

MARVELOUS INFANTRYMAN

Undoubtedly you have taken flak about the picture of that marvelous Infantryman on page 1 of your July-August 1984 issue. Sure, his ammo is dangling about and dragging the ground. It's wrong but it's Infantry, and I'm sure a good sergeant took care of this soon after.

But still, it's a great shot of the Infantryman we love and have seen countless times. This guy is tired, dirty, and grimy, but he has the swagger and the determined look of a winner.

The picture is a damn sight better than the staged "photo opportunities" that plague us.

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DEFENDER RESPONDS

In the letters section of the September-October 1984 issue of *INFANTRY* (p. 50), Captains Michael Phipps and F.R. Hayse provide a critique of the tactics instruction in the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. While their letter is in the main a reasonable one, it is not without fault. Readers must remember, for one thing, that these captains were students in IOAC 4-83 — more than a year ago — and much has changed since then.

Having been in the Defense Branch of the Infantry School's Combined Arms and Tactics Department since June 1983, I can say that some of the faults cited in the Phipps-Hayse letter are simply not true. In the opening paragraphs the authors state that "the students are presented . . . a hypothe-

tical scenario that seldom changes between operations." Just as in 1983, there are now no less than ten different scenarios ranging from defending Lawson Army Airfield on Fort Benning to defending the city of Columbus, Georgia, during a MOUT (military operations on urban terrain) exercise. Although a European location is the common thread in some classes, we also defend with a mechanized task force in Manchester, Georgia, one-half hour from Columbus. And a separate Korean scenario is presented now just as it was earlier.

Captains Phipps and Hayse also state that "in the scenario . . . the higher 'commander's guidance' severely limits the student commander as to the options available." If they believe that a commander's intent (guidance) is a limitation, they're right. If they believe that a commander's intent inherently reduces their ability to think, they're wrong. Being "too audacious" is one thing; violating a commander's intent, without concurrent approval to do so, is quite another. (In fact, the latter could be fatal to the troops that these captains and others might lead one day.)

Since the authors' course, however, we in the School have made some of the changes they suggest in their letter. The students in IOAC now issue an oral operations order, one-on-one with an instructor, during a mechanized team tactical exercise without troops (TEWT).

Besides adding the oral order, we have reorganized the students into six-man staff groups, which, along with the instructor, "wargame" courses of action with other six-man staff groups. Each of these staff groups — put together with previous company commanders, other maneuver arm officers, and Allied officers spread throughout the class — works as a

team and the members learn from each other as well as from the instructor.

We agree with Captains Phipps and Hayse that training on how to think is more important than on "what" to think. We base all our instruction on doctrine and then apply that doctrine against the ten scenarios in the defense block of instruction. The estimate of the situation is the most important factor in "how" we think: What's the process and how does it work here, in this particular location, this particular terrain?

We agree with the authors about getting rid of the "inane arguments concerning the placement of units or weapons." So we made a change to get the students off the CAMMS board (Computer-Assisted Map Maneuver System) and have them execute command, control, and communications during the CAMMS exercise as the commander and staff of a mechanized infantry/armor task force. The execution of a CAMMS exercise is now a high-stress, performance-oriented series of four hours of defensive exercises.

We do not, however, agree that the Allied students and exchange instructors should teach the "tactical adaptations and doctrine of their armies, not ours." There is only enough time and resources to get our own doctrine across to everyone. Students certainly can seek out our Allied friends and pick their brains for other views of how to do things; indeed they are encouraged to do so.

Currently, we test in much the same way the authors recommend, except that we do not have the students write and brief a five-paragraph field order as a final exam. (During company-level instruction, we do the oral order but do not subject a student to doing it in front of his peers.) While this is a

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feasible idea for final testing, the authors admit that it "would require more time than is now allotted." I would make that "a lot more time." Only with more time and also more instructors would a final exam such as the one they propose be possible.

These two captains, even in their criticism, conclude by saying that "a great many U.S. Infantry captains are quite competent in small unit tactics." And the Infantry School is presently providing a course that is as performance-oriented as it can be in an effort to ensure that the U.S. Army Infantryman gets the best company commander possible.

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HISTORY AND TACTICS IN IOAC

I read with interest the article by Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Timmons ["Junior Leader Proficiency," page 22] and the letter by Captains Michael Phipps and F.R. Hayse [page 50] commenting on training and tactics at the Infantry School in INFANTRY's September-October 1984 issue. Both emphasize the need to incorporate military history and the study of the art of war into the School's curriculum. The captains especially stress the use of examples from the eastern front in World War II. I agree completely and only regret that the authors did not check on the changes that have taken place since they attended the course before making their remarks.

We have recently made substantial advances in both areas. We now offer five hours of instruction on the Russo-German war and discuss the entire range of operations on the eastern front. (This can, of course, be no more than an introduction to that vast subject.) The Combined Arms and Tactics Department uses these hours as an introduction to its instruction on tactics, intelligence, and Soviet forces. We stress the scale of that war, its brutal nature, and the methods the Red Army used in that epic struggle.

These classes emphasize the need to understand mobile warfare as practiced by Guderian, Manstein, Balck, and other German leaders. We further cite numerous ways in which the history of that war can be of use to modern officers. I have no doubt that the Infantry School leads the entire TRADOC school system on this point.

We also now require each student in the advanced course to write a lengthy research paper on any topic of his choosing related to military history or the art of war. Students must further read three books on military history chosen from a short list established specifically for our junior officers. This program introduces them to what we think are some of the basic professional studies and takes the first step in encouraging them to build their own professional libraries.

Finally, we use the class introducing the students to military history to emphasize (to both basic and advanced course students) the necessity of studying military history and the art of war as the only means of developing the type of judgment required by the AirLand battle doctrine. We outline the content of a good reading program for professional self-development, suggest some ideas on how to identify good journals and books, and provide numerous examples of the importance of military history. Some of these examples draw upon very recent developments within the School and within the TRADOC system.

We still need to infuse history into the tactical instruction even more than we do now, and a vigorous major effort is already under way in that area also. No program is perfect, of course, nor can a program satisfy everyone.

The authors cited earlier offer some very positive suggestions on the use and application of military history. In fact, they are so good that we have already adopted as many of them as is currently feasible.

DANIEL J. HUGHES
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EXCELLENT ISSUE

Thank you for your excellent September-October 1984 issue. An entire issue devoted to leadership is a welcome sight. With the current trend toward multi-contingency units, leadership becomes the linchpin to effective deployment.

The note about pushup deficiency troubles me. A recent article in *Military Review* (March 1984) entitled "REFORGER: Realistic Training for the ARNG" also lists physical conditioning as "among the most pressing problems." All the scenarios I have seen, been told about, or dreamed of for a future war refer to a short and physically demanding conflict (forgo mentally until it's all over). Add to that the fact that the existing Reserve Components are probably the first and last replacement or augmentation source for the Active Army and it makes for frightening visions of exhausted soldiers too tired to fight at a critical juncture in the course of the big battle.

Forget about the mental? The question raised about revising IOAC tactical training is interesting and is probably still valid for IOBC as well. Captain Maginnis's article ["Independence on the Modern Battlefield," page 29] answers this question in his remark that "all of us . . . should encourage our small-unit leaders to find new ways of building independence." He goes on to say, "We should be instrumental in getting them out of garrison into the field to learn to know themselves, to face the challenge of thinking for themselves, and to expand their horizons beyond the unit's borders."

IOAC is where the theory is taught to ensure uniformity of background throughout the Army. Personal initiative in reading historical tactics is identical to the discipline necessary for physical readiness training. (Although S.L.A. Marshall may have wanted to teach Infantry leaders to think, I would hope that he meant that he wanted to encourage them to think and to do.)

Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Friedrich's notes on NET ["NET,"

page 32] are welcome in that many more commanders will be faced with seemingly insurmountable tasks similar to his, but, as he says: "We learned many lessons. The most significant one was that good planning . . . makes execution simpler."

And last but not least are Major Vernon W. Humphrey's comments on the National Training Center ["NTC: Command and Control," page 36]. It appears that we must take Colonel Friedrich's "lesson," combine it with Captain Maginnis's "suggestion," and hope that we passed our APRT — and that we do not face the enemy with a Befort Bayonet Replacement [see *INFANTRY*, May-June 1984, page 49].

I suggest to other readers that they re-read the entire issue and if possible also read the *Military Review* article cited here.

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IMPROVED M203

I am an antiarmor company commander in a mechanized infantry battalion where the 81mm mortar is sorely missed. Its absence leaves only one indirect (or semi-indirect) fire weapon in the inventory — the M203 grenade launcher. The M203 is an outstanding weapon. It is a suppressive fire weapon from the platform of the M113, an effective area fire weapon at longer ranges, and an accurate, close-quarter "knuckleduster" in the hands of a grenadier. Thus, the M203 can be used to separate enemy infantrymen from their carriers, to clear buildings, and to terminally discourage the most determined of snipers and machine-gunners.

But I think it can be made even better. What if we combined an improved barrel and chamber, and a new quadrant and "flip-up" front sight? The weapon should then have an extended range to 600 meters, a flatter trajectory, and a better steel-on-target capability. We could call it the Magnum 203.

What are the possibilities for such a weapon?

First, the company commander could engage an area target such as dismounted infantry and APCs out beyond the maximum effective range of the M16 and in conjunction with the .50 caliber and 7.62mm machine-guns to separate the infantry from their carriers and tanks and to destroy some of the vehicles in the process. With tight, inter-platoon fire control the commander could concentrate his Mag 203s and have a long-range "assault breaker" not unlike the old 81mm.

The Mag 203, with its increased explosive capability, would also be a bridge between the hand grenade and the rifleman's assault weapon in urban fighting. And it would be the equalizer in the hands of the four-man crew of the M901 ITV in the antiarmor company. The weapon could be used in conjunction with the smoke dischargers and the machinegun to break contact and suppress infantry attacks.

Finally, the infantry company could use the Mag 203 as an anti-helicopter weapon in addition to its attached Stinger teams. Several 40mm rounds fired into the path of a predatory HIND-D could definitely distract the pilot's attention.

The inevitable question is what the cost of the Mag 203 would be. The M203 would have to be modified, the operators would have to wear flak jackets to dissipate the recoil, and they would need more range training time. But the advantages of greater range and power would be worth the cost, whatever it was.

BO BARBOUR
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MOBILE SCALE MODELS

The Fort Benning Field Unit of the Army Research Institute is investigating the use of 1/8-scale, radio-controlled tanks for infantry fighting vehicle training. Recent technological advances have made possible re-discovering old uses for miniaturized

vehicles in a natural setting and developing new training strategies with them. In addition to their obvious use as mobile, reactive targets for gunnery training, the tanks can be used for tactical and leader skills training.

Although the use of scale models has a long history in military training, only a few articles or research reports discuss their uses. I would like to obtain information from people who have used mobile scaled models or who have ideas for using either static or mobile scaled models for training purposes.

My address is ARI-Ft Benning Field Unit, P.O. Box 2086, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905; and my AUTOVON number is 835-4513.

DR. JOHN C. MOREY
Research Psychologist

LRRP UNITS

The 3d Reconnaissance Company was formed to conduct the deep reconnaissance mission during REFORGER '82. At that time it was only a 21-man section under Company A, 3d Aviation Battalion (Combat), 3d Infantry Division. It was by no means the first long-range reconnaissance unit in the Army; the 9th Infantry Division Scout Company and the Michigan and Texas National Guard LRRP units preceded it. But it was the first unit of its type formed in USAREUR.

The work of this company and the other units like it has finally borne fruit in the formation of corps LRRP companies and divisional detachments under Division 86. The need for units of this type has been demonstrated over and over again in countless REFORGERS and by the use of Allied LRRPs to support U.S. corps.

The purpose of this letter is not to restate what has already been said in numerous articles about LRRPs but to discuss the decision to attach divisional LRRP detachments to the headquarters troops of the cavalry squadrons in both the heavy and the light divisions.

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The need for specialized training and training resources for units of this type is of the utmost importance. Personnel in European LRRP teams have served from four to six years together. I believe the detachments that are now under division control would be better trained and manned if they were detachments of their respective corps LRRP companies.

This organization would offer many benefits:

- The LRRP detachments would be protected from being misused as they were misused in Vietnam.

- Their training would be significantly improved if it were consolidated at corps level. Training resources such as the International LRRP School in Weingarten and the numerous international exercises held by our allies could be a benefit to all the LRRP units in the Army.

- They would be part of an organization that was more oriented toward their needs and requirements.

- The quality of the personnel, either under a regimental or an additional skill identifier system, could be better controlled.

- The divisional detachment would be able to call on a larger organization, and one similar to it, for logistical and communication support.

- Additional insertion assets would be available to the divisional detachments from corps level and higher.

But if things develop as they are now planned, the divisional LRRP assets may well die on the vine as the corps LRRP units absorb all the training assets and the high-quality personnel.

The major concern of the division commander is the loss of control of this detachment to the corps, along with its responsiveness to his requirements. This concern can be allayed by putting these detachments under the operational control of the division and by including the G-2/G-3 and the assistant division commander in the detachment commander's rating scheme.

Under the present concept of organization, these long-range reconnaissance units are in danger of

being misused and inadequately supported. Now that we have this important asset back in the Army system, let's think through its proper position and role in that organization.

JOHN G. PROVOST
CPT, Infantry
3d Reconnaissance Company

KEVLAR HELMET GOOD

I was shocked to read in the letters section of your May-June 1984 issue the comments of Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Kingsbury (page 50). These comments left me and other paratroopers shaking our heads. I will not waste time debunking his theories, but I will state one hardcore fact!

During the 82d Airborne Division's mission in Grenada in October 1983, an infantryman wearing the Kevlar helmet was shot point blank in the head by a Cuban armed with an AK47. I'm sure all of us in the Army know the ballistics of the AK round, and so too did the developers of the Kevlar helmet. That helmet harmlessly absorbed the massive AK round and that soldier, with a supply of aspirin, continued with his mission.

This particular helmet is now on display in the "Grenada Exhibit" in the 82d Division's museum. The round is sticking one quarter of the way outside the Kevlar, where all enemy head shots should be!

By comparison, the old steel pot can't stop a .22 Magnum much less an AK47 round.

DAVID C. CUSUMANO
PFC
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HISTORICAL ITEMS

The U.S. Army Center of Military History has received two requests for help in ascertaining the location of particular items. In order to ensure a thorough search for these items, we are asking for the assistance of your readers.

The United States Embassy Bonn, West Germany, has requested assistance in finding 23 medals once belonged to Field Marshal Helmuth Von Moltke (1800-1891). Available evidence indicates that medals disappeared from the National Archives and Records Service Washington, D.C., some time between 1945 and 1954.

In addition, Ms. Mina E. Wright, Architectural Historian, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President, has requested assistance locating 19 cannon that were located at the present Old Executive Office Building in Washington from 1800 until they were removed from the grounds in 1943.

Anyone who has any information on these subjects (or who may need a list of the guns in question) may write to Chief, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN:: DAMH-HS Dr. Norman Cary, Washington, 20314-0200, or call Dr. Cary at (202) 727-0310 or AUTOVON 285-0310.

DAVID L. LEMON
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JODY, HQ STYLE

The following is in response to Jody calls in your May-June 1984 issue (p. 30):

HQs TROOP

I joined the Army to be a fighting man,
Now I'm in headquarters sitting on my case
I shuffle papers to my left
It's not the same as a PLF,
I shuffle papers to my right
It's not as exciting as a fire fight.
Air conditioning and big old fans,
I got no calluses on my hands.
My uniform's clean and my boots shine bright
I get to sleep most every night.
Up in the morning, go to work at 8
Get off at 4 'cuz I got a date.
In-box, out-box,
What will it be?
I'm a headquarters troop,
Just look at me.

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