

TRAINING NOTES

weapon and position adjustments that may be necessary. He then completes his company sector sketches. Unlike the squad and platoon sector sketches, the company sketch needs to be drawn to scale on an overlay. It should include:

- Primary and alternate traces for each platoon.
- All M60 and .50 caliber machine-guns and Dragons.
- All mortars, including primary and alternate positions for the company's organic mortars.
- Indirect fire targets, selected by the company commander as well as those provided by battalion.
- Mines and obstacles.

• All TOWs and other weapons attached to the company.

• Primary and alternate CP locations.

• Armor kill zones in the company sector.

• All CP/LPs.

The heading on the company sector sketch states only the company designation and the date-time group. Realistically, the company commander should try to get a copy of his sector sketch to his battalion commander within 90 minutes after he completes his METT-T analysis.

Squad and platoon leaders and company commanders need to plan their defense effectively, and the sector

sketch is an excellent way of doing this. It helps determine the adequacy of sector coverage and also helps in controlling fires. By using the METT-T analysis listed here and the described sequences of defense and sector sketch planning, commanders can effectively organize their unit defenses to halt and destroy any attacking enemy.



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72 Ways to Win Bigger

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Army 86 was developed to increase the Army's ability to cope with changes in the technology, organization, and nature of the Soviet threat. Basically, the Army feels it must be prepared to fight outnumbered and win. Specifically, this means the Army, from battalion through theater, must be able to see deep, attack deep, apply combat power, and protect and sustain the force.

Critical to these requirements is the role of superior technology, and every element of the Division 86 force structure will in some fashion benefit from its effects. Even the infantry battalion will benefit. Or will it?

Among the improvements envisioned for the Division 86 infantryman, for instance, is a series of small arms designed to increase his firepower. An increase in firepower serves two purposes: It increases potential lethality, and it lessens the need for developing and maintaining individual marksmanship skills.

The effect of superior weapons technology elsewhere in Army 86 is obvious, and high technology examples abound: the TOW antitank missile, the "smart" bomb, and the cruise missile. Even the tank is a technological benefactor. Thanks to such improvements as the laser rangefinder, a single main battle tank (MBT) round has a 50:50 hit probability at 2,000 meters. In short, what the tanker can see, he can hit.

But the infantry's planned technological future seems to represent a marked departure from the combination elsewhere of reduced ammunition expenditure, high accuracy, and high lethality. Is this the way to go? How about another look.

A MODEST PROPOSAL

At the infantry battalion level, significant benefits could accrue if we turned at least 72 riflemen per battalion into snipers.

Opponents of sound marksmanship in general and superior marksmanship in particular have long done the infantry a disservice and the enemy a left-handed favor: By neglecting the human factor in the man-plus-machine equation, they have substituted firepower for marksmanship. Thus, volume of fire takes the place of accuracy and apparently is to continue doing so. And all this ignores the fact that there are many electronic and optical improvements that can dramatically increase the individual rifleman's lethal potential.

The emphasis on increased small arms firepower has resulted, however, in a corresponding deterioration of the existing regard for even the most basic marksmanship techniques, skills, and standards. Thus the "cone of fire" has replaced an individual soldier's aimed fire. As a result, the infantryman now shoots more but hits less. This ability to shoot more, aided by weapons that fire ever faster and

ammunition that gets ever smaller and lighter, has made firepower more important than accuracy and now threatens to divorce the two entirely.

But enough on theory. How about reality?

Part of the reality of Army 86 is adequately addressing the Soviet threat, which has technological, geographical, and numerical dimensions. A critical part of the geographical dimension is the potential European battlefield. Not only will that battlefield be saturated with targets but these targets will be alarmingly close, especially for the infantryman. Nearly 85 percent of the target opportunities on a European battlefield will be within 1,500 meters. This is simply a function of terrain and urbanization; it does not address the additional constraints of weather, night, or smoke. In fact, urban areas, either intact or largely rubble, provide one of the best cases of all for developing and employing snipers.

Another Army 86 reality is so real as to be axiomatic: fighting outnumbered. Not only will significant reinforcement be unlikely — or at least untimely — on a future European battlefield, so too might even so basic a matter as resupply. Does it make great sense, then, to prepare and equip infantrymen for high rates of fire when the resulting ammunition expenditures may not be readily replenished?

There are also other realities to consider. Many of the infantry "targets," such as armored vehicles, will be quite impervious to high volumes of small arms fire anyway, at least, most of the time. (Strangely enough, while small arms usage — rifle, automatic rifle, machinegun — goes ever further in the direction of high rates of fire at the expense of accuracy, improvements in other infantry munitions — particularly those intended for use against armored vehicles — demand the opposite. The LAW, the rifleman's assault weapon, various bullet-trap type rifle grenades, and improved 40mm M203 grenades all demand accuracy for the best results. Since the Army does not expect dozens or even hundreds of these munitions to be fired indiscriminately in the direc-

tion of the enemy with only the vaguest expectation of a hit, why should it tolerate anything different with the soldier's basic weapon?)

For the infantry, though, neither combat in cities nor combat in general reduces the requirement for firepower at the lowest levels. Large numbers of snipers would simply complement the employment of other infantry battalion weapons.

REVIEW OF THE ISSUES

The present state of U.S. Army marksmanship is not good. Opponents of decent marksmanship seem to see it as an outmoded and unnecessary skill. Technology, they say, can easily substitute for that skill.

But the possession of high technology is less valuable than the mastery of it. The Falkland Islands and Bekka Valley experiences alone prove this. Merely pointing a weapon in the general direction of a target and spraying hundreds of projectiles at it will not necessarily increase the likelihood of hitting it. In fact, poor marksmanship techniques combined with a high rate of fire may well result not only in reinforcing the miss and the near miss but in institutionalizing them.

Good shooters have known ever since the first rock was thrown in anger that one hit on a target is worth infinitely more than any number that are not. And a hit is a function of weapon, training, practice, and confidence.

Training two snipers per squad in an infantry battalion would require a high quality marksmanship program. Such a program should not, however, have the goal of training Olympic-caliber marksmen. Its goal should be to turn out better than average shooters — much better. Available technology would take care of the rest.

But shooting is only one part of a successful sniper's skills. He also must be well trained in target identification and acquisition, must be an expert at camouflage and undetected movement, and must be capable of operating either as part of a squad, in combination

with other snipers, or alone.

Whatever else a European battlefield may produce, it will not produce a shortage of targets. Any officer, forward observer, artilleryman, traffic controller, vehicle commander, driver, radio operator, or reconnaissance trooper who is exposed — however briefly — will be a priority target. With modern technology and adequate training, what the modern marksman can see, he can hit. And he can do so far more efficiently than contemporary small unit weapons and tactics permit.

The urban battlefield is truly three-dimensional. Sniping positions and opportunities are thus virtually unlimited. With more than 70 snipers per battalion operating on both sides of the FLOT (forward line of own troops), an infantry battalion would truly be able to see deep, attack deep, and apply combat power.

Snipers could focus less on the "average" target and go after the ones that would hurt the enemy the most at that time: leaders, forward observers, communications and logistics personnel, and drivers. Killing or wounding an officer hardly means a battle won, but it almost always hurts the enemy more than killing or wounding a private.

Contrary to the theory advanced by the detractors of marksmanship training — that the modern battlefield reduces the value of aimed fire and increases the value of volume fire — the modern battlefield to a substantial degree does the opposite. Individual targets will be more protected than in previous wars. Helmets, body armor, rubble, terrain, and vehicles all will make hits more difficult to obtain. Under these circumstances, precision aimed fire will provide results far superior to those of "cones of fire."

In addition, individual snipers or small sniper teams can move more rapidly with less likelihood of detection than even the rifle squad; and sniper fire will not only score more hits for less ammunition expended, but the reduced volume of fire required for those hits will be more difficult to trace and neutralize.

Snipers never have been either employed on a large scale or well integrated into the overall defense. In the U.S. Army in particular, this is not surprising: Virtually all U.S. urban combat in the past has been offensive, not defensive. But times have changed, both in terms of the likelihood of our being on the defensive and in terms of using the sniper to the best advantage while on the defensive.

One sniper cannot be "everywhere," of course. But dozens of them in each defensive sector can be *almost* everywhere, or will certainly *seem* to be. Since offensive urban combat is already slow and demanding, effective sniper fire would be very difficult to neutralize and thus would aggravate an already strained offensive situation. Neutralizing many snipers at once from all parts

of the battlefield would complicate the matter even further.

Heavy losses from unseen, difficult-to-neutralize snipers who seemed to be everywhere would increase the psychological strain on the attacker and further impair his morale and his effectiveness. Able to move more frequently than the rest of the battalion, snipers could appear again and again from supposedly "cleared" locations. The enemy would then have two options: reclear these areas, spending time and resources, or suffer higher losses (and increased psychological strain).

Snipers alone would probably win few battles. The same can be said for infantry alone, or armor alone, or artillery or airpower alone. But a well developed, imaginatively and aggressively employed large-scale sniper effort

could do for the Division 86 infantry battalion what no other combination of tactics, organization, and "advanced" weaponry could do: significantly increase mobility, cost-effectiveness, survivability and — most importantly — lethality. Best of all, the ones who stood to lose the most would be the ones who should. And isn't that what Division 86 is all about?



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Infantry Mortar Training

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In today's Army there is a serious shortage of realistic, effective training devices for the Infantry's mortar platoons. Therefore, today's mortar crews are limited to three types of training: dry firing, subcaliber firing, or live firing with current service ammunition.

Dry firing is perhaps the most cost-effective method of training conducted by mortar platoons, but it is also the most tedious and unrealistic, and it does not give the forward observers or the ammunition bearers any training in their specialties. Training with subcaliber devices such as the sabot and the pneumatic firing device is an improvement over dry firing, but it is still not realistic, and it still does not provide any training for the ammunition bearers.

The use of service ammunition provides the best training, of course, but it is the most expensive. The expense of using service ammunition for training limits the amount of ammunition, thereby restricting training. As a result, training standards are lower than what commanders expect.

Within the next few years, all Army mortar platoons, 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm, may be capable of conducting their platoon ARTEPs on a field no longer than 600 meters in depth. This will be possible because of a new training device currently being co-developed by the Army Research and Development Center and the U.S. Army Infantry School. This training device, known as the "LITR" (low-cost indirect-fire training round), will be capable of adding realism to the

current training of our mortar crews and of providing all crew members with effective training in all aspects of mortar gunnery.

Because the LITR is a reasonable facsimile of the corresponding service ammunition, it will enable a mortar crew to practice realistic ammunition handling techniques, and it will give the forward observer an adjustment capability and the FDC the necessary training in FDC procedures.

The LITR's accuracy provides excellent target practice, because this full-caliber training round is equal in weight, shape, and operation to a tactical (standard) mortar cartridge.

The mortar and the sight are used exactly the same way they are used with standard ammunition. The LITR's range can be varied both by