


INFANTRY LETTERS



AMBUSH

I would like to make two comments regarding Lieutenant Chris G. Pappas' fine article "Platoon Live Fire Ambush" (INFANTRY, May-June 1988, pages 40-42).

First, I don't believe the use of the claymore to initiate an ambush is the best option. Most soldiers may prefer to use the most reliable weapon, ordinarily a closed-bolt weapon such as the M16.

Second, despite the lack of hits contributed by the M60, it is probably the best weapon for preventing the enemy from taking immediate action against the ambush force (at least psychologically). Many combat veterans have said that what the M60 did best was keep the enemy pinned down. As a matter of fact, if Lieutenant Pappas found the claymores struck low, I would think they would be excellent weapons to use when the enemy is forced to the ground seeking whatever deadspace may be available.

I hope more articles of this type make all the professional journals. Lieutenant Pappas could have just told us the "how to," but he went on to provide some lessons learned.

DAVID L. WALTER
Captain, USMC
1st Marine Division
Kansas City, Missouri

CONFEDERATE CANNON

Pertaining to the news item on a Confederate Napoleon 12-pounder cannon in the Infantry Museum (INFANTRY, July-August 1988, p. 9), I have additional information on these cannon, which were manufactured during the War Between the States in Columbus, Georgia.

During 1978 and up until September 1980, I was involved with the Phenix City (Alabama) Historical Society doing on-site research (and location determination) for the Confederate fort installations that provided the defense of Columbus.

While involved in this research, through conversations with local "old-timers," I was led to believe that in the days immediately following the "fall of Columbus" to Union cavalry forces a Federal lieutenant was detailed to destroy all of the arms and artillery captured within Columbus. The lieutenant, realizing that this would be an extensive undertaking, ordered his soldiers to discard all small arms (rifles, pistols, swords) into the Chattahoochee River, south of the original Fifth Street bridge. The lieutenant also ordered his detail to "roll" all cannon and caissons or limbers into the river, including those cannon still in the manufacture or assembly stage.

In the late 1960s, when the Chattahoochee River was being dredged in the vicinity of the ironworks, the resting place of the cannon was located. Only the "tubes" were found and the location information was forwarded to the Columbus Museum and to the Phenix City Historical Society. (Both organizations have kept the location confidential ever since.) At the time

of my departure from Columbus in September 1980, the Phenix City Historical Society had not yet acquired the funds to raise any of the cannon.

I have retained my research files concerning "the Forts of Columbus" and anyone who is interested in additional information may contact me at 1131 Crestview Street, Reynoldsburg, OH 43068.

DUNCAN M. THOMPSON, SR.
LTC, Infantry

ROAD MARCH STANDARD

Regarding Captain Martin N. Stanton's letter on foot movements in INFANTRY (July-August 1988, pages 5-6), EIB stands for *Expert Infantryman's Badge*. *Everybody's Infantryman's Badge* is the blue cord.

Before being assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment, one of today's elite Army units, every soldier has to qualify by successfully completing a 12-mile road march in three hours with a 35-pound rucksack, loadbearing equipment with two canteens, steel pot, and M16 rifle. The purpose of the march is to test not only the soldier's physical condition but also his will to give "100% and then some."

A leader who cares for his troops trains his soldiers to meet set standards. He does not help them to get a badge by convincing others to lower those standards. Captain Stanton's experience of watching the loss of control on road marches was not due to the speed of the march. It was due to that unit's lack of understanding of the mundane aspects of troop leading procedures. In addition, how many officers and NCOs made sure corrective training was conducted with the soldiers they saw do the rucksack flop?

While EIB training is conducted at

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the squad level, it is an individually tested skill. When testing for the Expert Infantryman's Badge, I saw most of the Rangers complete the run in about two-and-one-half hours or a little more. All of the Rangers tested made the three-hour limit. The 12-mile road march in three hours without a rucksack was simply a conditioning exercise. All they had to do was put one foot in front of another and breathe.

If I would make any recommendation to the EIB Board, it would be to make the EIB a conditional badge and the 12-mile road march in three hours one of the mandatory annual tests to keep EIB certified.

MICHAEL P. O'ROURKE
SGT, U.S. Army
Fort Myer, Virginia

MORTARS IN URBAN COMBAT

Reference Lieutenant Richard F. Steiner's article "Mortars in Urban Combat" (INFANTRY, May-June 1988, pages 42-44), I am glad to see that the programs and developments that I began in the Berlin Brigade in 1979 are still being pursued (see "Indirect Fire in MOUT," INFANTRY, March-April 1982, pages 11-13). But a number of the lessons are being forgotten or ignored.

The discussion of engaging targets in buildings fails to take into account the different types of structures found in urban areas. The principles of target engagement in suburban single-story structures, strip shopping areas, industrial parks, high-rise apartment complexes, and skyscrapers will vary a great deal because of the different types of construction of the individual buildings and the location of neighboring construction. The interaction of

the complex variables of construction material, angles of fall, direction of flight, and target location within the structures must be taken into account.

In target planning, the use of major street intersections for target reference points (TRPs) follows traditional fire planning guidelines while easing the problem of adjusting fire on specific targets. As long as the gun-to-target line is parallel to the major thoroughfare, this allows for the lateral adjustment of rounds into a readily visible corridor so that normal adjustment techniques can put the rounds onto the TRP. From there, accurate shift fire techniques can be used to engage other targets quickly. In the defense, this has the additional benefit of cratering major avenues of approach, thus slowing the movement of armored vehicles and making them more vulnerable.

Another point to be considered is that since most engageable targets will be found in the streets, and most European streets are less than 50 meters wide (building to building), these targets can be engaged effectively by a single gun. This is especially true with mortars because of their high rate of fire. This greatly increases the number of targets that can be engaged at one time and allows for the placement of individual weapons so that they can fire parallel to major high-speed avenues of approach.

Finally, a point apparently missed by all concerned: The large number of toxic and dangerous chemicals used and stored in all types of industrial buildings make accidental chemical warfare caused by indirect fire a very real possibility. When a unit is planning indirect fire in industrial or warehouse areas, the chemical people need to be brought into the planning process to consider the consequences of this type of incidental damage.

The adjustment of tactics and tech-

niques of all weapon systems needs to be re-examined in light of the peculiar circumstances of MOUT. I am glad to see that the Berlin Brigade is still leading the way in this field.

PATRICK J. COYLE
SFC, USAR
Columbus, Georgia

ORDNANCE CORPS AFFILIATION

The Ordnance Corps Certificate of Affiliation is ready for distribution to all Ordnance soldiers. A large portion of these soldiers do not receive this information, however, because they are not in Ordnance units. The largest number are the organizational mechanics who work in infantry units.

To be eligible to receive a certificate, a soldier must hold an Ordnance MOS or area of concentration. All Ordnance commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel are eligible to receive certificates.

Beginning in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1989, certificates will be issued by schools awarding MOSs or AOCs; therefore, units only need to request the number of certificates for soldiers currently in them.

Requests for certificates must be consolidated at battalion level or higher and forwarded to: Office Chief of Ordnance, ATTN: ATSL-O-S, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5201. The following information must be included in the request: name of unit, UIC, military address, point of contact, telephone number, and number of certificates required.

DWIGHT E. HAIR
COL., Ordnance
Chief of Staff
Office of the Chief of Ordnance

