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peacekeeping

OPERATIONS

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One of the four categories of missions a unit involved in a low intensity conflict (LIC) may be called on to perform is peacekeeping. The task of a peacekeeping force is to support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in an area of potential or actual conflict. To accomplish this non-traditional mission, a peacekeeping force uses its conventional military skills.

The United States has participated in a number of peacekeeping operations in the past. Most of its involvements, however, have been in the form of indirect action in support of United Nations (U.N.) efforts and the use of military personnel as observers. Recent experiences, though, such as those in the Sinai, have caused the U.S. to reanalyze its role to determine the exact nature of such operations and the most effective methods of conducting them in the future.

A review of the force structure of all U.N. peacekeeping operations shows a heavy preponderance of infantry-type units, augmented by support personnel. A battalion size unit has been the standard, a logical decision considering that a battalion is the smallest fully staffed, self-contained unit. It is therefore important for infantry commanders at battalion level and below to understand not only what their role might be in such an operation but also the overall concept of peacekeeping.

First, peacekeeping operations take place following diplomatic negotiations and agreement among the participating nations on the size and type of forces each will contribute. These

operations are then conducted in accordance with agreements among the parties to the conflict. Thus, U.S. participation might include tactical units or might be limited to individuals assigned to observer groups.

Essentially, peacekeeping operations are intended to interpose between the combatants an uncommitted, non-aligned third party whose task is to keep them separated and prevent further acts of war.

While all military operations have some political aspect, peacekeeping operations are more deeply influenced by the political environment. The fundamental difference is that a peacekeeping force acts on behalf of all the parties to a dispute—at their invitation and with their consent—and therefore must carry out its mission if possible, without using force except for self-defense.

Not surprisingly, intervention in such conflicts tends to be a lengthy process. A peacekeeping force can "manage" a conflict; it can quiet things down; it can lower the level of hostility; it can prevent further loss of life and damage to property but it cannot, of itself, resolve the problems that caused the conflict.

Principles

In order for a peacekeeping force to accomplish its mission, certain principles must be understood and observed. The force

must have the following:

- The consent of the belligerents.
- The political support of a portion of the international community.
- A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
- Enough freedom of movement to carry out its responsibilities.
- An effective command, control, and communications system.
- Well-trained, balanced, impartial, non-coercive forces.
- An effective and responsive all-source intelligence capability.

It is important for the commanders of such forces to understand how political factors influence the tactical execution of peacekeeping operations. Specifically, the political process mandates the rules of engagement (use of force), freedom of movement, and area of operations (AO). A tactical commander must comply with instructions and inform his chain of command concerning the tactical implications of a political decision.

The rules of engagement must be clearly stated in simple language. The two principal rules are to use a minimum of force and to be totally impartial. The use of deadly force is justified only in situations of extreme necessity—typically, only in self defense—and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed to curtail the use of violence by the parties involved.

A peacekeeping force operates with a mandate that describes its scope of operations. The sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries. Although these countries are supposed to be impartial, each may have its own idea of what the force should do. The final agreement, therefore, should frame the mandate for the peacekeeping force in such a way that neither belligerent is given an advantage.

The designated executive agent for the U.S. Department of Defense publishes terms of reference (TOR) that govern U.S. participation in a peacekeeping operation. These describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the U.S. military units and personnel assigned to or supporting a peacekeeping force. From the point of view of the units, these terms of reference are often far less precise than the commanders may desire.

A commander must continually emphasize the neutrality of the force. This means avoiding casual contact with the units and personnel of the belligerent parties, because such contact could result in accusations of favoritism from one side or the other. And if the peacekeeping force loses its position of neutrality, its usefulness is seriously diminished.

Contact between the various contingents that make up a peacekeeping force does pay dividends, however, in terms of cohesion and interoperability. This can be achieved through small unit exchanges, inter-contingent competitions, conferences, and social events.

Preparing the Force

Individuals and units that are assigned peacekeeping duties

need training in various skills and techniques before their deployment, but an urgent need to deploy a force to establish a cease-fire sometimes overrides the need to make adequate preparations.

In most cases, and with good prior planning, a training program can be developed that will help units prepare for these missions. Good leadership is important at every level, from the unit commander to the most junior leader: the situation facing the unit will require the utmost skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience on the part of all concerned. The training program must emphasize basic military skills in a field environment and should also include collective training for small units.

At the least, a training program should cover the following skills:

- Operating checkpoints and observation posts.
- Patrolling.
- Map reading.
- Weapon and equipment identification.
- The culture, language, habits, religion, and characteristics of the local people.
- Environment survival classes.
- Knowledge of first aid.
- Civil disturbance training.
- Rules of engagement.
- Search and seizure techniques.
- Legal considerations.
- Recognition of armored vehicles and equipment.
- Airmobile operations.
- Explosive ordnance recognition (primarily landmines).
- Field sanitation and hygiene.
- Communications.
- Civil-military operations.

Whenever possible, a unit should also have specific, mission-oriented training before it deploys. At the core of all training is the need to orient the members of a unit on the proper conduct of operations, either as part of a multinational force or as a unilateral force. The unit leaders must clearly understand the unit's place in the force, its objectives, and the implications of its presence as part of the force. The highest degree of unit discipline must be obtained and then maintained throughout the course of the mission. Members of the unit must also understand that they will be the target of foreign intelligence activities. A good counterintelligence program is desirable, one that includes an emphasis on communications security.

The observation and reporting functions of a peacekeeping force are its primary tasks. Because violations of an agreement, for example, may not be obvious to a soldier on the ground, the training must emphasize the importance of accurately reporting everything that is observed. When routine reports are accumulated at force headquarters, they may form a pattern of activity within the zone or sector. Variations in this pattern, then, may provide clues as to changes that may eventually constitute treaty violations.

Soldiers should know the standard reporting formats, including situation reports, shooting reports, overflight reports, and aircraft sighting reports. Training in recognizing armored vehi-



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cles and equipment should include all available graphic training aids—35mm slides, scale models, and flash cards.

Training in operating an observation post (OP) is essential. Small units must learn the layout of typical OPs and checkpoints and the general daily routine of duty on an OP. Such a unit may be required to live and work on an OP, isolated from its larger parent organization, for many days at a time. It may also have to share the OP with soldiers from other countries, which can add to the overall complexity of the situation.

Security procedures at an OP include a stand-to at BMNT (beginning morning nautical twilight), or just before sunrise, and at EENT (ending evening nautical twilight), or just after sunset. Perimeter patrols should be sent out to sweep the area immediately after a stand-to.

Soldiers who will man checkpoints astride major roads have to be taught to slow and observe traffic without stopping it. This will enable them to observe and report the traffic passing from one zone to another. In addition, they will have to stop vehicles and personnel leaving and entering installations and search them for contraband and explosives. Soldiers must therefore learn not only how to search but how to search courteously without undue force.

Communications are an essential part of knowing what is going on and being in a position to influence events. It is difficult to solve the problem of providing adequate communications for the force before it is deployed, though, because so

much will depend upon the circumstances of the operation. In one theater, the difficulty may lie in the great distances involved; in another, or possibly in a different part of the same one, the difficulty may be screening in urban areas. Normal military communications are unlikely to be adequate, because they are designed for a totally different kind of troop deployment.

Training in the proper conduct of reconnaissance patrols must be reviewed and reinforced. The organization of patrols, the selection of patrol routes, and the patrol debriefing format must be taught. Land navigation principles and road marches can be integrated into this training. (Stealth and concealment are not as important, because the mission itself stresses the presence, reliability, and visibility of the peacekeeping force.)

Explosive ordnance training is important, and a local explosive ordnance disposal detachment can provide it before a unit deploys. This training should familiarize the soldiers with different types of land mines—not only Warsaw Pact mines but also French, British, German, and U.S. mines—and should teach them to recognize, mark, and report all mines. The training should stress the fact that land mines, no matter how old they appear to be, are not necessarily inert, and might also include how to extricate oneself from a minefield.

Environmental and survival training is hard to conduct outside the actual environment, but this training must at least intro-

PEACEKEEPING EXERCISE

List of Activities

- When and how to use force.
- How to treat people seeking protection within a U.S. post.
- How to act when armed groups request the extradition of people under U.S. protection.
- Normal alert, increased alert, and full alert procedures.
- Patrolling.
- What to take on patrol. (ID card, recognition signals.)
- How to act when someone fires upon a patrol. (Use only small caliber weapons, shoot high, and use less ammunition than the other party.)
- How to choose a location for a blocking position or road block.
- What to do with seized weapons.
- Procedures for stopping vehicles and people.
- The use of a road block.
 - To check a vehicle—only one POV within the road block at the same time.
 - Conduct all checks under cover of other weapons.
 - How to check a loaded van or truck in a separate location.
 - How to check liaison officers and their vehicles.
 - How to inspect a privately owned vehicle. (Systematic approach, the use of mirrors, flashlights; how to check gas tanks, spare wheels.)
 - How to check people. (Use a scanner without observation by other civilians. Never touch women.)

duce subjects that can be reinforced after the force deploys into its operational area.

Transporting personnel and supplies will be a challenge for a unit occupying a large sector. Air transportation by helicopter will be important, so a unit's training program should include instruction in such airmobility techniques as load planning, pathfinder techniques, and sling loading. Since units will often deploy by air into and out of OPs, the soldiers must know how to stow their equipment aboard a helicopter. Training in initial ground control procedures for incoming helicopters is also important, as is maintenance on aircraft and ground vehicles.

And finally, all leaders should undergo language instruction that exposes them to some of the more common words and phrases of both the host country and the other countries assigned to the peacekeeping force. All personnel should receive training on the customs of the local populace.

The climax to pre-deployment training should be a peacekeeping exercise. This exercise should include establishing observation posts and checkpoints in a field environment and having the unit conduct operations as if it were in an actual peacekeeping situation. (A list of activities to be included is shown in the accompanying box.)

Each small unit should be required to observe and report as they would in an actual situation, and leaders should become



A pre-deployment peacekeeping exercise should include establishing observation posts and checkpoints in a field environment.

thoroughly familiar with the reporting formats. Normal ground and air traffic from other units moving about in the training area could provide the incidents to report.

A rotational type of exercise might be used to focus the training on communications and reporting procedures, fire prevention, maintenance and operation of electrical generators, improvement of fighting positions, reporting of visitors, resupply operations, and the general layout and routine of an OP. Physical training, individual training, stand-to, and other functions could be conducted, and drivers should go through an orientation of different types of driving conditions over a driving course.

At the same time, a standardized briefing for official visitors should be developed.

Once in the area of operations, a unit may not have time for anything other than orientations and reinforcement training from the unit it is relieving. In addition, training in the area of operations may be restricted by whatever agreement exists between the parties involved in the dispute. Training must therefore be organized, planned, and conducted before deployment on the basis of the time and resources available. (A detailed peacekeeping checklist is available by request to Editor, *INFANTRY*, P.O. Box 2005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-0605.)

Operations

Each peacekeeping operation is unique, but the planning, deployment, and conduct of all U.S. operations use the doctrinal procedures and techniques listed in Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Manual 2-20. All such operations are closely coordinated with U.S. State Department officials to ensure that a synchronized effort is made toward achieving the political objective.

The task organization of a peacekeeping force is based on an in-depth assessment of threat intelligence that considers the political realities of the area into which the force is being sent. The basic force structure, therefore, varies with the particular situations.

The commander of a U.S. unit that is involved in such an operation is ultimately responsible, however, for supervising and coordinating his missions, communicating any changes in that mission to the members of his unit, and responding to the needs of his committed units.

At times, the success of the mission may depend upon the leadership and initiative of his small unit leaders and their ability to conduct operations and maintain the health, morale, and training of their units. At his home station, for instance, a small unit leader might see only part of his unit for 12 hours a day at the most. During peacekeeping operations, he will have all

of his soldiers, plus additional personnel, all day, every day, under conditions of potential monotony.

Personal hygiene, medical self-aid, and sanitation are extremely important. Observation posts and checkpoints may be far removed from medical facilities, and widespread illness could cause the unit to fail in its mission. Human waste must be disposed of each day, and individuals have to keep themselves scrupulously clean to avoid disease, particularly of the gastrointestinal type.

A standing operating procedure (SOP) for a peacekeeping operation is a necessity. It must include, at least, reporting formats and procedures, rules of engagement, observation and checkpoint routines, and resupply procedures. It may also include vehicular and personnel search procedures, medical considerations and evacuation requests, lists of persons allowed to enter peacekeeping installations, and restrictions on contact with local forces and the populace. This SOP should include pertinent information from any area handbooks that may have been produced by the parent command.

Since the members of a peacekeeping mission are meant to be visible to all concerned, the force will be scrutinized by the local people and by the other contingents. The force must therefore reflect vigilance, readiness, and competence in its duties.

While all infantry battalions train to fight, if peacekeeping troops fight, they have essentially failed in their mission. The challenge, therefore, is to orient troops away from their war-fighting mission and toward a peacekeeping mission. The difficulty lies in developing a training program that capitalizes on individual skills and initiative and at the same time qualifies a soldier to operate in unfamiliar terrain and assume a highly visible mission that includes fighting only as a last resort.

Peacekeepers should work from simplified mission-type orders, because the complex rules of engagement under which they must operate place a great deal of responsibility on the individual.

Training for peacekeeping centers on undertaking diplomacy and mediation, suppressing unlawful assemblies, and acting in response to politically instigated or contrived situations. This is why understanding the customs and mores of a particular area is so important.

In peacekeeping, as in traditional military combat situations, a trained, disciplined, and well-organized unit can mean the difference between success and failure.

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