

main gun sabot rounds will have trouble getting one-shot kills at extended ranges. Here again, we face the historical fact that the greater the engagement range, the greater the likelihood that we'll be shooting at the 60-degree frontal arc of such vehicles.

The shorter employment ranges and the other compensating tactics and techniques mentioned above will allow us to overcome this deficiency without having to wait for the new and better ammunition that is already being fielded.

Finally, it is important to remember that the Soviets have not completely fielded their most modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Most of their equipment, like ours, is fielded over a period of years.

Nevertheless, even our infantry and combined arms leaders who now face those front line Soviet divisions with the most modern equipment can still kill Soviet armor with the weapons they have today. To do so, however, they must have a good understanding of the

capabilities and the limitations of their own weapons and must employ them accordingly.

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Team Eagle

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The time has come to reconsider the current modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for a Bradley infantry fighting vehicle battalion.

The J-edition MTOE has three main deficiencies: First, it creates an awkward and excessively large headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Second, it leaves the Echo Company (the antiarmor company) with reduced resources and few unique missions. Finally, it gives the battalion commander no significant, cohesive force with which to fight the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle.

The solution to all three of these problems lies in restructuring the HHC and the Echo Company by removing both the scout and the mortar platoons from the HHC and attaching them to Echo Company to create a "Team Eagle."

Under the J-edition MTOE, the number of personnel (339) alone can force even the most energetic and capable of HHC commanders to spread himself too thin. Too, the company's structure in itself creates a conflict in missions for

the commander. In a garrison environment, for example, he is involved in daily mission-support activities that are essential in keeping both the battalion headquarters and his company functioning, while in the field he is the commander of the field trains. In both cases, his primary mission is support. With the scout and mortar platoons under his command, however, he is responsible for combat elements as well.

GUIDANCE

Although these platoons are usually led by two of the battalion's more capable senior first lieutenants, both still need guidance in planning and executing their training programs in garrison and in executing their combat mission in the field. Removing the scouts and the mortars from the HHC would not only help reduce its size to a more manageable level, it would allow the HHC commander to concentrate his full attention on his support functions. At the same time, it would place the scout and

mortar platoons in a combat organization whose commander could more properly supervise and guide their activities.

Meanwhile, with the introduction of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (BIFV), the Echo Company's assets were reduced from 20 improved TOW vehicles (ITVs) to 12, with the number of M113s remaining constant at four and the number of soldiers down to 65, a considerable reduction in resources.

The fact that the BIFV is also equipped with the TOW missile system has had a significant effect on the number and the types of missions an Echo Company can reasonably be assigned. For instance, in a movement to contact conducted by a task force equipped with M1 tanks and BIFVs, the Echo Company's ITVs might reduce the force's speed and mobility while no longer offering the unique addition of firepower that they once did.

As a result of the changes in his company's size and mission, the Echo Company commander is now in a position to assume additional responsibilities. Since he is concerned solely with

combat missions, controlling the scouts and the mortars would cause no conflict of priorities. The addition of these elements would bring the Echo Company's strength to approximately that of a rifle company; thus, command and control would not be a problem.

The strongest argument in favor of the creation of a Team Eagle is that it would give the battalion commander a significant, cohesive force with which to fight the reconnaissance battle. To demonstrate the way the current MTOE limits a battalion's ability to fight that battle, we need only look as far as the National Training Center (NTC).

Most units begin their NTC rotations with the scouts as the only element committed and trained for reconnaissance. After its first engagement or two with the opposing force, a unit almost always finds itself losing that battle—the scouts are either spread too thin to be effective or they are destroyed piecemeal. The results of losing this phase of the battle are disastrous.

In an attempt to correct this situation, a battalion will usually begin to place its BIFV or tank platoons forward to work with the scouts. Then, although there are enough forces forward, those forces are generally ineffective. Command and control is poor because, with two and sometimes three platoon leaders forward, no one is in overall command of the elements. The best a battalion usually achieves is to place the scout platoon leader in charge, under the direction of the S-2. Even in this situation the platoons are still dependent logistically on their separate company teams, and with the exception of the scouts, they probably have been instructed to retain as much combat power as possible.

Conflicting priorities are a natural product of this situation. A common example might run as follows: Team Tank is given the mission of defending BP 23. Within a few hours, an additional tasking comes down to provide a tank platoon to work forward with the scouts. At this point, Team Tank is torn between fighting two battles at once, one defensive and the other counter-reconnaissance. No matter what arrangement is used, under the current MTOE it will be an ad hoc organization

and any success it may achieve will be due more to chance than to design. This would not be the case with a Team Eagle.

A Team Eagle—three ITV platoons, the scout platoon, and the mortar platoon—would give the battalion commander a force both strong enough and cohesive enough to fight and win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle. Obviously, this team has both the numbers and the firepower to accomplish the mission, and the ITVs



and the scout BIFVs would complement each other. The ITVs could cover the high-speed avenues of approach, and the scouts could concentrate on the dismounted or more difficult avenues; or the ITVs could remain static and the scout BIFVs could rove. Also, the mortars could support by fire, enabling the team to engage targets effectively without revealing its location.

No matter which specific technique was used, the entire team, especially the ITVs, would always have to be employed well forward because of the ITV's speed and maneuverability disad-

vantage in relation to both the M1 and the BIFV. This applies equally to offensive and defensive missions.

An example of the way this forward deployment in the offense might work would be as follows: The scouts would provide the covering force. The ITVs, mortars, and perhaps a tank platoon would form the advance guard. The BIFVs, with their speed and maneuverability, could move forward in bounding overwatch, while the ITVs continued to move in traveling overwatch. This would compensate for the difference in speed between the two types of vehicle.

The scouts would identify enemy positions either by visual observation or by coming under fire, at which point they would "hand off" targets to the ITVs. The ITVs and tanks, supported by the mortars, would suppress and fix the enemy positions through long-range fires. The scouts would continue to probe to the flanks. At this point, the battalion commander would have received firm reports of the enemy positions, would have fixed them with long-range fires and, most important, would have accomplished this without having his primary maneuver units decisively engaged. He would have retained his freedom to maneuver and to mass combat power at a point of his own choosing.

In summary, the Team Eagle concept offers many benefits. Command and control would be vastly improved. The entire reconnaissance effort would be under the control of a single element commander. And all the elements involved would receive their support and guidance from the same source, thus eliminating conflicting priorities.

This would be a tremendous improvement over the existing system, which frequently reduces the scouts and mortars to scavengers searching the battlefield for Class I, III, and V supplies. But the most significant benefit would be a company-sized element that was trained as a unit to fight the reconnaissance battle and to handle the advance guard mission as well.

It must be emphasized that Team Eagle would not be just a reincarnation of the old combat support company.

That company was primarily a garrison organization; once its battalion deployed to the field, the various elements were parcelled out and rarely, if ever, worked as a team. Team Eagle would be just that—a team—and the Echo Company commander would have control of all these elements both in garrison and in the field.

The current J-edition MTOE creates an imbalance in resources and deprives a battalion commander of an effective

reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance force. The present HHC commander is overextended, while the Echo Company commander is underutilized. The creation of a Team Eagle would be an effective solution to these problems. It would concentrate combat power instead of dispersing it; it would establish a clear chain of command; and it would give the battalion commander a dedicated commander for his reconnaissance effort.

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The Case for A Unit Historian

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Esprit de corps, the pride a soldier feels for his unit, is not something that magically exists in one unit and not in another. It is developed in the minds of soldiers through a sense of their unit's history and traditions. Soldiers who have a strong sense of their unit's past and present develop a pride in and a sense of belonging to the organization. Because that spirit is a combat multiplier, it deserves the attention of all professional soldiers who seek to improve the combat readiness of their units. One method of improving a unit's esprit is to appoint a unit historian, preferably a junior lieutenant in the battalion who is genuinely interested in the unit's history and who is willing to devote some time and energy to developing a sense of esprit in his fellow soldiers.

Unfortunately, the role of unit historian has usually been given to the battalion adjutant. Since this is an additional duty, though, the S-1 generally pays little attention to it unless he happens to be particularly interested in the unit's past. Another problem is that an adju-

tant rarely serves more than 12 to 18 months in that position, which causes a high turnover rate in unit historians. A junior lieutenant generally stays in a battalion for three or four years, so his appointment as the unit historian affords greater stability for that position. It also allows the lieutenant's senior rater—the battalion commander—to evaluate his ability to write, organize, and work independently.

TOOLS

A unit historian has many tools that he can use to develop an effective history project. For example, the U.S. Army Regimental System (USARS), as outlined in AR 600-82, was created specifically to foster esprit in today's Army. The system not only gives all soldiers an opportunity to select a regimental affiliation that is meaningful to them but allows units to maintain ties with the past and develop a historical awareness in its soldiers.

A portion of the Regimental System

concerns the designation of Distinguished Members of the Regiment, as well as an Honorary Colonel of the Regiment and an Honorary Sergeant Major of the Regiment. These individuals—former members of the regiment who have contributed greatly to its history and traditions—can help a unit learn about its past through their personal involvement with the present organization. The distinguished member program adds considerably to a unit's efforts to develop esprit.

The unit historian should gather as much information as possible about his organization. An excellent place to begin is the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The research librarians there are most helpful and can provide a great deal of information.

An advertisement in the locator file section of *Army Times* requesting information about the unit can yield a wealth of information; even one response from a former member of the unit can unlock many other doors as well.

If a wartime unit association exists,