

# BOOK REVIEWS



We are pleased to announce that our 1967 publication, *INFANTRY IN VIETNAM*, which was recently reprinted by The Battery Press of Nashville, Tennessee, has been selected by the Military Book Club as one of a dual main selection for June 1983.

We are also happy to announce that our 1971 book, *A DISTANT CHALLENGE*, which was a follow-on volume to *INFANTRY IN VIETNAM*, is now being reprinted by The Battery Press, and we expect that it will be available for purchase sometime after 1 June 1983. *A DISTANT CHALLENGE* contains accounts of small unit Infantry combat actions that occurred in Vietnam between 1967 and the end of 1970. A concluding chapter has been added to cover the highlights of 1971, 1972, and the early part of 1973, when the last U.S. ground combat unit was withdrawn from Vietnam, and to list some of the lessons that were learned during the almost seven years of fighting.

We are also very pleased to note that the U.S. Marine Corps Association has reprinted the long out-of-print book, *INFANTRY IN BATTLE*. The original manuscript for that book, which is a classic on infantry tactics, was put together in 1934 by the Military History and Publications Section of The Infantry School under the direction of Colonel George C. Marshall. The first edition was printed that same year. A second edition was published in 1939 by *The Infantry Journal*, which is no longer in existence and which was the official magazine of The United States Infantry Association; the latter merged with other military associations in the 1950s to form the Association of the United States Army. The reprinted edition, which sells for \$9.95, can be ordered from The

Marine Corps Association, Box 1775, Quantico, Virginia 22134. The Association's telephone number is commercial 703/640-6161. We recommend this book most highly to all of our readers.

In our last issue, we mentioned a few of the excellent books we have recently received that we think all Infantrymen should know about. Here are more:

• **LONG ENDURE: THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD, 1852-1867, Volume III of Military Uniforms in America.** From the series produced by The Company of Military Historians. Edited by John R. Elting and Michael J. McAfee (Presidio Press, 1982. 147 Pages. \$35.00). Sixty-four military units are represented in this volume, their battle histories written by 20 authors, their uniforms, in full color, depicted by 19 artists. There are U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and militia units; Confederate units; and representative units from the French military services that took part in the French invasion and occupation of Mexico in the 1860s. A glossary of uniform and weapon terms and an index complete this very fine reference work.

• **THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY.** By Boyd L. Dastrup (Sunflower University Press, 1982. 157 Pages. \$40.00). A large number of old and new photographs complement a factual, down-to-earth account of one of the Army's long-serving schools. The College has had its ups and downs since its founding in May 1881 as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, and its mission has changed countless times, sometimes seemingly without sound reasons. Today, few Army officers who have not completed the College's

resident or non-resident course can expect to advance in rank. We have only one objection to this book: The author fails to mention the important role the College's monthly magazine, *Military Review*, has played in advancing the College's professional image.

• **YOURS TO REASON WHY: DECISION IN BATTLE.** By William Seymour (St. Martin's Press, 1982. 338 Pages. \$17.95). This is a most interesting and novel approach to military history, and it is one that would make an excellent teaching vehicle. The author writes about ten military campaigns — from Hastings to Anzio — and at appropriate points stops the action and asks the reader to pretend he is one of the commanders and to select an appropriate course of action from a number of options, each of which is shown on an accompanying map. He then resumes his narrative, telling which option was selected, and gives his opinion of that selection. The author is quite knowledgeable in the field, and his writing style, which is easy-going but correct, makes reading his book a pleasure.

• **JANE'S MILITARY REVIEW: SECOND YEAR OF ISSUE.** Edited by Ian V. Hogg (Jane's, 1982. 160 Pages). Ian Hogg has put together a fine selection of articles on a variety of contemporary military subjects — the Falklands, Afghanistan, optronics, NATO, infantry fighting vehicles, and air power, among others. (The articles were current as of mid-1982.) Of particular interest to Infantrymen is Richard Simpkin's "The Roles of Infantry in the Maneuver Battle." Simpkin has written on this subject before, and in this essay he continued his attack on "mechanized infantry" and its functions in any future war. To Simpkin, "mech-

anized infantry . . . stands for an idea which lacks both a doctrine and a cult object and is thus open to truly Orwellian levels of doublethink and doublespeak." He holds firmly to one thought: the Infantry exists only to get the tanks forward. Therefore, the only kind of Infantry that will be needed in an all-out war in a European environment will be "in-house" Infantry, foot-soldiers who belong to and are trained by tankers and who know their real place in the pecking order — at the bottom. He also has some ideas about a seven-man squad and a new kind of IFV.

• **BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF WORLD WAR I.** By Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman (Greenwood Press, 1982. 424 Pages. \$49.95). This is an outstanding reference book and one that should be received with open arms by all students of World War I. Not only is it a complete guide to the major figures of that era, it contains an excellent introductory essay that covers the war's major events, maps of the major fronts, a complete chronology, and a bibliography of works in six languages.

• **LOUIS L. SNYDER'S GUIDE TO WORLD WAR II.** By Louis L. Snyder (Greenwood Press, 1982. 838 Pages. \$39.95). This is another outstanding reference book. The author has written extensively on World War II and is a recognized authority on nationalism and on modern German history. He examines all aspects of the war, using an alphabetical approach. Many of his entries have bibliographies for those who want to pursue the subjects in greater depth. The book also has a chronology of the war, a list of the "ten basic books on World War II," and a detailed index.

**TO WIN A WAR: 1918, THE YEAR OF VICTORY,** by John Terraine (Doubleday, 1981. 268 Pages. \$14.95).

The author is a well-known British military historian who writes well and has an almost encyclopedic knowl-

edge of World War I. In fact, this is his eighth book about the events of that war.

Therefore, it is easy to say that the book contains a good deal of useful information, even if it does display a definite British bias. Unfortunately, though, as several recent authors have done when writing about the events of 1918, Terraine concentrates far too much on the high level political and military machinations and far too little on the exploits of the Allied armies.

He gives short shrift to the roles played by the French and American armies and to their leaders during the last six months of the war, and believes quite strongly that never did the British Army show to better advantage than during the "last 100 days."

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**COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION, STRESS, AND THE VOLUNTEER MILITARY,** edited by Sam C. Sarkesian (Sage Publications, 1980. 305 Pages). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Rinaldo, Fort Eustis, Virginia.

With interest in Army Cohesion and Stability (ARCOST) initiatives at a high level, this collection of well reasoned and balanced scholarly articles should draw widespread interest, the more so because it relates to the concept of voluntary service and the numerous changes that concept has brought to the American military system.

Though divided into three parts — the dimensions of combat effectiveness, society and the profession, and leaders and soldiers — the collection weaves a common thread of concern about the current ways of looking at combat effectiveness within the military services. Lewis Sorley's essay, "Prevailing Criteria: A Critique," is especially provocative in this respect. Sorley, a highly respected scholar and a West Point graduate, asserts that we need "an accurate quantitative assessment complemented by informal professional judgment, both unadulter-

ated by considerations of career prospects."

While Sorley focuses on how we might measure combat effectiveness, Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder integrate history, sociology, and even art and literature in their review of the concepts. Concerning cohesion, they conclude that the "soldiers' battle" indicates "that unit integrity is not a *sine qua non* to combat effectiveness." They point to the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 when cooks, drivers, and clerks "without common unit identification and marginally proficient in their use of weaponry, nevertheless soaked up the attack of five German panzer armies."

Other essays by familiar experts such as Colonel William Hauser and Major Stephen Wesbrook, both of whom are experienced in infantry matters, reinforce the idea of the importance of an underpinning of support for and a recognition of the need and value of service to the Nation.

Again and again, in various guises, the moral factor of war and overall national support is stressed in this collection. For example, in an essay on "The American Experience in Vietnam," Guenter Lewy tells us that "in the final analysis then, military cohesion is a consequence of the cohesion of the political and social fabric and of the willingness of that society to support its military."

Notwithstanding a possible dearth of community and national support, Colonel Hauser feels that the Army must do a lot of in-house reforming to prepare itself morally and psychologically for war. Indeed, some of his recommendations have already been adopted.

Much, of course, remains to be done. This book will assist all military men to make considered judgments based on solid research and sound professional scholarship.

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**INFILTRATION,** by Albert Speer (Macmillan, 1981. 384 Pages. \$15.95). Reviewed by Alexander S. Birkos, Mount Shasta, California.

This book, published shortly before the author's death in September 1981, stands as a major addition to the literature of the Nazi era and of World War II. Speer, in vivid detail, examines the process by which Heinrich Himmler plotted to establish a separate SS industrial empire. At the same time, though, he lays bare his own soul for the world to examine.

After more than three decades, the former German Minister of Armaments and War Production was still haunted by the fact that he had ignored the terrible plight of the concentration camp prisoners, many of whom had been forced to work in his war factories. It had been too easy for Speer to look the other way.

Speer's central theme is both fascinating and astonishing: At a time when the German armed forces were fighting desperately for survival, let alone victory, and was literally starved for new weapons and equipment, Himmler made the work of Speer's ministry a nightmare by his intrigues, interferences, and hare-brained schemes. He constantly coopted industrialists and plant managers by making them honorary SS officers, thereby forcing them to work at cross-purposes to Speer's production plans. Time and time again he made Speer waste valuable time and effort to unravel the conspiratorial webs the SS continually created.

While this book does offer an intimate view of what went on in the higher German circles during the last years of the war, it also provides lessons for us in our own time. Anyone who is in the least concerned with managing America's military-industrial complex should heed these lessons. In a future general war, there may not be the luxury of time to undo the harm caused by petty, self-seeking, empire builders.

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**A MATTER OF HOURS: TREA-  
SON AT HARPER'S FERRY**, by  
Paul H. Teetor (Fairleigh Dickinson  
University, 1982. 309 Pages. \$29.50).  
Reviewed by Professor Benjamin F.  
Gilbert, San Jose State University.

Harper's Ferry, located in the Blue Ridge Mountains at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, functioned as an important military base during the Civil War. In September 1862, General Robert E. Lee decided to invade the North with his ragged Confederate army in an attempt to conquer Maryland. Crossing the Potomac near Leesburg on 5 September, Lee occupied Frederick, Maryland, two days later.

Lee thought that because of his move the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry would evacuate it. When this did not take place, Lee took a serious risk and divided his army in the face of a superior enemy force. He sent General "Stonewall" Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry while he led the other part of his army towards Hagerstown.

Harper's Ferry was then commanded by Colonel Dixon S. Miles, and this book briefly covers his military career up to that time and examines in detail his actions that led up to the surrender of his 10,000-man force. During the three-day siege conducted by Jackson, Miles made numerous mistakes. He also disobeyed orders relating to the defense of Maryland Heights and purposely kept the southern sector of Bolivar Heights relatively undefended. Miles even permitted paroled prisoners-of-war to return to their lines without wearing blindfolds and through sparsely defended areas. He surrendered to a force not much larger than his own and without waiting for an infantry assault by Jackson's men.

General David Hunter presided over a commission that inquired into the loss of Harper's Ferry. The commission found Miles was "unfit" to defend the post and referred to his "criminal neglect" and his "incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility." The author contends that Miles was a traitor and agrees with the historian of the 115th New York

**NOTE TO READERS:** All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

Regiment, James H. Clark, who in 1865 called Miles the "Benedict Arnold" of the Civil War.

The book has detailed notes and a substantial bibliography. An appendix reproduces the report of the Harper's Ferry Commission of 3 November 1862. With only a few photographs and maps, the book seems over-priced. But it should appeal both to Civil War scholars and to those interested in the study of military justice.

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**VIETNAM TRACKS: ARMOR  
IN BATTLE, 1945-75**, by Simon  
Dunstan (Oprey Publishing Limited,  
191 Pages. \$15.92). Reviewed by  
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Jones,  
Jr., United States Army Reserve.

With extensive research, Simon Dunstan has scrutinized and visually reviewed the armor experience in Vietnam between 1945 and 1975. At first glance, this book appears to be only a noteworthy collection of largely unpublished photographs of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). But as Major General George S. Patton, United States Army, Retired, states in his foreword, the author's "effort must be considered not only contributory to the study of armor in the Vietnam War, but also — and perhaps more importantly — to its capabilities and limitations in a counter-guerrilla environment which those who practice the profession of arms may well come to experience again."

The photographs in this book not only reveal the rich historical record of the AFVs used in the Vietnam War, they also point out the important modifications to them that paid dividends in the area's environment.

Almost to the point of redundancy, Dunstan (as does General Patton) stresses the enemy's effective use of mines. Hopefully, the lessons learned then will not be lost to the U.S. Army. Throughout his text, too, the author emphasizes armor's logistical requirements and stresses the fact that armor could be used effectively in Vietnam.

The book offers much useful information of practical application. But, sadly, it lacks a recapitulation, a solid overview of tactical operations, and a clear definition of the armor concept. Further, the author fails to provide an index, which would have improved the book's usefulness as a reference. I do recommend this book to those who may need its practical information on the employment of AFVs in an unconventional war scenario.

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**TRACKS OF THE BEAR: SOVIET IMPRINTS IN THE SEVENTIES.** By Edgar O'Ballance (Presidio Press, 1982. 240 Pages. \$14.95). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States.

This book focuses on Soviet activities during the 1970s. Its main theme is that short of waging open war to achieve global hegemony, Soviet leaders have preferred to conduct a "peace strategy" using non-violent means to accomplish their ends. Such means have included fighting proxy wars, supporting liberation movements, providing aid to terrorist groups, and using negotiations, propaganda, misinformation, trade agreements, and espionage.

In ten very succinct chapters, the author retraces, on a regional basis, the major events of the decade and shows how the Soviets used particular events to increase their global influence. He writes that "the outstanding lesson of the seventies is that the Soviets do not react to gestures of goodwill, kindness, or consideration."

The message conveyed by O'Ballance is two-fold: the United States must deal with the Soviets from a position of strength, and the West must not expect the Russians to think as the West does or to follow their declared policies.

The book itself provides the general reader a good understanding of the Soviet threat to world peace.

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**MIRACLE AT MIDWAY.** By

Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (McGraw-Hill, 1982. \$19.95). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel William A. DePalo, Jr., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This book is a sequel to *At Dawn We Slept*, the late Gordon Prange's splendid account of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and its aftermath. It picks up the action in the Pacific following the inconclusive Coral Sea engagement and carries it through 6 June 1942, the final day of combat on and around Midway Island. Completed by two of Prange's capable associates, it is based on the same exhaustive primary source research and the same incisive analysis that characterized the Pearl Harbor volume.

The battle of Midway, which was the turning point for the United States in the Pacific war, is a classic study of an inferior force defeating a superior enemy through a combination of initiative, bold offensive action, and a good deal of plain luck. The battle also vividly illustrates the value of timely intelligence to commanders who are astute enough to act upon it.

Most of all, though, Midway is a case study of the emerging dominance of aerial over surface warfare at sea. Carrier-based air power decided the outcome at Midway, not firepower from surface vessels. The all out naval battle that the Japanese had been seeking in the Pacific simply did not materialize.

Fundamentally, as the authors point out, it was over-confidence and contempt for their enemy that doomed this Japanese campaign to failure. The operation itself showed none of the meticulous planning that had preceded the successful attack on Pearl Harbor. Flushed with an unbroken string of victories, the Japanese had become infatuated with their own apparent invincibility and had ignored the precautions that would be necessary to insure further successes.

By sheer weight of numbers the

Japanese should have been able to win this engagement and to win it decisively. But certain intangibles, such as the breaking of the Japanese JN25 code, inadequate air reconnaissance, and poor judgment by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo at a crucial point in the battle turned the tide and gave the Americans a resounding victory.

The authors conclude that "had Nimitz, his various staffs, and sea commanders not taken positive, intelligent and imaginative steps, the Japanese might have won the battle of Midway in spite of themselves."

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**RECENT AND RECOMMENDED**

**THE BIG DROP: THE GUNS OF MERVILLE, JUNE 1944.** By John Golley. Jane's, 1982. 174 Pages. \$19.95.

**ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: A STUDY.** By Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired). United States Strategic Institute, 1983. 141 Pages. \$8.00, Softbound.

**THE ERA OF THE CIVIL WAR, 1820-1876.** 1982 Edition. By Louise Arnold, with accompanying essays by Richard Sommers and Michael Winey. Special Bibliography 11. United States Army Military History Institute, 1982. 704 Pages, Softbound.

**BEFORE ENDEAVOURS FADE.** By Rose E.B. Coombs. Completely Revised and Enlarged Edition. After the Battle Magazine, 1983. 160 Pages, Softbound.

**BATTLES IN VIETNAM, 1967-1975.** By Perry Moore. Weapons and Warfare Special No. 7. International Graphics Corporation, 1982. 34 Pages. \$3.50, Softbound.

**DEATH BEFORE DISHONOUR.** By Trevor Boyle. St. Martin's Press, 1983. 176 Pages. \$14.95.

**THE WORLD WAR II QUIZ AND FACT BOOK.** By Timothy B. Benford. Harper and Row, 1982. 230 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

**WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE WILDERNESS YEARS.** By Martin Gilbert. Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 280 Pages. \$16.95.

**UNITED STATES MARINES IN VIETNAM: AN EXPANDING WAR, 1966.** By Jack Shulimson. History and Museum Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1982. 390 Pages. \$9.00.

**THE U.S. MARINE CORPS STORY.** By J. Robert Moskin. Revised Edition. McGraw-Hill, 1983. 807 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

**THIS IS THE SAS: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGIMENT.** By Tony Geraghty. Arco Publishing, 1983. 156 Pages. \$16.95.

**DUST OFF: ARMY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN VIETNAM.** By Peter Dorland and James Nanney. Center of Military History, United States Army, 1982. 134 Pages. \$5.50, Softbound.