

Snipers never have been either employed on a large scale or well integrated into the overall defense. In the U.S. Army in particular, this is not surprising: Virtually all U.S. urban combat in the past has been offensive, not defensive. But times have changed, both in terms of the likelihood of our being on the defensive and in terms of using the sniper to the best advantage while on the defensive.

One sniper cannot be "everywhere," of course. But dozens of them in each defensive sector can be *almost* everywhere, or will certainly *seem* to be. Since offensive urban combat is already slow and demanding, effective sniper fire would be very difficult to neutralize and thus would aggravate an already strained offensive situation. Neutralizing many snipers at once from all parts

of the battlefield would complicate the matter even further.

Heavy losses from unseen, difficult-to-neutralize snipers who seemed to be everywhere would increase the psychological strain on the attacker and further impair his morale and his effectiveness. Able to move more frequently than the rest of the battalion, snipers could appear again and again from supposedly "cleared" locations. The enemy would then have two options: reclear these areas, spending time and resources, or suffer higher losses (and increased psychological strain).

Snipers alone would probably win few battles. The same can be said for infantry alone, or armor alone, or artillery or airpower alone. But a well developed, imaginatively and aggressively employed large-scale sniper effort

could do for the Division 86 infantry battalion what no other combination of tactics, organization, and "advanced" weaponry could do: significantly increase mobility, cost-effectiveness, survivability and — most importantly — lethality. Best of all, the ones who stood to lose the most would be the ones who should. And isn't that what Division 86 is all about?



Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett, an instructor at the United States Air Force Academy, served as an advisor in Vietnam and has also served with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Berlin Brigade. He has previously published articles in *INFANTRY* and other military publications.

# Infantry Mortar Training

**MASTER SERGEANT ROBERT E. BREWSTER  
MASTER SERGEANT CLINTON WILDER, JR.**

In today's Army there is a serious shortage of realistic, effective training devices for the Infantry's mortar platoons. Therefore, today's mortar crews are limited to three types of training: dry firing, subcaliber firing, or live firing with current service ammunition.

Dry firing is perhaps the most cost-effective method of training conducted by mortar platoons, but it is also the most tedious and unrealistic, and it does not give the forward observers or the ammunition bearers any training in their specialties. Training with subcaliber devices such as the sabot and the pneumatic firing device is an improvement over dry firing, but it is still not realistic, and it still does not provide any training for the ammunition bearers.

The use of service ammunition provides the best training, of course, but it is the most expensive. The expense of using service ammunition for training limits the amount of ammunition, thereby restricting training. As a result, training standards are lower than what commanders expect.

Within the next few years, all Army mortar platoons, 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm, may be capable of conducting their platoon ARTEPs on a field no longer than 600 meters in depth. This will be possible because of a new training device currently being co-developed by the Army Research and Development Center and the U.S. Army Infantry School. This training device, known as the "LITR" (low-cost indirect-fire training round), will be capable of adding realism to the


current training of our mortar crews and of providing all crew members with effective training in all aspects of mortar gunnery.

Because the LITR is a reasonable facsimile of the corresponding service ammunition, it will enable a mortar crew to practice realistic ammunition handling techniques, and it will give the forward observer an adjustment capability and the FDC the necessary training in FDC procedures.

The LITR's accuracy provides excellent target practice, because this full-caliber training round is equal in weight, shape, and operation to a tactical (standard) mortar cartridge.

The mortar and the sight are used exactly the same way they are used with standard ammunition. The LITR's range can be varied both by

elevation of the tube and by removal of increments. (The removal of LITR increments is simulated by removing plugs from the projectile.) The "safe" and "arm" mechanism of the fuze makes it safe to handle and fire. On impact, its spotting charge simulates a detonation by providing a flash, bang, and smoke signal. The fuze incorporates a selection button that simulates the "super quick" mode. The fuze assembly contains a cap similar to that on the multi-option fuze system.



fielded with the 120mm mortar system.

The LITR will be incorporated into the indirect-fire training system as the training round to be used instead of standard HE ammunition. It could be incorporated into live fire training exercises as well to reduce the cost of firing service ammunition. A one-tenth scale LITR, with smoke signature only, will be used by crews where there is no firing range — on parade fields, for example, or on large open areas — to increase effectiveness and realism and to reduce cost.

The approach that will be used in integrating the LITR into institutional and unit training programs will be based upon the standards outlined in the direct fire soldiers manuals, the

skill qualification test, and ARTEPs 7-15 and 71-2. Existing indirect-fire training programs will be revised or modified as appropriate to provide for the LITR.

In the future, the mortar platoon's indirect fire support is going to be relied upon more and more; company and battalion commanders must therefore have confidence in the ability of their "hip pocket artillery."

It has been said that to prepare for war you must have an adequate training program during peace — our mortar platoons have been "short changed" on training in the past, and the LITR may help even out this shortage.

The cost of this new raining system (\$30 per 81mm mortar) will allow more rounds for training. Additional cost savings can be found in the refurbishing of the LITR once it has been fired. To refurbish the LITR, all that is necessary is to visually inspect the fired round, remove the old fuze and fin assembly, and replace it with a new fuze and fin. Total cost — approximately five dollars. Retrieving the fired round will be the responsibility of the crew that fired it, but it has not been decided whether the crew or direct support maintenance will refurbish the round.

Technical data on the proposed LITR rounds has been developed for all the 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars, and testing is being conducted on the 60mm and 81mm rounds. The 120mm round will be



Master Sergeant Robert E. Brewster is assigned to the Directorate of Combat Developments at the Infantry School. He has served in mortar platoon assignments in Vietnam and with the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division.



Master Sergeant Clinton Wilder, Jr., is assigned to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Infantry School. He was previously senior FDC instructor for the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course, and he also served in Vietnam.

# The Indicating Round Technique

**WARRANT OFFICER-2 KEITH F. HOYLE, British Army**

Modern technology allows us not only to introduce new equipment, but also to give older systems and techniques a new lease on life. Although laser range finders have been with us

for some time and are used extensively on today's modern battlefield, they have not normally been used by Infantry soldiers at company level. In Great Britain, however, the hand-held laser

range finder (HHLRF) has given the mortar platoon a new and important procedure — the indicating round technique (IRT).

The IRT gives a forward observer