

programmed "random raise scenario") 24 to 48 hours before their actual record fire. Of the 48 soldiers tested, 73 percent passed it when it was predicted they would pass or failed when it was predicted they would fail. Nineteen percent passed when it was predicted they would fail, and, most significantly, only 8 percent failed when it was predicted they would pass. The use of the device for prediction is not foolproof, of course, and it may be difficult for unit commanders to schedule the use of the device over extended periods for testing purposes. But it is an option for the commander who may feel he has no options.

Used in this way, the Weaponeer

may at least be able to identify weak shooters before they go to record fire so that they can be given remedial training. As an alternative, their performance on the Weaponeer might be used as a substitute for some record fire, which should result in significant savings in time and money. (ARI is now in the process of preparing a report that will provide specific information on how to conduct "surrogate" record fire testing on the Weaponeer. And a more complete discussion on the use of Weaponeer is presented in ARI Research Product 82-08, *Guidelines for Use of Weaponeer During Basic Rifle Marksmanship Training*, by J.D. Schendel and G.P.

Williams.)

Thus, research indicates that if the Weaponeer is used as suggested here, and not misused, it can be a valuable resource both during BRM training and later in unit marksmanship training programs.



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CAPTAIN WILLIAM D. PHILLIPS

The Light Leaders Course now being conducted at Fort Benning was developed in conjunction with the conversion last year of the 7th Infantry Division to the new light division organization. Once that division's training has been completed, the other divisions that are being activated or converted to that organization will also be trained.

The course was designed as a way to increase the infantry skills of company leaders in the areas of leadership, training instruction, and tactical battle drill. In addition, it emphasizes the development of unit cohesiveness, teamwork, and professionalism. The "spirit of light infantry," which flavors the course, helps produce a tough, aggressive, and smart infantry leader — one who has confidence in his abilities, his training, and his men, as well as in the ability of light infantry units to fight and win on the battlefield.

The course is 28 days long and includes an average of 16 hours of train-

ing per day. Although the course is taught by members of the York Branch, Benning Ranger Division of the U.S. Army Ranger Department, it is not a Ranger school — it is a leadership course, and one that is unique in the Army's formal education system.

Each class is made up of the company chain of command, from commander through team leader, of three rifle companies from one battalion. (Under its TOE, each light infantry battalion has three rifle companies and a headquarters company.) The three company cadres are formed into student platoons for training, with the leadership positions rotated daily. (The students wear their regular insignia of rank, however, and the formal chain of command of each company is still responsible for all non-training administration and control for that company.)

During the course, the three company commanders work as part of the course staff to plan and present instruction and training. And because

the Light Leaders Course uses a train-the-trainer approach, more than half of the formal instruction and training is prepared and presented by members of the class. All members of the student company, in fact, participate in the training and are evaluated by Ranger instructors on their leadership, motivation, supervision, and communication, as well as on their tactical application of the subject matter.

The subject matter is divided into three groups: core subjects, METT-T training, and tactical battle drills (which culminate in a situational training exercise). The core subjects are the individual soldier skills and leadership skills soldiers must have to perform squad collective tasks and battle drills — marksmanship, physical training, hand-to-hand combat, and troop-leading procedures, for example.

The METT-T training includes tasks that each leader must overcome his fears to perform — such as small-

TRAINING NOTES

boat operations, helicopter rappelling, and helocasting. (These are things people in TOE units seldom do.)

But the true meat of the course is the tactical battle drill portion, which is taught in two phases — the drills themselves and the students' presentation of them to their fellow students.

A tactical battle drill is that portion of a collective task that can be learned by rote, a standard technique or procedure that, after repetitive training, becomes spontaneous and instinctive. Such a drill also relates to the direct employment of weapons by more than one person for the destruction of enemy personnel and equipment.

The collective tasks in tactical battle drills are more elaborate than the individual tasks but less so than an ARTEP mission or task. A squad performing an area reconnaissance, for example, must also be able to perform

a passage and re-entry of lines, fast movement, crossing of danger areas, and actions at the objective. These subcollective tasks are taught as tactical battle drills.

As an example, the tactical battle drills involved in the ARTEP mission of conducting a raid are the tasks of breaching wire obstacles, clearing a trenchline, and knocking out a bunker. The individual skills needed to conduct these drills are rifle marksmanship, movement techniques, personnel camouflage, and securing and searching prisoners.

During the first phase of tactical battle drill training (Days 13-15), the students are taught 24 battle drills along with the necessary preparations for teaching them to others, including training aids and aggressors.

The class is divided into four groups, each containing several students from each company. Each group receives instruction on 6 of the 24 battle drills. The students are trained on the actions of each squad position in each drill, from squad leader through assault or security team to machinegunner. Then all the members of the composite squad for each drill practice it until they fully understand how each step of the drill is conducted and why. (There is no set time limit for a drill — it continues until the squad meets a set standard.)

There are four days between the two phases. During these four days, each student prepares to present to his regular squad two of the six drills he has learned.

The second phase begins on Day 18 and lasts for seven days. Each day, three battle drills are taught by the students to their squads, and at night patrol-base operations are conducted by other students. The students are evaluated by York Team instructors on how well they take charge of the unit; the motivation of the squad members to conduct the training; their supervision and on-the-spot corrections; their communication of instructions and concepts to the unit; and the conduct of the techniques of each tactical battle drill. Each evening, the next day's student instructors must re-

view their subjects and practice their presentations.

The tactical battle drills fall into three categories: offensive, control, and defensive, as shown on the accompanying chart. The fact that most of these drills are offensive ones reflects the offensive spirit of the light infantry, whose leaders must be prepared to take the initiative and perform boldly and aggressively.

The control drills are those that a unit must be able to do if it is to survive and sustain itself in combat — fieldcraft and common sense knowledge of dismounted patrolling. (More defensive drills may be added in the future.)

Within several of the drills, groupings of similar drills — called drill sets — are taught. Because they have a similar effect on the student squad and require the same aggressor and terrain support, these drill sets complement the overall concept of smart, economical training.

Although several of the tactical battle drills listed on the chart are ARTEP missions, the tasks that squads or teams conduct are pure battle drills. A platoon raid, for example, is an ARTEP mission, but the missions of the three squads in the course are to perform the three distinctive subcollective tasks of a security team, a support team, and an assault team. Each of the squads is instructed as a unit on each of the three tasks and on the responsibilities of each special team and each individual soldier before they rotate to one of the other tasks. In this way the ARTEP missions to conduct a raid, a reconnaissance, and an ambush (among others) are taught as tactical battle drills.

On Day 24, the students are taught how to rig the A21 containers that will be used to deliver their resupply of rations, water, and ammunition the next day. The students also enter a concentrated planning phase for the follow-on situational training exercise (STX), which begins with a tactical helicopter movement at dawn, followed by an air resupply and a force augmentation by Air Force C130 aircraft.

During the remaining two and a half

TACTICAL BATTLE DRILLS

Offensive

- Breach wire obstacles
- Breach a minefield
- Knock out bunkers
- Clear a trenchline
- Conduct a raid
- Movement techniques/danger areas
- Zone reconnaissance
- Area reconnaissance
- Conduct antiarmor ambush
- Conduct hasty ambush
- Enter and clear buildings (MOUT)
- Fire and movement
- Tactical air movement by helicopter
- Conduct vehicle movement

Control

- Establish patrol base/hide position
- Passage and re-entry of friendly lines
- Conduct aerial resupply
- Conduct a linkup
- Actions at rally points

Defensive

- Squad fire control (live fire)
- Target acquisition
- Establish hasty defense
- Establish/remove hasty minefield
- React to enemy contact/ambush/break contact

days of the course, the students conduct all of the 24 battle drills as portions of ARTEP missions. Working from fire team through company level, the students conduct reconnaissance, ambush, and raid missions as well as exfiltrations, linkups, and reentries of friendly forward lines. The student patrols are evaluated throughout the exercise to the same standards (and on the same evaluation forms) the patrolling teams of the Ranger Department use for Ranger students.

The Light Leaders Course has had a significant effect on the 7th Infantry

Division's preparations for conducting the Light Fighters Course at Fort Ord. The two courses have parallel objectives and a parallel construction. *The Light Leaders Course is the foundation for training the trainers and for instilling the tactics and the abilities soldiers need to become skilled, tough, aggressive, and smart light infantrymen.* The Light Fighters Course is the medium through which this knowledge and spirit is transmitted to the soldiers. The spirit of the light infantry is thus spread from the Rangers through the division's leaders and on to its soldiers. The divisions

that follow the 7th in this training process should find it equally beneficial when they convert to the light infantry organization.



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Training May Not Be the Answer

CAPTAIN JACK H. CAGE

If you have ever used a training program to solve a performance problem, you may have wasted your time. Training is not always the answer. A short story will illustrate:

A young lieutenant reporting to a battalion in Germany naturally wanted to command a platoon but a command position was not available. His battalion commander assigned him instead as battalion safety officer, but made a deal with him: "Lieutenant, I have a terrible problem with accidents in the battalion. I fired the last safety officer because he couldn't reduce the accident rate. If you *can*, you'll get your platoon." The lieutenant agreed and charged out on his crusade.

During the next few days, he asked several soldiers about the previous safety officer's approach. The reports were consistent: Day after day, the officer had held classes on vehicle opera-

tion, weapon safety, and so on. In essence, the relieved officer had seen the problem as one he could solve with training; he had tried to *train* the battalion to be safe. He had given so many classes, in fact, that they had become the number one gripe in the unit. Besides that, he had deluged the battalion with posters, handouts, and wallet-sized cards with safety mottoes on them. He had even moved demolished automobiles into the area to emphasize the results of careless driving. Unfortunately, the battalion's safety record plummeted, as did the officer's standing in the battalion.

What did the new lieutenant do? After determining that the unit's soldiers *knew how* to prevent accidents, he assembled the battalion and said: "By now you've probably heard that the accident rate in our battalion is way too high. And you already know

how to prevent accidents, so I won't stand up here and tell you about that. But if the accident rate decreases, I won't hold any more safety classes, and we'll hold a battalion cook-out every month the rate decreases." Interestingly enough, from then on the battalion had the lowest accident record in the division. And the lieutenant got his platoon.

This tale highlights three important aspects of human performance:

- Training is an appropriate solution to a performance problem *only* when the soldiers need more information or new skills. It is a waste of time and effort when they already have the required knowledge.

- You can use pointed questions, as this lieutenant did, to identify the extent of a performance problem and to determine whether training is needed.

- Linking incentives to soldiers'