FIVE-MILE ENDURANCE RUN
STANDARDS FOR PROPOSED CFB

MAXIMUM TIME IN MINUTES (Men/Women)

AGE GROUP (17-39)	17-25	26-30	31-35	36-39
	44:50/53:35	46:15/56:15	47:55/60:10	48:55/63:55
AGE GROUP (40-60)	40-45	46-50	51-55	56-60
	50:00/65:00	52:30/67:30	55:00/70:00	57:30/72:30

Figure 2.

maintain their proficiency.

Finally, this CFB program would have a separate endurance test — a five-mile run. Using the present APRT standards for the two-mile run, it would be simple to construct a performance table for a five-mile run. (A proposed table is shown in Figure 2.)

This particular CFB program would be easy to administer and could be done within the time now allocated for physical training and for weapons proficiency training in most units. It would be an excellent morale booster for all soldiers, combat arms or otherwise. The badge itself would also be an important new indicator in personnel evaluation because it would indicate continuing performance rather than a one-time accomplishment.

Other CFB programs could be devised as well. In all, though, the CFB standards should not be set so high that they could not be reached by most soldiers who were really interested. And the selected tasks should be easy to administer and should not require special facilities or a great deal of equipment.

The badge's design should be a distinctive one. One possibility is a winged foot within a wreath in an oval design similar to that of the airborne wings or the air assault badge. Another would be a short sword or dagger on a rectangular badge similar to the EIB.

If a CFB program such as this one could draw strong command support, it would give soldiers a good incentive to exceed the minimum standards that have been established for their physical fitness. Thus, it would also become an important factor in increasing a unit's basic combat readiness.

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Relief in Place

CAPTAIN JONATHAN P. CHASE

A relief in place is a complex operation and one that is designed for a specific purpose — to replace one unit with another on the battlefield. Often a relief is conducted to replace a unit that has suffered heavily, but it can also be used to strengthen a sector, to remove a unit for action elsewhere, or even to replace a unit from another country within a combined area of operation. For any of these purposes, a relief in place operation requires a great deal of planning, coordination, and preparation before its execution phase even begins, and the latter phase alone has been known to take as long as ten days.

Unfortunately, though, a relief in place is often confused with a delay, a withdrawal, or a passage of lines. As a result, it is largely taken for granted and receives far less training emphasis than it should. Commanders at all levels need to understand it better and see that it is included in their exercises whenever possible, because commanders at all levels become involved in the entire process.

Once a decision has been made — for whatever reason — to conduct a relief in place, the higher headquarters must publish warning orders as early as possible so that subordinate commands down to platoon level will have enough time to prepare

sketches, issue instructions, and coordinate everything effectively.

The idea, of course, is to conduct the relief without its being detected by the opposing force, and to do this commanders must carefully choose the best time for it to take place. Although limited visibility makes the entire operation easier to carry out, it also requires even more planning and coordination. But no matter when a relief in place is conducted, it should be executed on a man for man, weapon for weapon basis within the forward sectors.

In the case of an infantry company, the first decision the outgoing company commander has to make is what sequence his unit will follow in being relieved. He must decide whether to move his entire company at one time or to start the relief either from a flank or from its center. In making this decision, he must consider the location and the availability of covered and concealed routes to and from the rear, traffic control points, and unit assembly areas. These control measures become especially critical at night, and he should consider increasing the number and location of his guides and checkpoints and augmenting his quartering parties. (If the relief is to take place at night, his subordinate leaders should be given time to walk their routes carefully during the daylight hours.) He must also keep in mind the likelihood of an enemy attack and the critical avenues of approach into the forward sector during the relief operation.

Once the sequence of the relief has been determined and once orders have been published, subordinate leaders from both the outgoing and the incoming units can begin their preparations and any coordination they need.

Detailed coordination, which is essential to any military operation, becomes even more critical during a relief in place. For this reason, during the coordination and preparation phase, liaison officers should be exchanged. The company executive officers operate well in this capacity since they know the strength and disposition of both their combat elements and their support elements. The company commanders of the two units should also meet, if possible, to discuss and confirm the plan.

During this phase, routes, assembly areas, link-up points, start and release points (SPs and RPs), and time schedules have to be confirmed, and units have to be organized to facilitate the operation. At the very least, guides and quartering parties must conduct a detailed reconnaissance of their primary routes and must see that all routes and assembly areas are adequately marked before the main body departs.

The incoming commander must plan to accept the outgoing unit's defensive orientation, estimate of the situation, and fire plans and must not alter them until the relief has been completed. Positions for any additional soldiers the incoming unit may have must not be prepared, although they should be planned for and briefed, to be executed later on order.

PINPOINT

During their preparations for the relief, the incoming unit's leaders should pinpoint the exact locations of individual positions, weapon systems, tracked vehicles, GSR teams, communication and indirect fire elements, and command posts within their specific forward sectors. The outgoing elements must be sure to update and confirm all of their target reference points, range cards, sector sketches, barrier plans, minefield records, and any other data that the incoming units will need to establish an effective defense.

Every detail of the relief operation must be thoroughly coordinated — the failure to confirm a time schedule, a traffic control point, or a weapon location in advance may find the incoming units fighting for a once friendly position on the front line.

As a final step in the planning and coordination process, a time must be set for the exchange of responsibility for the forward sector and for the items of equipment the outgoing unit plans to leave behind. Normally, the outgoing commander will retain responsibility for the forward sector until two-thirds of his forces have been relieved. This two-thirds figure does not mean, however, that the incoming commander cannot establish himself within the forward area before the time comes for the changeover.

The relief itself and the incoming units' initial defense of the forward sector will work better if the outgoing units leave behind their machinegun tripods, with traversing and elevating mechanisms still attached, and also their mortar baseplates if they have already settled in.

These units might leave behind other things as well, such as range cards and sector sketches, individual aiming stakes and claymores, if possible, along with communication wire, which is usually used throughout a relief operation as the primary means of communication. The outgoing unit might also consider leaving behind ammunition, STANO devices, pyrotechnics, fuel, repair parts, and any other equipment they can do without in their subsequent operations. Whatever is decided, specific details for the exchange of this materiel and equipment must be coordinated and disseminated.

With the coordination and preparation complete, the incoming company can then establish its forward assembly areas and prepare to conduct the relief itself.

There is no set sequence for the movement of vehicles and personnel. Generally, during the execution of a relief in place, units will move over designated routes, under the control of guides and quartering parties, to previously established release points and assembly areas, following the sequence established by the operations order. Ideally, a detailed sequence of events should be strictly adhered to. But experience with relief in place operations, as well as other such operations, demonstrates that the true test of a unit's leadership is its

ability to react to unexpected problems. This means that flexibility must be a part of the plan, especially during night operations.

In any case, liaison officers must plan to remain until the last element has been relieved to help sort out any problems.

Wire should be the primary means of communication during the operation, but normal radio traffic should be continued too so that the enemy will not become suspicious. (Training can help eliminate the problems of two units operating over the same wire.) And with adequate planning and a detailed timetable, it should be possible to limit communications to reports of units crossing checkpoints. Even then, codewords should be used to keep any possible enemy monitoring of the land line from affecting the operation.

Fire support units should remain fully operational throughout the relief, and screening elements should not be replaced until the incoming unit has assumed responsibility for the forward sector.

If properly coordinated, the execution of a relief in place can be as successful as that of any other tactical operation. But a lot depends on the training that the units involved have had in the entire process. Shortcomings in such an operation usually result from a leader's lack of practical exposure to it or from a duplication of effort.

It is up to company commanders to prepare their subordinates to conduct a relief operation. For example, they should consider discussing it during professional development periods, officers' calls, and TEWTs. These discussions should stress, for example, preparing unit SOPs and checklists in advance.

The relief in place should be practiced in all kinds of field exercises. It is an excellent battalion level ARTEP mission, because it tests a unit's ability to staff, coordinate, and execute an operation that it is likely to have occasion to use on any future battlefield.

These exercises should not neglect the details of the relief. For example, in a peacetime training environment the exchange of equipment and supplies is often neglected, because it becomes tedious for the units involved. Senior commanders might instruct their subordinates to leave behind items that would realistically remain with the incoming unit. But if this has not been considered in advance, when the outgoing unit is back in garrison it will spend an unnecessary amount of time trying to recover its accountable items. If security arrangements and recovery procedures are considered well in advance, the exchange should not become a major obstacle to the total success of the relief.

This training, then, should take into account all the various details of planning, coordinating, and executing a relief in place. Only through this added emphasis will our units be prepared to conduct a relief in place when the time comes, either as an outgoing unit or as an incoming one.



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Misusing the TOW

LIEUTENANT KONRAD TRAUTMAN

In an armor-rich situation, a light infantry division's most important weapon is the TOW. Unfortunately, though, there is a major problem with this weapon. The problem is not with the training or the technical expertise of the 11H members of the TOW squads; they are well trained in the tactical and technical use of the TOW, despite its sophistication. The problem is not with maintenance either; a TOW is rarely "down" for more than 48 hours. The problem with the TOW is that some commanders repeatedly misuse it, apparently because they don't understand how to use it properly.

In my experience with TOW pla-