

more and that immediate remedial training for sub-standard crews is a must.

After-action reviews highlight strengths, define weaknesses, and resolve problems as they occur. The NET team is a particularly valuable resource in this process and should be used as much as possible. The coaxial machinegun should also be used more

as a subcaliber device, coupled with the Dry-Wet-Wet approach, because it develops skills early and provides an inexpensive means of multiplying training opportunities.

Finally, the implementation of a total systems approach forms a solid base upon which a unit can build while bringing into the Army the most revolutionary piece of equipment in

the history of the Infantry — the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

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NTC: Command and Control

MAJOR VERNON W. HUMPHREY

Throughout this series of articles on the training being conducted at the National Training Center, weak command and control has been shown to be a common shortcoming in almost all units.*

For the purpose of analyzing the problem, I have divided command and control into two major areas: battlefield leadership and battlefield management. "Leadership" is defined here as "getting people to do things," and "management" as "arranging matters so that things are done efficiently."

Battlefield leadership, as I use the term, is a process in which a leader fills two roles: that of a leader and that of a follower.

In his role as leader he must know how to assess a situation and his mission and then how to develop plans that are within his unit's ability to execute and that will lead to mission accomplishment. In short, the leader must know his tactical responsibilities.

He must also be able to communicate — to express his desires and

explain his standards to his subordinates so that they have a thorough understanding of his plan and the way he wants it executed. Then he must supervise the plan, making sure all parts of it are carried out on time and to his standards.

In his role as a follower, the leader must be proficient in all the hard skills necessary to carry out the tasks he is assigned. He must implement the plans of his leader, not by slavishly following orders but by knowing and understanding the intent of the leader and by trying to bring about the desired outcome.

The follower must also keep his leader informed of situations that may impede the execution of the plan; accordingly, he must recommend actions and request permission to deviate from the plan if he believes it is necessary to accomplish the mission.

FAILURES

In general, experience at the National Training Center indicates that leaders fall down on two of their tasks as leaders — communicating plans to their subordinates and supervising the plans' execution. These leaders often assume that their

responsibilities end when they issue their orders.

As followers, their failures often result from the fact that they have not been given much latitude and responsibility during their training programs back at their home stations. All too often at the NTC, junior leaders and soldiers do things they know are inappropriate because they "were ordered to do it." They do not feel that they have the latitude to make the on-the-spot adjustments a situation may demand.

At all levels, subordinates frequently fail to report accurately, to make recommendations, and to request or suggest changes in a plan. Often the unit is "roped in" by such restrictions as boundaries and limits on reconnaissance, things that could (and would) have been changed if higher headquarters had known of the difficulties they presented.

Subordinates seem to lack a sense of responsibility, too, and there is often little pressure *upward* for instructions, assistance and support. Leaders seem to be satisfied with this situation, so the result is a two-way breakdown in communication.

Aside from battlefield leadership, there is also battlefield management, which includes planning, preparation, and execution. In the planning

*This is the sixth in a series. The views expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.

phase, the first phase of any operation, commanders and leaders must give clear guidance and must issue orders *on the ground* wherever possible. Not only must they issue orders, they must also *explain* the operation, going over possible enemy reactions, actions at critical junctures, and alternate schemes of fire and maneuver depending on what the enemy might do. The aim is for key subordinates at each level to understand the plan and the commander's intentions as thoroughly as his leaders do. An excellent technique for improving leader communication is to require briefbacks from subordinates on their plans.

The succession of command also must be planned for before the battle begins — *who* will take command, *how* he will take command, and *under what circumstances* he will do it — and everyone must thoroughly understand these plans. Many units assume the XO will take command if the commander is killed or otherwise taken out of action. There's nothing wrong with this, but whoever is to take command must:

- Be physically located so he can take command immediately. (He can't be five or ten kilometers back with the trains.)

- Be fully aware of the terrain and the friendly and enemy situation. (He has to have seen and heard the same things the commander saw and heard, without the distractions of having to solve logistical and administrative problems.)

- Have a command vehicle with good communications. (If the commander was killed in a tank or an APC, how long will the *new* commander survive in a jeep?)

If the battalion XO is to assume command, then, he must be a *combat* XO, not a chief of staff or trains supervisor. If the S3 is to take command, he must keep up with the battle and move with the action. At company level, the choice is between the XO and the senior platoon leader, with the same considerations.

In the preparation phase, vehicles must be rearmed and topped off, range markers put out, fighting posi-

RESPONSIBLE	AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	ORIENTATION	SUPERVISE	WATCH FOR
S1	Casualties and replacements.	Rear to front for replacements. Front to rear for casualties.	Medical platoon, PAC.	No incoming casualties during action; no reports.
S2	Intelligence, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.	Forward	Scout platoon, GSR, patrols.	Lack of reports during operations; no patrol plan from units; no info from patrols.
S3	Operations and plans.	Forward	Maneuver units and combat support attachments.	Inadequate preparation for operations, plans not in synch with OPORD.
S4	Rearming, refueling, and resupply. Recovery and repair.	Rear to front	Support platoon, maintenance platoon.	No reports of loss in action. No damaged vehicles in repair. Ammo not broken down for quick issue.
FSO	Fire support.	Forward	FIST teams, mortars.	Lack of company fire support plans; units not calling for fire in action; poor use of mortars. Target info not being passed to S2/S3.
Engineer officer	Breaching and installing obstacles and minefields.	Forward	Engineer platoon.	Lack of mobility/plans. Readiness of engineers to execute plans.
ADA NCO	ADA Support.	Forward	Redeye/stinger teams.	Lack of ADA plans; priority areas not covered.
FAC	CAS, TAC Air, JAAT.	Forward	Air support assets.	Lack of air support plans; coordination between artillery and air.

DUTIES OF THE STAFF IN COMBAT

tions prepared, and all the other steps necessary for the coming operation carried out. Assistants must be used intelligently to supervise these actions. Staff officers, XOs, sergeants major, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants should be assigned specific areas to inspect and report on during the preparation phase of the mission.

In the execution phase, the leader must keep abreast of the situation and constantly issue fragmentary orders and directions to control the action as it develops. As the saying goes, "No plan survives contact," and leaders must be prepared to improvise once contact is made.

The first step in improving battlefield management is to streamline the tactical operations center (TOC). As we have seen in previous articles in

this series, the TOC is usually ineffective — left behind in the attack and overrun in the defense or the delay. And no wonder! The typical TOC at the NTC consists of a group of several large vehicles linked together through cumbersome extensions, covered with an enormous net, and surrounded by smaller vehicles, ration boxes, and sleeping soldiers.

The TOC doesn't have to be that big and clumsy. Impediments such as coffee pots and huge charts and graphs mounted on sheets of plywood aren't necessary. Except for the communications equipment, everything a battalion TOC needs can be put into a single canvas mapcase — a plastic-encased map, some pencils, and a notebook with the various charts and graphs.

Fundamentally, the TOC is a message center. It should serve as a focal point for the staff, a place through which information flows, and from which orders and information are disseminated. To be effective, a TOC must be near the scene of the action. If it's too far from the battle, its occupants can't communicate well and soon find themselves isolated.

STAFF

Along the same line, another thing a leader needs for good battlefield management is a good staff. We have long recognized the need for a commander to "see the battlefield," to visualize the totality of friendly and enemy combat, combat support, and combat service support dispositions and activity. But a commander cannot do this alone — he has only one pair of eyes. Nor can he alone supervise the planning, preparation, and execution stages of an operation. Accordingly, he has been given a staff to assist him, each member of which should have specific supervisory responsibilities. Each should also actively seek the information his commander needs to fight the battle.

With the TOC serving as a message center, the staff members are free to go out and actively supervise their areas of responsibility, which are outlined on the accompanying chart.

Formations can also be an aid to command and control. Unfortunately,

though, too many units use formations as a substitute for effective command and control measures. Leaders must remember that formations alone do not provide security. Bounding overwatch, the use of cover and concealment, and seeing the enemy first provide security. But units that concentrate on their formations tend not to use bounding overwatch well because it messes up the formation. They do not use cover and concealment well because they don't want to lose visual contact with their base elements. As a result, the enemy usually sees them first and can accurately estimate the location of those elements he cannot see.

Another way a commander can maintain control is to balance his dispositions. This means that the commander must control the physical deployment and movement of his unit in such a way that it can react to any likely enemy threat or action. He does this by ensuring that some portion of the unit is initially unengaged and can be maneuvered and committed to tip the outcome of the battle. This unengaged unit, of course, is the reserve.

The reserve may not be formally assigned in the commander's operations order. In fact, each element in the command may assume the reserve role at any time, depending on the need. The key is that the commander holds the reserve under his own control and moves it to the place where it can be committed most effectively. He may move the reserve several

times before committing it, or he may simultaneously commit his reserve unit and assign another unit the reserve role. The commander must think at least two steps ahead — "Where should I commit my reserve, and what should I plan to do after that?"

Balanced dispositions can also be improved by realistic and flexible plans that also maintain security.

The aim of all good command and control measures is to help the commander keep his fighting elements firmly under his thumb and to maneuver them rapidly and effectively in a fluid situation. To do this, he needs to devote his full attention to the problem. Therefore, his subordinates must be trained to deal with all other matters that affect the command without making excessive demands on the commander's time and attention. At the same time, they must also be alert to the things the commander needs to know to control the battle and then see that he is informed of these things.

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COMPANIES ON FRONT COVER BELONG TO THESE REGIMENTS

(All units are Infantry, except as noted.)

1st	2d	3d	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th	21st	22nd	23rd	24th	25th	26th	27th	28th	29th	30th	31st	32nd	33rd	34th	35th	36th	37th	38th	39th	40th	41st	42nd	43rd	44th	45th	46th	47th	48th	49th	50th	51st	52nd	53rd	54th	55th	56th	57th	58th	59th	60th	61st	62nd	63rd	64th	65th	66th	67th	68th	69th	70th	71st	72nd	73rd	74th	75th	76th	77th	78th	79th	80th	81st	82nd	83rd	84th	85th	86th	87th	88th	89th	90th	91st	92nd	93rd	94th	95th	96th	97th	98th	99th	100th
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REGIMENTS OF THE U.S. ARMY