

includes leader training in sniper employment, procurement of another sniper rifle, and additional selection courses to maintain fully manned and trained sniper-observer squads. The division has submitted an MTOE change for a nine-man sniper-observer squad and has strongly recommended that an 11-man squad be included in Army of Excellence organizations. (More detailed information on the selection, training, and use of sniper-

observer squads can be obtained from the Commander, 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307.)

The dividends to be gained from developing sniper-observer squads far outweigh the resource requirements they demand in terms of manpower spaces, equipment, and dollars. By providing a commander with an additional combat capability, these squads increase the

readiness of any infantry battalion to fight and win on a modern battlefield.



Captain James W. Bowen, a 1982 graduate of the United States Military Academy, was Assistant S-3 of the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry when the sniper-observer program was developed and is still involved in the program.

# Tactical Logistician

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER J. CRIMMINS, JR.

Our brigade and battalion S-4 officers, along with the others in the logistical chain, are responsible for fueling and fixing our vehicles and weapon systems and for feeding and arming their operators. On the battlefields depicted in Field Manual 100-5, these logisticians will have to accomplish their tasks in a variety of combat operations by determining how to get what is needed to the point where it is needed at the time when it is needed. They must be able to select the correct course of action and carry it out under adverse conditions as well.

Unfortunately, our normal peacetime training leaves tactical logisticians less than fully prepared for such combat situations. Both peacetime constraints and training emphases hinder their on-the-job development and training. In particular, three aspects of training limit the kinds of problems an S-4 must solve and may even prevent him from considering other problems.

First, logistics for any field training exercise (FTX) is normally limited to what is necessary for the play of the exercise. This aspect of the problem acknowledges that logistical assets are too precious to be prepared, expended, or used when they are not needed. It also acknowledges that manning levels are not high enough to allow fictitious operations to be

planned and monitored when there are actual ones that must take place. Thus, the emphasis is usually placed on supporting a particular FTX, with little question of how that support would be done in combat. Whatever support is not needed is never addressed or planned for. Although this conserves precious assets, it also limits opportunities for planning and executing the handling of these assets.

## LIMITED

The second aspect of the problem concerns the physical limitations of today's training areas. This simply acknowledges that maneuver units cannot conduct offensive and retrograde movements over the distances the writers of the FMs envision for the future battlefields. In addition, maneuver units in an FTX rarely employ all forms of combat support and combat service support. Live fire events are usually limited in scope and duration, and this means that S-4s and the CSS system are less than fully exercised.

During most field problems, S-4s are rarely required to operate at extended distances from their supply base and their support units, or with a challenging array of requirements. Even the size and the complexity of the trains may be re-

duced to a deceptively simple level. In short, in the logistical environment found in many field training exercises, management and span of control problems are greatly reduced.

The third aspect involves the importance of brigade and battalion level FTXs to the commanders concerned. Maneuver units pour a great deal of effort into planning and preparing for such an event, because many of their critical training tasks can be done only during an FTX. It is therefore quite natural that commanders should demand that every possible step be taken to support the exercise. This emphasis is well placed, but its results must also be considered.

In actual practice, CSS is rarely ever interrupted or limited—the support of the FTX is the end purpose; the training of the tactical logistician is secondary. Good units do stress training in communications, security, camouflage, and fieldcraft of all types, but this, unfortunately, is not the type of training in question. The S-4, for example, rarely gets to move and set up field trains in new locations during darkness. His span of control is not tested, and he is not required to support and move at the same time. He may practice noise and light discipline on resupply runs but may never get a chance to attempt a throughput operation

(bypassing intermediate supply activities). While the maneuver units may practice night withdrawals, the S-4 probably stays in a static location until those units begin withdrawing from the field.

If all this is so, where does it leave us? It leaves us, the tactical logisticians, with deficiencies in our training and a need to overcome them through an increased emphasis on logistical training at the tactical level.

Accordingly, the tactical logistician must seek out the tactical operations officer early in the formulation of training plans and present his own training objectives. Then, together, they can plan and identify requirements. Teamwork is necessary to both.

The teamwork between the S-3 and the S-4 must begin *before the troops go to the field*. Command post exercises (CPXs) with FIRST BATTLE or other simulation games can be used. Reporting systems that parallel the field system can be set up in which a unit that does not request resupply or replenishment is rendered ineffective until its requests are submitted and acted upon. Maneuvers that are impractical to do on many posts

can be exercised during CPXs.

Extended offensive or retrograde operations that require the displacement of trains can be conducted as part of the movement to or from the field location. Field Manual 52-4, The Division Support Command and the Separate Brigade Support Battalion, states:

*In retrograde operations, whenever possible, brigade trains displace to the rear before the combat elements begin their rearward movement. Some elements from the brigade trains may be required to remain in the forward area to provide immediate support to combat elements.*

Brigade and battalion S-4s and their commanders should explore this general guidance, asking themselves these questions: What elements remain to provide immediate support? How much of each element remains forward? Who is in charge of setting up the new area? Who is running the existing area with the support requirements? What supplies are en route to this location? What supplies and equipment should be, or can be, left behind? These questions multiply when a tactical trains displacement is being considered.

Careful planning and timing could even allow for a complete move of a trains area during an FTX. Such a move could be the very first or the very last event of the exercise. It could even be worked into the tactical play.

Such ideas may be only food for thought, but we are all trainers, and each of us must look at the training needs of the other. Not every FTX has to have a complete movement of the field trains, of course, but somehow each S-4 must be fully trained through practice and experience. It is only through this on-the-job problem solving that an S-4 can develop his ability to support tactical operations. He must demand opportunities to do so during peacetime and must show how the aspects of training that limit his development can be overcome. If his opportunities and challenges in peacetime are limited, his responses and solutions in wartime may also be limited—too limited.

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Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Crimmins, Jr., is assigned to Readiness Group Fort Benjamin Harrison. He has served as a battalion executive officer and S-3 and as a battalion and brigade S-4. He holds a masters degree from the University of Southern California.

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# Shortcomings in New TOE

LIEUTENANT TERRY L. DURAN

The old story about the lack of a horse-shoe nail causing the eventual loss of a battle is one that makers of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) would do well to heed. In the Army's rush to a Division 86-style Army of Excellence, care must be taken not to let too many horses want for nails, lest the battle overrun both the soldiers in the field and the TOE makers.

A prime example is the average J-series, M113-equipped mechanized infantry battalion in Europe. Although this battalion can expect to receive the M2

Bradley infantry fighting vehicle within the next year or two, it must, because of its location on the "front lines of freedom," be ready to go to war at any time, regardless of what it is equipped with. Unfortunately, some shortcomings in the transitional J-series MTOE (M113) are definitely nails that could cause many a shoe to be lost. Admittedly, many of these shortcomings apply to the expanded headquarters company only, but some of them apply as well to the entire battalion.

These problems can be loosely grouped

into three categories: Too Much, Too Little, and Incompatibility.

## "TOO MUCH"

First, the Division 86 mechanized infantry headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) has more than 300 men, regardless of which particular "modified" TOE (MTOE) is referred to—more than a third of the battalion's entire manpower. Because of the company's size and diversity, it is not surprising to find