

counseling [through] continuous communication." But it is clear that among this particular group of officers, this interaction seldom occurred.

What this means is that these officers, when assigned to new positions, in many cases, received little guidance on what was expected of them or what their jobs consisted of in the eyes of their raters or senior raters. Neither did many raters and rated officers develop similar ideas in advance about what constituted good or bad performance.

Feedback is another problem. The current officer evaluation system encourages both raters and senior raters to provide this feedback to their subordinates. Yet 46 percent of the officers in this survey said they did not receive any such feedback from their raters, and an alarming 73 percent said they did not receive any from their senior raters.

A positive aspect is that 72 percent of the officers said their raters did discuss their performance with them at the *end* of the rating period. In view of the earlier lack of agreement on performance objectives, however, and the absence of clearly communicated performance standards, this eventual discussion may have been more of a report card than a fair appraisal. For the 28 percent who did not discuss their performance ratings with their supervisors at all, this was clearly the case.

A major concern is that most of the officers did not believe the rating would improve their future performance or

otherwise affect it. This indicates that little communication and coaching took place. It also indicates that the OER was essentially a report card and that it was not used within the intended structure to promote the development of the individual officer.

Thus, it seems that many of these officers were not really participants in the evaluation system. Some seem to have weaved their way through the system and received a report card on their mission accomplishment at the last stop. They may have realized then what had been expected of them all along and what their raters and senior raters considered good and bad performance.

Still others seem to have gone through the entire process only to receive a report card based on arbitrary standards that were never communicated to them, not even at the end. The system certainly was short-circuited in these cases, and the victim was the subordinate.

Preparing performance appraisals is not an easy task or a popular one. Many officers are uncomfortable making such judgments and even more uncomfortable communicating those judgments to their subordinates. Another problem is that some supervisors tend to assume their subordinates know what they are supposed to do and are surprised when they do not.

Although more extensive research would have to be conducted to confirm that there is a problem, certain recommendations can be made from this survey.

First, since a senior rater has a tremendous effect on an officer's career, an effort must be made either to see that senior raters fulfill their monitoring role or to eliminate their input entirely. Further study would be necessary to confirm one option or the other, but it appears that some senior raters do little except pass judgment, and one can only imagine the performance criteria they use.

Second, more stringent measures need to be applied to see that the support form is used the way the regulation prescribes, perhaps in the form of suspenses.

In addition, the system must ensure that officers who become raters understand their duties and obligations to their subordinates. Every officer should therefore be required to attend instruction on the purpose and methodology of the officer evaluation system. Then each officer should be required to demonstrate that he can follow the correct procedure.

Hopefully, additional training and closer monitoring will help alleviate these problems, and the system can be made to work the way it was designed to work.

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# World War II History

## German Military Studies

CAPTAIN HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR.

Mao Tse-Tung wisely noted that "We should carefully study the lessons which were learned in past wars at the

cost of blood and which have been bequeathed to us. . . ."

One of our greatest legacies from

World War II, but one that is now virtually unknown to soldiers and scholars alike, is the 24-volume *World War II*

*German Military Studies* and the 15-volume *War in Asia and the Pacific*. (Both series were published by the Garland Publishing Company, New York, 1979 and 1980, respectively.) Written primarily by former German and Japanese military and naval officers, these studies (along with a multitude of unpublished studies in each area) provide a unique inside view of the organization, strategy, and tactics of the armed forces of our former adversaries. Many of these studies are worthwhile to infantrymen as examples of successful, and unsuccessful, small unit operations conducted by an experienced enemy.

### NO PLANS

The story of the development of the German studies, in particular, is an interesting one, and it emphasizes the need for an effective and well-organized military history program. When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945, a number of Allied nations and their staffs and agencies scrambled to seize and exploit German documents, primarily for their intelligence value and as potential evidence in the forthcoming war crimes trials. The U.S. Army failed to appreciate, however, the wealth of knowledge and insight it had at its disposal in the minds and memories of the hundreds of high-ranking former *Wehrmacht* officers being held as prisoners of war. Indeed, the war-weary Army had no plans for a major historical project involving large numbers of former enemy commanders and senior staff officers.

In July 1945 the European Theater historian, Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, sent one of his staff members to the Luxemburg prisoner of war camp that held the top German leaders, saying, "Get what you can get in a week or ten days and then come back." That officer, Major Kenneth W. Hechler, worked tirelessly and almost single-handedly and by the end of July returned to Paris with 16 reports. These reports contained answers to a multitude of insightful questions that had been posed to such leaders as *Reichs-*

*marschall* Hermann Goering, Field Marshals Wilhelm Keitel and Albert Kesselring, Generals Alfred Jodl and Walter Warlimont, and Admiral Karl Doenitz.

As Major Hechler interviewed General Warlimont, who had served as Deputy Chief of Operations in the German High Command, he realized immediately that an unprecedented amount and quality of historical information was available on the innermost machinations of Hitler's Third Reich. Major Hechler was immeasurably impressed and inspired by his initial interview with Warlimont and later wrote "My eyes widened as I saw for the first time what had taken place 'on the other side of the hill.' Each response opened a new vista: Hitler had felt we would land in Normandy... The other Germans thought it would be closer to Pas de Calais...," and so on with similar revelations.

The value of the reports compiled by Major Hechler led to the formal organization the following year of the Operational History (German) Section within the European Theater Historical Division. Former German Army Chief of Staff General Franz Halder was selected as the program's German director, and the project centered on carefully selected groups of German prisoners of war. From the inception of the program until its termination in 1961, more than 2,500 manuscripts totaling over 200,000 pages were prepared.

Each of the German manuscripts, based upon the general topic and time of writing, has been classified into one of the following categories:

**ETHINT-Series.** ETHINT is a contraction of European Theater Historical Interrogations, and the 81 manuscripts in this series (all of which have been translated into English) make up the first American historical interviews with German officers after the end of the war. Most of the manuscripts pertain to campaigns and other strategic topics. They include "Normandy Invasion," by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, written 23 July 1945 (ETHINT-49) and "Comments on Patton and the U.S. Third Army

(September 1944)," by *Generalmajor* Friedrich von Mellenthin, written 16 May 1946 (ETHINT-65).

**A-Series.** This series is made up of all the translated German manuscripts found in the first complete inventory made in mid-1946. These manuscripts were numbered in inverse order from A-1000 to A-855. All the authors were in a prisoner of war status, and their manuscripts include operations down to and including regimental level. Examples of A-series manuscripts are the following:

- "History of the Attempt on Hitler's Life (July 20, 1944)," by *Generalmajor* Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff, 1946. Personal experiences of one of the conspirators (A-855).

- "Strength, Organization, Armament, and Equipment of Troops in Battle," by General of Panzers (Lieutenant General) Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel, 1946 (A-872).

- "The Truth about Katyn," by *Generalmajor* Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff (the general staff officer charged with the direction of interrogation and exhumation), 1946 (A-917).

**B-Series.** This series is made up of all the manuscripts still untranslated when they were inventoried in mid-1946, and of other manuscripts added until July 1948. This is the largest category—850 manuscripts on the greatest diversity of topics, including infantry, armor, airborne, and mountain division operations, logistical problems, Rommel, coast artillery, combat experiences in Russia, and the campaigns in Italy, the Balkans, Norway, Poland, and elsewhere. Many topics, however, are concerned with the Western Front after the Normandy landings.

**C-Series.** This series was begun in July 1948, largely as a continuation of the B- and D-series. The C-series consists of 102 studies (many of them subdivided into multiple sections), including a wide variety of topics, unit operations, and battle and campaigns.

**D-Series.** This category is made up of 431 documents, 317 of which were written at Garmisch between December 1946 and July 1947, with the last study being written in 1951. Most of these studies are about German operations in

the Mediterranean and the Soviet Union, but other topics include munitions production, logistics, horse diseases, river crossings, and artillery in swamps and ice, among many others.

**P-Series.** The studies in this series, started in 1948, will undoubtedly be of the greatest interest to infantrymen. Many of them were written at the request of the U.S. Army and other Federal Government agencies at the time of the growing East-West tensions that manifested themselves in the Berlin Blockade and airlift, the Truman Doctrine, and the U.S. involvement in the Korean War. The United States wanted detailed information, especially for intelligence and training purposes, on German military experiences on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union. Topics include, for example, "A Study of Soviet PW Camps" and "Russian Interrogation Methods and Propaganda." Many of the studies cover small unit tactics that emphasize the role of the infantry and the other combat arms. It is worth noting that most of the Department of the Army Pamphlets in the "German Report Series," published in the early 1950s, were derived from P-series studies. (See "A Forgotten War," by Captain Michael A. Phipps, *INFANTRY*, November-December 1984, pages 38-40.)

**T-Series.** These studies, written between 1947 and 1949, are generally about broad topics (most about the Eastern Front) and strategic operations and large campaigns, such as "The Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942." Many of them are multi-volumed and were written by a committee of officers, one of whom was selected to be the topic leader to supervise the project and edit the results.

In all, 213 of the German reports, representing six percent of all the manuscripts (or about one-sixth if one considers only the studies that have

**PART I. INTRODUCTION AND GUIDE (Vol. 1).**

Editor's Introduction.

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The German Opposition Against Hitler—seven studies (Vol. 24).

The National Redoubt and the Final Collapse—six studies (Vol. 24).

been translated into English) are included in the 24-volume *World War II German Military Studies*. They represent a cross-section of all the studies that were written. These and the rest of the manuscripts as well can also be found in the National Archives. (The basic contents of the volumes in this series are shown in the accompanying box.)

All of these studies, published and unpublished, are invaluable as primary source documents for military historians. In defense of the project in 1947, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, said, "In the absence of adequate German records, the reports by the German commanders

of their operations are proving to be not only reliable, but the only information we will ever have as to what occurred on the German side. This is our one opportunity to prevent our own military history from being one-sided."

Now, in 1988, the German Military Studies deserve and need to be resurrected from obscurity and brought to the attention of professional infantrymen and military historians alike.

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