

under the worst possible conditions. It does mean, though, that they should do more than run two miles a day and do 25 or 30 pushups and 40 or 50 situps.

For example, every infantryman should do more physical training while carrying his individual weapon and wearing his load bearing equipment (LBE). Thus, with his weapon and LBE he could be required to jog two or three miles, or go through a confidence course, or run a bayonet course. Although some people might consider bayonet training outdated, this is one of the best ways for infantrymen to develop a solid foundation of individual and collective confidence in their physical abilities and their leadership abilities. Conducting extended foot marches in connection with tactical exercises, training in hand-to-hand combat, and rotating junior leadership positions are some

of the other things that can be done to improve the fighting qualities of any unit.

A fear has to be instilled in the enemy soldier, a fear that will inhibit his mobility and his reactions. Our front line soldiers can help bring on that fear by demonstrating their determination and their fighting abilities.

To be able to do this, they must be mentally and physically prepared to face and overcome at least three or four enemy soldiers each. Their smart and confident use of their individual and crew-served weapons and their bayonets should help reduce any unfavorable odds they may face. Individual initiative must also be encouraged, because once the battle is joined, the front line infantryman's actions, working either as an individual or as a member of a group, may well carry the day.

In a peacetime environment, infantrymen must project an image of strength and determination. If called on to do battle, they must couple that image with courage and determination to fully support the Army's mission to fight and win. For that is the culmination of the front line infantryman's role on the extended battlefield, which is, as it has been on every battlefield throughout history, to close with and destroy or capture the enemy.

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# Train to be Miserable

MAJOR TIMOTHY P. MARONEY

Some commanders and trainers honestly believe that "you don't have to train to be miserable." I think you do. A battlefield is a hostile environment, and success in that environment does not come without a great deal of misery, hardship, and self-denial. Only the soldiers and units that are hardened, disciplined, and conditioned to function effectively under the most adverse and demoralizing conditions are going to be able to win through to victory.

Unfortunately, our people, for the most part, are not accustomed to misery, hardship, and sacrifice. We live in an environment and an era in

which pleasure-producing products and services abound, and we're glad we do. But this comfortable, almost opulent lifestyle will put us at a great disadvantage on a battlefield if we are ever pitted against a determined enemy whose entire culture revolves around sacrifice and hardship.

Accordingly, our infantry commanders must begin today to train and condition their soldiers to function under the most miserable conditions; they must train their units to be miserable so that they will be prepared to deal with the problems associated with battlefield misery. They should plan a training program

that will progressively and systematically introduce elements of misery. Units can then move on to higher levels of misery by accomplishing given tasks under increasingly difficult and demoralizing conditions.

Veteran infantrymen can readily identify most of the elements of misery a unit can expect to meet in combat: prolonged adverse weather conditions, lack of food and equipment, loss of a respected leader or comrade, fatigue, extended marches over unfamiliar or hostile terrain, boredom, and uncertainty, among others.

The common denominators that

opposing forces share on a battlefield are the terrain on which a battle is fought and the weather conditions that prevail at the time of engagement. Within this fixed framework, assuming the sides are evenly matched, certain variables will determine the winner and the loser — the principles of war that the leaders apply and the level of troop proficiency on each side. The units that are prepared, disciplined, and trained to carry out their missions under the most adverse, demoralizing conditions will have a distinct advantage over those that have not been conditioned to the hardships of a combat zone.

Training to be miserable could be accomplished within the existing framework of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) structure. For example, unit commanders and trainers could control and evaluate a unit's demonstrated ability to function under increasingly difficult conditions simply by modifying the conditions under which each task is accomplished. In ARTEP 7-15, The Rifle Squad, the forced march/live fire exercise can be used to illustrate this point most graphically. The task for Levels 3 and 1 could remain the same: to conduct a forced

march and a live fire exercise during daylight. Only the forced march distance would change between the two levels. The distance of 6 kilometers for Level 3 would double to 12 kilometers for Level 1. The evaluation standards between the two levels could be changed so that an extra hour would be allocated for the march, and the percentage of target hits during the live fire exercise could be made higher.

Thus, for all ARTEPs, the same task and evaluation standards could be maintained; only the conditions would change. After achieving Level 1 satisfactorily, for example, the unit could undertake the same missions during hours of darkness or limited visibility. Then it could try to accomplish the mission on a rainy night simulating at least one wounded team member. The soldiers might also try doing it with empty bellies and crossing unfamiliar terrain. These are conditions that unit commanders and trainers at all echelons could easily program into their exercises. Such variables as training locations, the time of day, the season of the year, and the duration of the training periods are controllable and could be programmed in a "misery escalation planning schedule." The absence of

precise long range local weather forecasts might preclude exact scheduling when that particular "element of misery" is called for, of course, so there would have to be a certain amount of flexibility in any planning cycle.

Our present tactical doctrine calls for our units to undertake offensive operations to control the combat zone. Accordingly, adverse weather and terrain conditions can actually assist an attacking force. In bad weather, defending forces often instinctively seek creature comforts, let their guard down, and lie vulnerable to surprise, enabling a well-trained, offensive-minded unit, secure in its abilities, to outwit, confuse, and destroy them, even when they are otherwise superior.

My proposal, therefore, is a simple one — let's train to be miserable!



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## PMCS versus GITI

**CAPTAIN ROBERT R. LEONHARD**

Without a doubt, the longest nights for a mechanized infantry company commander in garrison are those immediately preceding an annual general inspection (AGI). And on those nights he probably spends more time worrying about his motor pool than about any other part of his com-

pany. The reason for this is that the company's maintenance managers seem to wait until the last minute to solve their problems. The company may pass its AGIs most of the time, maybe all of the time, but between AGIs the motor pool still has those problems.

Of course, the company commander is responsible for making sure that his equipment is ready for combat and that his troops are trained in combat maintenance. He must also attain such tangible peacetime goals as passing AGIs and roadside checks and having good mission-