

mounted or dismounted, are the men who should receive such panoply and glamour as are accorded to this dreary business of war. The mounted men have always had it—prancing steeds, glittering uniforms, sabretaches, scimitars, dolmans, leopard-skins, and the like in the old days; the imposing clatter of tanks and smart black berets in these sterner days. But the infantryman who bears the danger, the dirt, and the discomfort has never enjoyed the same prestige.

But I believe that what the Infantry would appreciate more than anything is some outward and visible symbol. No one grudges the parachutist his very distinctive emblem, but the infantryman is, I will maintain, subject to greater and more continuous, though less spectacular, risk than the parachutist, and should certainly have an emblem. What it should be I must leave to others—a rampant lion, crossed bayonets, a distinctive piping?

It can surely not have escaped notice that nearly all our leaders who have distinguished themselves in this war have all been infantrymen—Field-Marshal Dill, Alexander, Montgomery, Wilson; Generals Auchinleck, O'Connor, Platt, Leese, Dempsey, and others. Last war was a very static war, but there was a fashion for cavalry generals; in this war infantry generals have shown that they can move as fast as any.

So let us always write Infantry with a specially capital "I" and think of them with the deep admiration they deserve. And let us Infantrymen wear our battle-dress, like our rue, with a difference; and throw a chest in it, for we are the men who win battles and wars.

Wavell advances a number of cogent points in his article that apply as well to our own Infantrymen today. Why doesn't he receive more pay, a higher enlistment bonus, or a higher selective reenlistment bonus? Whatever happened to the proficiency pay given to holders of the Expert Infantryman Badge, or the incentive pay proposed in the late 1970s for Infantry



noncommissioned officers serving in combat leader—or "green tab"—positions? Why don't the Infantrymen in line units (battalion and below) who habitually spend sustained periods of time in the field living in austere conditions and separated from their families receive incentive pay?

What about the standards of our Infantry recruits? Why aren't the physical and mental standards for initial entry and subsequent promotions raised—for private soldiers as well as officers?

Granted, Infantrymen are authorized to wear the blue Infantry shoulder cord on the uniform coat of their Army Green

uniform, but what distinction is there when this jacket is not worn? Why isn't there a distinctive Infantry (branch) color coding—a piping—in place of the current gold band on the shoulder boards of rank for the light green shirt, in a manner similar to that employed by the German Army? And what about the light Infantryman who almost always wears the battle dress uniform? Why isn't he authorized a "Light" Infantry tab, to be worn above his division patch like a Ranger tab; or a beret; or a special trench or commando knife he could wear on his pistol belt?

Positive answers to all of these questions will add immeasurably to the morale of each of our Infantrymen. They will also help create a more cohesive, efficient, and effective branch (and better units), and will help compensate the Infantryman for his additional privations, burdens, and responsibilities.

Wavell's laudatory praise of the Infantry—with a very special capital "I"—is as relevant today as it was four decades ago. The Infantry is destined to remain the paramount and indispensable branch of the Army. Long live the Infantry, Queen of Battle!



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Training Management

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The Army's training system is designed to give commanders everything they need to prepare their units for com-

bat. This is basically a three-fold process that includes the basic combat training of the individual soldier, the sustainment of

combat training, and unit field exercises that simulate actual warfare. Additionally, the system provides for training doc-

trine, individual and collective training, advanced training keyed to soldiers' career progression, and a wide variety of training resources.

It is the primary responsibility of battalion and company commanders to manage the aspects of the Army's training system that support the training of their soldiers and units. ARTEPs were developed in 1977 to guide them in their unit training and evaluation by identifying training objectives and minimum performance standards for critical missions and tasks. With both SQT/Soldier's Manuals and unit ARTEPs, the systematic integration of individual and collective training tasks has greatly improved standardization and combat mission readiness.

BTMS

With this system firmly entrenched in Army doctrine, it was then necessary to provide commanders at all levels with the management tools they needed to identify individual and collective training deficiencies, improve overall MOS quality through multi-echelon training and cross-training, and maintain a controlled and sustained training program to meet a unit's needs. The training program developed to attain these goals was the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS).

Within BTMS there are five levels of training management with each geared toward those who direct training at the various levels of command: first-line supervisors, platoon trainers (leader and sergeant), training supervisors (first sergeants and command sergeants major), training managers (battalion and company commanders and battalion S-3), and commanders (above battalion). Workshops are conducted for trainers at the first four levels to acquaint them with the program, and a training management system is provided for the higher commanders and staffs.

BTMS, which was formally integrated into the Army in 1979, mandated through command channels that everyone attend the applicable workshop. The one-week workshops were conducted at post level and continued for several years. Once a unit had held its initial workshops, a

follow-on—called the BTMS Unit Sustainment Program—would be scheduled for the next year. This assured that commanders and troops at all levels would be exposed to the BTMS system of management.

The BTMS program is goal oriented and recognizes that unit commanders will never have enough time, money, or resources to accomplish everything they want to do. What the program does is to establish a framework within which commanders and staffs can establish goals and priorities and manage scarce resources.

There are some inherent problems with the implementation of BTMS, however, for the very people who should benefit most from it. First, it is a full-time job just gathering resources, coordinating training areas, and submitting support requests. Imagine every platoon leader and company commander trying to plan, supervise, and direct training in addition to these tasks. It cannot be done.

In addition, unit training, which is supposedly the Number One priority, often takes a back seat to mandatory training and short-fuse requirements from higher headquarters. It has often been said that mistakes in training can easily be overlooked because that is the purpose of training. But failures in other areas—meeting administrative deadlines, supervising subordinates properly, and passing I.G. inspections—are not as easily forgiven. Common sense dictates, therefore, the efforts that will emerge as top priorities.

Another problem is in the concept of decentralization. Decentralization is a key component of BTMS because it gives subordinates a sense of mission and the assurance that their input really counts toward the success of the mission. The system basically leaves it up to commanders, however, to decide how and to what extent they will implement the program. Commanders therefore instinctively hold onto control and subvert decentralization. Although unit commanders at all levels were quick to implement BTMS when it was introduced, they implemented only those parts of it that fitted their operating philosophy. While long- and short-range plans are now used by almost all higher headquarters, training is not



usually decentralized to any great extent. As a result, the initiative of leaders at lower echelons is decreased and this eventually leads to a "let's-wait-and-see" attitude.

The problem with the decentralization associated with BTMS is that more work is required to run it properly, and battalion and company headquarters often find that they lack the current staffing to do the job.

(The allocation of material resources does not present a problem for unit training in the Army. Assets and resources are budgeted yearly and are basically fixed. Unit commanders know what they have to work with ahead of time and, by employing long- and short-range planning, they can allocate those resources according to priorities. And as long as a commander uses his resources in the most cost-effective manner, he is not held liable for training deficiencies because he was never given the necessary resources to accomplish the task. Basically, he just "goes with what he's got." At all levels

of command, this resource programming institutionalized by BTMS is one of the single most effective benefits of the system.)

The basic policy concept needed to improve BTMS is to enforce training time through *administrative action*. As an administrative action, training would become *accountable* in the form of mandatory time periods for decentralized training. This could be institutionalized very easily on the unit's weekly training schedule and submitted to brigade headquarters for approval, and would ensure that training was given command attention at all levels.

The brigade commander must take charge of the decentralization process, because he has the authority to implement or emphasize the desired corrective action and to *standardize* BTMS throughout the subordinate battalions.

He can directly implement the unit training schedule with emphasis on de-

centralization by applying the administrative deadline process and by making sure training schedules are written at no higher than squad level, or in certain instances at platoon level. Command emphasis on an administrative matter has never failed to achieve results.

As for the implementation of BTMS, since it was designed to be implemented at battalion level, it should be accepted at this level to the best of the command's ability.

At company level, commanders have an inherent duty to train subordinates in leadership and to allow the soldiers to develop professionally. The best way to do this is by decentralizing training, allowing soldiers to make and implement training decisions, generate initiative, and foster a team concept. Subordinate leaders will not face punitive action for mistakes or shortcomings in training because training missions are *not* considered in the administrative deadline class.

Good intentions alone will not implement even the best ideas. Emphasis and command guidance should start from the top and provide for follow-up.

Training management in the Army today is far above what it was ten years ago. The addition and integration of individual and collective soldier tasks has allowed leaders to set priorities and to plan and execute more effective training. To fight, win, and survive the first battle of the next war, subordinate leaders must be able to conduct effective training and develop team integrity and leadership. BTMS is an effective tool for that purpose, and it should be refined to the fullest extent possible.

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Unit Histories

A Guide to the Agencies That Can Help

MAJOR GLENN W. DAVIS

If you have been assigned to develop or expand the unit history of your organization as part of the U.S. Army Regimental System, there are several places you can go for help.

There is a Roster of Organizations, which lists the active associations of former members of various units that served within the U.S. Army structure at various times. If your unit went through a lineage redesignation (name change), an active association may still be in existence. You can get a copy of the current roster through Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, ATTN: OCPA-

CR, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-1500; AUTOVON 224-0739.

Unit history cards will provide you with details on your unit's authority, assignments, and locations since its activation. These data cards can help you track where your unit was stationed and when. Then you can call various installation museums or veterans associations in the continental United States for assistance. Requests for unit history cards can be obtained through the U.S. Army's Institute of Heraldry, 5010 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22304-5050; AUTOVON 284-6632/6633.

Information relating to heraldic items

such as coats of arms or historic insignia can also be obtained through the Institute.

Unit morning reports are in the custody of the National Personnel Records Center, 9700 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63132. These reports can give you your unit's personnel assignment status as well as casualty lists.

The historical records of most U.S. Army units or military installations in operation *before* 1953 are in the custody of the Military Field Branch, which is in the Washington National Records Center Building, 4205 Suitland Road, Suitland, MD 20746; commercial (301)