

For the first time in many months we are pleased to be able to report on a number of excellent books recently published in the field of U.S. military history. In fact, we have received so many that we are forced to hold some of them for our next issue. Here is the first batch:

• **AMERICA'S FIRST BATTLES, 1776-1965.** Edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (University Press of Kansas, 1986. 416 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound). Although the title of this book is misleading—"The U.S. Army's" should have been substituted for "America's"—and several of the selections are arguable, overall this is a fine piece of work, much needed by today's Army, and the editors and individual authors are deserving of our congratulations.

Ten different authors discuss the Army's first (or near first) battles of our nine major wars. Wisely, the editors selected two opening battles for World War II, one in the Pacific area, the other in the Atlantic area. A concluding chapter assesses the long term effects of the battles as well as their human and technological dimensions.

Each author is well known in the military history field: Graham Cosmas (San Juan Hill and El Caney), Jay Luvaas (Buna), Ira Gruber (Long Island), Martin Blumenson (Kasserine Pass), George Herring (The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley), K. Jack Bauer (Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma), Theodore J. Crackel (Queenston Heights), W. Glenn Robertson (First Bull Run), Allan R. Millet (Cantigny), and Roy K. Flint (Task Force Smith and the 24th Division). John Shy wrote the final chapter.

The editors were at the Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth during the preparation of this book. (William Stofft is now the Army's Chief of Military History.) They steered it through various conferences and seminars to its completion. Their authors were not required to, nor do they, paint a rosy picture of how the U.S. infantryman reacted

in his first battle and how he then adjusted to his drastically changed environment.

More than anything, the authors point out the important role leadership played in those battles and how today's combat leaders can benefit by analyzing and reflecting upon the art and science of war.

This is another of those books we think all infantrymen should have in their personal libraries.

• **THE OLD ARMY: A PORTRAIT OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN PEACETIME, 1784-1898.** By Edward M. Coffman (Oxford University Press, 1986. 514 Pages. \$35.00). This is the story of the people who served in three of our "peacetime armies" during the years 1784-1812, 1815-1860, and 1865-1898, many of whom took part in the Army's first battles of three of the wars mentioned in the Heller-Stofft book.

But it is not a story of wars, campaigns, or battles; it is a story of the men who served and of the women who followed them, made their homes, and bore their children. Who were they? Why did they sign on, knowing they would probably be sent to small frontier posts where the living was hard? How did they train and prepare for war? How did they live? Or die?

The author, noted previously for his World War I studies, is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin. He has done a fine job answering those questions and bringing our military predecessors to life. His book, too, deserves a place in every infantryman's library.

• **PHIL SHERIDAN AND HIS ARMY.** By Paul A. Hutton (University of Nebraska Press, 1985. 479 Pages. \$29.95, Softbound). If you want to know more about the war-fighting activities of much of the third of Coffman's peacetime armies, this book gives you that story. It is wrapped around the man, Philip H. Sheridan, who was the nation's chief Indian fighter from 1867 until he succeeded William T. Sherman in 1883 as overall Army commander.

The author, who teaches history at the University of New Mexico, points out that Sheridan "commanded a larger frontier region for a longer period of time than any other soldier in the history of the Republic. . . . The troops under his command fought 619 engagements with the natives, with a loss of 565 officers and men killed and another 691 wounded."

His story is the story of the major campaigns the frontier army fought, though not the individual battles. He is particularly good at describing the hierarchy of command in the West, the men who occupied the principal leadership positions, and the effects of the Civil War on those men. Unfortunately, he never quite gets hold of his main subject, Sheridan, whom he seems repelled by and yet attracted to at the same time.

Still, his is a good account of the Army in the West and of Sheridan's military career from the end of the Civil War to his death in 1884. He also includes accounts of Sheridan's role in the reconstruction of the South, his actions during and after the great Chicago fire in 1871 and in the great railroad strikes of 1877, and his trip to Europe in 1870-1871 to observe the Franco-Prussian War.

• **SILENT WINGS: THE SAGA OF THE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE COMBAT GLIDER PILOTS DURING WORLD WAR II.** By Gerard M. Devlin (St. Martin's Press, 1985. 410 Pages. \$27.95). The author tells a lively story of the development of the U.S. glider effort during World War II, with its attendant growing pains, operational problems, and eventual demise, although the Army did not officially do away with gliders until 1 January 1953. (The last U.S. training maneuver in which gliders were used—Operation Tarheel—took place in 1949.) The Marine effort, which began in March 1942, lasted only until June 1943.

The gliders were never popular with the troops who had to go to war in them,

even after they began receiving hazardous duty pay in mid-1944. While the glider pilots performed magnificently, their efforts were marked as often by failure as by success.

• **KOREA: THE FIRST WAR WE LOST.** By Bevin Alexander (Hippocrene Books, 1986. 558 Pages. \$24.95). The Korean War has never received the attention it deserves from our military historians. Nor has it received serious study within the Army's ranks. As a result, it is one of our wars that today's infantryman knows little about.

This is too bad, of course, for the Korean War has many lessons to offer. Bevin Alexander, who commanded an Army historical detachment in Korea in 1951 and 1952, has written a book that offers some interesting new views on the war and on the relations between the United States, the United Nations, and Communist China.

He finds serious fault with General MacArthur's handling of the war (except for the Inchon landing, but not for its aftermath), with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and their seeming lack of control over military events in the Far East, and with the general lack of vision shown by the Truman administration throughout the war. He also finds serious fault with the conduct of the U.S. ground combat soldier during the first six months of the fighting in Korea. He simply does not believe that soldier was a good combat soldier, but thinks he was as often prone to run as to fight unless he had overwhelming fire support and superior numbers.

Alexander's accounts of the first battles of the war, of the Inchon landing, of the fighting in northeast Korea in November and December 1950, and of the prisoner-of-war uprisings on Koje-do in 1952 are excellent. He also devotes a few pages of one chapter to the five-day R&R program in Japan that began in early 1951 for many soldiers and Marines, a program he feels boosted morale throughout the Eighth Army.

But the author's real interests are at the higher levels. For this, his book deserves to be read by all infantrymen. But in their reading, those infantrymen should not overlook the hard combat lessons that were learned and the price the Army had to pay for them.

• **UNITED STATES ARMY IN VIETNAM IMAGES OF A LENGTHY WAR.** By Joel D. Myerson (Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1986. 225 Pages. GPO S/N 008-020-01031-6. \$22.00). This is the second published volume in the Army's Vietnam series. It is a photographic history, somewhat similar to those produced by the Center for World War II and the Korean War. It is a vivid chronicle of the significant aspects of the Army's experiences in Vietnam, beginning with the period of advice and assistance to the French between 1945 and 1954 through the actual intervention with U.S. ground combat troops in 1965 and the last battles between 1969 and 1973.

The author, a member of the Center of Military History, commanded a military history detachment in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. He has collected a fascinating group of photographs (both black-and-white and color) and a number of excellent maps to tell his story. He introduces each section of his book—there are six—with a well done narrative that describes the major events and their results during each sectional timeframe, and then lets his photographs with their captions and his maps take over. An index adds to the volume's overall usefulness and reference value.

The author has handled a complex subject in a thoughtful and sensitive manner. His book should be looked at and read for that reason.

In addition to the books mentioned above, we have also received a number of other publications we think you might be interested in. For example, the Osprey Publishing Company (England) has sent several more in its various uniform and equipment series:

• **THE M2 BRADLEY: INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE.** By Steven J. Zaloga. Vanguard Series 43. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ARMIES (2): UNION ARTILLERY, CAVALRY, AND INFANTRY.** By Philip

Katcher. Men-at-Arms Series 177. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES.** By Gordon L. Rottman. Elite Series 10. 1987. 64 Pages. \$9.95, Softbound.

• **ANTITANK HELICOPTERS.** By Steven J. Zaloga and George J. Balin. Vanguard Series 44. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ARMIES (3): STAFF, SPECIALIST, AND MARITIME SERVICES.** By Philip Katcher. Men-at-Arms Series 179. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **U.S. CAVALRY ON THE PLAINS, 1850-90.** By Philip Katcher. Men-at-Arms Series 168. 1985. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **THE ALAMO AND THE WAR OF TEXAN INDEPENDENCE, 1835-1836.** By Philip Haythornthwaite. Men-at-Arms Series 173. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

• **RUSSIA'S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.** By David Isby. Men-at-Arms Series 178. 1986. 48 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

Here are a number of our longer reviews:

THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION. Edited by William V. O'Brien and John Langan (Lexington Books, 1986. 260 Pages). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

In 1983 the Conference of United States Catholic Bishops published a pastoral letter—"The Challenge of Peace"—that addressed the issue of nuclear deterrence. It attracted widespread interest in the news media and various non-Catholic religious groups.

This book contains a series of well-thought-out and varied essays on the issue of nuclear war within the just war tradition. Although some readers may find the essays a bit overly philosophical, the arguments presented are stimulating. For example, James Turner Johnson, professor of religion at Rutgers University, provides an excellent essay, "Defense of Values," which originally appeared in *Parameters* magazine. In it he presents a reasoned analysis of the moral basis for the use of force in both a conventional

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We do not sell books. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

and a nuclear war environment. And in the concluding essay, William O'Brien, one of the editors of the book, draws a significant distinction between a limited nuclear war fought in response to theater-level aggression and a strategic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Whether President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative becomes an operational reality or not, the debate over nuclear deterrence and its role in national defense will surely continue. This collection of essays is a valuable contribution to that debate.

JANE'S ARMOR AND ARTILLERY, 1986-87. Seventh Edition. Edited by Christopher F. Foss (Jane's, 1986. 1,030 Pages).

This comprehensive and continually updated reference work is always a pleasure to see. This seventh edition contains 750 new photographs and 95 new entries.

As usual, it details the latest available information on the armored vehicles and artillery pieces (including surface-to-air missiles) found in the world's armies. (Unfortunately, our copy has one 16-page signature bound upside-down and backwards.)

Christopher Foss has edited each of the seven volumes published in this series and continues to demonstrate his mastery of his subject. In his foreword he clears up whatever mystery there has been about the Soviet T-80 main battle tank (MBT), holding that it is a further development of the T-64 MBT, which tank, as Foss points out, has also been something of a mystery tank because it has been issued only to Soviet Army units. Foss also says that there may be another new Soviet MBT in service, this one without a turret but with an externally mounted main armament.

The 20-page addenda section contains information and photographs on a number of the projects discussed in the main text. It is correct to 1 August 1986.

NO MORE HEROES: MADNESS AND PSYCHIATRY IN WAR. By Richard A. Gabriel (Hill and Wang, 1987. 179 Pages. \$17.95). Reviewed by

Major Robert L. Maginnis, United States Army.

This is the third in a series of Richard Gabriel's ventures into the field of military psychiatry. In it he focuses on the abject terror the future battlefield will hold for the soldier. He reasons that America's only two alternatives to that terror are to chemically alter its soldiers into aggressive psychopaths (a technique for abolishing fear on the battlefield) or to "disinvent" many of the modern technologies that have contributed to the face of modern war.



He sets the stage by describing the arsenal of modern weapons and argues that most Americans cannot appreciate the full horror of modern war and the effects of modern weapons because they have never experienced conflict on the scale and in the intensity that future conflicts will offer. He gives a rather damning sociological profile of the American soldier—fragile, addicted to all types of drugs (controlled and not) and soap operas, and generally lacking in discipline and proper conditioning for the rigors of modern war.

He recommends, therefore, the use of battlefield prophylactics—chemicals that can be used to alter behavior—to enable the soldier to cope with extremely stressful conditions. The "chemical" soldier would then be given to extreme risk-taking and would function only on the

cognitive plane. Ethics, for the "chemical" warrior, would no longer be appropriate

As for the other alternative, he contends that the armed forces should begin to "disinvent" certain modern technologies, and suggests that their removal would help to reduce the lethality of the modern battlefield.

Gabriel concludes that the armed forces must do either one or the other—resort to chemicals or disinvent technologies—or they will have a force filled with a significant number of battle stress-induced dysfunctional warriors or worse.

The military professional should become familiar with this book because, unfortunately, it may well capture the imagination of many militarily naive civilian readers. Those people may accept his rationale and revelations as being technically and doctrinally accurate. The military professional must be prepared to discount such a blatantly misleading set of recommendations and conclusions.

JANE'S WEAPON SYSTEMS, 1986-87. 17th Edition. Edited by Ronald T. Pretty (Jane's, 1986. 1,127 Pages.)

Although this edition carries Ronald Pretty's name as editor—as all of the other 16 in this series do—it does so because of the kindness of the publisher to a long-serving staffer. Because of a serious illness, Pretty could not carry on as editor and the volume was completed under the editorship of Bernard Blake. The series has not suffered from the sudden change, and this edition meets the high standards of accuracy and reliability established by its predecessors.

As usual, it contains a wealth of detailed information on both ground and naval weapon systems, as well as on air-to-air missile systems, and their accompanying equipment. The almost 100-page analysis section presents in tabular form information presented in this series as well as in other series published by Jane's. Thus, there is a list of the NATO designations for Soviet equipment; five tables with information about army ordnance equipment; another set of tables that identify the major items of equipment found in all of the world's land forces; and tables of information about the most

important naval vessels and the military aircraft of each nation and the equipment they carry.

IRON EAGLE: THE TURBULENT LIFE OF GENERAL CURTIS LEMAY. By Thomas M. Coffey (Crown, 1986. 474 Pages. \$18.95).

WINGS OF JUDGMENT: AMERICAN BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II. By Ronald Schaffer (Oxford University Press, 1985. 272 Pages. \$18.95). Both books reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Mudie, United States Air Force Retired.

Strategic bombers are much in the news today in connection with arms limitation talks. So also is the debate on the morality of even maintaining a nuclear weapon capability, let alone using it. Both of these books provide insight into the problem.

Coffey's book is a biography of the man probably most readily associated with the actual operational use of the atomic bomb in World War II and the subsequent development of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) into our primary nuclear deterrent. Schaffer's book, on the other hand, takes a unique look at the moral debate that was waged at the high command during World War II over the use of U.S. strategic air power against Germany and Japan.

Commissioned from the ROTC program at Ohio State as a second lieutenant in the field artillery, LeMay almost immediately transferred to the Army Air Corps. His career spanned the struggle for air power recognition in the 1920s and 1930s, the rapid development of that power during World War II, the subsequent establishment of an independent air force, and the heated debate both inside and outside the military services over the proper use of air power in Vietnam.

As a junior officer, LeMay had a career that was typical of the times—long years in each grade, close personal and professional friendships developed in the relatively small Army Air Corps, and the temptation to forsake the poorly paid but exciting military profession for more lucrative and physically secure civilian pursuits. As happened to most of our World War II crop of senior leaders, LeMay rose rapidly in rank. He became the youngest four-star general in U.S. history except for U.S. Grant and served in that grade longer than anyone else.

In his book *The 25-Year War*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., writing about the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1960s, describes LeMay as "rude and arrogant." Palmer's judgment may be harsh—and possibly biased—but LeMay indeed was called "The Diplomat" somewhat sarcastically even within the Air Force. His "diplomacy," however, succeeded in

getting the job done—over Germany and Japan as a combat commander, in starting the Berlin airlift and, perhaps most effectively of all, in forging and developing the Strategic Air Command as its hard-driving commander

General LeMay's frustrating and losing battles with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara over aircraft development (the TFX) and our Vietnam policies led to his futile run for the vice presidency as George Wallace's 1968 running mate.

This book should be of interest to officers of all ranks and services. Juniors can be consoled that even four-star generals once held innocuous and mundane additional duty jobs: field graders can note that sensible innovations and tough training are the hallmarks of successful combat leaders; generals can be reminded that Clausewitz's principles are still valid; and very senior generals can learn from the frustration of dealing with civilian leaders who consider their own military judgment superior to that of experienced military professionals.

Ronald Schaffer's book, which includes many references to General LeMay's combat record, holds that it is an analysis of the moral ramifications of the strategic bombing policy followed by the United States Army Air Force during World War II. It is evident, however, that the final chapter contains the author's real purpose for writing his book—there-

