

attack. The other defending units will be only lightly engaged or not engaged at all.

The unengaged units, therefore, should be used as reserve units, and the defensive plan should provide for moving units and weapon systems to other positions from which they can be used effectively to ward off an OPFOR attack. The reserve units can:

- Execute counterattacks.
- Form fire pockets by repositioning themselves to fire into the OPFOR's flanks or rear.
- Withdraw to positions farther to the rear either to block the OPFOR's advance or to cover the withdrawal of friendly units.

Engaged forces normally cannot do much maneuvering. A unit or a weapon system that is faced with the choice between being destroyed if it pulls out of position or of being overrun should stay put and fight it out. If the OPFOR bypasses it, then that unit should reposition itself when it is safe to do so to fire on the OPFOR's rear. Ultimately, it should follow the OPFOR's attacking units.

In the attack, supporting units must establish bases of fire — both near and far — to allow the offensive unit to reach the OPFOR's positions without heavy casualties. Normally, the far base of fire will be manned by tanks and TOWs and will be set up about 2,000 meters from the OPFOR's position.

As a unit gets closer to the OPFOR's position, it should establish an additional base of fire, usually at between 1,000 and 500 meters from the OPFOR. The weapons in the near base of fire should engage the OPFOR from a different angle from those in the far base of fire, so that the OPFOR has to fight in two directions.

Since the two bases of fire together will support the friendly assault unit, the scheme of maneuver should be such that the fires from the bases do not endanger the assault unit or interfere with its maneuver. Once the initial squad or platoon objectives have been taken and the OPFOR position begins to unravel, the forces from the bases of fire can then also be committed to the assault.

Throughout the attack, commanders must maintain close control over their direct fire systems, because these are usually employed close to friendly troop units. For example, engineers breaching a minefield must work close to the OPFOR forces covering that minefield, and those OPFOR forces have to be suppressed by direct fire. To complicate matters, the engineers also need to be screened by smoke, and the same smoke may also screen the OPFOR's positions.

Check points within the objective must be used to control close-in fires. The assault force identifies a target with reference to a check point — "machinegun bunker 100 meters

northwest of Check Point 49," for instance — and then adjusts the fire in meters up or down and left or right along the gun-to-target line. (Since MILES fires cannot be sensed, an observer must establish a search pattern to cover the entire target area.)

Direct fires in the assault should be controlled by the assault force commander. He is, after all, the man who will be killed if there's an error and the man who can best assess the effectiveness of the fires.

But no matter how good a commander's other plans may be, it is fire that kills. Without careful and thorough fire planning and coordination, he cannot execute those other plans, because he cannot kill the OPFOR fast enough to keep from being overrun. With careful and thorough fire coordination, though, he can make his other plans work and help him win at the NTC — or, more important, on the battlefield.

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The Cook's Worksheet: A Commander's Tool

NAOMI PAYNE

In spite of all the sophisticated weapons and equipment the Army now has, the infantry soldier will continue to be the decisive factor on the battlefield for some time to come. An

infantry commander, therefore, is naturally interested in the welfare of that man, and one thing that keenly affects a soldier's welfare is his diet — proper food. Still, this concern some-

times gets shuffled to the bottom of a commander's stack of priorities, because he knows his soldiers will be fed. But how *well* they will be fed is something else.

Most commanders keep a close watch on the accountability of such items as weapons and ammunition, but they probably don't give that same attention to subsistence accountability. In fact, according to recent reports from the Troop Support Agency's food management assistance teams (FMATs) and the Army Audit Agency on the Army's food service program, subsistence accountability is a major problem.

This lack of proper accountability presents a two-fold problem for a commander: It allows for waste, fraud, and abuse in the handling of such supplies, and it affects the kind of food the soldiers get. If a food service officer, sergeant, or cook is not doing what he should be doing, the soldiers are not going to eat as well as they should.

There is one tool in every dining facility that a commander can use to see how well his unit's food service program is doing. This tool is DA Form 3034, the cook's worksheet (see accompanying sample). Although it is partly a production work schedule that tells the kitchen work force what to do, it is capable of being used for more than that — provided it is properly maintained. The worksheet can be used to help with food accountability, to improve food quality and preparation, and to decrease food waste. It can also be used to show which foods the soldiers prefer, to schedule skill qualification training, to develop on-the-job training programs, and to document enlisted evaluation reports (EERs).

Unfortunately, though, as a 12-month review of FMAT visits revealed, most dining facility personnel do not fill in the worksheet accurately or completely. (AR 30-1 tells how it should be done.)

The cook's worksheet, along with issue slips and monthly inventories, is a key link in the food accountability chain. When an auditor compares the food on hand and the amount prepared (including leftovers) with the amount of food received, he should be able to account for the food used. But in a recent survey of 12 dining facilities in a major command, for example,

COOK'S WORKSHEET		ORGANIZATION		NUMBER TO PREPARE		SERVING PERIOD		DATE	
NO. CO. 1ST BN 2d REG				175		28 OCT 83			
MENU <small>(List all items to be prepared and served including leftovers)</small>	PERSON ASSIGNED	POST TO PREPARE	PREPARE FROM TO START	COOKING TO START	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	LEFTOVERS		MENU ITEM COMMENTS	
						TO BE USED	TO BE DISCARDED		
AMENDMENT STEAKS	HARRIS	75ER	1500	1530	USE 2 1/2 LBS BURGERS	2 SERV		VERY GOOD	
SALAD STEAKS	HARRIS	3016R	1537	1530				GOOD	
OVEN BAKED CHICKEN	HARRIS	1500	1500	1545		2 QTS		GOOD	
OVEN BAKED CHICKEN	LILLSON	1500	1500	1620				GOOD	
OVEN BAKED CHICKEN	LILLSON	1500	1500	1620				VERY GOOD	
SAUTEED CORN	SMITH	1500	1500	1530				EXCELLENT	
OVEN BAKED CHICKEN	JONES	1500	1500	1610				GOOD	
SPRING SALAD	SMITH	1500	1500	1710				GOOD	
BARBECUE SAUSAGE	SMITH	1500	1500		USE 2 1/2 LBS SAUSAGE			GOOD	
CHEESE	SMITH	1500	1500					GOOD	
ASSP. DR. SAUSAGE	SMITH	1500	1500					OVER PREPARED, GOOD	
BMY ADOLF	JOHNSON	1500	1500	1515					
BUTTER	C.F.A.	1500	1500	1515					
CHEESE CAKE	JONES	1500	1500	1530				EXCELLENT	
OVEN BAKED CHICKEN	JONES	1500	1500	1530				GOOD	
MILK	C.F.A.	1500	1500	1515				GOOD	
TEA	C.F.A.	1500	1500	1515				GOOD	
COFFEE	SMITH	1500	1500	1615	USE 2 1/2 LBS COFFEE			TRULY VERY	
SOFT DRINKS	C.F.A.	1500	1500	1615					

6,000 pounds of high-cost meats, worth about \$6,600, were unaccounted for in one month. This does not necessarily mean the meat went out the back door; more likely, it means a supervisor failed to add to the worksheet the additional food prepared over the initial amount planned as shown on the worksheet.

Leftovers also need more attention on the cook's worksheet. The amount of leftovers can indicate several things. Too much of one item can mean that the food was prepared improperly, that too much was prepared in relation to the headcount, or that the soldiers did not like that particular food. The "comments" column of the worksheet provides a way to evaluate leftover items and show whether they were satisfactory. If this column is not being used, the shift leader should be reminded to complete it.

A commander should also review the worksheet to see what type of menu is being prepared. From it he can readily see whether the food service sergeant is serving only low-cost meal items (to stay within three percent of the basic daily food allowance) or is serving foods the troops seem to prefer. While he is in the dining facility, he should compare the worksheet with the serving line to see that all the items on the line are also on the worksheet. At the same time, he should see that the worksheet does not list items that are *not* on the line.

A commander can also use the cook's worksheet to verify an enlisted

evaluation report on one of the cooks. For example, let's assume that a food service sergeant prepares an EER for a food service specialist, and says that the soldier is a poor cook and cannot do his job. One way a commander can verify this statement is to review the cook's worksheet to see what remarks have been made about items the soldier in question has prepared.

So among all a commander's daily worries about such things as supply, maintenance, and training, he must not forget to devote a little time to seeing that his soldiers get good food. Equipment deadline rates and all other aspects of the unit may be perfect, but if his troops get sick from food poisoning or from a lack of adequate food, or if they have low morale because of a poorly operated dining facility, his unit is unlikely to be able to perform its mission.

If a commander takes steps to see that the cook's worksheet is used properly, therefore, he should see an improvement in food accountability. Just as important, maybe more so, his soldiers will have better food, their training will be improved, and the commander will gain satisfaction from knowing they are well cared for.



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