

tion" means "to coordinate." "Demonstration" invariably means there will be VIPs present (brigadier general or higher), with no hands-on training to follow, and that refreshments will be served in a tent erected for officer-observers. "Tactical training" can be "without ammunition," with "false ammunition" (blanks), or with live ammunition.

The Egyptians admired our unit for its vigorous PT program. When we first arrived, our counterparts were concerned that we might not be acclimated to the Egyptian summer. From the first road march, however, our soldiers met or exceeded any standard set by the Egyptians. (We gained a real psychological advantage because of our predeployment physical conditioning in the humid afternoon heat back at Fort Campbell.)

Another cultural difference arose in regard to the 13 female soldiers who deployed to Egypt as part of Task Force Desert Eagle. Given the subservient role of women in Middle Eastern culture, it is not surprising that they created quite a stir. The initial guidance given our advance party

was that U.S. female soldiers, regardless of rank, would not speak to, or even look directly into the eyes of, any Egyptian man; that they would not wear shorts, even in PT formation; and other similar rules. This was clearly unacceptable, and the guidance was quickly revoked. Our Egyptian counterparts apparently had difficulty believing that our female soldiers were not camp followers. But by the end of the exercise — after much discussion and after the Egyptians had participated in night air assaults flown by both male and female Blackhawk pilots — the professional status of our female soldiers was understood (if not accepted as anything more than a cultural difference), at least by the Egyptian officers.

During BRIGHT STAR 83, the development of good will, mutual understanding, and interoperability procedures was just as important to the U.S. Army as the tactics we employed or the techniques our soldiers learned. Our leaders at all levels had to be flexible in their thinking and sensitive to the political and cultural implications of their words and ac-

tions. By all accounts, Task Force Desert Eagle succeeded, both tactically in the desert and politically in both nations. We hope whatever strides we made toward interoperability will help future CENTCOM elements that may deploy to the Middle East for combined operations and training.



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## CAPTAIN TAMAS F. DREILINGER

The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) is designed to simplify the training of every soldier, from individual skills through unit ARTEPs. To accomplish this mission, the system employs a multi-tiered system of teaching, with the immediate supervisor being responsible for the training of his subordinates.

The system is ideal for some units, those in which the senior trainer, at

one time or another, has done the jobs of his subordinates. But while most infantry company first sergeants have been squad leaders and platoon sergeants, few PAC supervisors have ever been chaplain's assistants.

Not long ago, I served for 14 months as commander of a headquarters troop in an air cavalry squadron. During that time, I faced some of the pitfalls of implementing BTMS in

a headquarters outfit. (There were 22 separate MOSs in the troop, many with a density of only one or two.) The very nature of a headquarters complicates the challenge, because the desires of the company commander and the first sergeant must be balanced with the operational needs of the various staff agencies as they implement the battalion commander's guidance.

**MAJOR TASK**

FM 21-2 Task #071-326-5703 — Construct Individual Fighting Position.

**SUB-TASKS**

FM 21-2 Task #071-326-0513 — Select Temporary Fighting Position.

FM 21-2 Task #051-191-1361 — Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment.

FM 21-2 Task #051-202-1363 — Camouflage Your Defensive Position.

FM 21-2 Task #071-331-0852 — Clear Fields of Fire.

**LEADER TASKS**

FM 21-3 Task #071-326-5704 — Supervise/Evaluate Construction of a Fighting Position.

FM 21-3 Task #071-326-5710 — Designate Fighting Positions for Squad Members.

FM 21-3 Task #071-326-5701 — Supervise the Preparation of a Squad-sized Element's Defensive Position.

FM 21-3 Task #071-326-5725 — Direct Squad-sized Element's Efforts in the Defense.

Perhaps the solution I developed will be useful to others who find themselves in command of a headquarters outfit.

First, Soldier's Manual tasks can be divided into two broad categories: common skills and MOS specific skills. Time was the major stumbling block I encountered in trying to see that my soldiers were trained in both. I had no doubt that my soldiers spent a full duty day working at their jobs and that they were receiving MOS training in the process. Fortunately, I found it easy to convince the heads of the staff sections that some specific Soldier's Manual tasks related to each soldier's daily duties. In fact, we dedicated two hours each week to training in those tasks, with the tasks for each section determined by the section heads. Each section provided my training NCO with a quarterly training schedule showing the tasks, by MOS and skill level, that were to be taught during a particular quarter. There was enough flexibility in this arrangement for change — if my first sergeant noticed that leave forms were not being prepared properly, for example, additional training in that area could be programmed in the allotted time.

But my efforts to set aside duty time for training the soldiers in common skills were met with less than total enthusiasm. Mandatory training, for-

mations, equipment maintenance periods, and weapon qualification already disrupted the day-to-day functioning of the staff sections and caused a great deal of overtime. This left no time for any additional training. Yet my major duty was to ensure the combat readiness of every soldier. I soon realized, after studying the common task manuals, Field Manuals 21-2 and 21-3, that most of the tasks were simple to teach and easy to learn. In fact a soldier could teach himself many of them. From that, we developed our task-of-the-day program.

The idea behind this program was just that simple: Each soldier would study the task selected for his skill level for any given day and demonstrate proficiency in the task to his immediate supervisor before the close of business. My first sergeant and I would quiz the soldiers and their supervisors on the subject matter to see that they were complying. After six months of this system, the troop would conduct a military stakes test. In this test the soldiers would have to demonstrate their proficiency in previously scheduled tasks at different stations in the round-robin event.

After I was satisfied that most of the soldiers could do the assigned tasks, the training moved to a more structured, one-hour-per-week demonstration of tasks that required more

preparation. Accordingly, our task-of-the-week was intended to evaluate a soldier's performance as well as his first line supervisor's abilities to ensure satisfactory performance. Each of our 13 staff agencies had a specific one-hour block of time during which the section as a whole demonstrated their knowledge of the subject matter to the first sergeant or me. The soldiers would already have been taught the associated sub-tasks; the session itself was designed as the diagnostic "hands on" evaluation of performance. (The accompanying outline may serve to clarify the system.)

A soldier, having been instructed on the major task and the associated sub-tasks, would demonstrate proficiency in those tasks during the session, in the context of an established scenario. In my role as the commander, I would evaluate not only the soldier but also the supervisor in his performance of the leader tasks. The scenario itself was "real-world," complete with a mission and situation, and this enabled a soldier to understand how each task was woven with the others to accomplish the mission. The training site was easy to set up, and the training itself was simple to conduct and evaluate.

With any system, the proof of its success or failure lies in the performance of duties under actual conditions. The performance of the soldiers on their skill qualification tests and the performance of the troop during three field training exercises indicated to both the soldier and his chain of command that the task-of-the-day program was a success. The training objective was met using realistic, hands-on training, without robbing the staff agencies of valuable time and energy.



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