

INFANTRY LETTERS



AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

EDITOR'S NOTE: We recently received the following letter from the Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery School. We are grateful to all of our senior officers who take the time to share their thoughts on subjects that are important to the Infantry community.

I recently finished reading the September-October 1989 issue of *INFANTRY* and found it outstanding. I read with particular interest Captain Michael I. Parietti's article, "Organic Air Defense for a Light Infantry Company" (pages 38-40). As Chief of Air Defense Artillery, I applaud his concern and effort to improve the air defense of the maneuver forces. I must take exception, however, to the notion that the air defense of light infantry forces could be improved simply by providing Stinger missiles to Dragon gunners.

The Air Defense Artillery community

has studied for many years the use of nondedicated gunners for the man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). Each of these studies has shown that effective MANPADS gunnery is achieved only through the use of trained, dedicated gunners.

A review of four key issues will highlight the severe limitations of Captain Parietti's proposed solutions:

Training. Studies comparing dedicated and nondedicated MANPADS gunners have shown that MANPADS gunnery is a skill that requires intensive training on a continuing basis. The studies have consistently shown that two critical MANPADS skills—aircraft recognition and range estimation—are highly perishable. As the accompanying chart indicates, nondedicated gunners trained only in the mechanical techniques of firing the system have a high probability of not launching, of firing at targets that are out of range, or of engaging friendly aircraft. The result is extremely ineffective air defense coverage.

Employment. The effective employment of Stinger requires the deliberate deployment of the weapon on the battlefield to support the commander's intent. An intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and an Air IPB in particular, is critical. Unfortunately, the suggested solutions, like most nondedicated gunner solutions, leave the employment of the missile to chance. The results are poor battle positions and the destruction of the protected force before the missile is launched.

Command and Control. Due to limited engagement windows, MANPADS gunners are highly dependent upon early warning, cueing, and IFF (identification, friend or foe) to ensure successful engagements. Without these, a nondedicated gunner is limited to a self-defense role, engaging only after he is fired upon. This lowers the probability of kill considerably because of short reaction times. In many cases, this will result in missed targets or a gunner's failing to fire.

Combat Experience. The Mujahi-

Historical Gunner Effectiveness

Skills	Non-Dedicated Gunners	Dedicated Gunners Redeye / Stinger	Difference
Proper Range Ring use during engagement	32%	87%	Dedicated gunner 2.7 times more proficient
MTS engagement drill using same target sets (Volume of Fire)	45% fail to launch 25% one launch 30% two launches	13% fail to launch 29% one launch 58% two launches	Dedicated gunner launches 3.5 times more often fires 2 rounds twice as often
Visual Aircraft recognition (VACR)	61%	86%	Dedicated gunner recognizes target 1.5 times more often

deen's use of Stinger in Afghanistan proved the value of dedicated Stinger gunners. The Mujahideen obtained a 79 percent kill rate by using dedicated gunners deployed to best support the commander's intent. The gunners were selected on the basis of intelligence, literacy, and initiative. Emphasis was placed on tracking techniques, range estimation, and correct firing aspects. Since all the aircraft in the area were hostile, the Mujahideen's command and control problems were greatly reduced and fratricide was not a problem. (See "Stinger in Afghanistan," by Major William McManaway, *AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY*, January-February 1990, pages 3-8.)

Throughout history, successful mission accomplishment has come about through the use of trained soldiers who were skilled in their craft, led by competent leaders, and deployed at the right time and in the right place. Any compromise of this proven recipe for success must be deemed unacceptable. The proliferation of Air Defense Artillery weapons in the hands of untrained gunners is likewise unacceptable.

DONALD M. LIONETTI
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Air Defense Artillery
Fort Bliss, Texas

ARGUMENT CONTINUES

I am a prior-service noncommissioned officer who earned the Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) while serving in the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. A few years later I left the Active Army to attend ROTC and serve in the Nebraska National Guard. I was assigned to that state's long range surveillance detachment and from that position served as a module NCO in charge of the Guard's fall 1989 EIB testing. I therefore feel qualified to comment on Platoon Sergeant Marshall K. Maddox's perception of today's EIB (*INFANTRY*, March-April 1990, page 4).

Sergeant Maddox says in his letter that "since the standards are the same as those required for the average infantryman"

we should take the "Expert" out of the EIB title. I reread the prerequisites for the EIB that Major General Michael Spigelmire included in his Commandant's Note on the same subject in the September-October 1989 issue (pages 1-2), but came away with some different interpretations from Sergeant Maddox's. For example, those prerequisites include qualifying as an expert marksman, and this is not an "average" task, particularly on the new computerized ranges.

Although it was not mentioned in the Note, a soldier must attain a score of at least 70 percent in each category of the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). In reference to standards, this is also much more difficult to attain than it was a few years ago.

Another thing I noted was that the first-time-pass rate in 1989 was 20 percent. In 1989, 50 highly motivated volunteers tested for the EIB in Nebraska, and four earned the badge (one second lieutenant and three NCOs) for a total of 8 percent, not exactly a give-away.

Sergeant Maddox also seems to associate prestige with limited numbers. He seems to feel that if we ration the EIB it will be more prestigious. Many times in the Ranger battalion, we had more people who had earned the Ranger tab than the EIB. Both were still prestigious—both were earned by deserving volunteers.

The sergeant also attacks the practice of scheduling training for EIB testing. I feel that commanders and all leaders should be commended, not berated, for placing emphasis on this training. If a soldier learns a task through repetition, I am thankful we had the time for him to do it, because no matter how he learned it, one day it may save his life or the lives of other platoon members.

Soldiers do have to use "self-motivation" and their "own personal time" to train for EIB testing. But I would like to point out that a CMF 11 soldier in a line unit regularly works 12 to 14 hours a day, and he may work or be deployed 150 to 300 days a year. He has far less "personal time" than a CMF 11 Active Guard Reserve soldier who may have a headquarters job. So "personal time" is relative. Commanders who don't allow their

soldiers to train for the EIB are not increasing the prestige of the badge; they are actually doing a disservice to the soldiers and the Army.

As a regular Army officer and a future platoon leader, I look forward to leading men who have earned the EIB and also those who have competed unsuccessfully for the badge but are willing to compete again. Then I'll know I have a platoon of highly motivated volunteers, an element of experts who know the standard of excellence and can be expected to maintain it.

WILLIAM B. OSTLUND
2LT, Infantry
Fort Benning, Georgia

OLD SOLDIERS' ARGUMENT

The prestige of the Expert Infantryman Badge is not in decline, as Sergeant Maddox states in his letter in the March-April 1990 issue of *INFANTRY*. If a few old soldiers think that too many young soldiers are earning the badge, then they need to look at the soldiers, not criticize the test. Yes, there are more soldiers wearing EIBs, not because the test is too easy but because the infantry soldiers are so much better.

I earned my EIB as a young private in 1974. The test was tough and the standards were high. Since then, I have trained and tested hundreds of EIB candidates while serving as a squad leader, platoon sergeant, platoon leader, and company commander. First-hand observation of 16 years of EIB tests has clearly proved to me that the test is not getting any easier. In fact, as the duties of the infantryman have become more complex, the test has become more demanding.

And as for Sergeant Maddox's comment that the standards are the same as those for the average infantryman, my only question for him is: When was the last time you scored 100 percent on your SQT?

U.S. Army Infantry Center Pamphlet 350-6, The Expert Infantryman Badge Test, states that one of the purposes of the EIB is to "enhance individual training programs in infantry units by provid-

ing a difficult, yet attainable, goal for which infantrymen can strive." So when I schedule training for the EIB, I set aside time to concentrate on tasks and, through repetition, to improve the training of all my soldiers.

Self-motivation plays an important role, and it is not diminished a bit by my scheduled training and practice sessions. When an individual soldier comes to the test station or steps off on the road march, it is up to him. He has to provide the motivation to successfully complete the event. Hopefully, my training program has taught him how to do the task and has instilled in him the confidence to know that he can do it.

That is what training is all about. Go to an EIB test site and look at the faces of the candidates after they have passed the first three or four stations. Their confidence shows, and it continues to grow as they continue from station to station. That is the true benefit of the test.

Today's infantryman is smarter, better educated, and more sophisticated than his predecessors who went through advanced individual training with me at Fort Polk in 1974. He is more capable and much easier to train.

It seems almost mandatory for old soldiers to tell the "youngsters" that in the old days the tests were harder, the schools were tougher, and men were really men when they had to shoot a "real" rifle. But how many of these old soldiers went through the last really tough airborne, Ranger, or basic training class?

The truth is that the schools, the tests, and the infantry are not getting softer and easier. They are better than ever. If the EIB, or the infantry, is losing its prestige, it's because the old infantrymen who are still living in the brown boot Army keep telling everyone who will listen how tough things were in the bad old days.

JOHN M. CHENOWETH
CPT, Infantry
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

GUNNERY MYTH

Major Michael R. Jacobson's article "Antiarmor: What You Don't Know

Could Kill You" (INFANTRY, March-April 1990, pages 37-40), made some salient points concerning antiarmor warfare. Unfortunately, he has perpetuated the myth that highly trained Dragon gunners will proportionately increase gunnery scores, and he cites Marine Dragon gunner/leader training as proof.

While it is true that Marine gunners average a higher probability of hit (PH) with the Dragon than do Army gunners, Missile Command data suggests that the difference is around 10 percent—hardly "significant." Furthermore, the Marine gunner's course devotes about the same number of hours to the Dragon as the Infantry School course does. The difference in hours is due to instruction on other antitank weapons (AT-4, LAW, and field expedients). The Marines train AT specialists, not just Dragon gunners.

Although Marine gunners are stabilized (more so than Army gunners) and



receive more live rounds during the course of a career, the fact that the difference in overall live fire results are not significant suggests that increased training and gunner stability will not significantly improve gunnery scores.

More important, live fires for both the Marine Corps and the Army are usually achieved in a sterile training environment. Targets are stationary; gunners are relaxed and under little or no stress; visibility is not limited; the best gunners usually fire the missile; and live fires are preceded by an intensive train-up. This calls into question the validity of any live fire statistics, regardless of service. Any unit that boasts high Dragon PH statistics should carefully examine the conditions under which they were obtained.

I agree that gunners should be stabilized. Unfortunately, though, the Army additional skill identifier (ASI) management system precludes successful person-

nel management by most units. It is telling that the Infantry School produces approximately 2,000 gunners a year but only a relatively small percentage of them ever reach TOE Dragon positions.

If you agree, however, that the medium AT gunner requires specialized training because of his importance on the battlefield, then he should be awarded a separate MOS (like the 0351 Marine gunner), or the specialty should be rolled into the 11H (TOW) series. In this case the need to stabilize gunners and provide specialized training is a result of the Dragon's design characteristics, and an inordinate amount of time is required to sustain only minimum levels of proficiency.

I agree that more emphasis on unit Dragon training is required, not because this training will increase live fire hits but because it will show gunners that they are more likely to miss the target. Having gunners who are more educated and who carefully select their targets will result in fewer dead gunners. The bottom line is that training and personnel management cannot compensate for a poorly designed weapon.

DEE C. CHRISTENSEN
MAJ, Infantry
Puyallup, Washington

CINCINNATI ROTC ALUMNI

The Army ROTC Department at the University of Cincinnati is establishing an Alumni Association. The association will seek to support the corps of cadets through affiliation with previous members and recognition of their deeds and accomplishments.

Alumni of the University's Army ROTC program are invited to send their names, addresses, and telephone numbers to Army ROTC, ML-44, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0044 or call Cadet Captain Terrence Brandt or me at 513-556-3660.

DANIEL D. GRAFF
CPT, Field Artillery
Cincinnati, Ohio

ARMORED FORCES MONUMENT

An impressive monument is being planned that will honor the "citizen-soldiers" and the "citizen-Marines" who have served in armored forces since World War I.

The Armored Forces Monument will consist of a three-foot wall around a 30-by-40-foot black granite engraving that depicts the evolution of armored forces from the U.S. cavalryman through World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It is scheduled to be dedicated on Veterans Day, 11 November 1990.

It will be adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery's new visitors center on Memorial Drive where some four million visitors will see it each year.

The memorial is being financed through donations, not public funds, as a gift from veterans to the American people in the spirit of "Their Valor is Your Heritage."

Veterans and friends of the U.S. Army's armored forces who are interested in contributing to the memorial may write to the Armored Forces Monument Committee, P.O. Box 1146, Fort Myer, VA 22211.

JAMES H. LEACH
COL, U.S. Army, Retired
Beaufort, South Carolina

RANGER ORIENTATION

I read with great interest the article "Ranger Orientation Program" (by Captain Charles T. Sniffin and Sergeant First Class Mallory L. Sump, INFANTRY, March-April 1990, pages 42-45). I would like to offer a suggestion for those who want to implement the program at their schools or units:

At the point when the company operations order (OPORD) is given to the assembled patrols, no chain of command should be announced. Let the members of each patrol plan out their mission as a group and prepare to backbrief the commander. The backbrief should be informal with no "props," only a blank map and a chart of the OPORD format on the wall.

Here's the key point: No notes. Each student who is involved in the planning must know the complete plan by memory—ingress route, egress route, the patrol's objective rally point (ORP).

Give each patrol enough time as a group to make up a plan and to get all the details down cold as individuals. Then have the briefback. Start off with whoever the commander selects and go right down the format. At any time, the commander may say, "Thank you, Cadet Jones; you pick up from here, Cadet Smith." This will ensure that all the patrol members have a complete interlocking, mutually supporting understanding of the plan.

I know this method will work. We used it for our mission planning in the 10th Special Forces Command Area Study and Mission Analysis Program (CASMAP). I ran the program for two years, and I put our A teams through on their missions using this method. My guess is that with all the profound changes in the world, the missions have probably changed, but the method still applies.

My thanks to Captain Sniffin and Sergeant Sump. I wish I had had this kind of article to prepare me for Special Forces School.

WILLIAM M. SHAW II
MAJ, Military Intelligence
Hollis, New Hampshire

47th INFANTRY REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION

The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment—all that remains of the regiment on active service—has established the 47th Infantry "Raider" Regimental Association to preserve the traditions and honors of the regiment. The association is made up of former and present members of the regiment and anyone who would like to support its preservation.

Further, in 1989, the 47th Infantry Regimental Hall of Honor was established at the 3d Battalion's headquarters at Fort Lewis, Washington. Currently, the hall contains regimental memorabilia dating back to World War I, along with the names and accomplishments of sev-

eral distinguished members of the regiment. All of the items in the hall were donated or placed on loan by former members of the regiment.

The battalion is seeking additional memorabilia to display and also accounts of battles to continue to flesh out our history. Anyone who would like to join the association or who has memorabilia to donate or lend to the association may obtain further information from Commander, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. ATTN: Regimental Adjutant, Fort Lewis, WA 98433-6540.

EDWARD E. THURMAN
LTC, Infantry
Fort Lewis, Washington

SHAEF AND ETOUSA REUNION

The Veterans Association of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) of World War II will hold its sixth annual reunion in Abilene, Kansas, 13-14 October 1990.

The reunion will coincide with the national observance of the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Anyone who needs additional information may write to me at 2230 South Overlook Road, Cleveland Heights, OH 44106; telephone (216) 721-0921.

WILLIAM LAHMAN
Vice Commander

