierarchical, scientifically-based area of study in the causes and conduct of war. The realm of military art contains Soviet strategy, operational art, and tactics. Each is concerned with the management of troop formations, logistics, and battle engagements at various unit levels.

While none of the writings included in this book pre-date the 1917 Revolution, there is a rich heritage of military thought and experience from the Czarist days that influences present Soviet military thought. The Soviets place a great deal of effort and time in the development of their military concepts and the thread of continuity is evident among these works.

This book will be an invaluable tool for all readers interested in examining the original works of Soviet military thought. This is the sort of basic information that will allow the reader in the West to gain a better understanding of Soviet policy and force structures.

THE CHINA SEA: THE AMERICAN STAKE IN ITS FUTURE. By Harold C. Hinton (National Strategy Information Center, 1980. 44 Pages. $3.95, Softbound). Reviewed by Doctor Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The National Strategy Information Center's agenda papers are brief essays on important strategic matters. In this paper, one of America's leading experts on China focuses on the increasingly important China Sea and its environs.

The China Sea is a major artery of commerce and communication, and is of great strategic importance. Its economic importance is heightened by the strong possibility of there being significant amounts of oil under the continental shelf. The countries of the area are engaged in trying to settle conflicting claims over territorial limits, the rights to islands, and control over underwater resources. Local military tensions are exacerbated by great power rivalries, especially the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Since World War II the United States Seventh Fleet has been the prime force in the area, but this supremacy is now challenged by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Hinton contends that the U.S. must retain a strong presence in the area, and that a continuance of the country's post-Vietnam tendency to withdraw would only lead to more rather than less instability in the region. The U.S. has no choice but to remain a Far East power, and most of the nations in the area, including the Peoples Republic of China, consider a strong U.S. presence essential as a check against the Soviets.

This short pamphlet contains nothing new or profound. But it is well written and spells out the issues for the layman.

THE SOVIET ESTIMATE: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND RUS-

SIAN MILITARY STRENGTH. By Jon Prados (The Dial Press, 1982. 367 Pages. $17.95). Reviewed by A.W. McMaster, Headquarters TRADOC.

This book is as difficult to review as it is optimistic in the task it establishes for itself in its title. Without a doubt it is factually impressive, and the author clearly has had access to a large amount of data. But he does not cover any new ground in this critique of our national estimate process.

A strong plus for the author, though, comes when he attempts to clarify where and why our estimates have frequently proven faulty. It is "misperception." This, in turn, leads to wrong guesses and also brings about a tendency to use assumptions that underscore the estimates. Thus, at one time our estimates said that the Soviets were seeking missile superiority when, in fact, they were desperately trying to catch up.

Two other interesting themes are surfaced in this volume. One is the military services' penchant to build weapon systems before having clear missions for them. The other is that of "competitive analysis." Here, CIA estimates on Soviet military capabilities were considered as one, corporate opinion. The so-called "B-Team," headed by Paul Nitze and including many expert, "conservative critics," produced a second opinion. In retrospect, the latter was deemed to have done a better job.

By the way, the Army's new Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS) has all but alleviated the problem of system acquisition without finite rationale. Headquarters TRADOC has moved the Army to a far more sensible, cost-effective, and integrative materiel identification and development program. Inadvertently, the Prados book provides some justification for this new management style.

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY AND PROCESS. By Amos A. Jordan. *et. al.* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 604 Pages). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy).

This timely, interesting, and well-written book focuses on the intricacies of the national security process. The authors have prepared an excellent text that deals with the complexities and challenges associated with the national security matters that will probably confront policymakers in the years to come. They view national security as doing more than just protecting a nation's people from physical harm; they believe it also includes protection "through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state."

The book is composed of five major parts and includes appropriate figures and tables. Discussion questions and recommended readings are included at the end of each chapter. The end notes, assembled at the back of the book by chapter, provide an extensive bibliographic source for those who would like to continue their reading. A thirteen-page index concludes the book.

This book is highly recommended for the policymaker, the military professional, and the serious student.

SLIM BUTTES, 1876: AN EPISODE OF THE GREAT SIOUX WAR. By Jerome A. Greene (University of Oklahoma Press, 1982. 192 Pages. $12.95). Reviewed by Professor Benjamin F. Gilbert, San Jose State University.

The battle of Slim Buttes, which occurred on 9 September 1876 in the Dakota Territory, symbolized the decline of the Sioux and the Cheyenne as the dominant power on the northern Great Plains. It was the first victory for the United States Army in the Sioux War and the climax to General George Crook's campaign to compel dissident elements of the Sioux to return to their reservations in the southwestern part of the Dakota Territory.

Prior to the battle, the Army had suffered three defeats. As a result, General Philip H. Sheridan, who commanded the Military Division of the Missouri from his headquarters in Chicago, formulated a new strategy. Accordingly, General Crook and his men of the Big Horn and Yellowstone expeditions were ordered to subjugate the Cheyenne and Sioux in the area. Crook found that the Indians had scattered and that their trail led eastward.

Crook decided to strike out for the Black Hills. Hoping to overtake the Indians, Crook insisted that his men travel lightly, but the resultant lack of food aggravated the physical discomfort of the troops.

Initially, the infantry set out each day one hour ahead of the cavalry. But once across the mud flats of the Little Missouri, the cavalry lagged behind the infantry. The cavalrymen were eventually forced to abandon, and even eat, their exhausted mounts. When a detachment was sent ahead on the strongest horses to procure provisions from the mining towns in the Black Hills, it accidentally discovered a large Indian village at Slim Buttes. The battle began with a surprise attack on the camp, but most of the fighting took place among the bluffs south and southwest of the village.

The book, a scholarly account of the Slim Buttes episode, contains an excellent selection of photographs and official documents, a reproduction of Walter M. Camp's 1918 article on the battle site, and a splendid bibliography. Those interested in the history of the American West and its military aspects should enjoy this superbly written book.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

PLANNING U.S. SECURITY: DEFENSE POLICY IN THE EIGHTIES. Edited by Philip S. Kronenberg (Pergamon, 1982. 214 Pages. $7.95, Softbound).

IN THE WAKE OF WAR: MEMOIRS OF AN ALABAMA MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER IN WORLD WAR II ITALY. By Robert M. Hill and Elizabeth Craig Hill. University of Alabama Press, 1982. 150 Pages. $15.95.